Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology

Volume 5

Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy and Psychology deals with theoretical pragmatics and pragmatics from a philosophical point of view. The connection between philosophy and pragmatics is double. On the one hand, philosophy contributes to creating a framework to be called the 'pragmatics of language' capable of dealing with interpretation phenomena that complement purely semantic processes; on the other hand, pragmatics is capable of coping with major philosophical problems, e.g. skepticism and Gettier's problem. All volumes in the collection reserve a central place for the philosophical ideas in pragmatics, such as contributions to epistemology in which pragmatics plays a key role. The collection: Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy and Psychology publishes: – pragmatics applied to philosophical problems and in the area of pragmalinguistics – pragmatics applied to the understanding of propositional attitudes, including knowledge, belief, in dissolving paradoxes and puzzles relating to epistemology. – pragmatics applied to psychology, especially on the topic of intentions and mind-reading – philosophical treatments of dialogue analysis The collection is not interested in proposals on conversation analysis or discourse analysis, unless a connection with philosophical issues is made obvious.

Alessandro Capone • Ferenc Kiefer
Franco Lo Piparo

Editors

Indirect Reports and Pragmatics

Interdisciplinary Studies

 Springer

Editors
Alessandro Capone
Department of Linguistics, Faculty
  of Cognitive Sciences
University of Messina
Messina, Italy

Ferenc Kiefer
Department of Linguistics Department
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Research
  Institute for Linguistics
Budapest, Hungary

Franco Lo Piparo
Department of Philosophy
University of Palermo
Palermo, Italy

*This book is dedicated by Alessandro Capone
to his unforgettable teachers Yan Huang
and the late James Higginbotham*

Acknowledgments

Contents

Contributors

Keith Allan School of Languages, Cultures and Linguistics, Department of Linguistics, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

The University of Queensland, St. Lucia, QLD, Australia

Luvell Anderson Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN, USA

Alessandro Capone Department of Linguistics, Faculty of Cognitive Sciences, University of Messina, Messina, Italy

Eros Corazza Department of Philosophy, ILCLI, The University of the Basque Country UPV-EHU, Donostia, Spain

IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao, Spain

Philosophy & Cognitive Sciences, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada

Samuel Cumming Department of Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA

Louise Cummings School of Arts and Humanities, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, UK

Wayne A. Davis Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA

Ferenc Kiefer Department of Linguistics Department, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Research Institute for Linguistics, Budapest, Hungary

Manuel García-Carpintero Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain

Alessandra Giorgi Department of Linguistics and Comparative Cultural Studies, Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Venice, Italy

Eleni Gregoromichelaki Department of Philosophy, King's College London, London, UK

Javier Gutiérrez-Rexach Department of Linguistics, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

Janet Holmes School of Linguistics and Applied Language Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand

Elisabeth Holt School of Music, Humanities and Media, University of Huddersfield, Queensgate, Huddersfield, UK

Kasia M. Jaszczolt Department of Theoretical and Applied Linguistics, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, England, UK

Istvan Kecskes Department of Linguistics, State University of New York at Albany, Albany, NY, USA

Ruth Kempson Department of Philosophy, King's College London, London, UK

András Kertész MTA-DE Research Group for Theoretical Linguistics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and University of Debrecen, Institute of German Studies, Debrecen, Hungary

Alan Reed Libert Department of Linguistics, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, Australia

Fabrizio Macagno ArgLab, IFILNOVA, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal

Meredith Marra School of Linguistics and Applied Language Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand

Neal R. Norrick Department of English, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

Franco Lo Piparo Department of Philosophy, University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy

Csilla Rákosi MTA-DE Research Group for Theoretical Linguistics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Debrecen, Hungary

Raphael Salkie School of Humanities, University of Brighton, Brighton, England, UK

Michel Seymour Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, Montreal, QC, Canada

Yael Sharvit Departments of Philosophy and Linguistics, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA

Howard Wettstein Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, CA, USA

Eric Whittle School of Communication, Independent Research: Language & Sociology, Formally Murdoch University, Murdoch, WA, Australia

Nellie Wieland Department of Philosophy, California State University, Long Beach, CA, USA

Jock Wong Centre for English Language Communication, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore

Introduction

Alessandro Capone, Ferenc Kiefer, and Franco Lo Piparo

The issue of indirect reports is of considerable theoretical interest, for various reasons. It is of interest to linguists and socio-linguists because its sheds light on linguistic social praxis; it is also of interest to philosophers, because clearly the issue of belief reports and the issue of reports of 'de se' attitudes can be embedded in the issue of indirect reports (see the papers by Capone, Jaszcolt and Cumming & Sharvit in this book). Since philosophy deals (among other things) with the transmission of knowledge, the chapter on indirect reports is clearly one which has to do with the transmission of knowledge (mediated by what another, possibly reliable person, said) and, therefore, has a philosophical core (the issue of opacity being of utmost interest to philosophers).

This book is interdisciplinary: it includes sociolinguists, conversation analysts, formal linguists and also philosophers of language. We are persuaded that interdisciplinarity is a strong point of this book and of research in general – just to remind readers of the genial scholars who applied interdisciplinarity (in linguistics and sociology), we have Chomsky and Goffman (among others). We have also decided – in order to press the interdisciplinary character of this research project – to allow the two sections of the book (The social praxis of indirect reports and indirect reports in the philosophy of language) to interact through a number of connected points.

A. Capone (✉)
Department of Linguistics, Faculty of Cognitive Sciences, University of Messina, Messina, Italy
e-mail: Alessandro.caponis@gmail.com

F. Kiefer
Department of Linguistics Department, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Research Institute for Linguistics, Budapest, Hungary
e-mail: kiefer@nytud.hu

F.L. Piparo
Department of Philosophy, University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy

Reporting a speech event (an utterance by a speaker, normally) is always a complicated task – we are tempted to say a 'polyphonic task' as the voices of the original speaker and the reporter interconnect opening the possibility that one voice comments on the other. The Hearer's task is therefore quite difficult, as s/he has to separate the two voices and know which portion of the text belongs to one voice or to the other. It is highly possible that pragmatics intervenes in securing an interpretation of indirect reports and in separating roles in this complex and intriguing language game in which voices are superimposed almost inextricably. An indirect report (according to Capone 2012) is essentially a 'language game'. In that paper Capone stressed polyphony as the essential characteristic of the game. Here, taking up those concepts, we want to emphasize that indirect reports have a dialogic structure (to put things in the words used by Weigand (2015), who is persuaded that language essentially has a dialogic format). Minimally they imply a dialogue between the original speaker and the reporter, but also between the reporter and the Hearer of the report. The reporter, qua Hearer, of course, had an advantage, because he is perceptually conscious of the context (and the physical surroundings) in which the interaction took place and which guided the interpretation of the utterances allowing the hearer to assign referents to pronominals (for example). The Hearer of the indirect report (to be distinguished from the reporter) clearly has a disadvantage, as s/he is not able to have access to the original context of the reported utterance. Thus, NPs have to be prepared for fruition by the Hearer of the report and they must be packaged in such a way that the Hearer of the report need not search for the original context in order to have access to the referents of the NPs used. Reports, in other words, to use an innocent metaphor, look like pre-packaged goods: they require transformations that will facilitate or allow fruition by the Hearer.

In this book there is a lot of emphasis on transformations and on issues such as opacity and transparency. This is more or less the philosophical story on indirect reports. However, in this book there is also a lot of emphasis on indirect reporting as a social practice, that involves constraints on what can be done, on what transformations can be tolerated, and on what contexts must be like to facilitate this social practice (or social practices?).

An interesting point of departure for the book would probably have to be the (rather complicated) relationship between direct and indirect reports. Although this issue was made thematic in one of Capone's chapters, most papers discuss or touch on this complicated issue. Some new data are offered in this book, starting from Davis' chapter, which we predict will be very influential in the years to come.

Indirect reports are, indirectly, a way of gaining knowledge through an intermediary (an intermediary knower). If we trust what the reporter said, then we can utilize what the original speaker said and if we trust the original speaker (or believe him trustworthy), we can use that piece of information for the purpose of action (in order to act or to prevent ourselves from acting, in case knowledge makes negative predictions on the consequences of our actions). However, important and useful though an utterance by an original speaker might be, there may be barriers to the fruition of that knowledge by the hearer of the indirect report. If the utterance is reported by using NPs with whom the hearer is not familiar, there is the risk that the

hearer will not acquire information but misinformation. Hence the indirect report is a laboratory where information is transformed, making use of whatever information the reporter has about the Hearer. (The indirect report seems to be highly influenced by what the speaker knows about the hearer and seems to connect with whatever files (of knowledge) relate to the hearer). Such transformations have to take into account what the Hearer knows and what she does not know. The reporter has to go beyond egocentricity but must project herself into the shoes of the Hearer, using bits of information coming from previous interactions with the Hearer. Thus if she knows that a certain NP would not convey any information to the Hearer, she would have to change the NP and use a co-referential NP such that it would aid the Hearer have access to the referent. However, there are surely limits to such transformations (Capone 2010a, b), as the original speaker will applaud innocent transformations but not transformations whose ultimate purpose is to put the original speaker in a bad light. (In other words transformations will be tolerated and welcome provided that they do not transform the original speaker's words into a different (more menacing) speech act)).

The testing-bed for a theory of indirect reporting will surely be a theory of non-serious speech (or speech acts) – there is surely the expectation that indirect reports should report the speaker's intentions (albeit not all intentions, but only those that are congruent with the social path of intentionality (that is to say intentions that are licitly conveyed through the speech act in that they are promoted by social intentionality)) and NOT merely the locutionary act. In some contexts, reporting the locutionary act may be (highly and deliberately) misleading, because one gives the impression that a literal intention was transmitted by an utterance, when, instead, the utterance was animated by (and exploited cues and clues to project) a non-literal intention. It may be of considerable use to examine the social practice of indirect reports with reference to a number of contexts, as there are contexts where literal meanings are promoted and contexts, where instead, given the deliberate dissemination of cues and clues, a non-literal interpretation is promoted (thus, it would be snide to report a literal interpretation when this, in fact, was only one step in the direction of a non-literal interpretation). We probably need a Principle of Prudence, inhibiting non-serious speech in contexts where it is possible that the speaker will be reported verbatim despite many indications to the contrary. This will surely be a chapter of societal linguistics, a la Mey (2001). We cannot be more detailed in this Introduction, apart from saying that one direction to explore is the social path of interpretation and, in particular, socio-pragmatics. A number of papers in this volume go into this direction, even if further progress is needed.

Indirect reporting, according to Wieland (2016), involves the following abilities:

An ability to understand and represent the locutionary content of the speech being reported;

An ability to understand and represent the illocutionary content of the speech being reported;

An ability to represent the way in which the original utterance was produced.

An ability to have a theory of mind for both the speaker being reported and for their
    audience;

An ability to organize the above functions in a kind of narrative structure.

We certainly think that Wieland's description of these abilities is a good way of
summing up the content of this book at the general level, although we need to add
that indirect reporting is essentially a polyphonic game and we cannot understand
it well, unless we concentrate on how different voices can co-exist in the same
utterance and interpenetrate one another. Sometimes the relationship between voices
is one of commentary, one of judgment, one of distancing or, on the contrary,
complicity. Thus, to sum things up, indirect reports are complex actions.

One of the linguistic phenomena closely related to indirect speech is what has
been called Quotative Inversion. Quotative Inversion occurs in English when a
quote, i.e. a passage of reported direct speech, immediately precedes or encloses
a reporting clause and it affects the order of subject and main verb within the
reporting clause. Pragmatic accounts of Quotative Inversion are often grounded
in particular assumptions about the narrative force of such constructions. Clearly,
they have also to do with topic and focus hence with information structure. They
are also related to foregrounding and back grounding, i.e. to fundamental discourse
organizing principles.

Quotative Inversion may bring to the fore the differences, if any, between the
reporting clause in sentence-initial position and sentence-final position (Kiefer
2016). Though any manner of speaking verb can be used to introduce a report,
the choice of verbs is not arbitrary. In sentence-final position verbs can be used
as reporting verbs which are not lexically (semantically) manner of speaking verbs
but which acquire such an interpretation via pragmatically conditioned metaphorical
transfer. This transfer may be considered to be an extension of what Recanati calls
pragmatic modulation (Recanati 2010).

Before closing this introduction, we would like to express a regret. Despite the
fact that many of the contributors come from different nationalities, this is clearly
not a book on cross-linguistic analysis of indirect reports. It would be nice if, in
a second volume, we could advance towards a cross-linguistic and cross-cultural
analysis of indirect reports. Such a book would offer further materials allowing us
to systematize our societal considerations by putting them to the test and modifying
them, if needed.

Nevertheless, we hope that this book will allow the authors to interact and use the
information which has been made available to them while the book was in progress.
We assume that some interaction has already occurred, because we made all the
papers available to the authors (of this volume) as soon they were written. This
looked like a genuinely cooperative process. We hope to see the results of this
collaborative project in the future and we hope that a new book will come out of
this – possibly with some other authors. Our research looks like infinite process
and at present we are only able to see the tip of the iceberg. We should not be
discouraged, nevertheless.

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Part I
The (Social) Praxis of Indirect Reports

Indirect Reporting in Bilingual Language Production

Istvan Kecskes

1 Introduction

Indirect reporting has been one of the most discussed topics in the linguistic-philosophical pragmatics line of research. Both linguists and philosophers have been analyzing the logical and inferential structure of indirect reports, the relation between the original utterance and the report, felicity conditions of indirect reports, the role of semantic and pragmatic factors in shaping and interpreting indirect reports and similar issues based on examples and data created by the researchers usually in the English language, heavily relying on thought experiments and introspective data to make their points (e.g. Capone 2010; Cappelen and Lepore 2004; Davidson 1968; Wieland 2010). This is necessary for them to explore and understand the underlying processes of this complex phenomenon.

Indirect reporting just like any other processes in language use is based on conventions of language and conventions of usage (e.g. Morgan 1978; Searle 1979). Its logical and inferential structure can be investigated and analyzed because speakers who use indirect reporting basically rely on the same or similar speech conventions within the English language. *But what will happen if the language users are not native speakers of English and they cannot rely on those language conventions and usage conventions?* How will people go about formulating indirect reports and interpreting them when they can't count on, or have limited access to those commonalities, conventions, standards and norms and in a sense, they are expected to create, co-construct them in the communicative process or their mindset is influenced by the conventions of two languages? This is the question that this paper intends to explore. In order to do so it will follow a path that differs from what

I. Kecskes (✉)
Department of Linguistics, State University of New York at Albany, Albany, NY, USA
e-mail: istvan.kecskes@gmail.com

is common in the relevant literature about indirect reports. The difference is mainly in three things. First, the study analyzes natural language use by speakers who can speak more than one language. Second, it is argued that emergent situational salience plays a decisive role in what speakers actually report from the original message, and how they shape the reported message. Third, instead of relying on introspective data and data resulting from thought experiments as indirect report studies have been doing this paper uses production data generated by bilingual subjects. This looks like a necessary step because recently several researchers have questioned the reliability of data heavily dependent on the linguist's own linguistic intuition (e.g. Dąbrowska 2010; Kertész and Rákosi 2012). Besides, research on indirect reporting has focused mainly on the English language, more specifically, language hypothetically produced by native speakers of English.

The dataset used in this paper consists of indirect reports produced by bilinguals whose L1 is English (9 subjects) and whose L1 is not English (12 subjects) but another language (Cantonese, Korean, Mandarin Chinese, Russian, Kurdish, Tibetian and Japanese). All subjects are bilinguals but there are major differences between their bilingualism. The English Native Speaker group has English as their L1 and their second language is Spanish (6), Italian (2) and German (1). Although they had a minimum of 4 years in their L2 their bilingualism is heavily dominated by their L1 and their language processing is very similar to that of native speakers. The Non-Native Speaker group represents a more balanced bilingualism because each subject has studied English for at least 8 years, spent a minimum of 1 year in the US and used both languages regularly. These facts will be very important when we compare their language production.

2   Understanding Indirect Reporting

Before discussing the research questions and methodology I need to clarify how indirect reporting is understood in this paper. I will not review the literature in details but focus only on those issues that have immediate relevance to the content of this paper and nature of data.

What do we do when we use indirect reports?

Through indirect reporting we usually share information with another party about what someone else has said. We can do this in two ways. We preserve the integrity of the original message by formally marking the boundaries between the main message and the embedded reported message, or we eliminate the boundaries by focusing on the information content and constructing our report the way we find it appropriate taking into account *one, some or none* of the following factors: actual situational context, illocutionary force of original message, evaluative load of original message and reportee/s. In indirect speech, the structure and content of the reported clause also depends on whether the speaker is reporting a statement, a question, request or a command. An indirect report regularly presents a less detailed summary of what was said.

This paper supports the view that indirect reports always have to report the minimal propositional content of the original utterance (see Cappelen and Lepore 2004; Borg 2004; Wieland, chapter "Reporting practices and reported entities", this volume). It does not matter what the communicative goals of the reporter are, and how much s/he takes into account the conditions described above, the indirect utterance can be considered a felicitous report only if minimal propositional content is preserved in the reporting.

Looking at indirect reporting as an ability, the act of reporting the speech of others comprises the interplay of cognitive, linguistic and pragmatic factors (see Cummings 2015). Depending on the way and form of reporting used, the speaker is expected to be able to produce utterances which contain embedded clauses, use a variety of lexical devices and employ into national, emphatic and other tools that represent prosodic features of another person's speech. These are, however, only the linguistic resources a speaker is supposed to be able to use. Beyond this, there are a number of complex cognitive and pragmatic skills that underpin indirect reporting. A speaker has to be able to remember what another person said and how it was said. Relying on verbal memory s/he should be capable of recalling not only the explicit content and prosodic features of a linguistic utterance, but also any implied meaning triggered by that utterance. The person who utters 'Bob said to me angrily, "Oh, what a good guy you are!" seems to have captured the sarcastic intent with which Bob produced his utterance. These implied or pragmatic meanings can only be recovered through complicated processes of reasoning that involve, amongst other things, theory of mind skills.

Why do we use indirect reports?

There appear to be two reasons. One of them is cognitive load. If we want to produce a direct report we need to make more cognitive effort than in the case of indirect report because we must recall the original message almost word by word from memory. We can either quote the message word by word (A) or make tense and indexical changes (B) so as to adjust the report to the current context. For instance:

(1)
A. Peter said: "I will go and visit you when I finish my lecture."
B. Peter said that he would visit me when he finished his lecture.
C. Peter told me that he would visit me after finishing his lecture.

Each option requires significant cognitive effort but on a different scale. This issue is especially important in our case where one group of subjects are not native speakers of English (NS) and the other group speaks English as a second language. According to second language acquisition studies indirect reporting is one of the most challenging tasks for second language users (e.g. Barbieri and Eckhardt 2007; McCarthy 1998).

Option A is the most cognitively demanding one because here the reporter recalls the exact words of the speaker. Option B appears to be less cognitively demanding solution because it allows the reporter to make indexical changes to adjust the content to the actual situational context. In option C the reporter adapts the message

to suit his needs. He can change lexical items and sentence structures as he wishes. As far as non-native speakers (NNS) are concerned this is supposed to be the easiest option for them. They are less constrained by semantic and linguistic requirements so they can focus on how to express content. This is where most of the reporter's subjectivity can be detected.

The second reason why indirect reports are used in conversation is preference of the reporter. S/he may not want the audience to know about every detail in the original message, or s/he wishes to avoid some unpleasant details, connotation or expressions used in the original utterance, or simply s/he wants to be less verbose than the original message is. In the case of non-native speakers preference can heavily be affected by proficiency issues as well. For instance, here are some of the variations that our subjects used when reporting A.

(2)
A. Amy: − Don't even think about lying to me.
E1.[1] Amy demanded that you don't lie to her.
E2. Amy said to not even think about lying to her.
xxx
CA. Amy demands the truth.
CH4. Amy said she had already know my tricks.

E1 and E2 are native speakers of English. Both preferred to use indirect reporting with adjusted structures and indexicals. It is interesting that the Cantonese and Mandarin speakers selected to keep the content but change wording significantly. This is a very common thing in the group of NNSs as will be discussed later.

What do current theories say about indirect reports?

Current research seems to agree that indirect reports cannot be analysed properly without consideration of pragmatic factors. Although indirect reports usually have important semantic properties, their formulation is heavily affected by the peculiarities of actual communicative situations that are neither systematic nor generalizable. Cappelen and Lepore (1997:289) summarized this approach the following way:

– Indirect reports are basically pragmatic in nature. Reporters aim to convey information about a particular act in a particular context C to a particular audience situated in a different context C*.
– There is a same say-relation between the original utterance and the indirect report. However, the nature of this relation can be revealed only in part by applying semantic analysis.

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[1]Reporters in the dataset are referred to by capital letters and numbers. Capital letters denote first language of the reporter. If there is more than one speaker of the same L1 numbers are used to refer to them. E stands for English, CA refers to Cantonese, CH to Mandarin Chinese, K means Korean, J stands for Japanese, R means Russian and KU refers to Kurdish.

– Indirect reports share some solid, not necessarily context-sensitive semantic features. However, they also have pragmatic properties that are neither systematic nor generalizable.

Capone (2010) and Wieland (2013) referred to the fact that instead of presupposing a same-say relation between the original utterance and the indirect report we should assume that there existsa pragmatic equivalency relation between them, and this relationship results from some kind of metarepresentation that can be analyzed. Wieland (2013) argued that given the varieties of indirect reports they are not expected to represent the propositional content of the original utterance in its entirety or without alteration. Capone (2010) claimed that pragmatic equivalency can be explained by using Mey's (2001:218) theory of pragmemes which refers to an instantiated pragmatic act.

There is no doubt about the fact that in the case of indirect reports the content of the original message of the speaker can be considered an invariant, and its instantiations of that content in the indirect reports are the possible situational variants. For instance, the following six utterances by a NSs of English from the dataset can all be considered as possible variants of utterance A.

(3) A. Andy: − How are you doing?
E1. Andy wanted to know how we are doing.
E2. Andy is greeting someone.
E3. Andy wants to know how you are doing.
E4. Andy asked how I was doing.
E5. Andy is greeting someone.
E6. Andy wonders how I've been.

This is in line not only with Mey's (2001, 2006) way of thinking about pragmatic acts but also with Geis's view of speech acts, according to which there are broad mappings (or correlations) between sentence types and illocutionary forces (or types of illocutionary force). The appeal to the context serves to determine the specific meaning accruing to the situated use of a literal speech act (Geis 1995). In order to explain those broad correlations Kecskes (2008, 2010, 2013) put forward the dynamic model of meaning (DMM) in which *coresense* represents the invariant pragmatic function or content while *consense*(s) (contextual sense) are the possible instantiations of that invariant. In this approach the minimal propositional content can be considered as coresense while the actual indirect reports are representatives of consenses. For instance (see Kecskes 2010:2894):

Pragmeme: [inviting someone to take a seat]
Practs (pragmatic acts): Why don't you sit down?; Please take a seat; Sit down, please, etc.

The difference between Mey's pragmeme theory and Kecskes' dynamic model of meaning is that while Mey puts the emphasis on the interactional situation and considers semantics as secondary, Kecskes gives equal importance to encoded semantics of utterance and the role of interactional context in which it is used (see

discussion on the issue in Kecskes 2010). Mey says the following about pragmatic acts: "The theory of pragmatic acts does not explain human language use starting from the words uttered by a single, idealized speaker. Instead, it focuses on the interactional situation in which both speakers and hearers realize their aims. The explanatory movement is from the outside in, one could say, rather than from the inside out: instead of starting with what is said, and looking for what the words could mean, the situation where the words fit, is invoked to explain what can be (and is actually being) said (Mey 2006:542)." The problem with this definition is that it emphasizes that the explanatory movement should go from the outside in. Kecskes (2010) argued that the explanatory movement in any pragmatic theory should go in both directions: from the outside in (actual situational context → prior context encoded in utterances used) and from the inside out (prior context encoded inutterances used → actual situational context). This has special importance in the language production and interpretation of non-native speakers whose starting point is usually the compositional (literal) meaning of the utterance rather than the actual situational meaning (e.g. Abel 2003; Bortfeld 2002, 2003; Cieślicka 2004, 2006; Kecskes 2007). Based on those findings we can hypothesize that when reporting someone else's utterance non-native speakers in most cases first analyze the semantic content of the utterance and then will come up with a possible variant for its instantiation in the actual situational context. What exactly the wording is going to be depends on several factors, which will be discussed below.

3   Role of Emergent Situational Salience in Indirect Reporting

In his socio-cognitive approach Kecskes (2010, 2013) argued that while fitting words into actual situational contexts speakers are driven not only by the intent that the hearer recognize what is meant as intended by the speaker (cooperation),[2] but also by speaker individual salience that affects production subconsciously (egocentrism).[3] Both cooperation and egocentrism are part of human rationality. However, the two factors affect the communicative process in a varying degree. The interplay of these social (recipient design) and individual (salience) factors shapes the communicative process and utterance production. The *important role*

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[2]"Cooperation" is used here in the Gricean sense according to which cooperation is part of human rationality.

[3]"Egocentrism" in the SCA refers to attention-bias that is the result of prior experience of individuals. It means that interlocutors activate and bring up the most salient information to the needed attentional level in the construction (by the speaker) and comprehension (by the hearer) of the communication. In this sense there is nothing negative about egocentrism (Kecskes 2010, 2013).

of emergent situational salience in indirect reporting can be demonstrated through those examples in our dataset where reporters did not care much about how precisely they conveyed the content of the original message. Rather they focused on what was most salient for them in that message. In those cases the reporters (both NSs and NNSs) generally used a more condensed way of report focusing on the content of the original message and reporting what they found most salient in it. For instance:

(4)
Molly: − I do not want to tell you what I think about Tom.
E2. Molly has a secret.
E. Molly has no comment about Tom.

CA. Molly does not want to tell her opinion of Tom.
CH5. Molly refused to talk about Tom.

Salience plays a special role in indirect reporting because it appears to be the main driving force in shaping the indirect report. As a semiotic notion, salience refers to the relative importance or prominence of signs. The relative salience of a particular sign when considered in the context of others helps an individual to quickly rank large amounts of information by importance and thus give attention to that which is most important. In psychology, attention represents the process that enables organisms to select, among different sources of information, those that will receive cognitive processing. Information is selected according to its saliency. Thus, salience denotes a feature of an object (both contextual and subjective) whereas attention is a process. In pragmatics when we speak about salient information we mean given information that the speaker assumes should be in central place for the hearer when the speaker produces the utterance. It is the most probable out of all possible.

The importance of salience in language processing was highlighted in Giora's graded salience hypothesis (Giora 1997, 2003). The main claim of the graded salience hypothesis (GSH) is that salient information is superior to less salient information and often (Giora 2003:15), though not always, to unstored information, such as novel information or information inferable from context (see Giora 2003: 10–11; Peleg et al. 2001). As a consequence, salient meanings of lexical units (e.g., conventional, frequent, familiar, or prototypical meanings) are processed automatically, irrespective of contextual information and strength of bias. Although context (actual situational context) effects may be fast, they run in parallel with lexical processes and initially do not interact with them (Giora 2003:24).

According to the GSH hypothesis, in language processing, both salient information and contextual knowledge run in parallel, and salient information may not be filtered out even when it is contextually inappropriate. This claim basically questions context-dependency, which is one of the main tenets of current pragmatic theories. While salience, according to the GSH, mainly concerns the storage of knowledge as a function of degree of familiarity, frequency, prototypicality, and conventionality, salience in the socio-cognitive approach (SCA) refers to the contingent effect of salient knowledge as a result of the attentional processing of communication in a

particular situation, which facilitates or hampers the expression of intention and the subsequent achievement of communicative effects.

The socio-cognitive approach incorporates the graded salience hypothesis to a significant extent, but it does not accept all of its tenets. GSH basically is hearer-centered, while SCA focuses on both production and comprehension. The focus of GSH is on linguistic salience, specifically meaning salience. It deals with lexical processing, whereas SCA's concern is both lexical (linguistic) salience and perceptual salience. While GSH uses "context" in the sense of actual situational context, SCA emphasizes the difference and interplay between prior context encoded in lexical items and actual situational context. This is especially important in the case of indirect reports where a minimal propositional content should be preserved in the indirect utterance otherwise the report can't be considered a felicitous report (see Cappelen and Lepore 2004; Borg 2004).

Another significant difference between GSH and SCA is that the GSH emphasizes the importance of stored information, while SCA considers salience to be both a stored (inherent salience and collective salience) and an emergent entity (actual situational salience). According to the GSH (Giora 2003:15), for information to be salient—to be foremost on a person's mind—it needs to undergo consolidation, that is, to be stored or coded in the mental lexicon, which usually happens as conventionalization. Stored information is superior to unstored information, such as novel information or information inferable from the context: While salient information is highly accessible, non-salient information requires strongly supportive contextual information to become as accessible as salient information is. At this point Giora seems to equate salient information with consolidated/stored information and nonsalient information with unstored information. This is somewhat questionable because it considers salience as a relatively static entity that changes mainly diachronically. According to Giora, in order for something to be salient, it should be stored in the memory. What is ranked as "most salient meaning" at the present moment may die off after only a few decades. An example of such diachronical change is the word "gay," whose most salient meaning in the '50s of the past century was "joyful"; nowadays, this meaning would rank below that of "homosexual." Salient information can be "disconsolidated" when its salience dies off and the information in question ends up as less salient or non-salient. So the problem with Giora's approach is that it acknowledges mainly diachronic change, and does talk less about synchronic change. In contrast, SCA emphasizes that salience is in a continual state of change not only diachronically but synchronically as well (emergent situational salience) as a result of the interplay of linguistic salience and perceptual salience. *This emergent situational salience is that drives the formulation of indirect report.* What the reporter will find most salient in the original message will basically determine how the message will be reported. Wieland (chapter "Reporting practices and reported entities", this volume) expressed a similar idea arguing that in answer to the question of what speakers take themselves to be reporting in an indirect report, one possibility is that they take themselves to be reporting whatever is salient from the earlier context, including linguistic and para-linguistic events.

4   Objectives

As said earlier the paper aims to analyze and discuss the formulation of indirect reports and the difference (if any) in the reporting behavior of the participants depending on whether they do the report in the L1 or L2. Instead of working with constructed examples, which is very common in the literature this study analyzes data collected from bilingual subject whose L1 is English (9 subjects) and whose L1 is a language other than English (12 subjects). It is claimed that the indirect report is a reflection of the interpretation of the original message by the speaker. The research questions I seek answer to are as follows:

1. How much of the semantic core is preserved in the report?
2. In what ways do reporters try to express the pragmatic content they assume the original utterance has?
3. What factors may affect the ability and preference of non-native speakers to do things differently from native speakers?

5   Data Collection Methods

Data were collected from 21 bilingual subjects. As mentioned in the "Introduction" the native speakers (NS) of English have Spanish (6), Italian (2) and German (1) as their L2. The non-native speakers (NNS) represent several L1s: Cantonese (1), Mandarin (6), Japanese (1), Korean (1), Kurdish (1), Russian (1) and Tibetian (1). All the subjects were graduate students at a university in the north-eastern part of the US. They were between age 22 and 32. Most of the non-native speakers had very high command of English because they studied the language for 8 or more years. Each of them has spent at least 1 year in the US. These facts are very important because high command of English means that the non-native speaker subjects did not have to struggle with proficiency issues when they were executing the reporting tasks.

Each participant received a worksheet that contained the questions and information about what the participants were expected to do. The questions aimed to identify the language background and age of the subjects. Samples were provided to demonstrate what the subjects were expected to do:

Please read each utterance carefully, and report it similar or close to what you see in the samples:

Sample 1

John: − I do not know what my wife wants.
John said that he did not know what his wife wanted.

Sample 2

Mary to Bob: − Are you hungry?
Mary asked Bob if he was hungry.
Mary asked Bob if he wanted to eat.

The worksheet contained ten utterances that the subjects were expected to report to someone else. These utterances represented three functions: statements (4), questions (4) and request/commands (2). The sample helped the subjects clarify what exactly they were expected to do. They received 30 min to do the reporting in writing. Everybody was able to finish the work within the time limit. The 21 subjects worked in the same room for 30 min under the supervision of a professor.

6   Results

The results of the study will be reported through analyzing the indirect reports by functions: statements, questions and requests/commands. The comparison of native speaker and non-native speaker production will be addressed right after the results are presented for the given function.

Using the research questions as guides, the analysis first tries to identify what exactly is preserved from the content of the original message and why exactly that is it which is reported: how the reporter interpreted and evaluated the original utterance. As discussed earlier I agree with Capone (2010) and Wieland (2013) that we should look for relative pragmatic rather than semantic equivalency between the original message and the indirect report. The reporter is supposed to reflect the pragmatic content of the original message. Capone (2015:27) argued that semantics ensures that the 'standard' purpose of an indirect report is to report an utterance by a speaker (and his point of view or perspective) while pragmatics ensures that interpolations do not illegitimately interfere with the purposes of the original speaker (who proffered the original utterance). This, however, does not always work that way in natural language production. Although the reporter knows what is expected from him/her, s/he is still heavily under the influence of what is salient for him/her and wording is selected accordingly, as we will see in the examples below. It is not exactly what the message says rather what the reporter thinks it conveys.

6.1   Statements

There were four statements used in the production survey.

A. Jenny: − I will need your help.
B. Bill: − I am tired of answering your silly questions.
C. Molly: − I do not want to tell you what I think about Tom.
D. Larry to us: − Mary knows what Jim is hiding from us.

Each statement has a different structure and conveys different types of message. A is a simple request, B expresses a strong opinion, C implies the speaker's reason about not doing something, while D reveals the assumption of the speaker about another person's perception. Each of them has some complication for the reporter except A.

As expected almost half of the reports $(4 + 6)^4$ are simple sentences such as

E2. Jenny asked for help.
E6. Jenny needs help.
T. Jenny asked for help.
CH. Jenny requests for help.

In this type of reporting there is no difference between NSs and NNSs. The most salient piece of information is the same for each subject, which they try to report in the simplest possible way. It is worth noting that the "said that" equivalent ("Jenny said she would need my help"), which is the complex sentence alternative does not require much cognitive load either. So the choice between the simple sentence and complex sentence may not include any particular planning by the reporter.

B is much more complicated than A because the original message contains evaluation. The reports reflected that salient element in different ways. Most of the reporters expressed this evaluation even in the reporting verb:

E1. Bill *exclaimed* that he was tired of answering my silly questions.
E9. Bill expressed that he was tired of answering silly questions.
xxx
R. Bill *let me know* that he was frustrated by my silly questions.
CH3. Bill *complained* that he's tired of answering your silly questions.

Others used different sentence structures to highlight the evaluative element. Here there was a difference between NSs and NNSs. The former generally used a simplified structure while NNSs came up with more complex sentence structures as in the examples:

E2. Bill is annoyed about my silly questions.
E6. Bill is tired of my silly questions.
xxx
J. Bill is asking not to bother him with any more questions.
CH6. Bill does not want to answer more questions which he thinks are silly.

In C the evaluative element was further complicated by the fact that it was connected with a negation. With a couple of exceptions where the reporters stuck to the propositional content in short utterances such as

E. Molly has no comment about Tom.
J. Molly is not in the mood to talk about Tom.

the majority of reports reflected the endeavor of the reporters to include both the negation and the evaluative element, which sometimes resulted in quite complex utterances. This was especially the case with NSs where the reporters sometimes added their own evaluation.

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[4] The first number always refers to native speaker subject while the second one refers to non-native speakers.

E1. Molly said she didn't want to tell me what she thinks about Tom, so it must be pretty bad.

E5. Molly is saying that she does not want to share her personal feelings towards Tom, probably because she does not like him.

xxx

K. Molly said to me that she does not want to tell me what she thinks about Tom.

KU. She said that she did not want to tell me what she thinks about Tom.

In a way D was similar to C as far as the structure of the relative clause was concerned. The difference was that D did not contain a negation. This made the task simpler for the subjects, which resulted in a remarkable similarity in the reports of the two groups. The only major difference was that the NNSs paid more attention to backshift of time as in the examples below. In this case NNSs sounded grammatically more correct than NSs.

E8. Larry said that Mary knows what Jim is hiding from us.

CH2. Larry told us that Mary knew what Jim was hiding from us.

6.2 Questions

The four utterances that count as questions represent three types: A is a self-reporting question, B and C are yes/no questions while D starts with a question word.

A. Sally said: − I wonder why you look so happy.

B. Ruth to Brenda: − Can I borrow your pen?

C. Jim asked: − Do you know when the accident happened?

D. Andy: − How are you doing?

In A I wanted to find out what the subjects do with the speaker's self-reporting. Seven out of the nine NS participants merged the two clauses into one eliminating "said that" and using different introductory verb with a "why" clause.

E1. Sally was wondering why you look so happy.

E5. Sally is curious as to why you look so happy.

E7. Sally wondered what made me look so happy.

In the case of NNSs everyone did the merger with the exception of one person. For instance:

R. Sally was curious to know why I looked happy.

K. She wondered why I looked so happy.

It is interesting to see that some of the NNSs interpreted the utterance as if the speaker had some kind of resentment when asking the question and they reported the original utterance expressing this resentment overtly.

CH4. Sally complained that I should not be so happy, because there's nothing to be happy about.

J. Sally is asking what event made him/her happy.

CH5. Sally meant there was nothing to be happy.

CH6. Sally does not think that there is anything that can make the addressee so happy.

B represents a simple yes/no question. Here the interesting thing was to see whether the reporters will introduce a relative clause to report the question or prefer some other construction to convey the content. The numbers show no preference for either option. Four NSs used clause and five used some other structure such as infinitive construction or prepositional phrase. In the NNS group this number is six and six.

E1. Ruth wanted to borrow Brenda's pen.

E3. Ruth asked Brenda if she can borrow her pen.

xxx

T. Ruth asked Brenda to lend her a pen.

K. Ruth asked Brenda if she can borrow her pen.

D was an intriguing case because "How are you doing?" is a question structurally but it functions as a greeting in American English. Here there was a great difference between the reports of NSs and NNSs. While the NSs tried to preserve the semantics of the expression and overwhelmingly used a subordinate clause to report the original message, the NNSs focused more on the pragmatic function of the expression rather than on its semantics.

E3. Andy wants to know how you are doing.

E4. Andy asked how I was doing.

E6. Andy wonders how I've been.

xxx

CH1. Andy said hi to me.

R. Andy greeted me.

CH4. Andy says hi to me.

6.3 Request/Command

Request/commands represent a special category in indirect reports of our dataset with each of them containing some kind of speaker's evaluation and/or politeness. It is not an easy task for the reporter to recognize not only the original goal of the speaker but also the tone of the utterance that conveys the message.

This type of reporting is more rule-governed than statements and questions. What I mean is that we will need to observe the rules for the change of tenses, pronouns and other indexicals in order for the hearer to clearly understand the report. The

selection of the reporting verb like *request, order, tell, advise, beseech, threaten, beg, implore, ask, propose*, etc. has some kind of evaluative load. It shows what kind of evaluative load the reporter thinks the original message has. Note that all of these verbs except 'propose' must be followed by an object. Commands and requests are usually reported using a to-infinitive. That-clauses can also be used. After certain verbs, only to-infinitives are possible. In the same way, after some reporting verbs, only that-clauses are possible.

In our examples the task of the reporters was complicated by the fact that both commands contained an evaluative judgment by the speaker. A contained two utterances while B included a gerundial phrase.

A. Peter: − Don't open the window, please. It is chilly here.
B. Amy: − Don't even think about lying to me.

In the semantic content of the two utterances (Don't open the window, please. It is chilly here.) there was nothing that would suggest that Peter asked for the window not to be opened because he was chilly. This implicature had to be made. Most of the bilinguals (6) whose L1 was English found it important to explain the causal connection between the two reported utterances.

E3. Peter requests that you don't open that window because he is a little chilly.
E5. Peter is implying that he is cold.
E7. Peter asked me to keep the window closed because he is chilly.
xxx

This was not the case with most of the NNSs (8) who did not necessarily infer that Peter asked for the window to remain closed because he was chilly. They also combined the two utterances but used "it" as subject in the subordinate clause.

T. Peter said not to open the window because it's cold.
CH2. Peter said it was chilly there and asked to close the window.
KU. He asked not to open the door because it was cold there.

It is also important to note that the overwhelming majority of NNSs used an infinitive construction to combine the two utterances while NSs used both that-clauses (5) and infinitives (4).

B ("Don't even think about lying to me") was the most problematic utterance for the subjects to report. This was for a couple of reasons. The use of the emphatic particle "even" is a clear sign of Amy's anger. NSs made an attempt to convey that feeling in their indirect reports. They used reporting verbs or structures that made it clear how the speaker felt. With the exception of two they avoided using an infinitive construction.

E2. Amy knows something and can tell if the other person is lying.
E3. Amy demanded that you don't lie to her.
E6. Amy is fed up with the lies.
E7. Amy cautioned me to not even think about lying to her.

   The majority of NNSs (9) sticked to infinitive constructions in which the emphatic function of "even" was usually lost.

T. Amy said not to lie to her.
CH1. Amy asked me not to lie to her.
R. Amy warned me not to lie to her.

   There were some attempts in both groups to individualize the reporting by ignoring semantics and focusing only on the content as they inferred it.

E2. Amy knows something and can tell if the other person is lying.
CA. Amy demands the truth.
CH6. Amy says she's good at telling if a person is lying.

7   Discussion

The analysis of indirect reports by bilinguals revealed that both groups handled reporting in a very creative way. This means that they tried to retrieve the main pieces of information from the speaker's utterance and report it in an individual way selecting from the linguistic repertoire that was at their disposal. The reporting context was somewhat artificial because subjects had to do the reporting in writing and no particular actual situational context of reporting was defined in the task description with the exception that participants were expected to make a report. Consequently the subjects needed to create not only the report but also a hypothetical context in which they imagined the report was given. This resulted in individual differences in handling indexicals as the examples show below.

E1. Jim asked if you knew when the accident happened.
E8. Jim asked when the accident happened.
E9. Jim asked if they knew when the accident happened.

   Based on the results the research questions can be answered in the following way:

How much of the semantic core is preserved in the report?

There was a general tendency to make the report as condensed as possible focusing on the minimal propositional content. In many cases this endeavor led to the loss of pragmatic features included in the original utterance. For instance:

E6. Molly has no comment about Tom.
J. Bill is asking not to bother him with any more questions.

   The attempt to make the report as condensed as possible was also demonstrated by mergers of clauses where it was possible like in the case of the self-reporting example (Sally said: − I wonder why you look so happy.) where subjects merged

the two clauses into one eliminating "said that" and using different introductory verb with a "why" clause. For instance:

E1. Sally was wondering why you look so happy.
K. She wondered why I looked so happy.

The reporting practice of the subjects demonstrated that the semantic core of the original message was the most salient information they based their report on. Pragmatic enrichment was secondary. I agree with Allan (chapter "Reports, indirect reports, and illocutionary point", this volume) that "a truly indirect report utilizes pragmatic enrichment", but the real question is that in what degree subjects use pragmatic enrichment. Of course, there are individual differences as we saw in the results section but the general tendency in indirect reporting (at least based on this study) is to report what the reporter finds most salient in the original message. However, what the subjects found most salient depended on their language background. While for non-native speakers semantic content dominated the reporting process with less pragmatic enrichment, for native speakers pragmatics factors played a more important role.

This finding underlines the importance of both semantic and pragmatic analyses of indirect reports, which confirms that a top-down or as Mey (2006) puts it "outside in" explanatory movement may not be enough. As Kecskes (2010) argued the explanatory movement should go in both directions: from the outside in (pragmatic analysis) and from the inside out (semantic analysis). But the study points to a major difference between native speakers and non-native speakers as explained above.

In what ways do reporters try to express the pragmatic content they assume the original utterance has?

Subjects recognized pragmatic features implied in the original utterances. However, as said above they either ignored or reduced their effect. Most of the indirect reports reflected the illocutionary point, which was the basic purpose of the speaker in making the utterance (see Allan 1998). Much depended on the way in which illocutionary force was expressed in the original message.[5] If it was strongly articulated linguistically like in the examples below the reporters did not ignore it but tried to find some way to include it in their report. For instance:

Peter: – Don't open the window, please. It is chilly here.
E3. Peter requests that you don't open that window because he is a little chilly.
xxx
Bill: – I am tired of answering your silly questions.
E9. Bill expressed that he was tired of answering their silly questions.
xxx
Amy: – Don't even think about lying to me.
E7. Amy cautioned me to not even think about lying to her.

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[5]Illocutionary point and illocutionary force are understood here as in Searle and Vanderveken (1985).

It was mentioned above that based on the indirect reports we can say that there was not significant difference in what the subjects (both groups) inferred from the original report. However, some of the original utterances were open for different interpretation. What a sentence implies depends on its semantic content, while what a speaker implicates is a matter of his/her communicative intention in uttering the sentence. As Horn put it: speakers implicate hearers infer (Horn 2004:6). In certain cases what the subjects inferred from the original message was quite interesting.

CH4. Sally complained that I should not be so happy, because there's nothing to be happy about.
CH5. Amy says she's good at telling if a person is lying.
E1. Molly said she didn't want to tell me what she thinks about Tom, so it must be pretty bad.

What factors may affect the ability and preference of non-native speakers to do things differently from native speakers?

There was no significant difference between the bilingual group with English L1 and the bilingual group with L1 other than English where the illocutionary point of the original utterance was obvious, and there was relatively less pragmatic enrichment included. For instance:

Jenny: – I will need your help.
Ruth to Brenda: – Can I borrow your pen?

Differences between the two groups became obvious when more pragmatic enrichment was involved. However, I must underline that this has nothing to do with English language proficiency. Rather it may be the result of cognitive flexibility of those bilinguals who have relatively high proficiency in both of their languages. As discussed in the "Introduction" the English L1 group was a dominant bilingual group where English was their native tongue and their L2 proficiency was at a lower level while in the other group the level of L2 was close to native.

As a result the English L1 group behaved like native speakers rather than bilinguals. The other group, however, clearly showed the "signature of bilingualism" that is mainly connected with cognitive flexibility because they have rich experience in resolving the conflict between form and meaning (Bialystok et al. 2012). Neuroscientific studies have detected some structural and functional brain differences between bilinguals and monolinguals and talked about the "neural signature of bilingualism" (see Hull and Vaid 2007; Kovelman et al. 2008; Marian et al. 2009). However, there are no studies that have focused on the language production of bilinguals to prove that this "signature of bilingualism" exists in language production and comprehension as well. This study makes an attempt in this direction but our dataset is too small to talk about more than just certain tendencies.

What is quite clear, however, is that the NNS group (relatively balanced bilinguals) has shown some interesting differences in handling the indirect report task. The most significant difference was that the indirect reports produced by bilingual subjects whose L1 was English were a reflections of a pragmatics-based top-down approach to the original utterance while indirect reports made by bilingual

subjects whose L1 was other than English reflected more like a semantics-based bottom-up approach to the original utterance, which was enriched pragmatically by the reporter. How can we demonstrate that?

First of all NSs tried to preserve the illocutionary force of the utterance with pragmatic enrichment. Rarely did it happen that they deprived the original message from its pragmatic load and reported only the illocutionary point while the same cannot be said about the NNS group. Examples:

E4. Jenny said she would need my help.
T. Jenny asked for help.
xxx
E4. Bill said he was tired of answering my silly questions.
CA. Bill thinks the questions are stupid.

The NSs almost never added anything to or took away something from the pragmatically enriched original utterance. They attempted to report it in a felicitous way while the NNSs demonstrated more flexibility that occasionally resulted in reports that included evaluative elements that the speaker may not have implicated. They kept the illocutionary point but enriched the reported utterance in their own way. For instance:

Sally said: − I wonder why you look so happy.
CH6. Sally does not think that there is anything that can make the addressee so
    happy.
xxx
Jim asked: − Do you know when the accident happened?
CH4. Jim suspected that I know something about the accident.
xxx

The felicitous, pragmatically-driven reporting of NSs was best demonstrated in the way they reported the "How are you doing?" question. As said in the results section the NSs tried to preserve the semantics of the expression and overwhelmingly used a subordinate clause to report the original message, while most of the NNSs reported the function of the expression that was the most salient for them and represented the illocutionary point in their opinion.

CH1. Andy said hi to me.
R. Andy greeted me.
CA. Andy greets someone.
CH3. Andy said hi to someone.

8   Conclusion

This study investigated how indirect reports are formulated by subjects whose mindset may differ from the traditional native speakers' who rely on conventions of language and conventions of usage of their L1 only. It used not introspective and

constructed data but utterances produced by two groups of bilingual speakers. The paper hypothesized that there may be a "signature of bilingualism" that is detectable in language production of relatively balanced bilinguals. There was a significant difference in the two groups' language background. In the first group English was the L1 of the subjects with a rather weak L2. In the other group English was a strong L2 of the participants who represented six different L1s. This group was supposed to be a representative of relatively balanced high level bilingualism while the other one was a weak case of L1-dominated bilingualism. The expectation was that there will be differences in how the two groups would handle the task that required the participants to report someone else's utterance (statement, question and request) to a hypothetical audience.

The findings demonstrated that there was no difference between the groups as far as what affected the subjects' action in the task. It was salience that played a decisive role in what subjects actually reported from the original message, and how they shaped the reported message. The reporting practice of the subjects showed that the semantic core was the most salient information that the subjects based their report on. At the same time each indirect report utilized pragmatic enrichment in an individual way. The findings point to the fact that both semantic and pragmatic analyses are needed if we really want to understand indirect reports. This confirms that a top-down or "outside in" (Mey 2006) explanatory movement is not be enough. The explanatory movement should go in both directions: from the outside in (pragmatic analysis) and from the inside out (semantic analysis). The real question is about the degree of presence of these two movements (semantic and pragmatic) because this is where the differences become visible between subjects with different language background.

The analysis showed that there was a significant difference between the two groups' production. *Subjects whose L1 was English with a relatively weak L2 used a pragmatics-based top-down approach to the original utterance which was reflected in a special effort to preserve the core semantic and pragmatic features of the original message in their report. The balanced bilingual subjects whose L1 was other than English appeared to use a semantics-based bottom-up approach to the original utterance which was enriched pragmatically by the reporters either based on what the message conveyed or in their own way.* This finding seems to confirm the results of those studies that argued that in language processing of non-native speakers the starting point is usually the compositional (literal) meaning of the utterance rather than the actual situational meaning (e.g. Abel 2003; Bortfeld 2002, 2003; Cieślicka 2004, 2006; Kecskes 2007, 2015). This is an important issue because it results in differences in language production and interpretation between subjects who use their L1 and subjects that use the same language as L2.

Future research in indirect reports should use both introspective and corpus-based, naturalistic data if we want to understand the real nature of this complex phenomenon.

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Reported Speech: A Clinical Pragmatic Perspective

Louise Cummings

1 Introduction

In recent years, there has been a rapid expansion in the pragmatic and discourse behaviours investigated in clinical studies. In addition to speech acts, implicatures and figurative language, each of which has been the focus of numerous studies, investigators are now examining deixis, presupposition, topic management and requests for clarification in the verbal repertoire of clients with language disorders.[1] Notwithstanding the wide-ranging scope of these studies, one discourse behaviour has been all but completely overlooked by clinical investigators. That behaviour is reported speech. Like other aspects of language, reported speech is best character-ized by examining examples of its use. Consider the utterances in (1) to (7) below:

(1)   Sally said, "I hope to own a car like that".
(2)   Sally said that she hoped to own a car like that.
(3)   Frank went, "Not a chance!"
(4)   She was like, "You must be kidding!"
(5)   Bill shouted that he was very, very AN:::GRY!
(6)   What she said wasn't interesting.
(7)   Tom ran into me this morning; he is so stressed.

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[1]The reader is referred to chapter 1 in Cummings (2005, 2009) for discussion of these pragmatic concepts.

L. Cummings (✉)
School of Arts and Humanities, Nottingham Trent University, Nottingham, UK
e-mail: louise.cummings@ntu.ac.uk

The utterance in (1) is an example of direct reported speech. The reporting speaker is presenting the reported speaker's words – Sally's utterance 'I hope to own a car like that' – in the form of a direct quotation. In the indirect reported speech in (2), Sally's words are presented in the form of a paraphrase. Certain linguistic features of (1) and (2) distinguish these utterances as direct and indirect reported speech, respectively. In (1), the pronoun *I* and the verb *hope* reflect the context in which the words were originally used (i.e. the reported context). The pronoun *I* is used to refer to Sally and not to the speaker of the utterance as is the case in many other contexts in which this pronoun is used (e.g. 'I want to leave now'). However, in (2) the use of the pronoun *she* to refer to Sally and the verb *hoped* reflect the speaker's current context (i.e. the reporting context). A further linguistic feature of indirect reported speech is the use of a subordinating conjunction (e.g. *that* in (2) above) in the clause that frames the speech. Although the reported speech in (1) and (2) is introduced by a clause that contains a reporting verb (e.g. said, remarked, stated), some instances of reported speech use verbs other than verbs of saying. For example, in (3) and (4) the non-specific verbs, *went* and *was*, are used to introduce direct reported speech. Aside from these syntactic and lexical features, direct and indirect reported speech may also be distinguished by a range of non-linguistic and paralinguistic behaviours. These features typically mark direct reported speech. For example, one can easily imagine how hand movements may accompany the utterance of 'Not a chance!' in (3) or a pointing gesture may be used to indicate the referent of the deictic expression *that* in (1). Also, certain stress and intonation patterns, both aspects of prosody, may characterize the utterance of 'You must be kidding!' in (4). These same non-linguistic and paralinguistic behaviours are not a feature of indirect reported speech.

As one might expect, there are also instances of reported speech which present exceptions to the patterns and features described above. Some uses of reported speech combine the paralinguistic features of direct reported speech with the grammatical structure of indirect reported speech. In (5), the speaker uses a verb of saying (*shouted*) and the subordinating conjunction *that*, both grammatical features of indirect reported speech. However, this speaker has also used increased loudness and duration in his production of the word *angry*, both paralinguistic features that are more typical of direct reported speech. In some instances of reported speech, the speech of others is represented without any elaboration of its content. This is evident in the use of *what she said* in (6) above. In other instances, the content of the speech is detailed without there being any explicit marking that it is reported. This can be seen in (7) where the use of *he is so stressed* reflects the content of the exchange between Tom and the speaker without any attempt made to represent this as reported speech.

Reported speech can perform a number of communicative functions including discourse, social, interactional and referential functions. Li (1986: 40) states that direct reported speech is commonly used at the peak of oral narrative in many languages. This is because it requires the reporter-speaker to act out the role of the reported speaker and is thus a natural vehicle for vivid and dramatic presentation.

Quite different functions are served by reported speech in non-narrative discourse. In the classroom discourse of adult numeracy lessons, Baynham (1996: 61) states that direct reported speech 'constructs a distinctive evidential claim, serves as a device to structure mathematical reasoning in the classroom dialogically and may serve as a strategic device to manipulate social distance between participants'. As well as manipulating social distance, reported speech can serve other social functions including indexing relevant membership categories (Bangerter et al. 2011) and conveying intimacy and humour (Mertz 1993). The interactional functions of reported speech include the use of such speech as epistemic stance markers (Cliff 2006). By linking previous linguistic actions with their respective actors, reported speech also enables conversational participants to establish interactional coherence (Johnen and Meyer 2007). The speakers of the utterances in (1) to (7) above are performing a number of referential functions through the use of reported speech. These speakers are referring to a prior discourse context in which the utterance was originally produced. Within that context, the reported utterance is referring to people and objects such as when Sally uses the deictic expression *that* to refer to a particular car. Within the reporting speaker's discourse context, there is reference to people (e.g. Tom and Sally) and reference between linguistic expressions (e.g. anaphoric reference between *Sally* and *she* in (2) above). In short, there is a wide range of referential functions at work in reported speech.

Clearly, there is much more that can be said about the structure and function of reported speech. And many of the other chapters in this volume undertake eloquent discussions of just these aspects. However, this brief introduction to reported speech suffices for our current purpose. That purpose is to examine reported speech within a clinical context. Specifically, this paper makes the case for a much greater examination of reported speech in clients with language and cognitive-communication disorders than has been conducted to date. Notwithstanding a now burgeoning clinical literature on other aspects of pragmatics and discourse, reported speech continues to be overlooked by clinical investigators. This neglect, it is argued, is regrettable given the potential diagnostic significance of reported speech as a high-level pragmatic and discourse skill. The paper begins by considering the features of reported speech which make it vulnerable to disruption in clients with language and cognitive-communication disorders. By systematically examining the cognitive and language skills which are integral to reported speech, it is possible to make predictions about which types of clients are likely to experience difficulties with this aspect of language use. However, in the absence of clinical research into reported speech, these predictions must await future studies for their empirical validation. In the meantime, it is interesting to interrogate why there has been a lack of clinical studies with a focus on reported speech. The reasons for this omission are revealing, both in their own terms and for what they indicate about clinical pragmatic research in general. They suggest a field of research which is still not sufficiently cognitive in orientation, or open to developments in other disciplines, to accommodate a multidimensional aspect of language use such as reported speech.

2 Linguistic and Cognitive Dimensions of Reported Speech

Reported speech is a complex aspect of language use that draws on diverse linguistic
and cognitive skills. In illustration of these skills, consider the following examples
of direct and indirect reported speech:

(8)   Fran yelled, "I have the book you need".
(9)   Jack said that he wanted to leave on Thursday.

Setting aside phonological skills, the speaker of (8) must possess a range of
expressive language skills in order to produce this utterance. In terms of syntax,
this speaker must be able to form the past tense of the regular lexical verb *yell*,
and use the present tense of the verbs *have* and *need*. The form of these verbs
must reflect the person and number of their corresponding subjects, e.g. *I have*
(first person singular). The speaker of this utterance must be able to form noun
phrases (*the book*), distinguish proper nouns (*Fran*) from common nouns (*book*),
and nouns from pronouns (*I*, *you*), as well as use relative clauses (*the book you
need*). The speaker of (8) must also understand the grammatical roles of subject and
object such that *Fran* is the subject of *yelled* and *the book* is the object of *have*. To
produce the utterance in (9), a speaker must be able to form a subordinate clause (*he
wanted to leave early*) which is introduced by the subordinating conjunction *that*.
Additional expressive syntactic skills include the use an infinitive verb (*to leave*)
and prepositional phrase (*on Thursday*), and the role of the pronoun *he* in anaphoric
reference (*Jack . . . he*). Alongside these syntactic skills, the speakers of (8) and (9)
must possess semantic knowledge of words and sentences. This knowledge includes
the use of proper nouns such as *Fran* and *Jack* to refer to particular individuals and
knowledge that a *book* is an inanimate entity, *leave* is a verb of motion, and that
on Thursday expresses a temporal meaning. As well as lexical semantic knowledge,
the speakers of these utterances must know something about the conditions which
must exist in the world in order for these sentences to be true. For example, in (8)
there must be a world in which someone called Fran produced the utterance 'I have
the book you need'. If such a world does not exist – for example, it was Bill and
not Fran who produced this utterance – then we would have reason to doubt this
speaker's veracity or knowledge of the semantics of this utterance.

Leaving aside syntax and semantics, pragmatic and discourse skills are also
integral to the use of the reported speech utterances in (8) and (9). For example,
the speaker of (8) must be aware of a presupposition of Fran's reported utterance
which is triggered by the definite noun phrase *the book*. This is a presupposition
to the effect that the book which is needed exists. A further pragmatic feature is
that the personal pronoun *I* in this utterance functions as a deictic expression which
refers to Fran in the reported context, and not to the speaker of (8) in the reporting
context. Also, the pronoun *you* in Fran's reported speech refers to an individual who
is physically co-present in her discourse context and not to an individual who is in

the speaker's discourse context. The utterance in (9) contains a syntactic ambiguity that arises from the prepositional phrase *on Thursday* – did Jack's saying occur on Thursday or did his leaving occur on Thursday? This ambiguity is resolved through a pragmatic process of disambiguation. This process makes use of wider contextual information which includes, among other things, prior utterances in the conversational exchange of which (9) may be a part and the background knowledge of the hearer of (9). The use of anaphoric reference in (9) achieves cohesion between the two clauses of this utterance. This allows the hearer to connect or link these clauses which, in turn, helps the listener achieve a coherent interpretation of the information presented in them. The combination of these various features demonstrates that a rich interplay of pragmatic and discourse skills is as important to the reported speech utterances in (8) and (9) as the syntactic and semantic skills examined earlier.

However, we are still far from completing an examination of the skills which are essential to reported speech. This is because the complex array of language skills which we have just discussed is matched by an equally complex set of cognitive skills. These latter skills can be broadly classified as executive functions and theory of mind skills. Executive functions are integral to the planning, execution and regulation of goal-directed behaviour. They subsume a wide range of cognitive skills including working memory, impulse control, mental flexibility, planning and organization and the deployment of attention. Theory of mind (ToM) describes the ability to attribute mental states such as beliefs, knowledge and intentions both to one's own mind and to the minds of others. ToM skills are the basis of our ability to predict and explain the behaviour of other people. (The reader is referred to Cummings (2009, 2014a, b, c, 2016) for detailed discussion of executive functions and ToM.) Both sets of cognitive skills are integral to reported speech. The use of direct reported speech requires the retention in *memory* of the actual utterance produced by the reported speaker. The speaker who uses reported speech must display *mental flexibility* as he or she moves between the current discourse context and the discourse context of the reported speaker. The paraphrase of a speaker's utterance in indirect reported speech often reflects the features of that utterance to which the reporting speaker has given most *attention*. For example, the reporting speaker in (5) above did not only attend to the content of the reported speaker's utterance, but also to certain paralinguistic features of that utterance, namely, the increased volume and duration of the word *angry*. Finally, *planning* is integral to all aspects of reported speech. This includes, but is not limited to, the linguistic planning which is needed to construct the utterances in (1) to (9) above.

The speaker who employs reported speech must also be adept at attributing mental states to the minds of others (i.e. theory of mind). This is evident in direct and indirect reported speech where a range of mental states must be attributed to the mind of the reported speaker. For example, the speaker who produces the utterance in (10) below must attribute a particular *communicative intention* to Paula. That intention is to convey irony through the use of an utterance which is evidently false in the discourse context of the reported speaker:

(10)   Paula said "What a delightful child!" as Henry charged around the room.

(11)   Frank muttered that he was most unhappy about the decision.

(12)   Bill said that Mike was in France.

The speaker who utters (11) must attribute an *emotional state* (viz., unhappiness) to Frank. In (12), the speaker must attribute a *belief* to Bill about Mike's location. These attributed mental states differ not only in kind (emotion, belief, etc.) but also in their level of complexity. The reporting speaker who attributes a belief about Mike to Bill is engaging in first-order ToM reasoning. This is because the attributed belief is about people and events in the world, namely, that Mike is in France. A quite different type of ToM reasoning occurs in the reporting speaker who produces the utterance in (10). This speaker is also attributing a belief about the world to the reported speaker, namely, the belief that Henry is badly behaved. But alongside first-order ToM reasoning, the reporting speaker in (10) must also engage in second-order ToM reasoning in which a belief is attributed to Paula about the mental states of her interlocutor. Specifically, the following belief must be attributed to Paula by the reporting speaker: Paula believes that her interlocutor believes that Henry is badly behaved. It is this second-order ToM reasoning, involving the attribution to Paula of a belief about a belief, which is the basis of the ironic use of language.

As the above discussion demonstrates, there is much to be said about the linguistic and cognitive dimensions of reported speech. Although these dimensions appear clear enough in conceptual terms, they have not always been the focus of empirical research. While reported speech has been well investigated in certain contexts (e.g. in narrative production), little is known about the use of reported speech in other contexts. This paucity of research includes in particular the study of reported speech in children and adults with language and communication disorders. However, even in the absence of clinical studies, it is possible to use the distinct linguistic and cognitive dimensions of reported speech to make predictions about the types of clients who are likely to experience difficulty with this complex aspect of language use. Clearly, children and adults with primary language impairments are likely to be challenged by the linguistic dimensions of reported speech. For example, the child with specific language impairment (SLI) may struggle to form subordinate clauses in indirect reported speech (e.g. Joan said that she wanted to stay), while the adult with aphasia and impaired expressive syntax may be unable to use different verb forms in direct reported speech (e.g. Brian said "Leave me out of it!"). The linguistic deficits of these clients are likely to compromise reported speech beyond impairments of expressive syntax. The short intonation units of speakers with non-fluent aphasia may make it difficult for these speakers to reproduce paralinguistic features of the reported speaker's utterance (e.g. the increased volume and stress in 'Jack said "I REALLY HATE that song!"'). Even on the basis of these few examples, there would appear to be strong grounds for claiming that (probable) impairments of reported speech in some children and adults with language disorder may be related to primary deficits in structural language.

A quite different problem with reported speech is likely to arise in clients who have primary cognitive deficits as part of their clinical condition. This includes children and adults with autism spectrum disorder in whom there are significant ToM impairments, but also adults with schizophrenia who have impaired executive functions and mentalizing deficits (see Cummings (2009, 2014a, b, c, 2016) for discussion of ToM and executive functions in these clinical populations). The verbal child with autism spectrum disorder may avoid the use of reported speech owing to his or her failure to attribute mental states to the mind of the reported speaker. Where reported speech is attempted, certain patterns in its use would appear to be predictable. A 'complex' reported speech utterance that involves second-order ToM reasoning (e.g. the utterance in (10) above) is less likely to be used appropriately than a 'simple' reported speech utterance (e.g. the utterance in (12) above) that demands only first-order ToM reasoning. However, given the well-documented difficulties with first-order ToM reasoning in the ASD population, even 'simple' reported speech utterances may cause problems of interpretation in children and adults with ASD. The child who hears the utterance 'Rosie said that Frank is a doctor' may misinterpret this utterance to mean *Rosie is a doctor* – in its erroneous representation of a state of affairs in the world, this misinterpretation of the utterance avoids the need to attribute any belief state to the reported speaker. The speaker with schizophrenia and ToM deficits may incorrectly attribute beliefs to the reported speaker, leading to false and misleading reported speech. Also, this speaker may be unable to use direct reported speech on account of memory deficits (the linguistic form of the reported utterance cannot be retained), or may be unable to switch between the discourse contexts of the reporting and reported speakers, leading to 'confused' reported speech (e.g. 'I and Rosie said Frank is a doctor').

There is a third category of clinical disorders in which reported speech is likely to be significantly disrupted. This category includes individuals with so-called cognitive-communication disorders. These disorders describe a range of language pathologies which arise in consequence of cognitive deficits in traumatic brain injury, right-hemisphere damage and the dementias. These deficits are typically more generalized than the cognitive deficits found in ASD, for example, owing to the presence of multi-focal cerebral damage (e.g. in traumatic brain injury) or the onset of widespread neuro-degeneration (e.g. in the dementias). The impact of cognitive-communication disorders on reported speech is particularly difficult to predict, and is likely to involve some combination of the types of problems that were described above in relation to clients who have either primary language or cognitive impairments. The adult with traumatic brain injury may have the requisite linguistic structures to produce a reported speech utterance. However, he or she may use such an utterance inappropriately during narrative discourse such that a hearer is unable to follow how it relates to the wider narrative theme. Similarly, an adult who sustains right-hemisphere damage may have significant deficits in the use of linguistic prosody. This adult may be able to introduce direct reported speech at an appropriate juncture during a conversational exchange. However, he or she may be

unable to reproduce the paralinguistic features of the reported speaker's utterance on account of marked prosodic deficits. As with all the impairments of reported speech considered in this section, the actual impact of cognitive-communication disorders on the use of reported speech by individuals with these disorders awaits empirical investigation.

Before embarking on an examination of the reasons why reported speech has not been the focus of clinical studies, it will be useful to consider the findings of two studies which have investigated this aspect of language use in clinical subjects. They are Hengst et al.'s (2005) study of reported speech in individuals with aphasia, and Duff et al.'s (2007) investigation of reported speech in subjects with amnesia. (A study by Kindell et al. (2013) of a client with semantic dementia, who makes extensive use of direct reported speech, will not be examined here because of limitations of space.) Aphasia and amnesia are primary impairments of language and memory, respectively. Hengst et al. studied the use of reported speech by seven adults with mild to moderately severe aphasia during conversation with their routine communication partners. These seven dyads were videotaped in four everyday activities at home or around the community. Although subjects with aphasia produced less reported speech than their communication partners (29.3 % adults with aphasia; 49.3 % communication partners; 21.4 % other participants), all subjects with aphasia used at least one reported speech episode and in two dyads, the subject with aphasia produced more reported speech that his or her communication partner. The distribution of reported speech types was the same in the subjects with aphasia and their communication partners. Direct reported speech was the most common form to be used (49 %), followed by indirect (21 %), projected (16 %), and indexed (5 %) reported speech. Unsurprisingly given the linguistic limitations of the adults with aphasia, the percentage of reported speech episodes which were coded as complete and accurate was higher for communication partners (85 %) than for speakers with aphasia (60 %). Hengst et al. (2005: 152) accounted for the relatively strong reported speech use of these subjects with aphasia in terms of their largely intact pragmatic language skills, adding:

> '[T]he relatively intact pragmatic abilities of individuals with aphasia give one way to account for the successful use of reported speech by the participants in this study. However, this interpretation suggests that reported speech should not be as readily available to, or evident in the discourse of, individuals with cognitive-communication disorders in which pragmatic deficits are more diagnostically relevant (e.g., right hemisphere damage, traumatic brain injury)'.

In a later study, Duff et al. (2007) studied the use of reported speech by nine individuals with amnesia and nine comparison subjects with no brain injury. The memory deficits of the subjects with amnesia were expected to compromise the management of the two temporal frames of reported speech (i.e. reporting context and reported context). The reported speech of both types of participant during a series of discourse tasks (e.g. picture description) and non-task interactions was recorded and analysed using the same reported speech categories employed by Hengst et al. (2005). Subjects with amnesia produced on average only half as many reported speech episodes during discourse sessions as the normal control subjects.

There were no significant differences between the groups for the type of reported speech used (direct, indirect, etc.), and the distribution of temporal domains was similar between the groups. (Temporal domains were classified as past, in-session, future and unspecified.) Within reported speech episodes there was some evidence of qualitative differences between episodes with a pre-amnesia reported context and those with a post-amnesia reported context. The former reported speech episodes were more like those produced during sessions with normal control subjects or by the clinician in the interaction, in that they were more animated, detailed and covered a diverse range of topics. The reported speech episodes with a post-amnesia reported context were less detailed, specific and were topically limited, most often to the impact of amnesia on the subjects' daily lives. Duff et al. (2007: 11) attributed the reduced use of reported speech in subjects with amnesia not to any linguistic deficits but to an impairment of memory that makes it difficult for these subjects to move flexibly between different temporal frames in reported speech:

> 'In the current work, we did not observe deficits in basic linguistic mechanisms in amnesia; rather, individuals with amnesia used all forms of reported speech. Instead, the difference between amnesic and comparison participants was in the less frequent use of this form of discourse by those with amnesia. Given that reported speech seems to place great demands on maintaining, relating, and flexibly moving back and forth (mentally) between different time frames, the finding here, that reported speech is called upon less often in individuals with damage to precisely that memory system – declarative memory – thought to support such memory demands, makes good sense'.

Even on the basis of these two clinical studies, there is considerable support for the view that reported speech is likely to be compromised in certain predictable ways in clients with language and cognitive-communication disorders. However, to substantiate more fully the distinct clinical categories and reported speech impairments discussed above, further clinical studies of reported speech must first be undertaken. The reasons why these studies have not been forthcoming to date are numerous and complex. It is to an examination of these reasons that we now turn.

3   Clinical Research on Reported Speech

As the discussion of Sect. 2 demonstrates, there are reasonable grounds for believing that reported speech is likely to be compromised in children and adults with language and communication disorders. It was also stated in this section that there is a dearth of clinical research on reported speech. A question of some interest is why investigators have not undertaken to conduct clinical studies of reported speech when this complex aspect of language use is likely to be disrupted in these disorders. The reasons for this omission, it will be argued, are threefold. Firstly, reported speech draws on a range of linguistic and cognitive skills which are typically the focus of study of distinct academic and clinical disciplines. The lack of integration between these disciplines has had the effect of focussing research on certain concepts and issues to the exclusion of interdisciplinary concerns such

as reported speech. Secondly, there is a misguided assumption among clinical researchers that reported speech has little communicative value for participants in social interaction. As such, reported speech does not warrant the attention of researchers in the way that certain speech acts (e.g. requests) or conversational turns (e.g. openings and closings) have tended to justify. Thirdly, the neglect of reported speech as a research area has a corollary in its omission from pragmatic assessments. These clinical tools, it will be argued, are inclined towards the assessment of 'simple' verbal and non-verbal pragmatic behaviours (e.g. gestures, speech acts) to the exclusion of more 'complex' behaviours of the type found in reported speech. This feature of assessments cannot solely be accounted for in terms of factors such as the age range and cognitive level of the subjects targeted by these tools. Rather, it is argued, it is related to the cognitive dimensions of reported speech which are not always understood by clinicians or successfully measured by certain assessments.

It was described in Sect. 2 how reported speech draws on skills from the domains of language and cognition. Linguistic decoding and encoding rules, even when supplemented with pragmatic language skills, are not sufficient by themselves for speakers to manage the discourse contexts or temporal frames which the use of reported speech demands. These language skills must operate alongside an equally complex array of cognitive skills in areas such as attention, memory and theory of mind in order for speakers to use and for hearers to understand reported speech. With increasing specialization in the cognitive and neurosciences, the linguistic and cognitive dimensions of reported speech have been carved up for study by a number of distinct academic and clinical disciplines. Linguists continue to investigate the phonological, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic processes by means of which we encode, decode and interpret utterances. Speech-language pathologists assess and treat clients in whom these processes are disrupted through injury, disease or developmental anomalies. Meanwhile, developmental and cognitive psychologists aim to unlock the stages that children pass through on their way to acquiring a theory of other minds. For their part, neuropsychologists study processes such as reasoning, attention and memory and how these processes are compromised as a result of conditions such as traumatic brain injury. However, the disciplinary specialization that has enabled investigators to develop increasingly sophisticated accounts of each of these linguistic and cognitive phenomena has had the unfortunate consequence of detracting research from behaviours such as reported speech which naturally straddle several language and cognitive domains. It is from the interconnections between these domains that serious work on reported speech must now proceed.

A first step on the road to achieving the type of interdisciplinary integration that is likely to extend our understanding of reported speech is for there to be a cognitive reorientation of pragmatics. I have argued for such a reorientation in a number of earlier publications (Cummings 2009, 2014a, b, c, 2016). Yet, the very fact that cognitive investigations of reported speech are still outnumbered by literary and discourse studies of this notion and by studies of the formal, linguistic and functional aspects of reported speech is evidence that this reorientation is

proceeding at a stubbornly slow pace.[2] But an equally important step in achieving disciplinary integration will have been taken when cognitive and clinical investigators appreciate that pragmatic phenomena such as reported speech can have theoretical and diagnostic significance within their own disciplines. In Cummings (2007, 2009, 2014b, c, 2016), it was argued that ToM theories failed to fulfil a criterion of pragmatic adequacy, while standard tests of ToM often failed to assess the pragmatic behaviours they purported to examine. From theory construction to test development, ToM research, it was contended, would benefit directly from a closer integration with, and understanding of, linguistic pragmatics. In Cummings (2012), the case was made for attributing a diagnostic role to pragmatic behaviours in disorders as wide-ranging as the dementias, schizophrenia and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. The somewhat limiting view of reported speech as an interesting stylistic device with few implications beyond the study of narrative has lessened the appeal of this notion to cognitive and clinical investigators. It is only when reported speech is viewed as a high-level aspect of language use which has the potential to contribute insights to theory development, and/or as a notion that may hold diagnostic significance for certain disorders that we can expect to see a proper integration of pragmatic, cognitive and clinical disciplines.

A second reason why clinical research has tended to neglect reported speech is the mistaken assumption that reported speech has limited communicative value for language users. As such, this speech is not a priority for clinical assessment and intervention. However, this assumption overlooks the frequency and functions of reported speech both in the communicative repertoire of language intact subjects and in individuals with a range of clinical conditions. In terms of frequency, there is evidence that reported speech is commonly employed in the linguistic (spoken and written) output of language users. In a study of hand-written narrative data produced by 108 subjects, Ely and Ryan (2008) reported on average one instance of reported speech per 100 words of text. Across all narratives, reported speech accounted for 8.3 % of text (range 5.7–10.4 %). Reported speech is even more commonly found in spoken language. In a corpus of 58 spoken narratives of personal experience, Johnstone (1993) recorded reported speech in 67.2 % of narratives, with 10.8 % of lines containing reported speech. Reported speech was used in all 18 30-min conversational sessions between individuals with amnesia and a

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[2]Articles on reported speech rarely tackle this topic from a cognitive perspective. A survey of some published titles since 1991 confirms that this is the case: reported speech in Chinese political discourse (Kuo 2001); uses of reporting speech in native American folk narrative (Mishler 2009); reported speech in children's spontaneous narratives (Maybin 1996); *like* as a marker of reported speech (Romaine and Lange 1991); non-narrative functions of reported speech (Vincent and Perrin 1999); uses of reported speech in discursive constructions of interracial contact (Buttny and Williams 2000); gender differences in reported speech (Ely and Ryan 2008). Two papers with a cognitive orientation are Smyth's (1995) study of children's conceptual perspective-taking in pronoun interpretation in reported speech, and a study of perspective management during story retellings by children with autism spectrum disorders (Stirling et al. 2009).

clinician which were studied by Duff et al. (2007). Moreover, reported speech occurred with a frequency between 1 and 78 episodes per person per session. These combined figures clearly indicate that reported speech is very far from being a rare or occasional feature of language. Rather, this aspect of language actually pervades all forms of linguistic exchange between speakers (and writers) and hearers (and readers). In terms of its frequency in language alone, reported speech warrants more attention than it has been afforded by investigators to date.

The functions of reported speech are also particularly diverse. In Sect. 1, it was described how reported speech can perform discourse, social, interactional and referential functions. Even among clinical subjects, reported speech can perform a number of varied functions. Across the discourse activities undertaken by subjects with amnesia, Duff et al. (2007: 8) found that reported speech was used 'to give voice to fictional characters, to project possible discourse, and to provide details and animate voices of narratives'. There were several instances in the data obtained in this study where reported speech had a clear interactional function, with both the clinician and the subject with amnesia collaboratively producing reported speech. In the following extract between the clinician (C) and an individual with amnesia (A), the client with amnesia completes the reported speech initiated by the clinician (Duff et al. 2007: 9). Moreover, he or she does so appropriately by retaining the discourse context established by the clinician:

C: So I watch … this person being killed and then I go to bed and I'm you know lying there going, "well".
A: "Did I hear something?"

An even more sophisticated instance of collaboratively produced reported speech is evident in the following extract. In this case, the clinician and the patient with amnesia enact a scenario in which the patient as a store clerk does not know how to help a customer. Both participants effortlessly assume the voices of the two characters (store clerk and customer) in the scenario:

A: Especially if a customer comes and wants to buy something. I'm just like, "what is that?"
C: "Come pick it out".
A: "Yeah. Do you know what it looks like?"
C: "Show me what it looks like".

Even clients with impaired language skills are able to use reported speech to achieve a range of communicative functions. In the following exchange between a woman with aphasia called Mary (M), her son Rob (R) and a researcher called Julie (J), no less than eight reported speech episodes are used in the initiating event of a story about the rescheduling of a bus that takes Mary to her therapy appointments (Hengst et al. 2005: 148). The reported speech episodes in Mary's turns are indicated in bold. Such extensive interactional work is undertaken by Mary's use of reported speech that her conversational partners are either silent (Rob) or limited to producing brief supportive turns (e.g. sure you can't change the bus)

and back-channel comments such as *right* and *yeah* (Julie). The entire interaction is effectively structured by Mary as she assumes (and animates) the voices of the two participants in the conversational exchange that she is relating to Rob and Julie. Despite her linguistic limitations, Mary is adept at using direct reported speech (e.g. she says "can you come early?") and indirect reported speech (e.g. she said she's sick). She is also able to report her own speech (e.g. I says my bus is coming at three) and the speech of others (e.g. she says . . . well then I better keep that up to that).

M: Linda called me and **she said she's sick** and **she says**
R:
J: Okay so it was Linda that called?   Okay
M: **can you come early** and **I said no I can't call you early**.
R:
J: Sure you can't change the bus.
M: **I says my bus is coming at three**.   And you know she's gonna and
                                                  I'll be back
R:
J: Right.
M: for 3:30 and **she says** . . . **well then I better keep that up to that. I says no I**
R:
J: m hm
M: **think I can I said I think she can go me to try it again**. And **she says**
     well . . .
R:
J: m hm
M: **you give your y-you give your answer over it again with me** . . . and **she says**
R:
J:
M: **get your things s-see if you can say what your gonna say right**. And I
R:
J: yeah   uh huh
M: actually I accidentally let her down [laughing].
R:
J: You hung up on her? [laughing]

With the exception of a semantic paraphasic error in Mary's third reported speech episode (i.e. use of *call* for *see*), Mary's linguistic output is relatively intact until about halfway through the above exchange. At that point, a number of restarts, rewordings and/or aphasic errors begin to dominate her output (e.g. she says well . . . you give your y-you give your answer over it again with me). However, Julie and Rob appear still to follow the reported speech that Mary is attempting to convey.

For even as the linguistic form of Mary's utterances is compromised, she is able to indicate clearly that she is using reported speech and whose speech she is reporting.

Children with clinical conditions such as autism spectrum disorder can also employ reported speech to achieve a range of functions. In a study of story retell in typically developing children and children with ASD, Stirling et al. (2009: 33) remark that it is 'unusual' that the boy with ASD who produced the following extract of written narrative did not go on to represent the response of the wolves to the challenge from the big bad pig:

> One day, the big bad pig came prowling down the road. When he saw the house that the three little wolves had built, he said "Little wolves, little wolves, let me come in, or I'll huff and I'll puff and I'll blow your house down!" So he huffed and he puffed and he puffed and he huffed, but the house would not come down.

But what is clear from this extract is that this child is able to use reported speech to progress the story or move it along. Moreover, the function of direct reported speech in this case, with its repetition of the vocative noun phrase *little wolves* and use of the rhyming verbs *huff* and *puff*, is to animate the character of the pig for the reader of the narrative. Through this animation, the boy with ASD is able to secure the attention of, and engage his reader in, the unfolding narrative.

As these examples indicate, children and adults with cognitive and language disorders are reasonably adept at using reported speech to perform a range of functions. The idea that reported speech has limited communicative value is thus not supported either by the frequency with which this aspect of language is used, or by its diverse functions, in language intact individuals and in subjects with clinical conditions. Any assumption to the contrary serves only to misrepresent the important communicative work that is undertaken by reported speech. It also serves to diminish the relevance of this notion to clinical investigators who are then disinclined to attribute any significance to reported speech within assessment protocols. But there is another feature of these protocols which has led to the neglect of reported speech. This is the tendency to assess 'simple' pragmatic behaviours over 'complex' behaviours. The former typically involves behaviours that can be readily elicited in a clinical context such as the use of speech acts to make requests and promises, and to decline an invitation. This category of pragmatic behaviours also includes the identification of violations of Gricean maxims of quantity, quality, relation and manner which are mistakenly presumed to tell us something about pragmatic communication. The use of gestures and facial expressions, and the mental states (e.g. intentions, emotions) that are revealed through them, are also included in this category of pragmatic behaviours. Other behaviours in this category are those on display during conversational routines such as turn-taking and during the sequences enacted by participants in conversational openings and closings. An examination of the content of two prominent pragmatic assessments – the Pragmatics Profile (Dewart and Summers 1988) and the Pragmatic Protocol (Prutting and Kirchner 1987) – confirms the preponderance of these behaviours:

Pragmatics profile (Dewart and Summers 1988)	Pragmatic protocol (Prutting and Kirchner 1987)
A. Communicative functions	**Verbal aspects**
1. Attention directing	A. Speech acts
2. Requesting	1. Speech act pair analysis
3. Giving information	2. Variety of speech acts
4. Giving instructions	B. Topic
5. Narrative[a]	3. Selection
6. Humour	4. Introduction
7. Expression of emotion	5. Maintenance
B. Response to communication	6. Change
8. Gaining child's attention	C. Turn taking
9. Understanding indirect requests	7. Initiation
10. Idiom	8. Response
11. Sarcasm	9. Repair/revision
12. Metalinguistic awareness[a]	10. Pause time
13. Responding with amusement	11. Interruption/overlap
14. Negotiation	12. Feedback to speakers
15. Request for clarification	13. Adjacency
C. Interaction and conversation	14. Contingency
16. Interest in interaction	15. Quantity/conciseness
17. Maintaining an interaction or conversation	D. Lexical selection/use across speech acts
18. Presupposition and shared knowledge	16. Specificity/accuracy
19. Conversational repair	17. Cohesion
20. Joining a conversation	E. Stylistic variations
21. Terminating a conversation	18. The varying of communicative style
D. Contextual variation	**Paralinguistic aspects**
22. Person	F. Intelligibility and prosodics
23. Situation	19. Intelligibility
24. Time	20. Vocal intensity
25. Topic	21. Vocal quality
26. Books as a context for communication	22. Prosody
27. Use of language in play	23. Fluency
28. Peer interaction	**Nonverbal aspects**
29. Compliance with social conventions	G. Kinesics and proxemics
	24. Physical proximity
	25. Physical contacts
	26. Body posture
	27. Foot/leg and hand/arm movements
	28. Gestures
	29. Facial expression
	30. Eye gaze

[a]Illustrative examples do not include reported speech

Clearly, one's ability to communicate effectively will be compromised if any of these behaviours is noticeably aberrant. So the inclusion of these behaviours in a clinical communication assessment is certainly warranted. But none of these behaviours is dependent on the complex meta-representational abilities that are the basis of reported speech. In order to report speech, I must do more than merely entertain a mental state which is then revealed to others, in the way that a speaker can convey his state of anger by simply shaking a clenched fist. I must attribute mental states to a speaker who is removed in time and space from my own discourse context. The beliefs and other mental states which I attribute to the reported speaker may relate to people and events in the world (first-order belief attribution) or they may relate to the beliefs of interlocutors in the reported speaker's discourse context (second-order belief attribution). We may not even stop at second-order belief attribution of the type that is needed to produce reported speech utterances such as *Tom said that Sally thinks the painting is a sight to behold*. For we may also need to use reported speech utterances such as *Tom said Sally thinks Bill believes the painting will attract a high price* which require third-order belief attribution. The meta-representational capacity which makes these utterances possible is not addressed by most (or any) pragmatic language assessments. These assessments overlook cognitively complex pragmatic concepts such as reported speech even when their target age range extends into late adolescence and beyond, a time when these concepts may be expected to be part of one's communicative competence.[3]

Narrative-based discourse procedures are often not much better than pragmatic language tests in assessing reported speech. Many of these procedures require subjects to retell stories using wordless picture books or a series of line drawings. A wordless picture book, which is commonly used for this purpose, is Mayer (1969) *Frog*, *Where are You*?.[4] One of the pictures from this book is presented below (Fig. 1). The difficulty with an assessment of this type is that it is possible to give a perfectly adequate narration of the events in this picture (and, indeed, of all the pictures in the book) without needing to use reported speech at all. The narrator can say the following: 'The dog is jumping up to a nest of bees in the tree. The bees are flying around the nest. The boy is looking for his frog. He is shouting into a hole in the ground'. The often minimal elicitation of reported speech that is achieved by an assessment of this type would appear to be confirmed by a study of narrative production undertaken by Reilly et al. (2004). These investigators examined the use of narrative in typically developing children and in children with SLI, Williams syndrome and unilateral focal brain damage. When pictures such as

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[3]The upper age limit of two prominent pragmatic language assessments – the Test of Pragmatic Language (Phelps-Terasaki and Phelps-Gunn 2007) and the Children's Communication Checklist (Bishop 2003) – is 18;11 years and 16 years, respectively.

[4]The wordless picture book *Frog*, *Where are You*? is one of four audiotaped narratives which is included in the Strong Narrative Assessment Procedure (SNAP; Strong 1998). The SNAP is a criterion-referenced measure which is designed to assess narrative discourse skills through the use of story retell. It may be used to evaluate children from 6 to 13 years of age, although comparison data are only available for children from 7 to 10 years of age.

Fig. 1 Picture from the wordless picture book *Frog, Where are You*? (Mayer 1969)

the one shown above were presented to these children, their utterances only rarely contained episodes of reported speech. In fact, across the 53 utterances (or 600 words) of these children included in Reilly et al.'s paper, only 35 words (5.8 %) were used to report speech (see Table 1). This figure of 5.8 % is well below the figures of 8.3 % and 10.8 % which have been reported in other narrative contexts (Ely and Ryan 2008; Johnstone 1993). Clearly, narrative retell based on pictures – a mainstay of clinical discourse assessments – is not always an effective means of eliciting and measuring reported speech.

4 Future Clinical Research on Reported Speech

It emerges that the current state of research on reported speech, at least in a clinical context, is not a particularly productive or beneficial one. With the very rare exception, reported speech has not been a topic of investigation for clinical researchers. This has been the case notwithstanding several factors which suggest that this aspect of language use should be a focus of clinical research (e.g. the high frequency and diverse functions of reported speech). There are many, interrelated reasons for this

Table 1 Reported speech utterances (bold) of typically developing (TD) children and children with focal brain injury (FBI) and Williams syndrome (WMS) studied by Reilly et al. (2004)

Child's status	Age (year; month)	Narrated output
FBI	11; 11	They yelling **the frog's name**
FBI	7; 0	He's telling the dog **to be quiet**
FBI	10; 11	While they lean out the window they're calling **the frog's name**
TD	4; 3	He couldn't find him and he said "**Froggie come back**!"
TD	7; 3	He was trying to tell the dog **to be quiet** because his frog was in the log
TD	9; 6	And then the boy took the frog and said **goodbye** to the other ones. That's it
TD	10; 0	And the family lets the boy have a little frog and they say **goodbye**
WMS	9; 10	So many bees! The boy said "**Ow! Somebody stung me**!"
WMS	9; 0	And he said "**Hey frogs, we're all together**!" The end! That was great wasn't it?
WMS	10; 0	Here's the frog and he's in love! And he says "**Hooray! Hooray! Hooray! I found my froggie**!" And then he says **Byeeee**!"

omission including a lack of integration between academic and clinical disciplines, a preoccupation with cognitively simple over cognitively complex pragmatic concepts, and various limitations of clinical assessments. Having acknowledged this dearth of clinical research, the issue now is one of how future researchers can usefully address it. The way forward, I contend, rests on new ways of thinking about reported speech and on new collaborations between researchers. Specifically, future research must (1) achieve a cognitive reorientation of reported speech, (2) examine reported speech in naturalistic communicative contexts, (3) include reported speech in clinical pragmatic and discourse assessments and measures of functional communication, (4) pursue multidisciplinary investigations of reported speech over investigations conducted within a single discipline, (5) examine reported speech across clinical populations which are distinguished by their linguistic, cognitive and combined cognitive-linguistic deficits and (6) establish developmental norms for reported speech in typically developing children which may be used to determine the extent of any delay in children with neurodevelopmental and other disorders. Each of these points will be examined further in the rest of this section.

A cognitive reorientation of reported speech is needed to bring this aspect of language use fully into the clinical domain. The identification of the cognitive substrates of reported speech will make possible a new and powerful level of explanation in our understanding of this notion in clients with clinical conditions. These substrates are likely to involve some combination of the skills which we have described in this chapter as meta-representation (or theory of mind) and executive function. Certainly, cognitive accounts based on ToM and executive function skills

are beginning to make a significant contribution to our understanding of other pragmatic concepts (see chapter 4 in Cummings (2014a) for discussion). A likely gain of any cognitive reorientation will be in terms of theory development. Cognitive frameworks will make it possible to bring forward testable hypotheses about reported speech in a range of disorders. For example, it is likely that some types of reported speech involve higher levels of meta-representation than other types. The greater inferential complexity of the former may render them vulnerable to disruption in clinical populations with specific deficits of this meta-representational capacity (e.g. autism spectrum disorder). Similarly, the additional memory load that accrues when multiple discourse contexts are accessed and represented during reported speech may find this aspect of language use particularly compromised in clients with certain forms of dementia and traumatic brain injury. Generation and testing of specific hypotheses have largely not been possible in the less explicit analyses of reported speech which have been undertaken in philosophical, linguistic and literary domains.[5] In their continued absence, investigators will be constrained to use non-cognitive frameworks which have limited explanatory power in a clinical context.

There is now considerable focus on naturalistic communicative contexts in the assessment and treatment of language disorders. This is borne out of the recognition that assessment targets and treatment goals only have value to the extent that they bring about communicative gains in these contexts. But there is a further reason for the emphasis on naturalistic communicative contexts in the management of language disorders. This is the recognition that contrived scenarios such as asking a child to narrate a story to a wordless picture book or an adult to act out the role of a customer in a service encounter can alter the very nature and extent of linguistic behaviours. We have already seen, for example, how reported speech during picture-based story retell may occur at an altogether lower frequency than reported speech in other contexts (e.g. spoken narratives of personal experience). This variation in frequency is likely to be explained by factors such as the increased salience to an individual of personal events and increased motivation to report the spoken contributions of actors within those events (as opposed to characters in a story who may have little personal relevance to the narrator and whose speech may be less frequently reported as a result). Naturalistic communicative contexts are also likely to affect the content of reported speech. In these contexts, the reported speaker's utterance(s) must be retrieved from memory and may be relatively inaccessible as a result. Reported speech under these conditions may take the form of more or less accurate paraphrases of these utterances. During story retell, the reported context is readily accessible to the narrator in the form of pictures. Reported speech in this context may include details which would not be found in speech reported during conversation, for example. These effects of context require that we look to

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[5]Studies of reported speech in these domains can be found in Holt and Clift (2006), Cappelen and Lepore (2007), Janssen and van der Wurff (1996), Lucy (1993) and Beck (2012).

naturalistic contexts to understand reported speech rather than depend on contrived clinical scenarios that may serve only to distort this notion.

In an ideal world, research developments should sustain a range of activities which are conducted as part of clinical practice. Evidence of this relationship can be found throughout speech-language pathology and includes the use of cognitive neuropsychological research in the development of aphasia assessments, the results of stuttering treatment studies to establish the most effective form of fluency intervention and the use of developmental studies of phonology to determine the order in which to treat phonological targets in children. But, of course, an ideal world is not the actual world. Not infrequently, the research base in an area is either almost non-existent or not particularly well developed. In such a scenario, clinical practice must take the lead and begin to assess and treat communicative behaviours in advance of research findings which indicate how this may best be done. Just such is the case for reported speech. It is now time, I contend, for clinicians to forge ahead and include reported speech as standard in their communicative assessments of clients in the expectation (or maybe hope) that sustained research on this notion will follow. Functional communication measures should also embrace reported speech. This is because even clients with severe language disorders may still be able to use reported speech as an effective interactional resource. In this way, Hengst et al. (2005) reported the case of a 21-year-old woman called Ethel who, despite her moderate to severe non-fluent aphasia, was able to use non-linguistic resources to shape her telegraphic and single-word utterances into reported speech, framing them with gestures and shifting voice with paralinguistic features. By putting reported speech on their assessment agenda, clinicians can play an important role in making the clinical case for its systematic investigation by researchers.

Another key issue for future clinical research on reported speech must be the pursuit of studies which combine the insights of several academic and clinical disciplines. Linguists with a background in pragmatics and discourse need to work alongside cognitive psychologists and neuropsychologists in order for the cognitive basis of reported speech to be understood. The insights of fields such as developmental psychopathology will be invaluable in terms of understanding how the ToM impairments of individuals with autism spectrum disorder can compromise the use of reported speech. The discipline of psychiatry can contribute expertise to interdisciplinary studies of reported speech through its knowledge of how psychotic and affective disorders are likely to compromise the type of perspective-taking which is integral to this aspect of language use. The already strong links between linguistics and speech-language pathology in areas such as phonology and syntax can be strengthened further by including pragmatists and discourse analysts in clinical linguistic investigations of reported speech. These interconnections between disciplines are the points from which new thinking about reported speech will arise and from which future clinical research on reported speech must now proceed. Moreover, the benefits of these interdisciplinary exchanges will not be in one direction only. In the same way that aspects of language use appear set to assume increasing significance in the early diagnosis of disorders such as the dementias (see Cummings (2012) for discussion), reported speech may also find itself in

the service of clinical disciplines in areas such as diagnosis. The largely single-discipline studies of reported speech which have been conducted to date have certainly contributed to our understanding of this notion. However, interdisciplinary investigations are now needed to take our knowledge of reported speech to the next level.

A further point which might usefully steer future clinical research on reported speech is that we should embark on the research process with clear (but not fixed) categories in mind of the types of clinical conditions in which reported speech is likely to be impaired. In Sect. 2, we attempted to do just that by drawing a distinction between clinical conditions with primary language disorders (e.g. specific language impairment), conditions with primary cognitive disorders (e.g. amnesia) and conditions with so-called cognitive-communication disorders (e.g. traumatic brain injury). This tripartite classification was supported by the quite discrete sets of cognitive and language skills upon which reported speech depends. As results begin to emerge from clinical studies, this particular classification may be found to be erroneous – reported speech may not break down along the lines indicated by this classification. Instead, impairments of reported speech may be shown to coalesce around the different levels of meta-representation that this notion demands and the clinical conditions in which meta-representational abilities are most compromised. But at least this classification provides a rational starting point for clinical research which, if left fully unconstrained, may come to resemble the quite chaotic situation that has characterized clinical pragmatic research over many years (see Cummings (2007, 2009) for a critical evaluation of the current state of clinical pragmatic research). Even an incorrect initial classification is an effective organizing principle for research if it avoids a proliferation of studies which have a limited capacity to reveal anything about reported speech or the clinical conditions in which reported speech is impaired. The more likely scenario is that this tripartite classification can be revised and increasingly refined as results are forthcoming from clinical studies.

A final point that may facilitate future clinical research on reported speech concerns the need to undertake developmental studies of this notion in typically developing children. In the absence of studies of the developmental stages that typically developing children pass through on their way to acquiring full competence in the use of reported speech, we have no normative values whatsoever to bring to the study of children with impairments of this aspect of language. We cannot judge if the child with specific language impairment or if an adult with autism spectrum disorder has a developmental deficit in the use of reported speech if we do not know the reported speech abilities of the chronological age peers and/or mental age peers of these individuals. (The comparison with mental age peers is necessitated by the fact that some children and adults may have an intellectual disability alongside conditions such as autism spectrum disorder.) Certainly, the small number of developmental studies of reported speech which

has been conducted to date is not remotely adequate for this purpose.[6] However, it should be emphasized that reported speech is not unique in this regard. In Cummings (2009), it was argued that a lack of developmental studies in all areas of pragmatics represented a considerable hindrance to clinical pragmatic research. If clinical pragmatics is to achieve the same status as the more highly developed fields of clinical phonology and clinical syntax, a significant research effort, it was contended, needed to be directed towards developmental studies of pragmatics. The recommendation now is for developmental studies of reported speech to be included as a significant part of that effort.

5   Summary

This chapter has explored reported speech from a clinical pragmatic perspective. It began with an examination of the linguistic features of reported speech and the language and cognitive skills that are needed to report speech. The diverse functions of reported speech were also considered. In the absence of clinical studies, a number of predictions were then made about the types of clients for whom reported speech may be an area of compromise. Three categories of client were distinguished – children and adults with primary language disorders (e.g. aphasia), those with primary cognitive disorders (e.g. amnesia) and those with cognitive-communication disorders (e.g. right-hemisphere damage). Based on the impairments of these groups, quite different aspects of reported speech were expected to be challenging for the adult with aphasia and the adult with a cognitive-communication disorder following traumatic brain injury, for example. Of course, these predictions, while reasonable, were nonetheless largely speculative in the absence of their empirical validation in clinical studies. Several reasons why these studies had not been undertaken were considered. They included a lack of integration between the academic and clinical disciplines which could throw light on reported speech, the mistaken assumption that reported speech has limited communicative value for language intact subjects and individuals with clinical conditions, and certain limitations of clinical pragmatic and discourse assessments. The chapter then concluded with a discussion of six key issues which, it was claimed, could usefully steer future clinical research on reported speech.

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[6]It is revealing of the lack of developmental studies which have been undertaken on reported speech that a search of titles in a major journal in the area – *Journal of Child Language* – revealed only one article on this topic. The paper in question is Smyth (1995). A rather unique study by Hemphill et al. (1994) examines developmental changes in direct and reported character speech, among other discourse features, in typically developing children and children with perinatal brain injury between the ages of 5 and 7 years.

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On the (Complicated) Relationship Between Direct and Indirect Reports

Alessandro Capone

1   Introduction

The issue of (direct and indirect) reports is magisterially summed up in Keith Allan (2016a):

> Essentially a report is X's re-presentation to Y of what Z said. Because X is not identical with Z, what Z said is necessarily transmuted by X. X may use a different medium (e.g. written in place of spoken); X will have a different voice; and X will re-present what Z said, more often than not using different lexis and grammar, even when attempting a verbatim quote. X may have misheard or misinterpreted Z's utterance: she may add an affective gloss. All of these distinguish X's report ρ from Z's utterance υ in both form and content, which renders every report "indirect" to some extent; there are different degrees of indirectness, but a truly indirect report utilises pragmatic enrichment, e.g. when Z's utterance *It's never stopped raining since we arrived* is reported as *Z complained about the terrible weather there* or *I won easily* is reported as a boast, mistake, or lie.

Although for Allan there is not a clear-cut distinction between direct and indirect reports, he assumes that if there is something to distinguish them, it is the indirect reports' reliance on explicatures (explicatures do not appear (or it is best to say, are not explicated) in direct reports). In this paper, we shall discuss a number of related issues on the basis of this presupposition – although at some point we discuss a(n allegedly) grammatical difference between direct and indirect reports – one which is not accepted by Allan (p.c.) and which my other considerations also lead me to be suspicious of.

The issue of indirect reports is fairly complicated, one of the basic assumptions presupposed (or assumed) by most scholars working on indirect reports is that they are different (in many respects, even if in the end the difference could only be a

A. Capone (✉)
Department of Linguistics, Faculty of Cognitive Sciences, University of Messina, Messina, Italy
e-mail: Alessandro.caponis@gmail.com

matter of degree) from direct reports.[1] One way to characterize this difference is to say that its main ingredient is accuracy or the lack of it (greater or less granularity, in the terminology of Holt 2016). Indirect reports seem to allow the speaker (and prepare the hearer) for a lower degree of accuracy than direct reports. Direct reports, we may assume, but this is a fiction to be dispelled in the course of this paper, report verbatim what a speaker said. They more or less report the same things as indirect reports, but they are required in different contexts. Direct reports seem to prevent the reporter from manipulating the content of the report – interpolations are banned, or so it might appear 'prima facie' (however, we should soon insist on the difference between strict and loose direct reports). But there are many ways to manipulate the content of a direct report without giving rise to criticism. Suppose Speaker A said 'p' and then 'q'. The direct reporter may make an innocent change, by inverting the order of the utterances. He could report: A said q; p. This is a 'prima facie' innocent change but it shows how easily we can inject our voice even into a direct report. As Grice was well aware, the report may be misleading, because it conveys different implicatures (in Capone 2008, I actually thought that some of these inferences were properly called 'explicatures'). A probably has a reason to say p before q. Perhaps the reason is that q explains p or elaborates on p. If the order is changed, the perlocutionary effects are different (Allan 2016a writes of 'rearrangements'). Now, although this case can be clearly deepened further, all I need it for is to show that some small differences in the message reported may account for big differences in interpretation. So, it is possible for the speaker to add some interpolations in direct reports too, although we expect that such interpolations should be more substantial in indirect reports. In indirect reports, the speaker may change the words to some extent and thus one of the tasks of the hearer (of an indirect report) is to reconstruct what was actually said on the basis of what was reported (eliminating possible transformations which altered the content too much). So the reporter's problem is obviously the reverse of the hearer's problem. The reporter needs to move from the words uttered to an indirect report which more or less summarizes the content of those words (an author who explicitly uses the term 'summary' (or 'gloss') for indirect reports exhibiting less granularity is Holt (2016)); the hearer has to move from the words of the indirect report to the words of the reported speaker, often having to infer that (some of) these words belong to the reporting speaker and not to the reported speaker or vice-versa that these words belong to the reported speaker and not to the reporting speaker. Although 'prima facie' indirect reports might appear simple, in fact they are rather complicated language games (see Capone and Salmani

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[1]With some exceptions, such as Saka (2005) and Keith Allan (p.c.), who reiterates what he expressed in Allan (2016a, b). Allan has not been able to find any significant difference between direct and indirect reports. He also thinks that indirect reports could admit interjections as parts of mixed-quoted segments. Also see Coulmas (1986, 5) who says "What appears to be simply the alternative to direct discourse is thus a complex assembly of ways of reporting another's speech or certain aspects thereof (. . .) make indirect speech a versatile mode of speech reporting ranging from faithfully adapting the linguistic form of the reported utterance to the deictic centre of the report situation to a summarizing paraphrase of an utterance irrespective of its linguistic form".

Nodoushan 2015 for the view that indirect reports are language games), where both the speaker and the hearer have to adhere to a social praxis, which consists in a number of constraints (to be spelled out later on). In this paper, we try to understand why direct and indirect reports are different language games, even if apparently the rules for the two practices are not completely different. Intuitively, it is the context in which the activity is embedded that shapes the structure of the activity. So we hope to be able to deepen the differences between the two practices by focusing on the contexts and the purposes which accompany them. (The purpose to which the indirect report is put allows us to infer the direction of the changes made by the reporter).

2   Opacity

Let us start the comparison between direct and indirect reports by examining the notion of opacity. Opacity is a characteristic of verbatim direct reports, which may be somehow extended to indirect reports and to belief reports (which, as we shall see, are a variety of indirect reports). (The Davidsonian approach to opacity in indirect reports was to see it as a consequence of seeing the indirect report as a direct report in disguise – Davidson (1968) certainly has the merit of having pointed out the connections between direct and indirect reports and to have pointed to the phenomenon of voicing in indirect reports (although he never explicitly wrote about the polyphonic dimension of indirect reports)).

Consider the following direct report:

(1) Mary said 'You are an idiot'

The speaker of (1) uses some modes of presentation like 'You' and 'idiot' and if one replaces those words, the result may be unsatisfactory, for various reasons. The corresponding indirect report 'Mary said that John is a handicapped person' is unsatisfactory, first of all because the report now uses the proper name 'John' instead of the mode of presentation 'you' (the second person pronoun 'you' has no implication that the speaker knows the addressee by name, as in 'Can you move your car a bit' said to a stranger clearly proves that 'you' does not imply knowledge of the addressee's name).[2] It is also unsatisfactory because the speaker meant to insult John, rather than describing or characterizing him, whereas the replacement of 'idiot' (which is normally used to insult) with 'handicapped person' seems to involve a transition from an insult to a description or characterization (and the transformation is clearly more evident when the insult is paraphrased through an indirect report, as now we are no longer in a position to know whether Mary is speaking face to face to John (in which case 'idiot' is more insulting') or whether

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[2]Although unsatisfactory, the transformation in an indirect report has the advantage of helping the hearers identify the referent, while the pronoun 'you' clearly is not of much help, given that anyone at all could be addressed by the second person pronominal 'you'.

she is speaking of John with a friend. We immediately see that an indirect report is less fine-grained than a direct report (Mary said to John: 'You are an idiot'), and it involves indirection not only in so far as it does not quote a verbatim utterance but because it invariably involves a less fine-grained picture of the situation and the loss of detail has the effect of mitigating the import of the words. (Of course another tactics is available to the indirect reporter, as she could provide a less fine-grained report by focusing on the offence, as in 'Mary offended John' or 'Mary insulted John'. Such tactics focus on the speech act uttered, rather than on the words, and seem to encapsulate interpretation of the words (Mary might have said: 'you are an idiot' smiling (as a joke) in which case it would not be correct to report the utterance as if it counted as an insult). (In Oxford I overhead various times young students saying to one another 'You bastard' (the utterance got my attention because you would never say that in Italian unless you want to be punched). How could one report such utterances? 'X said that the bastard VPs' is clearly not an adequate indirect report and certainly 'bastard' could not be heard as a quoted segment, because there is no way to distinguish between a serious and non-serious use, once the segment is quoted (unless a bit of the original context is provided, a possibility which ought not to be excluded). A segment of speech may be mixed-quoted (or mixed-reported) only when it is possible to recognize whether it was uttered with a serious or non-serious intention. If such a recognition is not possible, given the clues available, then the quotation will lead to obscurity and a violation of a Gricean maxim (perspicuity: in this case, avoid unwanted ambiguities).

But opacity is strictly the consequence of a view of 'said' which amounts to interpreting 'said' as 'exactly said'. So opacity needs to be qualified as being the result of interpretation of the verb 'say', as surely there can be no opacity if we know that the report, despite the fact that it is direct, is not exactly a verbatim report. The report can fail to be a verbatim report either because we inject something into the utterance or because we eliminate some constituent of it.

Indirect reports and belief reports (a sub-case of indirect reports) seem to behave differently with respect to opacity. Opacity here is more the result of the application of pragmatic principles, than the application of semantics, although the basic principles are semantic. The idea is that if a report does not contain a word actually used in mental or actual speech by the subject (the original speaker), he would object to its being used in the report. Suppose John believes 'Mary is at the cinema' and I report 'John believes that the Queen is at the cinema' and there is no evidence that John knows that Mary is the Queen, then I have clearly not reported something he believes but a proposition which happens to be coextensive with the proposition which he believes. John may not assent to the report of his belief that the Queen is at the cinema. In other words, substitutions in both belief reports and in indirect reports in general cannot be made, without creating a problem, as the reported speaker may not approve the report. However, according to some authors (see Soames 1988, 1989), this is not due to semantics, but to pragmatics. In other words, although the practice of substituting a coextensive NP in a belief report or indirect report in general is not deviant from a semantic point of view, it is not acceptable due to pragmatics, given that the reporter implicates, by using a certain sentence, that

the original speaker or the subject of the belief believes the proposition under the mode of presentation offered by the sentence used, given that he could have used different modes of presentation, but did not use them. In direct reports (especially those which are verbatim) it is clearly semantics that is involved in opacity, as the quotation marks usually are taken to indicate that the words in quotation marks were uttered verbatim (without modification or without much modification). This is semantic opacity – but notice that this view is correct or close to correct only if we accept that quotation marks are conventional semantic indicators that the sentence or words they bracket are verbatim reports. As I said, this view is not devoid of problems, because we notice that there is some latitude in the semantics of 'say', as sometimes it means 'say more or less', some other times it means 'say exactly'. Even 'say' is a context-sensitive expression and we should decide whether we have two verbs 'say1' and 'say2' or whether we have only 'say', which can be weakened or reinforced (another problem is to establish whether the weaker or the stronger meaning is associated with the semantics of 'say', while the other meaning can be obtained (for free) by subtracting or adding features in a context of utterance). This would be a case in which pragmatics is allied with parsimony (see Jaszcolt 1999), given that on the basis of the same lexical entry, two meanings (or shadows of meaning) are constructed.

2.1   Transformations in Direct and Indirect Reports

In this section, I shall argue that both direct and indirect reports can undergo drastic transformations (in the sense that in reporting the original utterance some element of the utterance is lost and some element accrues to it; in other words, a report is sometimes less fine-grained, some other times more fine-grained). If this thesis proves correct, then we should seek the difference between direct and indirect reports elsewhere – or we have to say that the difference is one of degree and not of substance.

First of all, we need to be aware that in some cases (rare though they are) a direct report sounds very much like an indirect report. It may even be a consequence of conventions that such direct reports are interpreted as indirect reports, that is to say they are not to be taken verbatim, although 'prima facie' they look like direct reports. One example that comes to mind is: He said Good Bye (it is interesting that the Italian translation means more than the report of a greeting, and often implies the sudden interruption of an interaction due to a disagreement (or an argument)).[3]

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[3]Another example similar to 'He said Goodbye', is the Italian utterance 'Gli ho detto vaffanculo' (I said to him Go to hell), which although it looks like a direct report (apparently quoting the words said) need not be a direct report, as the hearer imagines that the speaker may have proffered different words (a longer utterance, possibly). This looks like a summary. Another way of summing up the situation would be: 'L'ho mandato affanculo'. Although this does not make reference to any words or utterances, it sums up the situation when we make clear to someone else that we no

With this example, there is no implication that 'Good Bye' is all that the speaker said, but this is a narrative way of saying (a summary, in other words) that the interaction came to a halt. In English, 'he said Goodbye' can also mean that there is a ceremony in which some people give their last greeting to a deceased. In this case it is not a Goodbye utterance but it may be a sequence of utterances or a sequence of utterances by (possibly) different speakers (They said Goodbye). Furthermore, such an idiom places emphasis on the speech act rather than on the words, it works like a summary, even if it appears that it is quoted speech. Here there is an element of convention. However, in some cases it is not convention but context that will allow us to detect an indirect report on hearing a direct report. Consider the following:

(2) Mum said: Mary must have a bath (said to a 5 years old daughter)[4]

Here the father is dramatizing the mother's words to have a greater impact on the daughter but there is no reason to expect that this is a verbatim quote; perhaps the mother said 'Do not forget Mary's bath'. Here there may be an element of convention too, as the father does not expect his daughter to take him literally (it may be a consequence of adult-child interaction that different conventions are used, with quotations used as indirect reports).

It might be of interest to collect examples involving this kind of transformation, but this is not the main point of the section. The main point of the section is that the border between direct and indirect reports has been corroded.

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longer want to have intercourse with them. This is clearly a summary of what was said and of the (perlocutionary) effects of what was said.

[4]When I re-read this part of the paper, I realized there is an ambiguity (if no colon is inserted), as one does not know whether a direct or an indirect report is issued. Davidson was probably right in his intuition that opacity in indirect reports comes from a structure like: Mum said that: Mary must have a bath. I assume that in oral speech, there are ways to distinguish between the direct report structure and the indirect report structure, as with quotation there must be a pause. We wonder whether the pause is a pronominal in disguise (an implicit pronominal like 'that') followed by a colon. This issue cannot be settled here, but surely there is something in the Davidsonian intuition and what matters most some pragmatics is needed to resolve the ambiguity indirect report/direct report in some cases, even if, unless we interpret quotation as strict or pure (involving quotation marks and an expression which is literally quoted), there would be no need to resolve such an ambiguity, because there would be trivial differences between direct and indirect reports. As far as I know the only obstacles that stands in the way of a conflation between direct and indirect reports is a) that sometimes quotation must be interpreted as strict quotation (Mary said exactly that: . . .) and that direct quotation, but not indirect quotation, does admit the insertion of discourse markers. But of course, this obstacle can be overcome if one admits mixed quotation in indirect reports: He said that oh yes he was happy to accept the professorship. At least in spoken utterances, scholars have envisaged the possibility of mixed quotation in indirect reports (or mixed indirect reports), and thus a small step forward would possibly be to admit that discourse markers and interjections can appear in indirect reports too (He said that, Oh làlà, he was finally in love). (Of course a non-negligible problem is to attribute the interjection to a speaker or to another, given that the indirect report conflates the reporter and the reported speakers' voices). This problem will be discussed later and I will say that considerations on explicatures can explain why interjections seem not to appear in indirect reports (or are considered illicit there).

Now we shall be concerned with the transformations we can notice in direct reports. Surely we do not expect the direct reports to be exhaustive. Even if an utterance were to be taken as a verbatim report, there is no implication that this is all that was said, but only that what is reported is relevant to the conversational needs at hand. By reporting an utterance, the speaker hopes to provide useful information to the addressee. There is no need to report parts of the utterance which are not of use to the addressee and, thus, no implication that what was reported was everything that was said.[5] Perhaps it was only a selection of what was said. Of course, if the speaker made a selection of utterances to report, it is possible that he decided not to report something which could be of relevance to the addressee, but which was not congruent with the speaker's purpose. Thus there is no point in assuming that the speaker made no manipulation of the utterances he reported.

2.2 Elimination

One reason why 'elimination' seems to us to be an essential transformation is that we cannot possibly report everything that a speaker said and, thus, we have to make a selection or possibly select only an utterance out of many that she proffered (originally, elimination was discussed by Wieland (2013) in a very interesting paper on indirect reports (though she did not say anything on direct reports) and taken up and critically discussed by Capone (2013a, b)). Relevance may be an element in our choice – as we discard those utterances which are not relevant to our purpose. Elimination is an important transformation, although we qua hearers are not able to see the boundaries of the utterance and imagine what was adjacent to those utterances. However, the reported speaker can sometimes complain 'But this is not everything I said' or 'this is only part of what I said', with the implication that the reporter deleted materials which could have been useful in establishing whether the reported speaker was guilty of something (in case the report is used as part of an accusation). I do not easily forget the event in which, in the course of a meeting of the college council, the Dean said, as a way of making an example, "Suppose I say that Professor Buccheri is an idiot". As you can very well imagine, the Professor in question complained violently although the word 'idiot' was only used as part of a supposition. The truth is that careful though you might be to bracket (or frame, to use a Goffmanian expression) an epithet as part of a quotation, attributing an epithet to someone is insulting (or so it is perceived). So, I quite agree that Professor Buccheri had reasons to complain, but what followed the complaint was not quite

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[5]I distinctly remember deleting from my academic quotations those parts which I deemed to be irrelevant to the purpose of the quotation (using (. . .) to mark the deletion transformation). Of course, in the written mode of communication one can signal slots, where the inverse transformation can be effected, but in the oral mode of communication it is not possible to insert such empty slots and thus the hearer is not encouraged to reconstruct the deleted part.

correct. In fact, in order to express this complaint formally, the professor in question needed the minutes of the meeting and such a report was very partial, both in the sense that it only partially reported the Dean's words and in the sense that it was written in favor of professor Buccheri. It was clear, after the Dean compelled us all to read and approve the report (or withdraw approval), that much of what had happened had disappeared and that the only event on which the minutes focused was the utterance mentioning Buccheri's name. In this way, the Dean appeared to be a very crazy person who wanted to insult the Professor – it was not any longer evident that Buccheri's name appeared in the course of making the example and that the utterance was a temporary hitch (a momentary impasse), some unintended offence. (The Dean showed that she was not sensitive to some social constraints which should have prevented her from associating the name of someone who was present at the meeting with the epithet 'idiot' even if as part of an example). So, from this discussion we can evince that ELIMINATION is a powerful rhetorical strategy which always has some perlocutionary function.

Another type of elimination is what can be called ELIMINATION UNDER ENTAILMENT (see Wieland 2013 for discussion of this transformation in connection with indirect reports and Capone 2013a for criticism). This too looks like a simple and innocent sort of elimination, although we had better ask, why should the speaker want to eliminate a constituent? Elimination under entailment is the practice of eliminating some constituent which might be deemed superfluous or redundant or irrelevant to the purpose of the citation. Suppose Mary says: John, who has always spoken in defense of freedom, yesterday attacked freedom of speech, saying that nowadays people can say all sorts of offensive things. Now it is clear that the previous utterance entails → John yesterday attacked freedom of speech, saying that nowadays people can say all sorts of offensive things. Under entailment we could make one further deletion, given that the utterance thus obtained entails → John yesterday attacked freedom of speech. And now we could also make one further deletion, since the utterance now obtained entails the following → John attacked freedom of speech. It is clear that all these deletions may be oriented towards a purpose, which may lie not in brevity, but in some possibly opaque and to some extent unpredictable perlocutionary purpose. By deleting 'yesterday' the speaker may give the impression that this attitude is not limited to a short period of John's life and by deleting 'saying that nowadays people can say all sorts of things', the speaker may eliminate a reason for John's position (thus, John may look a more dogmatic person than he is or his remark may have greater generality, since having deleted this constituent, John may be taken to be opposed to freedom of speech for the wrong kind of reason (for all we know he may want to prevent anyone from speaking, even those who say things that are right; instead John only wants to prevent fools from speaking)). By deleting the constituent 'who has always spoken in defense of freedom', the speaker is charactering John as someone who has always held the position that freedom of speech should be attacked, when instead the speaker explicitly says that this attitude is a fairly recent one and that he used to think otherwise. Furthermore, the speaker is now deliberately avoiding giving the impression (given by the original utterance) that there is a contrast between what

John used to think in the past and what he thinks now (with the implication that there was a point at which he changed his mind). So now it should be clear to the speaker that the perlocutionary effects of the report orient the possible transformations and eliminations from a verbatim report.

That verbatim reports do not exist or are very rare is something that emerges from the literature on quotation and on indirect reports. Saka (2005), for example, says that quotation is rarely verbatim and Keith Allan (2016a, b) says that reports (whether direct or indirect) at least may involve a reshuffling or reordering of the events reported.

2.3   Expansions

Intuitively, indirect reports are more susceptible of being expanded. It may be possible to add materials in an indirect report, without drastically altering the content of the original utterance. Indirect reports often reveal the reporter's interpretation work. He wants to make sense of an utterance, not just report it. Thus we expect that he may reveal the explicatures and the implicatures of the original utterance, in a way that the original utterance did not (see Keith Allan 2016a for the basic idea that indirect reports may semanticize pragmatic aspects of the original utterance). The indirect reporter may furthermore be sensitive to possible contradictions in the original utterance and eliminate them by offering an interpretation that reconciles the readings of the various sentences in the utterance (thus she will work on the assumption that the original speaker is rational and could not have said things that contradict each other; therefore alternative interpretations have to be sought beyond the literal meaning of the sentences) (Dascal 2003). The reporter may also report qualities of the utterance such as the voice (he said that in a soft voice; or, he said that shouting; he shouted that …). And finally he may intercept sincerity or falsity (he was not sincere when he said that; I could see it in his eyes; when I looked at him, he diverted his eyes). The speaker can also intercept sarcasm or metaphoric meaning (thus an indirect report may also be indirect in the sense that it will typically go beyond the literal meaning to capture metaphoric meanings[6]). Appositions can be added to clarify the referent of an NP in addition to the possibility of replacing an NP with a coextensive one. Appositions can also be added at the sentential level to clarify the meaning of an utterance (He said that p, by which he meant that q). What is most interesting is that the reporter can also draw inferences of a non-linguistic type, especially of the deductive type. In other words, the reported speaker could focus on the consequences of what the original speaker said; by drawing the

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[6]The social practice of indirect reporting presumably involves constraints such as the following:

Do not (indirectly) report the literal meaning of an utterance if you know that the utterance had a non-literal meaning (according to the speaker's intentions) unless you know that the hearer has clues which will allow her to reconstruct the intended meaning.

obvious consequences of what the speaker said, he may say something that praises the speaker or something that criticizes her (in case the obvious consequences were negative and did not occur to the original speaker).

2.4   Interjections in Indirect Reports

It appears that in English indirect reports do not admit interjections or discourse markers (Mayes 1990; Hassler 2002; Wilkins 1995; Holt 2016). Our expectation is that direct reports should admit interjections and discourse markers. If this is true, then we expect there to be a distinction between direct and indirect reports (what we have said so far, if anything, militates in favor of a conflation of direct and indirect reports). The distinction, however, is not neat. In fact there is the theoretical possibility of having mixed reports in English and in other languages – thus if anything we would expect indirect reports to admit interjections and other discourse markers even if it should be taken for granted that, if such elements appear, they are understood as enveloped in quotation marks. (The fact that interjections in indirect reports are not attested need not amount to saying that they are ungrammatical; they could be dispreferred for a pragmatic reason (a plausible one could be that it is difficult to establish whether the interjection belongs to the original speaker or to the reporting speaker). The literature is silent on the possibility of interpreting interjections in indirect reports as mixed quotations, and thus I take this to be a controversial point (but not a completely outlandish position). What is less controversial is the fact that free indirect reports can contain interjections, expressive and discourse markers (see Blakemore 2013 for serious work on this).[7] This could be taken as evidence that there should be the theoretical possibility of having mixed indirect reports admitting interjections. After all, free indirect reports involve explicatures specifying the 'He said that' or 'He thought that' constituent and once the complete explicature is reconstructed, we return to the problematic utterance 'John said that oh he was very surprised'. At this point we have two options: (a) say that indirect reports too admit interjections, although there is clearly the preference for expressing interjections in explicit direct reports, which explains why such reports of the mixed type are not attested (contrary to ordinary mixed reports); (b) say that there is a difference between the explicature and the explicated utterance and that what is illicit at the level of the explicit utterance is licit at the level of the explicature (thus free indirect reports (with interjections) which are reconstructed on the basis of an explicature are licit (the case of free indirect reports), while ordinary (explicit) indirect reports with interjections are not licit). The reason for this is that (or should be that) although the explicature provides lexical materials ordered in a syntactic fashion, the syntax reconstructed is invisible to grammatical

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[7]An example could be the following:

   Mary thought she was happy. Oh làlà, the love of her life had arrived.

processes. Thus the reconstructed semantico/syntactic constituents are visible from a semantic point of view but are invisible to grammatical constraints (one of these is that interjections cannot be inserted in indirect reports). And now if this option is adopted (but it is not yet clear what (all) the consequences of adopting this option can be), we can explain why mixed indirect reports containing interjections are not possible. After all, even mixed indirect reports rely on explicatures. Consider the following example:

(3) John said that 'that bastard' does not deserve our trust

By using the mixed quotation, the speaker is distancing himself from the expressed proposition (a modal effect is being somehow conveyed, like lowering the speaker's commitment to the expressed proposition). In order to achieve this, we need some kind of pragmatic/syntactic reconstruction:

John said that the person whom he referred to by the words 'that bastard' does not deserve our trust.

The explicature involves addition of a syntactic structure. Now consider again:

(4) John said that oh he was so surprised

This can have the following explicature:

John said that he was so surprised, which he expressed by using the interjection 'Oh'.

But this is clearly uninterpretable: as far as we know John could have produced the ungrammatical 'I am oh so surprised' or 'I am so surprised, oh'. Given the impossibility of assigning one single interpretation to the explicature, this is ill-formed.

I should conclude this section on interjections on a positive note. For those who believe that the difference between direct and indirect reports is only a matter of degree, interjections should not count as an obstacle (to conflation) because one could hold the same position as Keith Allan does expressed in an important personal communication:

> I should have added that if you can't indirectly report an interjection (which you can), then you can't indirectly report a speech defect, a cough, laughter, etc. etc. either. Of course it IS possible to report all of these along with comments on the way the speaker looks.

There is something of considerable theoretical importance in these considerations. Once we accept the theoretical possibility of quoting fragments of speech or the possibility that fragments of the that-clauses of indirect reports can be interpreted this way, then one has to think hard to explain why some types of constituents can occur while others cannot. It is possible that it is not grammaticality in itself that is involved in the fact that interjections appear to be banned in indirect reports, but that some considerations concerning ambiguity and the difficulty in attributing the interjection to the reporter or to the reported speaker prevail. But should not one say that the same considerations that are applicable to interjections should be applicable to other quoted expressions? Without explicit quotation marks, how can we distinguish between the speaker's voice and the reported person's voice?

This is clearly a matter of pragmatics, and while the possibility of interpretative ambiguity looms large, there is always the theoretical possibility of distinguishing between voices. In another paper (Capone 2010b), I argued at length that we need something, This is what I called the Paraphrasis/Form Principle (some constraint on interpretation or some principle specific to indirect reports) which allows us to segregate the reported speaker's from the reporting speaker's voice.

2.4.1 Paraphrasis/Form Principle

The that-clause embedded in the verb 'say' is a paraphrasis of what Y said, and meets the following constraints:

Should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer 'that' on account of its form/style. (Capone 2013a, p. 174).

In a different paper (Capone 2015), I specifically discuss a number of objections leveled by Wayne Davis (in personal communication) to my principle. Since there are ways to surmount those objections, I need not mention them here. However, I need to stress that the Paraphrasis/Form principle clearly has some work to do in the case of interjections and it easily attributes them to the reported speaker (and not to the reporting speaker) by default.

There are some residual problems for a view that allows interjections as quotations in that-clauses of indirect reports. How can we explain the fact that the following report seems to be out?

(5) John said that But he was relieved that he no longer had to work

even with the interpretation:

John said that "But" he was relieved that he no longer had to work.[8]

There may be grammatical reasons – rather than semantic reasons for this – given that both 'that' and 'but' serve to connect sentences (and we may assume that only a connector at a time is allowed to link two sentences, not to mention the fact that 'that' is a connective associated with subordination while 'but' is a connective associated with coordination). Someone with a pragmatic mind might reply that, after all, 'But' can also be considered a discourse marker (see Schiffrin 1987) and under such an interpretation it is not a connective. Yet, one might easily reply that even if 'But' can be used as a discourse marker, this function does not erase its function as connective (as it is able to connect two sentences by distinct speakers),

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[8]I was surprised to read that Alessandra Giorgi (p.c.) finds that under the appropriate intonation (5) could be found acceptable. I must register her different opinion.

which shows why it cannot be compatible with 'that'. At this point people like Keith Allan might accept this explanation but still claim that it is only a grammatical explanation which certainly does not extend to all interjections, as we can find other interjections which do not have the status of sentential connectives (even if they are discourse markers). Thus Allan could be forced to accept that in some cases interjections or discourse markers are not allowed in that-clauses of indirect reports, but that this is not the general case, as in the general case it is possible to hear the interjections as merely quoted segments of the (mixed) indirect report. For the time being we might be happy with this explanation, which certainly has the merit of not making a difference (from a syntactico/semantic point of view) between indirect reports and free indirect reports. Alternatively, one might disagree with Allan and insist that there is a difference between indirect reports and free indirect reports and that in indirect reports the main problem with interjections is that (a) it is not clear whether they should be assigned to the reporter or to the original utterance; (b) even if we assign an explicature that encapsulates the quoted item, such an explicature cannot formally capture the position of the interjection in the corresponding direct report and therefore indeterminacy results, which of course would defeat the purpose of the explicature. This section, we are afraid, does not end with firm conclusions.

2.5 Pronominals

Direct and indirect reports show a different behavior in connection with pronominals. Pronominals, as is pretty obvious, require a context which determines their interpretation (the pronominal is saturated in context). But pronominals within quotations clearly need to be saturated by the context of the original utterance, whereas pronominals of indirect reports need to be saturated by the context of the report (see Holt 2016). Consider this example:

(6) John said that he (pointing to Fred) is so clever.

Clearly the hearer of the report need not search the context of the original utterance in order to assign a referent to 'he' (and even if he wanted to, he could not do this, as only the reporter knows (if he remembers well) the context of the original utterance and although the reporter could furnish part of the context (in a narration prior to the indirect report[9]), one usually does not expect him to do so). Of course he could do so, but then how would the hearer decide whether the referent comes from the context of the original utterance or from that of the narration? This is something of a puzzle, one that clearly cannot be resolved on every occasion of utterance. I suggest that the hearer knows in advance whether the referent should come from the context of the report or from the context of the original utterance. Let us for a

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[9]See Holt (2016) for indirect reports that precede direct reports (to provide circumstantial information). Something similar could happen with indirect reports.

minute suppose that the truth is that the hearer expects the referent to come from the context of the report, for some reason. One such reason might be that the reporter has summed up, as part of the indirect report (or as a preliminary to the indirect report) the context (or part of it) of the original utterance. (However, if the narrator has not provided a narration that sets up the context of the original utterance, there is nothing to search for there (the context of the indirect report)). Another reason might be that the reporter is accompanying the utterance (of the report) with some gestures (in correspondence with the pronominals), thus indicating that the context of utterance will provide the referents and in particular certain objects demonstrated (by movements of the eyes or of some finger (the gesture of pointing)). Another possibility is that pronominals are used anaphorically to refer back to previous NPs – in which case there is no question of searching the context of the original utterance, as the report itself may promote some NP as the antecedent of the anaphor. In this case, pragmatic principles of anaphora suffice (see Huang 1994, 2015). Now let us move back to pronominals in direct reports. Clearly a verbatim report may be indifferent to the issue whether the hearer of the report will recover the referent. The hearer may simply hold the pronominal in his mind until he finds the referent (notice that this way of thinking supports a minimalist view of what is said). Of course, within quotation, there can be anaphoric relations and thus what has been said before may become a context for the pronominal used. Notice, however, that especially in the written mode of communication, one can use brackets to specify in them the referent of a quoted item. I suppose that nothing prevents the speaker from doing the same in oral communication and add some interpolations clarifying/specifying the referent. However, I suppose that the speaker should qualify the message in such a way that his voice is heard as distinct from that of the reported person.

2.6   Ungrammaticality

Occasional errors are eliminated by the reporter both in direct and indirect reports. In direct reports the Principle of Charity prevails – we avoid presenting other people's errors unless they are relevant to the discussion at hand. Thus, If have to write a report on a paper and want to justify my rejection, I can use bits of the paper to show that it cannot be published. I report the text not to report the content but to justify my negative decision. The report here focuses exclusively on the grammar or on the style. Suppose, however, I want to quote Lyons or Levinson, in a scientific paper, and notice that a comma is missing or that an -s (the third person morph) is missing. Unless I want the hearer to focus on this error, I will pretend that the error did not occur – thus I rectify the error. It would be interesting to study written interviews published by newspapers to see if errors are corrected. From what I see, this is the ordinary practice (see Lehrer 1989, for a detailed paper on this). The reason is pretty obvious. Focusing on the errors would amount to discrediting the people whose words we value as informative. Furthermore, the errors (as I said) would be too much of a distraction for readers, while journalists or reporters want

their readers to concentrate on the facts. I assume that the direction of the corrections attests to (a) the existence of a Principle of Charity; (b) to the fact that the face of the interviewer is protected; (c) (and most important point), focusing on the style or on the bad grammar would be a distraction, while the reporter wants readers to concentrate on the facts.

In direct reports, it is clear that if an error is injected into the text, the reported speaker is responsible for it (albeit in the case of negligible mistakes one may stop to wonder whether the error should be attributed to the reporter (a misprint, for example)). If there are serious mistakes, then the journalist, who is normally in charge of good grammar, is not held responsible. However, things may be somewhat different for indirect reports. In indirect reports, it is never clear whether the error belongs to the reporter or to the reported speaker. Presumably, the reporter should be in charge of good grammar and we might reason that the main voice is that of the reporter (thus errors should be assigned to him). However, if mixed indirect reporting, as many argue, is a reality, it should be possible to quote segments of speech and thus part of the utterance may contain ungrammaticality.

2.7 Summaries

Another non-negligible difference between direct and indirect reports is that indirect reports sometimes work like summaries. Consider the following examples:

(7) He told me to go to New York
(8) He promised to come with me

These indirect reports are more like summaries and they identify the speech act proffered in the original utterance. They do not only describe the words, but they describe the illocutionary point. This is clearly not possible with direct reports, unless one replaces the verb 'say' with a description of the speech act, as in the following cases:

(9) He made the request: 'Go to New York now and interview M. Johnson'.
(10) He promised: 'I will certainly come with you'

These are cases where narration and direct speech coexist, although, I should say, they are bit strained – they are not impossibilities but surely not standard ways of reporting things.

2.8 Reference to Sexual Organs

One may think that quotations may be freer (than indirect reports) in reporting utterances which make reference to sexual organs (one of the strictest taboos in current society, despite sexual liberation). Quotation envelops the taboo word and

seems to assign responsibility to the quoted person. But it is like using a folder with Windows seven: if you hide a obscene photograph in a folder, it is still visible. You need to embed the folder into another folder, to hide the obscenity. But unlike folders in Windows seven, regardless of how many embeddings in quotation marks you use (X said that: X said that: X said that: p), the nudity still emerges. Taboo words cannot be cured by quotation and the reporter is always complicit (to some extent). I remember the silence I obtained at the Intercultural Pragmatics conference in Malta when I used as an example (to exemplify the kind of phenomena I am discussing now) the following:

(11) My colleague said that Berlusconi has a small dick.

I apologize with the readers of this article, but it shows the truth of what I am saying. Given that the reporter runs the risk of becoming complicit, he should minimally provide a bit of context in order to introduce the example. Notice that (strict) direct reports tolerate no substitutions, while indirect reports are freer in the sense that the indirect reporter can use substitutions of the items to be shunned (in that they are taboo words). So at least a difference emerges between direct and indirect reports. Indirect reporters have a way to avoid taboo words which is not available to direct reporters. Another strategy would be to distance oneself from the reported item, by adding something, in terms of sentential apposition (John said: shit, which he should not have said). However, sometimes the reporter and the reported speaker decide that the obscene word is needed (sometimes we all agree they are appropriate); in this case, the speaker may have ways to let the hearer know that he agrees with what the speaker said, that he shares his perspective (and he did well to say that!).

2.9   Voice

Indirect reports are cases of polyphonic language games – very often the hearer is assigned responsibility for deciding which portion of utterance belongs to which voice. The problem of distinguishing voices besets (or characterizes) indirect reports and makes them more interesting. The task of establishing whether a segment of the indirect report is in fact a quotation is a non-trivial one and is often illuminated by pragmatics. Of course, sometimes we are able to recognize a certain speaker's voice in an indirect report (we say, this is not the reporter's voice, he never uses such a language; or, more specifically, we can say: I recognize John's voice; this is the way he speaks (meaning, this is the style he uses). However, there may be ways to differentiate voices, in the oral language (the problem does not arise in the written mode of communication because here the writer can use quotation marks, which obviously set the quoted text apart from the indirectly reported text). My idea is that quotation, in oral language, correlates with an intonational pattern which is specific to quotation or, in any case, sufficiently different from the one used in the indirect report in general: even subtle differences in voice can signal a distinction. What is

sufficient is that here should be a contrast, even in quality of the voice (softer; less soft, for example).

Direct reports – despite the various transformations they can undergo – are not polyphonic or are not polyphonic to the same extent as indirect reports – they do not hide slots for different voices (although a speaker in directly reporting may resort to sentential apposition), to make comments (John said 'I am completely honest', which is obviously false). There may be complications for direct reports: they admit interjections, but then should the interjections always be attributed to the quoted speaker or could they also – at least sometimes – be attributed to the reporter's voice? Consider the following:

(12) John said I am completely ah ah ah honest.

I deliberately avoided punctuation because I want you to consider it, by a stretch of the imagination, at least for a moment, as a spoken utterance. While, due to quotation marks, interpretation is easy in the case of the written utterance, things are more complicated in the case of the oral utterance. We need to segment discourse – and we want to know whether 'ah ah' (a brief laughter) belongs to the reported speaker or to the reporter. Here one might assume that the laughter cannot belong to the reported speaker, because it runs the risk of undermining his credibility. Thus, it can be taken as a comment by the reporter, who, for a minute, is not only a reporter, but someone who makes comments or assessments. The laughter plays the same role of a sentential apposition: 'which is not true, of course'.

2.10 The use of Clitics

Before concluding this paper, I want to provide a section on Italian clitics, which I have studied in combination with propositional attitudes (Capone 2013b). Verbs of saying, if we follow Jaszczolt (p.c.) are not to be assimilated to propositional attitudes. I agree and disagree with that. When we utter something like 'Mary said that John is crazy', there is the implicature (or explicature?) that Mary believes what she says and, thus, she believes that Mary is crazy (after all, ordinary people say things which they believe to be true, with the exception of liers). Certainly things change with direct quotation. In 'John said: I love Mary' one needs a bit of context to judge whether John really believes he loves Mary. Could not John, in fact, be an actor performing on the stage? In such a case, his words would be devoid of intentionality. John, in such a case, is only the animator of the message, he is not the author let alone the principal (in Goffman's (1981) terms) (the perennial notion of footing comes up again and again). So in a sense Jaszczolt is right, in another sense (in which we consider explicatures as part of the content of the utterance) she cannot be completely right. The notion of footing clearly seems to divide neatly direct from indirect reports, as indirect reports seem to imply a different footing.

I used the clitic 'lo' in previous papers (simplifying a bit the discussion), to show that in combination with verbs of propositional attitude ('sapere', 'capire', 'sentire'

etc.) it introduces a speaker/hearer presupposition (a presupposition shared by both the speaker and the hearer). Now if there are different ways of considering 'say', and of attributing to say1 lack of propositional attitude and to say 2 a propositional attitude content, we should expect that the clitic 'lo' which correlates (a) with propositional attitudes and (b) with speaker/hearer presuppositions should not be able to come up in direct reports, while it can be found in indirect reports. And this is exactly what happens.

(13) A: Giovanni ha detto 'Maria è cretina'
      * B: Sì, anche Mario lo ha detto 'Maria è cretina'[10]
      (A: John said 'Mary i san idiot'
      B: Yes, Mario too it said 'Mary is an idiot'(lit.))
(14) A: Giovanni ha detto che Maria è cretina
      B: Sì anche Mario lo ha detto che Maria è cretina.
      (A: John said that Mary is an idiot.
      B: Yes, Mario too it said that Mary is an idiot (lit.))

The difference between (13) and (14) seems to support the difference between say1 and say2, say1 being dissociated from propositional attitudes and say2 being associated with propositional attitudes. It appears that in (14) what Giovanni said has been added as a presupposition (given that such proposition was not challenged, it was somehow accommodated), and thus B is able to take up the presupposition by means of the clitic 'lo'.

2.11 Future Topics

The considerations I have provided so far on the relationship between direct and indirect reports are necessarily provisional. We have more or less built a platform from which we can study the issue. Something which the paper does not do – as it is objectively difficult to do – is to examine the relationship between direct reports and the original utterances or between the indirect reports and the original utterances, to see the transformations and rhetorical effects that go hand in hand with manufacturing a direct or indirect report. It is impossible or almost impossible to do all this with spoken conversation, but this should be possible in connection with citations and indirect reports in academic texts. But this is a topic for the future. Another topic for the future is to study the interpretation of utterances adjacent to utterances which are clearly labeled as indirect reports by a verb of saying (and a that-clause), which are only implicitly (and ambiguously) indirect reports. Holt (2016) has examined some such cases and has pointed out an ambiguity, as they

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[10]But the sentence improves if a demonstrative is inserted: 'Anche Mario lo ha detto questo 'Maria è cretina'.

could easily be seen as reporting contextual and circumstantial information which is to be used in the interpretation of the indirect report. A sketch of how we should proceed with these cases is to consider them possibly free indirect reports. Since free indirect reports should be supported by contextual information that allows the insertion of a 'X said that' constituent in terms of free enrichment, it is easy to see how such interpretation can be aborted in case contextual factors militate in favor of a circumstantial reading of the report. But as I said, this is a topic for the future, although it clear involves the consideration of pragmatic inferences in determining whether an utterance is to count as a (free) indirect report or not.

Another topic to investigate in the future is implicit indirect reports, like the following:

(15) Allan has not been able to find any significant difference between direct and indirect reports. He also thinks that indirect reports could admit interjections as parts of mixed-quoted segments.

Contextual clues lead us to consider 'Allan has not been able to find any significant difference between direct and indirect reports' an indirect report. We might reason: how do we know that Allan has not been able to find any significant difference? Presumably we know this because he said that in a paper or a book; thus the speaker is implicitly categorized as a reporter and, in particular, as an indirect reporter. We can reason in a similar way with 'He also thinks that . . . '. How do we know that thinks that . . . ? Presumably because he said that in a book or a paper, thus the speaker is telling us that he said that and is implicitly qualifying himself as a reporter. Analogous considerations apply to an example by Holt (2016) ('apparently she doesn't like them'). Holt seems to contrast an expression like 'apparently she doesn't like them' with an expression like 'she said she doesn't like them'. She comes close to implicit indirect reports, in this example, although she does not care to draw some obvious consequences. Of course, a reader might now object: how do you distinguish between free indirect reports and implicit indirect reports? The question is an important one. One answer might be that, after all, we may not want to distinguish them. Another answer is that it appears that in free indirect reports the freely indirect report follows an utterance which explicitly uses the verb 'say' or 'think'. Implicit indirect reports need no such verbs. In any case, it ought to be said that both implicit indirect reports and free indirect reports need pragmatic interpretation and, in particular, an implicature.

3   Conclusion

There are still some controversial points which this paper has not been able to resolve. The considerations by Allan and by Giorgi, seem to prove that indirect reports can admit interjections and discourse markers – in this respect they are similar to direct reports. But if they are similar to direct reports, what does the difference between direct and indirect reports boil down to? And is this difference

so crucial, after all? Could we not just ignore it? But now there are other questions. Suppose that, for a minute, we completely conflate direct and indirect reports. Does then claiming that there are mixed indirect reports make any sense? It is more reasonable and more interesting to discuss the phenomenon of mixed indirect reports under the presuppositions that there are pure quotations (or pure direct reports), unless charges of circularity are raised. The considerations by Giorgi that with certain intonational contours discourse markers like BUT can be inserted in that-clauses of indirect reports does not amount to accepting that there is no significant difference between direct and indirect reports, because she assumes that insertion of BUT with the wrong type of intonation into that-clauses of indirect reports is nevertheless banned. Thus the difference between direct and indirect reports is vindicated – and this is enough to avoid the charge of circularity in the treatment of mixed indirect reports.

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Indirect and Direct Reports in Hungarian

Ferenc Kiefer

1 Introduction

In principle, formally three main types of reports can be distinguished depending on to what extent the speaker adheres to the wording of the original utterance. In the case of *direct reports* (also called citations) the speaker repeats the original utterance word by word. When the speaker does not reproduce the reported utterance literally we speak of *indirect reports*. In the case of indirect reports the speaker summarizes (part of) the propositional content of the original message. Indirect reports may be considered to be the result of a grammaticalization process by which two utterances are conflated. One describes the reporting event, the other one the reported event. As a result of grammaticalization the latter is embedded under the former (*x says something, Bill is sick → x says that Bill is sick*).[1] Indirect reports must obey certain formal properties deriving from the local and temporal setting of the original utterance. In certain cases only some of these formal properties are observed. Furthermore the speaker may also express her subjective evaluation of what is being reported. Contrary to what could be expected indirect discourse cannot be automatically derived from direct discourse. None of them is more fundamental, they simply represent two different ways of reporting corresponding to two different

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[1]For Hungarian a detailed description of this grammaticalization process can be found in Haader (2003).

F. Kiefer (✉)
Department of Linguistics Department, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Research Institute for Linguistics, Budapest, Hungary
e-mail: kiefer@nytud.hu

perspectives (Maingueneau 1991: 101–105; Garric and Calas 2007: 137–150). As we shall see presently, some linguistic elements which may occur in direct discourse are not admitted in indirect discourse and the other way around. In written works (esp. in literary works) sometimes a combination of direct and indirect discourse called free indirect discourse is being used (cf. Maingueneau 1991: 112–116).[2] To take a Hungarian example, the utterance (1a) illustrates direct reports (citations), (1b) indirect reports and (1c) free indirect reports.

(1)　　a.　Péter azt mondta neki: „Gyere haza vacsorára!"
　　　　　　Peter AP[3] said to-him come home dinner-for
　　　　　　Peter said to him: „Come home for dinner!"
　　　　b.　Péter azt mondta neki, hogy jöjjön haza vacsorára.
　　　　　　Peter AP said to-him that should-come home dinner-for
　　　　　　Peter said to him that he should come home for dinner.
　　　　c.　Péter [azt mondta, hogy] szeretné, ha [ő] otthon vacsorázna.[4]
　　　　　　Peter [AP said that] he_i would-like if he_j at-home would-eat-dinner ($i \neq j$)
　　　　　　Peter would very much like him to eat dinner at home.

　　Note that the main clauses in (1a,b) are practically identical,[5] the reporting sentences differ in the ways the reported utterance is expressed. In (1a) the reported utterance is rendered *verbatim,* in (1b) the addressee of the main clause

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[2]To take a very simple example, (i) illustrates indirect discourse, (ii) direct discourse and (iii) free indirect discourse:

　(i)　She looked at the hotel room. She thought it would be nice to stay there the next day.
　(ii)　She looked at the hotel room and she thought, "It will be nice to stay here tomorrow."
(iii)　She looked at the hotel room. She would stay here tomorrow.

　　Free indirect discourse (iii) combines the person and tense of indirect discourse (*she would stay*) with the indications of time and place appropriate to direct discourse (*here tomorrow*) which yields the sentence: *She would stay here tomorrow.* This form of statement allows a third-person narrative to exploit a first person point of view.

[3]AP represents the anticipatory pronoun which serves as a reference marker. It is obligatory when the reporting clause precedes the reported clause, but it can be ommitted in the case of so-called quotative inversion. In Hungarian quotative inversion is obligatory when the reported clause precedes or is enclosed by the reporting clause: *Gyere haza vacsorára! – mondta nekem Péter*'Come home for dinner! – said Peter to me', or *Gyere haza – mondta nekem Péter – vacsorára!*'Come home – said Peter to me – for dinner' (for details cf. Gärtner – Gyuris 2014). In direct speech the demonstrative pronoun *ezt*'this' can also be used which has a foregrounding function: it empasizes the verbatim rendering of the original utterance: *Péter ezt mondta neki: „Gyere haza vacsorára!".* This function explains why the demonstrative can never be omitted.

[4]The brackets indicate the presupposed parts of the utterance, which are necessary for the correct interpretation of the utterance.

[5]Of course, variations are possible here, too. In the neutral setting such variations are restricted to the choice of the reporting verb, however. For example, we may use the verb *kér*'ask' instead of *mond*'say' as a reporting verb but, of course, this entails a change in meaning.

(*mondta **neki***'said him') is identical with the subject of the embedded utterance ((*ő*) *jöjjön*'he should come', change of perspectivization) and the verb is put into the subjunctive. In (1c) the reporting clause is omitted and the original message is slightly reformulated (cf. the use of an emotionally loaded predicate) and the conditional is used instead of the subjunctive. The bulk of the paper will concentrate on direct and indirect reports in Hungarian, and nothing more will be said about free indirect reports.

The speaker may prefer using indirect reports instead for direct reports for several reasons: (i) Direct reports may be more difficult to integrate into an ongoing discourse than indirect ones. Typically, they are used when the exact wording of an utterance is at stake. (ii) In direct reports the speaker of the original message remains in the background. On the other hand, indirect reports may carry information about the speaker's attitude toward the reported event.[6] The speaker may indicate his attitude by his choice of the reporting verb or, more importantly, by the appropriate reformulation of the reported clause. (iii) Cognitively it is more expensive to use direct reports than indirect ones. That is, memorizing verbatim requires more memory space than providing a report which concentrates on the propositional content of the message or on part of it.[7]

Pragmatically, reporting can be accounted for in terms of adaptation, contextualization and perspectivization (Tátrai 2011: 154–158). Adaptability is the property of language which enables humans to make negotiable linguistic choices from a variable range of possibilities to approach points of satisfaction for communicative needs (Verschueren 1999: 61). In this respect it is relevant what parts of a previous discourse are recalled and how this is done. That is, the choice between direct citation and indirect report is, at least partly, due to adaptation. Contexts do not exist independently of speech acts, in fact, contexts are brought about or generated by the utterances in which they are produced. Contextualization is thus a dynamic process. A citation calls for a new context in a discourse though the original context in which the speech act was performed also plays a certain role in the interpretation of the cited discourse (Verschueren 1999: 75–114). Finally, an important aspect of embedded discourse has to do with perspectivization, i.e. with the point of view from which the speech event is represented.[8] Perspectivization determines the choice between direct and indirect discourse to a considerable extent.

In the present paper I am going to discuss three aspects of reporting in Hungarian. First, I will sum up the structural peculiarities of Hungarian direct and indirect reports and describe their semantic and/or pragmatic consequences. In particular, I am going to discuss some aspects of the interrelationship between information

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[6]For the details see Section 4.

[7]It is often claimed that in indirect speech the speaker summarizes the propositional content of the original message. Though this may sometimes be the case, indirect speech, as we shall see further below, may also contain pragmatic particles or attitudinal markers which are not part of the propositional content.

[8]For the notion of perspectivization cf. Sanders and Spooren (1997: 86–95).

structure and indirect discourse. Second, we will have a closer look at the semantics and pragmatics of the reporting verbs. Given the fact that in Hungarian – depending on context – practically any 'manner of speaking' verb can be used as a verb of saying in preposed position, and a considerable number of other types of verbs can be used as reporting verbs in postposed position I will have to discuss the question of how this meaning comes about. I am going to argue that in quite a few cases the 'way of saying' meaning is partly the result of a grammaticalization process giving rise to transitivity. It will also be shown that the reporting verb may be used to express the speaker's evaluation of the embedded message. In other words, the reporting verb may contribute to what may be called pragmatic enrichment of the reported message.[9] Finally, the ways in which a speech event is reported may also depend on the speaker's intentions, i.e. on what she considers to be the most important part of the message. Hungarian makes use of a reference marker AP in the reporting clause which, too, as we shall see further below, plays a role in the determination of the information structure of the reported utterance.

2   The Reporting Clause

In indirect reports the speaker summarizes the content of the embedded utterance and is not interested in the original form of the utterance whereas in the case of direct reports she tries to remember the wording of the original message. In indirect speech the referential center, which determines the spatial and temporal orientation of the reported event, is the speaker. Typically the embedded clause is introduced by the complementizer *hogy* 'that'.[10] This is equally true of declaratives, interrogatives and imperatives. Compare (2a,b,c) below.

(2)   a.   Péter azt mondta, hogy ma otthon dolgozik.
            Peter AP said that today at-home works
            'Peter said that he is going to work at home today.'
      b.   Péter azt kérdezte, hogy hol van Anna.
            Peter AP asked that where is Ann
            'Peter asked where Ann is.'
      c.   Péter azt akarta, hogy Anna vele maradjon.
            Peter AP wanted that Ann with-him stay
            'Peter wanted Ann to stay with him.'

At this point, two properties of indirect reports in Hungarian can already be noticed. First, the reporting clause contains the anticipatory pronoun (AP) *azt*

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[9]Cf. Allan (2015) with respect to the notion of pragmatic enrichment.

[10]For an earlier discussion of direct and indirect reports in Hungarian cf. Kiefer (1986) and Fónagy (1986).

(composed of the distal demonstrative *az* and the accusative case suffix –*t*). Second, the embedded utterance is introduced by the subordinating conjunction *hogy* 'that', which, however, in the case of declaratives and interrogatives can be omitted without loss of meaning.[11] On the other hand, the utterance (2c) would be ungrammatical without the conjunction, which is a consequence of the fact that the verb *akar* 'want' requires the conjunctive mood. The utterances in (2a,b,c) are neutral in the sense that either one can be used to initiate a discourse, no preceding context is required.

Indirect reports can be constructed from the original utterance by observing the following rules:

In the case of declaratives the reporting verb is the basic verb of saying *mond* 'say' whose Past Tense form is *mondta* 'said' which is preceded by the AP *azt* and is followed by the subordinating conjunction *hogy*'that'. In addition, 1st and 2nd person subjects are left unchanged or become 2nd or 3rd person; 3rd person subjects are left unchanged. In this respect Hungarian does not differ from the Germanic or Romance languages. In the case of interrogatives the basic reporting verb is *kérdez* 'ask' and in the case of imperatives *parancsol* 'order', *felszólít* 'request'. Tense is not affected by these changes for the simple reason that Hungarian has only one past tense form, temporal concord is expressed by other means, which need not concern us in the present context. On the other hand, the verbs *mond* 'say' and *kérdez* 'ask' differ from the verb *akar* 'want' since the latter requires subjunctive mood. Recall the differences between (2a,b) and (2c) discussed above.

The AP can be omitted if the grammatical subject *Péter* is the focus of the sentence (cf. (3a)) or if we want to confirm (or emphasize) the occurrence of the speech act, in which case the verb *mondta* carries prosodic focus (cf. (3b)). Neither (3a) nor (3b) can be used to introduce a discourse due to the contrastive meaning they carry.

(3)   a.   **Péter** mondta (azt), hogy ma otthon dolgozik.[12]
                (Azt) **Péter** mondta, hogy ma otthon dolgozik.
                Peter said (AP) that today at-home works
                'It was Peter who said that he is going to work at home today.'
        b.   Péter (azt) **mondta,** hogy ma otthon dolgozik.
                Péter **mondta** (azt), hogy ma otthon dolgozik.
                'Peter said indeed (AP) that he is going to work at home today.'
        c.   *Péter mondta, ma otthon dolgozik.
                Péter azt mondta, (hogy) ma otthon dolgozik.

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[11]The conditions under which the conjunction can be omitted was discussed in more detail by István Kenesei (Kenesei 1992: 673–679). Cf. also Kenesei (1994).

[12]The constituent in bold means heavy stress. It should be noted that not only the reporting clause but also the reported message can appear in various forms depending on the information structure of the original message. Formal properties of the original message will not be our concern in the present paper, however.

As can be seen the AP *azt* may occur in both (3a) and (3b) but it is excluded from (3c). (3a) presupposes a context in which an utterance such as „Somebody said that he is going to work at home today" was pronounced. (3a) asserts that it was Peter and not somebody else who said that he is going to work at home today. On the other hand, (3b) puts emphasis on the speech event itself, i.e. it asserts that the speech event took place without any doubt. Both (3a) and (3b) are corrective utterances. Such corrective utterances occur in dialogues rather then in a narrative discourse. In the case of noncontrastive (neutral) utterances, in contrast to corrective utterances, the lack of the AP leads to ungrammaticality.

Typically, direct speech is introduced by the accusative form *ezt* of the proximal demonstrative *ez,* though the AP (formally identical with the distal demonstrative), too, is possible.

(4)   a.   Péter ezt/azt mondta: „Ma otthon dolgozom."
              Peter Dem/AP said today at-home work
              Peter said: Today „I am going to work at home."
       b.   *Péter ezt mondta, hogy ma otthon dolgozik.
              Peter Dem said that today at-home work
              (cf. Péter azt mondta, hogy ma otthon dolgozik.)

As (4b) shows that the proximal demonstrative cannot be used in indirect speech. This seems to reflect an interesting difference between direct and indirect speech: direct speech is associated with closeness, and indirect speech – in some sense – with remoteness. Closeness is related to the fact that the reported clause is foregrounded while remoteness implies backgrounding (and indirectness).[13]

If the reported message precedes the reporting clause only the proximal demonstrative *ezt* can be used:

(5)   a.   „Ma otthon dolgozom" – ezt mondta Péter.
              today at-home work Dem (proximal) say Peter
              "Today I am working at home" – said Peter.
       b.   *„Ma otthon dolgozom" – azt mondta Péter.
              today at-home work AP (distal) say Peter
       c.   „Ma otthon dolgozom" – mondta Péter.

The AP can be omitted, as shown in (5c). In (5a) the demonstrative cannot be moved into any other position: it must occupy the position immediately following the reported speech event.[14]

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[13]The terms foregrounding/backgrounding come from Paul Hopper's seminal work (Hopper 1979). According to Hopper, the most salient information in each genre is considered to be the "foreground" of the discourse, that which moves it forward. The less-salient information, that which does *not* advance the discourse, is called the "background."

[14]This holds true for the neutral case but other possibilities do exist, as well. For example with clause intonation: . . . *Péter ezt mondta;* with focus on 'Péter': . . . *ezt **Péter** mondta,* . . . .***Péter** mondta ezt,* etc.

As already mentioned, the utterances in (2a,b,c) are neutral in the sense that they do not presuppose any special context. Note, however, that the AP *azt* may occupy several positions in the reporting clause.[15]

(6)   a.   Péter azt mondta, hogy ma otthon dolgozik.
           'Peter said that he is going to work at home today'
      b.   **Péter** mondta azt, hogy ma otthon dolgozik.
           'It was Peter who said that he is going to work at home today'
      c.   Azt **Péter** mondta, hogy ma otthon dolgozik.
           'It was Peter who said that he is going to work at home today'

The examples in (6a,b,c) show clearly how closely word order and prosody are related to information structure. By uttering (6a) the speaker wants to inform the listener about the given state-of-affairs. In the case of (6b), on the other hand, it is assumed that 'somebody said that p' and the question is who that person was. And (6b) asserts that – from among the possible alternatives – this person was 'Peter'. In other words, (6b) exhibits the well-known properties of a focus construction. Exhaustivity is one of these properties: i.e. in the given context Peter is the only person who said that she is going to work at home today. Noone else said that (exhaustive listing). The utterance (6c), too, does express contrast. Since this contrast concerns the topic 'Péter', we have to do here with an utterance expressing contrastive topic. In the given context several things were said, among other things, other persons may have said 'I am going to stay at home today' but we are interested in what Peter said. The reporting clause is pronounced with a rising-falling intonation.

To (6a,b,c) we may add (6d) where the verb *mondta* carries prosodic focus.

(6)   d.   Azt Péter **mondta**, hogy ma otthon dolgozik.
           'Peter did say that he is going to work at home today'

The utterance (6d), too, implies contrast and it could easily be continued by something like (7).

(7)   but he did not say that he is not going to come to dinner.

The utterance (6d) is pronounced with clause intonation expressing the expectation of a continuation.

If the exact wording of the reported utterance is at stake, the reported utterance is repeated but the reporting clause contains the adverbial particle *így* 'so, thus', as in (8a,b). The reported clause can be preposed, as in (8a), or postposed, as in (8b).

(8)   a.   „Ma otthon dolgozom" – így mondta Péter.
           'Today I am going to work at home' – (so) said Peter.
      b.   Péter így mondta: „Ma otthon dolgozom."

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[15]Positional restrictions as well as focussing problems of subordinate clauses in general are discussed in considerable detail in Kenesei 1992, 1994.

From the above discussion it can easily be seen that an utterance such as 'I am going to work at home today', when reported, can convey various additional information expressing the speaker's evaluation of a state-of-affairs in a given discourse situation. In Hungarian, the AP *azt* plays an important role in the expression of this additional information. If the reporting clause is preposed the AP is obligatory in the neutral case and the reported clause is backgrounded. On the other hand, if the reporting clause is postponed, the AP is optional and the reported clause is foregrounded. In both cases the AP precedes the verb. The reporting clause may be unmarked but it can also be a focus construction or a clause containing a contrastive topic. In the latter cases the clause is marked by special word order and prosody. The proximal demonstrative can only be used in direct reports but it plays a similar role with respect to the expression of information structure as the AP. The complementizer *hogy* 'that' is obligatory in cases such as (6b,c,d), but not (6a).

3   What Can Be Reported and What Cannot

It is taken for granted that propositions can be reported, but, of course, not all utterances express a proposition, or, to put it differently, not all parts of an utterance need be propositional.[16] For example, it goes without saying that interjections such as *jaj* or *jé* cannot be part of the proposition expressed by the speaker's utterance. Compare

(9)   a.   Bill felkiáltott: "Jaj, de fáradt vagyok!"
            Bill exclaimed: „Gosh, I'm tired!"
      b.   *Bill azt mondta, hogy jaj de fáradt.
            *Bill said that gosh he is tired.
(10) a.   Anna felkiáltott: „Jé, milyen érdekes."
            Ann exclaimed „Gee, how interesting,"
      b.   *Anna felkiáltott, hogy jé milyen érdekes.
            *Ann exclaimed that gee! how interesting.

The same is true of interactional interjections such as *apropó* 'by the way' or *persze* 'of course, sure':

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[16]If an utterance is propositional or not can be checked by the usual tests: a proposition can be negated, questioned, it can be a premise of a conclusion, etc.

(11) a.   Apropó, tegnap találkoztam Annával.
            ,,By the way, I met Ann yesterday"
      b.   *Bill azt mondta, hogy apropó tegnap találkozott Annával.
            *Bill said that by the way he met Ann yesterday"
(12) a.   Persze ő sem ment haza.
            Of course, he/she did not go home either.
      b.   *Bill azt mondta, hogy persze ő sem ment haza
            *Bill said that sure he/she did not go home either.

Since the utterances containing interjections cannot be negated they do not express propositions.

The fact that an utterance can be reported does not entail that it is propositional. Normally, shading particles (German *Abtönungspartikeln*) can be reported in spite of the fact that the utterances containing them are not propositional. Shading particles may express confirmation, mitigation, diminution, moderation or the speaker's emotive attitudes. They are quite frequent in Hungarian.[17] Note, however, that the shading particle *ám* in (13b) is not part of the quotation (report), it is rather the expression of the speaker's attitude and it refers to what is being reported. Similar things hold true of (14b) and (15b), as well.

(13) a.   Hallottam ám a dologról.
            hear Part Art thing
            'I have heard of it, you know!'
      b.   Péter azt mondta, hogy Bill hallott ám a dologról.
            Peter said that Bill has heard of it, you know.
(14) a.   Jánosnak ugyan mondhatod.
            John-Dat Part you-can-say
            'John won't believe you!'
            'It's no use (you) telling him.'
      b.   Péter azt mondta, hogy Jánosnak ugyan mondhatod.
            Peter said that John won't believe you.
(15) a.   Csakhogy látlak!
            Part I-see-you
            'Good seeing you!
      b.   (Péter) azt mondta, hogy csakhogy látom!
            Bill said that it was good seeing you.

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[17]Hungarian is related to German in this respect not only because it has a considerable number of particles but also because their frequent use. Typologically, Hungarian is one of the so-called 'particle languages'.

The particle *ám* expresses confirmation, the particle *ugyan* diminution and the particle *csakhogy* joy in the cited sentences.[18] The examples could easily be multiplied.

For obvious reasons parentheticals do not occur in indirect reports.

(16)   a.   Péter, tudom, ma otthon dolgozik.
              Peter I-know today at-home work
              'Peter, I know, works at home today'

        b.   *János azt mondta, hogy, (?) tudja, hogy …
              *John AP said that Peter, (?) he knows, …

(17)   a.   Péter, gondolom, szereti Annát.
              Peter I-think loves Ann
              'Peter, I believe, loves Ann'

        b.   *János azt mondta, hogy Péter, gondolja, szereti Annát.
              *John AP said that Peter, he-believes, loves Ann. …

Parentheticals are markers which express speakers' attitudes characterizable in terms of (subjective) epistemic modality. Utterances containing a parenthetical are not propositional: they cannot be negated, nor questioned and they cannot function as a premise in deductive reasoning.

We also know that modal adverbials expressing the speaker's attitude to a given state-of-affairs or the degree of evidence he/she has for the truth of a given state-of-affairs are not propositional. An utterance such as (18a) cannot be negated, it cannot be questioned and it cannot be the premise of a conclusion.

(18)   a.   Péter talán otthon van.
              Peter perhaps at-home is
              'Peter is perhaps at home'

        b.   *Nem igaz, hogy Péter talán otthon van.
              It is not true that Peter is perhaps at home.

This means that (18a) does not express a proposition, however, it can be embedded in indirect reports. As a consequence it is not correct to say that an indirect report contains the propositional content of the original utterance, though it may contain parts of it. The above examples (11a,b)-(12a,b) and (18a,b) also show that there is an essential difference between interjections and shading particles, on the one hand, and modal adverbs, on the other. While the former cannot be reported, the latter can, as shown by (19a,b).

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[18]The examples are taken from Keszler (2000: 280). It goes without saying that shading particles are difficult to translate, which is in part due to their polysemous meaning, in part to the fact that they are not propositional.

(19)   a.   Péter azt mondta, hogy Anna talán otthon van.
              Peter AP said that Ann perhaps at-home is
              'Peter said that Ann is perhaps at home'
        b.   Péter azt mondta, hogy Anna valószínűleg otthon van.
              Peter AP said that Ann probably at-home is
              'Peter said that Ann is probably at home'

This discrepancy may be due to the fact that modal adverbs have an evidential meaning, which can be shared by the reporting person but a full explanation is still wanted.

To be sure, the facts presented in this section are not specific features of Hungarian but I wanted to show that the reported clause in indirect speech can in no way be identified with the proposition expressed by that clause.

4   The Reporting Verb

The reporting verb in the above examples is *mond*'say', which is the most basic verb of saying. In contrast to indirect reports, direct reports may be used with a large variety of manner of speaking verbs provided that this verb is used at the end of the utterance:

(20)   a.   „Beteg vagyok" – siránkozott/sóhajtozott/jajgatott Anna.
              „I am sick" – complained/sighed/moaned Ann.
        b.   *Anna siránkozott/sóhajtozott/jajgatott: „Beteg vagyok".[19]

An utterance such as (20b) would certainly be completely unacceptable. Note, however, that if we add the manner adverb *így*'in this way' to the reporting verb the utterance (20b) becomes grammatical[20]:

(21)   Anna így siránkozott/sóhajtozott/jajgatott: „Beteg vagyok".

Note that the verbs *siránkozik*'complain, lament', *sóhajtozik*'sigh' and *jajgat*'moan' are intransitive verbs which explains why they cannot take a *that*-clause.[21] However, in a different case frame even *that*-clauses may become possible.

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[19]Note that (20b) with an AP and objective conjugation, too, would be unacceptable: *Anna azt sirákozta/sóhajtozta/jajgatta, hogy . . .* 'Ann AP complained[obj] /sighed[obj] / moaned[obj] that . . .'

[20]Note that even the presence of a quantifier may render (20b) grammatical (István Kenesei, p.c.): *Anna sokszor siránkozott/sóhajtozott/jajgatott, hogy . . .* 'Ann complained/sighed/moaned often that . . .'.

[21]These verbs exhibit a complex morphological structure: *sir-ánkozik*'lament' is derived from *sír*'weep', *sóhaj-t-ozik*'sigh' from the noun *sóhaj*'sigh' and *jaj-gat*'lament' from the interjection *jaj*'oh' by means of diverse derivational suffixes. Fónagy (1986: 261) observes that some basically non-transitive verbs may occur with the objective conjugation. Such a verb is *sóhajt*'sigh'

Note that the above verbs can also take the oblique case *-ról/-ről* (the delative case)'about, thereof'.

(22)   *Anna arról siránkozott/sóhajtozott/jajgatott, hogy* ...
         Ann thereabout complained/sighed/moaned that . . .

Moreover some emotive verbs (such as *sóhajtozik*'sigh' and *jajgat*'moan') may occur in a transitive construction following the objective conjugation in postposed reporting clauses in spite of the fact that these verbs are definitely not transitive.[22] Consider

(23)   (a)   „Beteg vagyok" – sóhajtozta Anna.
                sick I-am sighed[Obj] Ann
         (b)   „Beteg vagyok" – jajgatta Anna.
                sick I-am moaned[Obj] Ann

Fónagy has shown (Fónagy 1986: 264–267) that quite a few verbs (belonging to various semantic classes) can occur in a postposed reporting clause, though they are excluded from the preposed position. In particular, the following verb classes belong here: (i) verbs referring to non-verbal sound production: *nevet*'laugh', *ásít*'yawn', *lehel*'breathe'; (ii) verbs expressing facial mimetics: *mosolyog*'smile', *hunyorít*'squint (one's eyes)', *ráfintorodik*'grimace (at someone)'; (iii) verbs expressing bodily movements: *legyint (a kezével)*'waved his hand (to express discouragement); *fordul vki felé*'turn toward sb'; *felugrik*'jump up'; (iv) verbs expressing emotive attitudes: *csodálkozik*'wonder', *bosszankodik*'be annoyed', *haragszik*'be angry' and some further minor classes. In all these cases quotative inversion (Collins 1997; Collins and Branigan 1997, for Hungarian see Gärtner and Gyuris 2014) is impossible since the verbs mentioned above cannot occur in a preposed reporting clause.[23] Of course, lexically these verbs are not verbs of saying, nor are they verbs of manner of saying, they rather describe the emotional state or the gestures/actions of the speaker which accompany her acting. The verb of saying meaning is attributed to them metaphorically provided the speaker's acting can be

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which may follow both the objective ((*azt*) *sóhajtotta*'sighed') and the subjective conjugation (*sóhajtott*'sighed'). He points out that „the verb in objective conjugation creates closer links between the reporting and the reported sentence, and suggests indeed a similarity with object clauses". Note, however, that even if a verb such as *sóhajt*'sigh' follows the objective conjugation, the reporting clause cannot occur at the beginning of the sentence: **Sóhajtotta/*azt sóhajtotta* . . .

[22]We will return to the problem of transitivity further below.

[23]Syntacticians are not interested in lexical matters, i.e. in syntax the question to what extent quotative inversion depends on verbal semantics is never asked. In view of the fact that so many verbs can only be used in postponed reporting clauses raises the question whether it makes sense at all to consider the noninverted quotation as being more basic as the inverted one since inversion is possible in a few cases only (see further below). Fónagy (ibidem) points out that Hungarian makes use of a wide variety of verbs denoting non-verbal activities in indirect reports. „In spite of their impressive diversity, all of these expressions are genuinely related to communication." In addition, he remarks that „secondary verbs of saying are metaphors".

interpreted as a speech act. The speech act initiates the pragmatic process which leads to this interpretation.[24] This also explains why the metaphorically interpreted verbs can only follow and not precede the reported event. This interpretation can only come about after the report's interpretation is completed.

Note that not all verbs expressing emotive attitudes admit the pragmatic reinterpretation described above. Fonagy points out that „only verbs expressing extrovert attitudes are used as verbs of saying, since these tend towards verbal or non-verbal expression. Verbs denoting introvert emotive states, such as *félt*'he was afraid', *szomorú volt*'he was said', *haragudott*'he was angry' have no such speech-deictic power." (Fónagy 1986: 266)

From among the verbs expressing bodily movement the pragmatic reinterpretation is possible only in cases where the activity presupposes an addressee. Thus, no reinterpretation is possible in the cases of verbs such as *fut*'run', *ugrál*'jump iterative', *mászik*'climb', etc.

It would thus seem that verbs describing the circumstances of the speech act can act as a verb of saying – an observation which goes back to Otto Behaghel (1877).[25]

In contrast to verbs of saying where a complement is required emotionally colored verbs of sound emission such as the ones in (20a) can be used without any complement. Compare

(24)   Anna megint siránkozik/sóhajtozik/jajgat.
        'Ann is again lamenting/sighing/moaning'

Let us turn now to the verbs of saying which typically occur in preposed reporting clauses. Our starting point will be George Miller and Philip Johnson-Laird's well-known classification of verbs of saying (Miller and Johnson-Laird 1976). The authors distinguish the following four classes: (i) verbs of uttering (*gibber, roar, bawl, murmur*, etc.); (ii) verbs of asserting (*say, state, assert, tell,* etc.); (iii) verbs of requesting and questioning (*order, forbid, request, ask,* etc.); and (iv) conversational verbs (*discuss sg, talk about, argue with sb, converse with sb,* etc.).

It would seem that verbs belonging to class (i)-(iii) do occur as reporting verbs provided that they admit a *that*-complement:

(25)   a.   Bill murmured softly that he must go to school soon.
        b.   „I must go to school soon"
(26)   a.   Bill told everybody that he wanted to learn English.
        b.   „I want to learn English"
(27)   a.   She requested that the door be left open.
        b.   Leave the door open (please).

---

[24]The pragmatic process at stake is not mentioned in Recanati's taxonomy of pragmatic processes (Recanati 2010: 293). It certainly requires extralinguistic information and it is a top-down process, but – in contradistinction to what Recanati calls modulation – it is not optional.

[25]Cited by Fonagy (1986: 268).

On the other hand, for obvious reasons conversational verbs are excluded from this function.

The following generalization seems to hold: If a verb can be used as a reporting verb in a preverbal reporting clause it may also be used as a reporting verb in a postverbal reporting clause but the opposite is not true.

For simplicity's sake I have been using English examples in the above discussion but everything I said is equally valid for Hungarian.

5   The Transitivity Cline

The discussion in the previous section suggests that transitivity may be involved in the development of the verb of saying meaning in the case of verbs of sound emission. In fact, it has been suggested in Molnár (1974: 306) that some verbs of sound emission develop their transitive meaning according to the following cline[26]:

(28) V_{itr} postposed $< V_{itr}$ postposed objective conjugation[27] $< V_{tr}$ preposed with pronominal object $< V_{tr}$ preposed with full DP $< V_{tr}$ preposed with a demonstrative in the accusative case

The cline is exemplified in (29)[28]:

(29)   a.   .... dünnyögött[subj] Péter. ' ... mumbled Peter'
      b.   .... dünnyögi[obj] Péter. ' ... Peter mumbles'
      c.   Péter dünnyög[subj] valamit. 'Peter mumbles something'
      d.   Péter dünnyögi[obj] a régi dalt. 'Peter mumbles the old song'
      e.   Péter azt dünnyögi[obj], hogy ... 'Peter mumbles that ...'

The verb in (29a) is just an intransitive verb of sound emission, and in this form it occurs only postposed. Note, however, that if the adverbial *így* 'in this way, in such a manner' is added the reporting verb can also occur preverbally. The verb in (29b) is transitive (and presupposes something more definite) but it is still a postposed verb of sound emission. The indefinite object in (29c) already refers to speech, though to not fully articulated speech ('to say something mumbling'). In (29d) with a definite

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[26]It may be interesting to note that this transitivity cline had been proposed much before the rise of grammaticalization research. Molnár points out that the cline (29) cannot be attested for all verbs of saying of the type discussed above yet the historical development of the verb of saying meaning can be characterized by that cline for a considerable number of verbs.

[27]In Hungarian transitive verbs exhibit two paradigms. Roughly speaking, the subjective conjugation is used with indefinite object phrases and the objective conjugation with definite object phrases. The examples *Péter ír egy könyvet* 'Peter is writing a book' – *Péter írja a könyvet* 'Peter is writing the book' show the contrast. Intransitive verbs follow the subjective pattern. See also fn.18.

[28]The superscript 'subj' refers to the subjective, the superscript 'obj' to the objective conjugation.

object the verb receives a more 'speech-like' interpretation. Finally, in (29e) the verb admits a proposition. A fully developed transitive verb such as *dünnyög* 'mumble' in (29e) can easily be used as a reporting verb, which suggests that the verb of manner of speaking meaning is closely associated with transitivity. The verb meaning can be paraphrased as 'to say something mumbling'. This seems to indicate that the verb of manner of speaking meaning develops paralell with the rise of transitivity.

Statives and action verbs which only receive their manner of speaking meaning via metonymical shift never get higher on the cline than step two, even step two is rather exceptional. Cf. *zokogott* 'sobbed subj' – *zokogta* 'sobbed obj', *nevetett* 'laughed subj' – *nevette* 'laughed obj', *lihegett* 'wheezed subj' – *lihegte* 'wheezed obj', *dörgött* 'thundered subj' – *dörögte* 'thundered obj'[29] but not *siránkozott* subj' 'complained subj' – **siránkozta* 'complained obj', *csillogott subj* 'glittered subj' – **csillogta* 'glittered obj'. As to be expected, no generalizations seem to be possible with respect to the behavior of (sub)classes of verbs in this respect.

6   Conclusion

We saw that Hungarian indirect and direct reports show an important number of features which are not shared by Romance, Germanic or Slavic languages. One of them is the use of the demonstrative in the reporting clause whose presence or absence, and whose position is an important indicator of information structure. Another property has to do with the different behavior of preposed and postposed reporting clauses. I have also shown that some verbs in the postposed reporting clauses receive their manner of speaking meaning via metaphorization. Finally, some remarks were made concerning the relationship between transitivity and the manner of saying meaning.

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[29]Corpus examples from Fónagy (1986: 264–265).

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Indirect Reports, Quotation and Narrative

Neal R. Norrick

1   Introduction

This chapter aims to relate indirect reports and narrative, and to explore the role of indirect reports and quotation within narrative contexts. It will focus particularly on narratives of vicarious experience and how they differ from narratives of personal experience with regard to indirect reporting and quotation, further how tellers justify their basis for telling narratives of vicarious experience and establish their epistemic stance toward the events related in them. The chapter begins with several data-based observations concerning indirect reports and narrative. Next several research questions will be addressed, again based on natural language data. Then a series of examples will be analyzed illustrating how indirect reports differ from direct reports and from reported speech (or constructed dialogue), how tellers establish epistemic authority in the sense of Sacks (1984) for narratives introduced as indirect reports, how telling a story in the form of an indirect report influences its tellability in the sense of Labov and Waletzky (1967), and how telling as an indirect report can affect the teller's stance toward the events and characters. Finally, since indirect reports can differ in wording from direct reports, how do tellers in the indirect mode manage narrative resources to mark adherence to and divergence from their sources? And how do listeners perceive these divergences?

The data for this study derive from a range of corpora representing a wide variety of American and British English storytelling types, speakers and contexts: the Saarbrücken Corpus of Spoken English (SCoSE); the CallHome Corpus from the Linguistic Data Consortium; the Switchboard portion of the American National Corpus (ANC), consisting over 240 h of recorded speech, and about three million

N.R. Norrick (✉)
Department of English, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany
e-mail: neal@norrick.de

words, spoken by over 500 speakers; the British National Corpus (BNC), the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (SBCSAE); and the Longman Spoken and Written English Corpus (LSWEC) containing nearly 2.5 million words of American English conversation. For the sake of consistency, excerpts from all other corpora have been adapted to the transcription conventions of the SCoSE, as described online at http://www.uni-saarland.de/lehrstuhl/engling/scose.html.

2 Some Observations

Indirect reports initially describe speech events like 'she said that …', but those speech events may in turn instantiate narratives. Thus, an indirect report can take the form of a story: that is, once a person is in the indirect mode, she can go on to produce a narrative, as in the passage below.

> and she says y'know the way when you're standing,
> and from the back you can feel somebody,
> that their eyes are penetrating through you.
> and she said she happened to turn round,
> and there she's sitting in,
> in this girl's car.

Conversely, a story may take the form of an indirect report, beginning with the phrase 'she/he said (that) …'—as opposed to simply beginning 'she/he …'. In an initial example, Melinda responds to the question 'what did she do' not with a direct report but with an indirect report prefaced with 'well she said'.

> Alina   what did she do?
> Melinda   well she said that they uh, she saw the truck coming and,
>   she turned through the median to go to her house.

The same language performance may count as both an indirect report and a narrative, though neither must be coextensive with the other: many indirect reports are not narratives, since narratives recount past events, and many indirect reports perform other functions, such as stating an opinion, as in:

> no, **they said that** anything over thirty is a waste of money.

or informing someone about mental activities and states of affairs, as opposed to past events, as the following excerpt.

> yeah, **he uh said that**,
> he was thinking,
> maybe he would be able to, uh,
> buy a place up in, uh,
> southern Pennsylvania.

In the brief passage below, Nancy is reporting a recent bit of interaction and talk in the direct mode with 'she said' and then 'I said', but even though these two indirect reports are delivered within a narrative context, they are not themselves narrative, but rather statements of plans for the near future.

> like she said she was driving alone,
> so I wouldn't mind.
> like I even said to her,
> y'know I'll come there,
> and then I can drive with you.

And, conversely, many narratives are not indirect reports (even when they are narratives of vicarious experience). Nevertheless, a story may contain indirect reports representing the voices of characters to produce dialogue, as in:

> when Philip came home I said,
> 'what was wrong with the bus?'
> and he said,
> 'a different bus driver'.

These little indirect reports represent dialogue within a narrative, but are not themselves narrative. Taken by themselves, these indirect reports do not describe past events, and therefore cannot count as narrative, just as those in the excerpt below cannot.

> and he like looked at me.
> and I'm like 'oh no'.
> and he goes 'okay go in for Erin Potters'.

In sum, indirect reports may constitute or contain narratives, and narratives may take the form of indirect reports, generally accompanied by 'she/he said' and similar expressions, and they often contain indirect reports as in dialogue, again generally accompanied by 'she/he said' and similar expressions, but all these relations are contingent rather than necessary.

Cutting across the distinction between direct and indirect reports is the distinction between narratives of personal experience and narratives of vicarious experience (see Norrick 2013a). When participants in everyday conversation tell stories, they are usually narratives of personal experience. But conversationalists sometimes do tell stories about other people, sometimes people they do not know engaged in actions those tellers did not witness. Such narratives of vicarious experience are told in the third person (*he, she, they*) by contrast with the first person *I* characteristic of stories of personal experience. Only narratives of personal experience purport to describe past events in an unmediated way (*I did this and that*), while both narratives of vicarious experience and indirect reports distance themselves from personal experience, the first in relating experiences of others (*she did this and that*) and the second in rendering their contents in the form of a speech event (*she said she did this and that*). The teller must have observed or heard about/read about the matters reported, as opposed to experiencing them personally. Access to the thoughts and feelings of the actors is second-hand at best, acquaintance with details is by hearsay: the teller necessarily relies on imagination to fill out the picture. Both narratives of vicarious experience and indirect reports require that speakers identify all the actors in their discourses and establish their relation to them, whereas in narratives of personal experience the use of the pronoun *I* provides an automatic hinge between the teller and one actor in the story. Nevertheless, it is possible for

a teller to render a narrative of personal experience as an indirect report (*I said that I did this and that*) resulting in a special sort of mediation, which shall receive attention below.

Tellers have privileged access to their own experience and naturally assume telling rights for stories about their personal experiences. But it is not obvious who has the right to tell stories about non-present third parties or stories assembled from the spoken and/or written reports of others. Sacks (1984) discusses entitlement to tell stories through having witnessed and being in some way affected by the events reported. Speakers include in their stories of personal experience epistemic grounds upon which the report is based, and tell how they were affected by the events they report. This works naturally when someone actually witnessed an event, but how do tellers establish their right to tell a third person story about someone they do not know? In indirect reports and stories of vicarious experience where the teller does not appear as a character or even as a witness, the right to tell seems tenuous, the epistemic grounds for the report and the reasons for telling are not immediately obvious. Both tellers and listeners may be expected treat third person stories of vicarious experience and stories in the form of indirect reports differently from first person stories of personal experience. The following analysis will attempt to shed light on the linguistic means tellers employ to gain the floor to produce stories as indirect reports and to tell stories of vicarious experience more generally and to establish their right to tell such stories in the conversational context.

Fricker (2006) investigates the speech act of telling and the relationships between telling, testimony, speakers and hearers. She stresses the importance of the trustworthiness of the teller for the credibility of testimony. Missing from her discussion is an account of what speakers do to establish their trustworthiness in the telling performance. Looking at real data we see tellers are often at pains to establish their first-hand knowledge or at least the trustworthiness of their second-hand knowledge in various ways. Moreover, tellers of stories signal their own attitudes toward and evaluations of the events they report. These are matters one can only explore through conversation analysis of real spoken data, and it is just such an approach taken in this contribution.

3   Research Questions

In this section, I describe the research questions to be addressed in this chapter, again based on natural language data. First, what's the effect of choosing the indirect report form rather than the direct report form for a narrative? What's the difference between saying A and saying B, and presumably C as well?

A: Chris said that one of her girlfriends once made a turkey …
B: one of Chris's girlfriends once made a turkey …
C: Mary said, 'I made a turkey …'

The third option C is often called reported speech, but in line with an under-standing of tellers producing a story for a particular context and audience, we must recognize that narrators construct dialogue for their own purposes rather than simply reproducing speech from memory verbatim. Much of what speakers construct as direct speech – that is, the direct quotation of someone else talking versus an indirect summary or paraphrase of their words – is simply not meant to, indeed cannot, represent recall of real talk, as Tannen (1986) has shown: tellers produce as direct quotation utterances never actually spoken (*and I almost said*), general observations (*everybody says*), talk they cannot have observed, say by multiple speakers (*so the voters are saying*), and so on. According to Mayes (1990) at least half of 'direct quotations' are not authentic; they lie along a continuum, ranging from possible to impossible as real quoted speech (cf. Tannen 1986; Chafe 1994). Moreover, direct speech often has a symbolic meaning for evaluation, as when a narrator says, *and I said to myself, 'this is it',* as described by Labov (1972). Clark and Gerrig (1990) argue that when someone quotes another speaker, she is pretending to speak like them, so as to demonstrate what it would be like to hear the original performance. It counts as a non-serious activity in the sense of Goffman (1974) in that it represents that original performance, though the current speaker is not producing those words as her/his own. They propose a *Decoupling principle*, namely: Demonstrators intend their recipients to recognize different aspects of their demonstrations as depictive, supportive, and annotative, and a *Selectivity Principle*, namely: Speakers intend their quotations to depict only selective aspects of the referents under a broad description. Taken together these principles ensure that recipients of quotations will recognize certain features like word choice as salient and others like voice quality as belonging to the teller rather than to the original quoted performance. It will be necessary and instructive to consider the relationship between indirect reports and reported speech—or, better, constructed dialogue, as we will refer to it in the following, especially to separate it from the other senses of 'report'. We need to consider not just differences in truth value, but also differences in illocutionary force and interactional significance. A fourth possibility is so-called free indirect quotation, which occurs only rarely if at all in spoken performance (cf. Clark and Gerrig 1990: 787–788); it is difficult if not impossible to distinguish from constructed dialogue and will not be considered separately here (cf. Clark and Gerrig 1990, section 6.4 on hybrid quotations pp. 791–792).

Further, we must reflect on how tellers establish epistemic authority in the sense of Sacks (1984) for narratives introduced as indirect reports. How do they convey their own trustworthiness in the sense of Fricker (2006), and demonstrate that they are taking responsibility for the content or point of the story? How do they distance themselves from the original storyteller? And how do they convey their stance to the characters and the point of the narrative? Based on Du Bois (2007; cf. Bücker 2013), stance-taking in storytelling includes how tellers align themselves with or in opposition to the characters described, how they position themselves with regard to their motives and actions, and how they evaluate characters, actions and events. When a single person fills the participant roles of both teller and main character in a story, events are usually related and evaluated from the perspective of the teller; the

teller is more or less automatically aligned with her/himself as protagonist. When tellers relate stories in the indirect speech mode, they are borrowing words and perspectives from another person, perhaps someone they do not know personally, and they have to establish a stance toward the events and characters from the ground up. This contrasts with narratives of personal experience, where the identity of the roles of teller and protagonist suggests a certain range of stances: typically empathy for the protagonist qua earlier embodiment of the teller. Instead, stories in the indirect report mode, like stories of vicarious experiences, often derive their evaluation from the telling context: the larger context often already carries with it a particular evaluative stance, or set of stances. How, then, do tellers develop their own stance in indirect report narrative?

Does telling a story in the form of an indirect report influence its tellability in the sense of Labov and Waletzky (1967)? Tellability has often been seen as an inherent property of the (detached) content of a story, though Ochs and Capps (2001) show that it must be treated as one of the gradient dimensions of narrative, describing tellability in terms of a breach of canonicity or violation of cultural norms that distinguishes the story as unique. According to much literature on conversational narratives, a story must be 'reportable' in the sense of Labov (1972) or 'tellable' in Sacks' terms (1992): A would-be narrator must be able to defend the story as relevant and newsworthy to get and hold the floor and escape censure at its conclusion, as Polanyi (1981) argues. Labov (1972) stresses the importance of evaluation in determining reportability. A near-death experience is his classic example of a reportable event. However, tellers do not simply relate the seemingly fatal events step by step; they characteristically stop the action at the climax for an evaluative comment, for instance *and I said to myself, 'this is it'*. Telling a story without evaluation or without a currently relevant point constitutes a loss of face for the teller, especially when received with a scathing *So what?* (Labov and Fanshel 1977) or *What's the point?* (Polanyi 1979). Fludernik (1996) says tellability in this sense and the point of a story 'dialectically constitute one another. The narrative is narrative, not because it tells a story, but because the story that it tells is reportable and has been interpreted by the experiencing I, the personal storyteller' (p. 70). What happens, then, when the teller is not the same as the experiencer as in narratives in the indirect report mode? Does it render the story more or less tellable? Does it allow the teller to adopt a different stance toward the events and characters? How do tellers of indirect reports indicate their alignment or disalignment with the original teller? And how do they establish a stance of their own and ensure the evaluation so central to tellability?

According to the paraphase/form principle of Capone (2010), an indirect report need not contain the exact words of the original speaker, even when the constructed dialogue is brief: this ties in with our comments about reported speech/constructed dialogue above; then certainly no one would expect a (longer) narrative cast in the form of an indirect report to consist of exactly the same words as spoken by its source: storytellers can be expected to modify/embellish the original report for their own purposes and those of the audience. But how much liberty can a teller take with a narrative received from someone else and still be justified in prefacing it

with 'she/he said ...'? Introducing a narrative with 'she/he said' may give the impression that the indirect report replicates the original story verbatim, while a storyteller might distance herself from this impression with phrasing such as 'she said something like' or 'I'll just give you the gist of what she said'. Once a narrative is introduced as an indirect report, does everything the teller say then count as (more or less) the source story? What are the linguistic means at a teller's disposal for marking divergence from the original story?

Finally, what happens when a teller reports telling a story of her own, the narrative of personal experience told as an indirect report mentioned above? What effect does it have when someone reports telling a story, beginning as below?

I've told the cute story ...

How does it differ from telling a story by someone else? Can the teller (clearly) separate the present telling from the past telling/from past tellings? Do recipients hear a story or an indirect report in narrative form? Does telling about telling affect epistemic authority, credibility or stance? And how? I hope to offer tentative answers to these questions in the following pages based on examples from everyday conversation.

4   Epistemic Entitlement, Telling Rights

Consider the indirect report in the passage below from the SCoSE. Four women are gathered before a late-afternoon Thanksgiving dinner in the living room of the house just outside the kitchen where food preparation is ongoing. Appropriately, they are talking about roasting turkeys, when Jean is reminded of a story she heard 'the other day at work'. But this temporal and spatial location are not sufficient for Jean, who goes on to anchor the story by identifying the topic of discussion in line 2, the teller Marge Jankowski in line 3, and then the protagonist 'one of her girlfriends' in line 4. Once the initial indirect report is finished, Jean describes her further interaction with the teller in lines 14–18 as well.

1	Jean:	we were laughing the other uh day at work.
2		we were talking about making turkeys and stuff.
3		and um Marge Jankowski said,
4		well, one of her girlfriends
5		one time made a turkey.
6		first time.
7		and she said,
8		'oh' she was so proud of herself,
9		she made the turkey.
10		the only thing,
11		she left the bag in.
12		she said,
13	Annie:	HOOH.
14	Jean:	and then I said ...

15   'well, nobody saw it right?'
16   she said 'EVERYBOdy saw it'.
17   I said 'oh THAT WAS TErrible.
18   how would anybody keep a bag in there?'

Jean clearly assigns responsibility for the story to a specific source: 'Marge Jankowski said' in line 3, 'and she said' in line 7, and again 'she said' in line 12. She further establishes her relationship to this source in her preface by saying they were laughing the other day at work, and she returns to her own direct involvement with the teller at the end of the story in lines 14–18. All these moves are characteristic for indirect reports and stories of vicarious experience, and they all differ from anything one finds in narratives of personal experience. The set-up, 'we were laughing ...' in line 1, and 'we were talking ...' in line 2, along with line 14 'and I said', leading into Jean's commentary, frame this narrative of vicarious experience from Jean's perspective. Then the phrase 'Marge Jankowski said' in line 3 identifies the actual source of the narrative. These moves again reflect typical strategies in delivering indirect reports as opposed to stories of personal experience. Here can be no conflation of the teller's perspective with that of the protagonist as in narratives of personal experience, where the cohesion of the teller and protagonist roles allows assessments and attributions of knowledge to flow back and forth. Instead, the teller establishes a clear distance between herself and the unfortunate girlfriend who left the bag in the turkey.

In 'Doing Being Ordinary' Sacks (1984) discusses entitlement to tell stories through having witnessed and being in some way affected by the events reported. Sacks found that speakers routinely include in their stories epistemic grounds upon which the report is based, and tell how they were affected by the events they report. This works naturally when someone was actually involved in an event, but potential tellers must establish their right to tell a story borrowed from some other teller in other ways. Like vicarious narratives generally, an indirect report 'operates as narrative by hearsay. Its tellability depends on the interest afforded by the described experience, which needs to have been especially funny, weird, exotic or outrageous' (Fludernik 1996:54). We should expect that tellers will have to expend more effort in tying the story to the current context and in explicating their relation to the original teller and/or to the characters in the story. These apparent distinctions in tellability, telling rights and epistemic authority are mirrored in the linguistic means tellers employ to gain the floor to relate indirect reports and to establish their right to tell such stories in the conversational context. In the examples from Sacks, the tellers establish their epistemic authority through their witnessing of the events reported, but for indirect reports narrators draw their epistemic authority and right to tell by citing a specific source such as 'Marge Jankowski' and 'the other day at work' in the passage above. But Jean also inserts herself into the story, questioning the teller, starting at line 14.

The excerpt considered above continues as below with a second indirect report narrative related to the first. Here Jean introduces a second woman, Mary, who reports her own experience preparing turkey. Apparently the listeners can identify

Mary by name based on the information that the reported talk took place 'at work'. This identification helps Jean establish her claim to know and tell the story. Jean initially reports what Mary said in lines 21–23 and her own response in lines 24–28, then she goes on to report Mary's further embellishments on the story in lines 29–33.

19	Jean	Mary, Mary kept watching.
20		and she said,
21		'I did it.
22		nobody saw it.
23		and I didn't tell anybody'.

-----8 lines deleted, discussion of what it means to leave the bag in a turkey ---

24	Jean	so I said,
25		to Mary I said,
26		'Mary' I said,
27		'didn't you know?
28		didn't you-'
29		she says 'I saw the thing'.
30		she said, 'it said ready to cook so I',
31		she said 'who-
32		nobody told me I had to CLEAN it'.
33		she said 'so I put it in the oven'.

Jean initiates the story with 'she said' in line 20, thus constituting its status as an indirect report. She frames her own talk with 'I said' repeated three times in lines 24–26, then insists on marking Mary's talk with 'she says' (line 29) and 'she said' (lines 30, 31 and 33). Of course, Jean switches voice quality to characterize the spoken passages in the live performance. The tense shift from 'says' in line 29 to 'said' in line 30 may signal a shift of attention from Mary's perception 'I saw' to the authority of the printed instructions 'it said', in line with observations by Johnstone (1987): other relevant sources on the alternation between the past tense and the (historical) present tense in conversational narrative in English are Wolfson (1982), Schiffrin (1981), Fleischman (1990) and Chafe (1994); a general consensus has formed that the tenses themselves have no specific meaning, but that the switch between them can partition one narrative event from another or signal a shift in perspective.

    If it seems that Jean is paying extreme attention to the matter of who is speaking in the second part of this passage, it is certainly justified at least in part by the very nature of indirect reports as narratives. Indirect reports differ from direct reports and it is important to distinguish them clearly. Also Jean switches frequently between speakers and there are opportunities for misunderstanding: in the initial passage above, first Marge Jankowski's girlfriend speaks, then Jean, and here Mary speaks, then Jean, and then Mary again. The repetition in lines 24–26 'so I said, to Mary I said, Mary, I said' is rather formulaic in everyday spoken English. Finally, the repetition of 'she said' from line 30 to line 31 is presumably motivated by the

occurrence of 'it said' with reference to the preparation instructions on the turkey packaging in line 30. The overall effect of all the reports of saying is one of listening to lively dialogue rather than straightforward narrative.

5   Speech Act Considerations

Mary's initial narrative from line 21 to line 23 constitutes an admission that she fell into the same trap as Marge Jankowski's girlfriend, namely failing to remove the bag from the turkey before roasting it. In doing so, she aligns herself with the unfortunate woman. But her response to Jean in the following lines 29–33, Mary explains and defends her actions, and by implication those of the girlfriend as well: the package said 'ready to cook', so she put the turkey in the oven as is. This reduces her transgression to the sort of routine error anyone might make in preparing a turkey for the first time. Since the listeners apparently know Mary, they are likely to be more sympathetic to her than the indefinite girlfriend in the first episode. Mary's admission of her own mistake presumably helps exculpate her as well. These are effects not achievable in the same way with a direct report.

In speech act terms, the original story in lines 3–18 constitutes a report of a blameworthy action, where the teller adopts a negative stance, but lines 19–23 report a confession, where the teller seems rather sympathetic. Indeed, line 21 alone 'I did it' constitutes a confession. In the direct mode 'Mary did it' counts as an accusation or as testimony, even in the mode of constructed dialogue, the confession is unequivocal, though the status of an indirect report such as 'Mary said she did it' is much less clear: compare 'Mary essentially said she did it'. In reporting a failure by another, one assigns blame, but in reporting one's own failure, one performs a confession—with different consequences for reception by a listener. In allowing Mary to tell her own story in the form of an indirect report, Jean adopts an empathic stance, while the stance toward the action in the initial report in the initial excerpt above is ridicule. Thus, the differences between modes of telling can be seen to bear interactional consequences.

The talk about Mary is not yet complete, the conversation goes on. In response to questions from Annie in lines 42 and 44 below, Jean summarizes the story in the form of a direct report in her own words. Annie is in charge of cooking her own turkey in the adjacent kitchen and she leaves the conversation periodically to keep an eye on the cooking process, so she must have missed at least part of the preceding narrative: hence her questions, giving Jean occasion for a quick run through (Polanyi 1981 discusses the use of an abbreviated run through, a kind of summary of a story familiar to at least some of the present participants: the teller typically produces not just a synoptic version of the story, but speaks more rapidly and with little variation of intonation). Following general laughter, Jean returns to constructed dialogue framed by 'she said' to continue the story in Mary's words in lines 41–45.

34	Annie	who?
35	Jean	this girl at work.
36	Annie	oh.
37	Jean	she put it in,
38		with all the guts and everything.
39		with the bag inside and everything.
40	All	((laugh))
41	Jean	she said,
42		'but nobody knew it.
43		but', she said,
44		'they ate it.
45		it was good'.

Again there is repetition of 'she said' from line 41 to line 43, again clearly marking the status of the report as indirect and setting it off from Jean's brief stretch of direct report. This time the phrase 'this girl at work' stands for Mary and helps identify the context of the story as something Jean heard at work, though Annie presumably knows Mary as well. At the same time, 'this girl at work' depersonalizes the story and generalizes the events, especially in combination with the vague 'put it in' (line 37) and the repetition of 'and everything' in the next two lines (38 and 39). Jean's direct report may seem more objective, but it is definitely less animated and less definite than the portions in constructed dialogue. The return to the indirect mode following her own direct report serves to place Mary back in the center of the events reported and to round out the whole performance. By allowing Mary to have the last word in the form of constructed dialogue, and in particular since Mary can finish by saying 'they ate it. It was good', Jean puts a positive spin on the story and seems to exonerate Mary for her failure to remove the bag before cooking the turkey.

6   She Said She ... Versus She Said, 'I ... '

The notion of indirect report can be further divided into indirect reports in the form of so-called indirect speech and indirect reports in the form of so-called reported speech, or, as we prefer, constructed dialogue. We have already encountered examples of both in the foregoing section. The grammatical distinction is between *she said (that) she ...* and *she said, 'I ...'*. In the written idiom, quotation marks help set off the latter form from the former, in the spoken idiom, a shift in voice often, but not always, marks the latter vis-à-vis the former. Quotation marks suggest, as does the voice shift in oral performance, that the teller is reproducing the words and sounds of the original speaker, but, as discussed above, this is not usually the case, indeed, there is no reason for a narrator to reproduce the words and sounds initially uttered by someone else.

   The passage below (from the British National Corpus KDN6807) provides an interesting example of how a single teller can transition through the three telling modes of direct report, indirect report and constructed dialogue. The teller Kyle

begins a story in the neutral third person narrative form, though it should be clear from the context that he is relating a story he heard from the protagonist, that is that he is relating a narrative of vicarious experience. Following a simple response token by his listener at line 6, the teller switches into the mode of indirect report with 'he said he' in line 7. After a second response token from his listener at line 11, the teller switches into the mode of constructed dialogue, saying 'and he said, I suddenly felt so ill' from line 12 onward.

1	Kyle	back home uh, from the office.
2		an over his lunch hour,
3		to see if he could just,
4		go and lend a hand,
5		ge- generally help out over his lunch hour.
6	Hank	mhm.
7	Kyle	and he said he was alright over y'know, that period.
8		and he said he got back to office,
9		then two hours later.
10		he said he was in, in such great PAIN.
11	Hank	oh.
12	Kyle	and he said,
13		I suddenly felt so ill, y'know,
14		and I was shaking,
15		and, and, and, and, and obviously started running a temperature and,

Kyle shifts his telling mode twice, moving first from a direct report to an indirect report, and then on into an indirect report cast in the original teller's own words. Each move takes his own narrative performance closer to the performance he must have witnessed as a basis for his own telling, and each move renders the narrative more immediate, animated and convincing. In line with Clark and Gerrig (1990), Kyle is pretending to speak like his source, so as to demonstrate what it would be like to hear the original performance. It is a non-serious activity in the sense of Goffman (1974) in that it represents that original performance, though the current speaker is not producing these words as her/his own. Kent is not in pain, but he mimics the original words of someone who was in pain as a demonstration. Note the three repetitions of 'he said he' in lines 7–10: having begun in the direct mode, Kyle apparently deems it necessary to repeatedly mark the shift into the indirect report mode. When he goes on to the constructed dialogue mode from line 12 on, another repetition of 'he said' and the introduction of the first person *I* serve to signal this second transition. Even without Capone's principle it seems clear that Kyle is not recalling and repeating the actual words he heard in the original telling of this story excerpt, as we have argued above.

Particularly questionable is the inclusion of the tag 'y'know' in the indirect report in line 7 and again in the constructed dialogue in line 13, but also the repetition of 'in' at line 10 of the indirect report and the multiple repetition of 'and' in line 15 of the constructed dialogue. It is highly unlikely that a listener would recall that the original speaker had inserted 'y'know' at just these points in his story or that he had pronounced 'in' twice and 'and' five times. Clark and Gerrig (1990: 779)

talk about imitating stuttering and dialect as part of the process of quotation, but they do not discuss disfluencies by the speaker which must be discoupled from the performance as a demonstration of the original referent. When we listen to everyday talk, we expect various disfluencies, and we do not usually take notice of them. This is another reason to consider quotations in narratives as constructed dialogue produced for rhetorical purposes rather than recalled. Someone listening to Kyle's performance would hence assign the 'y'know' to the teller rather than to the original speaker. The repetition of 'to' in line 10 and the repetitions of 'and' in line 15 certainly seem to signal that the teller is experiencing production difficulties rather than that the original speaker stuttered during the initial performance Kyle heard. Thus, both indirect speech and constructed dialogue may contain words and structures assignable to the speech production process of the current narrator rather than to the original teller: this is an ambiguity which cannot occur in narratives related in the direct speech mode.

The switch between telling modes also serves rhetorical purposes, it is not because Kyle suddenly remembers the words of his source teller. Both switches come following listener feedback, and this may be relevant: input from other participants routinely serves to animate storytellers. With the encouragement of his audience, Kyle progressively finds his way into his borrowed narrative, and increasingly takes on the voice and feelings of his protagonist. The transition from direct report to the mode of indirect report is here just an initial foray in the direction of full-fledged constructed dialogue, where the teller moves stage by stage closer to performing the story as he must have experienced it originally. From our current perspective in conversational narrative it is useful to view the indirect report mode as midway between direct report and constructed dialogue.

7   Re-Telling Your Own Story

What kind of report is a story prefaced by the teller identifying it as a story previously told? Does the framing render it an indirect report: is the speaker reporting on something she said? Or does the framing simply count as auxiliary information about a story to be received as direct? Can a speaker ever be said to be performing an indirect report of her own story? Clark and Gerrig (1990: 770) write 'story telling, joke telling … are also nonserious uses of language, but only quotations qualify as a type of demonstration'. Still, as we have seen, stories are sometimes told *as* quotations, the teller presenting the story as one already told elsewhere, perhaps by another person. If such stories are then demonstrations in the sense of Clark and Gerrig, what, if anything, changes? Clark and Gerrig (1990: 772) actually note that 'quotations can even appear as complete narratives', for instance in Mark Twain's *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court*—and one could multiply examples from Twain (*The Celebrated Jumping Frog*) and elsewhere in world literature from Boccaccio and Chaucer onwards—but they do not follow up on this observation.

In the excerpt below (from the SCoSE corpus), Amy is seeking to *narrativize* her personal experience, while for Pat the events have already been narrated and even codified as 'the story'. Pat has been describing a party she attended where she related this same story for the amusement of outsiders, but here the story is co-narrated as one familiar to everyone in the immediate family, all of whom are present (see Norrick 1997 on the dynamics of co-narration). The participants are the four members of a nuclear family. Pat and Ralph are the parents of two college-age daughters, Amy and Mary, who are home for Thanksgiving. Only these four family members are present, and all four were involved to some degree in the events rehearsed in the narrative, though Pat identifies Amy as the primary character right at the outset: 'the story about you [namely Amy] and the little chipmunk'. This description suffices for Amy to remember the story, or at least the relevant events as she experienced them, and in the co-narration that ensues, Amy seeks in various ways to identify herself as the middle point of the events described, and the story as hers, saying that she had been 'thinking about that just the other day' at line 6; foregrounding her emotional experience 'that thing scared the heck out of me' at line 7; insisting that it was twice (lines 9 and 12) and delivering a brief description of the first time in lines 14–16; supplying dialogue (lines 18–19), but Pat takes over the telling from line 21 onward. Nevertheless, Pat continues to invite involvement by the others, for instance in asking 'remember?' in line 22.

Though Pat apparently invites co-participation, this is her story and she claims it by announcing that she 'told the story' at the outset. But what are the consequences of commencing a story by identifying it as 'the story' one has previously told? Is Pat primarily reporting something she said/told as in an indirect report or is she primarily (re-)telling a story, in this case one familiar to her audience—rendering them potential co-narrators?

1	Pat	and then I told the story,
2		about you and the little chipmunk.
3		out in the . . . garage.
4	Mary	oh ((laughing)).
5	Amy	I kept- I kept.
6		I was just thinking about it the other day.
7		that thing scared the HECK out of me.
8	Pat	with all with all the,
9	Amy	[it was twice.]
10	Mary	[((laughs))]
11	Pat	[sunflower seeds.]
12	Amy	it was twice.
13		and the first time,
14		'there's a RAT in there,
15		there's a big MOUSE in there.
16		I SAW it'.
17	Mary	((laughs)) I-
18	Amy	'no, there's nothing in there'.
19		'yes, I SAW it'.

20	Mary	I wouldn't believe her.
21	Pat	well I went out.
22		remember?
23		and checked the bag-
24		it was a bag of CANS.
25		that was when we were looking for a golf ball,
26		cause you hit the ball in the can.

Pat clearly frames her telling with the formulation 'I told the story', and by adding 'about you and the little chipmunk', she specifically includes her daughter Amy in the storyworld, and potentially in the telling performance as well. By announcing and identifying her story, Pat potentially includes the rest of the family as well, inasmuch as they were all involved in the events reported, and she elicits lots of co-narration from her two daughters, but otherwise it seems she might be telling a first-hand story of her own. She might have generated the same sort of response and co-participation by simply saying 'remember the time you saw the little chipmunk out in the garage?' She need not establish her right or her epistemic authority to tell the story, and everyone is familiar with the basic plot, at least from their own perspective and within the limits of their memories, so she can proceed to rehearse the narrative relatively unencumbered, albeit with plenty of input from the others. The performance does not differ in relevant respects from other instances of co-narration in any data I have inspected: it seems that prefacing a narrative in a way that effectively makes it an indirect report has no significant effect on its potential for interaction.

Again in 'my story' below, Berry clearly labels what she will tell as 'my story' and 'this story', explicitly laying claim to telling rights and epistemic authority. In addition, Conny calls it 'that story', recognizing its status as a text pre-existent in narrative form, which is, after all, the hallmark of indirect reports. Berry's question 'did I tell you this story?' in line 8 shows that she fears even Ayesha may have already heard it, but she forges ahead without waiting for a reply. In any case, we have here another instance of a story explicitly told in the form of an indirect report.

1	Ayesha:	we were all having our quiet time.
2	Berry:	((laughing)) you've heard **my story**,
3		have you heard **my story**? ((laughing))
4	Conny:	oh no.
5		you gotta tell Ayesha **that story**,
6		that's funny.
7	Ayesha:	oh no.
8	Berry:	did I tell you **this story**?
9		I was having a quiet time with Denora out on Hendry's Beach.
10		and we were on the beach.
11		but up away from the water,
12		but on the sand.
13		and we were just sitting there reading,
14		and people were walking around,
15		all kinds of people were walking around,

16	their dogs just running everywhere,
17	no leash, no nothing,
18	and this lady was jogging by down by the water.

Alyesha's response 'oh no' in line 7 is brilliant: it echoes Connie's initiation in line 4 and expresses surprise in anticipation of a story with high tellability. Though Connie's initial 'oh no' can be taken either as a comment on the exceptionally tellable content of Berry's story or as a reaction to Ayesha's apparent unfamiliarity with the story, Ayesha's response works. Even though it now seems clear that Ayesha does not know the story, Berry begins with a standard opening for a joke or funny story: 'Did I tell you this story?' Notice the phrase 'quiet time' in the first line of the story (namely line 9) to hook explicitly with the same phrase in Ayesha's turn preceding the story initiation, thus ensuring tellability on thematic grounds.

This time we see a performance by a single narrator with the unique right to tell her own story with no co-narration, though Conny clearly has already heard it at least once, often enough to characterize it as 'that story'. Again there is nothing about this telling to differentiate it from a story told in the direct mode. Even when a teller marks a story as previous told, indeed even as canonized as 'my story' or 'that story', it seems to have no effect on the telling performance or on the reception the story receives. Perhaps this is the case more generally for indirect reports, namely that for practical purposes in terms of the interaction they generate, there is simply no difference between saying Mary once cooked a turkey and saying that Mary said she once cooked a turkey—especially if we know and trust the teller and we know and trust Mary.

8   Retelling Your Own Story as an Indirect Report

Consider now a special case of retelling a personal story, namely retelling a personal story which the teller only gleaned from the accounts of others. Conversationalists sometimes tell stories about themselves which they heard from others, say because they were very young or under the influence of alcohol or drugs—we are not always the best authorities to report on our own actions. In such cases tellers may produce what are in effect indirect reports based on their own activities. Consider the excerpt below where Kent is persuaded by Len to tell a story from so early in his childhood that he must rely on others for the details of the events he cannot himself remember, hence his curious phrasing: 'I could tell you a story that's been told to me about me' in lines 09–10, again in lines 11–12: 'it's a story like when I was- my mum told me innit?' and once more in line 36: 'they told me that like'.

7	Len	I mean you don't have to tell me something too private.
8		maybe something silly you did.
9	Kent	um um um, I could tell you a story.
10		that's been told to me about me.
11		it's a story like when I was-
12		my mum told me innit?

13	Len	mm mm.
14	Kent	when I was like THREE.
15		yeah basically when I was three.
16		I cracked out of my house.
17		I snuck out of the window.
18		and I was in nappies.
19		and I went ((laughs)).
20		yeah and basically snuck out of my window.
21		and I- I walked all the way to Tesco.
22		so to say, that Tesco was about like probably,
23		you see where the bus stop is?
24	Len	yeah.
25	Kent	like in front of my house.
26		th,
27		so I walked from my house to THERE.
28		and I went to the Tesco.
29		and I went to the Tesco.
30		and I think I stole something from the Tesco.
31		in my NAPpies y'know ((laughs)).
32		and then I walked back.
33		that's probably how far it was innit?
34		well and then I was walking back to my house.
35		and obviously I- I was a little kid.
36		they told me that like-
37		I didn't know which way was my house.
38		so I walked to the block that was opposite.
39		someone found me innit.
40		and they basically thought I was a GIRL ((laughs)).
41	Len	that's sweet ((laughs)).

The teller is continually at pains to distance himself from the person portrayed in the story, although his identity and that of the protagonist are laminated together (in Goffman's 1967 term) through the unchangeable first person pronoun *I*: Kent insists on his tender age of three (lines 14–15), that he was still 'a little kid' (line 35), still 'in nappies' (lines 18, 31), that he 'didn't know which way was my house' (line 37), was taken for a girl (line 40), and that he came to know the story only through the telling of others: 'my mum told me innit?' (line 12). He consequently bears no real responsibility for his actions, thus: 'I think I stole something' (line 30) and 'they told me that' (line 36). He thus repeatedly undermines his own trustworthiness as a witness and the credibility of his story as testimony in the sense of Fricker (2006), but it does not diminish the force of the narrative. Indeed, Kent seems to be more interested in exculpating himself than in putting his story on record. The result is a narrative more like an indirect third person report than a first person narrative of personal experience, except for the repetition of the first person *I* repeatedly affirming the (formal?, mystical?) identity of the protagonist and the speaker.

Nevertheless, the overall effect is the same as if Kent had simply reported what transpired in the (more or less) neutral form of a direct report. Certainly, listeners do not hold 3 years olds morally responsible for their actions, whether these actions

are related to them in the third person or in the first person. Moreover, and more to the point here, it does not seem to matter where the teller gleaned the details of the story. At least for tellers we can say that the assignment of blame and praise (for instance in the initial turkey cooking stories) or responsibility and guilt in the present story depend not upon the mode of telling but upon the intrinsic relations described in the narrative. Seemingly, there is simply no difference between saying 'I once stole something from Tesco' and saying that one's mother said that one once stole something from Tesco—again, so long as we trust the teller and we trust, by implication, his mother. Particularly the final stroke 'and they basically thought I was a girl' seems destined to elicit the sympathetic response 'that's sweet'.

Narratives are different from other genres of discourse. There is generally no objective test for truth regarding the contents of narratives. Stories of personal experience are generally told to position the teller vis-à-vis events and other participants in the action related rather than to establish truth claims about past events. The teller says: 'I'm this sort of person because I did these things' or 'these things happened to me and that's why I'm this sort of person', rather than 'here are the details of what happened'. In everyday storytelling, personal motivations and evaluations are for more important than so-called facts. Obviously, the conditions differ significantly in contexts like courtroom testimony and job interviews.

Returning to indirect reports as our central theme, we can say that the mode of telling is subservient to the content conveyed in the case of conversational narrative. In everyday interaction participants are more or less immune to the logical distinction between someone telling a story and someone reporting that they told a story: the announcement that a story has previously been told and details of its previous telling(s) are treated as mere prefaces to their telling with no real consequences for their information value or truth value. In fact in general, factualiy and information range far below positioning and evaluation in narratives of personal experience. In spite of obvious differences in truth value from a logical perspective and speech act status, the (perlocutionary) effects of the following speech acts qua narrative performances seems to remain the same:

The station manager quit.	direct report
The station manager said (that) she quit.	indirect report
The station manager said, 'I quit'.	constructed dialogue

This final story suggests that it does not harm the narrative as narrative when the teller apparently undermines her/his own trustworthiness. The story content apparently stands in spite of the teller's untrustworthiness. Surely the telling of a story at all argues its tellability in the sense of Sacks. We might say this is a good story whether it is true or not, and again it seems that listeners are happy to go with the flow and accept the story as an exemplar with appropriate consequences for positioning and evaluation by the teller. In all the data I have inspected I have rarely found listeners questioning the validity of the basic events described in stories, so long as the story remains consistent and understandable. Although listeners occasionally challenge tellers regarding individual claims or demand clarification of details, such attacks seem not to depend on the mode of telling (see Norrick 2013b for examples and analyses).

Even taken with the previous two examples, we are left with certain questions. Remember: not all direct reports are narratives, nor are all indirect reports, and both may follow patterns different than those described here based on narrative examples. Narrative develops an inner consistency and force of its own, which may render the distinction between direct and indirect reports negligible, perhaps all the more because of the frequency of constructed dialogue in narrative. Still the consideration of indirect reports as narratives and narratives as indirect reports (by contrast with constructed dialogue in and as narrative) is certainly instructive in itself.

Finally, there is the whole matter of *said* versus *told*, which has been glossed over here. In English there are significant grammatical differences between *say* and *tell*: namely *tell* regularly takes an indirect object as in *she told me (that) she*, whereas *say* cannot, it is limited to *she said (that) she*. This is obviously a language-specific difference with no necessary correspondence in other languages, so it probably does not matter for present purposes, but it should not be entirely ignored in future investigations. I have been treating *tell* as equivalent to *say* for semantic/logical purposes, but there may be differences I am not aware of.

9   Conclusions

Several firm conclusions can be drawn along with several more tentative ones. An indirect report can take the form of a story, and a story may take the form of an indirect report, beginning with 'she/he said (that) . . . '—as opposed to simply beginning 'she/he . . . '. Still, many narratives are not indirect reports, even when they are narratives of vicarious experience. Further, both direct reports and indirect reports can contain instances of reported speech/constructed dialogue, indeed whole passages of narrative may be related as if repeating the words of a previous telling, perhaps by a different speaker. So there is really a three-way distinction to maintain between direct reports, indirect reports and constructed dialogue.

Indirect reports are like narratives of vicarious experience more generally in requiring tellers to establish epistemic authority and telling rights. Tellers deploy various linguistic devices to show that they are taking responsibility for the content and point of the story and to convey their stance toward the characters and the point of the narrative. Indirect reports cannot conflate the teller's perspective with that of the protagonist as in narratives of personal experience, where the lamination of the teller and protagonist roles allows assessments and attributions of knowledge to flow back and forth. Consequently, narrators must work harder when they choose the indirect mode.

Because of the way they relate to tellers, indirect reports realize different speech acts than direct reports and constructed speech. Both direct reports and constructed dialogue seem to convey factual information: someone did something, someone said 'I did something', but indirect reports occupy a middle ground: someone said that she did something, leaving room for doubt about just what was done and just what was said. Telling what a person did differs from telling what they said they did and

both differ again from giving voice to the person to describe what she did herself. The distinctions allow tellers to assign different evaluations and to adopt different stances toward the action and the actor.

A narrator may switch between the three modes of direct report, indirect report and constructed dialogue for rhetorical purposes. The transition from direct report to the mode of indirect report moves the narrator closer to the story as s/he must have experienced it originally, and the transition to constructed dialogue allows the narrator to take over the voice of the original teller, demonstrating rather than describing in the terms of Clark and Gerrig (1990). Thus, the indirect report mode is midway between direct report and constructed dialogue. Nevertheless, there seem to be no significant differences in the way a story is received by listeners. The mode of telling appears subservient to the content conveyed for the tellability and credibility of a story. In spite of obvious differences in truth value from a logical perspective and speech act status, it does not seem to matter to the audience whether a story is prefaced as an indirect report or even as a retold narrative in the mode of constructed dialogue.

In a special case of retelling a personal story gleaned only from the accounts of others, the narrator was seen to have lots of extra work to do, identifying the sources of the story and his relation to them, relativizing the credibility of certain details, distancing himself from the person portrayed in the story. Still the basic content of the story seems generally unaffected by the telling mode. Even when a teller admits the second-hand status of her own story and questions her descriptions of details, the force of the narrative remains intact. Recipient response is ensured in great part by the coherence of the narrative and the teller's expression of stance and evaluation.

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Reporting, Dialogue, and the Role of Grammar

Eleni Gregoromichelaki and Ruth Kempson

1 Introduction

There is a lot of debate in the literature as to whether metalinguistic, echoing or metarepresentational phenomena require semantic or pragmatic explanations or, perhaps the widest consensus, a mixture of the two. Recently some attention has been paid on whether grammatical models, i.e., models that define syntactic-semantic mappings (see e.g. Potts 2007; Ginzburg and Cooper 2014; Maier 2014), can offer a more substantial contribution in answering this question. In this chapter, we argue that they can, but not under standard assumptions as to what kind of mechanism "syntax" is and what the differentiation is between grammatical and pragmatic processes. Like Ginzburg and Cooper (2014) we take natural languages (NLs) to be primarily means of social engagement and on this basis we believe that various mechanisms that have been employed in the analysis of conversation can be extended to account for metarepresentational phenomena, which, as stressed in the Bakhtinian literature, demonstrate how dialogic interaction can be embedded within a single clause. However, we take such phenomena as a case study to show that a model adequate for accounting for the whole range of metalinguistic data, as well as for their interaction with other dialogue phenomena, has to depart from some standard assumptions in grammatical theorising: (a) we have to abandon the view of syntax as a separate representational level for strings of words, and (b) we need to incorporate in the grammar formalism various aspects of psycholin-guistic accounts of NL-processing, like the intrinsic incrementality-predictivity

E. Gregoromichelaki (✉) • R. Kempson
Department of Philosophy, King's College London, London, UK
e-mail: elenigregor@gmail.com

of parsing/production, and a realistic modelling of the context as information states that record or invoke utterance events and their modal and spatiotemporal coordinates.

The structure of this chapter is as follows: Firstly we present the traditional distinction between direct and indirect discourse (Sect. 2). We then show that the echoing and metarepresentational abilities that underpin such uses are not peculiar to reported discourse but occur also in dialogue, in particular in cases of repair and the process of "grounding", i.e. signalling of comprehension, (dis)agreement, or request for clarification of a previous utterance (Sect. 3). We then present a recent model, Ginzburg and Cooper (2014), which attempts to integrate the traditional view of direct/indirect discourse within a dialogue model without ad hoc devices not needed independently in the analysis of conversation (Sect. 4). We will then argue that the traditional direct/indirect discourse distinction cannot be maintained in view of various intermediate phenomena like free (in)direct discourse, hybrid, and mixed quotation (Sect. 5). In view of this we present an alternative grammar formalism that integrates some of the ideas of the Ginzburg & Cooper account but within a distinct incremental processing architecture that accounts naturally for the properties of these intermediate phenomena (Sect. 6).

2 Direct vs. Indirect Discourse

It has been assumed that talking about language or thought can be achieved in two distinct ways: directly or indirectly. In so-called "direct discourse"[1] one "pretends" to be the original speaker and reports the words accordingly; in "indirect discourse" it has been assumed that one reports the content of somebody's words or thoughts from one's own perspective. The first characterisation is akin to what in the Bakhtinian literature is characterised as the *pictorial style*, which emphasises the dialogicity of discourse by maintaining the style of the reported event; the second can be taken to correspond with the *linear style*, which, supposedly, focuses on the content of the reported speech and maintains a clear-cut boundary between reported speech and reporting context.

It has ten been argued that direct and indirect reports are grammatically distinct ways of reporting. In *direct discourse* the so-called framing verb combines with a clause which appears relatively independent, is attributed to the subject of the framing verb (the reportee), and there is a requirement for faithful or "verbatim" reporting (Maier 2015):

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[1]We use the term *discourse* as neutral between reporting language (written or spoken) and thought.

(1)   (Ann said:) "Really, I could care less about that" (said Ann).
       [adapted from Maier 2014]
(2)   She walked up to him and kissed him. "What am I doing? He is going to hate me now,"
       she thought.   [from Maier 2015]

In *indirect discourse* the framing verb combines with a subordinated clause, sometimes introduced with the complementiser *that*, whose content is presented from the reporter's perspective so that paraphrase is allowed:

(3)   Ann said that she couldn't care less about that.

In the literature, direct reports are classified under *quotation*, i.e., the complement of the framing verb involves reference to linguistic objects. Indirect reports are analysed in parallel with intensional constructions so that the complement of the framing verb is taken to denote a proposition (Kaplan 2007; Maier 2007). Various further syntactic/semantic characteristics are assumed to distinguish the two types (see e.g. Partee 1973; Maier 2015). In writing, direct reports are supposed to be enclosed in quotation marks while in spoken language intonation distinguishes the reported part (Potts 2007). Indirect reports may involve the presence of a special complementiser like *that* in English. In some languages, like English, there are also mood-indicator shifts in indirect reports. For example, questions are assumed to be reported with non-inverted word order and without the presence of auxiliaries. In indirect reports, because the object reported is taken to be a proposition, non-propositional speech-act indicators like exclamations, vocatives or imperatives do not constitute appropriate markings on the verb's complement. It is also assumed that due to the independence of the reported clause in direct reports various syntactic processes are blocked for example, *wh*-extraction is not allowed. Schlenker (2011) argues that grammatical dependencies cannot "cross quotation marks" which accounts for the fact that (4) below has only the reading in (a), not the one in (b) which would be the one obtained if the embedded sentence were construed as a direct report:

(4)   What did John say I ate?
       (a) Indexical pronoun interpreted in current context: 'What did John say I (= the current
           speaker) ate?'
       (b) *Shifted Reading: 'What did John say he (= John) ate?'

This judgement relies on the fact that, semantically, the interpretation of indexical expressions, like *I*, *you*, *here* and *tomorrow* in indirect reports is assumed to depend on the reporting utterance's context while in direct discourse it follows the reportee's context. Additionally, any tense occurring in the embedded clause of an indirect report follows language-particular sequence-of-tense rules.

However, there are semantic commonalities in the two types of report. Firstly, as has been pointed out since Partee (1973), the supposed independent sentence in direct reports is actually interpreted (contrary to the assumption that it constitutes pure "metalinguistic" use), witness a host of anaphoric phenomena, e.g. pronoun reference and ellipsis, that can depend on this independent sentence's content:

(5)   "I talk better English than the both of youse!" shouted Charles, thereby convincing me
       that he didn't.   [from Partee 1973]
(6)   The sign says, "George Washington slept here", but I don't think he ever did.
       [from Partee 1973]

Further, as is well-known, indirect reports, despite the supposed current-speaker's context perspective, block logical entailments that are encountered in "transparent" environments. This has led to analyses of indirect reports as involving two separate sentences, for example, (7) has the underlying structure of (8) (Davidson 1968):

(7)   Galileo said that the earth moves
(8)   The earth moves. Galileo said that.

However, it is clear that this contradicts the syntactic criteria offered for the differentiation of direct from indirect reports, for example, the fact that blocking of *wh*-extraction is due to the presence of two independent clauses in direct reports. Such an analysis can then be put forward as an argument for an independent level of syntactic analysis, independent from semantics/pragmatics, with its own constraints and restrictions. Such an assumption is standard now in all formal approaches to NL-analysis. However, in our view, it can only be maintained by arbitrarily restricting the domain of data that constitute the remit of NL-grammars, in particular, by excluding data of NL-use, for example, the elliptical, fragmentary and incremental nature of structures and interpretations occurring in everyday conversation, including phenomena dismissed as "disfluencies", and non-linguistic behaviours. When we take such a broader view of NL, imposing the requirement on the grammatical formalism to be able to account for all such human-interaction data, we argue that direct and indirect discourse phenomena can be seen from a new perspective that unifies them under a holistic model of NL-use. We will now move to examine what unites all these traditionally considered distinct phenomena.

3   Mentioning Devices in Dialogue

Standard philosophical and linguistic approaches to the analysis of direct/indirect discourse take the view that these are idiosyncratic forms of language use, with particular formal characteristics and semantic entities involved. In fact, even approaches that take a dialogic perspective in the analysis of NL dismiss the prospect of a unified account of both conversational phenomena and reporting structures:

> "We are dealing here with words reacting on words. However, this phenomenon is distinctly and fundamentally *different from dialogue*. In dialogue, the lines of the individual participants are *grammatically disconnected*; they are not integrated into one unified context. Indeed, how could they be? *There are no syntactic forms with which to build a unity of dialogue*." (Volosinov, 1929/1973: 63; emphasis ours)

This perspective has been recently challenged in the domain of formal and psycholinguistic NL-models. In the domain of semantics/pragmatics such formal models do not necessarily restrict their remit to the level of single sentences. Instead, several researchers are currently interested in modelling the capacities underpinning NL use (see Cummings, this volume, Wieland, this volume) rather than formulating abstract systems that enforce standard competence-performance distinctions. In the domain of formal semantics, this has led to border disputes with pragmatics in that it's no longer clear whether the separation between "linguistically encoded" meanings and online, dynamically-derived ones, in interaction with contextual factors, can be enforced. In this respect, there has long been work emphasising the role of linguistic underspecification in the process of deriving meaning in context (see, e.g., Sperber and Wilson 1995; Levinson 2000; Recanati 2004, 2010) and formulating notions of 'procedural meaning' that cannot be accommodated under truth-theoretic conceptions of semantics (e.g. Blakemore 1987). Further inadequacies of traditional truth-based theories and the focus on single sentences have been highlighted by the "dynamic turn" in semantics (DRT, Kamp 1981; Kamp and Reyle 1993; DPL, Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991 and related frameworks) that have drawn attention to the importance of conceiving meaning as updates to 'information states' rather than, statically, as sets of truth conditions (propositions) assigned to sentences. Nevertheless, all these approaches still concentrate on individual mental states modelled as autonomous representations that abstract away from the social and material circumstances of NL processing.

3.1 Dialogue Phenomena: Echoing and Grounding

On a more psychologically-realistic perspective that looks at NL in terms of its use as part of social cognition, reported speech appears as only one aspect of a general phenomenon that is regularly encountered in the analysis of everyday conversation. First of all, it has been argued that fundamental processes in human interaction, the mechanisms explicating the contribution of non-declarative moods, employ metarepresentation of the embedded proposition (Wilson and Sperber 1988) or encode instructions on how to accommodate these contents in the discourse model (Gregoromichelaki and Kempson 2015; Eshghi et al. 2015). Further, in contrast to views that take NLs as abstract formal systems dealing with the definition and interpretation of well-formed sentences, some recent systems modelling NL use propose grammars that have the capability to offer syntactic mechanisms that can cross, not only sentential boundaries, but also turn boundaries (see e.g. Gregoromichelaki et al. 2011), as is required in order to provide natural and motivated accounts of phenomena where the construction, interpretation and authorship of utterances is spread across participants (*split utterances* see turns 3, 4, 5, 12, 14, 21 below):

(9)

1.   A: Instead of having < *name hidden* > <*unclear* > they had to come through the Dock
          Commission all of the men, they wanted so and so men for that boat, they used to
          come through to me.

2.   B: Before that though, <*name hidden* > and < *name hidden* > [<*unclear* > had their
          own men]

3.   A: [Had their own men

4.   B: unload the boats?

5.   A: unload the boats, yes. They <*unclear*>

6.   B: They were employed directly by

7.   A: That's right but they all came

8.   B: < *name hidden* > ?

9.   A: They used to work say 1 week and have about a month off or go on the dole for a
          month.

10. B: So then what happened was, did the Dock Commission say you can't have your
          own men anymore?

11. A: That's right they had to go on a rota.

12. B: Run by the Dock Commission?

13. A: Run by the Dock Commission. See the dockers then all got together and they said
          right so many men for that job, so many for that job and that didn't matter who
          they were, they had to < *unclear* > their job, all the way round the dock.

14. B: Whether they wanted to go on that job or not?

15. A: Whether they want to go or not, they take their turn and the employer had to pay a
          percentage into the pool what those men earned, so when those men hadn't work
          at all they drew their money from the National Dock Labour Board.

16. B: Is this where the National Dock Labour Board came into existence?

17. A: That's how how they come into existence, yes < *name hidden* > he was a man what
          introduced that.

18. B: When was this?

19. A: Oh that's er, I would say about nineteen forty roughly < *clears throat* > Id say
          about nineteen forty that came in, might have been before that.

20. B: Before that then if they were ill

21. A: They get nothing.

22. B: Could they not get any welfare benefit?

23. A: No   [BNC, H5H: 89–113]

In many cases of split utterances, as in reported discourse, the apparent speaker
can be seen as the *animator* but not necessarily the *author* or *principal* (Goffman
1979; Antaki et al. 1996). For example, in (9)-4 and (9)-12 above, the continuations
are offered by interlocutor B accompanied by a request for confirmation towards
A as to whether they reflect A's view of the situation, i.e., whether they provide
contents that the actual principal, A, deems as appropriate or whether they are an
appropriate "echoing" of A's authorship, i.e., what they were going to say. Similarly,
during interaction, issues of perception or interpretation of the interlocutors' words
constantly arise and various strategies for the resolution of such issues are employed
(as can be seen in (9)-12, (9)-14, (9)-18 etc.). These mechanisms rely in the
current speaker's utterance depending on the articulation of the previous speaker's

utterance, and, sometimes, employing its form and content as antecedents, explicitly or covertly, a characteristic in common with reported discourse, but transcending turn and interlocutor boundaries. Such phenomena have been analysed as requiring both incremental licensing of NL structures and contents but also as relying crucially in the intrinsically predictive nature of NL processing (Gregoromichelaki 2013a, b). In fact, it has been argued that reported speech is one of the environments where the phenomenon of split-utterances is observed frequently due to the assumed projectibility of the upcoming continuation (Lerner 1991) and, we would add, the potential for open authorship and assumption of responsibility for the speech act performed by such structures:

(10)   A: mid April. we had reached the point of thinking that we weren't going to be able to reach a policy decision
       B: that's right
       A: and so we must. tell these guys   [that we'll carry on ..]
       B: [we're going to carry on. yep]   [from Antaki et al. 1996]

(11)   Anne: I wish that he'd say- he said, "I have to be back around four because our family is having something," and I wish he'd say
       Kay: "why don't you come over honey"
       Anne: Yeah.   [from Lerner 1991]

(12)   Ken: she'll say // wouldja-
       Louise: wanna glassa milk? // hehhh
       Ken: No. wouldju like a little bitta he'ing?
       Louise: heh// ha ha
       Ken: wouldja like some crekles?
       Louise: ehh ha ha ha ha
       Ken: wouldja like a peanut butter an' jelly sandwich?   [from Lerner 1991]

(13)   Roger: they rationalized it. they say heh heh heh
       Louise: it wasn't there it was a(h)ll in hi(h)s imagination.   [from Lerner 1991]

From this perspective, "quotation" mechanisms are crucially involved in the functioning of dialogical interaction in that every utterance responds to an antecedent one and is construed as backward-looking commentary on that antecedent utterance (see e.g. *grounding*, Clark 1996, Ch. 8; Schegloff 2007) as well as a forward-looking action anticipating a response (Gregoromichelaki 2013a, b; Arundale and Good 2002). These mechanisms appear more transparently on the surface in cases of metacommunicative exchanges. This is more clearly shown when "echoing" means are used, for example, in cases of *clarification questions* which include reference to some utterance token (Ginzburg 2012):

(14)   A: Did Bo leave?
       B: Bo? ('Who are you referring to as 'Bo'?'; 'Did you utter the word *Bo*?')
(15)   A: Who came?
       B: Who came? How dare you? ('Are you asking "who came"?')

Notice that such phenomena, even though they display "metalinguistic" features, normally pattern syntactically with indirect reports in that indexicals take their reference from the parameters of the current context as it shifts incrementally during the unfolding of the utterance (Gregoromichelaki et al. 2011):

(16)   A: Oh, I am so sorry, did you burn
        B: myself? No, it's ok
(17)   A: Did you leave?
        B: Me? ('Are you asking about ['the current speaker'] ?')

However, the responsibility for the utterance act in question is not necessarily the current speaker's, as we said the *principal*, i.e. the agent of the utterance event is not necessarily identified with the agent of the speech act (Gregoromichelaki and Kempson 2015). So the agent continuing another's utterance can question the previous speaker as to why they are performing the relevant speech act, a practice normally infelicitous (Ginzburg 2012) in circumstances where the two roles (agent of utterance, agent of speech act) are identified:

(18)   A to C: Didn't B say yesterday that he's paranoid. Why?
        # 'Why am I asking if B said B is paranoid'
(19)   A to C: Didn't B say yesterday that . . .
        B to C/A: I am paranoid?   'B is paranoid'
        B to A: Why?   'Why is A asking C whether B said that B is paranoid?'
        A to B: Because you told us five minutes ago you're easy-going.

In (19) the agent of the questioning speech act 'Didn't B say yesterday that B is paranoid' is taken to be A, hence the felicitous *why*-questioning of A by B. Yet, the string *Didn't B say yesterday that I am paranoid* gives a misleading interpretation, if it's considered as a continuous string of words encoding a speech act performed by A, namely 'Didn't B say that A is paranoid'. Indexicals in indirect reports are supposed to conform to the current contextual parameters, which is indeed what happens in (19). However, because the context shifts during the reporting, the agent of the embedded assertion, B, and the agent of the relevant part of the utterance coincide temporarily, which, when considered from a global sentential point of view gives a misleading form. This is confirmed by a direct report version:

(20)   A to C: Didn't B say yesterday . . .
        B to C: "I am paranoid"?   '
        B to A: Why?   'Why is A asking C whether B said that B is paranoid?'
        A to B: Because you told us five minutes ago you're easy-going.

In this case the global string *Didn't B say yesterday "I am paranoid"?* gets accidentally the correct interpretation. Expressed in more standard formal semantic terms, this shows that interpretations for such strings cannot be derived globally but instead have to be derived incrementally at each word stage, with each word's *character* (Kaplan 1989) interacting with the contextual parameters at each subsentential stage of utterance. The final stage of semantic composition is then

only dealing with contents rather than sentential characters. Moreover, in terms of pragmatics, it shows that issues of speech act responsibility (agency) have to be determined separately from fixing the contextual parameter of 'speaker' (utterer), which, as we will see below, is a mechanism needed for accounting for cases of mixed quotation.

Asking an elliptical *why*-question as in (18)–(20) above, makes implicit reference to a particular antecedent utterance event and asks for its purpose. In (14)–(15) particular phonological tokens are repeated and have to be recognised as such, i.e. as repetitions, echoes, of the antecedent tokens in order to be interpreted. In addition, phenomena of *other-* or *self-repair* also require mechanisms that enable the recognition of a new token being produced as similar in form to an antecedent one, and then another token being offered as a replacement in terms of content for that antecedent one:

(21)   A: Bo, (not Bo,)(I mean) Joe, left
(22)   A: Bo left. (Not Bo,)(I mean) Joe.
(23)   A: Bo
        B: (Not Bo)(You mean) Joe.
        A: Yes. He left
(24)   A: Bo left.
        B: (Not Bo) (You mean) Joe.
        A: Yes.

Given that all these phenomena, split-utterances, clarification, and repair exchanges, are initiated from very early on in language acquisition, the means and skills involved in the production/comprehension of reported discourse do not appear so idiosyncratic (cf. Wieland, this volume). Taking this assumption seriously, two recent holistic models of NL use, HPSG-TTR (Ginzburg and Cooper 2014) and Dynamic Syntax-TTR (Gregoromichelaki, to appear) seek to model reported discourse via the same mechanisms as those used to analyse everyday conversation. We turn to these two models next.

4   Ginzburg and Cooper (2014)

4.1   Utterance Events and TTR Representations

4.1.1   Utterance Events in DRT

Recent efforts in formal semantics, inspired by work in Situation Semantics and DRT, have shifted attention away from a strict formulation of a truth theory for sentences as a theory of semantic competence to developing theories of semantic interpretation for utterances in context. For this purpose, a common representational system allowing the specification and seamless integration of multiple types of

information has been sought. One strand of this development, based on recent advances in developing compositional forms of DRT, is the PTT model (Poesio and Traum 1997, 1998; Poesio and Rieser 2010), which expands the dynamic view of semantics to take into account underspecification of meaning resolved in context and NL use in interaction. One distinctive feature of Poesio and Rieser (2010) is the assumption—derived from ideas developed in Situation Semantics (Barwise and Perry 1983) and Clark (1996)—that the 'information state' (context) representation of each participant in a conversation, also includes the reification and explicit representation of the *utterance event/situation*, i.e., the contextual parameters of the conversation itself. So, along with the mutually accepted truth-evaluable content of utterances (*common ground*), information about the discourse situation is recorded in a unified representation, a discourse representation structure (DRS), modelling each participant's 'information state' at each point in the dialogue. Even more innovatively compared to previous versions of DRT, here the occurrence of utterances of sub-sentential constituents is recorded in this representation as the occurrence of events in a certain temporal order (*micro-conversational events*) which thus become part of the information state. The occurrence of each such micro-conversational event leads to immediate updates of the participants' information states with the initiation of semantic and pragmatic interpretation processes (Larsson and Traum 2000; Stone 2004) following the specifications of the grammar. As regards pragmatic integration, in this model, speech acts are conceptualised as events too, termed as *conversational events*, since just like any other events, they can serve as the antecedents of anaphoric expressions:

(25)   A: You're an idiot.
        B: *That* was uncalled for. [*that*: A insulting B]

4.1.2   Utterance Events in TTR

Another recent articulation of this effort has been via the development of Type Theory with Records (TTR). TTR provides a transparent semantic representation format that can integrate both low-level (sub-symbolic) perceptual information (see e.g. Larsson 2011) and underspecified, flexible meanings of NL expressions (see, e.g. Cooper 2005, 2012). Such integration allows the modelling of how NL forms and meanings adapt to the discourse situation via the formalisation of an evolving, structured notion of the (multi-modal) context. Consequently, instead of adopting the assumption that the role of semantic theories is to assign truth conditions to decontextualised *sentences*, in these approaches, attention has shifted to the modelling of situated *utterances* and speech acts. This has led to a significant expansion of the data deemed appropriate for inclusion in a formal theory of interpretation, namely, the modelling of the use of language in interaction and the demands that this places on appropriate semantic models (see e.g. Ginzburg and Cooper 2004; Ginzburg 2012).

TTR is a representation language that provides recursive data structures reminiscent both of HPSG type-feature structures and, semantically, of discourse representation structures (DRSs). Records, like the record r below, are structured collections of statements ("fields") consisting of assignments of entities to "labels", the equivalent of discourse referents/variables in DRT:

$$(26) \quad r \ = \ \begin{bmatrix} \text{x} & = & \text{John} \\ \text{time} & = & \text{12AM\_13\_Oct\_2012} \\ \text{place} & = & \text{London} \\ \text{sit} & = & s_1 \end{bmatrix} \quad \overset{\text{labels}}{\underset{\text{a field}}{}}$$

Such records can then be taken as the representation of events/situations in the world. Importantly, contexts of utterance and the actual speech events that take place within them are represented by such records too. Records (and therefore events/situations) are classified by types which are called *record types*. Unlike the basic Montagovian types, record types are structured and recursive (i.e. types can be embedded as the value of labels within types) and dependencies are allowed among the values assigned to the labels. A record r belongs to a type T iff each field in r satisfies the constraints specified by T. For example, as a simplified illustration, the record r in (26) is of the type T in (27) below (it is a *witness* for T) because r assigns entities to the labels that satisfy the type requirements specified by T. This means that the label x is assigned an entity of type IND(ividual), namely, John, the labels *place* and *time* are assigned entities that are places and times respectively and the event s_1 is such that it is of a type that indeed contains evidence that John runs – perhaps it is an observation or some actual event of John's running (this latter characterisation is related to Martin-Löf's "propositions as types" idea, hence RUN(JOHN) is a type here):

$$(27) \quad T \ = \ \begin{bmatrix} x & : & \text{IND} \\ time & : & \text{TIME} \\ place & : & \text{PLACE} \\ sit & : & \text{RUN (JOHN)} \end{bmatrix}$$

Types, which can thus be conceived as categorisations of events and entities, are what provides the interface between the external world and cognition; for example, record types, namely, categorisations of situations, can be used to provide representations of perceptual judgements, meaning relations, grammatical information, speech act assignments, etc. In addition, in TTR, types are first-class citizens of the semantic ontology, not reducible to sets of their members. So types are intensional and inference can be performed at the level of types, irreducibly *about* the types themselves, solving puzzles that traditionally have been encountered in intensional constructions such as the complements of propositional attitude and reporting verbs. Moreover, because types are always modifiable by adding/deleting fields, the underspecification and subsequent enrichment that permeates type judgements during, e.g., language acquisition, knowledge adjustment, conversational coordination and even, as we will see now, quoting (some aspects of) another's speech, are naturally handled.

4.2   TTR-Modelling of Reporting Constructions

Currently a number of accounts have been proposed regarding the semantics of reported speech. However, such accounts devise ad hoc entities in order to shift the usual contents and otherwise ignore the contribution of the whole grammatical apparatus, e.g. syntax, phonology etc., and even pragmatics. In contrast, the account presented in Ginzburg and Cooper (2014) (G&C henceforth) provides syntactic analyses, denotations and pragmatic constraints for reporting constructions that utilise independently needed grammatical entities. G&C aim to demonstrate that a dialogical perspective on NL structure and use provides directly the tools to deal with reported discourse via structures and denotations that are already independently motivated for the modelling of dialogue phenomena.

4.2.1   Grounding and Clarification

Following the model most comprehensively detailed in Ginzburg (2012), the analysis of dialogue involves richly structured representations of context ('information states'). Adoption of the TTR formalism allows Ginzburg to construct models of the semantic ontology and the grammar as well as a model of how contexts evolve during the conversation. To account for the metacommunicative function of certain utterances, in particular, clarification requests (see (14) earlier), dialogue processing is assumed to crucially require *grounding* (Clark 1996), a process during which each participant either confirms that they have understood the utterance addressed to them, thus incorporating it in their information state, or seek clarification of aspects that have not been "grounded". Ginzburg extends the grounding requirement along two dimensions. Firstly, grounding is not immediate; instead, it allows partially comprehended utterances to contribute to the context while ungrounded (parts of) utterances can remain as "pending" and lead to metacommunicative interaction (clarification) for their resolution. Secondly, it is not only semantic content that is recorded in the participants' context, but also a range of properties of the utterance that has occurred, e.g., syntactic/phonological information that would enable the disambiguation and resolution of elliptical utterances that function metacommunicatively (see (14)-(17) earlier). These extensions require that the grammar should be able to express reference to utterances as "utterance events" specified along multiple dimensions. Records, like the one we saw in (26) earlier, are employed to serve this role. (Partial) Grounding is then formalised through the pairing of an utterance event (a record, a token) with a (partial) utterance type, i.e., a grammatical type (a "sign", recording grammatical aspects defined in HPSG) that classifies it. Such signs are modelled as record types, like the one shown in (27) earlier. So here a major advantage of the use of TTR becomes evident: the grammar and the conversational mechanisms are provided with access to both types and tokens of utterances, which forms the basis for modelling metacommunicative or metalinguistic functions of NL elements. For example, it is argued that the clarification request in (28) below, which echoes A's use of *Bo*, has a reading which

queries which individual named "Bo" the speaker was referring to in the previous utterance ("intended content reading"), not who the name *Bo* refers to in general – which is also a possible reading, as can be seen more clearly in the "intended content reading" of the predicate 'finagle' in (28). These readings need to be disambiguated from other readings such as the "clausal confirmation" readings in (c):

(28)   a.   A: Did Bo finagle a raise?
            B: (i) Bo?   /   (ii) finagle?
       b. Intended content readings:
       (i) 'Who is (the) "Bo" (you're referring to)?'   (ii) 'What does it mean "to finagle"?'
       c. Clausal confirmation readings:
       (i)'Are you asking if BO (of all people) finagled a raise?' /
       (ii) 'Bo FINAGLED a raise (of all actions)?'

If the grammar and the model of the participants' information states allow for reference to actual token utterance events, it becomes possible to explicitly model readings such as that in (28)b. By assigning interpretations to the fragment *Bo* that match the intuitive paraphrase given involving reference to the specific utterance event that has occurred, namely, A's uttering *Bo*. In order to achieve this, the model is formulated in a constructional version of HPSG expressed in the representational framework of TTR. The rich type theory included in this model allows for the definition of entities that the grammar and the model of the context can manipulate both at the level of utterance tokens (events) and utterance types (signs).

4.2.2   Locutionary Propositions and Abstract Semantic Objects

Two components in this process of grounding are relevant for the analysis of direct/indirect discourse that concerns us here: (a) locutionary propositions, and (b) abstract quasi-propositional objects assigned as contents to sentential units in order to serve as the arguments of speech act predicates. For an utterance in dialogue to be grounded, first it has to be parsed and understood correctly. The outcome of this process of parsing is modelled via requiring the truth of a so-called *locutionary proposition*. Simplifying somewhat, a locutionary proposition is the pairing of the current utterance event token with a fully-specified grammatical type (an HPSG-defined "sign"). Such signs are structured types, i.e., representations that include domains for phonology, syntax, semantics and pragmatic specifications with constraints governing their correspondence. If the truth of such a locutionary proposition cannot be established after parsing, i.e., if a complete grammatical type cannot be assigned to an utterance, various clarifications are licensed to occur that can make reference to the particular utterance token that causes the trouble. During this process, reference can also be made to the particular speech act performed by the previous interlocutor, e.g., modelling interpretations like 'Are you asking q', 'Are you asserting p?'. The quasi-propositional arguments *p* or *q* in such speech act specifications indicate abstract semantic objects like propositions, questions, outcomes, facts etc. These objects are defined in the semantic ontology and are assigned by the grammar as the contents derived through the realisation of the

speech acts performed with utterances. For example, root clauses are required by the grammar to include a speech act specification, selected from a small number of such specifications, like *Assert*, *Ask*, *Order*, *Exclaim*. Which of these speech act specifications is selected depends on the semantic object that such specifications attribute to the agent of the speech act. So, a *proposition* will be what an agent *Assert*s, a *question* will be the complement of the *Ask* relation, an *outcome* the complement of the *Order* relation, and a *fact* is the object associated with the *Exclaim* relation.

These abstract entities, locutionary proposition and abstract quasi-propositional semantic objects, that have been postulated independently for the licensing of NL use in conversation, especially metacommunicative interaction as in (14), are taken by G&C to naturally extend to pure and direct quotation, and indirect reports.

4.2.3   Pure Quotation

Having assumed a constructional version of HPSG, in applying these mechanisms to reporting discourse, G&C define *constructions* for various quotation phenomena that specify the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic constraints for their licensing. According to various theories of quotation (*identity theory*, Washington (1992); Saka (1998, 2011); *proper name theory*, Tarski (1933); Quine (1940), and *description theory*, Geach (1957), see Cappelen and Lepore 1997), the quotation marks modify the reference of the expression that is enclosed within them, so that the expression now refers to itself, rather than its usual denotation, an entity in the world. However, as C&G argue, pure quotation cannot be taken as simply involving reference to "expressions" in general. Their model offers a specification of the notion "expression" via the resources of some grammar that includes a characterisation of the TTR type of such token expressions (see also Maier 2014; Potts 2007). So, in analysing pure quotation, G&C assume that the contextual parameters included in the information state have to include a parameter Γ that refers to the grammar that licenses the type of the expression used. Γ roughly corresponds to what in Recanati (2010) is characterised as a "language", or as we will prefer to define it, for reasons that we will explain below, a conceptualisation of NL-use that reflects folk-linguistic conceptions but does not necessarily correspond with the analysts' grammar of a particular language (unless of course the discourse involves discussion of exactly such a grammar). Under this assumption, pure quotation, which is usually assumed to introduce a referential term that refers to the linguistic material enclosed in the quotation marks, is accounted for in G&C via a construction which licenses an NL term, e.g. *Mary*, to syntactically project a phrase whose semantic content is some aspect of the grammatical type (sign) relative to a particular grammar Γ, e.g., its phonology in a case like:

(29)   'Mary' starts with 'm'

The contextual parameters usually assigned by Γ to standard uses of the sign (e.g. speaker-hearer, time, location etc.) are discarded in such a quotational construction. This explains the opacity of such uses. Use of quotation marks in written discourse indicates this shift of content for such uses of signs.

4.2.4 Direct and Indirect Quotation

Turning to the analysis of direct and indirect discourse, these are seen as involving two components: (a) lexical entries for the framing verbs ('quotative predicates') and (b) constructions that specify the presumed idiosyncratic properties of such structures. Quotative predicates select for clauses denoting either (a) locutionary propositions, or (b) quasi-propositional abstract entities (see earlier Sect. 4.2.2). Both indirect reports and direct quotation are analysed as constructions that involve the combination of a framing verb, like *say* or *ask*, with a sentence whose denotation involves a quasi-propositional abstract semantic object.

A *direct-quotation construction* involves, firstly, the projection of a *direct-quotative phrase* from the quoted material. This phrase will then serve as the complement of a framing verb specified to require (the supertype of) such a complement. The derived semantic content of a direct-quotative phrase is a locutionary proposition, i.e., an utterance event to which a grammatical type, a "sign", is assigned by a particular grammar Γ (see earlier Sect. 4.2.2). However, unlike standard utterances in dialogue, the event component of such a proposition becomes the reported utterance event (simplifying somewhat) rather than the current reporting utterance event. This reported event though is now associated with a grammatical type assigned to it by the reporter relative to a grammar Γ thus accounting for the fact that, for example, the quote might be in a language different than the one of the original reported event or other modifications the reporter might effect (and still be counted as direct quotation). Since the grammar manipulates TTR types as well as tokens, it now becomes possible to express how the original utterance event and the reporting event are deemed to be "similar" in some respects (see e.g. Clark and Gerrig 1990). The grammatical type assigned to the reporting event by the reporter's assumed grammar Γ is constrained to "resemble" the type of the original event, i.e., there has to exist a contextually-defined value on a similarity measure between the grammatical types of the original and the reporting events. Further, even though via this construction the contextual parameters of the standard use of the sign are discarded, as we also saw in pure quotation cases earlier, for direct quotation, at the phrasal level, a new set of contextual parameters is introduced via the representation of the original utterance event and its grammatical type. In this way, the content of the reported sign becomes available. This allows for the explanation of cases of anaphoric reference to the *content* of the quotation subsequently, as in the Partee examples in (6) earlier. A further innovative advantage offered by this analysis is that by analyzing direct quotation complements as denoting locutionary propositions, which include as one of their component a "sign" (a grammatical type) we can explain the fact a single sentence can contain predications that make use of both

type and token aspects of a quotation, e.g., use the same quotation as both the complement of direct-quotation construction and as a pure quotation, as in (30)-(31):

(30)   *'Was I snoring' was asked by Bill* and *is a frequently used interrogative clause.*

(31)   'Am I snoring?' *asked Bill, a sentence* frequently uttered by men who don't think they snore. It is usually answered by 'You were before you woke up.'

The direct-quotative phrases whose properties we have just described are the complements of verbs that combine with direct quotations, i.e., independent clauses. Many such verbs also take embedded clauses as their complements, resulting in indirect discourse constructions. This is implemented in this model by defining such verbs to combine with complements that can have two distinct semantic objects as contents. For example, the lexical entry for *ask* has two versions. In the case of direct quotation, the lexical entry for the verb *ask* specifies that the complement must have as its content a locutionary proposition, i.e., the combination of an utterance event with a grammatical type. As we've just seen, due to the direct-quotative phrase specifications, the utterance event will be the reported event (simplifying somewhat) and the grammatical type a type similar to the one assigned to this reported event. Additionally, the lexical entry for the verb *ask* specifies that the SPEAKER x of the utterance event included in this locutionary proposition (the original utterer) is identified with the subject of the main clause. Since the grammar, according to Ginzburg (2012), conventionally associates speech act specifications with utterances (see earlier Sect. 4.2.2), the speech act characterisation of the original reported event is available through the usual grammatical type associated with it. Accordingly, the content of the main clause is inherited from the grammatical type of the complement of *ask* so that it comes out as the speech act specification *Ask(x, q)* where q is an abstract semantic object of type *question*. (Note that to this a new speech act specification will be added to the effect that the final content will come out as *Assert(Speaker, (Ask(x,q)))*).

On the other hand, the lexical entry for *ask* in an indirect-report context specifies that it combines with a subject x and a sentential complement. Unlike the case with direct quotation, this sentential complement is NOT of the type 'locutionary proposition', i.e., the original reported event is not included in the representation, hence, unlike direct quotation, it cannot affect the contextual parameters. The only restriction here is that the complement has as its content an abstract semantic object q of type *question* (e.g. *whether John left*). The content of the whole sentence built on the basis of the lexical entry for *ask* is then a proposition *Ask(x,q)* where x is identified as both the subject x of the main clause and as the agent of the speech act reported (the eventual content derived will again be *Assert(Speaker, (Ask(x,q)))*).

This account is designed to capture the commonalities of direct/indirect discourse via the lexical entries of verbs that combine with both. As we just saw the contents derived for both such structures are identical, even though the structure with the direct-quotative phrase includes reference to the original demonstrated event. Another commonality this setup is designed to capture is the common entailments between direct and indirect reports, illustrated by the fact that they both support common inferences about the characterisation of the semantic object they combine

with. So both (32) and (33) below entail (34), which is explained because, as we just saw, the contents assigned to the sentences built on the basis of the two versions of *ask* are identical:

(32)   Zohar asked whether she snored.
(33)   Zohar asked 'naxarti?'.
(34)   Zohar asked a *question*, a question about herself.

So the G&C captures successfully various properties of reporting constructions via the attempted unification of the mechanisms of quotation with mechanisms of repair in conversation. In addition, the TTR modelling proposed is able to allow for the explanation of new data like the cases of "mixed predications" in (30)-(31) where a single predication can address simultaneously both metalinguistic and reporting aspects of the same utterance. It also claims to capture the commonalities between indirect and direct reporting and the common and mutual entailments holding between such structures as seen in (32)-(34) earlier.

We believe that there are some problems with this latter claim, stemming from the fact that the grammar associates conventional speech-act specifications with each main clause. For the same reason, in combination with the fact that the grammar is defined in terms of constructions, rather than general structural constraints, the account does not seem to be able to generalise to cover all quotational possibilities that have been reported in the literature. We will argue below that the main technical and conceptual reasons for this are, firstly, the fact that the intrinsic incrementality of NL-processing is not part of the grammar, and, secondly, the fact that syntax is taken as an independent level of analysis with its own categories and constraints (as is standard for most grammar formalisms). In order to remedy these shortcoming we will then propose an alternative account that builds on G&C but within an incremental, dynamic framework.

5   Free (In)direct Discourse, Mixed Quotation, Hybrid Uses

Recanati (2001) makes a distinction between closed and open quotation. *Closed quotation* are instances where the quotation semantically plays the role of a singular term and fills a syntactic slot in the sentence. The C&G account is explicitly addressed to such closed quotation cases only. However, we believe that G&C have provided some of the resources that make a more inclusive account available, i.e., dealing with the phenomenon of *open quotation*, where the quoted material fulfils its usual role in the sentence, or none at all if it is a main clause. The only factor that prevents an easy integration of such phenomena in the G&C account is, in our view, the standard assumption of an independent syntactic level of analysis in the grammar and the lack of an incremental syntactic licensing and interpretation. The same assumptions, standard in all formal grammatical frameworks, prevent other grammatical accounts of quotation (e.g. Potts 2007; Maier 2014) to deal with the whole range of data as we will show now.

   The C&G constructional account inevitably adheres to the standard strict division between direct and indirect quotation. However, these strict distinctions have been disputed (see e.g. Allan, this volume; Holt, this volume) as there is a host of phenomena that lie in a continuum between these two supposed extremes. Firstly, there is always the possibility to introduce quotative elements, for example, elements extraneous to the reporter's dialect, within a report otherwise characterisable as indirect (and without the use of quotation marks, contra Maier 2014):

(35) To which Mr Bailey modestly replied that he hoped he knowed wot o'clock it wos in gineral. [Dickens, Martin Chuzzlewit, from Clark and Gerrig 1990: 791]

   Then there is the phenomenon of *free direct discourse*. In these cases there is no framing verb or clause to indicate reporting but indexicals and other devices conform to the reported context indicating direct reporting:

(36) **Hilary** crept into the back room. **She** saw the curtains, dragged together roughly, as if – as if – There's someone behind them. **I**'m sure there's someone behind them. **I** must stay calm. – **She** reached for the light.   [from Crystal 2013]

   Free indirect discourse is similar to indirect reporting in that there is potential shift of tenses and indexicals. However, usually there are no overt reporting indications and some features of direct discourse (such as direct questions and vocatives) are maintained so that there is only a partial shift of perspective towards the reportee:

(37) **Mary** felt relieved. If Peter came **tomorrow**, **she** would be saved.   [from Recanati 2000]
(38) **John** is totally paranoid. Everybody spies on **him** or wants to kill **him**, including **his** own mother.   [from Recanati 2000]
(39) **Marie** was wondering. Did **her** brother arrive?   [from Bonami and Goddard 2008]

   And there are further "hybrid" cases, for example, in English, the interrogative word order can sometimes be maintained in indirectly reported questions:

(40) The baritone was asked **what did** he think of Mrs Kearney's conduct. [from James Joyce, *Dubliners*, cited by McCloskey 2006 in Köder and Maier 2015: fn. 1]

   These phenomena cannot be handled by the C&G account because their model requires that the grammar deals with phrasal constructions that specify either direct or indirect features. In all these cases, however, there is no necessity for a framing verb to determine the appearance of a quotation-like interpretation. Another phenomenon that is excluded for the same reasons is that of *mixed quotation*, a combination of direct and indirect discourse, characterized, in written language, by the use of quotation marks in the sentential complement of an indirect-report construction (see e.g. Cappelen and Lepore 1997):

(41)   Alice said that life "is difficult to understand".

In these cases, in common with indirect reporting, the complement of the verb is a *that*-clause which "samesays", i.e., has the same content as, what the reported speaker said (Davidson 1968). As in direct reporting, there seems to be indication

that the referent of the subject of the framing verb used similar tokens as those appearing in the report ("sametokening"). Since both these aspects of the reports affect the truth-conditions of the sentence, they need to be accounted for by an adequate model of NL use (Recanati 2000; Potts 2007; Geurts and Maier 2005). However, certain alleged peculiarities of mixed quotation create problems for both syntactic/semantic and pragmatic accounts. First of all, like direct quotation, and, as we saw earlier in (35), even with indirect quotation proper, there is the possibility to switch not only the interpretation of indexicals but even language in the midst of reporting such quotations:

(42) Wright won't disclose how much the Nike deal is worth, saying only that 'they treat me well'. (The Face, September 93: 55)   [from de Brabanter 2010]

(43) A doctor tells him [Gustave Flaubert] he is like a 'vieille femme hysterique'; he agrees. (TLS online, 18 December 1998)   [from de Brabanter 2010]

Another issue that arises for formalisms that do not embrace the incrementality of processing in the grammar, attempting to characterise and interpret well-formed sentences, is the fact that the quotation-like interpretation might span multiple sentences or even within-sentence non-constituents:

(44) She replied, 'I live alone. My son lives alone too. We both prefer it that way'.   [from Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 1026, cited in de Brabanter 2010]

(45) Also, he categorically stated that "there is no legal way of temporal extension of the Greek debt without this being regarded as a credit event. Therefore there is no way that it will be allowed to happen such a credit event in Greece because it would create negative impact on the whole system."   [from Gregoromichelaki to appear]

(46) Writing that book, Doyle felt himself 'a slave to reality. I was just dying to write a big book, and to have a bit of fun'. (Independent Arts, 17 September 2004) [from de Brabanter 2010]

(47) David said that he had donated "largish sums, to several benign institutions". [from Abbot 2005]

(48) Mary allowed as how her dog ate "odd things, when left to his own devices". [from Abbot 2005]

(49) Tim Marlow of London's White Cube gallery suggested that such self-censorship was now common, though 'very few people have explicitly admitted' it. (www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/oct/01/religion.islam) [de Brabanter 2010]

(50) [The doctors'] actions defied the instructions of members of Congress, who issued subpoenas to attempt to block 'the barbaric' removal of her feeding tube on Friday [. . .]. (The Guardian online, 20 March 2005)   [de Brabanter 2010]

This cannot be handled by a grammar that requires phrases to be built out of conventional constituents that just switch interpretation. As de Brabanter (2010) argues, the whole set of these effects cannot even be handled by the ad-hoc constituency imposed by Maier's (2007) account since the continuity and unity of the quoted fragments gets lost. And, as Recanati (2010), among others, point out

such phenomena have truth-conditional effects, as can be seen from the distinct interpretations obtained when the quotation marks are removed:

(51) Paul says he's due to present his work in the 'paper session' [Paul calls "paper session" the "poster session"]

(52) Paul says he's due to present his work in the paper session   [Recanati 2010]

(53) James says that 'Quine' wants to speak to us   [James thinks that McPherson is Quine]

(54) James says that Quine wants to speak to us   [Recanati 2010]

(55) Nicola believes that his father is a 'philtosopher'

(56) Nicola believes that his father is a philtosopher   [Cappelen and Lepore 1997]

In our view, this clearly indicates that a grammar formalism needs to integrate interaction with pragmatics at a subsentential level, before the semantic contents derived from words are composed. The cases above have been analysed by Recanati (2010) in terms of a language-shift. We can implement this, as in the G&H account, by assuming that one of the contextual parameters that need to be included in a grammatical analysis must be variables representing various entities like potential idiolects, dialects, languages etc. However these are factors that can shift during the interpretation of a fragment of the utterance being processed and do not necessarily either project syntactically or are defined at the root level. Moreover, we also believe that we need a rather liberal characterisation of the entity that represents such folk-linguistic assumptions since such metalinguistic characterisations are open-ended and are not dependent on any actual grammatical characterisation as the examples in (51)-(56) show.

Another issue that arises for the C&G account is the fact that the speech-act specification associated with each main clause is taken to be conventionalised, i.e. there is a selection from among a predefined set of such illocutionary forces (see earlier Sect. 4.2.2). However, we believe that the precise speech act specification potentially assigned to each utterance is open-ended and subject to pragmatic inference so that there can't be any default specifications determined by the grammar; the grammar just needs to offer the potential for such optional pragmatic inferences to affect truth-conditional content on the way to deriving contents for the full utterance. This is shown by the fact that indirect report complements can appear with a multitude of speech-act denoting framing verbs:

(57) Replying to another question by the shareholders he characterised as "imaginary scenario" the possibility of Greece leaving the eurozone, however, he clarified that "there is no practice or methodology for a country to exit the eurozone." [newspaper extract, from Gregoromichelaki to appear]

And the alleged common inferences with direct discourse are equally possible for such characterisations:

(58)   In a reply to publications in the German newspapers Mario Draghi stated yesterday:
       "There is no practice or methodology for a country to exit the eurozone."
       [newspaper extract, from Gregoromichelaki to appear]

(59)   Mario Draghi clarified that "there is no practice or methodology for a country to exit the
       eurozone."   [from Gregoromichelaki to appear]

(60)   Mario Draghi offered a clarification of his previous statements.

Such alleged "entailments" are not qualitatively different from the ones offered by
G&C in (32)-(34). However, they cannot be explained as arising from a range of
fixed speech-act specifications encoded in the grammar, which is what provides the
explanation of (32)-(34) in the G&C model. If there is a mechanism for deriving the
inferences in (58)-(60) pragmatically, it can also be used to derive the inferences
in (32)-(34) as long as such pragmatically inferred contents can interact with
grammatical specifications at an appropriate level.

On the other hand, the alleged inviolable restrictions posed for indirect reporting
in the G&C account and others, regarding the interpretation of indexicals, do not
hold for mixed quotation, a structurally similar construction as indirect quotation
proper. So, for example, in a mixed quotation, a first person indexical need not refer
to the speaker performing the utterance act but, instead, to the subject of the framing
verb (Geurts and Maier 2005; Cumming 2005; Anand and Nevins 2003):

(61)   Bill Watterson said that reality "continues to ruin my life".   [from Maier 2014]

Additionally, *wh*-extraction is possible out of mixed quotation environments, which
places mixed-quotation on a par with indirect discourse proper and indicates that
quotation marks are not in any way "syntactic opacity" indicators (cf. Schlenker
2011 see e.g. (4) earlier), any extant constraints have to be sought elsewhere:

(62)   Who did Mary say that she would "never misunderestimate ever again"?
       [from Maier 2014]

Maier (2014) claims, nevertheless, that certain features of the quoted original
in mixed quotation have to be adjusted obligatorily to fit the new quoting environ-
ment. For example, he claims (citing Chung-chieh 2011) that grammatical gender
agreement appearing in a quoted phrase in gender-determining languages has to be
adjusted to fit its new environment. In our view of the data, there is no such strict
requirement. There are examples like the following where this alleged restriction
does not hold:

(63)   *Ta koritsia tis Lenas ine poli psagmenes   [Greek] [from Gregoromichelaki to appear]
       The girls$_{NEUT}$ of Lena are very sophisticated$_{FEM}$
       Lena's girls are very sophisticated

(64)   I Maria ipe oti ta koritsia tis Lenas ine poli "psagmenes"   [Greek] [from
       Gregoromichelaki to appear]
       Mary said that her girls$_{NEUT}$ of Lena are very "sophisticated$_{FEM}$"
       Mary said that Lena's girls are very sophisticated

We conclude that these intermediate phenomena, free (in)direct quotation,
hybrid, and mixed quotation show that there is no strict distinction between direct
and indirect reporting so that there is no need for distinct constructions to be defined

for each to account for their alleged distinct properties. Any such formalisation will prevent the whole range of phenomena from being captured. Speakers/writers can switch the mode of presentation of their utterance, indicate who takes responsibility for its content and form, or demonstrate some of its properties freely at any sub- or supra-sentential level. This argues against a model of NL-grammar that ignores the psycholinguistically established incrementality of processing, as well as the fact that grammatical semantic/syntactic constraints are not qualitatively different from pragmatic processing, and, therefore, cannot be segregated in a distinct abstract model. This is shown most clearly by the fact that contents provided by NL-sentences can compose with a variety of demonstrating events, like gestures, noises, laughs etc.:

(65)   The car engine went [brmbrm], and we were off.   [from Clark and Gerrig 1990]

(66)   The boy who had scratched her Rolls Royce went [rude gesture with hand] and ran away. [from Recanati 2010]

To capture such phenomena, we now turn to a grammar formalism that takes into account the fact that language is primarily a form of action, produced and interpreted in context in a time-linear manner. We aim to show that the problematic for other formalisms data mentioned above find natural explanations from such a perspective.

6   Dynamic Syntax

In distinguishing between open and closed quotation (see earlier Sect. 5), Recanati (2010) makes an alleged important distinction: open quotations are primarily "pictorial" involving

> "the meaning of the speaker's act of ostensive display. That meaning is pragmatic: it is the meaning of an act performed by the speaker, rather than the semantic content of an expression uttered by the speaker" (Recanati 2010: 271).

Closed quotations in contrast, according to Recanati, carry additional referential meaning due to their integration in the linguistic system. In our view, this distinction reflects the standard conception of NL-analysis as requiring a grammar on the one hand and a separate component of pragmatic inference on the other (see also Capone 2013). In contrast, a more radical alternative concerning the status of the syntax/semantics components of the grammar and their integration with pragmatics is proposed by Dynamic Syntax (DS, Kempson et al. 2001; Cann et al. 2005; Gregoromichelaki and Kempson 2013).

DS models the act(ions) interlocutors engage in during the derivation of both meaning and forms. So all levels of NL analysis are reconceptualised as actions performed and assigned meaning in context. So DS can be seen as a psycholinguistically-inspired action-based formalism that specifies the 'know-how' that is employed in linguistic processing, in contrast to standard formalisms which codify (specifically linguistic) propositional knowledge of rules and representations. Regarding levels of analysis, DS eschews a string-syntactic level of explanation and

implements the assumption that grammatical constraints are all defined procedurally in terms of the progressive development of representations of content ('information states'), with partial interpretations emerging step-by-step during social interaction on a more or less word-by-word basis. In the view we sketch here, this is a variant which combines Dynamic Syntax with the Type Theory with Records framework (TTR, Cooper 2005, 2012) (DS-TTR), which captures directly the fine-grained dynamics of dialogue, as well as the potential for underspecification and enrichment (Purver et al. 2010; Eshghi et al. 2015).

DS-TTR is formulated as a system which crucially involves:

– an action-based architecture that models dynamically the development of unitary representations integrating multiple sources of contextual information
– word-by-word incrementality and predictivity within the grammar formalism
– speaker/hearer mirroring and complementarity of processing actions

We will not go into the details of the formalism and the computations here;[2] for our purposes it suffices to look more closely at how this perspective, when applied to dialogue modelling and quotation devices, sheds new light on several puzzles: the phenomenon of split utterances seen earlier in (9), which we take up in Sect. 6.2; and how the mechanisms applied there, in combination with some of the tools provided by the G&C account, provide the means to model the continuity of direct and indirect discourse as we will see in Sect. 6.3. Since both dialogue phenomena and reporting devices are using the same grammatical resources they are predicted to interact. We show that DS-TTR is well-suited to account for such interactions.

6.1 Incrementality/Predictivity and Radical Contextual-Dependency in the Grammar

Instead of deriving sentence structures and propositional meanings, the DS grammar models the word-by-word processing of NL structures in context. For NL use in conversation this is a crucial explanatory factor since many of its features rely on such incremental production and comprehension. For example, the frequent occurrence of clarification requests in conversation (Ginzburg 2012 *inter alia*) shows that utterances can be processed and understood partially without having to map a sentential structure to a full proposition (contra in fact to Ginzburg 2012). Moreover, the process of grounding, modelled by Ginzburg (2012) (see Sect. 4.2.1 earlier) relies on the positioning of items like inserts, repairs, hesitation markers etc., a positioning which is not arbitrary but systematically interacts with grammatical categories and derivations at a sub-sentential level (see e.g. Clark and Fox Tree 2002 *inter alia*). In consequence, addressees display their comprehension and

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[2]We cite throughout the publications where the relevant formal details can be found, and also see Gregoromichelaki (to appear).

assessments of the speaker's contribution subsententially as the utterance unfolds through *back-channel* contributions like *yeah*, *mhm*, etc. (Allen et al. 2001). And speakers shape and modify their utterance according to such verbal and non-verbal responses they receive from hearers as their turn unfolds (Goodwin 1981). Hence the grammar must be equipped to deal with those in a timely and integrated manner, i.e., by providing syntactic licensing and semantic interpretation online. In addition, the turn-taking system (see, e.g., Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974) seems to rely on the grammar, as it is based on the predictability of (potential) turn endings in order for the next speaker to time appropriately their (potential) entrance; in this respect, experimental evidence has shown that this predictability is grounded mostly on syntactic recognition rather than prosodic cues etc. (De Ruiter et al. 2006). Therefore, the DS model assumes a tight interlinking of NL perception/production which imposes top-down predictive processes at all stages so that coordination among participants is the outcome of the fact that the grammar consists of a set of licensed actions that both speakers and hearers have to perform in synchrony. These actions perform step-by-step a mapping from phonological strings to semantic representations or vice-versa.

In DS-TTR, the semantic contents derived by processing linguistic strings are represented as trees inhabited by record types (see earlier Sects. 4.1 and 4.1.2). The nodes of these semantic trees are annotated by terms in a typed lambda calculus,[3] with mother-daughter node relations corresponding to semantic predicate-argument structure. For example, the CONTENT field associated eventually with the string *John left* will be the functional application of the lambda term $\lambda x.Leave'x$, inhabiting the function daughter, to the conceptual representation derived by processing the name *John*, which for simplicity we annotate here *John'*.[4] Following Gregoromichelaki (2006), we also assume here that the formula derived, *Leave'(John')*, also includes the event/situation referred to as well as the world/circumstance of evaluation (Recanati 2004). We also assume that each CONTENT field derived at each subnode of the tree includes independently shiftable world/event parameters to account for well-known cases of differentiation among the parameters of evaluation for various predicates in a sentence:

(67)   The fugitives are now in jail   [from Enç 1986]

In addition, in order to deal with the interpretation of indexicals like *I*, *you*, *now*, etc., contextual parameters are recorded in a structured *CONTEXT* field[5] on which the *CONTENT* field depends. The CONTEXT field records the occurrence of each

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[3] The language of the epsilon calculus is combined with the lambda calculus in order to deal with quantification, see Kempson et al (2001); Gregoromichelaki (2006, 2011).

[4] Two analyses for names currently co-exist in DS: (a) as constants resulting from the contextual enrichment of metavariables introduced by names, and (b) as iota-terms. We remain agnostic on this as it does not affect the issues we discuss here.

[5] The differentiation CONTEXT vs. CONTENT fields is for convenience of display only, it does not signify any substantial claim regarding any qualitative differentiation among the parameters handled.

word-utterance event (utterance action) including the agent (utterer, which can be distinct by agent taking responsibility for the action), the addressee (which can be distinct from all the present participants), time/location of the action (following the specification of *micro conversational events* in Poesio and Rieser 2010, see earlier Sect. 4.1.1), and the world parameter of the context. Concatenation of such subevents produces cumulative utterance events in parallel with the phase of functional application. For our purposes here, we note that there can be additional world and event parameters in the CONTENT field, freely introduced or via the actions of linguistic operators, with accessibility relations represented as TTR-dependencies among CONTENT and CONTEXT fields (to deal with phenomena where shift of evaluation occurs, e.g. conditionals, see Gregoromichelaki 2006). In the CONTEXT parameters, following Ginzburg and Cooper (2014), we now add an NL-use parameter, indicated as a metavariable $\varGamma_U$, to represent the characterisation of the utterance as an event/action conforming to the types of action specified in this resource.

The grammar operates by modelling word-utterance events as conditional actions, in effect *characters* defined in procedural terms, that check for the existence of contextual/semantic/structural specifications on the information state and, accordingly, execute a macro of sub-actions, extending the tree-representations, or aborting in case the conditions of use of the word are not satisfied in the current linguistic / non-linguistic context. There is also a set of conditional *computational actions* that can apply without the parsing/production of lexical types if the specified conditions apply in the current state of the information-state. Such actions, either predictively prepare the ground for the execution of further lexical actions, or perform housekeeping functions like composing contents via functional application of functor nodes to argument nodes and concatenating the sequential subevents to a cumulative event of utterance.

As in DRT (Kamp 1981; Kamp and Reyle 1993) and related frameworks (see also Jaszczolt 2005; Jaszczolt et al, this volume), semantic, truth-conditional evaluation applies solely to these contextually-enriched representations, hence no semantic content is ever assigned to structures inhabited by strings of words (sentences). However, unlike all these other models, truth-conditional evaluation applies incrementally, as each word is processed. The other distinguishing feature of DS, as compared to DRT, is that this process of progressive building of semantically transparent structures is the only notion of "syntax" admitted, in that there is no intermediate level of syntactic structuring where the string of words is assigned hierarchically organised constituency as either phrases or clauses. Such constituency is considered in DS as epiphenomenal on the function-argument semantic relations as typified in the lambda-calculus analyses of NL meanings. In consequence, all syntactic dependencies have been reformulated in procedural terms, including, in particular, the classical evidence for denying the direct correspondence between NL-structure and semantic content that led to accounts via transformations (long-distance dependencies, binding, quantification etc., see e.g. Kempson et al. 2001; Cann et al. 2005; Gregoromichelaki 2006, 2011, 2013a).

This model directly provides the mechanisms for accounting for split utterances and fragmentary discourse in dialogue (see (9) earlier), since both speaker and addressee perform the processing steps incrementally, guided not solely by the NL string, but also driven by *predictions* ('goals'). These goals are imposed by either the procedures associated with NL elements ('lexical actions') or are system-generated as general top-down computational goals to be achieved in the next steps. Simplifying for presentation purposes, for example, in English, with its characteristic SVO structure, a general computational goal will ensure that parsing/production starts with the expectation of a subject first, followed by a predicate afterwards. Subsequently the lexical entries for transitive verbs will introduce not only the conceptual content associated with the word but also the prediction/expectation that an argument, the object, will follow immediately afterwards and the event that is taken as the witness of the type derived by processing the clause (see earlier Sect. 4.1.2). Likewise for all other regularities occurring in English or any other NL "syntactic" structuring. Thus, *parsing* in DS incorporates elements of *generation* (production) through the constant formulation of predictions for what will ensue next. On the other hand, production exploits the parsing mechanism in that licensing of the generation of each word relies in checking that the string so far produced can deliver a conceptual representation that accords with the (partial) conceptual structure the speaker attempts to verbalise. As a result, speaker and hearer roles involve mirroring of each other's actions (Gregoromichelaki 2013a, b; Pickering and Garrod 2012).

6.2 Split Utterances in Dynamic Syntax

As speakers and listeners simulate the actions of each other, the fulfilment of syntactic/semantic goals (predictions) is essential at each incremental step, sub-sententially, for both parser (addressee) and generator (speaker) and can be satisfied by either, whether on the basis of the other interlocutor's input or by recourse to the processor's own resources and context. As no structure is ever assumed to be derived for the sentence string, no whole-string "grammaticality" considerations ever arise. Hence, fragments that can be processed by fitting into a structure that is already in the context are licensed directly, NOT as elliptical, without the assumption that they need to be enriched to a propositional type:

(68)   A: Who left?
       B: John?
       C: with Mary, yesterday.

Split utterances are then unproblematically processable and, in fact, a natural consequence of such a fine-grained bidirectional incremental system: As goals are constantly generated by the grammar, to be achieved symmetrically by both the parser and the producer, the addressee/parser can await for input from the speaker in order to fulfil these goals. However, according to the grammar, such goals are

also what activates the search of the lexicon ('lexical access') in production in order to recover a suitable NL word for the concept to be conveyed. As a result, a current hearer/parser who achieves a successful lexical retrieval before processing the anticipated NL input provided by the previous speaker can spontaneously become the producer and take over verbalising the continuation of the utterance instead (for detailed analyses see Eshghi et al. 2010, 2011; Gargett et al. 2008, 2009; Gregoromichelaki et al. 2011, 2013a, b; Kempson et al. 2011; Purver et al. 2006, 2009, 2011).

We will now see how these mechanisms which licence split-utterances in conversation interact with the reporting and metalinguistic phenomena.

6.3   Metalinguistic Devices in DS-TTR

Bonami and Goddard (2008), despite their otherwise significant contribution in providing a syntactic analysis for reporting constructions, characterise mixed and open quotation as "syntactically quite uninteresting" while admitting that they pose serious semantic problems. From their perspective, which aims to characterise sentential units, the noted parallel use-mention aspects and shifts in these structures can be ignored as data. However, from the current point of view, where syntax and semantics employ the same mechanisms, there is no independent level of syntactic characterisation, and the same syntactic mechanisms apply both to supra-sentential and subsentential licensing, things are different. Firstly, there is a requirement to address the modelling of the "semantic" issues mentioned by Bonami & Goddard, and, secondly, in fact, we will aim to show that there are significant interactions between the linguistic form and semantic interpretation of such structures that cannot be attributed to independent syntactic vs. semantic or, even pragmatic, mechanisms. For this purpose, the DS-TTR model, enriched with some of the resources offered by Ginzburg and Cooper (2014) (G&H, henceforth) accounts for a wide range of reported speech phenomena (for formal details see Gregoromichelaki to appear).

The lexical action for a framing verb (e.g. a *verbum dicendi* like *say*) can be assumed to uniformly combine with similar semantic objects in both direct and indirect reports, without imposing some specific type of syntactic complement. The only factor that accounts for the alleged "syntactic" differences between direct and indirect quotation (e.g. word order, or *wh*-extraction see earlier Sect. 2) is that the actions induced by such verbs, like other verbs in English (e.g. *eat*) can include "object-drop", which in the DS-TTR account is modelled by allowing such verbs to take as their complement a *metavariable*. As in the DS-TTR modelling of pronominal or elliptical anaphora resolution, such a metavariable has to be provided with a value from context. In direct quotation cases, the value for such a metavariable will be provided by the independent clause provided either anaphorically or cataphorically as an antecedent (see e.g. (69) below and (1)-(2) in Sect. 2 earlier).

(69)   John shouted, "I talk better English than the both of youse!"

Such verbs, and various others, can also compose directly with non-linguistic actions, which is straightforwardly modelled in the DS-TTR formalism, as there is no qualitative distinction between "grammatical" and other actions:

(70)   The car engine went [brmbrm], and we were off.   [from Clark and Gerrig 1990]
(71)   The boy who had scratched her Rolls Royce went [rude gesture with hand] and ran away. [from Recanati 2010]

This assumption allows us to capture the continuity of direct/indirect discourse as it appears in mixed quotation and free (in)direct discourse structures. The only differences among them occur in the specification of the CONTEXT field, which, we assume, is subject to pragmatic enrichment (Recanati 2010), at a subsentential level, so that the truth-conditional content derived is always directly affected.

As the DS-TTR grammar is articulated in terms of actions, we can postulate that the added properties that characterise direct discourse are the result of focusing the hearer's attention to the actions used by another speaker, whether at the level of types or particular tokens, which, we assume, can sometimes be indicated by the quotation marks. Essentially we agree with Maier (2014) that direct discourse and mixed quotation are the same phenomenon, however, in line with G&C, we don't think that the grammar needs to implement this insight by employing special devices. Since we do not posit a separate level of syntactic analysis for the string of words, only the semantic-conceptual representation derived by processing the string, there is no issue arising here in terms of characterising a distinct syntactic category for indirect, direct, and mixed quotation complements in contrast to any other grammatical analysis of quotation (and, in fact, contra Recanati 2000, 2010). In consequence, unlike G&C, we do not employ specific constructions to deal with separate quotational phenomena, so that the present account extends naturally to mixed quotation and free (in)direct discourse.

To distinguish the properties of what we assume are variable ways of processing, in line with Recanati (2010), we analyse standard uniform indirect reports as cases where the CONTEXT field remains stable throughout the utterance of both the reporting section of the sentence and the reported-event part. As a consequence, indexical elements receive their interpretations from the context established by the current utterance event U_0. However, as a consequence of the lexical action introduced by the framing verb, a new world parameter W_1 is introduced for the report to express the reportee's view. The contextual and world parameters can be shifted independently of each other, and the possibility of shifting world and context parameters incrementally as the utterance develops models the otherwise puzzling cooccurrences of transposed and untransposed indexicals considered by Recanati (2000: Ch 15–16).

Note that in cases of shared indirect reports, indexicals will acquire values according to who currently assumes the relevant interlocutor roles (see also (18)-(20) earlier):

(72) A: So **you** say **you** will live
      B: by **my** pen, yes
(73) A: Did **you** say to Nick that . . .
      B: **you** hate **me**? Yes, I think it's true   ('A hates B')
(74) A: Did **you** say to Nick that **you** . . .
      B: hate **myself**? Yes, my psychoanalyst says so.   ('B hates B')

As we said earlier in Sect. 6.1, the eventual representation derived, following
standard DS-TTR procedures, composes the contents derived at the various sub-
sentential stages, as well as recording the various concatenated u_0 subevents that
resulted in a (perhaps joint) utterance-event U_0. Hence the interpretation derived
eventually has the values of the indexicals as intended by the participants at each
previous stage in that their "characters" (lexical actions in DS) have been applied
subsententially to the then current context so that the eventual composition deals
with contents only. The fact that there is no level of syntactic representation for
the string of words makes utterances like (74) fully-licensed as joint utterances and
provided with appropriate interpretations (the same for (18)-(20) seen earlier). Any
other grammar that insists on an independent syntactic analysis of such strings (see
e.g. Potts 2007; Maier 2014) will have trouble with such utterances as the string
of words *Did you say to Nick that you hate myself* will have to be characterised as
ungrammatical (and for (73) will derive the wrong interpretation).

Following G&C, in direct discourse, a new utterance event U_D is introduced,
corresponding to the demonstration the speaker performs. As in G&C, this newly
introduced event bears a contextually-determined similarity value (resemblance)
to another, anaphorically-retrieved utterance event U_Q from which contextual
parameters are copied, thus accounting for the corresponding change in the values
of indexicals that can be stable across speakers and turns:

(75) Adam: Well. I can tell you what her view on that is. and that
      Sherm: what.
      Adam: is, .h **I**'m older, and therefore I'm in a worse competitive position, and **I** and **I**'ve
      really got to produce.
      Sherm: but **I**'m smarter== (laughs) yeah. (said very softly)
      Adam: and **I**'m going to.
      Sherm: yeah. (said very softly)   [from Grimshaw 1987]
(76) A: Did **you** say to Nick. . .
      B: "**I** hate **you**"? Yes, why?   ('B hates Nick')
(77) A: Did **you** say to Nick "**You** . . .
      B: "hate **yourself**"? Yes, why?   ('Nick hates Nick')

Given that linguistic and non-linguistic actions are not differentiated in this
account, the fact that the demonstrating event offers anaphoric possibilities that can
be exploited subsequently both supra-sententially, subsententially, and across turns
is a natural prediction:

(78)   "I talk better English than the both of youse!" shouted Charles, thereby convincing me
       that he didn't.   [from Partee 1973]
(79)   "Don't worry, my boss likes me! He'll give me a raise" said Mary, but given the
       economic climate I doubt that he can.   [from Maier 2015]
(80)   A: I talk better English than the both of youse!
       B: You obviously don't   [from Partee 1973]

Instead of assuming that the availability of such anaphoric resolutions is the result
of presuppositional elements or implicatures (as in Maier 2014), here the grammar
itself provides the resources for explaining the phenomena. The resolution of both
ellipsis and pronominal anaphora in DS is assumed to involve the reuse of terms
annotating CONTENT fields on treenodes or the rerunning of processing actions
stored in the context (Kempson et al. 2012; Kempson et al. to appear). Since the
demonstrating event is constituted by a set of such processing actions, and both
the ensuing content and its processing actions are not segregated from the rest of
the discourse representation, they are stored in the context and are available to be
invoked for the resolution of anaphoric occurrences as in (78)-(80). For the same
reason, as in G&C analysis, we can account for cases of "mixed predication" where
both token and type aspects are addressed simultaneously:

(81)   'Was I snoring' was asked by Bill and is a frequently used interrogative clause.
(82)   'Am I snoring?' asked Bill, a sentence frequently uttered by men who don't think they
       snore. It is usually answered by 'You were before you woke up.'

But further than the G&C account, the present analysis extends to cases where a
continuation of an utterance started with an initial speaker without any quotational
"intentions" can become quotational, i.e., treated as a demonstrating event, and
conversely, structures initiated without necessary provision of a quotation can be
provided a quotational, echoing, complement:

(83)   Jem: Mary, whatever it is you think you know you mustn't speak of it. Not if you want to
       stay safe.
       Mary: says the horse-thief   [Jamaica Inn BBC, Episode 1, 23:50'] [from
       Gregoromichelaki, to appear]
(84)   Miriam: That is the nastiest, dirtiest thing anyone has ever done
       Patience: says Black Peter's strumpet! What are you crying for?
       [from Gregoromichelaki, to appear]
(85)   Noel: What I'm saying is
       Stacey: you are It!
       Noel (ironically): Yeah . . .   [from Gregoromichelaki, to appear]

The difference between this account and G&H is that a monolithic demonstration
event U_D is not necessarily derived at once for the whole complement of the framing
verb. Instead, there is the possibility at each subsentential stage for the speaker to
switch in and out of the demonstration. This is what accounts for both cases of free
indirect reports and mixed quotation.

In the cae of *free indirect discourse*, in addition to the introduction of a
demonstrating event, there is also a shift in the world parameter of the context
(Recanati 2000), for example, the event is taking place in a world according to
somebody's beliefs:

(86) John is totally paranoid. Everybody spies on **him** or wants to kill **him**, including **his** own mother.   [from Recanati 2000]

Since there is the possibility for independent shifting of world and context parameters and the eventual interpretation emerges via the concatenation of utterance subevents which can define their contexts independently of each other, corresponding to the sequential shifting in and out of demonstrations the speaker performs, there is no problem with having to coordinate the world and context shifts. This account gives results similar to Meier (2015) but without using ad hoc devices like the "unquotation" mechanism. The results just follow from the incremental contextual licensing of structures and interpretation that constitute ab initio the basis of the model. And, unlike other grammatical analyses, e.g. G&C, Sharvit (2008), since there is no independent level of syntactic analysis for the sentence, we do not have to license a complete sentential complement that has to be internally consistent as to indirect/direct report features and contextual parameters (remember we compose contents not characters). So *free direct discourse* (see (36) in Sect. 5) is simply a case where the context parameters are also shifted along with the world parameter.

In the cases of *mixed quotation* (seen earlier in (41) in Sect. 5) we assume that there is no "verbatim requirement" (cf. Meier 2014), so no such difference with indirect discourse ensues, since, as Recanati (2010) has pointed out, the context might make it evident that the words of somebody else rather than the subject of the framing verb are being echoed, or, we would add, that nobody has in fact uttered those words (we do not consider 'scare quoting' as a separate phenomenon):

(87) Alice said that Clinton is 'smooth', as you would put it. Of course that's not the word SHE used.   [from Recanati 2010]
(88) These are not 'I really should' radishes . . . .   [from Clark and Gerrig 1990: ex. 5b]
(89) Dutch is a "that I him have helped" language.   [from Abbott 2005, attributed to Philippe de Brabanter]

Non-constituent mixed quotation does not present a fundamental problem for this account either, since, by definition, the grammar licenses and interprets incrementally word strings, without relying on what other grammars characterise as "syntactic constituents" either subsententially or supra-sententially:

(90) She allowed as how her dog ate "strange things, when left to its own devices". [from Abbott 2005]
(91) Pascal suspected that the mercury was really supported by the "weight and pressure of the air, because I consider them only as a particular case of a universal principle concerning the equilibriums of fluids."   [from Maier 2008]
(92) Also, he categorically stated that "there is no legal way of temporal extension of the Greek debt without this being regarded as a credit event. Therefore there is no way that it will be allowed to happen such a credit event in Greece because it would create negative impact on the whole system."   [from Gregoromichelaki, to appear]

But we can go even further than that to account for data that are completely out of reach for other grammars. Given its psycholinguistically-inspired nature, the DS-TTR account models the various alternative options arising during the processing

of ambiguous strings. Even options less probabilistically favoured and, hence, not currently pursued, are stored temporarily in the context model (see e.g. Hough 2015) in order to be employed for, e.g., the functioning of repair processes, like corrections, in dialogue. This independently needed modelling allows us here to capture the variable semantic-"constituency" ambiguity of some mixed quotation strings and how they can be exploited by interlocutors, for example, in puns and jokes, as pointed out by Maier (2014):

(93) The menu says that this restaurant serves "[breakfast] [at any time]" . . . [so I ordered
      [French toast during the Renaissance]].   [Steven Wright joke, mentioned in
      Maier 2014]

Even though, for reasons of space, we cannot go into all the details here, all the "peculiarities" of mixed quotation presented in Maier (2014) and others, e.g. quantifier-"raising" blocking etc. are eliminated in DS-TTR, since there is no level of syntactic constituency or any independent syntactic categories assumed (see Gregoromichelaki to appear for further formal details). One might wonder at this stage as to whether exactly this assumption will prevent us from dealing with cases of *pure quotation*, i.e. cases where metalinguistic mention is made to folk-linguistic categories, like "sentences", "phrases", "words" etc. As argued in Gregoromichelaki (to appear), we do not believe that we are at a disadvantage here. Unlike G&C, we do not assume that folk-linguistic characterisations and reifications coincide with what the psycholinguistic account provides. Instead such characterisations, like speech-act characterisations (see Allen, this volume), can be freely pragmatically generated in an ad hoc manner that suits the interlocutors' purposes and there is no requirement for systematicity and consistency at least for their use in informal everyday discourse. For this purpose, our modification of the parameter in the CONTEXT field, borrowed from Recanati (2010) and G&C (see earlier Sect. 4.2.3), allows for the anaphoric resolution of an NL-use parameter Γ that can be exploited in determining appropriate referents for such purely metalinguistic uses. An essential difference with the G&C account though is that the quoting event in such cases does not project a particular phrase or construction so that it can combine with the rest of the sentence. Instead it can appear directly as the argument of an appropriate predication since utterance event act(ion) and the grammatical actions induced by linguistic input mesh together without further ado as we also saw in cases like (70)-(71) in Sect. 6.3 earlier.

7   Conclusion

We have seen now that in taking a psycholinguistically-realistic view of grammar, one that relies on the incrementality/predictivity and contextual dependence of NL-processing, we can accommodate not only various recalcitrant for others dialogue phenomena, like fragmental and split utterances, but also the various uses words are put to in echoing others' speech and thought or even referring to the function of

the NL-system itself. We have also argued that, since all these phenomena employ the same mechanisms (conceptualised as actions) for their manifestation, we would expect, and we do find, significant interactions among them. We have sketched a model where such linguistic, metalinguistic and non-linguistic factors mesh together in deriving the coordination of action that characterises human interaction.

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Indirect Reports and Workplace Norms

Meredith Marra and Janet Holmes

1 Indirect Reports in Workplace Talk

Indirect reports constitute a valuable strategy in the on-going (re)negotiation of workplace norms. An important challenge for any workplace newcomer is "to adjust themselves to their organization and to become organizational insiders" (Takeuchi et al. 2009: 1). This transition involves both informal and formal workplace learning. Some aspects are made explicit and overt; others are left implicit and learned through observation and inference (Tynjälä 2008). Indirect reports offer one interesting implicit source of learning, usefully contributing to the process of professional socialisation. In this chapter, we illustrate a range of uses of indirect reports in the socialisation process on New Zealand building sites.

Our specific focus is the situated functions of these reports, thereby empirically addressing the call from Volosinov (1971) to ensure that the analysis is not removed from the context in which it occurs. By prioritising the context, from the immediate reporting context, through our chosen discourse context of narratives, to the particular norms of the group who are interacting, we take a wider approach to indirect reports than many of our colleagues in this volume. Our naturally-occurring data indicates the clustering of indirect reports (including constructed dialogue) with direct reports and we treat them alongside each other when analysing the interactions.

In terms of our understandings of these various forms, we view reported speech as a form of indirect speech which serves as an agency-framing device. While direct speech reports are typically employed to suggest the legitimacy or truth of an account (Baynham 1996; Lampropoulou 2011), indirect reported speech serves

M. Marra (✉) • J. Holmes
School of Linguistics and Applied Language Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
e-mail: Meredith.Marra@vuw.ac.nz; Janet.Holmes@vuw.ac.nz

as a way to frame social positionings (Johansen 2011), allowing speakers to distance themselves from potentially face-threatening acts (Tannen 2010). This discourse strategy is particularly valuable in environments where complex power differences are constantly being negotiated. The established hierarchies inherent in organisations and the dynamic power associated with expertise and experience suggest the workplace is a valuable context in which to examine the use of indirect reports.

Within research on workplace socialisation, narratives (our specific discourse focus as noted above) have been identified as a widely recognised means of acquiring both implicit and explicit knowledge, albeit in a typically indirect form. The co-occurrence of indirect reports and narratives (as described in detail in Norrick, chapter "Indirect reports, quotation and narrative", this volume) is well recognised. Combining these two areas, we draw attention in this chapter to the role of narratives in the process of sense-making during workplace socialization, using recordings collected from building apprentices for illustration. We provide an analysis of the work that indirect reports, and especially constructed dialogue, do in contributing to this enterprise.

2   Workplace Narratives and Socialisation

Storytelling is not an obvious workplace activity, yet narrative emerges as a regular component of workplace interaction (Holmes 2006; Mullany 2006; Dennehy 1999). The flexibility of narratives as a discourse type is suggested by the variety of approaches in which narratives constitute the analytic focus, and the range of functions that have been identified by those investigating storytelling: as a site for identity construction (Dyer and Keller-Cohen 2000; Holmes and Marra 2006); to fulfil important relational functions (Fletcher 1999); and as a form of sense-making (Mills 2002). The first two areas are the domain of discourse analysts within a linguistic tradition, with heavy emphasis on the negotiation of meaning within narrative sequences. Sense-making, however, is more typically the focus of those investigating organisations within management and communication studies.

The concept of sense-making is clearly relevant to the pragmatic analysis of indirect reports in narratives, since it draws on the important concept of "common ground" (Clark 1996; Kecskes 2014): "the sum of all the information that people assume they share" (Clark 2009: 116). As Patriotta (2003: 352) notes:

> First, narratives provide a fundamental medium for capturing the commonsensical, everyday character of organizational knowledge. Second, narratives are linked to sensemaking. They represent ways of talking about organizations and thereby reflect shared and widespread perceptions of organizing.

Narratives provide a means of interpreting what is going on at work, especially the informal, taken-for-granted ways of doing things which are rarely the focus of explicit comment. They provide an acceptable conduit for conveying workplace norms and practices, and for transmitting professional values (see also Weick 1979).

As noted above, Norrick (chapter "Indirect reports, quotation and narrative", this volume) provides a useful discussion of the relationship between indirect reports and

narrative. He points out (p. 95) that while narratives *may* include indirect reports, not all narratives do; similarly, not all instances of indirect reporting establish the discourse as a narrative:

> In sum, indirect reports may constitute or contain narratives, and narratives may take the form of indirect reports, generally accompanied by "she/he said" and similar expressions, and they often contain indirect reports as in dialogue, again generally accompanied by "she/he said" and similar expressions, but all these relations are contingent rather than necessary.

Thus, rather than forming overlapping categories, narratives and indirect reports may co-occur. Norrick's focus is the structural form of each: he describes the *he/she said* form as typical of indirect reports, and draws on the influential model of the structure of narratives by Labov and Waletsky (1967). Norrick's thorough discussion provides a valuable platform on which we build. Our particular interest, however, is the function of indirect reports in the context of the groups in which they are being used, and especially the use of "constructed dialogue" (Tannen 2005) within narratives.

It has been widely demonstrated that whether they use direct reported speech or indirect reports, speakers do not reproduce 'verbatim accounts' in their narratives, i.e. they do not produce the exact words they heard (Baynham 1996; Capone 2010, see also Holt, chapter "Indirect reported speech in interaction", this volume). Rather they interact with the narrative by bringing in their own understanding and interpretation of the event, using their own words with a given interactional focus or goal. As Johansen explains, from a pragmatic point of view, "the speaker's use of reported speech invokes two participation frameworks, that of the previous interaction and that of the present interaction" (2011: 2848). This is important when considering what the speaker is attempting to achieve in the current interaction, which may include implicit communication of professional norms.

In identifying the functions of constructed dialogue we are particularly interested in the "tellability" of the story, which Labov (1972) describes as typically falling within the evaluation section of the narrative i.e. where we get access to the narrator's perspective on the action described. Ochs and Capps (2001: 33) define narratives as tellable "in the extent to which they convey a sequence of reportable events and make a point in a rhetorically effective manner" (p. 33). The tellability of a narrative is often enhanced by the use of constructed dialogue, as we illustrate below, and the use of indirect reporting may be a means of conveying important normative information in a socially acceptable way. Our concern in considering the tellability of a narrative is thus essentially to identify the way in which the narrative provides information about norms for the group or community of practice.

3   Community of Practice: Theoretical Approach[1]

The community of practice (CofP), a concept rooted in the notion of situated learning, is a useful tool in examining the function of indirect reports in the process of socialisation within a particular group, in this case a specific team of builders.

Lave and Wenger (1991: 64–65) argue that any kind of learning involves increasing participation in a CofP, and describe how the "good" learner gradually moves from their initial peripheral status to becoming a more complex and fully engaged participant. The notion of 'practice' is central, along with three criterial features identified by Wenger (1998: 73): mutual engagement, a joint negotiated enterprise and a shared repertoire of negotiable resources accumulated over time. Because of the obvious relevance of the CofP to workplace socialisation, this has been explored in a wide range of contexts (e.g. Gherardi and Nicolini 2002; Holmes and Woodhams 2013).

The two building teams on construction sites, the source of the data in this chapter, qualify as communities of practice on each of these counts. They are engaged in a joint enterprise (building a house), and to achieve their objectives they draw on a shared repertoire of verbal and non-verbal resources, including technical and specialised terminology or jargon, established linguistic routines and ways of talking, as well as non-verbal tools and skilled practices. Narrative forms an important part of this repertoire. The interactions of members of a CofP are typically characterised by "local lore, *shared stories*, inside jokes, knowing laughter", and they use "jargon and shortcuts to communication" (Wenger 1998: 125; our italics). Negotiating and acquiring this repertoire is an important aspect of their integration within the community.

The interactions used for analysis below were recorded on site in New Zealand; they are drawn from the larger corpus of naturally-occurring workplace interaction recorded by the Wellington Language in the Workplace team. For more than 15 years we have been working with co-researchers in organisations spanning a wide range of industries to explore effective workplace communication. Adopting a philosophy in which we cooperate with workplaces to investigate issues of mutual interest, we hand over control of the recording process to the participants who record a sample of their everyday interactions (see Holmes and Stubbe 2003). To support our analyses of these recordings we supplement the data with ethnographic information gathered through participant observations, and debriefing interviews.

Our interest in construction and the related socialisation processes stems from the identification of future labour shortages by the New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. Understanding how apprentices are integrated into the profession and into workplace teams represents an important application for our on-going research. To capture the process in action we asked builders to carry small digital recorders as they went about their day. A period of time on site by a young male research assistant identified logistical solutions to the noisy outdoor environment and the physicality of the tasks undertaken. The builders wore the recorders in armbands attached to their non-dominant arm which enabled the equipment to pick up the speech of the builder and his interlocutors. In many cases multiple recorders were in use and we were able to synchronise audio tracks to create enhanced recordings from two different devices. In total we have around 25 h of data from each of two building sites where senior builders were working with apprentices. In the next section we use excerpts from this data to discuss the function of indirect reports or constructed dialogue in workplace interaction.

4   How Indirect Reports Convey Professional Norms

Building is a profession which involves periods of intense, highly focussed, complex activity which requires maximum concentration, and where talk is jargon-filled (from the perspective of an outsider). These periods are interspersed with sections of more repetitive work when more socially-oriented interaction is possible. During the latter, we often find evidence of how professional norms are conveyed in the form of indirect reports. Extract 1 illustrates how Max, a building apprentice, has learned to appreciate the importance and significance of good tools in this skilled occupation.

Extract 1
1.   Max: got he got me er like you know a cammed rip saw
2.   Tom: er
3.   Max: a big skill saw
4.   Tom: oh yeah yep
5.   Max: he got me one of them as well
6.   Tom: oh did he
7.   Max: yeah
8.   Tom: nice + I saw that on his truck
9.   oh cos you got your little one
10.   //haven't you oh not your little one\
11. Max: /yeah yeah he said I'll\\ get you another
12.   and I was like oh well I've got this
13.   and he said oh bro

Max first reports that the owner has given him two new tools, *a cammed rip saw* (line 1) and *a big skill saw* (line 3). The new tools are an important symbol of Max's professional development and increasing progress towards the status of a 'proper' tradesman. Max reports his appreciation of this in the form of a brief narrative addressed to his foreman Tom, who clearly recognises the significance of the story, as indicated by his response *nice* (line 8), followed by a comment about the saw Max already has which elicits the constructed dialogue or indirect report.

In the constructed dialogue Max reports the owner's comment *he said I'll get you another* (line 11), suggesting that the owner considers Max's current saw inadequate for the professional task in which he is engaged. Max's reported response *I was like oh well I've got this* (line 12) indicates that at that stage he was unaware of the inadequacy of his existing saw, though now of course he knows better. The owner's reply, as conveyed by Max, *he said oh bro* (line 13), in an effective use of an indirect report cast in the foreman's words (which, as noted above, is typically employed to suggest the legitimacy or truth of an account), clearly signals the discrepancy in their views: the utterance *oh bro* (where *bro* is a regular term of address between males in New Zealand) is articulated with exasperation. The reporting strategy adopted here is an economical means for Max to signal to Tom that he has taken the point of

this interaction, and learned about professional standards, and particularly about the importance of good tools in doing a professional job.

In terms of the structure of this narrative, the evaluation component is extremely minimal and implicit, conveyed entirely through Max's rendering of the owner's (eye-rolling) response *and he said oh bro* (line 13). Nevertheless, as well as clearly staking a claim for the tellability of this story, it importantly provides a clear though indirect indication that Max has got the message, and learned a significant lesson about professional standards. Max's use of the indirect report here is an effective means of attending to his face needs; he expresses the message succinctly and minimises the embarrassment of his obvious previous ignorance.

Extract 2 provides a paradigmatic example of indirect reporting from Tom who recounts his dissatisfaction with the (lack of) performance of Rick, a young worker sent to the building site once a week to gain work experience.

Extract 2

1.	Tom:	yeah he's er he's doing a pre trade
2.		he's not straight out of school sort of thing
3.		he's been there yeah no I don't know
4.		hey I mean it could be my fault
5.		last night I said
6.		cos we just locked the garage door we were locked in
7.		I said oh you can just roll the leads back
8.		and maybe just stack them at the multi box
9.		you know rather than put them all in the shed I told him
10.		it was the third time I told him
11.		he does the real tight roll around his arm
12.	XM:	yeah yeah
13.	Tom:	and they were all stacked like that
14.		rolled real tight but on top of each other
15.	XM:	yeah
16.	Tom:	and it was just this big jumble man
17.		I thought maybe I should have explained it you know
18.		I said put them by the
19.		so I said guess what happens now
20.		we need to spend ten minutes pulling them all out you know
21.	XM:	yeah
22.	Tom:	and I said you you lift one up and see what happens
23.		[power tool stops] and sure enough spaghetti
24.		just one eight eight leads into one you know

Tom introduces the constructed dialogue by establishing the basis on which he, as foreman and mentor to Rick, had good reason to expect that Rick should be familiar with basic tasks on the building site, such as rolling up leads. Tom reports that Rick has some experience since he is engaged in *a pre-trade* course and *not straight out of school* (lines 1–2). Tom is also prepared to consider that it is his fault

that Rick messed up: *hey I mean it could be my fault* (line 4): perhaps he wasn't clear enough or is expecting too much (we return to this issue of interpretation below). This preamble establishes a particular lens for the listener (another builder on site), foreshadowing the evaluation by indicating that what follows will be a story of unsatisfactory behaviour from Tom's perspective.

Tom then proceeds to explain, using classic narrative structure (Labov and Waletzky 1967) and extensive constructed dialogue, why he is dissatisfied with Rick's performance. He begins by providing the *orientation*, indicating the context of the interaction in the locked garage (line 6), and then proceeds to re-construct his dialogue with Rick (repeated below for convenience).

7.   I said oh you can just roll the leads back
8.   and maybe just stack them at the multi box
9.   you know rather than put them all in the shed I told him
10. it was the third time I told him

Tom here reports how he explicitly instructed Rick to pack away the leads by rolling them and then stacking them in a particular place. The *I said* at the start and *I told him* at the end of these reported instructions suggest that he feels he was very clear about what was required. And again the use of reported direct speech contributes to the impression that this is a true and exact account (Baynham 1996; Lampropoulou 2011). This is further reinforced by the repeated form *I told him* in the clause *it was the third time I told him* (line 10), with form echoing meaning very neatly. Moreover the pragmatic particle *you know,* a well-established means of appealing to shared understandings and common ground (Holmes 1986; Östman 1981; Schiffrin 1987), provides another subtle component contributing to the implicit evaluation prefigured in the introduction.

There follows a description of what Rick actually does in response (lines 11–16), producing *a big jumble,* with the address form *man* (line 16) at the end of the description, reinforcing the assumption of shared understandings and common ground between Tom and his interlocutor, an assumption which is supported by his supportive feedback, *yeah yeah* (line 12) and *yeah* (line 15).

Tom provides another implicit indication of his evaluative stance with a self-critical comment on his own thinking, *I thought maybe I should have explained it you know* (line 17), again accompanied by *you know*, appealing to shared understandings. He then proceeds with another constructed dialogue which indicates how he made the lesson quite explicit for Rick.

Tom's somewhat sarcastic reported question *guess what happens now* (line 19) is rhetorical, since he proceeds to answer it himself, *we need to spend ten minutes pulling them all out* (line 20), spelling out to Rick the consequences of his foolishness. As in lines 7–10 in extract 2, Tom's pedagogical approach is made quite explicit in this reported dialogue; he exhorts Rick to *lift one up and see what happens* (line 22). He then concludes the narrative with a wryly humorous resolution: *and sure enough spaghetti . . . eight leads into one* (lines 23–24). Again the use of *you know* (lines 20, 24) contributes to the evaluative component of this narrative, indicating Tom's assumption of a shared understanding (and his addressee's response *yeah* supports this), that Rick's behaviour is incontestably unprofessional from the

point of view of the building team CofP. The reporting strategy provides Tom with a useful framework for recounting an annoying experience, and thus enables him to take a wry and humorous position in relation to the work experience student. The distancing effect is thus valuable in managing his relationship with the student whilst also providing a means of reinforcing shared understanding with his fellow team member, who is discursively positioned as an equal in this interaction.

Overall, then, Tom's indirect reporting in this extract, used specifically when he is talking about Rick's responses, indicates that Rick's behaviour is demonstrably unacceptable: Rick fails to conform to the team's expected standard of competence. The evaluative component is implicit to this point in Tom's tone of voice, as well as his use of rhetorical and pragmatic devices which assume common ground and shared understandings with his interlocutor, another team member.

In the next extract, these understandings are made more explicit, and they are then followed by another example of Rick's professional incompetence.

Extract 3

1. Tom: but um I don't know
2.   that to me you just wouldn't do that
3.   would you drop them all on top of each other
4.   you even if you were (sensible enough)
5. XM: (common sense) mate that is
6. Tom: yeah that's what I thought
7.   but nah he's just like really ( )
8. XM: ( ) [laughs]
9. Tom: he um it's stuff like you know
10.   put a dwang in round a pipe
11.   and it was I explained it had to be flush and all that
12.   and I went and checked it and it was miles out
13.   and I said oh nah see it's got to be flush you know
14.   gib goes on blah blah blah
15.   he said okay
16.   so he did that and it was the last
17.   this was a couple of weeks ago
18.   and he disappeared
19.   and then I came back
20.   and it was still fucking miles out [laughs]

Tom here appeals explicitly to his team mate to confirm that Rick's behaviour is unacceptable, *you just wouldn't do that* (line 2), and they then proceed to negotiate their common understanding that this is not only professionally incompetent but just *common sense* (line 5), which of course it is to them with their years of experience. The second example of Rick's incompetence however clearly involves professional skills which Tom is patiently trying to teach Rick. Again Tom uses constructed dialogue to illustrate his pedagogical style in which he makes explicit exactly what is needed:

13. and I said oh nah see it's got to be flush you know
14. gib goes on blah blah blah
15. he said okay

There are discursive indications that Tom and his interlocutor share common ground, signalled not only by the pragmatic particle *you know* (line 13) but also with *blah blah blah* (line 14), a general extender (see Terraschke 2007; Overstreet 2014) used when participants share common experience and the completion is therefore unnecessary. Here it is used to abbreviate the constructed dialogue (for the benefit of an interlocutor who knows all this) in which Tom represents himself as being very explicit about what is required. Again Tom ends his narrative with a wryly humorous, snappy resolution which generates laughter from both participants: *and then I came back and it was still fucking miles out* (lines 19–20).

In this extract, the evaluation is made explicit and it is jointly negotiated (lines 1–6), as the participants confirm each other's perspectives regarding Rick's behaviour. They share an understanding of the professional norms and standards of their CofP. And the constructed dialogue serves the purpose of once again illustrating Tom's consistent pedagogical style, teaching by demonstration what is expected of a professional in this workplace team. Tom's constructed dialogue provides him with a means of presenting himself as a reasonable and patient mentor, and again the distancing effect of the indirect report strategy contributes to managing his relationship with the student and with his team mate.

We turn now to a second building site to illustrate further how indirect reports convey implicit understandings of shared professional norms. Nate, the site plumber, is talking to the building apprentice, Alex, about a plumbing apprentice they both know (Noah).

Extract 4
1.   Nate: he's working for another plumber temporary
2.   Alex: is he
3.   Nate: was + [laughter in the background]
4.   (I asked him how's it going
5.   nah don't work there anymore)
6.   Alex: did he get sacked already
7.   Nate: I don't know
8.   Alex: I thought he was
9.   Nate: the guy said he didn't have enough work
10.   but last this time last week the guy was so desperate
11.   he needed Noah for as long as Noah could stay for ++
12.   at this stage though (Noah? got no work for him)
13.   [laughter in the background] (6)
14.   he would go down as probably one of the worst plumbers
15.   that's ever worked for him +
16.   he was getting that bad ++

Because this is context-embedded talk between people who work together and share common understandings it is very hard for outsiders to follow. Nate and Alex clearly share a negative evaluation of Noah, a young plumbing apprentice. They first consider some evidence that Noah may have been sacked (lines 1–8) and then describe how the builder who sacked him clearly really needed a plumber since he had been desperate when he first asked to use Noah (lines 10–11), but now doesn't need him (line 12). They then return to the builder's reported evaluation of Noah, *as probably one of the worst plumbers that's ever worked for him* (lines 14–15).

The complex constructed dialogue in this extract has a number of interesting features. The implicit nature of the shared understandings is reinforced by the use of zero quotatives: these interlocutors clearly do not regard it as necessary to scaffold their indirect reports with the phrase *he said.* So Noah's response to Nate's reported question *how's it going* (line 4) is reported without any attribution *nah don't work there anymore* (line 5). And importantly for understanding this complex and implicit narrative, so is Noah's report of the reason: *the guy said he didn't have enough work* (line 9). So here Nate is reporting Noah's account of why he is not working for *the guy* any more to Alex, (and they then go on to discuss evidence that this is not the real reason why Noah is not employed by the guy any longer).

Zero quotatives have been analysed as features of talk between people who know each other well and who share common ground, and they clearly serve to reinforce solidarity between interlocutors (Holmes 1998; D'Arcy 2010). So Noah's dialogue is reported by Nate to Alex using a feature signalling close comradeship and shared attitudes. The latter are explicitly spelled out in what follows with the indications that Noah has been identified as not measuring up on professional standards

There is also an instance of embedded indirect speech. Here we refer to Nate's report of Noah's account of what *the guy* said in line 9, *the guy said he didn't have enough work,* where the indirect form signalled by the pronoun *he* indicates that this is reported speech within reported speech. Since Noah is the obvious source of this information we infer that this is his indirect report of what was said, here conveyed by Nate and attributed only implicitly for maximum impact, a similar effect to that achieved by zero quotatives.

Once again the effect of this indirect reporting or constructed dialogue is to emphasise the shared understandings, values and attitudes of the interlocutors. These are skilled workmen with professional standards and this narrative, with its complex indirect reports, is one means by which such standards are regularly and informally referenced and reinforced. They also provide a means of distancing the narrator from the main character in the narrative who is presented as someone who has not been professionally socialised.

5   Narratives as Expressions of Norms and the Role of Indirect Speech

Telling stories is a social activity but, as noted above, there is extensive evidence of their occurrence in workplace interaction where they often provide a means of making sense of what is going on at work. Stories serve to convey normative

information in an indirect way, taking advantage of the informal, taken-for-granted, common understandings and ways of doing things which are rarely the focus of explicit comment. As noted in the introduction, and illustrated in the analysis above, narratives provide a socially acceptable conduit for conveying workplace norms and practices, and for transmitting professional values. Hogg and Reid (2006: 17) note that "[p]eople in groups use other members' behavior as information to construct a group norm" (Hogg and Reid 2006: 17). And this behaviour includes workplace narratives which may be used very effectively to communicate such norms.

The analysis of the extracts in the previous section has demonstrated how narratives draw on and reinforce shared knowledge and experience and common understandings.

In the first extract, Max conveys his point with a minimal but very effective rendering of the owner's reaction to the sight of his (inadequate) tools: *oh bro.* This constructed dialogue, using direct speech, not only suggests the owner's expectations but also clearly indicates that Max has learned an important lesson about professional standards. Moreover, Max's story frames the relative social positions of the owner, the foreman, Tom, and himself, as apprentice; he thus expresses his learning in a way that sensitively indicates awareness of his steadily increasing status within the team.

In extract 2, Tom uses a narrative to convey his frustration with a work experience student, Rick, who seems unable to follow explicit instructions and makes a hash of what Tom considers a very straightforward task. His story is shared with another work colleague who clearly sympathises, and whose responses support Tom's interpretation of Rick's behaviour as unacceptable, not only from the standpoint of professional standards but even from a common sense perspective. The extract is replete both with pragmatic signals of Tom's evaluative stance and evidence of the assumed common ground and the shared understandings between the two builders.

These understandings are even more evident in extract 3 where Tom first asks for confirmation of his interpretation of Rick's behaviour as providing evidence of failure to acquire workplace norms, and then provides another example of his failure to meet minimal standards of professional competence. Here the constructed dialogue illustrates Tom's pedagogical approach, teaching by demonstration what is expected of a professional in this CofP, while the evaluation clearly indicates Tom's assessment that Rick fails to acquire his message and reach those standards.

The complex indirect reporting and embedded dialogue in extract 4 also serve to underline shared understandings and common ground in relation to professional norms and standards. Zero quotatives, for instance, are very clear indications of shared knowledge and experience; there is no need to make matters explicit since these participants are close colleagues with shared knowledge of the background to the story. Moreover the analysis indicates how the content of this extract clearly assumes shared attitudes and professional values – which Noah fails to meet.

These workplace stories thus emphasise what is regarded as important by work colleagues, as well as demonstrating what is considered an appropriate way of communicating such shared values and norms. In this enterprise the evaluation is a crucial site for defining the norms of the CofP. The evaluation is what justifies a story

as "tellable" and is a key component of the narrative, whether implicit or explicit. We have argued that it is the builders' professional standards and shared norms which emerge in the evaluation components as an important focus of participants' attention.

6   Indirect Reports for Socialisation Purposes

The stories presented above repeatedly draw attention to shared values and attitudes to work, to the professional norms and high standards of workmanship shared by the two building CofPs. The role of indirect reports or constructed dialogues has emerged as very significant in this enterprise. In extract 1, as noted, the evaluation is most obviously conveyed through Max's rendering of the owner's horrified expression *oh bro* in response to the sight of his current drill. The constructed dialogue, though brief, plays a critical part in conveying the message of the story.

In extract 2, Tom gives a subtle, implicit indication of the point of his story in his introduction to the narrative *I mean it could be my fault*, signalling that what follows is a story involving blame. The pragmatic particle *you know* in this extract as well as extract 3 indicates Tom's assumption of shared understanding with his interlocutor, and this clearly involves a shared evaluation. In both extracts the constructed dialogues serve to illustrate Tom's pedagogical approach which is a crucial component of his basic argument that while he has played his part as careful instructor and mentor, his pupil repeatedly demonstrates incomprehensible incompetence.

In extract 4, the constructed dialogue is remarkably complex and relies on extensive shared understandings and common ground, even to grasp what is being narrated. Once again the focus of the indirect reporting is a shared understanding of professional norms and standards of behaviour. Moreover, the negative evaluation of their colleague's behaviour is conveyed using indirect reported speech, a skilful stylistic means of presenting material with impact while distancing oneself as narrator. As noted above, the effect of these skilfully constructed dialogues is to emphasise the shared understandings, values and attitudes of the interlocutors.

By taking a discursive approach to our interpretation of indirect reports (as found within narratives), we have demonstrated the significance of context in interpreting the functions served by the reported speech, whether indirect or direct. Alongside others who have recognised the value of interpreting reports within their interactional context (see discussion in Holt 2009 and compare her use of Conversation Analysis as a means of interpretation in this volume), our analyses demonstrate the negotiation of meaning by interlocutors who make use of various strategies. The analysis indicates the importance of drawing on assumed common ground, the clustering of direct and indirect reports, and the role of constructed dialogue, each of which is used for the overall goal of integrating new community members. Together they speak to a complex picture of socialisation through indirect means, even in an environment such as the building site where apprenticing newcomers and providing explicit instruction is a stated goal. We thus argue for

an approach to understanding indirect reports that foregrounds the importance of negotiation of meaning within situated practices in line with the theoretical stance of a CofP which provides space between the micro detail of interaction and the macro practices within which the interaction occurs.

Transcription conventions

[ ]	Paralinguistic and editorial information in square brackets
+	Untimed pause of up to one second
(6)	Timed pause i.e. 6 seconds
//here\	Overlapping talk. Double slashes indicate beginning
/here\\	and end
( )	Untranscribable talk
(think)	Transcriber's best guess at an unclear utterance
?	Questioning intonation
XM:	Unidentified male speaker

All names are pseudonyms, and any identifying material has been removed.

Note

1. This section draws on Holmes and Woodhams (2013).

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Indirect Reported Speech in Interaction

Elisabeth Holt

1 Introduction

In this chapter I use conversation analysis[1] to explore indirect reported speech (henceforth IRS) in naturally occurring interaction. Most previous studies of reported speech in conversation have tended to focus on direct reported speech (henceforth DRS). However, analysis of a collection of instances of reported speech drawn from transcribed telephone calls from the U.K. and U.S. revealed that, though not as ubiquitous as DRS, IRS is recurrent. Furthermore, investigation showed that it occurs in distinct sequential environments. Aspects of its design make it ideal for specific interactional actions, and thus suited to contribute to different sequences than those associated with DRS. A recurrent pattern that has emerged from analysis of the corpus is that IRS regularly occurs as part of introductory detailing prior to a sequence of DRS in storytelling. In this chapter I explore this recurrent sequential position of IRS. However, there is also a comparative aspect to my analysis: in order to understand the recurrent occurrence of IRS in this sequential position it is useful to compare it to DRS. Exploration of the characteristics of and distinctions between these devices help to highlight the specific contributions of IRS and why it might be selected over alternative methods of conveying speech.

Previous analysis of IRS has often taken the form of a comparison between it and DRS, and certainly, this is a good place to begin when formulating a loose characterisation of the device. Authors have focused on the difference between the two forms in terms of the extent to which the speaker purports to re-enact the words

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[1] For more information on CA see Sidnell (2010).

E. Holt (✉)
School of Music, Humanities and Media, University of Huddersfield, Queensgate,
Huddersfield, HD8 8DL, UK

of another and the authenticity of the strategies. According to Coulmas (1986) DRS "evokes the original speech situation and conveys, or claims to convey, the exact words of the original speaker" (p.2) while IRS "adapts the reported utterance to the speech situation of the report" (p.2) and is therefore "variable with respect to the extent that faithfulness to the linguistic form of what was said is being claimed" (p.6). In a similar manner, Mayes (1990: 351) states:

> "...an indirect quote is merely a restatement of a previous utterance, and there is no expectation that words, sentence structure, intonation, or non-verbal messages should be preserved."

So, in indirect speech "the reporter comes to the fore", relating events from his/her own point of view (Coulmas 1986: 2). In DRS speakers purport to replay or 'demonstrate' (Clark and Gerrig 1990) the reported locution giving the recipient access (Holt 1996, 2000), whereas IRS may convey a summary or gist of what was said.

These distinctions arise, at least in part, because in DRS the deictic centre of the utterance is the 'original' speech situation, whereas in IRS it is the reporting one. In DRS, therefore, elements such as pronouns, deictic references, vocatives, turn initials, verb tenses and shifts in prosody are appropriate to the 'original' utterance (Partee 1973; Banfield 1973, 1982; Wierzbicka 1974; Li 1986; Mayes 1990; Holt 1996; see Clift and Holt 2007 and Holt 2009 for summaries). Whereas in IRS pronouns, verb tenses, and deictic references are all appropriate to the recounting situation. Furthermore, as Mayes (1990) points out, a range of constructions and components cannot occur in indirect reports, including interrogatives, vocatives, exclamations, imperatives and 'discourse particles' (pp. 338–339).

To further demonstrate distinguishing aspects of DRS and IRS, here is an instance of each from my corpus. The first extract contains DRS that occurs at the climax of a storytelling (see Holt 1996, 2000).

(1)[Holt:C85:4:2–3.]
(Lesley is telling a story about visiting a church fair)

```
1  Lesley:          AND uh ↑we were looking rou-nd the
2                   ↓sta:lls 'n poking about 'n he came
3           →       up t'me 'n he said Oh: hhello
                    Lesley, (.)
4           →       ↑still trying to buy something
                    f'nothing,
5                   .tch! .hh[hahhhhhhh!
6  Joyce:                    [.hhoohhhh!
```

Lesley clearly conveys that she is enacting the words of someone else on a prior occasion: the shift in prosody at the start of the quote (to a 'haughty' tone), the turn initial "oh:", the greeting and the inclusion of her name are appropriate to another speaker at another time, as are the verb tenses in "↑still trying to buy something".

The result is a vivid portrayal of a locution from a different occasion and footing (Goffman 1981), purporting to give the recipient 'access' to the locution (Holt 1996, 2000).

In IRS the speaker does not claim so much fidelity to the 'original' or shift footing so completely to suggest that that they are merely enacting a prior locution:

(2) [Holt: X(C)1:1:6:8]

```
1   Lesley:  →   ih↓Ye::s uhm-:-: u-Mark said eez not surpri:zed
2            →   that he:hh that he behaved like tha:t?
```

In this extract the pronoun 'he' is not changed to 'I' and there is no noticeable shift in intonation or inclusion of a turn initial (as in, for example, 'he said ↑well I'm not surprised he behaved like that').[2]

Analysis of instances of reported speech in interaction reveals that speakers do orient to the difference in forms in as much as they recurrently use the devices in distinct positions within sequences of action and types of interactional environments. In this chapter I explore one of these sequential environments – in storytelling, prior to DRS. Analysis of the design of IRS reveals why it is particularly well suited to fulfilling this role. Thus, in the next section I explore further the design of the device and the nature of the category, showing that distinctions are a matter of degree rather than absolute. Following this I present and analyse instances of IRS in this recurrent sequential environment, showing how it is delicately attuned to the interactional task it is used to perform.

2   The Design of IRS

Exactly what counts as IRS in interaction is not a clear cut matter. The category covers a broad range of reportings extending from instances that are indistinguishable from DRS and blends of the two forms (thus merging into quasi-direct or free indirect forms), to cases where the speaker loosely summarises or glosses previous locutions. Thus a first complicating issue is that the boundary between DRS and IRS is extremely fuzzy. Günthner (1997), in an analysis of reported speech in German, found that speakers can convey affect using indirect forms and, thus,

> "...the simple dichotomy between direct reported speech as conveying the "message plus the form" of the quoted utterance, and indirect reported speech as just conveying the "message", unduly reduces the complexities of restaging past dialogues in everyday interactions." (p. 267)

Analysis of instances from interaction reveals that other differences claimed in the literature are not always born out in use.

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[2]A further distinguishing element of IRS, but not DRS, is inclusion of 'that' (Li, 1996), but few of the instances in my collection included this complementizer.

Second, as shown below, the boundary between IRS and glosses or summaries of speech is also extremely fuzzy. On occasion speakers talk about what they or others have said, but we may not necessarily want to include it within speech reporting. It is often only the inclusion of 'said' that raises the question of its inclusion. Thus, a construction such as 'she said she doesn't like them' would be included in collections of IRS whereas 'apparently she doesn't like them' may not be. Capone (2015) succinctly summarises the problem: "there is some latitude in the semantics of 'say', as sometimes it means 'say more or less', some other times it means 'say exactly'" (p.5). Further, 'said' can be used in constructions that convey information about a speaker without necessarily claiming to report what s/he said (e.g. 'she says she loves dogs').

Third, within the category there is a broad variety of instances. According to Coulmas (1986: 5),

> (w)hat appears to be simply the alternative to direct discourse is thus a complex assembly of ways of reporting another's speech or certain aspects thereof . . . . . . (These) make indirect speech a versatile mode of speech reporting ranging from faithfully adapting the linguistic form of the reported utterance to the deictic center of the report situation to a summarizing paraphrase of an utterance irrespective of its linguistic form.

In this section I analyse instances to both further investigate recurrent aspects of the device and explore the fuzzy boundaries, showing the amorphousness of the category. I use this to suggest an alternative approach to viewing this and related devices. I begin with consideration of examples that cluster towards the end of the continuum where it merges with DRS.

In the following instance Fran and Ted are making arrangements to get together while Ted and his family are staying at the coast. Fran reports talking to Ted's daughter about the period during which they will be there.

```
(3)[ITB:13]
1  Fran:    =But sheron sid yer g'nnuh be there entil::
2      →    (0.3) Well she sid any time between no:w
3      →    enna week from this Saturday.=
4  Ted:     =nYeah.
```

It is conceivable that the words reported by Fran here, "any time between no:w enna week from this Saturday" could possibly have been uttered verbatim by Sharon: no elements, such as tense, pronouns or deictic references, portray this as clearly direct or indirect. However, the lack of any clear indicators of DRS (such as a turn initial or shift in prosody) means that Fran does not clearly shift footing to depict the utterance as produced by Ted's daughter.

In the following instance the reported utterance could also have conceivably been uttered verbatim on a previous occasion. However, the fact that the speaker introduces this as something both she and her husband said suggests she may be conveying it as more of a gloss or summary of former locutions.

(4)Holt:M88:2:4:20
(Deena is talking about the price of the house that her daughter and fiancé are
buying.)

```
1    Deena:     [That's ri:ght,] they're taw-
2               they're payin a hundred 'n ten Mark[
3    Mar:                                          [.tlok
4               ↑.awhhhhhh,hhh (.) gee:: 'ow do they do
5               it is it- you ↑sure that's not the
6               telephone ↓number Dee[na  [.hhh
7    Deena:                          [No: dea[r but it
8          →    makes you cringe, I mean Dwayne 'n I said
9          →    if we were startin' off again today up here
10         →    we'd u-we: u-wu(.) we'd never get
11         →    =a ↑mor[tgage](would w e ) ]
12   Mark:            [ N O ]we'd never get]sta:rted would
13              we-no:,
```

Again, this could have been uttered verbatim but it lacks clear indicators that
Deena is shifting footing simply to replay an utterance made on a former occasion,
and the fact that she portrays it as emanating from both her husband and her may
suggest further that it is not necessarily purporting to be a verbatim re-enactment.

Also to be found at this end of the continuum are instances of blends between
IRS and DRS that might be seen as free-indirect or quasi-direct (Coulmas 1986;
Banfield 1973, 1982; for a survey, see McHale 1978).

(5)[NB:II:2:10]

```
1    Nancy:      ... I only had o:ne (0.3) .hhhhhh (0.4)
2                dero:gatory rema:rk? if: you c'd call it
3                tha:t a:nd ah,h (0.6) u-it ca:me from a
4                gi:rl (0.2) and she said she fe:lt thet
5           →    I: would of gott'n more out'v the cla:ss
6           →    if I hed not been en eVOIder, h w'tever
7           →    sh'meant by tha:t, .hhhhh u-but that
8           →    ah::::, (0.5) I will c'ntinue t'remember
9           →    th'class en gro:w from it. Er sump'n (.)
```

The majority of Nancy's report here is indirect: the pronouns are from the point
of view of the current speaker, not the original speaker. However, she suggests
"en eVOIder" is directly reported: there is a change in prosody just before this
component, and "eVOIder" is said with heavy emphasis (especially the second
syllable) making it sound carefully produced. Also, her inclusion of "w'tever
sh'meant by tha:t" helps to suggest she is replaying the words of another. In the
last part of the reported speech – "will c'ntinue t'remember th'class en gro:w from
it" – she again claims some fidelity to the 'original', though "Er sump'n" (i.e. 'or
something') suggests that it is not necessarily verbatim.

Thus, these extracts demonstrate that the boundary between IRS and DRS is not clear cut: instances may consist of elements associated with both forms, or they may be designed in such a way as to not be clearly one or the other. At the other end of the continuum cluster instances that are indistinguishable from glosses or summaries of prior locutions. In the following excerpt the reporting summarises or glosses prior locutions without appearing to claim any great fidelity to the utterances.

(6)[NB:IV:10:40]
(Lottie has been talking to a friend who has similar skin problems to Emma and has recommended an ointment for Emma to try.)

```
1  Lottie:       A:nd ↓ uh: (0.4) *e-uh:: she uses it o:n
2                'er: (0.2) uh hHA:ndstoo↓*:.
3                Yhihkno[:w li(.)]ke uh yih u-yih-
4  Emma:                [°M  hm,°]
5  Lottie: →     Well you have tha:t'n she said fer you
6          →     tuh use this o:n the(.)on: yer::uh
7          →     psoriasis. 'nseeif it mi:ght
8          →     he[:lp ut.]h
9  Emma:            [°Mm : °]°°hm:°°
```

In this quotation Lottie does not give the impression that she is necessarily accurately reproducing what her friend said in advising Emma to use the ointment. This may be a blend of the reported speaker's voice and Lottie's voice. This is perhaps especially the case in the last part of the unit -'see if it might help'- where the hearer cannot be completely sure whether this is Lottie's voice or the reported speaker's. The lack of explicit indicators of DRS means that the speaker does not clearly shift footing to enact the words of another.

The following extract is even further into the grey area and we might hesitate to term it IRS. The part focused on here is Emma's report of her husband's action in 'TOL'ME hh A FEW THI:NGS'.

(7)[NB:IV:7:3]
(Emma is talking to her daughter about the fact that her she and her husband have had a fight and he has left.)

```
1  Barbara:      Wt ha:p-u- W't ↑ha:pp'n anything serious
2                [e:r wha[↓:t.]
3  Emma:         [.hhhh  [ N O]:he jis WA:LKED OUT ON ME
4          →     'EE CA:ME IN EN TOL'ME hh A FEW THI:NGS
5          →     E:N I said w'l I KNO:W what I'm doing
6                en:: oh: I had s'm foo:d that (.) tha:wed
7                ↓out I'm not gunnuh waste the ti:me
8                talkin'to yuh'bout *it. °hhhhh°
```

Several factors distinguish this from more prototypical instances of IRS. For example, there is no indication of what her husband said to her: 'TOL'ME hh A

F<u>E</u>W THI<u>:</u>NGS' is a highly non-specific characterisation of his locutions. Thus, it is a very broad-brush gloss of what appears to be several utterances.

The observation that this is a highly 'broad-brush gloss' of former locutions leads to another dimension on which IRS and DRS differ; one that connects to recurrent elements outlined above, but which has been largely overlooked before. Use of the elements that tend to clearly distinguish DRS from IRS, such as inclusion of turn initials and shifts in prosody, help to portray these utterances in fine-grained detail (see Schegloff 2000). Thus, in (1) above, the inclusion of the turn initial, the greeting, the vocative and the shift in prosody to convey his tone, all provide fine-grained detail of the portrayed utterance. (This is also helped by the granular description of events leading up to the interaction [lines 1–3]).

(1)[Detail]
```
1  Lesley:      AND uh↑we were looking rou-nd the
2               ↓sta:lls 'n poking about 'n he came
3        →      up t'me 'n he said Oh: hhello Lesley, (.)
4        →      ↑still trying to buy something f'nothing,
5               .tch! .hh[hahhhhhhh!
```

Extract (2), however, is less granular in that it does not contain elements such as a turn initial or a shift in prosody (as would be appropriate in DRS) and may be a loose summary of Mark's utterance/s rather than an enactment.

(2) [Detail]
```
1   Lesley:    ih↓Ye::s uhm-:-: u-Mark said eez not surpri:zed
2              that he:hh that he behaved like tha:t?
```

Similarly, in extract (7) above, the reporting is extremely non-granular, to the point where the recipient is given little idea of the nature of the utterances referred to by Emma. Thus an upshot of designing a reporting with elements clearly associated with DRS (turn initials, shifts in prosody, vocatives, greetings, etc) is generally a more granular portrayal then designing reports in ways more regularly associated with IRS (see Sect. 3 for more on this).

Rather than viewing DRS and IRS as categories of different kinds of quotations to be found in speech, analysis of naturally occurring instances suggests a slightly different approach. What has been identified in these two sections is a range of devices by which speakers can claim, with different degrees of force, that they are shifting footing to portray the words of another speaker (or themselves) on another occasion. Thus, in (1) Lesley employs a number of devices associated with DRS (including the shift in intonation, a turn initial, the greeting, the vocative, appropriate verb senses) to clearly show that she is enacting turns made by a different speaker on a previous occasion. In (3), for example, elements such as a shift in intonation and a turn initial are not employed and thus this is less clearly an enactment of another speaker's utterance. In instances where IRS shades into glosses or summaries of prior locutions, speakers design their utterances in such a way as to claim even less fidelity to the original locution(s). Employing devices to clearly claim a dramatic

shift in footing versus a merging of voices is done to achieve differing interactional aims and in different sequential environments. In the following section I explore a recurrent sequential position and interactional environment of IRS, showing why it may be useful to employ a device that summarises speech without purporting to depict it in fine-grained detail.

3   IRS in Introductory Detailing During Storytelling

Analysis of the recurrent sequential positions and interactional environments of IRS in the corpus revealed the patterns that underpin its use. IRS occurs in both narrative and non-narrative environments. Here I focus on its use in a narrative environment. Regularly IRS sets up the context for the reporting of an interaction using DRS. Thus, in a number of instances in the corpus, IRS occurs at or towards the start of a storytelling which usually involves an extended sequence of DRS. Analysis of some of the instances from this collection serve to demonstrate this recurrent pattern of usage, as well as showing how aspects of the design of the device render it particularly useful for this sequential environment.

Commonly in interaction stories focus on utterances or series of utterances that are recounted using DRS. Several authors have noted the relationship between DRS and the climax or peak of a telling (Li 1986) and its ability to be 'theatrical' (Li 1986), vivid (Chafe 1982; Labov 1972) and to create 'involvement' (Tannen 1989). Prior to the focus of the telling, details are given that 'set the scene'; including indicating when the event took place, who was involved, and so on. This is then followed by a shift to a more granular enactment of events through DRS. Bauman (1986), in an analysis of anecdotes, found that IRS regularly occurs towards the beginning, followed by a shift into DRS coinciding with a transition from telling about the circumstances and actions to depicting them. He states:

> "In the terminology of classic rhetoric, this may be seen as a shift along the continuum from diegesis to mimesis, from telling to showing." (P.65)

In a number of extracts in the current corpus IRS forms part of this introductory detailing. It can either occur at some remove from the DRS or immediately prior to it. Thus, in the following excerpt IRS occurs as part of the details leading up to a longer sequence of DRS which occurs after further detailing.

(8)[Holt:X(C)1:1:1:26]
(Lesley's mum is recalling a conversation she had with her grandson when visiting his house.)

```
1  Lesley:       I won't talk about it no:w then.
2                 (0.2)
3  Mum:          Oh(h)o n(h)o l(h)ove ↑eh-eh-eh .hhh ↑°I:
4                 uh° (0.2) I didn't (0.2) (mean that)
5  Mum:      →   he said they'd just come fr'm school
```

```
6                cz 'e goes t'school on Saturday
7    Lesley:     Yes.
8    Mum:        An' h(h)e(.) he wz ↑wet through. an'
9                it wz (.) ↑ever s'ch a cold da:y
10               (1.3)
11   Mum:        An' ih-he s-he(.) he I said ↑your jacket's
12               ↓wet Charlsie he said yes well (0.9) we ha:d
13               hh (0.4) p- it wz uhm (0.3) .p (0.5) eh-
14               e-football this afternoo:n b't ou::r
15               (0.2) team wasn't playing. But we had to
16               go out an (0.3) an' cheer £those that
17               we:re playing£[eh
18   Lesley:                   [Ye:s
19               (0.2)
20   Lesley:     hI'm not[surpri:zed
```

At the beginning of this extract there is a shift in topic: prior to this Mum has been talking about her grandson telling her that they have been doing dissection in school. Lesley describes her negative feelings towards the practice and some lack of affiliation between the speakers emerges. Thus, the shift in topic at lines 5 and 6 connects to the previous in that it concerns Mum's grandson's school activities, but also constitutes a transition away from talk about dissection. Mum begins by reporting that he said he had come home from school. This is IRS rather than DRS as the pronouns are not from the grandson's point of view (i.e. not 'we've just come home from school').

Where the IRS finishes is not clear, but it seems likely that 'cz 'e goes t'school on Saturday' constitutes a change of footing back to Mum's voice as she gives further information to Lesley as the basis for understanding the story. Whether this report includes this final section or not, it is short: most likely it is a single unit – 'he said they'd just come fr'm school'. It is a brief gloss of a locution with no clear indication that she is accurately replaying his words. Mum continues with further details that form the background to the story (lines 8 and 9), before using DRS to report a series of locutions beginning at line 11.

It is interesting to note that Mum does use reported speech to convey her grandson's utterance since simply saying 'they'd just come from school' without including 'he said' would be sufficient (and more economical). Including this, however, focuses on her grandson who is at the centre of the story. It also indicates that the context involves Mum in conversation with her grandson and thus helps to set up the sequence of DRS that follows.

In the next extract we see similar patterns to those underlying the use of the IRS in the previous one: a brief report in IRS occurs at the beginning of a story and forms part of the detailing leading up to more granular and extended reporting of an interaction using DRS.

(9)[NB:IV:10:64]
(Emma is recalling events of the day: while she was entertaining her friends Gladys
and Bill, another friend, Margy rang to ask if she could help her with her accounts.)
```
1    Emma:        .tlk.hhhhOHYA:H ↑I CALLED AFTER I got
2                 (.) throुgh din'r I tol' Margy I: said u-
3                 ahw- uyuh (.) e-uh: (0.2) I helped her
4                 with all this (0.2)gett'n these b'k
5                 (0.2)↓werk things↓ yihknow ah hadtuh ca:ll
6                 ↓back numbers:'n accou:nts ↓for'er .hh
7      →         .hhhhhh.hh A:nd uhm (0.3)tshe: ↑cahlled me
8      →         on the phone dih ask me if I:'d he:lp ↓*'er.
9                 (0.3)
10   Emma:        Yihkno: (.) w'n Bill'n Gladys w'r here'n
11                I sid ↑su:re ah'll be do:wn nuh bu I
12                u[m'n I'm g]IV'N THEM A CO:CKteel now=
13   (Lottie):     [(°Mhm,°)]
14   Emma:        ='n they're goin out (.) tih dinner sh'se
15                ↑ooh no:w don't- don't ru:sh but I sed (.)
16                .hhhhhhhh (0.2) UH: hhhe AH'LL BEDOW:N HELP
17                you so Go:d it hhhelped her a lot b'cz
18                then she's putt'n all dihgether 'n sending
19                out *'er STATE↓m*'nts see:, she's doing
20                th'bookwork fer ↓Larry
```

At the start Emma is talking about attempting to contact Lottie the previous
evening. This leads into recalling the events that led up to her call (involving her
answering Margy's request to help her with her accounts). At line 7 there is a shift
in the telling; from describing her activities in helping her friend she jumps back
in time to the point where Margy phoned her to request assistance. Thus, the IRS
comes at a slight shift of focus and at the beginning of a storytelling about the
interaction that led to her going to help Margy. The shift is managed, in part, through
the extended in-breath, her use of 'A:nd uhm' and the pause. The request in lines 7
and 8 is conveyed using IRS – 'ask me if I:'d he:lp ↓*'er': the pronoun ''er' is from
the current speaker's point of view, rather than that of the reported speaker.

There is no attempt to depict the utterance (e.g. through something like 'she
called me and said, ↑Emma, would you mind helping me with the accounts?'). The
report is a brief gloss of the request and does not claim fidelity to the 'original'
utterance. It is non-granular in that it summarises what may have been a series
of locutions constituting the request. After the report of the request Emma adds
a further detail necessary to understanding the directly reported interaction that
follows: she explains that her friends were with her, and these are then referred
to as 'them' in the direct quote at line 12. Thus the IRS forms part of a sequence of
detailing that 'sets the scene' for the enactment of the interaction using DRS starting
at line 11.

In both the instances considered so far the IRS has been employed to report the turn of another (non-present) former interlocutor, while the first turn of DRS portrays the response by the co-participant who is also the current teller. While this is quite common in the collection the same pattern can occur when recalling an interaction to which the speaker was not party. In the following extract Lesley is telling a story that was told to her about the teller's friend, Duncan, who got drunk one evening whilst out with friends. At this point in the story Lesley recalls Duncan's wife ringing up his friend to find out where he is.

```
(10)[Holt:SO(88):2:7:3]
1    Lesley:        ↑wu-What's his wife's caw- (0.2) n a m e.]
2    Petra:                                            [Lynn.]
3                   (0.2)
4    Lesley:        Sorry?
5    Petra:         Ly:nn.
6    Lesley:   →    .hhhhh Lydd. Well ↑Lynn rang↑ up this
7              →    ↓fellow an' said .hhh was Duncan with
8              →    hih- is about midnight.=
9    Petra:              [( )
10   Lesley:   →    =hh[hh[was Duncan with him because .hhh
11   Petra:            [Oh[: ↓dea:r.
12   Lesley:   →    he hadn't come home yet. An' ↑he said no
13                  I haven't seen 'im all ↑eve↓ningk.=
14   Petra:         =Oh-: (.) God
15   Lesley:                 [.hhhmffff.khh A:n:d she s'd
16                  oh ↑↑what £you know 'n£ went off th'dee:p
17                  end .hhhh Well- (0.2) .knhh h- (0.2) i-he
18                  ↑then turned up- (.) u-very::very:::
19                  l:ate. we:ll.very early in the morning
20                  reall[y,
```

In Lesley's storytelling there is an aside (lines 1–5) where she asks Petra for the name of the wife of Duncan. Following this Lesley continues the story with "well" followed by a report of Lynn ringing up her husband's friend to find out whether he knows his whereabouts. She uses IRS to gloss her question "was Duncan with hih-" breaking off to report another detail – "is about midnight." – before redoing the IRS – "was Duncan with him because .hhh he hadn't come home yet.". It is not possible to be sure where the IRS ends. While the first part appears to be a gloss of what Lynn said, the second part "because .hhh he hadn't come home yet." may possibly not be reporting a prior utterance but giving Petra the necessary information to make sense of the question.

The report of her question is not fine grained and does not suggest fidelity to the 'original' utterance. The response to the question is conveyed using DRS (line 15), and though Lesley cuts off the report to gloss its nature instead, the inclusion of the

turn initial 'oh' and the dramatic rise in intonation give a granular impression of her reaction.

   In the extracts examined so far in this section IRS forms part of the detailing in the run up to direct reporting of an interaction. In these it appears that further detailing occurs after the IRS, prior to the DRS (although in [10] it is not clear whether the detail immediately preceding the direct quote is part of the indirect report or a further detail necessary for understanding the direct report that follows). In other instances, however, the IRS clearly immediately precedes the direct reporting.

(11)[NB:II:4:13]
(Nancy has arranged to visit her friend Helen. However, when she arrives she discovers that Helen has other visitors due: Rob and his aunt [Helen Fretwell] have come from some distance so that they can make arrangements for an impeding trip which Helen and her husband Bruce are taking with Helen Fretwell.)

```
1    Nancy:    ...so thet Helen F:retwe:ll could fill out
2              the ↓fo:rm a:n'give Bruce a check en all
3              fer this ↑trip(.) tshe decided tuh ↑take
4              with them. .t.hhhh.hh SO W'N I got there
5        →     she seh w'l they were coming down en I seh
6              w'l then I:'m going tuh lea:ve becuz:*e-after
7              all I c'n see you inny ↓t*i:me a:n:'
8              they'll have lotta things t'talk abaht'n
9              tshe said ↑no::  I:  don't u-↑want ↓you
10             tuh lea:ve↓u-uh: that's reason I didn'call
11             you et WOR:K.h .h[hhhhhhh]
12   Emma:                     [°Mm hm,°]
13   Nancy:    becuh I thaw'v I gotche over here you
14             wouldn't yihknow leave 'n tshe said
15             plea:se jis st*ay shesid Ro:b's,h .hhh
16             younger en it give him somee tih ↓t*alk
17             to'n: so forth'n so on, .hhhhhhh A:nd uhm
18             (0.5)
```

   At the start of the extract Nancy is conveying background information regarding the trip that Helen and her husband are about to take with Helen Fretwell. In line 4 she begins recalling the events of the evening once she arrived at her friend's house. She uses IRS (line 5) to report Helen telling her that she has other visitors expected, "she seh w'l they were coming down". The deictic 'were' is from Nancy's current point of view rather than Helen's at the time. This shares several characteristics with others considered in this section: (1) it is brief, consisting of a single unit; (2) it lacks granularity: it is a broad-brush gloss of a locution or locutions; (3) it does not depict the 'original' utterance(s). There is one distinction though; it includes the turn initial "w'l". As outlined above, turn initials such as this usually

suggest direct reporting, thus, this comes across as something of a blend between the two forms. Immediately after this Nancy begins reporting her response using DRS (lines 5–8).

In the next extract the IRS again immediately precedes the DRS. Emma is recalling talking to her sister who reported that her friend has a similar problem to Emma (relating to her toe nails) and that she told her sister how painful it is to have them removed.

```
(12) [NB:II:4:6]
1  Emma:          .k.hhh s::So I[:tawd ]ih my sister]=
2  Nancy:                   [°↑Oh::]↓y e : : h.°]
3  Emma:     →    =yest'day'n tshe said- he:rf:riend had
5          →    ih taken undeh- eh had'er ↑nai:l taken
6          →    ↓awv'n tchiz my God I never suffered zo
7                ↑YIHknow it's no fun tih have a thing
8                cut OU↓[:T.]
9  Nancy:            [°n:]: ↑No↓::. Course no:t.°
```

In lines 3–5 Emma reports her sister telling her that her friend had her nail taken off. This is a loose, non-granular report which claims no fidelity to the 'original'. It sets up the context for the report of the continuation of the story which uses DRS beginning at line 6 – 'she says my God I never suffered so'.

In these two extracts a unit of IRS is immediately followed by DRS. In the following extract the report changes from IRS to DRS part way through.

```
(13)[NB:IV:10:45]
1 Lottie:     ↓Ye:ah
2 Emma:    →  .t.hhhh So I just ↓ca:ll'Barbr'en I told
3         →  'er eh said we'd hadda problem Barbr'en
4            I don'know whether yer father's gun
5            be do:wn here en I'm aw:f'lly upset,h
6            .hhhhhh An'in the (0.2) When he CA::LLED
7            me,hh (0.2) u- er I called him the
8            other ni↓*:ght.
9 Lottie:    Ye:ah,
```

In lines 2–3 Emma begins to recall a conversation she had with her daughter about falling out with her husband (Barbara's father). Initially she uses IRS (as indicated by her use of 'we'd' rather than 'we've') in a very non-granular gloss, "hadda problem". But she then includes a vocative 'Barbara', and at this point switches to DRS, "I don'know whether yer father's gun be do:wn. . . ." (her use of "yer father" being a clear indication that she has shifted footing to replay what she said to her daughter). Thus a very broad-brush form is used to set the scene, then Emma quickly focuses in with a much more granular, direct reporting of telling her

daughter that she doesn't know whether he'll be coming for Thanksgiving, and her reaction to this (line 5).

Thus, in the extracts presented so far in this section, certain regularities underpin the use of the IRS: (1) it occurs in storytelling, at or near the beginning of the telling; (2) it occurs as part of detailing through which tellers set the scene for the subsequent sequences of the story; (3) it is brief, consisting of a single unit; (4) it precedes further reporting through DRS, which is generally extended over multiple units; (5) sometimes it immediately precedes the DRS, or sometimes further introductory details follow the IRS. More detailed analysis of the design of the IRS and the unit into which it is embedded reveals why it is useful for employment in this particular sequential position, and how it contributes to the ongoing action.

In each instance the IRS is embed into a larger unit. Preceding the quote, there is a pronoun or name and speech verb (as is also usually the case with DRS); however recurrently in these instances there is also information about how and (often) when the speakers came to talk.

```
(9)[Detail]
7  →    .hh hhhh.hhA:nd uhm (0.3) tshe: ↑cahlled me
8  →    on the phone dih ask me if I:'d he:lp ↓*'er.

(10)[Detail]
6  Lesley: →   .hhhhh Lydd. Well ↑Lynn rang↑ up this
7               ↓fellow an' said .hhh was Duncan with
8               hih- is about midnight.=
9  Petra:                 [( )
10 Lesley:    =hh[hh[was Duncan with him because .hhh
11 Petra:        [Oh[: ↓dea:r.
12 Lesley:    he hadn't come home yet.

(11)[Detail]
4       with them. .t.hhhh.hh SO W'N I got there
5  →    she seh w'l they were coming down

(12)[Detail]
1  Emma:   →   .k.hhh s::So I[:taw d]ih my sister]=
2  Nancy:                  [°↑Oh::]↓y e : : h.°]
3  Emma:   →   =yest'day'n tshe said- he:r f:riend had
5               ih taken undeh- eh had'er ↑nai:l taken
6               ↓awv

(13)[Detail]
2  Emma:   →   .t.hhhh So I just ↓ca:ll'Barbr'en I told
3               'er eh said we'd hadda problem Barbr'
```

In each of these the indirect quote is preceded by information about who did the speaking (usually involving a pronoun as the identity of the speaker is available through prior detailing), who they talked to (again, regularly a pronoun such as 'me' or 'I'), often how the reported speakers came to interact (for example, the fact that it was over the phone is made explicit in [9], [10] and [13]) and, regularly, when the speakers came to talk. As (12) occurs at the beginning of a story, this information about who was involved and when the conversation took place is fairly elaborate – 'talked to my sister yesterday', other instances rely on other information given during preceding telling (for example, there is no mention of *when* in 'so I just called Barbara' in [13]), or omit mention of when the interaction took place since this is made clear in preceding details (for example, 'And she called me on the phone to ask me if I'd help her' in [9]). In the following extract the design is slightly different in that information about when the conversation took place is conveyed in the quotation:

```
(8)[Detail]
5  Mum:    →   he said they'd just come fr'm school cz 'e
6              goes t'school on Saturday
```

Thus, the report makes clear that they were talking after he arrived home from school, and the continuation (which may or may not be part of the reported speech) states the day on which the conversation occurred. As in the other instances it also makes clear who did the talking, though the fact that it was to the current speaker is available in prior details.

So, in these instances speakers orient to matters concerning *who* and *when* in introducing the reported interaction. There are also regularities concerning *what*, i.e. the design and action of the report itself. In presenting the extracts above I have mentioned that speakers do not fully shift footing to depict the reported utterances (hence the use of IRS rather than DRS) and that they do not operate at a high level of granularity. Here I consider this in more detail. In each case the indirect report contributes towards introducing the direct reports that follow by giving a brief indication of the nature of the dialogue. In extracts (9) and (10) the IRS conveys a question that is portrayed as beginning the interaction (the response being reported in DRS), in (11), (12) and (13) it conveys information which is then discussed and elaborated in subsequent reported turns. Extract (8) is again slightly different in that the reported turn is less obviously the start of the sequence (for example, a question or a request), but subsequent reports display its relevance in that she reports herself commenting on his wet state, and him reporting that it was a result of an activity at school. So, in orienting to when they conversed, she also introduces information crucial to understanding the DRS that follows. Thus, in each case, the IRS briefly conveys information about the beginning of the interaction that sets the scene for understanding subsequent turns conveyed through DRS.

In these instances then tellers do not begin the report of the interactions using DRS from the outset. Thus it is pertinent to consider why IRS is used to begin the tellings. Relevant to this are the observations that the IRS operates at a less granular level and that it does not purport to necessarily depict the utterances. To illustrate this further it is useful to compare instances of IRS with the DRS that follow it.

(9)[Detail]

```
7                 .hhhhhh.hh A:nd uhm (0.3)tshe: ↑cahlled me
8                 on the phone dih ask me if I:'d he:lp ↓*'er.
9                 (0.3)
10  Emma:         Yihknow:(.) w'n Bill'n Gladys w'r here'n
11                I sid ↑su:re ah'll be do:wn nuh bu I
12                u[m'n I'm g]IV'N THEM A CO:CKteel now=
13  (Lottie):      [(°M hm,°)]
14  Emma:         ='n they're goin out (.) tih dinner sh'se
15                ↑ooh no:w don't-don't ru:sh but I sed (.)
16                .hhhhhhhh (0.2) UH: hhhe AH'LL BE DOW:N HELP
```

Margy's request for help is portrayed with little granularity: 'ask me if I'd help' glosses the request at a general level. By not depicting it in fine detail the hearer is not given access to the request itself. The 'original' request would presumably have been longer, so this is likely to be a brief summary of the utterance(s). Compare this with the report of her response (line 11, 12 14) and subsequent turns (lines 14–16). First, there is a lot of detail, for example, Emma reports saying that she is giving her friends a cocktail before they go to dinner. Second, there are various indications of the speakers' stances. In reporting Margy saying 'oh now don't rush' we have the change of state token 'oh' (Heritage 1984) conveying that this is news to Margy. Further, the report suggests her consideration for her friend in telling her not to rush. Thus in depicting subsequent turns in fine granularity and in subtly conveying the stances of the speakers, the DRS enacts the interaction, purporting to give the recipient a level of access that is not provided by the indirect report.

The subtle complexity and the fine-grained granularity of the DRS, giving greater access to the stance of the reported speaker, is also exemplified well be extract (10).

(10)[Detail]

```
10  Lesley: →    =hh[hh[was Duncan with him because .hhh
11  Petra:          [Oh[: ↓dea:r.
12  Lesley: →    he hadn't come home yet. An' ↑he said no
13                I haven't seen 'im all ↑eve↓ningk.=
14  Petra:       =Oh-: (.) God
15  Lesley:                  [.hhhmffff.khh A:n:d she s'd
16                oh ↑↑what £you know 'n£ went off th'dee:p
17                end
```

Lynn's question to Duncan's friend is glossed with little granularity. The man's response is depicted through DRS. Lesley then begins to use DRS to convey Lynn's response but breaks off to gloss its nature using a figurative expression 'went off the deep end'. However, her use of 'oh what' is enough to conjure up the nature of her reaction meaning that it is unnecessary to add more. This, along with the other details, sufficiently conveys Lynn's angry reaction.

In the extracts in this section, then, there is a transition between the IRS and the subsequent turns reported through DRS. While the IRS is brief, operates at a less fine-grained level of granularity and glosses rather than depicts the utterance, the DRS is usually more extended, is highly granular, depicts the turns giving the recipient greater access to them, and is subtly complex, providing greater insight into the stance of the reported speakers and the nature of the interaction. One result of this transition is that the IRS and the unit into which it is embedded can briefly provide details (*what, who, when*) necessary for understanding the DRS, adding to introductory detailing. Further, by not using DRS at this stage, the teller manages a transition from preliminary sequences within the telling to the focus of the story. In switching to a more granular, multi-dimensional method of reporting, the speaker constitutes the turns depicted using DRS as the focus of the story. Other actions can also be managed at the same time, as extract (13) demonstrates.

```
(13)[Detail]
1  Lottie:        ↓Ye:ah
2  Emma:    →     .t.hhhh So I just ↓ca:ll'Barbr'en I told
3           →     'er eh said we'd hadda problem Barbr'en
4                 I don'know whether yer father's gun
5                 be do:wn here en I'm aw:f'lly upset,h
```

The falling-out between Emma and her husband is depicted in an extremely broad-brush manner: "hadda problem" glosses the event in such a brief and general way that it gives very little insight into the nature of the problem. But the nature of the falling out is not the focus here; rather it is ongoing issues arising from this. The focus is the fact that her husband may not return to Emma for a Thanksgiving celebration to which Barbara is coming. Thus, the transition from IRS to DRS helps create a focus on this matter deftly sidestepping discussion of the nature of the fall-out (both in the current conversation with Lottie and perhaps in the reported one with Barbara too).

The role of switching from IRS to DRS in creating the focus of the story may give insight into the following extract. Here IRS is used to convey the initial turn in a dialogue subsequently portrayed using DRS. However, the name of the town needs to be conveyed as it was said at the time (i.e. directly reported), and the speaker goes to some lengths to get it right.

```
(14)[Holt:SO88(II)1:4:8]
1    Hal:        A:nd uh then at Ca:nterbury you paid on
2                your way out.
3    Skip:       I:: see:,
4                (0.3)
5    Hal:        An' then when you .hh[we When we- When
6    Skip:                            [khm-khm
7    Hal:        I came back see Skip cuz we decided to go
8                in by trai:n we thought it- (.) be better
9                tha[n ↓dri:v]ing
10   Skip:         [ihYe:s,]I think parkin's: a problem
11                there[n o w,].hh[h
12   Hal:             [Yea:h.]   [And when I came back to
13                Canterbury station 'n had to get a ticket
14        →     Isaid .hh I've ↓I: said I(h) wanted two
15        →     to Gill↓im:.=
16   Skip:       =.p.h[°aa-°
17   Hal:     →       [Gellin:g Gill↓im[:.
18   Skip:                             [ihYeh,?=
19   Hal:        =So 'ee said where ↑the
20                devil [do y(hh)ou]↑come[vro(h)m↑]=
21   Skip:             [g n i k k]ehhh [h h e h ]=
22   Skip:        =↑hhe[h  [eh[uh
23   Hal:              [sai[d [oh Somerset.'ee said I
24                ↑THOU:GH[T ↓so(h)o,
25   Skip:               [ehh heh.hhh↑e:h ↑hih u h h ]
26   Hal:                                 [He  said w'l]we
27                call it Jillim o[ver (here).]
28   Skip:                        [.h u h h h ]
```

The turn including the IRS at lines 14, 15 and 17 conveys information concerning
who, when and *what* as in other the instances: it indicates where the interaction took
place, who Hal was speaking to and what request began the interaction. These are
necessary for understanding subsequent turns conveyed through DRS. The focus
of the story Hal's mispronunciation of the name of the town and the ticket seller's
prediction about Hal's place of origin (where there is a town with the alternative
pronunciation). Thus, using IRS for his initial request helps maintain the focus on
the ticket seller's reaction to his mispronunciation. But in order for the story to work,
Hal needs to depict that pronunciation in the indirectly reported turn, and make it
clear that this is being directly reported. This may explain his repetition of the name.
Interestingly the third pronunciation is the same as the first, so the repetition seems
to suggest more that he is taking care to get it right rather than actually repairing the
first version he provides.

The result is something of a blend. By producing it in this way Hal employs the advantages of using an initial indirectly reported quote – briefly glossing the origin of the interaction along with where and when it took place and who he was talking to, while also maintaining a focus on subsequent turns- at the same time as conveying that the pronunciation of the town's name is directly reported. The reason that he did not use DRS from the outset to portray the interaction may be that the IRS enables him to briefly present the *who, where,* and *what* of the interaction while maintaining focus on the ticket seller's response and the subsequent turns.

4   Summary and Conclusion

Analysis of IRS in naturally occurring interactions has revealed the variety within this category. It also showed that the boundaries between IRS and DRS, and IRS and loose glosses or summaries of prior speech are so fuzzy as to be indistinguishable. Thus it may be productive to view these devices as positioned on a continuum that stretches from DRS on one side to glosses and summaries on the other. However, along with this I suggest an alternative approach that might cohere more with the stance towards these devices suggested by their use in interaction. Various features of the forms have been used by analysts to help define and distinguish the categories (including deictic reference, tenses, pronouns, vocatives, and discourse particles), but to participants these are resources to be used in order to shift footing more or less dramatically. Thus in order to purport to re-enact a locution from another occasion participants can employ devices such as turn initials, vocatives, shifts in intonation, as well as providing a high level of granularity (just as Lesley does in extract [1]). This is particularly useful in certain sequential positions such as at the climax of a story. However on other occasions such as at the beginning of recounting a conversation, a less dramatic shift in footing may be useful to broadly brush details, convey the context and help create a shift from background information to the peak of the telling. For analysts of reported speech in interaction, then, rather than seeking to identify different forms, an approach that coheres with participants' concerns may be useful. In other words, analysts can consider the design and sequential position of reported speech to identify the devices employed to more or less dramatically shift footing for particular purposes.

As well as highlighting the lack of a clear boundary between IRS and DRS, the analysis has also pointed to the fuzziness of the distinction between IRS and glosses or summaries of utterances. This is tricky in that it makes it difficult to know what to count in any collection of reported speech. However again the answer is the same. Analysts should cast the net wide and then focus on the devices participants employ to indicate, more or less explicitly, that they are shifting footing rather than just summarising speech. This facilitates examination of the resources speakers exploit and the benefits to be gained from shifting footing to greater or lesser degrees.

An important dimension that has emerged in analysing IRS and considering the difference between it and other forms concerns degrees of granularity. Employing

aspects of design associated with prototypical direct reportings helps to create a highly granular portrayal of the utterance. Rather than conveying just what was said, the speaker provides additional information through the inclusion of elements such as turn initials and intonation shifts that give insight into the stance and action of the reported speaker. Thus, including 'well' at the beginning of the quote suggests something about what it was doing in response to the previous turn in the 'original' interaction. A shift in intonation can suggest the speaker's stance (for example, that they were angry or argumentative). IRS, in contrast, with its focus on just conveying what was said is less granular and less multi-dimensional. Blended forms may emerge when speakers employ elements that, by their very use, suggest a direct form (such as turn initial 'well') to indicate something more about the reported action otherwise produced using indirect elements.

Investigation of one recurrent position of IRS – in stories, prior to DRS – reveals why conveying speech in this form can be suited to the environment. The IRS occurs as detailing or 'scene setting', often along with other details, prior to the DRS. Recurrently, the IRS, along with the rest of the unit in which it is embedded, conveys information crucial to understanding the DRS that follows: it indicates who the participants were, how they came to interact and gives a broad gloss of the nature or beginning of the sequence that led to the contributions (or contribution) then reported using DRS. These indirect reports are brief, tending to be one unit long. They are less granular than the DRS that follows, often giving a broad-brush characterisation of the nature of the action that led to the subsequent turns. The distinction between the IRS and the DRS helps maintain the focus on the subsequently directly reported utterances. Between the IRS and the DRS there is a transition from more background detailing to more foregrounded replaying of talk. This transition can occur within a single reporting or across over several turns. Thus, the transition, in DRS, to a more granular, more multidimensional and usually more extensive reporting helps constitute the climax or peak of the telling.

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The Academic Practice of Citation

Jock Wong

1 The Importance of Citation

Citation is said to be an 'integral part' of scientific or academic writing (Cronin 2005a, p. 1505). In most literature on academic writing, one usually finds a section devoted to the topic of citation or reference (and I shall like Cronin (2005b) use the two words 'citation' and 'reference' interchangeably). There are also manuals and websites detailing citation styles, teaching academic students how to cite correctly. All this indicates that the importance of citation is widely recognized. This chapter focuses on the meaning of citation in an academic context.

Citation may of course be seen as a kind of reporting, both direct and indirect, represented by direct quotation and indirection quotation respectively. However, it is argued here that citation could be considered a special class of reporting. Ordinary reporting may be potentially problematic. To use Capone's (2010 p. 378) words, 'We can reconstruct what is going on in [the reported speaker's] mind only if, and because, we can understand what kind of situation she is in'. The conditional clause implies that there is a condition. It implies that there are instances in which the addressee does not fully understand the situation and thus cannot reconstruct what is going on in the reported speaker's mind. However, in academic writing, such instances are minimized if we can assume that all academic writers (writing in English at least) consciously follow Grice's conversational category of manner, in which language users are expected to be 'perspicuous' (Grice 1975, p. 46). This means that academic writers are expected to 'avoid obscurity of expression' and 'ambiguity'. By extension, it would also mean that academic writers are expected to clarify the context of that which is quoted.

J. Wong (✉)
Centre for English Language Communication, National University of Singapore, Singapore,
Singapore
e-mail: jockonn@gmail.com

However, despite this expectation, understanding what citation is mainly about may not be easy. This is mainly because any given citation may appear to be pragmatically ambiguous. The literature on citation suggests that citations are in fact associated with a number of functions, like the avoidance of plagiarism for example. In a chapter unremarkably but effectively entitled 'Avoiding plagiarism', the authors of a publication on academic writing correctly associate 'the importance of crediting sources' with 'avoiding plagiarism' (Zemach et al. 2011, p. 39). The authors spend a chapter cautioning students against plagiarism, which reflects the importance of this particular function of citation. In particular, they write,

> It is not easy, even for professional writers and professors, to always know what should be cited. If you are not sure, check with your own instructor. It is better to ask 20 questions about 20 sentences than to make one mistake! (Zemach et al. 2011, p. 41)

Another function of citation is, of course, to provide evidence to support one's claim. This function seems to be in line with Grice's 'supermaxim' of quality, which requires a person to make their contribution 'one that is true'. This supermaxim comes with two more specific maxims:

- Do not to say what you believe to be false;
- Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence (Grice 1975, p. 46).

Grice's category of quality is particularly relevant to the academic context. It is important for academic writers to strictly observe Grice's maxim of quality and citations to a large extent allow them to do just that.

Obviously, avoiding plagiarism and observing Grice's supermaxim of quality are just two of a number of functions that citation performs. As the author of another publication on academic writing David Lindsay points out, citations or references have 'many' uses.

> References have many uses. They can be used as the ultimate authority on which to base their arguments. They can be temporary authorities whose validity you intend to challenge, or you may consider them to be obviously wrong. It is possible to suggest to the reader which of these uses you wish to make of a reference by the way you word the text. (Lindsay 2011, p. 48)

In a similar fashion, Swales and Feak (2012, p. 340) present five theories about the 'role and purpose of citations in academic texts'. According to these theories, citations are used for:

- acknowledging the intellectual property rights of earlier authors;
- showing respect for previous scholars;
- giving your arguments greater authority;
- helping (promoting) your friends and colleagues;
- showing that you are a member of a particular discipline community.

In a previous (second) edition of the same publication, Swales and Feak present another theory, by Swales (1990), which states that citations are used to 'create a research space for the citing author' as they 'point the way to what has not been done [by 'describing what has been done'] and so prepare a space for new research' (Swales and Feak 2004, p. 252). Nevertheless, Swales and Feak (2012) clarify that

'a more recent consensus among those senior scholars who have studied citations for many years' suggests that 'the primary motive for citing remains *perceived relevance*' (p. 340). However, they do not explain what relevance exactly refers to in this context, other than that it relates to content. Otherwise, another source says that citations are 'widely held to be measures of intellectual impact, indicators or perceived utility or surrogate measures of academic quality' (Cronin 2005b, p. 146).

There are of course additional reasons for citing. According to Cronin (2005a, p. 1506), 'there is a battery of social and psychological reasons for citing, which may have as much to do with, for instance, rhetorical gamesmanship (persuading the reader of one's own viewpoint through selective under- or over-citation) or strategic coat-tailing (citing friends, immediate colleagues or celebrity authors) as with the topical appropriateness or semantic suitability of the citations themselves'. This suggests that there could be personal reasons for citation.

To add to the diversity, one could consider self-citations, which is 'extremely common' according to White (2001, p. 89). White (2001, p. 88) notes that an author 'will always be the top-ranked figure in his or her image set ['the set of all authors with whom one has been cocited'], and usually in the identity set ['the set of authors that an author cites'] as well'. In fact, White (2001, p. 88) sees few exceptions to the latter rule and, on occasions, 'ties for top place in the identity set'. As an example, he points out that 'the linguist Robin Lakoff was tied with Noam Chomsky in her own citations' (White 2001, p. 88). White's observation thus points to what appears to be an 'egocentric' (2001, p. 102) reason for citing.

As can be seen, there are various pragmatic and personal reasons for citing. As mentioned, citation is pragmatically ambiguous. In the opinion of this author, there is little use in remembering all the given functions if one wants to truly understand citation. Instead, it would help if we could identify an underlying reason that all citers are expected to share, or in other words a universal reason. This universal reason, which would related to the (invariant) meaning of citation, would not be a personal reason but presumably something that is inherently related to the nature of the context in which citation is most commonly found, which is the scientific or academic context. In the first instance, it could be said that citation practices universally reflect scientific thinking and values, such as respect for fact, evidence, and other people's opinions. This view is arguably related to what Cronin (2005a, p. 1506) calls the 'normative position, with its emphasis on objectivity, rationalism and collectively (albeit tacitly) understood rules'. In other words, citation has inherently and thus universally much to do with scientific pursuits and values. Tellingly, as Cronin (2005a, p. 1508) correctly adds, 'In securing our knowledge, we rely upon others, and we cannot dispense with that reliance'.

At this point, it should be pointed out that the values associated with the mentioned normative stand (i.e. respect for fact, objectivity, rationalism) are arguably also values that the English language uphold (Wierzbicka 2006, 2010); they are values that the English language (e.g. words) reflects. It could thus be said that English embodies scientific thinking. Of course, we also know that English is the dominant language in academia worldwide, although in this context the language is sometimes called 'academic English'. Because of its importance, academic English

is a linguistic variety that many non-native speakers of English attempt to learn in order to pursue university degrees, which will presumably lead to a better future for them and their families.

All this naturally means that it is important for academic writers, in particular university students, to understand what citation is about. Of course, the assumption made here is that citations are meaningful, the knowledge of which constitutes part of our understanding of academic English. Yet, while there is much literature on the functions of citations and citation styles, scholarly circles are virtually silent on the semantics of citation. In the first place, the idea that citation is meaningful is rarely, if ever, explored. We may know how to 'word the text' (Lindsay 2011, p. 48) of a citation, but do we all accept that each kind of 'wording' means something? As Lindsay (2011, pp. 48–49) points out, the following statements, which obviously adopt the APA citation style, say different things:

> All aerobic bacteria are sensitive to umptomycin (Bloggs 2007).
> Bloggs (2007) found (or showed) that all aerobic bacteria are sensitive to umptomycin.

However, although the author does say what each of these specific examples imply, i.e. 'an accepted concept', 'a less well-known concept' respectively (Lindsay 2011, pp. 48, 49), he does not explain the context-independent, invariant meaning of each 'type' of wording. It is important for an academic English learner to understand the invariant meaning of each type of citation, as distinct from any contextual meaning (e.g. that expressed by a reporting verb, such as 'showed'). Furthermore, when an academic English student learns how to cite, it is also important that they understand the importance of and the values underlying citation. For this purpose, it would help if the learners could understand what the different types of wording associated with citations mean.

For the purposes of this paper, semantic explications to express the meaning of the following four types of APA citation 'wording' are proposed. The four types of 'wording' are represented by the following examples.

1. Wierzbicka (1996, pp. 211–212) says, 'Meaning is what language is all about.'
2. Wierzbicka (1996) says that language is all about meaning.
3. Studies suggest that language is all about meaning (Goddard 2011; Wierzbicka 1996).
4. Language is all about meaning (Wierzbicka 1996).

The APA style is selected for study because it is commonly used in university education, at least in the university that I work in (i.e. The National University of Singapore). It is also a style favored by or used in many journals (e.g. the Journal of Intercultural Communication Research). In the first example above, a direct quote is used (i.e. direct reporting), with the name of the author stated in the text (i.e. not in brackets), a practice commonly found in the Humanities but not in the pure sciences. This type of citation involving a direct quote is also used when an author wants to refer to a dictionary definition. In the second example, what an author says is paraphrased with the name of the author given in the text (i.e. indirect reporting). Similar to type 1, examples of type 2 are rarely found in papers written for the

pure sciences; science articles tend not to present the names of cited authors in the main text. It could be mentioned that the type 1 and type 2 citations are analogous to direct and indirect reports in ordinary speech, as represented by the following examples (Capone 2012, pp. 594–595).

> She said: I am happy (direct report);
> She said she was happy (indirect report).

There is nonetheless an important difference between direct reporting in ordinary speech and in academic writing. In ordinary speech, people tend not to use direct reporting, if only because they are limited by memory of what the exact words were. Even if someone tries to engage in direct reporting in ordinary speech, there is no expectation that exact words and only exact words are used. However, in academic writing, such an expectation is there.

In the third example (indirect reporting), the idea is paraphrased but the authors' names are not given in the text, but in brackets, which could imply that the authors' names are not particularly important. The analog in ordinary speech might look something like 'some people say . . . ' In the last example (indirect reporting), an idea, which is accompanied by a citation in brackets, is presented as a statement attributable to nobody in the text and it seems obvious that the cited author's name is not of sufficient importance to be presented in the text. In fact, the idea is presented like a statement of truth or fact that the citing author takes to be unquestionable and should not be disputed. The main difference between example three and four is that in the former, indirect reference is made to some source. There can of course be other types of wording but this author thinks that these are at least the more basic ones that university students should be familiar with first and foremost.

2   Meaning and Metalanguage

It is noticed that in many discussions on citations, the authors adopt what Wierzbicka (1986, p. 523) might call a 'functionalist' approach (although Wierzbicka was discussing particles, not citations), marked by attempts to characterize the function of citation. The examples presented above support this observation. Understanding the function of citation is no doubt useful for learners of academic writing in English. However, arguably, to understand and appreciate the function of citation, one should ideally first focus on its invariant meaning.

Meaning, strictly speaking, refers to that which is semantically invariant and thus context-independent. By contrast, function is usually context-dependent. To use an example, one could consider the utterance 'I have a gun'. The meaning is obvious; as long as one knows what a gun is, anyone with a basic command of English would understand what the utterance means. However, this utterance or meaning could be associated with various functions. It could be a threat (presumably the most common

interpretation) but it could perhaps also be a mere piece of information or something for the speaker to boast about. Thus, a single invariant meaning could be associated with three context-dependent functions. Arguably, in this example, the meaning is obvious and so the distinction between meaning and function is not difficult to discern. However, when the meaning of a word or expression is not obvious or is difficult to state, it seems that scholars then tend to associate its meaning with functions. Words or expressions whose meaning is either not obvious or is difficult to state include particles, interjections and reduplication (Wierzbicka 1991). When dealing with such linguistic items, scholars tend to describe their functions. For example, a number of scholars who study reduplication focus on functions instead of meaning by using words like 'augmentation', 'diminution', 'continuity' and 'intensification' to describe the process. (Wong 2003, p. 50). Citation would presumably fall under this category; it is not obvious that citation is meaningful and its meaning is presumably not easy to state.

Although citation is often considered a way to avoid plagiarism, something not uncommonly emphasized by academic English teachers, avoidance of plagiarism is a function, not meaning. This is because citation is not always used for the purpose of avoiding plagiarism; this use is not invariant. There are instances in which the purpose of citing a source is not the avoidance of plagiarism. For example, an author might want to comment on a piece of work, as when they are writing an academic book review or the literature review section of a paper. The author then cites the source to tell their readers which piece of work is being reviewed. The objective is not to avoid plagiarism; it is not the case that the citing author is afraid that readers might mistake someone else's work for theirs.

It cannot be overemphasized that meaning and function are conceptually distinct. The same meaning can be associated with different functions (e.g. 'I have a gun' can, depending on the context, be a piece of information or a threat) and the same function can be generated by different meanings (e.g. 'I'm thirsty' and 'could you please get me a glass of water' can serve similar functions). To avoid confusion, it is important to give students something concrete or invariant, which is meaning, to hold on to. Focusing on meaning also has the advantage of giving learners a better idea of which type of wording to use in a particular context. It might thus be said that to understand function, one has to first understand meaning.

To state meaning, a number of scholars, such as Goddard (2011) and Wierzbicka (2006, 2013), advocate the use of a metalanguage that comprises words that are indefinable and universal in combinations that are, again, universal. Studies (Goddard and Wierzbicka 1994; Peeters 2006; Yoon 2005) have suggested that some words are both indefinable and universal, in that their meanings cannot be paraphrased in simpler terms and that each of these words has a semantic counterpart in every other natural language. Additionally, these words can combine universally to form sentences that can be generated by the grammar of each and every natural language (Goddard and Wierzbicka 2002a, b). The words are called semantic primes and are expected to be semantic universals. Semantic

primes and their universal combinations constitute a kind of 'mini' language which practitioners call 'natural semantic metalanguage' (NSM). Using NSM, meaning can be unpacked with minimal ethnocentrism. It should be noted here that NSM is the outcome of over 40 years of research (Wierzbicka 1972) and has been used in numerous studies for the purposes of stating meaning and cultural norms associated with a number of languages with maximal clarity and minimal ethnocentrism.

In this paper, I will refer to a number of examples in my discussion and many of the examples (but not all) come from Wierzbicka's publications. A Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities, the Australian Academy of Social Sciences, and of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences, Wierzbicka has published extensively over decades in areas that span a number of disciplines, including anthropology, psychology, cognitive science, philosophy, religious studies and linguistics.[1] She has cited numerous sources in her works and her citations may be studied for our purposes.

3   The Semantics of Citations

In this section, the four types of citation wording are discussed and their meanings explicated. In the discussion, a number of things may be looked at, including some of the functions of citation, how the source is referred to, the form of the name used and the part in parentheses (e.g. the year of publication).

3.1   Type 1 & 2: Author's Name in the Text (Wierzbicka says, '...' and Wierzbicka says that...)

Before we discuss the meaning of citation, it is worth nothing that in academic papers, usually the last name is used and not the first name. For example, one would say 'According to Wierzbicka...' or, on rare occasions, even 'according to Anna Wierzbicka', but very rarely, if ever, 'according to Anna'. Studies have suggested that the form of a name used is meaningful (Wierzbicka 1992; Wong 2014) and the use of the last name or surname reflects distance and detachment, which is valued in academic discourse; the first name sounds personal. Presumably, the meaning of the last name form has a component that looks something like this:

> when I say something about this someone, I don't want people to think
>   that I feel something towards this someone when I say it

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[1]https://researchers.anu.edu.au/researchers/wierzbicka-a

The idea is that whatever is said, the author positions themselves as someone who is objective, who is not influenced by how they feel about the author of the source cited, whether the feeling is good or bad. The use of the last name is thus consistent with academic values. Of course, as a consultant suggests, the use of the last name helps the reader to identify the person, given that first names are more common. This is perhaps a valid argument in many cultural contexts (except for Chinese, where one finds many common surnames). Thus, there can be different reasons underlying the use of the last name in citation, and it is believed that detachment is an important one.

It is noted that, as Brian Poole (2014, personal conversation) points out, the 'someone' in the explication could in fact be the author himself. This happens when the author self-cites. An example comes from Wierzbicka (2013, p. 10):

> Concluding my chapter in the recent volume *Language and Bilingual Cognition* (Wierzbicka 2010: 215), I wrote:

It is noted that when an author self-cites, the surname is included in the citation. In the above example, Wierzbicka does not write something like 'I (2010: 215) wrote . . . ' Again, it could be argued that this practice is an attempt on the part of the self-citing author to sound maximally detached.

Obviously, the meaning of the last name form ought to be included in the meaning of citation but, for the purposes of this paper, it will not be. The last name ('Wierzbicka') will be used in the proposed explication but the interested reader could refer to Wierzbicka (1992) for the meaning of the various address forms.

Types 1 and 2 have something in common; the author's name (or the source, such as the name of a dictionary) is given in the text. The main difference between the two is that one uses the author's exact words and the other uses a paraphrase or a summary.[2] As mentioned, a citation could give one's argument 'greater authority' (Swales and Feak 2012, p. 340). One way of doing this might be to invoke an authority to support one's argument or idea. This authority could be a big name that everyone in the area knows or is expected to know about and they are usually the founder of a theory or school of thought (e.g. Grice in pragmatics, Chomsky in syntax).

Wierzbicka, who with colleagues like Cliff Goddard, developed the natural semantic metalanguage (NSM) theory, often refers to well-known scholars in the area to support her ideas. She has, for example, referred to 'big' names in scholarly circles like Aristotle, Arnauld, Descartes, Locke and Leibniz, in some instances with lengthy quotations, to support her ideas (Wierzbicka 1986, 1996). Below is a more specific example.

> A definition which attempts to explain the simple word *if* via the complex word *implication* flies in the face of the basic principle of sound semantic analysis put forward more than two millennia ago by Aristotle (1937: 141[a]):

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[2]http://www.writeawriting.com/academic-writing/citation-definition-types-writing-guidelines/

> First of all, see if he [the analyst] has failed to make the definition through terms that are prior and more intelligible. For the reason why the definition is rendered is to make known the term stated, and we make things known by taking not any random terms, but such as are prior and more intelligible . . . (Wierzbicka 1996, p. 10)

It might be added that when big names are referred to, the idea is not always to seek support for one's ideas. Their works could be singled out for criticism. Wierzbicka has on occasions referred to big names like Chomsky, Bloomfield (Wierzbicka 1996) and Labov (Wierzbicka 1984) with quotes from them with the purpose of criticizing some of their ideas. To give a more specific example, Wierzbicka quotes the following lines from Bloomfield:

> To put it briefly, in human speech, different sounds have different meanings. To study this co-ordination of certain sounds with certain meanings, is to study language. Leonard Bloomfield (1933/1935: 27). (Wierzbicka 1996, p. 9)

Following this quote and just below it, Wierzbicka writes with the obvious intention of criticizing Bloomfield's position on how linguistics is to be studied:

> How is it possible to admit that to study language is to study the correlations between sound and meaning and, at the same time, to try to keep linguistics maximally "meaning free"? Bloomfield's own reason for this contradictory position is quite clear: he wanted linguistics to be a serious and rigorous discipline – a "science"; and it was not clear at the time how, if at all, meaning could be studied in a rigorous and "scientific" manner. (1996, p. 9)

The discussion so far establishes the idea that citation is not always about agreeing with someone's idea. In other words, reference to someone's idea that is in line with the author's own may thus not be an invariant property of citation. Whether the source is saying something that the author wants to say, or something that the author is speaking against, a citation has to do with an attempt to establish an idea and perhaps to give the author's argument 'greater authority', as mentioned, by allowing the reader to know why the author says what they say or want to say. Thus, it could be said that one invariant semantic component of a citation might be something like 'it can say why I say it (i.e. what I want to say)'.

It should be added that when I say that a citation has to do with an attempt to establish an idea, I do not imply that what the author refers to or cites is always an 'idea' (e.g. a view, a theory), like the examples associated with Wierzbicka with reference to Aristotle and Bloomfield presented above are. A linguist could cite a piece of literary work (e.g. a novel, a play, or a poem) or an academic paper because they want to use examples from it for linguistic analysis or for the purpose of exemplifying something, such as language use. In a paper on Singapore English, for example, Wierzbicka cites a poem written by Stella Kon published in an edited volume (Pakir 1992) to showcase expressions that 'refer to important realities of Singapore life' (Wierzbicka 2003, p. 329) and, later, part of a play written by a Singaporean playwright (Chu 1991) to illustrate the 'frequent use of particles and interjections in Singapore English' (Wierzbicka 2003, p. 338). In the same article, Wierzbicka also refers to examples of use presented in another paper (Platt 1987) for a 'clue' to the meaning of a Singapore English particle (2003, p. 341). Even though

examples of use are not ideas as such, they can lead to an idea that the author wants to present. The use of examples thus allows the reader to say, 'it/they can say why I say it.'

As is obvious, it is not always big names that are cited. An academic writer could refer to any author for their purposes. Wierzbicka, for example, has referred to a number of writers who cannot be considered well-known figures in the area, at least, not people who have the kind of status that scholars like Aristotle and Locke achieved in their respective areas. For example, in the paper on Singapore English, Wierzbicka refers to a number of Singaporean authors in her discussion and many of these authors cannot be said to be well-known internationally (like Chomsky is), such as Kwan-Terry (1992) and Ho (1992).

Whether the author referred to is well-known in the area concerned or little known, what seems striking is the observation that an author could refer to names like their readers are expected to know who they are. This seems to be a convention; authors can refer to people, well-known or little known, like they are 'known' and thus need no introduction. However, it seems clear that this convention is a deviation from an important academic writing rule that encourages users of English to present old or known information at the beginning of a sentence and new information towards the end or, in Halliday's terms, a 'theme-rheme' structure (Halliday and Matthiessen 2014). In fact, the rule is often referred to by this author in his writing classes when he teaches students how to organize their ideas: 'Do not present new information at the beginning of a sentence'. Thus, when a person's name is mentioned for the first time in a text, especially when the name is not expected to be known to most of the readers, it should ideally be presented at or towards the end of a sentence as a kind of introduction. An example from Wierzbicka's writing shows how this may be done. In the example, Wierzbicka introduces Furbee, a cultural anthropologist,[3] by presenting her name at the end of the sentence in accordance with the rule mentioned above.

> In the 2010 volume on *Language Documentation: Practice and Values* one scholar who particularly emphasizes the need for genuine cross-linguistic understanding between linguists and native speakers as co-documentors is Louanna Furbee. One way to build language document collaboratively is, Furbee suggests, to create . . . (Wierzbicka 2013, p. 144)

However, it seems obvious that this rule, if used all the time, can render the text unnecessarily verbose, which of course goes against the rule of conciseness, another important rule in academic writing which is not unrelated to Grice's maxim of quantity. Presumably because of this, the old information-new information structure is not always used when it comes to citation. For example, in Wierzbicka's paper on Singapore English, where it is first mentioned by the author in section 4 of the paper, the name 'Kwan-Terry' appears at the beginning of the sentence, a place usually reserved for known information: 'For example, Anna Kwan-Terry (1992: 62) writes . . . ' (Wierzbicka 2003, p. 338). Even though 'Kwan-Terry' is not new

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[3]http://anthropology.missouri.edu/?q=node/233

or known information, or a well-known name, it is presented like it is. This way of presenting an author as if the reader will know who they are is not uncommonly found in Wierzbicka's writing and that of many other authors. Of course, the author is not assuming that every reader knows who the cited author is; the author aims for conciseness and leaves the interested reader to find out who the cited author is for himself.

It seems that a discussion of the meaning of citation, at least citation using the APA style, is not complete without including the part in parentheses. In the APA style, the parenthesis is used to present the year and, sometimes, the page number. When the author's name is not presented in the main sentence, it appears in the parentheses. According to a website,[4] parentheses are used to mark off a parenthetical word or phrase 'as an explanation or afterthought into a passage which is grammatically complete without it.' Other online dictionaries say something similar, that they are used to mark an explanatory or qualifying remark. All this suggests that that which is presented in parentheses is additional information, perhaps even incidental. It is not presented as something that the reader needs to know to understand the meaning presented in the main text. In other words, the integrity of the text is not affected without the part in parentheses.

Nevertheless, whether something is presented in parentheses or not could make a difference to the overall meaning of the main text. The example below may serve to illustrate this point.

> When Yasunari Kawabata became the first Japanese to receive the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1968, he gave a speech called "Japan, the Beautiful, and Myself" that presented a benignly aesthetic portrait of the so-called Japanese spirit larded with references to classical poetry, the tea ceremony and ikebana. When Kenzaburo Oe received the prize in 1994 . . . (Kato 2014)

This text is obviously fine and we know that the 'prize' that Kenzaburo Oe received in 1994 was the 'Nobel Prize for Literature'. However, if the words 'for Literature' were presented in parentheses, then presumably the 'prize' that Oe received in 1994 could be interpreted as a Nobel Prize, without necessarily being in literature. The words 'for Literature' would be considered additional information. Similarly, in the case of a citation, the part in parentheses presents something (e.g. the year, sometimes the author's name) as additional information and should be considered part of the meaning of a citation.

On the basis of the discussion so far, the following things may be said about citation types 1 and 2 ('Wierzbicka (2013) says that . . . ').

1. The author uses the cited part to support what they want to say;
2. The name of the author of the source cited is part of the meaning;
3. The names of the authors of the sources cited are sometimes presented like the reader knows who they are.

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[4]http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/parenthesis

These are the components that the meaning of citation type 1 and 2 is expected have in common. The meaning of type 2 is presented first.

Wierzbicka (2013) says that . . . =
    I want to say something about something
    when I say it, I want you to know why I say it
    because of this, I want you to know that
        Wierzbicka says something somewhere
    this something can say why I say it

(the part in brackets)
at the same time, when I say Wierzbicka says something somewhere,
    you can want to know where ('2013') if you want to

This semantic explication comprises two parts. The first part spells out the core meaning of a citation, which is to use something (someone else's idea or an example, etc.) to support an idea that the citer wants to put forth. This is proposed to be the primary meaning of a citation. The cited author's name is also part of the meaning and is presented like the reader knows who the cited author is. The second part accounts for the part in parentheses, which gives information about the source (e.g. the year, which is associated with a source in the reference section) and sometimes the location (the page). However, as the information is not presented in the main text (but in parentheses), the assumption seems to be that it is secondary; the reader can know it if they want to but they do not have to.

As mentioned, type 1 citation is similar to type 2 except that it uses direct quotes. Interestingly, direct quotes are rather common in the humanities but not in the pure sciences. Perhaps it is because, in the pure sciences, emphasis is usually given to hard data and much of scientific argument revolves around empirical and measurable data, around facts and proofs. On the other hand, in the humanities, there is more emphasis on perspectives that cannot be proven by data. For example, in discussing cultural perspectives, a humanities scholar could use argument and data to support their claim, not to prove anything. In using argument, the author may cite another scholar for support and they may prefer to use the original words instead of a paraphrase to avoid obscurity and misrepresentation.

It is proposed that the meaning of type 1 is similar to the meaning of type 2 and the difference lies in additional components that describe the use of original words.

Wierzbicka (2013) says, 'xyz' =

    I want to say something about something
    when I say it, I want you to know why I say it
    because of this, I want you to know that
        Wierzbicka says something somewhere
    I want you to know that she says it with these words 'xyz'
    I want you to know this because I don't want you to think:

> 'Maybe she doesn't say it like this
>   Maybe she wants to say something else'
> these words 'xyz' can say why I say it
>
> (the part in brackets)
> at the same time, when I say Wierzbicka says something somewhere,
> you can know where ('2013') if you want to

The additional components describe the use of original words and try to explain why they are used. It is claimed that the author does not want people to think that they might have in any way misrepresented the source or obscured something. Presumably, for humanities scholars, the use of original words is felt to be authentic and hence more impactful.

It is to be noted that the explication does not attempt to describe certain functions that citation is often associated with, such as the avoidance of plagiarism. The inherent 'function' of citation (if it may be so called) as described by the proposed meaning is to help explain why the author says something. The part cited could be something that the citing author agrees or disagrees with and it could be examples of use that they want to use for analysis. Whatever it is, it could be used to say 'if you know this, you can now know why I say it'.

3.2 Type 3 (Studies suggest that . . .)

Type 3 citation does not include the author's name in the main sentence but relegates it to the part within parentheses, where the year of publication is presented. However, reference is made to some unspecified sources. It could be of the form 'Studies (citation) have shown that . . . ' This type of citation does not seem to have received much scholarly attention and its specific functions are not well studied. However, one obvious function is to refer the reader to another study or studies in a particular area. Here is one example (Wong 2013, p. 368):

> Forty years of research (since Wierzbicka 1972) on a number of culturally diverse languages lend support to the idea that some meanings are language-independent, in the sense that they are lexicalized in all languages as words, phrases or bound morphemes, collectively called semantic primes (Gladkova, 2007b; Goddard (ed.), 2006, 2008; Goddard & Wierzbicka (eds.) 1994; 2002; Peeters (ed.), 2006; Yoon 2005).

In this example, it seems clear that what each cited author says specifically is not important. If fact, it may even seem that who the cited authors are is not important. The important thing is that there are sources which the citing author could count on to support what they want to say. Further examples come from Wakefield (2013, pp. 376–378):

> The goal of this approach is to help people clearly and fully understand the (sometimes opposing) beliefs and values embedded in cultures that may be vastly different from their own (for a detailed description of the cultural scripts method, see Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2004; see also Wong, in press, and references cited there).
> (. . .)

The literature has contrasted Chinese child-rearing values and practices with those of the West, saying that Chinese parents demonstrate comparatively more parental control (e.g. Chiu, 1987; Lai, Zhang, & Wang 2000; Lin & Fu 1990), put more emphasis on achievement (Ho & Kang, 1984; Lai et al., 2000), and express less affection, use more physical punishment, and use love withdrawal and shaming (e.g. Fung, 1999; Lai et al., 2000; Lin & Fu, 1990).

Below is yet another example by Ganapathy-Coleman (2013, p. 394):

From a distinguished line of interdisciplinary scholarship, we know that language serves to socialise the individual into a particular socio-cultural worldview, for widely shared ways of thinking in a society are preserved in its ways of speaking (Gumperz & Levinson, 1996; Humboldt, 1836/1988; Kramsch, 1998; Lucy, 1996; Sapir, 1949; Sweetser, 1987; Vygotsky, 1934, 1978; Wertsch, 1985, 1991; Whorf, 1984; Wierzbicka, 2002, 2005; Wilson & Sperber, 2004).

Interestingly, some authors may do something similar by presenting the cited authors' names in the main sentence, like the following example (Goddard and Wierzbicka 1997, p. 237)

For good descriptions of yet other cultural discourse styles, see Schiffrin (1984) and Tannen (1981) on contemporary American Jewish culture, Wakan (1990) on the Balinese, Scollon and Scollon (1981) on the Athabaskan, Harkins (1994) on Australian Aborigines, Matisoff (1979) on traditional East European Jewish culture, and Kochman (1981) on Black Americans.

Although the last two examples serve the function of telling readers about available literature, the difference is that one (Goddard and Wierzbicka 1997) places importance on the individual authors by presenting their names in the main text, rendering the citation type 2, while the other (Ganapathy-Coleman 2013) places more emphasis on their availability, without presenting names in the main text (i.e. type 3).

The meaning of type 3 citation could thus be formulated in this way.

Studies say that . . . (Wierzbicka 2013) =
    I want to say something about something
    when I say it, I want you to know why I say it
    because of this, I want you to know that
        some people say something somewhere
    this something can say why I say it

    (the part in brackets)
    at the same time, when I say some people say something somewhere,
    you can know who ('Wierzbicka') if you want to
    you can know where ('2013') if you want to

In this explication, the author's name is not stated in the first part, which reflects the idea that it is not presented in the main text, but in parentheses. Otherwise, the meaning of type 3 is rather similar to that of type 2.

3.3   *Type 4*

Type 4 is interesting in that there is no mention of any source in the main text. It is as if the author is making an asserting or stating a fact and then referring the reader to a source or sources for support. This type of citation seems to reflect a high strength of claim that is just below the level that is associated with a well-known fact and which does not require any citation. The focus is on the content, not on the sources, indicated by the lack of overt reference to a citation in the main text. In fact, it might even seem that the citation is incidental.

Here are some examples from Goddard and Wierzbicka (1997, p. 236), Wong (2013, p. 368), Wakefield (2013, p. 378), Ganapathy-Coleman (2013, p. 394) and Wierzbicka (2013, p. 24) respectively.

> The metalanguage of lexical universals can be used not only for semantic analysis, but also to formulate cultural rules for speaking, known as 'cultural scripts' (Wierzbicka 1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c).
>
> If semantic primes are indeed semantic universals, they can be used by a researcher to describe an "other" culture (Goddard & Wierzbicka, 2007).
>
> Most authors' work on child rearing is based on the assumption that the ultimate aim of the child-rearing process is "to enculturate the child to become an effective and valued member of society" (Chan, 2011), and this assumption is also made here.
>
> Many middle-class immigrant Indians are able to do so ["take advantage of social and economic opportunities"] because they can speak fluent English, and are highly educated professionals who are well acculturated structurally and economically (Khandelwal, 2002; Kibria, 2002).
>
> As I have discussed in detail in my chapter on "Pain" in *Words and Meanings* (Goddard and Wierzbicka, In press) . . .

In these examples, it seems clear that the authors are saying things with a rather high degree of certainty. It is almost like they are presenting a statement of truth or fact, and in some cases they could well be. The citation seems to be there for pre-emptive purposes, in case a reader is not familiar with what is presented. Any more well-known and the citation could become superfluous. The meaning of this type of citation may thus be formulated in this way.

> It is like this (Wierzbicka 2013) =
> I say something about something now
> I know it is like this
>
> (the part in brackets)
> at the same time, I know that some people do not know it
> if you do not know it,
>   you can want to know why I say it
> you can know why because some people say something somewhere
> this something says why I say it
> you can know who ('Wierzbicka') if you want to
> you can know where ('2013') if you want to

The first part of this explication tries to represent the bare statement, which, unlike previous examples, is not qualified by words or phrases such as 'according to ...', 'author X says that ...' or something similar. It can sound like a fact, even if it does not have the status of one. The second part tries to explain the part in parentheses and it is different from previous explications because of the nature of this type of citation.

4   Discussion

Hitherto, I have presented the meaning of four different types of APA citation. More specifically, each explication reflects the meaning of one of the following types of citation:

1. Wierzbicka says, '...' (year: page)
2. Wierzbicka says that ... (year)
3. Studies say that ... (author X_1, year Y_1; author X_2, year Y_2 ...)
4. It is like this (author, year)

These four types of APA citation seem to be quite commonly found in humanities papers. There could be other kinds of wording but it is believed that the explications presented here can account for most instances of APA citation at least in the field of linguistics, if not in the humanities in general. A question that remains might be what citation is generally about, regardless of the wording.

As discussed, it seems that citation is commonly associated with the prevention of plagiarism. For example, I once casually asked a friend (who has a PhD in microbiology) what he thought was the main function of citation and his answer was 'Don't plagiarize' (although he later added 'I think so' as an afterthought). However, it seems certain that the avoidance of plagiarism is not what citation is invariably about. After all, one could cite oneself and scholars do talk about 'self-plagiarism', so there is no genuine threat of plagiarism (in the conventional sense of the word) here. Also, one could cite a publication that one wants to review or critique, in which case plagiarism is again not a problem; if a reviewer did not cite the publication under review, the problem would be that the reader would not know where to access the publication. Presumably, no one would accuse the hypothetical reviewer of plagiarism. Moreover, if an author has no intention to plagiarize, even if they forget to cite a source, the way the text is composed would make it clear that the plagiarism is unintended. Although unintended plagiarism may be considered plagiarism, the author would not be accused of dishonesty.

As my analysis suggests, citation has two invariant semantic parts. Firstly, all citations seem to offer some kind of support or justification for what an author wants to say. This seems to be the prototypical 'function' of citation. The citing author wants to say something and the cited source can say why the author says it. The author is saying, in reference to that which is cited, 'this something can say why I say it.' In a sense, the cited source might be considered a kind of evidence. Thus, it

might even be argued that this meaning is not unrelated to one of Grice's maxims: 'Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence' (Grice 1975, p. 46). Even if the citation is not always about providing adequate evidence, the idea is that some kind of support or justification for saying something is appreciated. The citation prototypically serves this purpose.

In fact, one internet source even links citation to the notion of relevance, which is of course what Grice's (1975) third supermaxim is about. According to this internet source, 'a citation is an abbreviated alphanumeric expression (e.g. [Newell84]) embedded in the body of an intellectual work that denotes an entry in the bibliographic references section of the work for the purpose of acknowledging the relevance of the works of others to the topic of discussion at the spot where the citation appears.'[5] Even though I do not think that relevance can fully explain citation, it is clearly compatible with my proposed meaning. If a source 'can say why I say something', it is evidently something relevant to what is said.

As my analysis also suggests, another invariant semantic aspect of citation seems to have something to do with the location. A citation allows readers to know where the part being cited comes from and access it if they are interested to find out more. This also means that readers get to know the year of publication and thus how recent or dated the material is. In this sense, it could be said that citation is also about the sharing of resources and the building up of knowledge. By allowing readers to know what or where the sources are, the author is essentially sharing the sources with their readers. Surely, many academic writers have benefited from the reference sections of academic publications like I have. In fact, I have on occasion suggested to my university students to refer to the reference section of academic publications for the purposes of writing a literature review.

Interestingly, understanding the meaning of each type of citation may also give us a clue as to when to use each type. It is proposed here that the first part of the meaning of each type of citation could give us a clue. Below, the first part of the meaning of each of the four types of citation is presented for contrast.

> (Type 1: Wierzbicka says, ' . . . ')
> I want to say something about something
> when I say it, I want you to know why I say it
> because of this, I want you to know that
>   Wierzbicka says something somewhere
> I want you to know that she says it with these words 'xyz'
> I want you to know this because I don't want you to think:
>   'Maybe she doesn't say it like this
>   Maybe she wants to say something else'

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[5]http://www.writeawriting.com/academic-writing/citation-definition-types-writing-guidelines/

these words 'xyz' can say why I say it

(Type 2: Wierzbicka says that . . .)
I want to say something about something
when I say it, I want you to know why I say it
because of this, I want you to know that
    Wierzbicka says something somewhere
this something can say why I say it

(Type 3: Researchers say that . . .)
I want to say something about something
when I say it, I want you to know why I say it
because of this, I want you to know that
    some people say something somewhere
this something can say why I say it

(Type 4: It is like this)
I say something about something now
I know it is like this

It seems that the four types reflect a kind of specific-to-general direction. In type 1, both the author's name and the exact words are used. In type 2, the author's name is stated but, instead of the exact words used, a paraphrase or summary is presented. In type 3, specific authors' names are not stated in the main text but there is indirect reference to them. In type 4, a 'bare' statement is presented, without any 'wording' that points to a source. The source is instead presented in parentheses.

Type 1 thus reflects a rather high degree of caution on the part of the citing author. The citing author states the cited author's name and cites original words instead of using a paraphrase. It is as if the citing author does not want to risk misrepresenting the cited author and wants to distance himself from the claim by not trying to re-interpret what is being said in the form of a paraphrase. It is hypothesised here that in using type 1 citation, the author says something that may be considered new, or is expected to be new to many readers. The author uses type 1 to justify or validate that which is said to persuade readers to accept what they are saying. In a sense, it could be said that type 1 reflects a rather weak strength of claim. The status of the idea which the citing author wants to present does not seem to be anywhere near that of an established fact. In fact, it is probably something that many or most people do not know about or do not accept.

Type 2 also reflects a relatively high degree of caution because the cited author's name is stated in the main text. However, the degree of caution is probably not as high as that of type 1 because a paraphrase or summary of the cited author's idea is used. The citing author seems to exhibit a higher level of confidence in what they want to say; a paraphrase is used for justification or validation instead of the original words. The status of what the citing author wants to say is still nowhere near that of an established fact but it seems obvious that what is presented enjoys a higher strength of claim.

By contrast, type 3 seems to reflect a higher level of confidence. The citing author tells readers about the availability of sources that can support their ideas but the sources are not presented in the main text (but in parentheses). The relatively high strength of claim thus seems evident.

Type 4 does not even make any overt attempt to refer to any source in the main text. The sources are presented in parentheses, as if they are incidental. In fact, if not for the part in parentheses, the citing author could give the impression that what they are referring to has the status of a fact or something that is widely accepted. It is in this sense that the strength of claim associated with this type of citation seems higher. In fact, any higher, what the author is referring to will have the status of a fact or something that is expected to be known to all, or at least the readership. Examples of well-known concepts that may not need citation include Grice's maxims, Brown and Levinson's politeness theory, and Kachru's model of inner, outer and expanding circles of English. When writing for linguists at least, reference to such concepts is not always accompanied by a reference to the original source, even if the authority's name is sometimes mentioned (e.g. 'Grice's Co-operative Principle'). Thus, of the four citation types under discussion, it seems that type 4 enjoys the highest strength of claim.

Understanding the invariant meaning of citation is important for university students, some of whom may be learning about citation for the first time in a formal setting; in Singapore, for example, high school or pre-university students do not learn how to cite formally. If students understand citation not in terms of its invariant meaning but its functions, they may end up citing only when a function is applicable. For example, a student might only cite if and only if plagiarism is a risk factor. On the other hand, if students fully understand the meaning of citation, not only will they know when to use each type of citation, they will also know how to use it (i.e. the wording) to reflect the strength of claim they want to express.

5   Conclusion

It is proposed in this paper that citation is primarily about (i) the use of evidence and data to support one's ideas, and (ii) the sharing of resources and building up of knowledge. It is further hypothesised that how a citation is worded can reflect its strength of claim. Learners of academic English, who need to learn how to use the citation style applicable to their discipline, should ideally also learn what the invariant meaning of citation is about and how to use it to express the strength of claim of what they want to say.

In the discussion of the meaning of citation, this paper also showcases a methodology, NSM, which can allow us to state meaning with maximal clarity and precision. The NSM methodology has been used extensively by some scholars (e.g. Anna Wierzbicka, Cliff Goddard) to explicate lexical, grammatical and pragmatic

meanings. As this paper shows, it can in fact be used to describe anything that has meaning, even if the 'expression' cannot fall neatly into any one of those linguistic categories.

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The Reporting of Slurs

Keith Allan

1 Defining Terms

If someone tells me that they have a stone in their shoe, that is a direct report. Reporting using direct speech as in *Galileo ha detto del mondo 'Eppur si muove'* is best described as a direct quote; however *Galileo said of the earth 'And yet it moves'* is not a direct quotation, but a report in English of what Galileo said in Italian; and, with respect to its meaning, I cannot class it as a 'direct' report in contrast to the 'indirect' *Galileo said of the earth that, nonetheless, it moves* though others will disagree. Quotation marks are a feature of punctuation in written language; in spoken language there is no difference between *Alice said that life is difficult to understand* and *Alice said that life is 'difficult to understand'*: both are reports of what Alice said, and neither is more indirect than the other (cf. Recanati 2001; Saka 2011).

For this essay, a report is X's re-presentation to Y of what Z said. It is often the case that Z is identical with X at some earlier time. Occasionally Y and X are the same person, but that is of little interest in this essay. X's report is never exactly identical with Z's utterance; even if the same words are captured, the context is different, the voice will be different, the speaker's intention may be different, the medium may be different. Often X will choose to render the report more coherent by rearranging what was said, and/or more vivid by embellishing the original to attract and/or maintain audience attention. When X's report ρ is compared with Z's utterance υ, the accuracy of ρ depends on whether or not Z's message in υ can be

K. Allan (✉)
School of Languages, Cultures and Linguistics, Department of Linguistics, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

The University of Queensland, St. Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia
e-mail: Keith.Allan@monash.edu

reconstructed from it. In other words, the content of ρ is dependent on the content of υ. An accurate report ρ re-presents the illocutionary point of the source utterance υ. A speaker has an illocutionary intention to create a perlocutionary effect by means of a reflexive intention to have the hearer (= addressees and ratified participants (Goffman 1981: 131)) recognize this intention via an understanding of the locution and illocutionary point of the utterance.[1] A speaker's reflexive intention towards the hearer is the intention to have the hearer recognize that when uttering υ in context κ, the speaker intends υ to have a certain effect on the hearer partly caused by the hearer recognizing that the speaker has the intention to communicate with him or her by means of υ.

Because there is necessarily a degree of indirectness in all reporting of utterances, **it is only significant to label a report 'indirect' if the reporter X pragmatically enriches source Z's illocutionary point as sanctioned by the locution, its entailments, implicitures, and implicatures** (for exemplification see Allan 2016). There is a constraint that material introduced in an indirect report as a pragmatic enrichment must be strictly relevant to the matter being spoken of by the reporter. An accurate and felicitous report ρ of utterance υ must capture the illocutionary point in υ such that Z's message in υ can be correctly reconstructed from X's report ρ.

I turn next to slurs. A slur is an expression of disparagement that discredits, slights, smears, stains, besmirches or sullies what it is applied to (cf. the *Oxford English Dictionary*). A slur is not, as it is often taken to be, the lexical form (or forms) in a language expression ε, but instead the perlocutionary effect of ε as a constituent of υ (such that ε ⊆ υ); the said perlocutionary effect can only be determined from κ, the context of utterance – i.e., ε's co-text and the situations of its utterance and of its reception (cf. Austin 1962; Bach and Harnish 1979; Allan 1994a). Justification for this view is argued at length from empirical evidence in Allan (2015b) which cites a similar conclusion from Asim (2007), Kennedy (2003), McWhorter (2010), inter alios; and it will be confirmed here.[2]

The judgment of Anderson and Lepore (2013: 43) that 'slurs are prohibited words; and, as such, their uses are offensive to whomever these prohibitions matter' does not explain where such prohibitions might come from. Allan (2015a) discusses an idealized benchmark for (im)politeness in Anglo communities dubbed 'the middle class politeness criterion'. Although the defined on the 'middle class' as a default (much as the freezing point of water is defined as 0° C) the criterion applies to all ranks of society; for discussion of this conundrum see Allan (2015a). (Im)politeness is never a depersonalized, decontextualized absolute but always a perception or judgment of appropriate behaviour on a given occasion; it is what

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[1]The way in which this is accomplished is described in Allan (1986, 1994a, b, 2006), Bach and Harnish (1979).

[2]Many people insist that lexical forms such as *nigger* invariably slur: it will be shown that this, like many other potentially offensive terms, can be used with no offense or disparagement intended or taken. This fact is incompatible with such a naïve view of the lexical form.

one expects oneself and others to do in a particular social interaction. This ties (im)politeness to frames and scripts and to the notion of habitus (Bourdieu 1991; Eelen 2001; Mills 2003; Terkourafi 2001; Watts 2003). In its adherence to a set of social norms, the Anglo concept of (im)politeness is broadly similar to Japanese *wakimae* defined by Ide (1992: 299) as 'sets of social norms of appropriate behavior people have to observe in order to be polite in the society [in which] they live. One is polite only if he or she behaves in congruence with the expected norms in a certain situation, in a certain culture and society.' (Im)politeness as a means of managing (aspects of) social interaction is apparent in all communities and Allan claims that the middle class politeness criterion is a frame or cultural script, i.e., a benchmark for behaviour, for which there is a counterpart in all communities. The constituents will differ in particulars for different communities but they will always identify social constraints on the use of language that are designed to maintain harmonious social relations within the community.

In order to be polite to a casual acquaintance one tends to use euphemism (*loo, bathroom*) or orthophemism (*toilet, lavatory*) rather than the dispreferred dysphemism (*shithouse*, etc.). Orthophemisms (straight talking) and euphemisms (sweet talking) are words or phrases used as an alternative to a dispreferred (undesirable, inappropriate) expression because they avoid possible loss of face by the speaker and also the hearer or some third party. An orthophemism is typically more formal and more direct (or literal) than the corresponding more colloquial and figurative euphemism. Slurs are by definition dysphemistic, thus reporting a perceived slur such as *nigger* will often use a euphemism such as, in this case, *the N-word*. Here, the typical corresponding othophemism is *African-American*. This kind of reporting is sometimes described as 'being politically correct' i.e., being unwilling to risk giving offense, especially to a group vulnerable because its members are perceived to have been mocked, disparaged, or insulted for long periods of time (see Allan and Burridge 2006, chapter 4). It might, less emotively, be described by Richard Watts' term *politic behaviour*: 'Politic behaviour is that behaviour, linguistic and non-linguistic, which the participants construct as being appropriate to the on-going social interaction' (Watts 2003: 20).

It is because the slur is taken to lie in the form of expression ε that the reporting of slurs is so often understood to be of itself a slur. What I shall tease out in this essay is that racist terms like *nigger* or *yid* and insults such as *whore, slut, bitch,* and *cunt* have an affective meaning that arises from their frequent dysphemistic use in slurs, insults, and obscenities (see Sect. 2); consequently they evoke strong emotions that lead to the belief that these expressions in themselves constitute slurs and insults; this is the 'politically correct' view but also the view of certain people who have been personally traumatized by the use of such terms (e.g., Hall 2014). Any reader who thinks that the occurrence of *nigger, yid, whore, slut, bitch* and *cunt* in this essay justifies the belief that I am slurring or insulting anyone is badly mistaken; I am not.

2   Inquiry into the Semantics and Pragmatics of ε

This inquiry is restricted to only relevant meanings of the six potential slurs *nigger, yid, whore*, *slut, bitch,* and *cunt*. When these potential slur words are in fact used as slurs, the shared trait is a widely accepted (if, for other members of society, unacceptable) dysphemistic attitude towards whomever or whatever is slurred. This is predictable because it merely fulfils the definition of a slur. Each of these six terms is presented as capturing some supposed dominant characteristic of the referent; in the following sections I spell out these supposed characteristics.

One recurrent characteristic of each of the six potential slur words is that, with the possible exception of *whore*, at least when used as slurs, all are colloquial. Colloquial language uses informal and intimate styles (cf. Joos 1961); it includes, but is not identical with, slang (see Allan and Burridge 2006).

2.1   Nigger

Etymologically *nigger* derives from Latin *niger* "black, dark, unlucky" which extended in late Latin to "black person". Until the late eighteenth century *nig(g)er* was synonymous with *Negro* (see exx in the *OED*); thereafter and until the second half of the twentieth century the term *nigger* was essentially a colloquial synonym for *Negro*. From earliest times until after mid-twentieth century the belief was prevalent – even by enlightened people such as Charles Darwin (see Darwin 1871: 121) – that non-Europeans were inferior, which encouraged disparagement of them. Dysphemism favours colloquial terms: *faeces* is not an expletive, instead we say *shit*; we tell someone to *piss off* not to **urinate off*. Consequently, *nigger* is preferred to *Negro* as a slur. *Nigger* denotes anyone of black African descent, and is sometimes extended to other peoples of dark complexion, too.[3]

In this essay I limit discussion to the use of *nigger* in the United States of America. As a racial slur, *nigger* is applied to African-Americans.[4] Since January 2009, America has had a black President nonetheless black males are twice as likely to be imprisoned as Latinos and almost six times more likely than whites. White attitudes to African-Americans can be judged from the fact that both President Obama and his wife Michelle have, as black adults, been assumed by whites to be lackeys, see Westfall (2014). African-Americans are more likely than other racial groups to suffer police harassment (see, e.g., *Report of The Sentencing Project to the United Nations Human Rights Committee Regarding Racial Disparities in the United States Criminal Justice System*, August 2013 and http://sentencingproject.

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[3]The relation of *nigger, nigra, nigga* to *Negro* might be compared with the similar colloquial–formal correspondences *bubby–baby, bust–burst, crick–creek, critter–creature, cuss–curse, gal–girl, hoss–horse, sassy–saucy, tit–teat*.

[4]*Nigger* has been used by whites in referring to other peoples of dark complexion such as Australian Aborigines and (Asian) Indians.

org). A couple of recent examples: on August 9, 2014 a white Ferguson MO police officer shot six times and killed an unarmed 18-year-old African-American male; riots ensued because of the apparent excessive force used. On November 22, 2014 in Cleveland OH a white police officer shot and killed a 12-year-old African-American boy playing with a toy pellet gun; the person who warned the police said twice that he thought the gun was fake, although this was not passed on to the officer who attended (see http://edition.cnn.com/2014/12/04/justice/cleveland-police-officer-timothy-loehmann). What such examples demonstrate is that some part of the white community has such fear of African-Americans that they are led to significantly violent overreaction that demonstrates no respect at all for the life of the African-American. This is not new, as is demonstrated by the history of racism, lynchings and less extreme mistreatments catalogued in, e.g., Kennedy (2003), Asim (2007), and many other places. Among the negative stereotypes of African-Americans identified by Reddick (1944), Asim (2007), and Croom (2013) are that they are mentally, socially, educationally inferior; childlike, subservient, open to bad treatment, lazy, irresponsible; delinquent, menacing, inclined to crime and violence; noisy, uninhibited, sexually depraved and licentious. If a subset of these negative stereotypical characteristics is attributed to the referent of *nigger* then the word is used as a slur. In consequence, the word itself 'evokes and provokes the underlying, almost entitled bigotry that still pervades the racial attitudes of far too many Americans, both actively and passively' (Hall 2014). But, as I have said, *nigger* itself is innocent; the negative connotations arise from the way it is used in slurs and insults. As demonstrated at length in Allan (2015b) and as stated earlier by Kennedy (2003), Asim (2007), Coates (2013, 2014), McWhorter (2002, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014), inter alios, it is the context in which *nigger* is used that marks it as a slur – or not. If it is the speaker/writer's perlocutionary intention and effect to use *nigger* in order to disparage the referent in uttering υ, then it is a slur. In Sect. 3.1 I will briefly discuss unintentional offense.

   Within many minorities and oppressed groups a term of abuse used by outsiders is often reclaimed to wear as a badge of honour to mark identification with and camaraderie within the in-group (what Australians call 'mateship', see Rendle-Short 2009). To this end many African-Americans have adopted the term *nigger*, often respelled *nigga* (which remains homophonous), to use to or about their fellows (Allan and Burridge 1991, 2006; Asim 2007; Croom 2013; Folb 1980; Kennedy 2000, 2003; McWhorter 2002, 2010; Rahman 2012, inter alios). The speaker identifies as a person who has attracted or might attract the slur *nigger*: in other words s/he trades on the hurtful, contemptuous connotation and subverts it (cf. Hornsby 2001: 134).[5] Examples can be found all over, e.g., in many films by Spike Lee and Quentin Tarantino. Three examples from 'Pulp Fiction' (1994) are:

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[5]Alessandro Capone has suggested to me (p.c) that there are two words *nigger₁* a slur and *nigger₂* not a slur (and presumably the same for all other words that are potential slurs). This is a classic example of polysemy and so although one cannot say *Ordell is a nigger₁ and so is Beaumont* [*a nigger₂*] because it violates the Q-principle of both Horn (1984), Levinson (2000) it is perfectly possible for one African-American to say to another *That honkey called me a nigger₁, nigger₂*.

(1) JULES: I wouldn't go so far as to call the brother fat. He's got a weight problem. What's the nigger gonna do, he's Samoan. (Tarantino 1999: 18)

(2) ENGLISH DAVE [*a young black man from Baldwin Park*]: Vincent Vega, our man in Amsterdam. Jules Winnfield, our man in Inglewood. Git your asses on in here. (*Vincent and Jules, wearing shorts and T-shirts, step inside.*) Goddam, nigger, what's up with them clothes?
     JULES: You don't even want to know. (Tarantino 1999: 35–36)

(3) VINCENT: Alright, it was a miracle. Can we go now? (*Opens the door and leaves.*)
     JULES (*to the dazed Marvin*): Let's go nigger. [1:49:55] Come on. Shit. (*They hussle out the door.*)

In (1) Jules, who is black, is addressing a white guy while speaking of a shared acquaintance, Antwan, whom he had earlier described as 'Half-black, half-Samoan'. Here Jules counts him as one of an in-group of black 'brothers'. Secondly, Jules thinks well enough of Antwan to be kindly euphemistic about his size. So when he says 'What's the nigger gonna do, he's Samoan' he is using *nigger* as a colloquial descriptive that is in no way a slur. In (2) Jules himself is addressed as 'nigger' by a fellow African-American (the epithet 'English' is unexplained); incidentally, Inglewood is a dominantly black neighbourhood. In (3), which is not in the published script, Jules addressing Marvin as 'nigger' is in the spirit of camaraderie, though this may be bolstered by the fact that Marvin is lower in the pecking order than Jules and also at that moment stupefied by the murder of three people he had befriended to spy on.

    Quotes (1)–(3) illustrate what has many times been demonstrated: that *nigger* is not necessarily used as a slur. The same will be seen to be true of the other five potential slurring terms. Lest it be thought that 'Pulp Fiction' has no such slurs, there are racist slurs against Asian and Jewish shopkeepers at Tarantino (1999: 10) and *nigger* is also used in that vein in (4), which is not in the published script. White hillbilly Maynard's shop was invaded by two men fighting: Butch (white) has pinned Marsellus (black) to the floor of the pawnshop and is pointing Marsellus' own. 45 handgun in his face.

(4) MAYNARD [*pointing his shotgun*]: Toss the weapon. (*After a brief delay Butch throws the gun to his left.*) Take your foot off the nigger [1:33:2]. Put your hands behind your head. Approach the counter, right now. (*Maynard slugs Butch with the butt of his shotgun.*)

This occurs after Butch, who is white, has deliberately run Marsellus over and the latter has been shooting at him. Butch has sought shelter in the pawnshop and was followed in by Marsellus. A vicious fight ensued in which Butch floors Marsellus. Needless to say, Maynard is enraged by this violent invasion of his premises, so we cannot expect him to be courteous to either of them. He refers to the groggy Marsellus as 'nigger' and he slugs Butch with his shotgun. Under these circumstances the racial slur is not out of place from a dramatic point of view; whatever term was used to refer to Marsellus was going to be insulting and there are not a lot of choices that would pass the censor.

2.2 Yid

Everything I have to say about *yid* arises directly or indirectly from the work of Emma Poulton (see Poulton and Durell 2014). The Urban dictionary lists as the meaning of *yid*:

[A] Person of Yiddish descent
[B] Jewish person
[C] Tottenham Hotspur Football Club supporter (originated due to the large yiddish community in that area of London) (http://www.urbandictionary.com/define. php?term=yid)

The sequence echoes the extension from [A] to [B] and then [C]. Because of its relevance to the present essay, I follow Poulton to concentrate on its use in respect of Spurs supporters.

The situation with *yid* exactly parallels that of *nigger*. There is a perception that London's Tottenham Hotspur Football Club (Spurs) has a large number of Jewish fans (in fact it constitutes only around 10 %) but members of rival clubs have come to refer to them and their team as 'Yids'. In consequence many Spurs supporters, whether Jewish or not, have adopted the term as a symbol of in-group camaraderie.

> (5) The use of 'Yid' is controversial, with many conceiving of it as a 'race hate' word (Baddiel 2013; Baddiel 2011; Chakraborti and Garland 2009; Herbert 2012). Yet, for a significant proportion of Tottenham fans, this taboo word is regularly and widely used with pride and as a term of endearment to express their support for the team. Tottenham Hotspur Football Club 2014 surveyed their season ticket holders to gauge opinion on their use of 'Yid' following on-going public debate since the launch of *The Y-Word* film [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIvJC1_hKt8], which has even involved comment from [British] PM David Cameron (Baddiel 2013; Herbert 2012; Pollard 2013; Poulton 2013). Seventy-four per cent of non-Jewish respondents and 73 % of Jewish respondents were in favour of fans being allowed to use the word (total number of respondents: 11,389) (Poulton and Durell 2014: 2).

So, although *yid* is used as a slur by certain supporters of opposing football teams, a majority of Spurs supporters, both Jews and non-Jews, are happy to use and/or accept use of the term as a mark of team support – notwithstanding the unfounded view expressed by Herbert 2012:

> The notion that Tottenham fans, less than 5 % of whom are likely to be Jewish, can reclaim a word of genocide, slaughter and humiliation is an insult to anyone's intelligence.

2.3 Whore and Slut

The meanings of *whore* are (cf. *OED*):

[A] A female prostitute.
[B] **A** sexually promiscuous woman.
[C] Any unprincipled person, male (less likely because of the dominance of senses [A] and [B]) or female.

Among the euphemisms for *whore* are *working girl* and *escort*; and in the following quote 'girlfriend or mistress':

(6)   I would let him know what I needed and for what and he would give me the money. In his mind, I guess that made me a girlfriend or mistress instead of a whore. (Jan 10, 2009 http://lettersfromworkinggirls.blogspot.com.au)

There is also the derivation *ho* which is often just a misogynistic term for "woman" but this dysphemism is founded in the derogatory idea that every woman is sexually promiscuous. There is an underlying premise that the sexual promiscuity of a woman is immoral behaviour that is denigrated to a far greater extent than it is in a man. This notion accounts for the sequencing of the three senses of *whore*. A woman whose profession is to sell sex to anyone (and selling sex is immoral behaviour) >any woman who has many sexual partners >anyone indulging in amoral behaviour.

It is not entirely irrational that a sexually promiscuous woman is despised far more than a sexually promiscuous man. Because women and not men bear children, and consequently menstruate, lactate, and are primary carers of children, women are physically and socially disadvantaged compared with men. In consequence men have traditionally asserted social dominance and even ownership rights over women that has led to peculiar taboos over women's procreative organs (and often over their entire bodies) which purportedly aim to protect a genealogical investment. There is reason behind this (irrespective of one's moral evaluation of it): until the advent of *in vitro* fertilization, a woman invariably knew that the child she has borne is genetically her own; whereas a man can only be certain his wife's child is genetically his if he is certain she has not had sexual intercourse with another man. In the interests of self-protection, women have generally accepted and even encouraged the taboos on their bodies as measures towards ensuring their personal safety and economic security. These taboos have been confirmed by the dominant religions in many cultures. Against this background, any question about a woman's sexual behaviour has been seen as an offence against a desirable social, religious, and even rational norm.

Hence, to call a woman a whore is one of the worst ways to insult her, and one of the commonest. Nevertheless, the term *whore* is used as an orthophemism equivalent to *prostitute* by a South Australian female sex worker who tweets under the handle Jane Whatshername and blogs at http://becauseimawhore.com/ on matters relevant to a sex worker. Some examples:

(7)   I'm not superhuman, I wasnt born with a whore gene. I find it insulting when someone thinks there is something inherently different about me. I would rather not work as a plumber cleaning shitty sewage pipes, but I COULD do it. Obviously. (becauseimawhore.com, 28 January 2012)
A renewed feeling of whore power! After 2 years of struggling on part time minimum wage, all I had done was outlay $50 in advertising plus a spare sim card and i was able to make 2 grand in just over 24 hours with very little planning. (becauseimawhore.com, 20 July 2012)
Being the talkative and opinionated whore i am, i didnt last as a voyeur for long. (becauseimawhore.com, 13 June 2014)

There is no slurring in the quotes in (7), but (8) is a wife reporting a slur from her husband:

(8)   [W]hen he called me a slut, cunt, worthless bitch, I slapped him at some point, then he followed me to the porch, where I'd gone to cry, to tell me how I spread my legs for anyone who walks by[. . . .] This is not the first time he's called me a slut/whore/cunt/bitch/etc. (http://forums.thenest.com/discussion/12002898/husband-called-me-a-c-t-b-ch-sl-t, September 2103)

Although I recall seeing saw a selfie of three teenage girls who referred to themselves as orthophemistically as 'hos', I am unable to trace it or any similar examples; so I assume that *ho* is typically dysphemistic. Ann Hart Coulter is a vociferous right-wing commentator. In a celebrated entry for *ho* in http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=ho by 'Vermont Ferret' in 2005:

(9)   Anyone who dehumanizes themselves by selling their soul to others. The term can be applied to either a man or a woman or – as in the case of < Anne Coulter > ──both.
      Anne Coulter: You two ladies look awfully interesting. Are you Indians?
      Woman #1: Yes, I'm a Navajo.
      Woman #2: I'm an Arapahoe.
      Anne Coulter: What a coincidence! I'm a right-wing ho!

On April 4, 2007, in his radio talk show, Don Imus characterized the Rutgers University women's basketball team players as 'rough girls', commenting on their tattoos. His producer Bernard McGuirk responded by referring to them as 'hardcore hos' and Imus then described the girls as 'nappy-headed hos' because many of them were African-American. African-American Civil Rights activist Al Sharpton castigated these remarks as racism and Imus apologized, saying there had been 'some idiot comment meant to be amusing' and that 'nappy-headed hos' is a term that rap artists use to refer to black women. In response Ann Coulter wrote:

(10) If Imus had called me a "towheaded ho" or Al Sharpton a "nappy-headed ho," it would be what's known as "funny." (And if he called Anna Nicole Smith [stripper and would-be actress with whom Imus had reportedly fathered a child] a "flaxen-headed ho," it would be "absolutely accurate.") But he attacked the looks and morals of utterly innocent women, who had done nothing to inject themselves into public debate. (http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1815807/posts, April 11, 2007)

Coulter is using *ho* dysphemistically throughout, even in respect of herself. There is vitriol against Imus, Sharpton, and Smith.

Today the primary meaning of *slut* is:

[A] A woman who is wearing skimpy or sexually provocative clothing and/or who is sexually promiscuous.
[B] Any sexually promiscuous person.

The *OED* sense of being slatternly is not obsolete, but it is rare, and I will leave it out of discussion.

An example of *slut* used as a slur has already been seen in (8). There's a song by P¡nk called 'Slut like you' in which a guy says he's looking for a quick fuck and she responds 'me too' because 'I'm a slut like you' (https://www.youtube.com/watch?

v=HjU0xAZbZkA). This is playing with an apparent dysphemism, converting it into something closer to an orthophemism. There is a similar example of this in (11), which moves from dysphemism towards orthophemism in reclaiming the lemma *slut*; and in (12) *slut(ty)* is reclaimed on a similar basis to that for racist reclamations (see also Neal 2012).

(11) [S]omeone is slutty if they are dressing for attention from other people, or if they're sleeping with someone to make the person like them. Sluttiness seems to connote a lack of agency on behalf of the slut. It is both conferred and enjoyed by others but not the slut.

But, like, what if it just means revealing clothing, or sexual promiscuity, but not in any pejorative sense? What if it just communicates a specific concept, but without that concept taking on any negative overtones? Could we maybe say 'slutty' with absolutely no derision in our voices but only the desire to convey an accurate impression? (http://heylabodega.tumblr.com/post/18662027833/sluts)

(12) So we are proud to reclaim the word "slut" as a term of approval, even endearment. To us, a slut is a person of any gender who celebrates sexuality according to the radical proposition that sex is nice and pleasure is good for you. Sluts may choose to have solo sex or to get cozy with the Fifth Fleet. They may be heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual, radical activists or peaceful suburbanites. (Easton and Hardy 2009: 4)

As with other terms I have been discussing, whether or not *slut* is a slur depends on the context of use.

2.4   Bitch

The online *Macquarie Dictionary* (https://www.macquariedictionary.com.au) offers the following meanings for the noun *bitch.*

[A] a female dog.
[B] any female canine.
[C] *Colloquial* a disagreeable or malicious woman.
[D] *Colloquial* (*taboo*) any woman.
[E] *Colloquial* a contemptible person, male or female.
[F] *Colloquial* something giving rise to difficulties and dissatisfaction: *life's a bitch*; *the bitch of a thing won't work.*

Once again the sequence indicates extensions of meaning. It needs to be explained why senses [C]–[F] are dysphemistic. Despite [D], I will claim that not all instances of *bitch* applied to a woman are dysphemistic, though such non-dysphemistic reference is rare.

Primarily, a bitch is a female dog. What makes a bitch different from other female mammals is that a bitch in oestrus has the reputation for being unconstrainedly willing to mate, often with several partners; many dog-owners believe that the bitch needs to be protected from male dogs at this time and rather than have all this (perhaps apocryphal) trouble, they have the bitch spayed. In other words, when in heat, a bitch is a nuisance and therefore a cause of complaint to people. The extended

uses of *bitch* are grounded in the literal sense. To condemn a woman as a *bitch* potentially likens her to a bitch in heat, a sexually promiscuous woman. Linking the sexual insult with an animal-name insult is doubly-dysphemistic. A good example is rapper 2Pac's 'Wonda why they call u bitch' (Tupac Amaru Shakur, words at http://genius.com/2pac-wonda-why-they-call-u-bitch-lyrics) where the woman addressed is called 'ho' and accused of prostituting herself, finally dying of HIV AIDS. Incidentally, although *son-of-a-bitch* is comparable with Spanish *hijo de puta* and similar expressions in many other languages, the use of *bitch* simply to mean 'prostitute' is rare to non-existent in English.

   The sexual undertone is normally secondary when *bitch* is used as a slur. It is common for insults to liken humans to animals that are conventionally ascribed certain behaviours, cf. *cat, fox, vixen, sow, pig, cow, bitch, cur, dog, mongrel, swine, louse, dove, hawk, coot, galah, chicken, turkey, mouse, rabbit, bull, ox, goat, ape, monkey, ass, donkey, mule, rat, snake*, etc. Among American children *bitch* is the favourite insult from girl to girl and used proportionately more often than by boys (who also target girls with it, of course); cf. Jay (1992: 60–67). Human bitches are shrewish, malicious, contemptible; as in Alanis Morisette's use of *bitch* in 'I'm a bitch, I'm a lover, I'm a child, I'm a mother/I'm a sinner, I'm a saint, . . . /I'm your hell, I'm your dream' (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eAjNVKtQHAY). Further on from the quote in (8) is (13):

(13) He lunged for the door and I put a hand out and said "If you lay one finger on me, I will scream and call the police." This is when he proceeded to call me a f*cking cunt, bitch, and a piece of shit (he'd called me worthless earlier in the week, again not for the first time). (http://forums.thenest.com//12002898/husband-called-me-a-c-t-b-ch-sl-t)

(13) belittles the wife as contemptible rather than attacking her sexual mores as was reported in (8).

   Like many other insults, *bitch* has been reclaimed with women addressing each other as *bitch* much as (male) African-Americans address one another as *nigger/nigga*.

(14) On top of all this confusion, I'll add that some women have "reclaimed" the word [bitch], and call themselves bitches in a positive light. I'd say there are two streams of this – one is explicitly feminist, used by women who want to celebrate being loud and assertive, refusing to be oppressed, etc. The other stream is women who have just heard the word a lot, so they'll jokingly refer to themselves and their friends as "bitches" without any political statement intended. (http://forum.wordreference.com/showthread.php?t=2086109

   In *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, when game-keeper Mellors is making love to Lady Chatterley says (15), he once uses *bitch* in a sense of camaraderie:

(15) Tha'rt real, tha art! Tha'rt real, even a bit of a bitch. Here tha shits an' here tha' pisses: an' I lay my on 'em both an' like thee for it. I like thee for it. Tha's got a proper, woman's arse, proud of itself. It's none ashamed of itself, this isna'. (Lawrence 1960: 232)

This is thin ice for a man addressing a woman and maybe it is just Lawrence being unrealistic.

2.5   Cunt

The meaning of *cunt* (cf. *OED*) is:

[A] Female genitals.
[B] A woman as a source of sexual gratification.
[C] Term of abuse for a despised, unpleasant, or annoying person or thing.

It is generally accepted that *cunt* is the most tabooed word in English. Interestingly, the same is not true of its cognates in other languages: French *con* and Spanish *coño* have the same origin – Latin *cunnus* "cunt, promiscuous woman" – but their extended uses are much less dysphemistic. For instance, French *Vieux con* (literally, "old cunt") is more likely to be jocular than insulting – compare British *old bugger*. (On Spanish *coño* see Allan and Burridge 2006: 52). *Cunt* turns up in medieval place names, see Briggs (2009). For instance, there was Gropecuntelane in London, also in Oxford (where it became Grove Passage), York (where it became Grape Lane), and Northampton.[6] There was a Cunte Street in Bristol. What in the eighteenth century was still sometimes called the River Cunnit by Wiltshire locals has become the Kennet; adjacent to it was the Roman settlement Cunetio. A cunt was a water channel and *cundy*, *cundit, kundit, cundut* are all early variants of *conduit* (*OED*). *Cunny* "cunt", used for the body-part from the fourteenth century, derives from Latin *cunnus* and is retained in modern *cunnilingus*. Latin *cunnus* is very possibly a euphemism derived from *cuneus* "wedge, wedge-shaped" the dominant visual appearance of the human female pubic triangle: 'The great cleft is called [. . .] the cunnus, because it looks like the impress of a wedge (cuneus)' (Graaf 1672 quoted in Blackledge 2003: 87). Early topographical names for clefts and gullies such as Kuntecliue (Lower Cunliffe), Cuntewellwang, Cuntebecsic, Shauecuntewelle (Shinglewell) are noted in Briggs 2009 and the *OED*. The suffix *cunt* was found in people's names, e.g., Godwin Clawecuncte (1066), Simon Sitbithecunte (1167), John Fillecunt (1246), Robert Clavecunte (1302) and Bele Wydecunthe (1328) (cf. McDonald 1988: 36 and the *OED*). Such names sound worse today than they would have in the Middle Ages because *cunt* could be used orthophemistically then. Thus it was used in *Lanfranc's Science of Cirurgie* c. 1400 where *vagina* would be required today: 'In wymmen þe necke of þe bladdre is schort, & is maad fast to the cunte' (*OED*). Between the thirteenth and the late nineteenth century, this body-part term was homophonous in some dialects with the adjective *quaint* (various spellings) as in Geoffrey Chaucer's: 'And prively he [Nicholas] caughte hire [Alison] by the queynte' (Chaucer 1396; line 3276 of *The Canterbury Tales*). It seems likely that the action of a man stealthily grabbing a woman's genitals would have provoked exactly the same frisson in the fourteenth century as it would today – whatever word is used to describe the body-part in question.

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[6]It is tempting to surmise that these must be 'redlight' venues, but that is not the case.

The use of *cunt* as a slur has been exemplified already in (8) and (13). An odd-job man whose invoice I was disputing wrote me 'You allways were a tight arse and a cunt into the Bargain' (*sic*, August 20, 2004). The report of Police v Butler [2003] NSWLC 2 before Heilpern J, June 14, 2002 quotes a defendant in an offensive behaviour case saying to police officers 'Get fucked you cunts, I'm just trying to help my mates'.

As with the other terms I have been discussing, *cunt* is used orthophemistically (as well as dysphemistically) in academic essays such as this one. Also in the magistrate's explanation of his decision in the offensive language prosecution cited above. Heilpern J said:

(16) Channel 9 has recently broadcast a show (Sex in the City) that includes the words "fuck off" and "fucking" as well as "cunt". (Police v Butler 2003)

And *cunt* may be used as an expression of bantering camaraderie – as can *silly, ass, idiot, bastard,* and *fucker*, cf. (17) or showing camaraderie and empathy in (18) – which is in the Leith dialect of Edinburgh (Scotland).

(17) DAVEEE; crazy hockey cunt. Love him (Bugeja 2008)
    wookey is a gem love that cunt (ibid.)
    [laughs] you're a gross cunt [laughs] (Wellington Corpus of Spoken New Zealand English J 2)
(18) — Granty … ye didnae hear? … Coke looked straight at Lenny.
    — Naw. Wha …
    — Deid. Potted heid.
    — Yir jokin! Eh? Gies a fuckin brek ya cunt …
    — Gen up. Last night, likes.
    — Whit the fuck happened …
    — Ticker. Boom. Coke snapped his fingers. — Dodgy hert, apparently. Nae cunt kent aboot it. Perr Granty wis workin wi Pete Gilleghan, oan the side likesay. It wis aboot five, n Granty wis helpin Pete tidy up, ready to shoot the craw n that likes, whin he jist hauds his chist n cowps ower. Gilly gits an ambulance, n they take the perr cunt tae the hospital, but he dies a couple of ooirs later. Perr Granty. Good cunt n aw. You play cairds wi the guy, eh?
    — Eh … aye … one ay the nicest cunts ye could hope tae meet. That's gutted us, that hus. (Welsh 2013: 129)

3   The Reporting of Slurs

There is an extensive literature on the reporting of slurs since there is a legitimate question of whether or not reporting a slur does in itself constitute a slur. Anderson and Lepore (2013), Lepore (2010), for example, assume that the linguistic expression ε constitutes a slur, which inevitably leads to the conclusion that the report necessarily constitutes a slur. Given my definition of slurring, such a conclusion is false. Capone (2016) correctly says that in reporting a slur, the reporter must take care to indicate whether or not s/he subscribes to the slur lest a hearer/reader make an unwanted inference.

In this essay I have, necessarily, already been reporting slurs in addition to non-slurring utilizations of the words *nigger, yid, whore, slut, bitch* and *cunt*. I hope I have made it clear that in employing these terms in the essay I am not myself slurring anyone; nor is it my intention to offend anyone, even though I recognize that certain readers may find the very appearance of one or more of these terms offensive. In this section of the essay I examine typical reports of these six potentially slurring words.

3.1   Reports of Potentially Racist Terms

Randall Kennedy caused huge controversy when he published *Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word* (Kennedy 2003). A typical review is headed 'A black author hurls that word as a challenge'– using the substitute 'that word' – although it bravely prints out *nigger* 23 times in a 1500 word article (Kirkpatrick 2001). The usual politically correct euphemism is *the N-word* as in Donegan (2002), Asim (2007), McWhorter (2010). An audio recording of LBJ uttering 'niggers' is titled 'President Lyndon Johnson using the "N" word' (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r1rIDmDWSms). Variations on this are *n****** (McWhorter 2014) or *n—r* (Shaw 2014). A comparable example of euphemising is an ABC11 report of cheerleaders from Millbrook High School (Winchester VA) 'loudly chanting the N-word, while taking a picture' in which they are plainly creating an N with their hands (http://abc11.com/news/millbrook-high-cheerleaders-accused-of-chanting-racial-slur-/371837). It is claimed that the teenaged girls chanted 'Nigger Nation'. Judging from the partially pixelated photos, at least 6 of the 8 cheerleaders in them are African-American. One of the girls is reported as saying 'We said it but we didn't, like, chant it out loud. We weren't trying to mean it in a racism way' (http://lady-armageddon.tumblr.com/post/101340057829/my-school-embarrasses-me-one-of-the-girls-are). Since Nigger Nation (see http://niggernation.info) takes a positive stance on black appropriation of the term *nigger* as a marker of camaraderie, this rings true: it was a risky assertion of who the girls felt they are – compare the adoption of *yid* by Spurs fans both Jewish and non-Jewish. In the ABC11 report there is the image of an Instagram that reads 'Yasss n   nation, keep the legacy going!' in which 'igger' is whited out. There were no blanks in the original, so the report is euphemising in order to be politically correct. The same is true of a screen shot of a purported letter of complaint to the TV station advising of the sensational event. It includes a reference to the chant 'N   Nation' from which, again, 'igger' is whited out. This is typical of a reporter ensuring that the form of the potentially offensive word does not appear spelled out explicitly in the report, even though there is absolutely no doubt about what that word is. The irony in the Millbrook High School report is that we can be almost certain no racial slur was intended by the cheerleader girls but, to be politically correct, the reporters use euphemism where none should have been needed.

As might be expected, reporting the use of the term *yid* is exactly comparable with the reporting of *nigger*. The title of Baddiel 2011 is '"Alarming" levels of antisemitism in football must be tackled' and Ivor Baddiel describes the chanting of *Yiddo* by and at Tottenham fans as 'racism'. But article does not euphemise 'Yid(s)'. Herbert (2012) writes of racism and claims that '"Y" word chanting ... simply legitimises antisemitic abuse by other fans'. I believe Herbert misuses the term *legitimise*, what he should have said is it *is the cause for* expressions of antisemitism. Brothers David and Ivor Baddiel both refer to the 'Y-word' but also both regularly spell out and speak out 'Yid' in full. They created a short film 'Let's kick racism out of football' (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RIvJC1_hKt8) which is often referred to as 'the Y-word' film because that expression is uttered many times in it, e.g.,

(19) It's against the law to call someone a Y-word in street. It's against the law to call someone a Y-word in the supermarket. It's against the law to call someone a Y-word at a football match.

That may be true, but a typical fan among those quoted by Poulton and Durell (2014) responded:

Have to say as a four-by-two [Jew] myself I don't have a problem with the yid chant. Its evolution came from other teams chanting antisemitic stuff against Jewish and non-Jewish spurs fans. Using it has weakened that and in my family of spurs fans we use it as a term of affection ie Papa yid, baby yid, brother yid etc. So i have no problem with it and no intention of stopping using it. (ibid. p. 14)

The Tottenham Hotspur Football Club itself reported (14 April 2011)

Historically the 'Y word' chant has been adopted by Spurs fans as a 'call to arms' in order to own the term and thereby deflect anti-Semitic abuse. A small number of both Jewish and non-Jewish Spurs fans use the Y word in what they consider to be an inoffensive manner. The defining principle has always been whether or not the term is being used in a manner and in a tone which is deliberately intended to cause offence. (http://www.tottenhamhotspur. com/news/the-launch-of-the-yword-film-thfc-comment-140411)

This report euphemises to be politically correct, but nonetheless takes a very level-headed positive stance.

Do any of these reports cast an antisemitic slur? The Baddiel brothers, Herbert (op.cit.) and their supporters argue that any use of the term *yid* is a slur; yet, although they mention the term, we must conclude that their purpose is NOT to slur. As I have maintained throughout this essay, there is a distinction between the mention of a potentially slurring word and its use with the perlocutionary intention of making a slur. In castigating Spurs fans for adopting *yid* as an in-group marker of camaraderie, critics like the Baddiels fail to understand the true nature of slurring as an intention to be offensive. The Baddiels and their supporters are being hypersensitive to the perlocutionary effect of the slur on them without due recognition that this does not correlate with the perlocutionary intention of many Spurs fans.

There is a problem that offense may be caused unintentionally and we need to accept that an unintended offense can be almost as hurtful as intended offense. There is no solution to this dilemma and the best way to handle it must be for a general

rule that whereas intentional offense should be castigated as obnoxious, unintended offense should be forgiven, and it also needs to be recognized that there may be reasonable grounds for it to persist.

Fans of rival teams are expected to verbally abuse each other and slurs of various kinds are to be expected. As discussed in Allan and Burridge (1991, 2006), since about the 1960s racist slurs are judged particularly noxious. If the Baddiels are right to denounce such behaviour they are wrong to fulminate against Spurs fans who have subverted the slur.

3.2   Reports of Terms That Are Potential Insults to Women and Men

Quotes (8) and (13) are from an online letter headed 'husband called me a c**t, b**ch, sl*t' (http://forums.thenest.com/discussion/12002898/husband-called-me-a-c-t-b-ch-sl-t) in which, being politically correct, the offensive slur words are euphemised by not being spelled out in full. This headline obviously reports a slur but equally obviously it does not itself slur the woman to whom they were originally addressed. The euphemistic forms of these potentially offensive words are presumably used in line with the so-called 'middle class politeness criterion' (Allan 2015a; Allan and Burridge 1991, 2006) in order not to affront the reader. Nonetheless within the body of the letter these terms are spelled out: 'This is not the first time he's called me a slut/whore/cunt/bitch/etc. [. . . H]e proceeded to call me a f*cking cunt, bitch, and a piece of shit'. (Why 'f*cking' is used in place of explicit *fucking* is unfathomable.) Here is a woman complaining about her husband slurring her. Her purpose in reporting these embarrassing events instead of keeping silent is presumably that she is seeking advice, sympathy, or seeking relief through trouble-sharing. There can be no cogent argument that she is slurring herself. One might take the view that, in making the report, she is slurring her husband by revealing his offensive behaviour towards her, but note that in such a case she is performing a slur and not reporting a slur, and so it lies outside the concern of this essay.

(20) is a report mentioning a slur by Barbara Bush, wife of Republican 41st US President George H. Bush, on 1984 Democrat Vice Presidential candidate Geraldine Ferraro, though the topic of the article is the Bush pooch (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millie_%28dog%29).

> (20) To borrow words Barbara Bush once used to describe Geraldine Ferraro, Millie Kerr Bush is something that rhymes with rich. (*Time Australia*, March 6, 1989: 62)

The original report of the slur reads, in part:

> (21) But if some people were surprised to hear white-haired, gentle-looking Barbara Bush calling Mrs. Ferraro a "four million dollar – I can't say it, but it rhymes with rich," some others were not so shocked. (Joyce 1984)

In a questionnaire I ran back in 1989, 99 % of respondents understood this to mean that Barbara Bush called her husband's political opponent a bitch, thus slurring Ferraro. Indeed, the *Time Australia* reporter clearly understood her to mean "bitch", otherwise it would make no sense to apply Bush's words to a female dog. However, Bush used a euphemistic dysphemism, because it would have reflected badly on her had she explicitly spelled out the slur. The question is, do the reports in (20) and (21) themselves slur the late Geraldine Ferraro? They don't. The act of slurring is clearly attributed to Barbara Bush and the reports reflect ill on her character rather than that of Ferraro. In fact Joyce (1984) writes: 'Mrs. Bush later apologized for the remark'. Such an apology does not indicate that Barbara Bush revised her opinion of Geraldine Ferraro, only that she later regretted making the insult public, thereby staining her own character.

In Sect. 2.5 I referred to disparate reports of *cunt* used as a slur (a) by husband to wife (Z to X) in (8) and (13); (b) by a defendant in an offensive behaviour case calling police officers 'cunts'; and (c) I reported an odd-job man (Z) calling me (X) a 'cunt'. In none of these cases is it truly feasible to claim that the reporter is slurring the original target. (a) and (c) are reports by the slur's target (X) and for (a) all the evidence from the wife's letter indicates she does not accept her husband's slur on her and is deeply upset by it; for (c) I can vouch that I did not and do not subscribe to the odd-job man's description of me (and in fact took out a legal injunction against him – though not for that slur alone). Report (b) is a quote from the report of court proceedings (Police v Butler [2003] NSWLC 2) and I don't believe any reasonable person would argue that the court subscribes to the defendant's slur on the police.

3.3 Headline: 'North Korea Hurls Racist "Monkey" Slur at Obama'

U.S. political website The Hill ran the headline 'North Korea hurls racist "monkey" slur at Obama' (Mali 2014) and several other news services in Australia, Britain, Canada, and the U.S. also fulminated about a 'racial slur' in reference to what a North Korean spokesman said, namely (22):

> (22) Obama always goes reckless in words and deeds like a monkey in a tropical forest. (Kim 2014)

The context is North Korean anger at Obama's support for the film 'The Interview' in which there is a fictional assassination of North Korean President Kim Jong Un. (22) is undoubtedly a slur that insults Obama by likening him to an animal but that doesn't, ipso facto, constitute a 'racial' slur; for instance, no one would accuse Barbara Bush of casting a RACIAL slur on Geraldine Ferraro when she likened her to a bitch. (One could more accurately call such remarks 'speciesist' (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speciesism). It follows that the press reports that describe (22) as a 'racial slur' are pragmatically enriching what is said in (22) by interpreting the

North Korean slur as racial. Presumably the grounds for doing so are that Obama is described as 'like a monkey in a tropical forest' because he is African-American. While this certainly could be a correct explanation for the choice of insult by the North Korean spokesman, one cannot be certain:

> (23) It wasn't the first time North Korea has used crude insults against Obama and other top
> U.S. and South Korean officials. Earlier this year, the North called U.S. Secretary of State
> John Kerry a wolf with a "hideous" lantern jaw and South Korean President Park
> Geun-hye a prostitute. In May, the North's news agency published a dispatch saying
> Obama has the "shape of a monkey." (Kim 2014)

It is quite possible that the North Korean source for (22) may have been likening Obama to a particular animal in the same way that Kerry was likened to a particular kind of animal and President Park, being a woman, was likened to a prostitute – all of which are unquestionably crass insults, but there is no indisputable evidence for racialism. I conclude that reports describing (22) as a 'racial slur' actually succeed in casting a racial slur on Obama, even though they purport to denigrate it.

4   Conclusion

With the possible exception of the report discussed in Sect. 3.3, I conclude that in none of the reports of slurs considered in this essay does it follow that the reporter re-slurs the target. Given the adage that *there's no smoke without fire* one might say that the reporting of slurs does to some extent contaminate the target of the slur by bringing to mind the possibility that the slur applies. The strength of such contamination, however, will depend upon the hearer/reader's prior beliefs about the nature of the slur (ε), its target, and the character of the slurrer (Z).

Considerations of politeness and political correctness on the one hand and/or having suffered personal attack with a particular slurring term on the other may lead a person to take umbrage at the very existence of expressions like *nigger, yid, slut, bitch* and *cunt* such that any mention of them is offensive. Intentional uses of ε that are non-slurs (e.g., when the expression is used to express camaraderie) should not be condemned although the speaker/writer is open to criticism by an audience member deeply offended by any use of ε.

Where it is not the speaker/writer's perlocutionary intention to be offensive but nevertheless the audience is insulted – i.e., when the perlocutionary effect of ε in υ is an accidental slur – the offense should be forgiven.

I hold to the view that the use of ε in υ should only be condemned when Z is recognized to have the perlocutionary intention to slur. Although a slur eventuates as a perlocutionary effect, and dysphemistic effects are properly castigated, what is more abhorrent is the intention to achieve such an effect. The speaker/writer's intention can only be surmised from κ, the context of utterance – ε's co-text and the situation of υ's utterance including what is known about the speaker/writer and the perlocutionary effect of this and similar uses of ε. Judging the perlocutionary effect

of ε in υ as a slur is also a matter of surmise, although it is normally identifiable by the target as the sense of insult. So, both perlocutionary intention and, to a lesser degree, perlocutionary effect are open to controversy resulting from differing interpretations of the same set of data. Therefore the reporter (X) of Z's slur should, if there is any likelihood of being understood to subscribe to the slur, make it clear whether or not this is part of the intention of the report. Reports of slurs do not, in themselves, constitute slurs.

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Indirectly Reporting and Translating Slurring Utterances

Alessandro Capone

1 Introduction

In this paper, I am going to examine the intricate connection between indirectly reporting and translating, to move forward with the application of this connection to slurring. Since I consider (more or less) slurring a derogatory speech act (albeit an orthogonal or secondary speech act, one that cannot be carried out unless one performs another speech act, like, e.g., asserting), the question I examine reduces to how one can indirectly report or translate the speech act of slurring. I will give some attention to the idea that slurring is a derogatory speech act (and possibly one in a series of speech acts aimed at maintaining the status quo (that is the social distinction between social categories (e.g., blacks vs. whites). This idea of slurring as a derogatory speech act is similar to the idea by Croom (2008, 2011, 2013a, b, 2014, 2015) (and other scholars such as Saka (1998) and Potts (2007)) that slurring contains both an ideational component and an expressive one. However, the expressive dimension is more regulated than one may have thought, so much so that I venture the idea of a speech act (with an appropriate distinction between the micro speech act of slurring and the macro speech act of dominating by a series of micro speech acts) (see van Dijk 1980 on macrostructures).

In this paper, I am going to assume, rather than arguing in detail, that society is stratified and that slurring expressions may reveal this stratification as well as conflictual relationships between dominated and dominating (Waugh et al. 2015). Becoming aware, from a linguistic theoretical point of view of the demeaning force of slurs amounts to recognizing that there are opposite forces in society which want to threaten the status quo and establish a more equalitarian relationship between

A. Capone (✉)
Department of Linguistics, Faculty of Cognitive Sciences, University of Messina, Messina, Italy
e-mail: Alessandro.caponis@gmail.com

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the oppressors and the oppressed. Interesting phenomena like, e.g., appropriating a slur (e.g., blacks referring to themselves as 'niggars')[1] attest that there are forces that threaten the status quo. This paper is not going to reveal, but will presuppose, knowledge of a story of oppression in which a social category is oppressed (linguistically as well as socially) by slurring (among other things). The recent events in USA like riots against the brutality of the police towards weaker social categories like (e.g.,) Afro-Americans attest that in addition to a linguistic reflection on the means of oppression (like slurring), a growing awareness of the political and social oppression of certain weaker social categories is resulting in mobilization of social events of pondering on and resisting the brutality of the oppressive acts. This is going on in many spheres of life, as homosexuals demand greater rights, Hispanic people demand social recognition, immigrants, in general, demand recognition as human beings, American Indians demand rights which were trodden on in the past, etc. Since slurring affects many social categories (as recognized e.g., by Croom 2013b), by examining slurring we are going to address the topic of metalinguistic reflection and emancipation of oppressed social categories (see Waugh et al. 2015). This is possibly a topic for critical discourse analysis. However, I will only explore certain linguistic aspects of the phenomenon and in particular the connection with the issue of indirect reporting and translating. This chapter is an indirect contribution to the issue of slurring and a direct contribution to the issue of indirect reports. In a sense, the aim of this paper is to expand the theory of indirect reports, by using slurs as a testing bed for the theory.

In particular, I would like to explore the issue of how slurs can be translated and of the difficulties encountered by translators in translating them. Since translating and indirect reporting are interconnected activities, I hope to glean the advantages of applying my previous views of indirect reports to this issue.

2   Structure of the Paper

I will examine the interconnection between indirect reporting and translating, arguing that there is some overlap and that the former illuminates the latter (and vice-versa). I shall focus on transformations which indirect reporting and translating have in common: addition, elimination, replacement, modification, syntactic adjustments. I shall then consider the translation of American slurs into Italian and consider that translation is not easy, due to the lack of the cultural presuppositions and of a semantic item covering the same semantic area as e.g., 'Nigger', I arrive at the idea that modulation may be of help where there is no close

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[1]As Croom (p.c.) says, it would be closer to the truth to say that black interlocutors often call each other 'nigga' – or more often 'my nigga' as in 'what's up my nigga?' – but do not typically call themselves this in isolation or on their own. The non-derogatory use often occurs in these kinds of **dyadic** in-group exchanges.

counterpart of the slurring expression in the language one uses for the translation. Finally, I consider the issue of translation with respect to the Paraphrase/Form/Style Principle I formulated in Capone (2010). I also consider some consequences of the phenomenon of appropriation on translation practices. I offer general considerations on the lack of pragmatic flexibility exhibited by slurring expressions with respect to non-literal uses. I end the paper with some technical considerations on responsibility for slurs in indirect reporting and the discussion of a serious problem raised by Wayne Davis in p.c.

3   Translating and Indirect Reporting

Before proceeding with the main issue of this paper, I want to discuss the connection between indirect reporting and translating. The connection is pretty intricate, because on the one hand indirect reporting may involve segments that are translated (whether a few words or an entire sentence), on the other hand, translating what one said is a form of indirect reporting, since the translator is faced with difficult choices (should she use a register or another? Should she use a certain syntactic structure or a different one?). It is fair to say that translating may involve adding interpolations which might even include the translator's comments, especially when a word or syntactic structure is ambiguous. It is fair to say that in the same way in which the reporter in indirect reporting has some freedom to alter the wording of the message, in translating, the translator can change the message somehow, as, after all, translating means not merely translating words literally but capturing the speaker's intentions. If one is faced with a choice of words that are different, one should choose one rather than the other by trying to work out (in a rational way) the speaker's intentions. Working out the speaker's intentions is not a matter of guessing those intentions but of using reason to work out the intended message – and this might involve conscious or unconscious processing and inferencing (see Cummings 2009 on non-modular pragmatics). On the one hand, the fact that the speaker is rational and is endowed with a theory of mind module (massive modularity is currently being preferred to classical rigid Fodorian modularity (see Carruthers (2006)), induces us to infer whatever can be inferred thanks to an innate inference system that provides default inferences or, in any case, modulates meanings in context by using heuristics such as those presented by Relevance Theorists (in short, the principle of Relevance, whether cognitive or communicative) (see Sperber and Wilson (1986); Carston (2002); Hall (2013). On the other hand, we might use conscious inference to calculate what the speaker intended to mean. We may consciously ask ourselves, "Why did the speaker behave in this way?", "Is there a reason why he did or said this?". We may answer these questions by using reason and by constructing a sort of argument (see Macagno and Walton (2013) on conversational implicature as argument). We may, for instance, want to eliminate certain interpretative options by realizing that those options could not be intended because the speaker is too rational to have intended them. We certainly

do not want to infer logical impossibilities or absurdities – and thus much of the inferential process is busy finding plausible alternatives to otherwise implausible interpretations which could not be rationally intended and which it would be irrational to attribute to a speaker in the attempt to work out what she intended. Often, the context comes to our help in working out what the speaker meant, as the context serves to eliminate certain options or to make others manifest. Dascal and Weizman (1987) are absolutely right in claiming that interpretation should be guided by abundant cues and clues. These cues and clues are like Hans and Gretel's pebbles – they help us find the best route towards the intended interpretation. The cues and clues are the foundations of interpretative acts, as they orient them either by eliminating certain options or by selecting certain options as more plausible or desirable than others.

4 Transformations Which Indirect Reporting and Translating Have in Common

In indirect reporting or translating a message, there is a basic requirement, as pointed out by Dascal (2003). The speaker has a duty to make himself understood, which is counterbalanced by the duty to be as faithful as possible to the original message. This means, in practice, that an indirect report or a translation should be oriented to the Hearer; however, if there is the risk that the message be altered, then the speaker has a duty to choose a more literal option. This means that the reporter should make an effort to interpret the original message and make it intelligible to the hearer – by possible transformations, like clarifications of the message, which may be appended as appositives, to the indirect report/translation. However, when the reporter has reasons to believe that the message, despite all efforts of clarification, is obscure, she has a duty to go back to a more literal level of meaning – postponing the interpretation act while preserving the original message and granting the possibility that in the future, one might go back to the original intention, through richer clues. In such cases of obscure messages, the preservation of literality (and of the clues available) amounts to a postponing of the interpretation act.

The basic transformations that apply to indirect reports/translation acts are the following (although I do not claim to exhaust all possibilities) (see Wieland (2013) for a detailed discussion of such transformations and Capone (2013c) for a reply).

Addition
The speaker appends some words in the way of apposition, to an NP or to a S, in order to clarify the message and add further identificatory information.

Replacement
Devitt (1996) proposes that one can replace an obscure NP with a coextensive one to allow the Hearer to identify the referent.

Elimination

The speaker eliminates some word (or segments of the message) which are not useful to the hearer. Since the aim of the indirect report is to provide useful information which may interact with information or aims already possessed by the Hearer, if the reporter deems that a certain segment does not or will not interact in any fruitful way with the information already possessed by the Hearer, he is free to eliminate a certain segment (although the responsibility of elimination rests on him and at any moment he could be pressed to explain why he eliminated a certain segment).

Syntactic Adjustments

Syntactic adjustments are usually ameliorative. Nobody would bother to alter a message by using bad grammar. Of course, it is possible that the reporter himself is not a grammar expert and makes grammar mistakes. In this case, should we attribute the mistake to the reporter or to the reported? This is an interesting and thorny case, where world knowledge might be of help. For example, if we know that the reported speaker is Professor Higgins, we may be reluctant to attribute bad grammar to him and thus we might choose to regard the reporter responsible for the mistake. However, there might be no reason to use bad grammar in reporting a message which was originally grammatical unless we want to throw the reported speaker in a bad light. In general, there is a tendency to eliminate mistakes from messages, thus the reporting speaker may act as editor (he will edit the message), eliminating false starts, hesitations, and even words uttered by mistake (see Goffman (1981) on this charitable attitude). Suppose I say 'cat' while I had 'dog' in mind, if the reporter notes the mistake through contextual clues, he can legitimately edit the message. Editings, thus, follow a positive logic. The result may be disappointing, as we may get indirect reports which have been edited and we do not know whether the edited text belongs to the original speaker. However, sometimes we get reports that use a bad grammar and we must decide whether the grammar belongs to the reporter or the reported speaker.

In Capone (2010), I put forward a Paraphrasis/form/style Principle saying that one should not indirectly report an utterance in such a way (that is to say by accepting transformations) which the original speaker (or, alternatively, an impartial judge) would not approve of. Thus, one can easily guess that the original speaker would not approve of a report in which her utterance has been transformed and syntactic errors have been injected (voluntarily or involuntarily) into the reported utterance. One could guess that the original speaker would not object to being reported by an utterance where his original errors (if there were any) have been purged and the ungrammaticality has been removed. However, there can be intermediate cases. I imagine someone could object if his speech was transformed, even if his style was improved on (suppose an Oxford professor with his unique unparalleled style was employed to embellish the utterance as much as possible). An honest person, we can imagine, could object to her utterance's being improved on – even if (or because) the improvement is to her advantage (if that person is honest enough). Thus, again

(even in the case of improvements) the notion of an original speaker's approval (or of an impartial judge's approval) is crucially important.

Clarification

The speaker may attempt to make the message more easily comprehensible by adding sentential appositions but also by the omission of hedges, repetition, conjunction, removal of clefts, etc. The reporter can also rearrange the content to aim at greater coherence (see Allan 2015 on clarification).

5   Translating Slurs

There is no doubt that for every slurring expression we might find a neutral counterpart (see Croom 2013b), which is a word capable of referring to a category of people in a neutral way (it is a different matter to consider that even a harmless counterpart can be transformed into a demeaning expression if pronounced with derogatory tone, accompanied by a frowning or, alternatively, derisive facial expression (consider in Italian 'E' g-a-y'). Neutral counterparts are at risk of losing their neutrality, but they are certainly less damaging than slurring expressions, which, as Saka (1998), Potts (2007) and Croom (2013b) say, are associated with an expressive dimension. To use the terminology I used in a previous section, when a slurring expression is uttered, it is as if the slurring expression alone was responsible for a speech act of slurring, which is orthogonal to the main speech act (say, assertion, if the utterance has overall assertive force). We may well want to distinguish between a primary and a secondary speech act – the slurring expression is responsible for the secondary speech act.

In American society, the word 'Nigger' is one of the worst slurs which one can use – one of the most hated and irredeemable words of the American language, according to Kennedy (2002). Its use has been associated with violence – moral and physical violence, since the insulted person may feel authorized to reply and to be offensive in return. The use of this word need not be pejorative – as Kennedy says, as it can be modulated in context. However, rather than saying that the word is ambiguous or that there are different rules of use for the same word, I at most favor the idea of an interpretative ambiguity.[2] In particular, if the word is associated with moral abuse, with the potential for derogating, demeaning and insulting, in certain other contexts, it can be used in a positive sense. Describing someone who resisted abuse by white people, a black person might say 'He is a real nigger' (Kennedy 2002). In this case, the use of the word is positive, as the word connotes a positive quality. Black people themselves can use 'nigger' with a derogatory intention. In some cases, black people, among themselves, use the word 'nigger' not

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[2]I accept Hom's (2008) view that the semantics of slurring expressions has a potential for doing harm; however, it is the uses to which these expressions are put that determine the ultimate meanings of such expressions.

as derogatory but in order to refer to Afro-American people – these are the so called 'appropriated' uses, which as Croom (2013b) and Bianchi (2014) say, contain an echoic dimension, also being reminders (Jacobs 2002) that white people will never come to consider Afro-Americans on a par, as reminders that Afro-Americans are at risk of being discriminated or ill-treated.

Recent events in USA, as well as internet posts by eminent philosophers like Jennifer Saul and Jason Stanley, attest to a history of racism (if this was not enough, one could read and be outraged by the very sad stories Kennedy (2002) tells us about discriminatory practices in USA and the terrible and devastating consequences for children. Madison T. Shockley (2014) writes:

> The presumption of guilt and danger that is at the heart of racial profiling lays heavy upon every black person living in America. It changes our relationship with the world. We are constantly on guard against a charge, a confrontation, a challenge. Racial profiling does long-term damage to the self-image, self-esteem and ego of the African American.

When it comes to translating words such as 'Nigger', Italians have their own dose of problems – as there is no equivalent word packed with racial hatred to the same extent. It is true that in current Italian, in a way parallel to the English language, a distinction is being made between 'nero' and 'negro', 'nero' being more politically correct. However, at least 20 years ago, it was ordinary and licit to use the word 'negro', just to refer to someone of black skin possibly coming from Africa or America. No hatred, contempt or derogation was signaled by the use of 'negro'. As I said, on the spur of the linguistic changes going on in America, now we could differentially use 'negro' and 'nero' – but the word 'negro' never comes to acquire the negative connotations associated with 'nigger', which is utterly derogatory. The reason for this, I would like to claim, is that Italian society is not racist in the same way or to the same extent as American society. There are no stories of violence involving black people – even immigrants. The attitude towards immigrants is benevolent, though of course immigrants are more likely to be exploited.[3]

As I said, if Italians are racist, they are so in a different way. The use of words like 'nigger' presupposes an attitude to the person derogated which involves considering it as being sub-human. Italians would still treat black people as human beings, even if their conscience is blind to the issue whether it is licit to exploit them. Italians surely think there are different social classes and that the higher classes deserve greater respect. However, they would not show disrespect towards immigrants, but would reserve differential forms of behavior such as using 'tu' instead of 'Lei' in addressing an immigrant (see tu/vous languages, Brown and Levinson 1987) and also using differential syntax, simplified syntax without morphology being reserved to the immigrants either because they think they would find it easier to understand this way or just to mark the immigrant status of the people in question. (There are exceptions, like the Lega spokesman Calderoli, who defined the Italian black

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[3]This is not to say that there have never been episodes of racism – surely there have been, but we have never seen the revolting episodes described by Kennedy (2002) in connection with American history.

minister on equal opportunities an 'orango tango' – but xenophobes of course are everywhere).

To my knowledge, there are no slurs for black people in Italian, although there are slurs for immigrants in general (regardless of the nationality they come from), such as 'vocumpra' (do-you-want-to-buy-it). Of course I am not arguing that Italians do not have any slurs – of course they have. 'Terrone' was a slur reserved to farmers from the South. It is interesting that Anglo-american society does not have slurs for people in certain categories of jobs, as any honest job is sacrosanct in Anglo-American society. Interestingly, people from the north who had to buy oranges, mandarins and wheat from people from the south, found it objectionable that one could earn a living by working in farms.

Another terrifying slur is reserved to homosexuals 'ricchione', 'frocio' – I report these slurs just to make a comparison with 'negro', which, by comparison has no derogatory force, while the slurs 'ricchione' or 'frocio' are derogatory, have a potential to offend, and, most of all, are designed to address a category of people with (allegedly) sub-human qualities.

Now, we go back to the issue of how to translate 'nigger' given that derogating Afro-Americans is not a practice common to Italians. Should the translator use 'negro' (rather than 'nero') imposing a distinction between the two words? What is clear is that, by so doing, the translator superimposes a connotation that is surely derivable from the context of the translation and has to rely on contextual clues (possibly added by the translator in the course of the translation) on a word like 'negro'. It is not surprising, therefore, that the word 'negro' in the context of the translation acquires a new pragmatic connotation – one that can be purged if a different context embeds the expression 'negro'. In other words, in order to translate such words, the translator has to rely on what Recanati (2004) famously called 'modulation' – the potential that words have to acquire new extra meanings in context, meanings that depend on use and not on semantics, and which can disappear if the context is different. Such meanings are cancellable in the sense that they are modulated by the contexts, and if the contexts do not support such meanings, these are not promoted but they are inhibited. (So they are cancellable in the sense of being only potential).

6   Transformations in Translations

When someone translates a slurring expression, there are potential problems. If the translator hides the slurring expression, by using a common and comparatively neutral alternative, she is not sufficiently faithful to the literal meaning. If the slurring expression is associated with an orthogonal speech act, such a speech act disappears when the slurring expression is purged and replaced by a neutral counterpart. Already in Capone (2010), I noted that replacing a word with another may result in a different speech act – and this is the reason why one cannot always replace a word with a coextensive expression in the that-clause of an indirect report.

The same problem noted by myself arises in translation – possibly indicating the close relationship between translating and indirectly reporting. If the translator retains the slurring expression (by using a corresponding expression that has a slurring potential), there are two problems. The original speaker is credited with having said something which may objectionable in the language and culture of the hearer. And the translator is possibly held complicit, because he could have avoided the slurring expression, but did not do so. There is obviously a tension between the two problems. The translator cannot be both faithful to literal meaning and politically correct. She is confronted with a hard choice.

According to Anderson and Lepore (2013) there is an edict against slurring (against the use of slurs). The indirect reporter should not use the slurring expression because there is a rule of use saying that one should avoid slurs (while using their neutral counterparts, or conventional replacements such as the N-word). According to these authors, if there is a slurring expression in the that-clause of the indirect report, the reporter is responsible as well as the reported speaker.

However, accepting such a rule of use in a general way would prevent us from describing, reflecting on, and criticizing the uses of slurring expressions (see Capone 2014). Furthermore, the aim of an indirect report is to ascribe an utterance to the reported speaker and thus it is natural that if a slurring expression is present in the that-clause, the reported speaker should be principally responsible, the reporting speaker's job being only to inform the hearer of what has happened: a slurring event.

Going back to translation, if it is similar to some extent to indirect reporting, the translator too, according to Anderson and Lepore, should be accountable for the slurring expression. But we have already seen that the translator cannot edit the text without cancelling an important speech act. However, the translator is often in a position that is different from that of an indirect reporter. The indirect reporter often has the aim of reporting the original utterance (however indirectly) to draw attention to what the original speaker said and did, in saying it. The indirect reporter's aim may even be that of criticizing the speaker for what he said (conscious that uttering a slurring expression was something for which one could be criticized).

The translator, instead, does not usually report what the speaker said in order to criticize it, but in order to create a relationship between the speaker and the intended Hearer. The translator is a cultural mediator and it would be close to the truth to say, following Robinson (2003), that the translator is doing things with words. He knows that being homosexual in Russia is close to a crime, while this is not so in USA, where laws are protective for homosexuals. Thus, in English-Russian translation, the translator might do well to edit the Russian text and hide the possible slurs. In doing so, it is true, part of the speech acts proffered is lost, but the rapport between the conversationalists has been protected. Protecting rapport might involve, in this case, editings and the purging of slurring expressions.

Translations may, sometimes, involve additions. We may call these 'cultural preambles'. Slurring expressions are strongly presuppositional – they presuppose certain cultural assumptions, certain conflictual relationships, a history of hatred, and knowledge of the edicts (societal rules) that ban them. Translating the word 'Nigger' with 'negro' will not illuminate the Italian hearer as to the history of

the word. If such a translation is used, one needs preambles that explain how the word is originally used in USA. Without such preambles, the word is inert and its illocutionary force cannot be understood. In other words, translating might require some explaining. Something similar happens in indirectly reporting what a foreigner said. Italians find it difficult to understand the word 'patronizing' – and if one translates such words, one should make sure that an explanation is given as to the Anglo-American attitude towards freedom and interference. So, should one stop the translation and explain things? This seems to me to be necessary, although certainly time consuming. We might call it 'translator's notes'.

We have, so far, tacitly been assuming that the translator often has to edit a text, and to purge a slurring expression. But why is it that she makes use of a slurring expression? ('Making use' is the wrong expression, because the translator does not use words, but reports what he heard; at most he mentions certain words). If a translator preserves a slurring expression in the translated speech, she is conscious that the reasons for preserving the expressions were greater than the reasons for editing it. Should the translator be responsible? My answer is that only the reported speaker (or the translated speaker) is responsible for the slurring expression, In order to motivate this point of view, we might want to say that everything that should be said for indirect reports should be said for translation, which is a form of indirect reporting – albeit one in which translation does not only apply to a segment but to an entire speech event. In my previous papers on indirect reporting (Capone 2010, 2013c, 2014), I have supported the position that slurring should be attributed to the original speaker because indirect reports have the aim to report what the speaker said. I also said that it would be uneconomical to attribute the slurring both to the original speaker and to the reporter. I furthermore claimed that the Principle of expressibility by Searle (1979) supports the idea that the original speaker is responsible for the slur, because if this was not the case, it would never be possible to attribute a slurring expression to anyone. It is true that one can replace the slur with some descriptive word (e.g., the N-word) which loses its connotations, but this strategy is not available in many cases of slurs (and Croom has shown that slurring words can be a great many).

7   Translating Re-appropriated Slurs

Now I would like to touch on an issue of theoretical importance. We have seen (see Croom 2013b; Bianchi 2014; Jacobs 2002) that slurs can be re-appropriated by those categories which are typically slurred by them (e.g., Afro-Americans have appropriated the word 'nigger' (after effecting a phonetic modification: nigga). These uses of slurs – re-appropriated though they are – can be indirectly reported or translated. And now the question is, how can you translate or indirectly report an appropriated slur without using (or mentioning) that word, which in the mouth of the indirect reporter sounds much more racist and offensive than in the mouth of the users who have appropriated that word. There are conventions of use, A white

man cannot use 'nigger' or 'nigga' without causing resentment – and making a politically incorrect move. 'Nigga' is a word which only Afro-Americans can use (speaking among themselves, without slurring). So, how can one indirectly report such uses? And how can one translate such uses? Of course one strategy of indirect reporting, when things are not easy, is to resort to mixed quotation (see Cappelen and Lepore 2005). One can indirectly report what another person said, overall, by paraphrasis, but one can mix-quote the problematic segment. Things might proceed quite smoothly in the written language, where quotation marks, at least in certain languages can be used to distinguish paraphrase from direct quotation. But I doubt that things might proceed smoothly in the oral language, even because 'nigga' is not neatly differentiated from 'nigger' phonetically. Should the (white) translator or the indirect reporter participate in the same convention of use that regulates speech among members of the Afro-American community? Background knowledge might help – if hearers know sufficiently well that the slur was appropriated, then the same principle I used in my 2010 article (Capone 2010) on indirect reports might regulate the attribution of voice. The voice heard inside the indirect report (in connection with the segment 'nigga' is the voice of the reported speaker and not that of the reporting speaker. This time, the reporting speaker is not complicit, because the quotation device offered by the Paraphrasis/form/Style Principle will attribute the voice to the reported speaker and further background knowledge ensures that we know that the reporting speaker is only complicit in appropriation. In other words, we do not hear the reporting speaker as uttering or mentioning a prohibited word, as this time she is only mentioning a word as used by a community in which such a use is licit (and not prohibited) and is not heard as insulting or demeaning or derogating.

8   Responsibility for Slurs in Indirect Reports and Pragmatics

In the following sections I address some problems in connection with responsibility for the slurs in that-clauses in indirect reports, with an eye on a serious problem raised by Wayne Davis.

Anderson and Lepore propose that in indirect reports the reporting speaker, rather than the reported speaker, is responsible for the slurring expression appearing in the embedded that-clause. Now, while I accept that in some cases, the reporting speaker can be complicit in uttering the slurring expression, I am inclined to accept that the reported speaker has greater responsibility than the reporting speaker – intuitively because the indirect report is about the reported speaker and NOT the reporting speaker.

I would say that the pragmatic considerations I expressed in Capone (2010, 2012, 2013c) assign responsibility for the slur to the reported speaker, while the responsibility of the reporter consists in not having avoided the slur choosing a more neutral counterpart. However, if a more neutral counterpart had been chosen, how

could we know that the original speaker was responsible for slurring? This is a damn complicated question. We may get the idea that the reporting speaker was complicit in the slurring, however his responsibility for the slurring was inferior. And there are contexts in which the responsibility of the reporter has been completely corroded (take the current paper or a judiciary proceeding).

In my opinion, there should be ways to signal that the reporter is not primarily responsible for the slurring expression (here contextual clues could be mobilized to convey that that reporter's standard vocabulary does not include slurs and therefore by deduction, responsibility for the slurring is shifted to the reported speaker. Furthermore, pragmatic default inferences also contribute to assign responsibility to the reported speaker, as the interpretation that the perspective of the reported speaker is being adopted is more relevant – relevance being the ratio between contextual effects and processing efforts. An interpretation according to which either the reported speaker or the reporting speaker or both could be responsible for the slurring is clearly non-economical with respect to the possibility that one alone was responsible. If the reporting speaker was responsible for the slurring (and not the reported speaker), the reporting speaker could certainly be guilty of lack of clarity and the processing efforts would be greater. However, if the original speaker was responsible for the slurring, the interpretation would be the most relevant one since the perspective of the original speaker is what counts and what the hearer is interested in. The hearer does not want to know what the reporting speaker thinks, but only what the reported speaker thinks.

In Capone (2010, 2013c) I drew the readers' attention to the following:

Paraphrasis/Form Principle
The that-clause embedded in the verb 'say' is a paraphrasis of what Y said, and meets the following constraints:

> Should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer 'that' on account of its form/style. (Capone 2013c, p. 174).

In Capone (2010) I drew this principle from the principle of Relevance, but this is not at stake here.

Now, the paraphrasis/Form principle clearly predicts that if a speaker did not utter a slurring expression in her utterance, she would not like/accept being reported as having uttered that word. Hence the obligation by the indirect reporter to avoid using that word, as such use would cast a sinister shadow on the reported speaker depicting her as racist (when she is not). There is a complication here, because while the reported speaker never uttered the word 'nigro' or 'nigger', she may have wanted to utter it. The indirect reporter knows well that the slur was not uttered, but she also knows that if she had been permitted, the speaker would have willingly uttered it (she was prevented by political circumstances). Perhaps the reported speaker used

the word 'black' with derogatory intonation, or perhaps when this word was uttered the speaker's face was illuminated by a sinister grimace. Perhaps the reporting speaker merely guessed at the intention behind the word. So, should we take the reporting speaker who injects 'nigger' into the that clause of his report at face value and attribute it to the reported speaker or not? My story predicts that even if the reporting speaker was wrong in his choice of 'nigger', pragmatics says that the reported speaker is represented as being racist.

That these semantic/pragmatic considerations should be taken into account is obvious, if one considers that accepting the alternative account by Anderson and Lepore (2013) commits one to the view that an indirect report of a slurring expression is subject to a double prohibition (both the original speaker and the reported one are prohibited from uttering the slurring expression) and nevertheless the indirect report of a slurring expression gets by. Why is it that it gets by? Because it is important to someone that she know about the slurring utterance in the first place and this can be achieved only through reporting the slurring expression. It appears that the prohibition was evaded twice. Instead, a view that the reporting speaker is simply quoting (admittedly mixed-quoting) a speaker would ensure that only one person is guilty for the slurring – and this is the desired result, because ideally we would want to make a difference between the original culprit and the reporter who may be non-racist and whose purpose is (possibly) to denounce a racist remark. In Anderson and Lepore's (2013) view accusing someone of slurring is something that can occur in the court (presumably) but not in ordinary conversation. Yet, we have evidence that in ordinary conversations too we utter pronouncements against immoral and illicit conducts.

9   Arguments for the View That the Reported Speaker Is Responsible for Slurs in That-Clauses of Indirect Reports

In the remainder of this paper, I will expatiate on the reasons for believing that the story of indirect reports and slurs should proceed the way I have depicted it. I will advance a number of arguments, examining their consequences.

   The first argument is based on expressivity. We must be able to express what we think. Searle says "Whatever can be meant can be said (Searle 1979: 20). In the case of indirect reporting, we must have a way to report an offensive speech event (for the purpose of denouncing it) without committing/repeating the same offence. Clearly, one can resort to euphemistic ways of saying things or one can be indirect and use convoluted sentences that give the hearer an idea of what was done in the offensive utterance. To give you an example, one of our colleagues, who was known by everyone to be crazy, once said in the common room that "Berlusconi ha il pisello piccolo" (Berlusconi has a small dick). I then interpreted this utterance literally, although now it occurs to me that this was probably a way of saying that Berlusconi is not capable of governing the country, if an analogy is followed with

another expression which idiomatically means that (Berlusconi non ha le palle (per governare il paese). Perhaps this teacher had transformed the idiomatic form into an unidiomatic form. Whatever the case, I wanted to tell other colleagues what had happened, but I was terribly embarrassed to let the female teachers know. The taboo associated with this sentence was making its sting felt. However, there was no way to report the utterance without appearing to commit the same offence. But surely, if one had to report the utterance, one had to do so in a way that revealed the words used. Thus, as a consequence of Searle's principle of expressibility, a speaker must be in a position to make an indirect report of something that is obscene relying on the context or pragmatic principles to impute the offensive phrase to the reported speaker. There must be contexts, such as a court, where one must be able to tell the whole truth about what was said.

The second argument exploits a parallel between quotation and indirect reporting. If we accept Anderson and Lepore's view that there is a societal prohibition against uttering a slurring expression, it is clear that this should apply to quotation as well. Thus a sentence such as "Mary said: John is a nigger" should be as infelicitous as the corresponding indirect report 'Mary said that John is a nigger'. Here my opponent may reply that, after all, Anderson and Lepore think of a prohibition against using, rather than against 'mentioning' (in the sense of Lyons 1977) a slurring expression. I quite agree that quotative structures, in general, are associated with opacity and sometimes mention, rather than using, certain expressions. However, even accepting the using/mentioning distinction, it should be said that the distinction does not neatly correlate with the distinction between indirect reporting and quoting. In fact, we have seen that quotation structures can, in context, amount to indirect reporting. Furthermore, as Cappelen and Lepore (2005) themselves note, indirect reports exhibit the phenomenon of mixed quotation. Thus there are segments of indirect reports that are mentioned. We can easily have reports such as John said that 'apple' has five letters. If anything, we would expect quotations to host slurring expressions, while indirect reporting should not. However, in practice there is not much difference between quotation and indirect reporting.

The third argument is based on critical linguistics (on this, see Linda Waugh et al. 2016). If we want to expunge racism, we should be able to denounce it and we should be able to talk about it, rather than being scared to talk about it. Denouncing racism involves describing the kind of speech acts performed by people during their racist practices. It is clear that in doing so, we should be able to report utterances verbatim or close to verbatim, our moral authority sufficing to exclude that we are complicit in this kind of discourse. We should take position in public and this should be enough to label us as non-racists and to bracket the racist linguistic practices. Indirect reporting is a way of bracketing slurring expressions, which appear as enveloped in inverted commas. Contextual considerations combined with default interpretations should be enough to bracket slurring and racist expressions in general.

9.1 Objections by Wayne Davis

The job is done egregiously by my Paraphrasis/Form Principle, which however was attacked by Wayne Davis in a personal communication. There are two fundamental objections.

Consider the following example:

(4)

Billy: The first black person was elected U.S. president in 2008.

Tommy: Billy said that the first nigger was elected U.S. president in 2008.

Wayne Davis writes:

> I would say that Tommy's report is false. But your constraint need not be violated. Billy may not object at all to Tommy's way of reporting what he said and may have been just as happy using 'nigger' in place of what he said. Billy may take it as a fair paraphrasis of what he said. But it is not, so Tommy's report is false. It is also an unacceptable thing to say, whether or not Billy objects to it.

I quite agree that this is a plausible objection. But this is seen from the point of view of a racist speaker. So my prediction makes a difference between racist and non-racist speakers. It works in the case of non-racist speakers but not in the case of racist speakers.

We could try to revise my Principle:

> Should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, in case he were to accept certain norms that are standard or should be standard in society, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer 'that' on account of its form/style (Capone 2013c, p. 174)

Now, I should say that these contextual injections of clauses could go on in case other objections are raised. I doubt that all such clauses should be made explicit, as principles should have a general validity even if they are in need of being constantly enriched through contextualizations.

A better treatment of Wayne Davis' objection could be the following:

An indirect report of an utterance by X cannot be felicitous UNLESS X is inclined to approve if it on account of its content and form/style or some impartial judge is inclined to accept it on account of its content/form/style given what was said by the original speaker.

The case by Davis is ruled out because the reported speaker did not utter a slurring expression and although he would probably have approved of it, either

he or the impartial judge would agree that what he said did not include a slurring expression: thus, if the slurring expression features in the indirect report, despite the fact that it was not uttered by the original speaker, it must be construed as under the responsibility of the reporting speaker.

The upshot of this is the following: if a slurring expression features in the that-clause of an indirect report, assume that the slur is under the responsibility of the original speaker, because if the original speaker had not uttered it, the reporter would not have had the right to report it, given that either the original speaker or the impartial judge would object to its presence in the that-clause of the indirect report.

I take that indirect reports typically display the words used in speech by the original speaker. I believe that it is more natural that the indirect report should express the words used by the reported speaker rather than those of the reported speaker, because the indirect report is intended to reflect the utterance of the reported speaker.

Wayne Davis objects to this in a p.c. He says:

This may be true in some cases, but only when the reporter is using the same language as the reported speaker. It is also false in the same-language case when the reported speaker uses a lot of contractions or regionalisms that are inappropriate in the reporter's context or uses misspellings or mispronounciations.

Let us leave aside the different-language case, as here contextual considerations advert the hearers that it is not possible that the same words uttered by the original speaker are used by the indirect reporter. This is a notable exception, but I never claimed that my principle covers all cases. It is predictable that defaults in interpretation can be overridden by contextual considerations.

It is true that as Davis says, indirect reports can change the words, they can eliminate grammatical errors, misspellings, regionalisms etc. However, there is intuitively a difference between an indirect report that eliminates all such problems and an indirect report that introduces such problems. In the former case, a speaker should not be entirely unhappy about the reporter's charitable attitude and thus my principle may not be refuted by such a case. In the latter case, errors are being introduced on purpose (or perhaps involuntarily). But certainly, the original speaker should not be happy with the result. Such an attitude is clearly reflected in my Principle. Of course, a third case could be pondered on. A person who is particularly proud of belonging to a certain region, objects to the fact that the indirect reporter eliminated a certain regionalism. But this case too is covered by my Paraphrasis/Form Principle. In fact, the original speaker objects to the change or interpolation by the reporter, as I predicted. Whatever the success of my reply strategy, I would like to say that though I greatly appreciate the merit of Wayne Davis's objection, I object to his objection on general grounds. Of course I never said or would like to say that all the words used in the indirect report belong to the original speaker. In some cases, it may not be important to decide whether a word was part of the original speaker's speech or was just a synonym used for

convenience. The Paraphrasis/Form principle applies only when it is relevant, that is in the case of problematic words. If a word rather than another makes an important difference, in that the indirect report ends up reporting a different speech act (as I said in Capone 2010) or the indirect report ends up being offensive to the audience, then an interpretative problem arises and the interpretative ambiguity I discussed at the beginning of this paper arises, which needs to be resolved by pragmatic interpretation. So Davis might now be relieved by my conclusion that like him I do not think that every word of the original utterance must be in the that-clause of the indirect report.

Consider now a different case. I happened to send a paper to P & C. During the proofs something strange happened. I had no reply to my corrections and no revised proofs were sent to me. The result was that an uncorrected paper was published. Thomas Gray, whom I cited to embellish the paper, became Thomas Grey. Although the Press is now remedying this problem, which really horrified me (but was just one case out of many of bad publishing), I was certainly not happy to have been reported as saying that Thomas Grey and NOT Thomas Gray had written the Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard. I certainly object to my having been reported in that way. I understand that these things happen, but the real problem is when indirect reporters are either inaccurate and sloppy or dishonest. So there must be something general in defense of my principle.

10 On Translation

Translation may be a problematic area in the issue of indirect reports. While my form/style principle predicts that forms should be as close as possible to those of the original utterances (and utterers), I have allowed, in some cases, that the principle can and must be surmounted in case heavy contextual clues indicate that the words originally uttered cannot be in the language of the indirect report. In other words, it is possible that the original utterance is in Russian, while the reporting utterance is in English or Italian. I have also made it clear that, even when the context does not make us suspicious that the original utterance was in a language different from the one of the indirect report, we should not expect a coincidence between every word in the reporting utterance and every word in the reported utterance (the original utterance). We expect Relevance to be involved in selecting the lexical items which are under the scope of the Form/Style Principle.

Now suppose that there are some slurring expressions in the that-clause of the indirect report, which as the context may indicate, is expressed in a language non-coincident with that of the reported utterance. What should we make of those slurring expressions? Should we ignore them altogether, assuming that due to the translation we should give up the hope of reconstructing the original speaker's words? While I must agree that, in this case, things are much more complicated, my intuition is that the words used by the indirect reporter/translator still give us some indication as to the general quality of the words used by the original speaker.

The use of a slur in the that-clause of an indirect report, in my opinion, should correspond to a use of a slur in the reported utterance. And this may be imputed to some presumed **Principle of Translation**:

> Do not translate an expression occurring in the original utterance (reported) with a word which gives the impression that the original speaker was slurring, using foul language, insulting, etc. unless the original speaker was indeed slurring, using foul language, insulting, etc.

In other words, the form/style principle seems to survive despite the complications of translation. The Principle of Translation, in fact, seems to be necessitated by the Form/Style Principle. In fact, even by translating one can somehow give the hearer some indication about the original voice. It is not a matter of words, but of style, and thus despite the fact that the words may be different, because they come from a different language, the style seems to be preserved despite translation.

These may not be the final words on the matter, but I take these to be an important step forward.

11   Conclusion

The issue of slurs can be tackled from a philosophical point of view – it is just another way to prove that opacity exists and that in indirect reports one cannot (even try) to replace a word with a coextensive one. Slurs appear to be ("largely or for the most part," in accord with the family resemblance conception of category membership) coextensive with their neutral counterparts – if the considerations by Croom are accepted. Thus, they are one more weapon in the arsenal of the philosopher who argues in favor of opacity (of indirect reports or belief reports). So far, philosophers have found ways to severely restrict or corrode the idea of opacity. It is claimed that one can replace a word with a coextensive one – say a name with another – without changing the truth-conditions of the report (for example, Devitt (1996) is at pains to show that we can replace a proper name in a belief report if the coextensive name is more familiar to the hearer. The change does not affect the truth value of the utterance. I have always stuck to the more conservative view (see Higginbotham lectures, Oxford 1994) that opacity exists – and this can be supported by intuitions about slurs (this agrees with Croom (2015), as indeed his family resemblance approach has been attempting to argue this point even further, for D and S are not even strictly speaking co-extensive on his view!). Obviously there is a deep difference between 'John believes that Afro-Americans are clever' and 'John believes that niggers are clever'. John may have the former but not the latter belief – because he does not believe that Afro-Americans are niggers – that is to say despicable.

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Biographical Information   Dr. Capone obtained two Ph.D.s in linguistics (University of Oxford) and in Philosophy of language (University of Palermo). He was examined by James Higginbotham (linguistics) and Paolo Leonardi (philosophy). Likewise, he obtained in 2013 the Habilitation for Linguistics and for Philosophy of Language (including the Habilitation as full professor). Dr. Capone has lectured and carried out research at the Universities of Messina and of Palermo. He is the chief editor of the Springer series 'Perspectives on Pragmatics, Philosophy and Psychology', he is a member of the board of international journals like *JP*, *Brill research perspectives in pragmatics*, *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica*. Dr. Capone has more than 100 publications (authored books, edited books, special issues of international journals, research papers, review articles, entries for international encyclopedias, etc.). He has published papers or reviews in the following journals: "Journal of Pragmatics", "Journal of Intercultural Pragmatics", "Pragmatics and Society", "Pragmatics and Cognition", "Australian Journal of Linguistics", "La Linguistique", "RASK, International Journal of Language and Communication", "Oxford Working Papers in Linguistics", "Italian Journal of Philosophy of Language", "Reti, Saperi, Linguaggi", "Linguistics", "Studies in Language", "Lingua e Stile".

When Reporting Others Backfires

Luvell Anderson

I want to focus on one area of linguistic theory for a moment that slurs' consideration forces us to rethink, and that is the semantics and pragmatics of indirect reports. Reporting slurring utterances of others is risky business. Ordinarily, when a speaker reports another's utterance indirectly the report is of that utterance and the reported material is attributed to the original speaker. However, in the case of slurring utterances this is not always so. Oftentimes, the offense of slurs occurring in indirect reports manages to get attributed to the reporter rather than the reportee.[1]

For example, consider the following pair of sentences,

(1) Skip said that Tebow is a born winner.
(2) #Roberto said that Cecile Kyenge is the first nigger minister in Italy.

A report of (1) attributes the complement clause, i.e. 'Tebow is a born winner' to Skip rather than to the person reporting the utterance. But in the case of (2), the offense of 'nigger' in the complement is attributed to the reporter rather than Roberto. However, this is odd since reporting contexts are typically thought to be cases of *mentioning* rather than those of *use*. That is, the reporter is not asserting what comes after 'said that'; she is merely mentioning what someone else has said.

What explains the difference between the types of reports represented in (1) and (2)? Do slurs require a semantic analysis that attributes their content to the current speaker? Or are there pragmatic principles that explain why reports of slurs often result in the attribution of offense to the reporter?

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[1]See Jesse Harris and Chris Potts (2009) for an analysis of non-speaker oriented instances of expressives (slurs).

L. Anderson (✉)
Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN, USA
e-mail: lndrsn14@memmphis.edu

It is my contention that neither semantics nor pragmatics gives the right story for what happens when slurs occur in indirect reports. In Anderson and Lepore (2013a, b) I claim that the nature of slurs' offense is explained by violations of prohibitions placed on their use by the disaffected group or the relevant caretaker of the group. Drawing from that analysis I want to claim that it is not that slurs' behavior in indirect reports is radically different from non-slurring expressions due to semantic or pragmatic reasons. The prohibitive norms placed on slurs block semantic and pragmatic mechanisms from doing their work. At least, this is what I will argue in what follows. In this brief essay I will proceed as follows. In the first sections I examine a few key theories on indirect reports and what they say (or might say) about indirectly reporting slurring utterances. I show that each view presented is inadequate and fails to accurately explain the phenomenon in question. I then argue that the features unaccounted for are best explained by the Prohibitionist view on the nature of slurs' offense.

1   Some Preliminary Thoughts

Before looking at particular views it is important to list some of the features indirect reports are believed to possess. First, some claim that reporting utterances are cases of *mentions* as opposed to *uses*. Consider (3) and (4),

(3)   Janelle went to Italy.
(4)   'Janelle' has 7 letters.

In (3), 'Janelle' is used to talk about a person, namely Janelle, and what she did—i.e. go to Italy. In (4), 'Janelle' is used to talk about the name itself. The former is characterized as a *use*, while the latter is described as *mentioning*. As Nellie Wieland (2013) points out, however, the case is not so straightforward with indirect reports. Because a reporter can faithfully report another without using the original speaker's exact utterance, the report is not so much about language as in the case of (4) above. For example,

(5)   Jay Z is married to Beyoncé.
(6)   Alex said that the rapper that is the father of Blue Ivy is married to
        Beyoncé.

Note that substitution of co-referring expressions in an indirect report is perfectly admissible. In a sense the speaker *uses* the definite description to *mention* what Alex originally communicates.

Cappelen and Lepore indicate that most accounts of the semantics of propositional attitude reports share the following two clauses:

(A)   Propositional attitude reports assert that a relation obtains between an agent and
        a proposition (or a proposition-like content); and

(B) A propositional attitude report 'A V-ed that P' (for some propositional attitude verb V) is true only if the proposition (or proposition-like content) expressed by the complement clause P matches the proposition (or proposition-like content) of the agent's attitude.[2]

Thus, there is some feature of the proposition expressed in the complement clause and the content of the agent's attitude that allows us to say they are the same, or similar enough to constitute a felicitous report. It is important to note that, as Cappelen and Lepore point out, various views differ with respect to what constitutes *matching*. I won't, however, attempt to settle this question here. It is enough for the purposes of this essay to alert your attention to the issue.

Wieland (2013) notes that indirect reports need not represent the propositional content of the original report without alteration, as illustrated in

(7)   A: I went to the taco stand and bought a soda.
      B: A said that she went to the taco stand. (Conjunction Elimination)
(8)   A: I had some delicious nachos for dinner.
      B: A said that he had nachos for dinner. (Modifier Elimination)

Intuitively, the report in (7B) and (8B) are faithful reports of the original even though the contents of both are not identical to the originals.

In addition, Wieland indicates that reports involving inferences—what she calls an *inferential indirect report*—can also be felicitous. For instance, it is not difficult to imagine a context in which (9B) is a felicitous report of (9A),

(9)
A: I didn't fail any students.
B: Professor A said Maryanne passed her exam.

Wieland notes that as long as B knows Maryanne was in Professor A's class, the report is felicitous.

Lastly, Wieland points out that unlike their direct counterparts, indirect reports are only opaque *some of the time*. An example of the opacity of direct reports is illustrated by (10) and (11),

(10)   'Bachelor' has eight letters.
(11)   'Unmarried man' has eight letters.

Even though the quoted words in (10) and (11) are co-referring expressions one cannot substitute one for the other without affecting the truth-value of the utterance. Though this happens with indirect reports too, there are other occasions where substitution preserves truth-value,

(12)   A: Black Panther beat up Captain America.
      B: A said that T'Challa beat up Captain America.

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[2]Cappelen and Lepore (1997, p. 432)

In the reporting context, if B and the audience knows that Black Panther and T'Challa are the same person and that A does not know this, B's report can still be felicitous. The upshot of cases like these, as Wieland notes, is that the opacity of indirect reports "depends on pragmatic principles and contextual features."[3]

2 The Paratactic View

Having discussed some preliminary issues concerning indirect reporting, we can now consider the phenomenon's semantics and pragmatics. Donald Davidson (Davidson 1981) presents the paratactic view (PV) of indirect reports. The view makes use of the *samesay* relation, whereby the reporter makes an utterance with the same import as the original utterance. Presumably, the relation amounts to a match in content of the reportee and reporter's utterances.

According to Davidson, the logical form of an indirect report is present, with minor changes, in its surface grammar. What we really have are two utterances that get transformed into the usual form. That transformation is illustrated in (13)–(15),

(13)   The earth moves.
          Galileo said that.
(14)   Galileo said that. The earth moves.
(15)   Galileo said that the earth moves.

Davidson claims the 'that' in the report is a demonstrative that refers to an utterance, in this case an utterance of 'The earth moves.' 'Said' is a two-place predicate that relates speakers and utterances. The paratactic view, thus, characterizes (2) as constituting a relation between Roberto, the reporter, and (16),

(16)   Cecile Kyenge is the first nigger minister in Italy,

namely, the reporter of (16) and Roberto stand in the *samesay* relation.

What implications can be drawn from the paratactic view about slurring indirect reports? On this account the content of the reporter's utterance conveys the same import as the original speaker's utterance. One thing that might be suggested on behalf of the view is that since an indirect report seeks to establish a samesaying relation between the original speaker and the reporter, each speaker says something in their own right. That is, each makes an utterance and the report simply identifies the match in import. If that is correct, then it is not difficult to see why the reporter would be charged with an offense when the report involves a slur. On Davidson's account, the reporter seeks to match the import of the speaker's *utterance*, not the *sentence*.

It might seem at first glance that the paratactic view offers a very convincing story of slurring indirect reports. If in order to felicitously report another one

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[3]Capone et al. (2013).

must match the import—possibly, the illocutionary point—of the original utterance, then one must produce an utterance that shares the content of the original. Since indirect reports containing slurs often attribute the offense to the reporter rather than the reportee, one might think this compels us to conceive of slurs' content as possessing aspects that are speaker-oriented, thus making it virtually impossible to report others by re-using the originals speaker's slur.[4] The paratactic view coupled with a particular understanding of slurs' content would explain why a reporter who simply repeats the slur in the indirect report is attributed with the offense.

If slurs' behavior in indirect reports pushes us to think they have a speaker-oriented element, one might suggest we think of them as indexical items. David Kaplan (1989) describes two kinds of indexicals, *pure* and *demonstrative* indexicals. According to Kaplan, demonstratives are indexicals that require an additional element in order for them to refer—for Kaplan, that additional element is a directing intention. The characteristic example of a demonstrative is 'that.' Pure indexicals, on the other hand, do not require an additional element like a directing intention in order to refer. Paradigmatic examples of pure indexicals are terms like 'I' and 'now.'

Obviously, slurs do not require associated demonstrations so they could not be demonstratives.[5] Do slurs possess an indexical component similar to pure indexicals like 'I' and 'now?' Suppose the indexical component requires dependence on the speaker's perspective for an adequate evaluation. Presumably, the inclusion of such a component would make (17) out to be on a par with (18),

(17)   Dykes are lots of fun at bat mitzvahs.
(18)   I am hungry.

Just as a reporter could not indirectly report (18) correctly by using 'I', likewise, she could not indirectly report (17) correctly by using 'dyke.' Does this proposal explain the offense of indirect reports containing slurs?

This view does have a couple of virtues. First, it seems to explain the apparent speaker-oriented nature of the slur. That is, it tells us why indirect reports of slurs stick to the reporter rather than the reportee. Next, it also provides an explanation for why the offense of the slur is not contained within the complement clause following 'said that.' The indexical component scopes out of the embedded context. But despite these virtues there are vices lurking in the midst. First, the indexical approach does not explain how attributions of offense can vary depending on the social identity of the reporter. Generally, when the reporter is a member of the slur's target group, that person can successfully indirectly report that slurring utterance successfully, i.e. the offense is rightly attributed to the original speaker.[6] I suppose

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[4]See Amaral et al. (2007) and Harris and Potts (2009) for discussions of non speaker-oriented readings.

[5]I should point out that there is some controversy over whether demonstratives do in fact require associated demonstrations. For brevity's sake I bypass this for the current discussion.

[6]Philippe Schlenker (2003, 2011) speaks of *shiftable indexicals*, which include contexts other than the actual context of utterance as appropriate loci of evaluation.

one could attempt to explain this by proposing some sort of group-based indexical-like item. The challenge, however, is to say what exactly the semantic relationship between the social identity and offense is such that offense is attributed to out-group members but not in-group members.

Next, if the offense is located in an indexical component that is part of slurs' semantics, it must be possible to report utterances containing them. In the case of (18), we know how to convert it in order to yield a correct indirect report (i.e. samesay),

(19)   A said that he is hungry.

The speaker in (19) samesays the utterance in (18).

Is there an available paraphrase for (17)? Clearly (20) does not capture the offense of the original utterance,

(20)   A said that lesbians are lots of fun at bat mitzvahs.

But neither do attempts like,

(21)   A said, rather offensively, that lesbians are lots of fun at bat mitzvahs.
(22)   A said, using an offensive word, that lesbians are lots of fun at bat mitzvahs.
(23)   A said that D-words are lots of fun at bat mitzvahs.

None of these candidates, I suggest, adequately report the original speaker. The underlying assumption is that if the offense of the slur is a semantic component of the expression, then it must be accounted for in the report. I submit that the considerations presented above provide us with ample reason to be skeptical of appeals to indexicality as an explanation of slurs' offense, and hence a resolution for their behavior in indirect reports.[7]

3   Wieland on Indirect Reports

So far we've seen that the paratactic view does not capture the relevant data for indirect reports of slurring utterances. The move to indexicality failed to improve matters much. Perhaps we need a view that characterizes indirect reports in terms of *context sensitivity*. Nellie Wieland (2013) remarks, "a complete understanding of the content of the report requires knowing *something* about the context in which it was uttered (5)," and that the meaning of a context-sensitive expression is "underdetermined without knowledge of context (6)." Wieland presents a view of indirect reports that appeals to pragmatic principles for their analysis.

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[7]Also, see Anderson and Lepore (2013a, b) for criticisms of the indexical view of slurs.

Wieland opts for an account of indirect reports that views the practice as "a kind of *metarepresentation*" in which the reporter "is to represent relevant features of the reported context to the audience and thereby convey something about that earlier context (21)." The reporter relays information she finds important from the original context of the utterance for purposes relevant to her current context and audience.

Wieland finds the representational accuracy of indirect reports illustrated in several different types of cases. One such case is irony. Consider (24),

(24)   After a really bad philosophy talk, *A* says:
       A: That was, like, *really* good.
       *B_1: A said that the talk was really good.
       B_2: A said that he didn't like the talk much.

A report of what A said with B_1 is infelicitous on Wieland's view because it fails to capture the speech act content of the original utterance. In essence, B_1 fails to accurately represent something about the original reported context; namely, the ironic tone or sense of the original speaker.

How does this view handle our original question of slurring indirect reports? Wieland considers why some speakers are hesitant—even resistant—to utter another's slur in a report. She remarks that many speakers view slurs as non-referring and as a result are "unwilling to even repeat the slur in question for fear of using the slur inadvertently (15)." Ultimately, speakers are afraid that repeating the slur either signals their endorsement of the expression or an endorsement of its referential status.

I'm not sure this response gets us very far though. First, suppose slurs in fact are non-referring expressions, a supposition about which I am dubious. Are these the only non-referring expressions to appear in an indirect report? I would think not. If by 'non-referring' Wieland just means expressions with empty sets, then surely there are plenty of indirect reports of statements including non-referring expressions that do not produce the troubles incurred by slurring reports. For example,

(25)   Anibel said that the new superintendent is a witch.
(26)   Biff said that unicorns once roamed the earth.

Both 'witch' and 'unicorn' are non-referring expressions since their extensions are empty. I submit that there is no suspicion of endorsement surrounding utterances of these reports. Thus, slurs' purported non-referential status cannot be the reason speakers object to reporting it.

Of course, 'non-referring' may be understood differently from the sense elucidated above. Wieland could mean something else entirely. Another thing she could mean is, echoing the words of Kent Back (ms), that non-referring expressions are those in which "there is no attempt to refer (2)." According to Bach, "the phrase 'referring expression' is ordinarily limited to any expression whose propositional contribution is its referent (if it has one) (fn. 2, 2)." Adopting Bach's characterization, it follows that nonreferential expressions do not contribute a referent to the propositions in which they occur.

How does thinking of slurs as nonreferential expressions explain why reporters are often charged with committing an offense? At first glance there appears to be nothing special about non-referring expressions that would explain the phenomenon. Reporting a non-referring expression does not automatically indicate that the speaker endorses what she is reporting. At least, we do not typically think so in the case of non-slurs.

Further, there are instances where speakers shy away from reporting expressions that are presumably referential. Consider,

(27)   She said that Tim is an a-hole!

According to Mark Richard (2008), expressions like 'asshole', which contain an evaluative component, are referential. If that is correct, then the speaker who prefers not to repeat the expression is not resisting because she is afraid of endorsing its referential status. I submit that she steers clear of repeating the expression because she observes a taboo on its use. I will return to this idea shortly.

Before moving on, we should address a different view that locates the offense of slurs in speaker intention. Keith Allan writes,

> *A slur is an expression of disparagement that discredits, slights, smears, stains, besmirches or sullies what it is applied to (cf. the Oxford English Dictionary). A slur is not, as it is often taken to be, the lexical form (or forms) in a language expression ε, but instead the perlocutionary effect of ε as a constituent of υ (such that ε ⊆ υ).*[8]

On Allan's account, what makes an expression a slur is the speaker's perlocutionary intention to use it disparagingly; otherwise, the expression is not a slur. It follows then that if someone is offended by the occurrence of a purported slur in an indirect report though the reporter does not intend to disparage the expression's referent, then it is that person's fault for wrongly taking offense at an innocent utterance. The hearer should recognize the speaker's illocutionary intention.

Allan may be correct to claim that intention may play some role in determining whether a reporter slurs her target when she indirectly reports another's slurring utterance, but the account of slurs cannot be adopted generally. First, it wrongly assumes offended hearers mistakenly attribute ill intentions to reporters, but I do not see that this need be the case. One could very well discern the speaker's non-derogatory intentions and still be offended by the utterance. This much is evident from newscasters' practice of employing euphemisms for the more egregious slurs in a report. It seems clear that the audience recognizes the report as of someone else's utterances and actions yet the reporter (and the news station) knows uttering certain slurs will provoke offense. I conclude that Allan's view mistakenly conflates *offense* with *derogation*.

And secondly, Allan's intention-based account of slurs has implausible implications for speech in non-reporting contexts. If Allan were right that a speaker only slurs a target when she possesses a derogatory perlocutionary intention, then one

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[8]Keith Allan (2016).

could use the expression purely referentially without blame. For instance, a speaker, who lacks a derogating perlocutionary intention, would not slur his target even if he does intend bystanders to recognize the person is a member of a disliked group. I find this to be the wrong result. Allan fails to give account for the strong feeling many have that slurring expressions are derogatory independently of a speaker's current intentions. He ties the power and effects of the expression too closely to individual speaker intentions. I won't argue for it here but I think this strong intentionalist move disregards the structural realities needed to make sense of racist discourse.[9] That is, part of what gives these terms their expressive power are the relations of dominance they help establish, as well as the ones they help maintain. Ultimately, Allan's view does not really help us understand why indirect reports of slurring utterances provoke offense.

4 Prohibitionism and Indirect Reports

The failure of the views presented in the previous sections is, on my view, the result of a constrained imagination. The initial impulse is to explain any phenomena concerning language semantically or pragmatically. The same has been true when it comes to the nature of slurs' offense. Most theorists have offered theories of slurs' offense in terms of assertoric content, semantically embedded attitudes, presupposition, inference potential, or conventional implicature. In earlier articles (see Anderson and Lepore (2013a, b)) I argue that this impulse is mistaken. What is missing or overlooked is a sociology of language.[10] Purely semantic or pragmatic treatments leave behind important social factors that help lay the groundwork for the possibility of certain illocutionary moves.

According to the view presented in Anderson and Lepore (2013a, b) slurs are prohibited expressions and it is the violation of the prohibition that provokes offense. Of course, an explanation of how the prohibitions on slurring expressions arise is needed but that is outside of the scope of this essay.[11] The virtues of the Prohibition view are accentuated by the failures of the semantic and pragmatic theories.[12] For the purposes of this article I focus on the difficulties these theories have with explaining the offensiveness of indirect reports containing slurs.

If one is inclined to provide a semantic or pragmatic explanation for slurs' offense outside embedded contexts, it seems reasonable to expect a similar explanation for slurs' offense within embedded contexts. We have already seen attempts at explaining slurs' offense in indirect reports in the previous sections and those fell short of success. If offense were delivered semantically or pragmatically, we'd expect

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[9]I believe this to be true for sexist, ableist, classist, homophobic, etc. discourse.

[10]For more discussion on this issue, see Pierre Bourdieu (1991).

[11]For one version of such an explanation, see Lepore and Stone (ms).

[12]For more on specific objections to various semantic and pragmatic theories of slurs see Anderson and Lepore (2013a, b).

slurs to behave in similar ways as other expressions within indirect reports. Since they do not, we either must posit a different type of semantic or pragmatic content, or seek out an alternative explanation not based on semantics or pragmatics. What this new type of content—semantic or pragmatic—might be and the justification for supposing there exists such a thing I leave to others. In order to explain the phenomena this article set out to address I appeal to the Prohibitionist view.

I want to claim that the prohibitions on slurs short-circuit semantic and pragmatic mechanisms from operating. Because of a general prohibition on the *tokening* of slurring expressions—in particular, out-group members are prohibited—the offense emerges before semantic or pragmatic considerations can get off the ground. Because the reporter violates the prohibition in uttering the slur, it is she or he to whom offense is attributed.

Of course, not everyone is satisfied with this explanation. In his (2013) Alessandro Capone raises objections to this view. Capone maintains that indirect reports and quotation "work in a parallel way when slurring is embedded in the quotation or indirect report structure (177)." For Capone, indirect reports and quotation are connected and so must be analyzed together. This being the case Capone asks how we might explain the fact that "quotation marks do not rescind the responsibility of the reporter from that of the original speaker (179)?" Presumably, this is because quotation is regarded as a case of *mentioning* rather than *use*. Likewise, the complement clauses of indirect reports are being mentioned and not used. And because he describes Prohibitionism as a "rule of use" he wonders how use rules can apply to cases of mentioning.

Capone sums up his objections with two points: (1) quotation structure and indirect reports intended to have quotative structure undercut Prohibitionism because the original speaker can be assigned the greater responsibility for slurs uttered, and (2) in contrast to Prohibitionism a pragmatic view—particularly Capone (2010)—shows that responsibility for a slur uttered lies with the original speaker as well.

Capone claims that a pragmatic view containing the following two principles would allow us to assign the chief responsibility for a slur to the original speaker rather than the reporter:

Paraphrasis Principle   The that-clause embedded in the verb 'say' is a paraphrasis of what Y said that meets the following constraint: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, but would approve of it as a **fair paraphrasis** of her original utterance.

Paraphrasis/Form Principle   The that-clause embedded in the verb 'say' is a paraphrase of what Y said, and meets the following constraints: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer 'that' on account of its form/style.[13]

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[13]Capone (2013, p. 180).

If the original speaker would agree with both the content and the manner or style in which the report is delivered, then according to this view the report is felicitous.

I confess that I do not find Capone's alternative view convincing. He does note that it is not the case that the reporter is "beholden to the original speaker's 'approval' of [the reporter's] paraphrasis as fair" in all contexts (163). It is important for Capone that the hearer has contextual cues and clues to decouple the original speaker from the reporting speaker's voice. Thus, the default interpretation of indirect reports is guided by the two aforementioned principles.

But here is where I think the problem arises. Presumably, the offensiveness of slurs is supposed to prompt reporters to signal their distance from them by avoiding them if they can. A reporter can avoid uttering a slur in an indirect report by using a suitable substitution, otherwise the reporter risks complicity. Capone has not given a compelling story about what triggers this risk of complicity, however. If he opts for a presupposition view or an implicature view—he intimates that he is drawn to a conversational implicature view—then he is plagued with answering the objections raised against this view as an explanation of slurs' offense. As of yet he has not met that challenge.

Further, what are we supposed to make of a situation in which an original speaker would object to a reporter's indirect report on the basis of the paraphrasis/form principle, even though the content 'matches' in some suitable sense? Let us suppose the form of the report is delivered in a vernacular dialect that is foreign to the original speaker. Let's also suppose that no offensive expressions are used in the indirect report. Does this render the report unsuccessful? Infelicitous? It is unclear to me what the judgment is supposed to be. Intuitively, a report might still be felicitous even when it fails Capone's principles.

To return to the case of indirect reports containing slurs, Capone's view leaves unexplained why reporters making faithful reports of others are charged with an offense. We can imagine the proud bigot who would cheerfully affirm both the content and the form of a slurring report. The satisfaction of both principles typically means, according to Capone, that we can assign chief responsibility to the original speaker. Yet, attributions of offense to reporters persist. For Capone, this just illustrates the tenuousness of reporting contexts and the need for contextual cues and clues to help the hearer separate the original from the reporting speaker's voice.

I do not think things are as tenuous in reporting contexts as Capone describes. His insistence that the aforementioned view is the default interpretive mechanism relies on the assumption that reporting contexts are generally ambiguous with respect to separating original speaker from reporting speaker. However, the 'X said that' construction is a conventional marker that does much of the untangling between the original and reporting speakers' voices. It is quite possible that the objections to an indirect report of a slur have to do with hearers' discomfort with hearing the expression rather than any confusion about who actually *used* it.

5   Conclusion

To recap, I presented and evaluated representative views from both a semantic and a pragmatic approach. First, we saw how Davidson's Paratactic View could not explain how it is that if the reporter stands in the samesay relation to the original speaker, the former is still charged with the offense. This is alarming given that it seems a widely held belief that reports are cases of *mentioning* rather than *uses*. Next, we discovered that Wieland's pragmatic account falls short since an expression's being non-referring is not enough to signal endorsement on the part of the reporter. In the end, I argue that a Prohibitionist view on slurs' offense gives us a straightforward and simple analysis of the phenomenon.

The final upshot, then, is that the behavior of slurring expressions in indirect reporting contexts, as well as in other linguistic contexts, might prompt us to investigate whether an adequate and comprehensive analysis of linguistic phenomena requires more than semantic and pragmatic theorizing. A more complete analysis may require joining these analyses with perhaps a sociology of language.

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The Question of Reported Speech: Identifying an Occupational Hazard

Eric Whittle

1 Introduction

Arranging what we want to call 'reported speech' into predetermined categories is now an ongoing concern in language studies. Linguists routinely turn to the task with their ready conceptions. But in spite of our finest analytical intentions, report-types are yet to be specified without controversy. They emerge on their own terms, and then it becomes a matter of establishing more and more factors that would somehow explain their variations and subtlety of character. The enterprise tries to evolve but its ideals are never fulfilled. Perhaps its busiest responsibility is a satisfactory account of the so-called lexical introducer—"She says . . . " or "You said . . . "—and the harder we work at it, the more strained with anomalies our explanations become. If the concept of *saying* refuses to cooperate for the purposes of formal analysis, it may be time for pragmatics to relinquish assumed oversight and leave it (*saying*) to its own devices among the myriad circumstances from which it appears. And it follows that this has relevance to the concepts of *quoting* and *paraphrasing*.

By demonstrating how a concept works, and then proceeding with a short survey of the concept of *saying*, this piece argues that what analysts are technically obliged to call 'direct reporting' and 'indirect reporting' are not, in themselves, analysable objects. For the rest of the social world, they are not 'things' in *any* terminal sense. The proposal, in short, is that the term 'indirect reporting' has been misconceived. In which case, the questions that entangle our studies, "What really is *saying*?" and "What differentiates *telling*?" are needless ones, semantic hazards we can do without. While such enquiries reflect an academic approach to problem-solving, it

E. Whittle (✉)
School of Communication, Independent Research: Language & Sociology, Formally Murdoch University, Murdoch, WA, Australia
e-mail: woolly.bear@bigpond.com

is not as if social members outside the academy have any use for our answers. On the contrary, it is puzzling for them that anyone would take such questions seriously.

2   The Problem with Glossing Activities[1]

When components of a language are orchestrated into something intelligible in utterances and in books, it is not primitive speculation, apparently, to suggest that such arrangements constitute activities, or parts of activities. And given that, misunderstandings aside, we all engage in them—acclaiming, accusing, abusing, instructing, joking, quoting, questioning, and so on—(or perhaps choose not to engage because of them) it is difficult to conceive of a professional argument that can void the idea. This is old but still good news for speech-act theory and for variants of transcendent moral analysis. But here is the rub: When the professional analyst applies an action word, e.g., *questioning*, to an analytical description of an activity that has taken place, it is a mistake to assume that this word specifies a universal entity. In his paper, *Systematically Misleading Expressions*, Ryle (1990a) was continuing a long discussion on the incongruities that dog philosophical attempts to formalise abstract mental concepts such as *imagining*, *thinking*, *feeling*, *believing*, *knowing*, *hoping* and others. And while verbs such as *questioning* and *quoting* are not quite as abstract as the ones that interested Ryle, it can be shown that those disciplines that would have them categorised as topics of universal knowledge, without first acknowledging their routine use, are similarly misled.

   The stem of the argument is this: With reference to the grammatically correct sentence "That is a difficult question", it is reasonable to suggest that the word *question* is the subject and *difficult* is its predicate, i.e., the question has an attribute, which is difficulty. This might give promise to the idea that, because questioning has what appears to be an ascertainable property, it therefore qualifies as an ascertainable activity, and it follows, qualifies as the basis of a formal inquiry. And there is at least one such inquiry, called problematology. In much the same way, *joking* along with its various attributes (amusing, satirical, droll) has become the basis of the philosophy of humour. And *quoting* (direct, indirect, somewhere-in-between) also is the topic of interest in some formal studies. But the subject in "That is a difficult question" is a denuded grammatical kind, as if the sentence has simply presented itself for the purpose of formal analysis. Common logic tells otherwise: it belongs to a sequence. It orients directly to a previous utterance. So one might say that the previous utterance is the subject, and it has not one but two attributes—being difficult-ish, and being question-like.

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[1]The points of reference, the points of argument if you like, on these pages, are not arranged in order of importance or any particular sequence. Rather, they are coordinated features like those connected by roads on a map. One orientates from the whole.

But then, the question also has not simply appeared out of the bush; someone called Louie, who is an inquisitive child, uttered it. So in fact Louie is the subject, and it is he who has the attributes (among many others) of being able to do uttering-like things, to do questioning-like things, and to be difficult-ish. Difficulty is a quality of Louie and not the question because a complaint to him would be formulated in something like, "Why do you have to ask such difficult questions?" or "Why do you have to be so difficult?" and not "Why is your question so difficult?"

In order to complete the point of the argument, it has to be said that Louie, too, did not just stumble onto the scene. There are various physical, social and historical circumstances (ethnomethodologists and conversation analysts include acculturated rights, responsibilities and expectations among them) that account for the presence of not just Louie, but also his interlocutor, the question, and the response. That is, the scene itself is the subject of a good many attributes (including Louie) that come into consideration if one is going to make practical sense of "That is a difficult question". It is the fact that *difficulty* can be a quality of the scene, and not Louie or the question, which allows the other to later admit defeat: "I was stuck for words", or "What can one say in that situation?" In short, a whole scene of attributes is included in the meaning of "That is a difficult question" (and in the word *activity*).

Be that as it may, there are those who are going to insist that the word *question* in "That is a difficult question" is a reference to a generality that can be fully described, which is their prerogative. But in that case, it has to be conceded that a great deal of time is required, perhaps a whole career, making lists and describing all the different types of *questioning* there are, where *some* of them may have *some* aspects in common. A police officer can question a suspect, a follower can question the word of his or her faith, a navigator can question a set course, intentions can be questioned, intelligence can be questioned, one's health can be questioned, the weather is questionable, history is questionable, morals are questionable, there is scientific questioning in all its multiplicity, metaphysical questioning, and mathematical questioning. Then there is testing, trying, quizzing, auditioning, assessing, challenging, researching, reconnoitring, exploring, breathalysing, glancing over, groping, prying, tasting and sniffing. In this confusion there is no such thing as a ready reference for the word *questioning*, so why should our attempts to formalise the words *quoting* and *saying* be any less problematic?

If mere proliferation is a problem for determining the nature of questioning along one axis, it is deepened by ambiguity along another. It is eminently logical to say, "Can you tell us why" or "Will you show me on this map" or "Can't you just stop" or "Shouldn't you be helping"—though one can ask: Are these questions or commands, or instructions, or demands? Wittgenstein points out that even an ideal form of questioning can take on the form of a statement: "I want to know whether . . . " or "I am in doubt whether . . . " (1997: §24). Is the formulation "I'm asking you to leave" a question or a statement or an order or request? Do rhetorical questions count? So, not far into the enquiry, a dilemma becomes apparent: How can one ignore a gathering number of contradictions and ambiguities around questioning when social members in their own environment can use the word and its derivations

with such ease and clarity? Something is not right. And whatever is not right about investigations into questioning may have relevance to investigations into quoting and saying.

3   The Problem with Describing Concepts

Ryle and Wittgenstein, in their separate though partly overlapping projects, both demonstrated the logical inconsistencies that are part of the many attempts to formally define words and sentences. By way of their dialogic scenarios they show that it is consistency-of-use across an indefinite number of phrases and sentences that lends stability to a concept, *not* technical descriptions of it. In order to get a handle on the concept of questioning (or quoting, or joking), it is not a matter of describing an instance of it and then comparing with something else not questioning. The best that can be done is to compare consistent with inconsistent use of the word.

To render a concept intelligible, Ryle recognised (and he acknowledged Wittgenstein for doing the same) that one has to "... disentangle the required notion of *elucidation* from the obsessive notion of *object-description* ..." (1990b Vol 1: 188 original emphasis). Since Ryle's time, the forlorn quest for technical descriptions that might ground our reference terms for the goings-on in the social world has barely diminished. And neither have the field's epistemic problems. That they persist is evidenced in the sheer number of 'perspectives' to consider, from the technology of grammar to etymology to conversation analysis to anthropology to psychology to moral philosophy, if one wants to participate in language studies. Complexities, contradictions, and ambiguities have all featured in the push to discover a hidden order that bears on all words and/or the people who use them, and the ceaseless task of overcoming problems has become a ceaseless distraction. Yet, the very material that can offer clues as to the viability of such an enterprise is everywhere to see.

For some decades now a group of disciplined souls have set about establishing an important collection of this hidden-in-plain-sight material, but while the recording of it has been a diligent and rigorous process, it is not a process of induction and in no way suggests a maturing science, least of all a science of language.[2] Instead, the value of this repository is in its ready-made working models of logic, where anyone with an interest in language or cultural studies might find something by which to assess the limits of their own concepts.[3] That concepts are employed sometimes beyond the bounds of common understanding was something of concern

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[2]For a list of relevant publications see Paul ten Have's Bibliography of Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis found at http://www.paultenhave.nl/EMCABIB.pdf

[3]For example, those inclined to ask, "What is *laughter*?" might explore some of Gail Jefferson's writings on the topic. Cultural differences notwithstanding, one soon discovers that the question looses its imposed logical tension.

for Wittgenstein and Ryle alike, but while Wittgenstein (1997: §38), in a more sympathetic mood, suggested that extending words beyond their traditional use is to take them on holiday, Ryle (1963, 1990b) was somewhat scathing—we are guilty of displacing them into the realm of nonsense.

What follows is an attempt to show how uniquely professional concepts such as *'examining words', 'studying sentences'*, and *'analysing speech-acts'*, can go astray when press-ganged into the quest for an inviolable certainty. This has important implications for the notion that one can *analyse paraphrasing* or *explain indirect reporting*. It is a feature of investigations into concepts that, just as language is not subject to mechanical principles, there is no formula for calculating its limits; one can only set off into the cultural landscape until lost (for the literalist, it won't take long) and then retrace to logical territory.

4   A Misconception of Questioning

To begin: The components of language that make up, for example, a round of introductions—

Therapist	Hi, Jim / / c'mon in
Jim	H'warya
Therapist	Jim, this is uh Al
Jim	Hi
Therapist	Ken
Jim	Hi
Ken	Hi
Therapist	Roger
Roger	Hi
Jim	Hi
Therapist	Jim Reed

(Sacks 1995 Vol 1: 281)

—are part of folklore, they are phenomena of arbitrary tradition, so nothing of value is lost by withdrawing specialist theories of generalisable *units-of-meaning*, i.e., theories of grammatically regulated words and sentences encoded by nature, or our DNA perhaps. On the contrary, there are tremendous benefits involved. Primarily, there is relief from the embarrassment of a policy that would have the folk of our studies rendered logically witless, reduced to 'cultural dopes' in their own environment, as the ethnomethodologists put it. And not least, one can begin to dissolve the hazardous complexities and contradictions located around specialist terms for these components.

This approach involves accepting the fact that for bits and pieces of a language *there is no down time*, so they cannot be studied as static objects lounging around

with nothing to do! When the analyst studies a piece of material such as Jim's "Hwarya" (above) there is no point in agonising over which grammatical precepts to apply in order to construct its function; it already *has* a proper job (if not a haircut), relevant to its environment. But as it stands, academic operational policy provides for Jim's logic to be overruled. An analyst can propose, for example, that *Hwarya* is a colloquial contraction of *How-are-you* where *How* is an adverb that signifies a natural intention (whatever that is) to ask, via the present-tense verb *to be* (plural), a question of whoever is represented by the second person, personal pronoun *you* (singular . . . or it could be plural). One can further argue, perhaps, that this question involves a hidden topic, an absent present tense verb—perhaps *going* or *doing*, which in turn represents an undefined state of *being*—which would complete the sentence "How are you going", and therefore the intended question. So, do we grant our question this undefined topic, or not? Now the concept of questioning, i.e., the use of the word, is becoming aimless in a landscape already mysterious and confusing, so that one may be tempted to ask, "What really is *questioning*?" And this is the point that we take language on holiday; or as Ryle put it, we start talking nonsense. That is, it makes no sense to say, "What really is *questioning*?" And we may begin to suspect that it makes no more sense to say, "What really is *saying*?" or "What really is *quoting*?"

Jim's "Hwarya" has no transcendental security in a thing called *questioning*. There is no imperative for it to be categorised as a *question*, or to be confined to a class called *enquiries*. Rather, it is a constituent part of a method by which folk can greet each other. Period. If one needs to be more technical about these items, Sacks provided the term "adequate complete utterance" (1995 Vol 1: 96). That is, if "Hwarya" can be described as adequate, its adequacy is not to be found in natural rules of grammar or any model of transcendental logic, but in the routine use of an utterance which when complete has provided participants with all that is necessary to go on; in this case, to go on with an introduction sequence. When Jim opened the door to the room, the therapist presented the first greeting part (including name), "Hi, Jim", and then tagged on an invitation. Jim responded by providing a legitimate second greeting part, "Hwarya". In his discussion of this particular sequence, Sacks suggests that, while Jim's return-of-greeting is not as direct as, say, "Hi" or "Hello", it is nevertheless a valid substitute. It can go where first or second greetings go if, for example, one is not sure how to address the other. The point is: At this moment in time and in this particular environment, "Hwarya" is not a unit-of-semantic-meaning that stands for something called *questioning*.

There may be readers left wondering why so much fuss is being made about an issue long-solved by the term *phatic expression,* when we could instead be moving on to more important things such as arranging descriptions of various modes of quoting and paraphrasing. The reason is this: If "Hwarya" is a phatic expression, a social act, in the form of what we want to call a question, which in fact has nothing to do with questioning, then perhaps we can begin to see that at least as much fuss should be made about phatic expressions in the form of what we want to call a quotation or paraphrase; and most especially, if they have nothing to do with quoting or paraphrasing.

Occasionally, a sequence with "Hwarya" can feature a return that appears to be self-assessment. For example:

A: Hi
B: Hwarya
A: Good (or fine, or great)

But it is not always the case. Reading through Sacks's transcript, we saw that there was no return to Jim's "Hwarya" (and it is not as if we thought to ask: Why didn't the therapist answer Jim's question?). And when it *does* occur, that particular fact still falls short as evidence for an argument that *Hwarya* represents a subspecies of interrogation. It is simply an extension of the ceremony, and ceremonial greetings do not systematically imply seeking an account of the other's life-status. Instant self-assessment is not a necessary condition for A's "Good" (or fine, or great). A may be rejoicing, or indeed having a dreadful time, but nothing further needs to be said; the conversation may terminate there and then without any concern for either party that it lacked proper completion.

There *are* occasions where a more formal "How are you" can have the qualities of what we would like to call a determinate question, for example, in a doctor's consulting room or in an exchange with a friend who has suffered a tragedy of sorts. But even there, the speaker is still participating in social practice—diagnosing in the former, sympathising in the latter. If Jim had been met with "Where the hell have you been", one would not propose that it was just a question, or that his apologies, excuses etc., were just an answer. Or at least, in the course of conversations, participants are not always pointing out that questions and answers are just that (although, they can in very special circumstances).

It was mentioned above that Jim's *Hwarya* is possibly missing its topic, making it the vernacular of *How are you going* rather than *How are you*. But this particular reading makes little to no difference; there is still no solace for it in a mechanistic notion of *questioning*—the model is now required to mitigate confusion on the platform at the train station where a commuter who, having just greeted a grammarian acquaintance with "How are you going," is still trying to come to grips with the astonished reply, "Well, isn't it obvious!" Our conception of *questioning* is again lost in the wilderness. It should be pointed out that the word *questioning* has been replaced with another word, *greeting*, which has no more certainty than the first. All we can say is that it does not make sense to force *Hwarya* to correspond with a synthetic definition of *questioning* where contradictions and ambiguities are left hanging, which are not left hanging when people meet—"Hi", "Hwarya"—and engage in ordinary conversation.

Unpacking (*some* of) the concept of *questioning* may appear to be an unnecessarily oblique approach to the topic of indirect reported speech, but the procedure has a purpose. We are testing the notion that there are logical hazards associated with manoeuvring words from their general use and treating them as objects of our field obsessions. It can be seen that when we use them to gloss what we are bound to

call activities, they are at best inadequate, and at worst, misleading. And, as already suggested, this may have implications for our preoccupation with the words *quoting* and *reporting*.

5   Beyond Activities

Investigating concept categories is not a new idea. Both Wittgenstein and Ryle fully opened up the topic at around the middle of last century, albeit in distinct styles.[4] Their work, in part, turned to pointing out the logical antinomies in a widespread philosophical project that had been underway for some years (Wittgenstein himself was implicated in it; see for example, David Pears (1974), a programme which involved reducing the understanding of facts of the world to the logic of formulaic propositions. But how is this rigid logic, which is required to invoke fundamentals such as Existence and Being, to be derived from our necessarily flexible language(s)? And it should be quite obvious that we are not perpetually muttering truth propositions or hastily scrolling them through the imagination in order to make sense of our manifold circumstances. Wittgenstein later dissolved the problem with the notion of language games, our language games, that consist of sentences or groups of sentences with "family resemblances" (where philosophers' Uber-statements constitute one family, and not some kind of Uber-language), somewhat as ball games or board games are activities with resemblances (1997: §67).[5] Here (below), he is already encouraging the reader to think beyond a simplistic notion of activity, and to consider the acculturated milieu that gives it meaning—

> Here the term "language *game*" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or a form of life. (Wittgenstein 1997: §23 original emphasis)

He followed up this statement with a comprehensive list of possibilities: Ordering, obeying, describing, constructing, reporting, speculating, testing, presenting, storytelling, acting, singing, guessing, joking, solving, translating, asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying. But the character of what we do is always up for review, depending on who is characterising it and for what purposes. In other words, if there *is* a policy that helps, it is to decline these words as existential nominatives, or at least, not take them seriously. Psychological theory, biomechanical criteria, predetermined definitions and truth-values have no place here: it is the use of these verbs in our utterances, messages, studies, jokes, etc., that counts. This is a crucial insight when discussing the speech verbs now in question (quoting, reporting, saying), as will be seen shortly.

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[4]J. L. Austin also made an important contribution, especially with *How to do Things with Words* (1962). Like Wittgenstein and Ryle, he too was questioning logical atomism.

[5]As Rush Rhees (2006) points out, Wittgenstein's use of the 'games' analogy has serious flaws if taken as formal theory; one might begin to imagine universal rules of play. If taken informally in a way that leads us away from tautologies and other ironies that haunt arguments for a systematic language (a kind of calculus, say), then it has merits.

In parallel with Wittgenstein, Ryle suggested that the term 'speech' or 'discourse' "can be conscripted to denote the activity or rather the clan of activities of saying things", but the concept of *understanding-words-of-a-language* must be differentiated from the concept of *understanding-a-sentence* (1990b Vol 2: 407). As he put it, they belong to different classes of understanding, in an approximation of the way that the hard coins in one's hand are differentiated from the buying-lending-saving done with them: "A stock of language pieces is not a lot of activities, but a fairly lasting wherewithal to conduct them" (1990b Vol 2: 407).

Children collect language pieces and learn to compose them. Some activities, of course, can be shortened to one-word exclamations. Most parents would recognise their toddler's one-word request, "More?" or one-word refusal, "No!"—they recognise it because they acquired it themselves, and then taught it. But the child learns, also, that when she says "No!" she is being uncooperative, or she is whining, she is being naughty, she is exercising her right, she is being funny, she is pouting, she is being a drama queen, she is being cute, etc. Such words grow to accumulate multiple uses. The word "Help!" can be an appeal or a joke or a demand; "Run!" can be a warning or an order or encouragement. It may be reassuring to know they are stock items, *H-e-l-p* and *R-u-n* (just check your office dictionary), but we have nonetheless learned to put them to use either singly or in the company of others in an exceedingly promiscuous array of activities that maintain an environment. So, removing such verbs from their actual practice and attempting to make them conform to prudishly circumscribed syntactical standards is somewhat futile. The only option, at least for the ethnographer of ordinary moments, is to continue investigating a whole world of native-born utterances in which these verbs appear and perhaps glean a hint of the scope of circumstances they lend themselves to. But again, this approach is not some kind of enlightened technology; it does not pretend to emulate formal induction methods or offer profound hope for social pathologies. Its task is to resolve paradoxical findings by disassembling the paradoxical questions that give rise to them. In the process, we can slip the dead mechanical hand of lexical meaning and be astounded by the colouration and diversity of language in the wild.

6   A Conception of Writing

Analyses of reported speech often coagulate around the issue of speech verbs, as in, *I said . . .* , *He goes . . .* , *They're like . . .* , *She says . . .* , and so on, in order to formulate their syntactical or social structural implications. But the phenomenon has *already* been observed and understood by those present at the scene of the original utterance; or as the ethnomethodologists would say, it is already see-able and rational for all practical purposes (Garfinkel 1967: vii). *She says* does not need another load of criteria for its use airlifted in by analysts; just a description of indigenous resources already at hand will do.

As Ryle saw it, the problem for investigations into the deployment of verbs in phrases and sentences is that while there are cases—*outlive*, *succumb*, *know*,

possess, *forget*—that quite obviously cannot stand independently as *doing* words, there are many that belong to "a pretty fluffy-edged class of active, tensed verbs, which we could easily be tempted into mistakenly treating as verbs of doing" (1990d Vol 2: 467). *To say* is one of them. A survey of its uses manifestly contradicts the idea of a definitive action word that passed for a verb in our first grammar lessons at school. It belongs instead to a wide category of what might be called proto-verbs, which are not the same as pro-verbs.[6] Pro-verbs are substitutes for active verbs in an approximation of the way that pronouns substitute nouns.[7] *Do* is often cited as *the* classic pro-verb because of its extended use, at least in English. "Do as I do" can be instruction provided equally by an educator, chef, retail manager, or horse rider; *do* in this case denotes whatever activity (calculating the properties of triangles, fricasseeing, etc.) can be instructed on. Of course, its use goes far beyond instructing. *Have*, *be*, and *can* are other pro-verbs. On the other hand, the proto-verb (saying, walking), as I see it, is not so much a substitute as an abstraction that cannot fully exemplify the activities implied in it. Nonetheless, it remains a reference model for a complex series of verbs, affixed verbs, and adverbial phrases. Clues on how we deal with this complexity are found in Ryle's surveys of categories-in-use, i.e., concepts, found throughout *Concept of Mind* (1963) and *Collected Papers: Vols I & II* (1990a).

An example is required here, but by itself is not intended to stand as an explanation. Rather, it is a clumsy caricature that nevertheless provides meaning to an argument that then applies an empirical example of what we like to call a *speech verb*. So, for now, there is a conversation around the occupational habits of a writer. In this conversation, the proto-verb in the utterance "Julie writes" cannot stand in isolation; it requires at least a preceding or following descriptive clause in order to give "Julie writes" any traction. That is, if the fact that Julie writes is to have any relevance to the conversation at hand, we need to know the concept—the categorial character of the activity—involved when she goes about her writing. There are a number of easily recognisable verb-phrase categories applicable to "Julie writes", corresponding, roughly, to the writing genres one might find in the local library or bookshop. So, call this collection a *genre* class of activities: *to fictionalise*, *compose poetry*, *write biographies*, *co-author technical manuals*, *collect recipes and cooking tips*, *fantasise*, *write academic texts*, and more. If Julie is a university academic, then, given her circumstances, the concept of *writing academically* brings into inferential play another group of culturally stable, verb-phrase categories more or less equivalent to the group of disciplines taught at the university she attends. Call it a *discipline* class of verb-phrases: *write history*, *do economic analyses*, *do*

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[6]Nor am I appealing to the concept of *proto-Indo-European verbs* that language historians refer to, although verb forms they discuss are included here.

[7]The original source of the term 'pro-verb' is not entirely clear; I first found it in Sacks (1995) where he cites Uriel Weinreich (1963). But according to OED it goes back to Simon Kerl (1868) *Common School Grammar of the English Language*.

physics, *write sociologically*, *psychologise*, *write philosophy*, and several more.[8] These categories are traditionally stable in a way that warrants anyone with a minimal grasp of the concepts of tertiary education and academic writing to enquire about Julie, "What subject is she studying?" or "What field?", where a reference to history or economics would be part of a perfectly logical response, and where a reference to application forms would not. Filling out application forms is a logical activity on the academic scene but it belongs to another, say, *administrative* class of verb phrases—*applying for funds*, *requesting books*, *applying for ethics approval*, *submitting progress reports*, *writing excuses*, *applying for extensions*, and so on— not relevant to the *discipline* context of the question.

In *Concept of Mind,* Ryle meticulously surveyed many groups of verbs, highlighting the fact that member categories of otherwise disparate classes can be inappropriately conjoined in our talk and in our writing. This misuse of concepts is the basis of confusion and sometimes absurdities, even in well-intentioned forums. Of course, absurdities can be deliberate—as Ryle points out, Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland* (1920) celebrates them—where categories are deftly mismatched to formulate everyday witticisms. Indeed, the question, "What subject is Julie studying?", which anticipates a response derived from one particular verb-phrase class (*discipline*), can be answered, if warranted, with a verb-phrase from an incongruent class (*administrative*) to invoke irony: "The art of filling out application forms, apparently!" A like-absurdity occurred on the railway platform (above) where words that belong to the concept of *greeting*, "How are you going", were taken as those that belong to an *enquiry*, with resulting confusion: "Well, isn't it obvious!".

It is now established that Julie writes in the field of history, which invites a further class of *proficiency level* categories: *completing undergraduate studies*, *doing honours*, *doing a masters*, *undertaking postgraduate research*, *contributing to journals*, *authoring text books*, and more. This everyday phenomenon of operating with classes of verb-phrase categories provides for what Ryle called "thick description" (1990d Vol 2: 474) in which categories are "intention-parasites" (his favourite analogy was "Big fleas have little fleas", 479). It is a practical method of accounting-for, for giving-to-understand, what is being done in the world around us; or if you like, it provides meaning.[9] Several sets of presupposed categories can overlap to create options for even thicker description. These *proficiency level* verb categories invoke, if required, another class of what can be called *preparatory* verbs: *drafting an outline*, *doing literature research*, *re-drafting chapters*, *translating*, *editing*, *polishing*, etc. If Julie is doing postgraduate research, it makes sense that she

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[8]To say that these classes of categories are culturally stable is not to say they are immutable or impermeable. For the purposes of analysis, it is enough to say that we invoke them *recurrently*, according to the circumstances.

[9]Clifford Geertz (1973) borrowed from Ryle the term 'thick description' to outline an ethnographic methodology for rescuing cultural meaning from folk activities. Whereas Ryle was trying to get a handle on how folk themselves make sense of folk activities.

drafts and polishes her work; furthermore, if she drafts and polishes, it shows in a practical way that she intends to complete her postgraduate research. Perhaps, then, one could say that verb categories are symbiotic as much as parasitic. To overlap two or more of them in an utterance suddenly thickens its descriptive potential, but this thickening is not merely to yield more depictive information. This is important: It thickens the character of the current conversational activity *that descriptions stand as*.[10]

Category structures are built specifically to establish what Goffman called the "footing" of the conversation—i.e., "the alignment we take up to ourselves and others present as expressed in the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance" (1981: 128). The utterance, "She's been doing research for her postgraduate thesis" is perhaps thick enough to allow the speaker to justify Julie's absence from a social function. To thicken this description even further, one can call on an appropriate class of *process* verb categories: *attempt*, *struggle*, *work hard*, *burn the midnight oil*, *do one's best*, and *go all out*, which in turn can call on a group of, let's say, *dispositional* verb categories: *to resolve*, *to persist*, *be single-minded*, *be courageous*, and *be determined*. These add potential. The utterance, "Julie can be very single-minded; she works hard every night researching for her thesis" can be praise for her dedication, or perhaps involves concern for her wellbeing, or rebukes a suggestion that she is losing interest in her studies—depending on the circumstances around the current conversation.

Up to this point, the phrase "Julie writes" implies a genre, which implies a discipline; a discipline implies proficiency; proficiency implies preparation; preparation implies doing her best; and doing her best implies persistence. The sceptic can argue that just because Julie is preparing her thesis, it does not necessarily follow that she is *burning the midnight oil* or *doing her best*, and this is true. But if no category from this process class applies, it makes sense to question her circumstances, i.e., to make the circumstances logical. Perhaps she is one of those historiographer geniuses who eschew oil-burning, or she is distracted with relationship issues, or has been ill for some time, etc. Otherwise, no explanations are necessary. The very fact that she is preparing a postgraduate thesis invokes (at least, in the university environment) responsibility for, and expectations of, *doing her best*. So, keeping in mind that Julie writes academically, these category groups and their affinities are the basis of the logic of the speaker's descriptions, but only in as much as this logic is indistinguishable from whatever activity is taking place in the current conversational setting. This recognition applies to us as investigators and to participants alike.

Again, it is when these verbs are arranged properly together into thicker description that we get a grasp of the meaning of what it is being done, where what is

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[10]It is important also not to get hung up on the word *description*. *Describing* (like *questioning*) is not one essential thing, but a word I use in this language game. It is just as logical to say that the rolling of a teenager's eyes can describe an attitude, as it is to say that a police officer's report can describe a crime. Those who describe, and we who comment on (if you like, describe) their descriptions, are simply operating with commonly shared categories in a particular context.

being done is the current speaker's justification, praise, complaint, concern, rebuke, or some other scenic activity. And if the verb categories are mismatched, a joke may be involved—or a mistake. In its weakest form, the proto-term "Julie writes" provides only a hinted characterisation of possibilities. All proto-verbs, including Wittgenstein's above (asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying, commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, walking, eating, drinking, playing), find it difficult to operate alone; individually they constitute only the very thinnest of descriptions. Which is not to say that thin descriptions are entirely useless. Above, it was mentioned that in special cases participants could claim to be 'just asking' or 'just answering'. This thinning-down is a stratagem acquired very early in a child's life. A parent might ask young siblings exiting from their bedroom, "What were you two *doing* in there?" where a collection of limb and bodily movements coordinated with thumps, shouts, crashes, giggles, demands, assents, criticisms, instructions, and attempts-to-repair-something-broken, can (at a logical pinch) be summed up in the response, "Just playing!" Nonetheless, it is precisely because "Just playing" *is* so thin and uncharacterised that it raises suspicions of evasion, so this particular line of interrogation is unlikely to cease. In the same way, any attempt to deflect the perilous question "What do you mean by that?" with "Nothing, I was just saying", is seen for what it is. Withholding descriptions is not the same as having time out.

7   Conceptions of Saying: She Says, Something Says, Ten Bucks Says, That Says[11]

And so we return to the speech verb in "She says". There is no value in uncoupling "She says" from a conversation or description and then applying one or another style of analysis, because by itself it is not doing anything (except, as discussed, in very specific cases). Wittgenstein summed up the problem thus: "The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work" (1997: §132). The dialogue introducer or lexical introducer, as it is called, is an integral part of the whole mechanism essential to the footing of the current talk. When disengaged and examined as a generalised unit of meaning, it cannot function, which eventually causes frustration for those examining it. "She says" is fundamentally dependent upon, and can only be discussed in company with, whatever it is that precedes and follows, along with the environment that contains it. In this light, "She says" has no more potential for meaningful analysis than "Julie writes", "She plays", "She walks" and many other proto-terms. There is no point in staring long and hard at an idling engine in the hope that one might somehow penetrate its capabilities.

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[11]This survey of 'saying' is necessarily brief and inadequate. For an example of the social scope involved in a comprehensive survey please refer to Wittgenstein's On Certainty (1969), a book dedicated to the concept of 'Knowing'

What are some of the contradictions associated with *says*, and what are their workable remedies? There is potential for confusion around the idea that *She says* or *It says* is a universal cue for one or another kind of expression (a somewhat exhausted word); confusion because this approach makes a mystery of the utterance "Something says you're not happy." Here, "you're not happy" is certainly no quotation or paraphrase. In this context at least, one could never quote what *something* said; i.e., the remark, "Something said, you're not happy" makes little sense. An explanation may then turn to the possibility that the speaker had interpreted (another tired word) a sign, or if you prefer, a semiotic source. But it is precisely because nothing was manifested, i.e., there were *no* signs of happiness-cum-unhappiness, that the words make sense at all. This is a case of what Sacks called an "absence", the nonoccurrence of a "contingently relevant event", where something that *should* have happened did not happen, and its absence is therefore accountable (1995 Vol 1: 295). To demonstrate the concept of absences, he offered the following material in which a sequential greeting-turn is missing. There are two adult women; one of them is the mother of two children who both enter the scene:

Lady: Hi
Boy: Hi
Lady: Hi Annie
Mother: Annie, didn't you hear someone say hello to you?
Lady: Oh, that's okay, she smiled hello.
Mother: You know you're supposed to greet someone, don't you?
Annie: ((hangs head)) Hello.
(Sacks 1995)Vol 1: 262)

It is evident that a missing "Hi" or "Hello" can have consequences; this one was noted and corrected. One might add a further observation: Annie's mother addresses this lack of greeting *indirectly*, suggesting Annie has either not heard someone say hello, or she knows that she should greet acquaintances but needs a gentle reminder. Otherwise, directly questioning the absence with something like "Why didn't you say hello?" invites a whole set of alternative implications, starting with Annie's rudeness or ignorance. This may have relevance to the current situation where "Something says you're not happy" has been uttered.

In this case, Jack makes the utterance in response to a situation where he has completed a particular task in such a way that, in the sequential scheme of things, the accomplishment warranted acknowledgement from Dave, his boss. But the relevant acknowledgement failed to appear in its proper place. Its absence, then, is notable— "Something says you're not happy". At first pass, it may be tempting to argue that *says* is the predicate (the attribute) of *something*, which happens to be the absent acknowledgement. But that is a *grammatical* proposition, couched in some kind of mentalistic theory of happenings. In which case we would have to allow that the sentences, "Something says you're not happy" and "Something absent says you're not happy" amount to the same logic—a fraught road we care not to travel. It would be extremely difficult to find a set of circumstances to which the utterance

"Something absent says you're not happy" can be applied. On the other hand, it can be said that Dave (the boss) has acted in an unfolding, accountable scene where his proper acknowledgement failed to eventuate. In which case, the *saying* (of unhappiness) can be attributed to either Dave or the scene, depending on the thickness of one's description of events, but *not* to something that declined to turn up! "Something says . . ." in itself is a description too thin to contemplate without raising contradictions. (In a similar way, we discovered that being difficult could be attributed to either Louie-who-questions, or to the scene, but *not* the question itself.)

Jack's boss has implied *something* via the absence, but what? Which suggests this particular *saying* belongs to a class of *sayings* that include *suggesting*, *alluding*, *hinting*, *indicating* and *implying*. But like Annie's mother (above), Jack addresses the issue indirectly. Or put another way, "Something says you're not happy" is a fishing line, an indirect query rather than the confirmation of something explicit. This query works whereas a direct approach with, for example, "Why can't you show a little appreciation" could only be taken as a censure-of-sorts, and it's not in Jack's interest to censure his boss. This query is not something interpreted, as if by some shadowy go-between who translates for social members in perpetual hiatus—it is known by, and stands as, its local culture; part of what Wittgenstein calls 'a form of life'.

We can reinforce this particular concept of query in the following way. It is entirely okay for someone to give-to-understand unhappiness with what is proposed to be an explicit sign—a sigh, or a shake of the head, a glare, an expletive, a violent gesture, and so on—and then be the recipient of "Something says you're not happy." But in this case, the speaker has slipped the remark from its proper place as a *query* and re-categorised it as an incongruous *statement-of-the-flaming-obvious*. It has become a mild absurdity, a quip. To agonise over expressions and interpretations with reference to "Something says you're not happy" suggests that the characteristic formulation has been forgotten, albeit briefly. The very next time it is heard or deployed, one simply assumes it to be a traditional, everyday query, something that requires no formal analysis by those on the scene. To set about analysing the utterance "Something says you're not happy" as a quotation or paraphrase of some description is to take it on vacation.

In Australia, with its long and pluralistic tradition of gambling, there are a number of formulations for making a bet, each recognisable in its environment. So for example, in cases where a boast or some inflated claim has been made, there is a fairly standard betting procedure by which one can challenge the other's position: "Ten bucks says you can't!" It is quite obvious that the speaker cannot be quoting or paraphrasing her ten dollars, but there *must* be a connection, if we just look at *says* long enough and hard enough. But as already discussed, meaning is found in the scene of the utterance, not in the utterance itself. This is a dictum that so many of us acknowledge, but have so much difficulty adhering to; because if we adhere to it, a question such as "Is this direct or indirect reported speech?" is prone to collapse. In this betting move, it is not the ten-dollar note that says "you can't" in some strange imaginary way, but the speaker. After all, the banknote in the speaker's pocket is just a piece of polymer material with colours and lines imprinted. There is a group

of verb and verb-phrase categories with some relevance to the characterisation of this particular *saying*; including, for example, *challenging*, *confronting*, *calling his bluff*, *throwing down the gauntlet* and *daring*. That is, while the utterance would constitute (what we want to call) betting, it is characterised as a challenge rather than, say, *speculating* or *predicting* or *foretelling*. The utterance "Ten bucks says you can't" belongs to the same language game as "I bet ten bucks you can't" but has its own character; it is a different move. So there is no point in undertaking some kind of systematic analysis on *says* or posing questions as to expressions and interpretations.

It is possible that the use of this idiom can be traced through history, but the hope of exposing some kind of hidden formal logic (if we just keep digging!) that explains the quoting of banknotes is an idle one. The word *says*, in this case, is simply part of a device selected and used to practice a scenic activity. To wield an adequate complete utterance—"Ten bucks says you can't!"—is to select and wield a mallet, or some other adequate tool for the job:

> Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'. That is, where we ought to have said: *this language game is played.*
> (Wittgenstein 1997: §654 original emphasis)

A similar type of confusion is generated when the part-utterance "that says . . . "—used quite routinely in a mathematics classroom (see for example, Mike Baynham's 1996 paper that involves dialogue in an adult numeracy class)—is made the object of quotation studies. When an elementary maths teacher arranges chalk marks into 0.005 on the chalkboard and turns to the class with, "Okay, so that says five thousandths", the number itself is not in any way *saying* anything, although it makes a relevant prop.[12] It is the teacher on the scene who is *saying*. It is the act of scribbling the decimal fraction on the board that does the *saying*, not the fraction. If there is something suspect about the exercise (the teacher may appear to have written *0.065* instead of *0.005)*, it is the act of numeration that is suspect, not the number; like banknotes, numbers are not a class of categories that can say rightly, wrongly, stupidly, intelligently, quickly, loudly, or any other way, on their own account. "What that number says is wrong" is a logically dubious sentence, or perhaps an ironic one.

Writing the fraction on a chalkboard, or pointing to it on a piece of paper, or simply calling attention to it in a textbook and uttering "What does that say?" (a typical pedagogical move), can all mean the same thing, the characterisation of which is found somewhere in the following class of categories: *instructing*, *educating*, *guiding*, *training* and *demonstrating*. The fraction may also have been demonstrated along with the statement, "I say to you that's five thousandths" or "I'm telling you that's five thousandths", but teachers are not merely parading their

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[12]This is not intended to deliberately provoke semioticians or symbologists; they have their own reasons for doing what they do. The above is a method whereby attention is directed to *all* scenic properties, not just the symbol. For our purposes of elucidation, the symbol 0.005 *in, of, and by itself* is of no use, i.e., it has no meaning.

superior knowledge or injecting students with facts; they are sharing a technique. The utterance "Okay, so that says five thousandths" or "That's telling you five thousandths" is a particular way of talking, a constituent of a method of pedagogy by which the teacher is educating students on how to proceed. That is, students now know, potentially, how to demonstrate this and similar fractions to themselves and to others. They are being "shown the ropes", as Ryle put it (1990a: 452), and can now climb one of them with their own hands and feet. Of course, for older students, the only new attribute brought to this scene—this form of life—is the fraction *0.005*; others such as scribbling examples, pointing one's finger, using the words "that" and "says", have long been given meaning in the students' early experiences in the language-game of training (Ryle adds flesh to this notion of training in *Collected Papers Vol. 2*, 1990a: 451–464; and Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* 1997: §1–10).

Now back to betting: The activity of betting could be said to fall within a class of acts that Austin (1962) called "performatives": "I promise . . . ", "I apologise . . . ", "I'm warning . . . ", "I'm declaring . . . ", "I criticise . . . ", and "I welcome . . . " (they work only in the first person, present tense). They are performatives in the sense that one can perform a promise by saying "I promise . . . " or an apology by saying "I apologise . . . " etc. But Ryle's advice still stands: while they take the guise of fairly explicit doing words, they are still fluffy-edged proto-verbs in terms of grasping an understanding of the whole scene and its circumstances, which is the remedial analytic point—even for Austin: "The total speech-act in the total speech situation is the *only actual* phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaging in elucidating" (1986: 148 original emphasis). In this case, elucidation involves the question: What is the total speech situation around the utterance "Ten bucks says you can't"? Is the speaker being disdainful? Is it light-hearted scepticism where no money will actually change hands? Or is it part of an ongoing rivalry? The utterance may be the performance of *betting*, but only in as much as its categorial character is still to be brought home. One would need at the very least a substantial transcript and a description of the scene just to get it off first base.

8   I Still Say Though . . .

The sociologist who in his own time perhaps garnered most from the idea of everyday use of categories was Harvey Sacks. Sacks dedicated a significant part of his work to describing the procedure by which social members go about selecting categories in their everyday conversations; he called this procedure the "membership categorization device" (1972). In one lecture in particular (1995 Vol 1: 342–347), he brought Austin's notion of performatives to bear on the routine use of the word *say*, as it appears in the following sample of recorded material. Several youths

undertaking group therapy have been discussing cars before being interrupted.[13] Here (following the interruption), Ken takes up the topic again, and after a brief diversion, Al responds.

Ken: I still say though that if you take if you take uh a big fancy car out on the road and you're hotroddin' around you're— you're bound to get you're bound to get caught, and you're bound to get shafted.

():   (//)

Ken   W'l look— I'm gonna—

Al: Not unless ya do it right. // That's the challenge—that's the challenge you wanna try and do it right so you don't get caught!

 (Sacks 1995 Vol 1: 272)

Keeping in view Ken's opening phrase ("I still say though"), there are a good many categories of performatives that Austin (1962: 133–134) subsumed under the heading of "Illocutionary Force". So, for example, the verb *to state* in "I state that he did not do it" has a family resemblance to other verb phrases including "*I argue* that he did not do it", "I confirm . . . ", "I suggest . . . ", "I swear..", "I claim . . . , "I assert . . . " etc. Sacks points out that all these activities can be done in an abstract way with "I say . . . " One can begin to see, then, that "I say . . . " involves a proto-verb, a reference model for a group of 'sayings' in much the same way that "Julie writes . . . " is a reference model for a group of 'writings'. The question is: How does Ken go about saying what he says; i.e., what is the *character* of his saying? Sacks proposes that through this piece of talk, "I still say though . . . ", Ken is in effect committing himself to a position. Furthermore, the marker "still" suggests that the position has already been introduced, and the marker "though" suggests there has been some form of opposition to it. It may be tempting to take this as evidence that "I still say though . . . " is a cue to Ken's own words uttered previously. When one checks back through Sacks's transcript, the prior *claim* is recognisable, but any argument to the conclusion that Ken's words have been paraphrased in any formal sense is found wanting:

Ken: And the cops— the cops don't look at you when you just—

Roger: But they're stockers

Ken: If you're in a jeep—

Roger: But you drive a stocker. When a cop sees a hopped up car, he don't care if you're going 45 you must be doin' somethin' wrong, and if he wants to be mean, he can bust you on a thousand things.

(Sacks 1995 Vol 1: 271)

This *claim* (of discrimination by police) has been a collaborative affair in two sequential parts—

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[13]In fact, the interruption was the 'Hwarya' greeting-and-introduction sequence we encountered earlier.

1.   (claim)   Cops don't look at you in a jeep [a ubiquitous utility vehicle].
2.   (obverse of claim)   Drive a stocker [a modified street car] and you get busted.

—part 1 introduced by Ken, and part 2 by Roger. When Ken later utters the words "I still say though that if you take uh a big fancy car out on the road ... etc.", it is the whole of this previous claim that he is orienting to, not his own words that constituted its first part.

There may be another way of demonstrating our field confusion when it comes to building a self-supporting frame for the notion of indirect reported speech. Sacks (1995 Vol 1: 740) provides a further example of collaborative action, although in a different context; but it will suit expository purposes here. Take the case of *agreeing* where A says to B, "Do you agree?" and B says, "Yes." At a later point in time, A or C or D might say to B in reproach, "But you said you agreed!" whereas in fact B said "Yes." The reproach displays knowledge, not of how to formally paraphrase B's "Yes", but of how to use something that "Yes" is tied to. In other words, "But you said you agreed" makes sense not because it addresses what B *said*, but because it addresses what A and B *did*—together. Where what they did was collaborative *assent* in two parts:

1.   (seeking assent)   Do you agree?
2.   (assent)   Yes.

Indeed, it is just because this *was* collaborative assent that makes the subsequent utterance a reproach. And as Sacks points out, it is the shared knowledge that these two utterances are tied that disqualifies "I didn't say I agreed, I said yes" as a routine negation.

It may be the case that A says to B, "Do you agree?" and B responds, "yes, I agree", and sometime later A, C, or D reproaches B with, "But you said you agreed!", making it almost impossible to resist categorising the latter comment as an archetype of paraphrase. But such a finding is still problematic. It is simply an instance where the word *agreed* in the subsequent reproach (and therefore in the analyst's formal explanation of paraphrasing) has overlapped a similar word from a recognisable class of activities called *assents*:

"Is it a deal?"
"Let's do it"

"Are we unanimous on this?"
"Count me in."

"Can we give them the go-ahead?"
"I'll authorise it."

"So, what do you think?"
"Our group has no objections"

"Do you agree?"
"I agree."
And so on.

"You said you agreed!" is a complaint that can be properly applied to a retraction of any one of these assents; it just so happens that the word "agree" is included in the last. In which case, the overlap of the word "agree" (given that it comes with various affixes and in various compounds) has been somewhat fortuitous and officially confirms nothing about quoting or paraphrasing. Just as the greeting "Hwarya" has nothing to do with questioning, this complaint has nothing to do with quoting grammatically or lexically determined words. To accept the kind of logic that reduces it to a formal definition of reported speech is to accept *a posteriori* the meagre logic of its negation: "Well, I didn't say we agreed, I said our group has no objections!"

To return to Ken: The distinction between "I say" and "I said" is not simply a matter of tense; from scene to scene they are not interchangeable parts of the same thing. In Ken's case, his "I still say though . . . " is pressing for a position, the character of which is still unfolding. If one wanted to argue against Ken, it would be an argument with reference to the position he takes, not with reference to the words he may or may not have spoken (*that* would be a category mistake, a faux pas—or a joke). Ken's insistent argument can do many things: *demand*, *denounce*, *defend*, *reason*, *justify*, and a good deal more. And, it can *warn*: "If you're hotrodding around you're bound to get caught." Furthermore, the activity of warning can involve one or more of a whole class of activities that logically belong to it; as Sacks put it, "The format one uses for a warning can, with no change in what you say essentially, be used to do as well, alternatively or in combination, any of the following, at least: Threatening, predicting, advising, challenging, daring, promising" (1995 Vol 1: 346). It appears that what Ken presents as a warning is taken by Al to be a challenge: "Not unless ya do it right. That's the challenge—that's the challenge you wanna try and do it right so you don't get caught!"

In order to underpin his proposal that a *challenge* can be a logical member of the category-group *warnings*, Sacks acknowledges what appears to be a contradiction in Al's response. That is, while Ken has warned of the danger inherent in a particular activity (hotrodding around in a big fancy car), Al is actually promoting it. But one can bring this contradiction to terms by exploring how it is that taking on a dangerous challenge can somehow be advantageous to Al.

> The character of 'dangers' is, for one, that there are certain memberships that can only be achieved if one does something which is a case of the class 'dangers'. In its narrowest scope, the only way to be a hero is to do something dangerous. (Sacks 1995 Vol 1: 346)

One way of establishing or improving one's standing in a *reputation* class in which categories are hierarchical (hero, legend, sook, wimp, coward, etc.) is to become involved in a dangerous activity. If being a hero counts, and undertaking a dangerous challenge is a legitimate way of achieving such status, therein lies Al's warrant for doing it, or suggesting it be done. In sum: When Ken opened his utterance with the clause "I still say though . . . ", he was in no way alluding to bio-mechanical movements of his mouth and tongue, or to sounds in his throat. Nor was he cueing particular words from a previous conversational turn; i.e., he was not (what we want to call) quoting or paraphrasing, or invoking a transitional *degree* of

quoting or paraphrasing. It can be said, though, that he was orienting to a previous activity, a claim, which he and Roger had earlier collaborated on. For those on the scene, Ken was persisting with a claim that turned out to be a warning, a warning that, at least for Al, amounted to a challenge. The character of Ken's *saying* was being brought home, so to speak, as the conversation unfolded.

9   Dodgy Questions and the Elephant in the Office

It is quite okay to view this sample of use of the word *say* as rather old-school, a bit quaint. After all, it first appeared in one of Sacks's lectures half a century ago. In large part, *that* is the very point. The types of treatments invented by Wittgenstein, Ryle, Sacks and others, for easing field controversies around concepts such as *saying* have been available for many years. Nonetheless, the problems keep haunting us; not because there are correlations in the thesis of reported speech still to be accounted-for, but because formal questions such as "Do these words represent direct or indirect reported speech?" or "Do they belong to some hybrid genus of reported speech?" are, in a most important way, redundant. This is what was meant by the need to *disassemble* paradoxical questions (above, at the end of section *4. Beyond activities*). Their unneeded presence has become an occupational hazard for us—at every turn we stumble over them. Outside the language-game of our own very narrow field of enquiry, our very narrow culture, these questions don't make sense because the words used to compose their subject have been misappropriated. When operating in accord with their common use, words such as *reporting*, *speaking*, *quoting* and *paraphrasing* are no more secure than *writing*, *playing*, *betting*, or *saying. Quoting* and *paraphrasing* do not imply essential phenomena to be described—to claim that they do simply overlooks ongoing contradictions and ambiguities in our studies. There is nothing about *quoting* or *paraphrasing* that we can say is intrinsically true or intrinsically false, although we can agree (or not) on the use of one or the other word in a particular set of circumstances. Even in what we like to call the 'hard sciences', unwarranted questions as to the essence of things can muddy the enquiry. In the introduction to his *Principles of Mechanics*, Hertz (a scientist with every incentive to chase after the nature of energy) argued that we can never perfectly describe our topic, but it *is* possible to reduce the paradoxes in our language surrounding it:

> Our confused wish finds expression in the confused question as to the nature of force and electricity. But the answer which we want is not really an answer to this question. It is not by finding out more and fresh relations and connections that it can be answered; but by removing the contradictions existing between those already known, and thus perhaps by reducing their number. When these painful contradictions are removed, the question as to the nature of force will not have been answered; but our minds, no longer vexed, will cease to ask illegitimate questions. (Hertz 2003 [1899]: 7–8)

If, in the extract above, we were to substitute Hertz's "nature of force and electricity" with our "nature of direct and indirect reported speech", then my argument is clear.

I am reiterating what he did; that is, I am persisting with his critique-of-dodgy-questions for my own purposes. Persisting with another member's argument in such a way is commonly spoken of as "directly quoting" in academic and other investigative circles (some journalism, for example), so that it is entirely logical to say of the extract, "This is a direct quotation from Hertz." This statement-of-confirmation belongs to a scholarly tradition having, over time, circumscribed a conception of *quoting* for itself, which involves marking off the relevant words and citing a source (author, year, etc.). At last, it appears we have something substantial to examine. If we are going to discuss a proclaimed puzzle, then why not the elephant in the office. Which is precisely what Ruth Finnegan did in *Why Do We Quote: The Culture and History of Quotation*, only to reflect in her final analysis that the concept of *quoting* "is perhaps after all an edgeless and slippery arena" (2011: 218). Above, we found that a formal investigation into the concept of *questioning* would necessarily involve examining an impossible array of question-types. In a similar way, Finnegan discovered an overwhelming problem with *quoting*. She depicts this imbroglio with the lexical equivalent of a random mosaic, aptly titled "A Confusion of Quoting Terms" (Fig. 7.3: 213), which includes (in no particular order): indirect speech, citation, text, illustration, translation, import, theft, reflection, quotation, regurgitation, emulation, voicing others' words, evidence, parody, mimicry, borrowing, echo, multivocality, poetic memory, copying other writers' work, appropriation, plagiarism, formula, prior utterance, paraphrase, source, excerpt, parallel, cliché, testimony, metalinguistic discourse, allusion, compilation, model, reproduction, reminiscence, replication, reported speech, repetition, imitation, ventriloquism, inspiration, copy, inheriting, reference, and anthology. And let's add quips, aphorisms, catchphrases, epitaphs, family sayings, proverbs, jingles, and graffiti.

To further illustrate this dilemma, consider the following: When attempting to invalidate what we regard as one of the misguided 'isms', it is quite acceptable to arrange a quotation in such a way that it exemplifies our quoted author's particular 'ism'. That a full appreciation of this author requires reading between the quoted lines and acknowledging qualifications or contingencies is not the point; she or he said *these* words—here is an effigy of the 'ism'. And then we set fire to it.[14] But this is only one of the things among a very large number of things that can be done when we 'quote'. Now, what possible pragmatic equation, among what can only be an equally large number of equations, conveys this otherwise easily recognisable strategy? The meaning of this practice, i.e., this move in the language game of academic writing, inevitably slips from our grasp when the phenomenon is reduced to formal precepts of what we want to call 'quoting'.

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[14]In politics this is better known as the 'straw man' argument.

After all this confusion, a return to the 'voice-of-authority' raises the prospect of a more tangible concept, one would think. Indeed, in her college textbook on the use of intellectual resources, Brenda Spatt (2011: 107) lists "*appeal to authority*" (original italics) as the number one reason for quoting in the academic environment. But Finnegan suggests that we cannot rely on the 'authorial voice' as a means of avoiding multiformity; one simply faces multiforms of a different type:

> 'Authorial voice' is no single concept and can carry others' words and voices in allusive ways. A multiplicity of creators may interact in differing ways — and with differing degrees of deliberation — in the arts of invoking others' texts or voices: interpenetrating, reinforcing, opposing, qualifying, distancing, commenting and much else. (Finnegan 2011: 214).

While the voice of authority can be a useful (if fundamentally indeterminate) concept when discussing the research skills required to participate in a university scene, it in no way decrees programmatic ascendancy that by default oversees the practical logic of social members in other milieus. When meanings of words and sentences are in question, the literal arguments of Academe soon become unsustainable and then non-sensical if they ignore practical details at the scene-of-origin. If, for example, a colleague in the workplace were found to be parodying the utterances of another for the purpose of light-hearted ridicule and gamesmanship between friends, one would have to suspect the social competence of anyone on the scene, including the professional linguist, who complains: "That is a very loose quotation!" In the same way, when someone greets you with "Hwarya", it makes no sense to complain: "That is a very loose question!" It appears that providing quotations is an acceptable, even honourable practice, but on the other hand the term "quotation-monger" is a derogatory one. So, as with other well-worn proto-verbs, the conception (the characteristic use) of *quoting* and *paraphrasing* is an open field. The openness of this field is not made more manageable by pursuing questions such as "What really is quoting?" or "What really is paraphrasing?" This is only to exile the words to a strange land, with nothing to do.

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Part II
Indirect Reports in Philosophy of Language

A Theory of Saying Reports

Wayne A. Davis

1   The Expression Theory and Non-descriptive Meaning

I adopt the view that words are conventional signs of mental states, principally thoughts and ideas, and that meaning consists in their expression. In Davis (2003), I explain what it is for words to have meaning and express ideas in terms of speaker meaning and expression, and what it is for a speaker to mean or express something in terms of intention.

I focus on *thinking the thought that p* as a propositional attitude distinct from believing that p. One can think the thought that the moon is made of green cheese without believing it, and one can believe that bats fly without thinking that thought at the moment. Thinking in this sense differs from believing in being an *event* in the narrow sense of an occurrence or activity rather than a dispositional state. We retain our beliefs when we are asleep or unconscious, but thoughts are something actively going on. Thoughts, on my view, are structured events, and a particular kind of mental representation. They are similar in many ways to sentences, but fundamentally different. We think when thoughts occur to us. For S to think a thought T is for T to occur to S. I define *propositions* as thoughts with a declarative structure, or equivalently, as objects of belief and desire. I argue at length that thoughts have constituent structure—specifically, a phrase-structure syntax.

I define *ideas* (or *concepts*) as thoughts or parts of thoughts, and distinguish them carefully from conceptions (belief systems) and sensory images (structures of sensations). Conceptions and images are important forms of mental representation,

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W.A. Davis (✉)
Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA
e-mail: davisw@georgetown.edu

but meaning cannot be defined in terms of them. In addition to occurring and being parts of thoughts, concepts can be acquired and possessed, and may become associated with each other.

Unlike Grice (1957), who assumed that meaning entails attempting to communicate and produce a belief in an audience (false when talking to our pets, writing individual words, or telling stories), I take expressing a thought, belief, or other mental state to involve performing an observable action as an indication that it is occurrent. Thus Sam expressed the idea and meant *female fox* by uttering 'vixen' only if Sam uttered 'vixen' as an indication that the idea *female fox* is occurring to him. Since indication is a weaker relative of what Grice called natural meaning, my account is more Aristotelian or Lockean.

Grice focused on *meaning that p* ("cognitive" speaker meaning), which can be defined as expressing the *belief* that p. *Implying* involves expressing one belief by expressing another. If one writes 'Mars exploded' in a work of fiction, however, one is expressing the *thought* but not the *belief* that Mars exploded. Similarly, one expresses the *idea* of Mars by writing 'Mars,' not a belief. Meaning "Mars exploded" by a sentence, or "Mars" by a word or phrase, is a distinct kind of speaker meaning, which I call "cogitative." It can be defined as the direct expression of thoughts or thought parts. As Schiffer (1972: 2–3) observed, when Mark says "Bush is brilliant" ironically, Mark means "Bush is brilliant" by the sentence he uttered, but does not mean that Bush is brilliant by uttering it. While this distinction is easy to miss given that quotation and 'that' subordination are typically just alternative ways of referring to a proposition (for other exceptions, see Sect. 8), it is easy to see that what Mark did was express the belief that Bush is not brilliant by expressing the thought that he is.

On my definition, the meaning of individual words, as well as the non-compositional meaning of fixed idioms, is given in terms of what ideas they are conventionally used to directly express. The meaning of compounds is provided by a recursion clause, based on conventions to use particular expression structures to express certain idea structures. Conventions are common practices that are socially useful, self-perpetuating, and arbitrary.[1] The common goal served by language is preeminently communication. Conventions are self-perpetuating in a number of ways: precedent plays a role, as does habit, transmission of tradition, and normative criticism. Conventions are arbitrary in that other regularities could have served the same purposes and perpetuated themselves in the same ways.

Defining meaning as idea expression rather than reference enables natural solutions to Frege's and Russell's problems. People do think about Santa even though Santa does not exist, and such thoughts have a part conventionally expressed by the name 'Santa.' So 'Santa' has a meaning even though it has no referent. The

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[1]This is a development of David Lewis's (1975: 4–5) characterization, which was inspired by Hume. Lewis's formulation was theoretically fascinating (see especially Lewis 1969), but much too strong, failing to apply to paradigm linguistic conventions.

thought "ammonia is poisonous" is distinct from the thought "NH_3 is poisonous" even though ammonia is NH_3. Since 'ammonia' and 'NH_3' express different thought parts, they have different meanings, even though their extensions are identical. The states of affairs Russellians take to be propositions are on my vew one kind of extension for thoughts—the entities that make thoughts true. The sets of worlds in which a thought is true is its intension. Ideas and thoughts can naturally serve as the modes of representation and ways of believing introduced in triadic theories.

My theory is thus Fregean in important respects, but not all. First, I do not claim that meanings *are* concepts. In one sense, meanings are properties of words; in another, meanings are what words mean. Neither are true of concepts (thought parts). Words express concepts, and mean what the concepts are of. Second, I do not believe that terms in that-clauses *refer to* their senses. We will discuss this point below (Sect. 9). Third, Frege took thoughts and propositions to be abstract objects independent of the mental realm, making it mysterious how they could play an important role in human mental life. For me, thoughts and their parts are abstract because they are *types*—specifically, *mental event types*. Different people can think the same thought because the same mental event type can occur to different people. Frege denied that thoughts are "ideas," but he used 'Vorstellungen' to denote mental event *token*s, usually images, which necessarily occur to just one individual. Fourth, I reject the Fregean assumption that senses and concepts must be *descriptive* (see especially Davis 2005). We clearly use 'Mars' to express the common component of the thought that Mars is a planet, the thought that Mars is smaller than Jupiter, and so on. Kripkean arguments show that a name cannot be defined exclusively in descriptive terms. 'Mars' does not have a meaning like that of 'the fourth planet from the sun.' Indeed, standard names appear to be among the primitive or undefinable terms of a language. 'Mars' has a nondescriptive sense because it expresses a nondescriptive concept, as do syncategorematic terms (prepositions, logical constants, etc.)—and indexicals.

2   Indexical Meaning and Indexical Concepts

The paradigm indexicals include the personal pronouns *I, you, he, she,* and *it*; the demonstrative pronouns *this* and *that*, plus noun phrases with them as determiners; and the locative pronouns *now, here, there,* and *then*. These expressions contrast markedly with proper names like *Mars* and definite descriptions like *the fourth planet from the sun* in the way their reference is determined by an element of the context of use. Indexicals have different referents in different contexts even when used in the same sense and evaluated with respect to the same circumstances.

Indexicals not only have contextually variable referents, but different ways of being used. Imagine that Thomas Jefferson utters sentence (1) while in a room with George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and Benjamin Franklin.

(1)   Washington became president after he led the Continental Army to victory.
      (a)   *Anaphoric*: 'Washington' is the antecedent of 'he.'
      (b)   *Demonstrative*: The speaker is pointing at Hamilton.
      (c)   *Deictic*: The speaker is visually focusing on Franklin.

On the most typical interpretation of (1), the name 'Washington' is the *antecedent* of 'he,' and the pronoun refers to George Washington. This use is *anaphoric.* But it is also possible that the speaker is using 'he' while pointing at Alexander Hamilton, with the result that the pronoun refers to Hamilton rather than Washington. This use is *demonstrative*. Finally, it is possible that the speaker is using 'he' without using it anaphorically, and without pointing at anything. The speaker might simply be visually focusing on Benjamin Franklin, with the result that the pronoun refers to Franklin rather than Hamilton or Washington. I call this the *deictic* use.[2] The indexical 'he' is used in the same sense (linguistic meaning) in all three uses. But the referent is determined in different ways.

     The same three uses can be observed with demonstratives like 'this patriot,' as (2) illustrates.

(2)   After Washington became president, this patriot was killed in a duel.
      (a)   *Anaphoric*: 'Washington' is the antecedent of 'this patriot.'
      (b)   *Demonstrative*: The speaker is pointing at Hamilton.
      (c)   *Deictic*: The speaker is visually focusing on Franklin.

With demonstratives, however, the demonstrative interpretation is most typical. The same three interpretations are possible even with "pure" indexicals like 'I,' 'here,' and 'now,' with the deictic interpretation being most typical.[3]

     The propositions and propositional attitudes expressed using the first-person pronoun differ markedly from those expressed using any non-indexical terms. Even though the subject terms in (3) all have the same referent, the sentences do not have the same meaning. The propositions they express have the same truth conditions, but are not the same. Someone can believe one without believing the others.

(3)   (a)   Washington led the Continental Army to victory.
      (b)   The first U.S. president led the Continental Army to victory.
      (c)   He led the Continental Army to victory (visually focusing
             on Washington).
      (d)   This patriot led the Continental Army to victory (pointing at
             a picture of Washington).

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[2]Lyons (1977: 660) observed that when 'he' is anaphoric in sentences like (1), it is uttered with normal stress. When deictic or demonstrative, it has heavier contrastive stress. The terms 'anaphoric,' 'demonstrative,' and 'deictic' are common in linguistics, but there is little consensus on their usage. There are many ways of classifying the great variety of indexical uses.

[3]I focus on 'I' in Davis (2013a).

The problem for linguistics is to account for this difference in meaning. The problem for psychology is to explain how believing (3)(c) and (d) differ from each other and from believing (3)(a) or (b). This "problem of the essential indexical" also arises with other indexicals and the attitudes they express. A busy vice-president might believe "I have a meeting at noon" without believing "I have a meeting *now*," with the result that she misses an important meeting. A pilot may know that flying in Iranian airspace is prohibited without realizing that flying *here* is prohibited, with fatal consequences.

The linguistic and psychological differences can both be explained by the hypothesis that the subject terms of (3)(a)–(d) express different thought parts. The thesis that the name 'Washington' expresses the idea of Washington seems tautological, as does the hypothesis that 'the first U.S. president' expresses the idea of the first U.S. president. But what ideas do 'He' and 'This patriot' express? We cannot say that 'he' expresses the idea of him, for in *the idea of him*, 'him' has an object-position sense and requires a referent. The idea expressed by 'he' in (3)(a) is a subject-concept and has different referents in different contexts. We can, however, use *the idea "he"* to refer to the thought part expressed by 'he' in (3)(b) and on other occasions. I will use *c(he)* for the same purpose. 'This patriot' expresses the same thought part whether it is the subject or object of a verb. We still cannot say that 'this patriot' expresses the idea of this patriot because the thought part it expresses does not have a particular referent. But we can refer to the thought part it expresses as *the idea "this patriot."*

The name 'Washington' has different senses (it is the name of a president, a city, and a state, among other things), so it expresses different thought parts or ideas in English. But each of the ideas it expresses has a fixed referent. Whenever 'Washington' is used with the sense intended in (3) it refers to the same person. The same is true of 'the first U.S. president.' The ideas (thought parts) expressed by 'he' and 'this patriot,' in contrast, differ from both 'Washington' and 'the first U.S. president' in having different referents in different contexts of use (in any given world). They are what I call *indexical concepts*. What determines the referent of an indexical concept? We will focus here on primary indexical concepts, those that do not contain other indexical concepts.

I hypothesize that (primary) indexical concepts differ from those expressed by proper names and definite descriptions in connecting in a particular way with other representational mental events, including sensory experiences and other concepts, whose objects become their referents. Indexical concepts are capable of being *linked* to a *determinant*. Consider a sentence like (4), which has at least two different interpretations and logical forms because either 'Obama' or 'Clinton' can be the antecedent of 'he.'

(4)   Obama admires Clinton because he is liberal.

What makes one noun the antecedent rather than another on a given occasion of use? It seems evident that (4) is ambiguous because it can express either a thought in which *c(he)* is linked to *c(Obama)* or one with *c(he)* linked to *c(Clinton)*. Which thought is expressed depends on the speaker's intentions. The antecedent of 'he'

could also be a noun phrase used before (or after) (4) is uttered, perhaps 'Kennedy.' In that case, (4) expresses an unlikely thought in which *c(he)* is linked to *c(Kennedy)*. The speaker S cannot think that thought unless *c(he)* and *c(Kennedy)* both occur to S and do so in the right relationship, which I call indexical linkage.

Let '$\mathcal{R}$' be a variable for any primary indexical concept and 'δ' for any determinant. On my view, concepts are event types that can occur at different times as parts of different thoughts. Let '$\mathcal{R}^\delta$' stand for the subtype of $\mathcal{R}$ that consists of its occurrence linked to δ. Hence:

(5) $\mathcal{R}^\delta$ occurs to S iff $\mathcal{R}$ and δ occur to S and their occurrences are linked.

$\mathcal{R}^\delta$ is thus a more specific event type than $\mathcal{R}$. $\mathcal{R}^\delta$ is to $\mathcal{R}$ as *driving with friends* is to *driving*, and *striking in anger* to *striking*. For a neural model, suppose $\mathcal{R}$ is a circuit whose activation is the occurrence of $\mathcal{R}$. Let $\mathcal{R}$ be capable of being activated by other neural circuits, including δ. Then $\mathcal{R}^\delta$ might represent the activation of $\mathcal{R}$ by δ over a specific type of neural pathway.

From a semantic standpoint, the most important rule governing $\mathcal{R}^\delta$ is the derived reference rule:

(6) $\text{ex}\{\mathcal{R}^\delta\} = \text{ex}\{\delta\}$.

Thus the extension of *c(he)*$^{c(Obama)}$ is Obama, and the extension of *c(he)*$^{c(Clinton)}$ is Clinton. So when 'he' has 'Obama' as its antecedent, it refers to Obama. For 'Obama' is the antecedent of 'he' when the indexical concept expressed by 'he' has the concept expressed by 'Obama' as its determinant. The speaker uses 'he' to express the generic concept *c(he)*, thus meaning "he" by 'he.' The speaker also expresses the more specific concept *c(he)*$^{c(Obama)}$, thereby referring to Obama. Similarly, the intension of $\mathcal{R}^\delta$ is the intension of δ. The character function for $\mathcal{R}$ and indexicals expressing it is the function assigning to any context c the intension of the determinant δ linked to $\mathcal{R}$ in c. Indexical terms are characterized by a "double triangle of signification": the reference of a term is in general that of the idea it expresses, and the reference of an indexical idea is that of the determinant it is linked to.

3   Deictic Occurrence

Returning to example (1), the pronoun 'he' is used anaphorically to refer to George Washington, on my theory, when 'he' is used to express an occurrence of *c(he)* linked to the concept *c(Washington)* expressed by the proper name 'Washington' on that occasion. When the pronoun is used demonstratively, the determinant is related in a particular way to the speaker's pointing gesture. But in the deictic usage, there is no antecedent or demonstration. What then is the determinant? I believe what is distinctive about the deictic occurrence of indexical concepts is that they are linked to perceptual, introspective, memory, or even hallucinatory experiences—what I call

collectively *presentations*. When Jefferson used 'he' deictically, he was referring to Franklin because he was visually attending to Franklin, and *c(he)* was linked to that perception. Had Jefferson instead been using 'he' to express an occurrence of *c(he)* linked to his perception of Hamilton, 'he' would have referred deictically to Hamilton. Had he been using 'he' to express an occurrence of *c(he)* linked to an occurrent memory of John Adams, Jefferson would have been referring to Adams. Note that Jefferson could also have been using 'he' to express an occurrence of *c(he)* linked to his visual or auditory perception of Washington. In that case, Jefferson would have referred deictically rather than anaphorically to Washington. And conceivably, Jefferson might not realize that *he* is Washington.

By 'presentation,' I mean a non-epistemic awareness or memory of something, or a similar non-veridical state of consciousness. *Seeing a lemur* differs markedly from *seeing that it is a lemur*. The latter entails knowing and therefore believing that the object is a lemur, which in turn entails having the concept of a lemur. A subject can see a lemur without knowing that it is a lemur: the perceiver might misidentify it as some kind of raccoon, or be an animal incapable of knowing that anything is a lemur. The subject might not even know that what is seen exists: a man might mistakenly think he is hallucinating; a lower animal might not have the concept of existence. Since seeing-that entails knowing-that, Dretske (1969) called it "epistemic" perception. Seeing a lemur is "non-epistemic" perception. There is a similar distinction between remembering the lemur's jumping and remembering that the lemur jumped. Because the deictic use of indexicals is based on non-epistemic awareness or memory, it enables us to refer to objects we have not yet conceptualized. In this respect it resembles the demonstrative use and differs markedly from the anaphoric (cf. Lyons 1977: 673). Because deictic reference is determined by a presentation and not a concept, it is naturally considered more "direct" (cf. Saxena 2006: 131). In both cases, though, the reference of the indexical concept is determined by a determinant.

I characterized the determinant as a *separate* mental event. The externality is particularly clear when an indexical concept is linked to a sensory presentation. Mary's perception of Washington may cause her to think "He's tall," but is not part of the thought it caused.[4] *Indexical concepts connect the conceptual realm of experience to the nonconceptual.* Something must if thought and intentional action are to be effectively coordinated with events in the world. Suppose that a subject wants a cup of coffee, and that seeing one causes him to think "A cup of coffee is within grasping distance of Wayne Davis." Even if I am that subject, such thoughts are not sufficient to guide my hand to the cup. I have to think "*That* is a cup of coffee" perceiving it.

Attention is an essential element of the process whereby sense-perceptions or introspections become linked with indexical concepts.[5] Suppose we are looking at the grid of letters in Fig. 1.

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[4]Compare and contrast Vendler (1972: 73–6), D. W. Smith (1982: 202ff), and Boër (1995: 349).

[5]Cf. Schiffer (1978: 196), Levine (1988: 233).

c	f	c
f	u	Þ

Fig. 1 Six-Letter Grid

We see all six letters in this grid. There is a sensory presentation of the upper left 'c,' a sensory presentation of the upper middle 'f,' and so on. While remaining aware of all the letters, we can attend to one and think *This is a 'c.'* Whether the thought is true or false depends on which of the six letters we are attending to. The shift in attention does not change the sensory presentation: the array looks exactly the same. Visual attention is partly a non-sensory process.

We perceive an object by perceiving some of its parts. If Mary is looking at the *Enterprise*, she may be seeing its bow or its stern. Suppose now that Mary sees the aircraft carrier in virtue of seeing its stern and nothing else (she is looking at it directly from the rear). Even though they may coincide for a while, the process of perceiving the stern is different from the process of perceiving the ship. Moreover, Mary may be attending to the ship rather than the stern even though all she can see is the stern. The purely sensory component of the process may be the same as if she were attending to the stern. But attending to something has an additional non-sensory component that differs in the two cases. In virtue of the different non-sensory components, the subject has different dispositions to respond to changes in the stimulus. If Mary is attending to the stern, and the ship turns so that more of the ship is in view, she is liable to keep the stern in her focal point. But if Mary is attending to the ship, she is liable to shift her focal point away from the stern to a more central part of the ship. Because the processes of perceiving and attending to the ship differ from those of perceiving and attending to the stern, the indexical concept *c(this)* can be linked to a perception that is focused on the ship rather than on the stern, even if her sense-impression of the ship is a sense-impression of the stern. Consequently, she can truly say "This is thousands of feet long," referring to the whole ship rather than just the stern. Sense-impressions (the complexes of sensations involved in seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting, or smelling) are only part of the process of perceiving or attending to an object.

The non-sensory element in attending does not appear to be conceptual. A person can attend to a ship or its stern without having either the concept of a ship or the concept of a stern. Someone might acquire the concept of an aircraft carrier by looking at one. Animals with very limited conceptual abilities can attend to a vast range of objects. Even among humans, attending to an object and thinking of it as *this* does not seem to entail concurrently thinking of it in any other way. Someone who has never seen the symbol in the lower right corner of Fig. 1 can attend to it and think "What is this?" Hence the linking of an indexical concept to a perception focused on an object is not plausibly another case of linkage to a concept.

Attention can also be directed upon objects of introspective awareness. I can work with a pain in my foot without attending to it. But I must be attending to it when I think "It is still there." A similar process is involved when indexical concepts are linked to memory presentations, but is not called attention. Suppose we

are remembering a wedding, and have a vivid image of the scene in which the groom kissed the bride. We think *He kissed her.* We may be remembering the priest too. But our memory presentations of the bride and the groom are mentally highlighted, just as the sense-impression of the 'Þ' is when we are attending to it in Fig. 1. We cannot say that we are literally attending to the bride and the groom, but we can say that we are *focusing on* them. Attention is the specific case of focusing on an object of current perceptual or introspective observation.

We noted that perceiving and attending differ when it comes to parts and wholes. We perceive a ship by perceiving one of its parts. But if we attend to a part, we are not attending to the whole. In the case of tokens and types, we can both perceive and attend to a type by perceiving and attending to its tokens. When we attend to the 'c' in the upper left of Fig. 1, we are not also attending to the 'c' in the upper right. So we are attending to a particular token. But we are also attending to a type of letter, which we are not attending to when we attend to the 'Þ.' Focusing differs from attending in this case. Even though we are attending to both the token 'c' and the type 'c,' we may be focused on one or the other. As a result, the thought "This occurs more than once" may be true or false.

An indexical concept is linked to a presentation only if the subject is focusing on an object through it. I say in that case that the presentation is focused on the object. If $\rho(x)$ is a veridical presentation focused on x, the extension of $R^{\rho(x)}$ is x.

Since indexical concepts with demonstrative determinants are not involved in saying reports, I will not say much about them here. But it is important to see how being linked to a presentational determinant is different from being linked to a demonstrative determinant. To see this, return again to example (1), and suppose now that when the speaker uses 'he,' she is visually focusing on Hamilton while pointing at Franklin. The speaker is using 'he' deictically if she is using 'he' to express $c(he)^{\rho(Hamilton)}$—that is, if she is using 'he' to express an indexical concept linked to her presentation of Hamilton. In this case 'he' refers to Hamilton. The speaker is using 'he' demonstratively if she is using 'he' to express $c(he)^{\Delta(Franklin)}$, the same indexical concept linked to $\Delta(Franklin)$, the demonstrative determinant. In this case 'he' refers to Hamilton, and does so even if the speaker does not see or otherwise perceive Hamilton. Hamilton may be out of the speaker's line of sight and making no noise. In fact, the speaker may mistakenly think that she is pointing at Washington. If she is using 'he' demonstratively, then the referent of 'he' is the person she is actually pointing at, not the person she intends to be pointing at.[6] Nothing like a pointing gesture determines the referent in deictic uses, even if the speaker is also pointing at the referent. To explain why demonstrative uses work the way they do, I need to say more about demonstrative determinants and how they are related to demonstrative acts like pointing, but I will have to do that another time.

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[6]Kaplan (1977: 512, 1978: 30) made this point with his well-known Carnap/Agnew and Paul/Charles examples. These cases differ markedly from the sort of cases Kaplan (1989: 582) discusses later in which the act of pointing is a mere aid to communication, not a semantic determinant.

4 Individuating Primary Indexical Concepts

We have looked at what differentiates different occurrences of the generic indexical concept *c(this)*: they are linked to different determinants. What can we say about the different generic indexical concepts? How does *c(this)* differ from *c(he)* and other primary indexical concepts? Are they atomic or do they have components? The problem of the essential indexical shows that a primary indexical concept ℝ cannot be completely analyzed into descriptive concepts. But that allows ℝ to have some descriptive components as long as it has others that make it non-descriptive. To account for all the similarities and differences in meaning among indexicals, I hypothesize that each primary indexical concept is composed of a very general *sortal* concept plus a nondescriptive *determiner*. I present evidence that the sortal component of *c(he)* is *c(male)*, whereas that of *c(I)* is the more general concept *c(animate)*. The sortal component of *c(this)*, expressed by 'this' as a pronoun, is *c(thing)*; that of a phrase of the form 'this N,' in which 'this' is a determiner, is *c(N)*. The sortal component places a condition on the derived reference rule (6): $ex\{R^\delta\} = ex\{\delta\}$ *provided ex{δ} is in the extension of the sortal component of ℝ.* Suppose Terry points at someone he mistakenly believes to be male, and says 'He is tall.' Even though Terry is referring to a woman, 'he' cannot refer to a woman because of its sortal component. His statement suffers from the same presupposition failure as 'This/The male is tall.' The sortal component of *c(I)* explains why we would interpret a note attached to a stone reading 'I am a stone' as either a joke or a piece of make-believe.

   The determiner component of a primary indexical concept does a number of things. It combines with the sortal component to form an singular subject-concept that is indexical and therefore capable of linking to determinants. It furthermore determines the specific range of determinants the concept can link to. No two primary indexical concepts can occur with the same range of determinants. Each ℝ has a unique set of *determinant constraints*, which specify the determinants ℝ cannot link to. Some pronouns, such as 'this,' 'that,' and 'it,' differ only in their determinant constraints; there is no difference in their sortal components. Others, like 'he' and 'I,' have differences in determinant constraints that are independent of their sortal components. One such difference between 'I' and 'he' is illustrated by (7).

(7)   (a)   Caesar met Vercingetorix and thought "I will be victorious."
       (b)   Caesar met Vercingetorix and thought "He will be victorious."

In (7)(a), the pronoun can only have 'Caesar' as its antecedent because that is the subject of the propositional attitude verb 'thought.' In (7)(b) the pronoun can be interpreted as referring back to Caesar (especially given Caesar's unusual practice of referring to himself in the third-person), but is most naturally interpreted as referring to Vercingetorix. It is easy to imagine languages in which the occurrence constraints characterizing the personal pronouns are different. Indeed, Amharic (Schlenker 2003: 31, 76) and Kannada (Bhat 2004: 58, 68) are languages from different families

in which a pronoun expressing $R^{\alpha(S)}$ in main clauses may be logophoric in that-clauses. Gokana has a third-person pronoun occurring logophorically there (Bhat 2004: 62).

5   Indexical Descriptions

Definite descriptions can be used with either a *restricted* or an *unrestricted* interpretation.[7] The unrestricted interpretation was the main focus of the Russell-Strawson debate. On this interpretation, 'the F' means something like "the only thing in the entire universe that is F," so that 'The F is G' is true only if there is one and only one F and it is G. 'The queen of England' would most naturally have the unrestricted interpretation. A definite description like 'the cat,' in contrast, is seldom if ever used with the unrestricted interpretation. More commonly, 'the cat' means something like "the *contextually indicated* cat." If I see a cat and say "The cat is on the mat," then 'the cat' refers to the cat I am attending to. The fact that there are millions of other cats and mats around the world will not make my statement false or truth-valueless. What I said in no way implies or presupposes that there is just one cat in the whole world. The presence of more than one cat on the mat might raise questions. But even then there will be no problem if I can count on my audience knowing which one I was attending to.

Let 'the R_i' represent the general form of definite descriptions used with the sort of restricted sense 'the cat' has in the above examples. The rough gloss which says that 'the R' means "the contextually indicated R" is accurate in its implication that the restricted sense of a definite description is *indexical*. 'The cat' refers to different cats in different contexts even though it is used with the same sense and evaluated in the same world. Restricted definite descriptions can be used anaphorically or deictically, as illustrated by (8).

(8)   After Washington led the Continental Army to victory, the Virginian became president.

  (a)   *Anaphoric:* 'Washington' is the antecedent of 'the Virginian.'
  (b)   *Deictic:* The speaker was visually focusing on Jefferson when he said 'the Virginian.'

Replacing 'the Virginian' by 'he' in (8) produces little change in its meaning, except for replacing the presupposition that the referent is a Virginian with the presupposition that the referent is a man. Restricted descriptions differ markedly

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[7]Cf. Quine 1940: §2.7; Strawson 1950: 14–5; Sellars 1954; Donnellan 1968, 1977; Geach 1975: 198; Chastain 1975; Peacocke 1975: 208; Evans 1977, 1980; Grice 1981; Wettstein 1981; Salmon 1982; Barwise and Perry 1983: 152–3; Soames 1986; Bach 1987: §6.4; Recanati 1989a: 232–3, b: 314; Neale 1990: §3.7; Schiffer 1995: 114–6; Bezuidenhout 1997; Reimer 1998a; b; Powell 2001: 80ff. See also Braun (1994), who focuses on the complex demonstrative 'that F.'

from pronouns in being *compositional*: the meaning of 'the R' is determined by the meaning of 'the' and 'R.' In this respect, 'the R' is exactly like indexical noun phrases of the forms 'this R' and 'that R.' Replacing 'the Virginian' with 'this Virginian' in (8) produces even less change in meaning.

One hypothesis is that the restricted interpretation of definite descriptions is due to domain or universe restriction.[8] It is possible that 'the F' always means "the unique thing in the domain that is F," and that its restricted interpretation is due to the fact that the domain of quantification is contextually restricted. Domain restriction clearly accounts for some cases. When handing an exam back to my logic class, I might say "Everyone passed," "No one got a D," "One student who did not study got a D+," and "The student who got the highest grade is not here." The first three statements make it clear that the domain of quantification has been restricted to students in my logic class. The fourth statement then says something about the only student in the domain who got the highest grade. Domain restriction, however, cannot account for the two interpretations of (8) any more than it could account for the interpretations when 'he' replaces 'the Virginian.'

The leading theory holds that restricted descriptions are "incomplete" in the sense that they are *elliptical*.[9] The idea is that 'the R' can be used in a restricted sense only when there is some *description completer* 'C' such that the speaker is expressing the idea *the only R that is C*. 'The R' applies to different objects in different contexts because it is elliptical for different "complete" definite descriptions. Some restricted descriptions are plausibly elliptical. Suppose we are attending a National Symphony Orchestra concert. None too pleased with the performance, I say "The conductor must be deaf." I obviously do not mean that the world's only conductor must be deaf, and what I say cannot be criticized on the grounds that other orchestras have different conductors. What I mean is that the conductor *of a particular performance* is deaf, the one I am attending to. I used 'the conductor' to express the idea of the conductor of this performance. Because 'the conductor' is elliptical on this occasion for something like 'the conductor of this performance,' it refers to that particular conductor here.

But there are other cases in which the description completer theory is implausible.[10] Suppose that at one point in the concert we are struck by an unusual instrument carrying the melody. I say "The instrument is a woodwind." I have used an "incomplete" description, since 'instrument' applies to every instrument in the orchestra. When this fact is pointed out, no description completer leaps to mind. The case differs markedly from 'The conductor must be deaf.' While some completers might be suggested in this case ('the instrument that I am attending to'), none seem capable of accounting for the two interpretations of (8). A further problem is that

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[8]See e.g., Hawkins (1978: 101, 200); Neale (1990: 95); Bhat (2004: 203).

[9]See e.g., Sellars (1954), Evans (1982: 324), Soames (1986), Neale (1990: 100–2).

[10]Cf. Wettstein (1981); Schiffer (1995), and Powell (2001: 80ff).

unrestricted descriptions cannot be used deictically or anaphorically. Another is that plausible elliptical descriptions would be non-rigid. But restricted descriptions are rigid, as those in (8) illustrate.

A general consideration against the elliptical description theory is that in many respects, 'the R' in its restricted sense behaves very much like 'this R,' 'that R,' and pronouns. Indexical noun phrases and pronouns are not plausibly regarded as incomplete or elliptical, can be used anaphorically, demonstratively, or deictically, and are rigid when used deictically. Instead of saying "The instrument is ugly," I could well have said "That is ugly" or "That instrument is ugly." There is little difference between "The guy"s drunk," said of a professor trying to give a public lecture, and "He's drunk." Like 'that instrument,' 'the instrument' is non-descriptive. I can describe the person I am focusing on by saying "He is the conductor," but I cannot describe the instrument I am attending to by saying 'It is the instrument.' Terms like 'the instrument' and 'that instrument' are consequently both "directly referential" in the sense that their reference is not determined by descriptive conditions associated with the term, although it may be constrained by such conditions.

One way 'the R' differs from 'this/that R' is that it can *not* be used demonstratively. Compare:

(9)   (a)   This Virginian became president.
       (b)   The Virginian became president.

If there are a number of Virginians in the room, I can randomly point at one with my eyes closed and utter (9)(a). 'This Virginian' will then refer to the Virginian I pointed to. 'The Virginian' cannot be used in the same way. I can of course point in the direction of my intended referent when I utter 'the Virginian.' Yet the pointing must be interpreted as an emphatic gesture, not as a determinant of the referent. If I accidentally point at the wrong Virginian, what I said will not diverge from what I meant. The lack of a demonstrative use is a particular problem for the elliptical description theory since 'that I am pointing to' would seem to be a likely completer.

On my view, 'the R,' 'this R,' and 'that R' all express primary indexical concepts. Their referent on any occasion of use is determined by the determinant linked to the indexical concept it expresses (Rule (6)). Thus on the anaphoric interpretation of (8), the determinant is the concept expressed by 'Washington.' Hence 'the Virginian' refers to Washington. On the deictic interpretation of (8), the determinant is the speaker's visual presentation of Jefferson. Hence 'the Virginian' refers to Jefferson. In both these cases, the reference is rigid because the determinant is nondescriptive. If the antecedent of 'the Virginian' were 'the man who lived at Mount Vernon,' its reference would be nonrigid. 'The R' does not presuppose there is just one R because its referent is determined not by the description 'R' but by an indexical determinant.

Primary indexical concepts are characterized by their *sortal component* and their *determinant type*. 'The R' has the same sortal component as 'this R' and 'that R'— the concept expressed by 'R.' The determinant type for *c(the R)* differs from that

for *c(this R)* and *c(that R)*. For *c(the R)* cannot have demonstrative determinants. 'That R' and 'this R' differ from each other in their determinant constraints. For example, 'that speaker' cannot, be used demonstratively when the speaker believes he is pointing at himself. 'This speaker' can. Let Γ, K, and Λ represent the three different determinant types, and let ♂ represent the generic indexical determiner. Then the indexical concepts expressed by 'the R,' 'this R,' and 'that R' can be analyzed as follows:

(10)   **Indexical Concept Definitions:**
       $c(the\ R) = ♂^{\Gamma} c(R)$
       $c(this\ R) = ♂^{K} c(R)$
       $c(that\ R) = ♂^{\Lambda} c(R)$

The semantic rule assigning these indexical concepts to English noun phrases is one of the construction rules of English.

6   Ideo-Reflexive Descriptions

I have observed previously that English and other natural languages have productive rules whereby we can refer to an idea by using a word, phrase, or sentence that expresses that idea (Davis 2003: §1.6). The language thus exploits the word-idea pairings established by the primary conventions of the language for a second purpose. The word 'Washington' means what it does in English because it is conventionally used to express a certain idea, the idea of Washington. We can thus talk about Washington by using the word 'Washington.' The convention for referring to ideas enables us to talk about the idea of Washington by using any of the phrases in (11).

(11)   the idea "Washington"
       the idea *Washington*
       the idea Washington
       the idea of Washington

In all of these phrases, the word 'Washington' is used with one of its conventional meanings, and the phrases containing it refer to the idea it expresses in that sense. I say that the word 'Washington' is used *ideo-reflexively* in constructions like (11), and that descriptions which refer to an idea by using a word ideo-reflexively are *ideo-reflexive descriptions*.

While there are many similarities, ideo-reflexive descriptions are not themselves indexical descriptions. First, they are not indexical. When used with the same sense, they refer to the same idea in every context of use. *The idea "Washington"* does have different referents in different contexts, but only because it is used with different meanings in different contexts. When 'Washington' means "George Washington," *the idea "Washington"* refers to the George Washington in any context of use. When

'Washington' means "Washington D.C.," *the idea "Washington"* refers to the Washington D.C. in any context of use. Second, *the idea "Washington"* is not a definite description of the form 'the G,' where 'G' is a general term. Hence it does not mean anything like *the only idea "Washington"* or even *the contextually indicated idea "Washington."* These glosses do not even make sense because 'idea "Washington"' is not a general term. It cannot be preceded by an indefinite article ('an'), quantifiers ('all,' 'some,' 'no,' 'most,' etc.) or numerical determiners ('one,' 'two,' etc.).[11]

While not themselves indexical, expressions of the form *the idea "μ"* do contain an indexical description, namely 'the idea,' which can be used anaphorically or deictically to refer to any idea in appropriate contexts. Thus in *The idea "vixen" is complex: the idea contains the idea "female" and the idea "fox,"* the second occurrence of 'the idea' has *the idea "Vixen"* as its antecedent. My hypothesis is that *'the idea' is functioning as an indexical description in 'the idea "μ".'* If correct, we need to ask whether this is an anaphoric, deictic, or demonstrative use. Demonstrative use can be ruled out because there is nothing analogous to a pointing gesture when we use ideo-reflexive expressions. The use bears some resemblance to anaphora, with 'μ' serving as the antecedent. But 'μ' need not have a referent, and even when it does, the referent of 'the idea' is not its referent. In *the idea "city,"* 'city' is a general rather than singular term. Its extension is the set of cities, not a particular city, and certainly not an idea. The name 'Chicago' is a singular term, but *the idea "Chicago"* refers not to the name's referent (a city), but to the idea the name expresses (the Chicago). More fundamentally, anaphoric nouns normally refer back (or forward) to a noun used in an independent phrase, as illustrated in (1) and (8). But in an ideo-reflexive description, the only possible antecedent is in the very phrase used to refer to an idea.

My hypothesis is that the use of 'the idea' in ideo-reflexive descriptions is *deictic*. The function of 'μ' is to express an idea our introspective awareness of which is the indexical determinant of $c(the\ idea) = \sigma^{\Gamma} c(idea)$. On any occasion in which *the idea "μ_i"* is used, the idea i expressed by the displayed word 'μ' on that occasion is occurring to the speaker, who is introspectively aware of it. His introspective awareness α(i) of that idea is the determinant of $\sigma^{\Gamma} c(idea)$. Consequently, the speaker uses *the idea "μ_i"* to express $\sigma^{\Gamma} c(idea)^{\alpha(i)}$. It follows from the extension rule (6) that *the idea "μ_i"* refers to i. If communication is successful and the hearer understands *the idea "μ_i,"* then the idea i the speaker used 'μ' to express will occur to the hearer too, and her introspective awareness of that idea will be linked to her occurrence of $\sigma^{\Gamma} c(idea)$. Thus whereas 'the idea' expresses the generic indexical concept $\sigma^{\Gamma} c(idea)$, which may be linked to either conceptual or presentational determinants, *the idea "μ_i"* expresses the specific indexical concept $\sigma^{\Gamma} c(idea)^{\alpha(i),}$, whose determinant is the subject's introspective awareness of a particular idea, the one expressed by 'μ' on that occasion. Because expressions of the form *the idea "μ_i"* express specific indexical concepts, they are not themselves indexical.

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[11] 'Idea of φ' is a general term, however, when 'idea' means "conception" rather than "thought part." There are many ideas of justice, in this sense.

I use 'μ_i' as a place-holder for any term expressing idea (or other mental state) i. 'ρ_i' and 'φ_i' stand specifically sentences and object nominals respectively.[12] '$\alpha(i)$' stands for the subject's introspective awareness of an occurrence of i.

(12) **Indexical Concept Definitions:**
$$c(\text{the idea "}\mu_i\text{"}) = \sigma^{\ulcorner} c(idea)^{\alpha(i)}$$
$$c(\text{the idea that } \rho_i) = \sigma^{\ulcorner} c(idea)^{\alpha(i)}$$
$$c(\text{the idea of } \varphi_i) = \sigma^{\ulcorner} c(idea)^{\alpha(i)}$$

Whereas primary indexical concept definitions like (10) define generic indexical concepts, specifying determinant types but no particular determinants, (12) specifies a particular determinant as well as a determinant type. Hence (12) defines specific indexical concepts as determinates of the generic indexical concept $\sigma^{\ulcorner} c(idea)$.

These definition schemas can be generalized by replacing 'idea' with a variable 'C' holding a place for more specific terms like *subject concept, predicate concept, atomic concept, complex concept, syncategorematic concept, thought,* and *proposition*. Thus *c(the thought that grass is green$_i$)* $= \sigma^{\ulcorner} c(thought)^{\alpha(i)}$, where $\alpha(i)$ is a subject's introspective awareness of an occurrence of the thought which 'grass is green' expresses in the current context (i.e., in 'the thought that grass is green' as I used it). Since the proposition that grass is green is an object of belief, desire, and other propositional attitudes, we have further equations such as *c(the belief that grass is green)* $= \sigma^{\ulcorner} c(belief)^{\alpha(i)}$. 'This idea __' and 'that idea __' have parallel rules. *This idea "red"* and *that idea "red"* have the same referent as the phrases in (11). In general, 'this idea "μ_i"' expresses $\sigma^{K} c(idea)^{\alpha(i)}$.

7 Auto-reflexive Descriptions

The closest relative of ideo-reflexive reference is what I call *auto-reflexive* reference, a species of metalinguistic reference in which we refer to words by displaying what we are referring to, as in (13).

(13) (a)   the word 'Chicago'
       (b)   the word *Chicago*
       (c)   the word Chicago

All three of these descriptions refer to the name of the largest city in Illinois, the name that is used auto-reflexively in the phrases. Note that in the standard use we are focusing on, the three *phrases* in (13) are not themselves used auto-reflexively. They can be so used (see below), but in that case they are used to refer to themselves, not the word 'Chicago.' And whereas it is tautological that the phrases in (13) refer to the word 'Chicago,' it is not clear that the third word therein also refers to the

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[12] 'ρ_i' and 'φ_i' need restrictions for reasons indicated in Sect. 9.

word 'Chicago.' So 'auto-reflexive' does not mean *self-referential.* What the third word in (13) clearly does is *display* (*exhibit, present*) the referent of the phrase. To display something is to *show* it in the sense of *making it perceptible*.[13]

The forms in which the name is set off by quotation marks or italics (or stress, timing, and intonation in speech) are preferred in formal writing. The marking signals a non-standard use, making it easier for readers to realize that the name is not referring to the city. But the third form in which the auto-reflexive name is unmarked is grammatical, and fully conventional in colloquial writing. There are no quotation marks in speech, of course, and emphasis is optional.[14]

Like ideo-reflexive descriptions, auto-reflexive descriptions are not indexical themselves, but they contain an indexical description, such as 'the word' in (13). It is my hypothesis that 'Chicago' is also functioning as a deictic antecedent in (13). The determinant of *c(the word)* is our perceptual awareness of the word (type) displayed, namely 'Chicago.' This accounts for the fact that auto-reflexive descriptions refer *rigidly*. The phrases in (13) have the same referent in every possible world. Rule (12) thus has the following companion.

(14)   **Indexical Concept Definitions:**
       $c(\text{the word 'w'}) = \sigma^{\Gamma} c(word)^{\rho(\text{'w'})}$.

This word 'Chicago' and *that word 'Chicago'* work similarly and have parallel construction rules. Parallel rules also result from replacing 'word' with cognate terms like 'phrase' or 'sentence,' more general terms like 'expression,'[15] the plural 'words,' or more specific terms like 'noun' or 'verb.' Whereas ideo-reflexive descriptions exploit the fact that we are introspectively aware of the ideas expressed by the words of our language, auto-reflexive descriptions exploit the fact that we can see or hear the words we write or speak.

The rules for auto-reflexive reference differ significantly from those for ideo-reflexive reference in lacking the proviso that the word 'w' be a word of English.[16] *"The word 'belle' is French"* is a sentence of English that refers to a French word. The word it refers to has a meaning in French, but is not being used with its French meaning in that sentence. Its grammatical category is irrelevant. The speaker is consequently not using French (Davis 2003: §7.8). There is not even a restriction that 'w' be a word. "The word 'f' is short" is a perfectly grammatical English sentence. It has a semantic defect, of course, since it falsely presupposes that 'f' is a word. That is a consequence of the meaning assigned to "the word 'f'" by (14). The sortal component of the indexical concept it expresses is *c(word).*

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[13]Cf. Clark and Gerrig (1990), Recanati (2001: 639), Green (2007).

[14]We sometimes say "quote-unquote" before using a word or sentence, but not when the word is auto-reflexive. "Quote-unquote" functions like scare quotes or direct quotes. We sometimes use gestures called "air quotes" when using words auto-reflexively in speech, but not very often.

[15]The parallel for 'expression' implies that "the expression 'Chicago'" is ambiguous in English, most commonly referring to the name of a city, but also possibly referring to that name in quotes.

[16]Cf. Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 5, 19). See also Washington (1992: 592–4).

8   Saying Reports

There is a well-known contrast between (15)(a) and (b):

(15)   (a)   John said "Boeing makes planes."
       (b)   John said that Boeing makes planes.

On one interpretation—which we will assume for the time being—(15)(a) means
that John uttered a particular sentence, the sentence 'Boeing makes planes.' It would
be false if the sentence John uttered were 'Boeing makes airplanes' or 'Boeing
fabrique des avions.' When so interpreted, (15)(a) describes John as performing
what Austin called a *locutionary* act.[17] (15)(b) is like (15)(a) in entailing that
John uttered something. But (15)(b) does not mean or entail that John uttered
any particular sentence. (15)(b) might be true because John uttered 'Boeing makes
airplanes' or 'Boeing fabrique des avions.' (15)(b) instead describes something John
did *by* or *in* uttering something. It describes John as performing what Austin called
an *illocutionary* act. Illocutionary saying is much like *asserting*, but asserting is
stronger. If John is telling a story, he might say that a gigantic flying saucer hovered
over Los Angeles. But if he is just telling a story, then he did not assert, affirm, or
state that it did.

   We have seen that (15)(b) does not entail (15)(a) on the locutionary interpretation
we are assuming. It may be less obvious that (15)(a) on its locutionary interpretation
does not entail (15)(b). But (15)(a) might be true without (b) if, for example, John
were acting in a play, or just reading what is written on a note card. (15)(b) differs
from (15)(a) in requiring that John has uttered some words *in order to express
a proposition*. (15)(a) fails to entail (b) even when John is trying to express a
proposition, as when John is using a code rather than English, in which 'Boeing
makes planes' means "The president is on Air Force One." Unlike (15)(b), (15)(a)
entails nothing about what the sentence John uttered means or how John was using
it. The syntax and semantics of *John says ". . ."* when locutionary does not even
require that what John uttered was a sentence. *John said "Makes planes"* or *John
said "Make Boeings plane"* are well formed and might be true instead of (15)(a).
In either case, John may not have said *that* anything is the case. When utterances
are elliptical or ungrammatical, a completely accurate quotation will have to contain
the same defects. Finally, interrogatives, imperatives, and interjections are permitted
within quotation marks but not after 'that.'[18]

   One of the most important differences between (15)(a) and (b) is that a speaker
cannot use (b) without using 'Boeing' and 'planes' with particular meanings.
The speaker must mean "William Boeing" or "The Boeing Aircraft Company"

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[17]See Austin (1962); Alston (1964: 34–6).

[18]A syntactic difference with no evident semantic significance is that a comma after 'said' is
optional in (a), but prohibited after 'said' in (b). Commas are needed in illocutionary reports when
'said' follows or interrupts the subordinate clause, as in *Boeing makes planes, John said* or *Boeing,
John said, makes planes.*

(or something else) by the word 'Boeing,' and "airplanes" or "carpentry planes" (or something else) by 'planes.' But a speaker can use (15)(a) without having any idea what the words 'Boeing' or 'planes' mean, or without believing that they have any meaning. *John said "All mimsy are the borogroves"* might be just as true as (15)(a). *John said that all mimsy are the borogroves* cannot be true (at least in English). Conversely, we can know that (15)(b) is true without having any idea what words John uttered. It may suffice to know what his words meant. Without knowing what words John uttered, however, we cannot know that (15)(a) is true as a locutionary report.

When (15)(a) is used strictly to describe what expression John has uttered, the speaker is *quoting* John. The speaker is offering a "direct quotation" of what John said. (15)(b) is not a quotation at all. It cannot even be described as an "indirect" quotation. There really is no such thing as an indirect quote. There are of course paraphrases of what someone has said, as well as translations (see Sect. 10). But even they cannot be described as indirect quotations.

As this collection of essays illustrates, a sentence like (15)(b) is commonly described as an "indirect report" in linguistics and philosophy, while (15)(a) is described as "direct report." This terminology suggests, however, that (15)(a) and (b) are different ways of reporting the same thing. In fact, they report very different speech acts, as we have seen. The only way the two acts are related is that uttering the sentence 'p' is a typical way of saying that p. John can say that Boeing makes planes by saying "Boeing makes planes"—i.e., by uttering the sentence 'Boeing makes planes.' But there are countless other ways John can say that Boeing makes planes. We have also seen that (15)(a) can be true without (15)(b) being true.

The Latin terms *oratio recta* and *oratio obliqua* are also commonly used to mark the difference between (15)(a) and (b).[19] But these too are really not apt. The Latin terms apply more appropriately to the distinction between (16)(a) and (b), which are two different ways of ascribing the same thing to John.

(16) (a)   John believes that he makes planes.
      (b)   John believes him to make planes.

Whereas the subordinate clause in (16)(a) can be used as an independent clause, an independent clause cannot take the accusative + infinitive form in English or Latin. In Latin, *oratio recta* clauses cannot be used as subordinate clauses after speech act or propositional attitude verbs as they can in English. And whereas the accusative + infinitive form is required in Latin after verbs of saying, it is prohibited there in English. Unlike (16)(b), 'John said him to make planes' is ungrammatical.

An obvious syntactic difference between (15)(a) and (15)(b) is that the sentence 'Boeing makes planes' appears within quotation marks in (a) but follows 'that' in (b). 'That' blocks a locutionary interpretation: (15)(b) cannot be used to quote or paraphrase John. But the quotation marks do not force a locutionary interpretation.

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[19] See e.g., Dennett (1969); Recanati (2000).

For (15)(a) is ambiguous.[20] It can also be used with a meaning on which it is equivalent to (15)(b), and is an alternative way of attributing to John the illocutionary act of saying that Boeing Aircraft Company makes airplanes.[21] In this illocutionary use, neither the quotation marks nor 'that' are syntactically required. That is, 'John said Boeing makes planes' can also be used to attribute the same illocutionary act to John. Italics or emphasis may also mark the subordinate clause, as in 'John said *Boeing makes planes.*'

A syntactic difference is that locutionary but not illocutionary reports may contain elliptical or ungrammatical sentences. Thus John can answer "Does Boeing make planes?" by saying "Yes," and can answer "Who makes planes?" by saying "Boeing." *John said "Yes"* and *John said "Boeing"* are both grammatical, but have only the locutionary sense. Neither 'Yes' nor 'Boeing' can comprise a that-clause. And if John uttered 'Boeing maked planes,' then *John said "Boeing maked planes"* is grammatical and true in the locutionary sense. But it is ungrammatical in the illocutionary sense, as is *John said that Boeing maked planes.*

I will use '*S said* ⟨*p*⟩' to represent the general form of all sentences whose main verb is *said* in which a complete sentence 'p' indicates what is said, whether the subordinate clause 'p' is quoted, preceded by 'that,' marked by italics, or by nothing at all, and whether *said* ⟨*p*⟩ has a locutionary or illocutionary sense. I call these and sentences with different forms of 'say' *saying reports*.

Quote-clauses, that-clauses, and unmarked clauses provide alternative ways of reporting other illocutionary acts, as well as propositional attitudes.

(17)   (a)   "Boeing makes planes," John insisted.
       (b)   John insisted that Boeing makes planes.
       (c)   John insisted Boeing makes planes.

(18)   (a)   John believes "Boeing makes planes."
       (b)   John believes that Boeing makes planes.
       (c)   John believes Boeing makes planes.

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[20]By 'ambiguous' in this paper I mean *semantically* rather than pragmatically ambiguous: the sentence (or other expression) has two or more meanings in the language. A sentence is pragmatically ambiguous if speakers conventionally use it to mean something other than what the sentence means, as when it has a generalized implicature. Pragmatic ambiguities are the subject of Sect. 10.

[21]Cf. Capone (this volume, p. 59), who says that "in some cases (rare though they are) a direct report sounds very much like an indirect report." This does not mean that "the border between direct and indirect reports has been corroded" (Capone, this volume, p. 60), only that the syntactic difference between quote-clauses and that-clauses is not a perfectly reliable indicator of whether a locutionary or illocutionary saying is meant on a given occasion. I submit that once one gives up the notion that quotation marks entail a quotation, and carefully examines what sentences of the form *S says "p"* are used to express, one will find that illocutionary uses are very common, and as conventional as locutionary uses.

(17)(a) is equivalent to (17)(b) and (c), and (18)(a) is equivalent to (18)(b) and (c). (18)(a) does not describe John as believing a sentence, and may be true even if John knows no English and has uttered no sentence. (17)(a) entails that John has uttered something, but does not entail that John uttered the English sentence that is quoted, nor that John insisted a sentence. A speaker cannot use any of the sentences in (17) or (18) without knowing what 'Boeing makes planes' means, and intending a particular interpretation.

When used to report an illocutionary act or propositional attitude, quotation marks behave differently from 'that' when the subordinate clause contains pronouns or other indexicals. Like (15)(a), (19)(a) can be used to report either a locutionary act (Simpson uttered the sentence quoted) or an illocutionary act (Simpson said that something is the case). In its typical illocutionary use, however, (19)(a) is equivalent to (19)(b) rather than (19)(c).[22]

(19) (a)   Simpson said "I killed Nicole."
      (b)   Simpson said that he himself killed Nicole.
      (c)   Simpson said that I killed Nicole.
      (d)   Simpson said *I killed Nicole.*
      (e)   I killed Nicole, Simpson said.

The first-person pronoun in (19)(c) typically refers to the *speaker* of (19)(c), so that (19)(c) claims that Simpson said the speaker killed Nicole. The first-person pronoun in (19)(a) typically refers to the *subject* of (19)(a), so that (19)(a) claims that Simpson said he himself killed Nicole. We find the same difference in propositional attitude reports. Thus (20)(a) is equivalent to (20)(b) rather than (20)(c).

(20) (a)   Simpson believes "I killed Nicole."
      (b)   Simpson believes that he himself killed Nicole.
      (c)   Simpson believes that I killed Nicole.
      (d)   Simpson believes *I killed Nicole*.
      (e)   I killed Nicole, Simpson believes.

Note that subordinate clauses marked by italics or set off by a comma[23] behave like those marked with quotes. (19)(d) has the meaning of (19)(a), and (20)(d) has the meaning of (20)(a).

We have noted that (15)(a) is ambiguous. It can be used to report either a locutionary or an illocutionary act. (15)(b) does not have the same ambiguity. On the

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[22]Kaplan (1977: 511) credited this observation to Carnap. Kaplan mistakenly assumed, however, that a sentence like (a) *mentions* the quoted words. As an illocutionary report, (19)(a) is not like *Simpson uttered 'I killed him.'* If the quoted expression in (7) were simply auto-reflexive, the pronouns in (7) could not have referents or differ in what antecedents they can have.

[23]Cf. Giorgi (this volume).

other hand, (15)(b) has an ambiguity that (15)(a) lacks. (15)(b) can be used as an *opaque* report of an illocutionary act or as a *transparent* report. The same is true of (18)(b) and (c). Consider (21) and (22):

(21)   Mary: Mt. Kilimanjaro is snow covered.
      (a)   Mary said that the tallest mountain in Africa is snow covered.
      (b)   Mary said "The tallest mountain in Africa is snow covered."

(22)   (a)   Mary believes that the tallest mountain in Africa is snow covered.
      (b)   Mary believes "The tallest mountain in Africa is snow covered."

If the only sentence Mary uttered was 'Mt. Kilimanjaro is snow covered,' then (21)(b) is unequivocally false. But (21)(a) has an interpretation on which it is true as well as one on which it is false. The true interpretation is the transparent, the false interpretation is the opaque. (22)(a) has the same ambiguity, but (22)(b) is unambiguous. On the opaque interpretation of (21)(a), it is equivalent to (21)(b). On the transparent interpretation of (21)(a), it can be true even though (21)(b) is false. On the transparent interpretation, (22)(a) follows from the fact that Mary believes "Mt. Kilimanjaro is snow covered" together with the fact that Mt. Kilimanjaro is the tallest mountain in Africa. (22)(b) does not follow from the same two facts. Capone (2008: 1026) claims that the transparent interpretation of (22)(a) "is not perceived to be the normal, ordinary use of belief reports, which is to throw light on the mental life of the believers." But transparent reports are also used to describe the mental life of believers. To a first approximation, what (22)(a) says on the transparent interpretation is that Mary believes *some* proposition equivalent to the proposition (22)(b) says Mary believes, which is the proposition (22)(a) says Mary believes on the opaque interpretation. It is thus a weaker claim about Mary's mental state, but it still tells us something important about it. The relation between the transparent and opaque interpretations of (21)(a) is similar. I believe a comprehensive survey of uses of sentences of the form 'S believes/says that p' will show that both transparent and opaque uses are normal, ordinary, and very common.[24]

    Locutionary reports are also opaque, but for a different reason. 'Mt. Kilimanjaro is snow covered' and 'The tallest mountain in Africa is snow covered' are different sentences even though their subjects refer to the same mountain. So uttering one is not uttering the other. In the illocutionary sense, saying "Mt. Kilimanjaro is snow covered" and saying "The tallest mountain in Africa is snow covered" are different because 'Mt. Kilimanjaro' and 'the tallest mountain in Africa' express different concepts. Saying "The math teacher is nice" and "The teacher of math is nice" are the same in the illocutionary sense even though 'the math teacher' and 'the teacher of math' are different phrases, because they express the same concept.

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[24]I argue at length against the various attempts of Millians to argue that the opaque interpretations are implicatures rather than senses in Davis (2005: §§11.4–11.6).

9   The Semantics of Saying Reports

It is well known that clauses function differently when they are subordinate in speech act or propositional attitude reports than they do when they are independent sentences. *How* they function there is a controversial matter. I believe they function ideo-reflexively in illocutionary reports and auto-reflexively in locutionary reports, and that their uses can thus be analyzed in terms of indexical concepts as in Sect. 7. In this section I will provide a brief sketch of the semantics of saying reports: sentences of the form 'S said $\langle p \rangle$.' I will differentiate the three senses we have identified by the subscripts L, O, and T for *locutionary*, *opaque illocutionary*, and *transparent illocutionary* respectively. I will put the subscript on the word *said*, although I do not believe the word itself is ambiguous.

There is one further ambiguity in speech act reports that is not relevant to any theoretical issues. *Said* can be used narrowly in opposition to *wrote*, *signed*, and so on, or broadly to cover expression through the production of letters and hand signs as well as speech sounds. The word *utter* has the same ambiguity. In the definitions that follow, the interpretation of 'utter' in the definiens should match that of 'said' in the definiendum.

The simplest sense to analyze is the locutionary.

(23)   **Locutionary Saying Reports:** *S said$_L$ "p" at t iff S uttered 'p' at t as a whole sentence.*

Uttering an expression involves more than its production. Word processors produce words on their monitors, and chimpanzees can produce words by typing randomly on keyboards. But in neither cases are words being uttered. As a consequence, nothing is said.[25] By uttering 'p' as a whole sentence, I mean uttering it as a sentence but not as part of another sentence. If S utters 'p' as a subordinate clause in another sentence, that does not suffice for saying$_L$ "p." Thus someone who says *If there is peace on earth, I will be very happy* has not thereby said "There is peace on earth." If the quoted sentence is not the whole sentence uttered, ellipsis marks must be used to indicate the omission. Because we are using 'p' to stand for complete sentences, (23) is incomplete as a definition of illocutionary saying. For sentences of the form *S said$_L$ "σ"* may be true when 'σ' was uttered by S as an elliptical sentence (e.g., *John said "Yes, Boeing"*), when 'σ' contains ellipsis marks to indicate the speaker's omission, when 'σ' is an ungrammatical sentence (*John said "Makes Boeing planes"*), or when 'σ' is a sequence of sentences (*John said "Boeing makes planes. Boeing makes satellites. Boeing makes a lot of things"*). A 'that' clause, in contrast, must be one complete and grammatical sentence.

The truth conditions for the opaque illocutionary sense are simplest when the subordinate clause contains no pronouns or other indexicals. Let 'ρ_i' stand for such a sentence interpreted as expressing proposition i.

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[25]The spoken directions offered by Google maps and other devices are borderline cases we need not address here.

(24) **Opaque Illocutionary Saying:** *S said$_O$ "ρ_i" at t iff (i) S uttered some expression e at t as a whole sentence or conjunct of a conjunction in order to express what e expresses in some language L; (ii) e expresses i in L; (iii) i matches what S meant by e more closely than any other proposition e expresses in L.*

Given the restrictions on 'ρ_i,' *S said$_O$ that ρ_i at t* has the same truth conditions.[26] According to (24), what S said$_O$ is determined jointly by speaker meaning and sentence meaning. Clause (ii) entails that what S said$_O$ is something the sentence S used means in the language S was using, which need not be the language of the report (English in our case) or even a natural language. Clauses (i) and (iii) rule out the case in which S is simply reading lines in a play because the speaker means nothing by the sentence.

Few if any sentences in a natural language are unambiguous. As a result, the sentence S uttered will typically express more than one proposition in the language S is using. If all goes well, what S meant by the sentence is one of those propositions. In that case, clause (iii) rules that what S meant is what S said. Otherwise clause (iii) rules that what S said is the proposition which matches the speaker's meaning exactly to the extent that it coincides with something the sentence uttered means, and as closely as possible where it does not. Suppose Sue slipped when she uttered *Roosevelt rode a plane to New York*, meaning "Franklin Roosevelt rode a *train* to New York City." 'Roosevelt,' 'plane,' and 'New York' all have more than one meaning in English. What Sue meant fixes what 'Roosevelt' and 'New York' meant on this occasion. So Sue did not say that Theodore Roosevelt rode an airplane to New York State. But what Sue meant still leaves two possibilities: *Franklin Roosevelt rode an airplane to New York City* and *Franklin Roosevelt rode a carpentry plane to New York City*. The former matches what Sue meant much more closely than the latter, so (ignoring tense) clause (iii) rules that what Sue said$_O$ is that Franklin Roosevelt rode an airplane to New York City. Definition (24) thus allows that what a speaker said may differ from what the speaker meant.[27] When two or more propositions match what S meant equally well, we cannot say which S meant.

The basic idea behind the analysis of transparent illocutionary saying is that what S said$_T$ is either something S said$_O$ or something that can be obtained from what S said$_O$ by replacing concepts with coreferential concepts. The same rule holds whether or not 'p_i' contains pronouns.

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[26] 'S said that p at t' is to mean "S said at t that p," not "S said that p-at-t."

[27] Grice (1969: 87) was idiosyncratic in taking 'S says that p' to entail 'S means that p.' So he was forced in the case of metaphorical usage to say that the speaker "makes as if to say," and would deny that the speaker even makes as if to say in the case of verbal slips. Cf. Neale 1992: 523–4, 549; Bach 2001: 17; 2010: 134; Davis 2007; Carston 2010: 220.

(25) **Transparent Illocutionary Saying:** S $said_T$ that p_i at t iff there is some
proposition j such that (i) S $said_O$ "p_j" at t (ii) i differs from j at most in
containing concepts c_1', c_2', ... c_n' where j contains c_1, c_2, ... c_n, and
(iii) c_x and c_x' have the same referent for all x from 1 to n.

In example (21) above, what Mary $said_o$ is that Mt. Kilimanjaro is snow covered.
The proposition that the tallest mountain in Africa is snow covered differs from what
Mary said only in containing the concept of the tallest mountain in African where
what Mary $said_o$ contains the concept of Mt. Kilimanjaro. Since Mt. Kilimanjaro
is the tallest mountain in Africa, these two concepts have the same referent. So
Mary $said_T$ that the tallest mountain in Africa is snow covered. When (21)(a) and
Mary said that Mt. Kilimanjaro is snow covered are opaque, they report independent
speech acts. But when they have their transparent sense, they are different ways of
reporting the same speech act given that Mt. Kilimanjaro is the tallest mountain in
Africa. A speaker will not use (21)(a) to describe Mary, however, unless the speaker
realizes that Kilimanjaro is the tallest in Africa. The same goes for Mary herself.

While (25) captures the basic relationship between transparent and opaque
illocutionary reports, it ignores a number of complexities. First, the proposition j
must be *non-tautological* unless i is tautological, and the concepts c_1, c_2, ... c_n
must be *non-descriptive*. For both reasons, *S said "The 35th president was the 35th
president"* does not entail *S said that John F. Kennedy was the 35th president*.[28]
Second, *Lois Lane said that Bruce Wayne is stronger than Superman* may be used
transparently in such a way that it follows from *Lois Lane said "Batman is stronger
than Superman"* but not from *Lois Lane said "Batman is stronger than Clark Kent."*
That is, *Bruce Wayne* may be transparent while *Superman* is opaque (cf. McKay and
Nelson 2010: §8). I work out these complexities in Davis (forthcoming b, §7.4),
where I also generalize the account to all propositional attitude and speech act
reports.

I said at the beginning of this section that I do not believe the word *said* itself
is ambiguous, even though sentences of the form 'S said ⟨p⟩' are ambiguous. As
McKay & Nelson observed, a simple ambiguity in the verb would not account for
the fact that there are three different ways in which *Lois Lane said that Bruce Wayne
is stronger than Superman* can be transparent. Furthermore, if *said* were ambiguous,
we would expect to find that *Lois said "Bruce Wayne is stronger than Clark Kent"*
has a transparent interpretation on which it is true. But it does not. Similarly, it is
not *said* itself that has the locutionary/illocutionary ambiguity. What I believe to
be ambiguous are the constructions *said "p"* and *S said (that) p*. I show in Davis
(forthcoming b, §7.4) that when transparent, instances of 'S said that p' are non-
compositional and idiomatic, which explains some of their most surprising features,
such as that *Lois Lane believes that Bruce Wayne is stronger than Superman* and
Lois Lane believes that Bruce Wayne is not stronger than Superman may both be
true transparently even though Lois is in no way irrational.

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[28] See e.g., Kaplan (1969: §VI–VIII); Perry (1979: 9–11); and Chisholm (1981: 108).

Expressions of the form 'S said (that) p' have a further ambiguity when 'p' contains quotation marks or parenthetical insertions, as in (26).

(26)   (a)   Lois said that "The Caped Crusader" is in Gotham.
        (b)   Lois said that the Caped Crusader (Batman) is in Gotham.

(26)(a) can be interpreted as having the truth conditions given by (24) or (25) and so as entailing something unlikely to be true: Lois said that the epithet 'The Caped Crusader' is in Gotham. But (26)(a) can also be interpreted as a "mixed" quotation. In that case, it entails not just that Lois uttered *some* sentence expressing the proposition that the Caped Crusader is in Gotham, but that Lois uttered a sentence in which the expression quoted is the subject of that sentence. This condition holds whether the interpretation is opaque or transparent.

Turning to (26)(b), it can be interpreted as having the truth conditions given by (24) or (25), entailing that the sentence Lois uttered had a parenthetical clause corresponding to '(Batman).' But on another interpretation, (26)(b) entails that the sentence Mary uttered did not contain a parenthetical clause corresponding to '(Batman).' The parenthetical material is inserted by the speaker to help the hearer identify the man Lois said something about, making (26)(b) equivalent to *Lois said that the Caped Crusader is in Gotham. The Caped Crusader is Batman.*[29] The same analysis applies when the parenthetical insertion takes other forms, as in *Lois said that the Caped Crusader, i.e. Batman, is in Gotham.* (26)(a) has a similar ambiguity when the quotation marks are scare quotes. On the interpretation given by (24) or (25), (26)(a) would entail that the sentence uttered by Lois contained scare quotes or something equivalent. On the other interpretation, the scare quotes express the speaker's attitude toward the term quoted. So *S said$_O$ that p_i at t* has the truth conditions of *S said "p_i" at t* only if 'p_i' is free of non-metalinguistic quotation marks and speaker appositives as well as pronouns.

When the subordinate clause contains indexicals, the rules for *S said$_O$ "p_i" at t* and *S said$_O$ that p_j at t* differ in systematic ways, and the propositions they express will generally depend on the speaker's context c. The proposition they express in c will moreover assert the existence of a context c' in which the subject S utters a sentence at t that expresses a proposition i' in c'. If 'p_i' contains a first-person pronoun whose antecedent is 'S' in *S said$_O$ "p_i" at t*, then the proposition i contains $c(I)^{c(S)}$, where $c(I)$ is the generic subject-position self-concept and $c(S)$ is the concept "S." The definiens must then specify that where i has $c(I)^{c(S)}$, i' has $c(I)^{\alpha(S)}$, where $\alpha(S)$ is S's self-awareness. The opaque report will be true only if the subject used the first person pronoun to refer to himself. *S said$_O$ that p_j at t* will then be equivalent to *S said$_O$ "p_i" at t* provided 'p_j' contains 'he himself' in the position 'I' occupied in 'p_i,' where 'he' expresses $c(he)^{c(S)}$, the third-person masculine indexical

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[29]Capone (2008: 1022–3) makes a similar claim about belief reports with appositives or parenthetical assertions. But unlike (b), *Lois believes that the Caped Crusader (Batman) is in Gotham* has only one interpretation, on which the parenthetical intrusion expresses what the speaker rather than Lois believes about the Caped Crusader.

concept with $c(S)$ as its determinant. The 'himself' is what communicates that the proposition S expressed at t contains the first-person rather than the third-person masculine indexical concept. If 'p_i' in *S said$_O$ "p_i" at t* contains a present-tense verb phrase 'VP,' it is anaphoric on 't,' so that the determinant of the temporal component of $c(VP)$ is $c(t)$. The definiens must specify that the determinant of the temporal component of $c(VP)$ at the same place in i′ is $\alpha(t)$, S's awareness of the time of c'. This will make a sentence like *John said "Mary is hungry" at 10:35* equivalent to *John said at 10:35 that Mary is hungry.* When 'p_i' contains 'now,' the rule is similar for *S said$_O$ "p_i" at t*. When 'p_i' contains 'here,' the determinant of $c(here)$ is $c(S's\ location\ at\ t)$, and j must contain $c(here)^{\alpha(l)}$ where i contains $c(here)^{c(S's\ location\ at\ t)}$ and $\alpha(l)$ is S's awareness of his location at t (i.e., of the location of c). When 'p_i' contains either 'here' or 'now,' there will usually be no equivalent sentence of the form *S said that p at t. John said "I am hungry now" at 10:35* is clearly not equivalent to *John said at 10:35 that I am hungry now*. When 'now' occurs in a that-clause, it normally refers to the time of the speaker's context. There is no equivalent using *said that* because there is no temporal analogue of *he himself*. The same is true of 'here' and other pronouns.

   I have not fully worked out the complex rules for the case in which the subordinate clauses in illocutionary speech reports contain indexicals, non-metalinguistic quotation marks, or speaker appositives. We have enough detail, though, to see how the subordinate clauses in reports of the form 'S said $\langle p \rangle$' function, and what specific indexical concepts are expressed. The proposition expressed by *S said$_L$ "p"* is auto-reflexive, containing $\male\ ^\ulcorner c(expression)^{\alpha('p')}$. The propositions expressed by *S said$_O$ "p_i"* and *S said$_T$ that p_i* are ideo-reflexive, containing $\male\ ^\ulcorner c(proposition)^{\alpha(i)}$. In the locutionary form, the determinant is the speaker's auditory or visual focus on the subordinate clause. In the illocutionary forms, the determinant is the speaker's introspective focus on the thought expressed by the subordinate clause.

   As noted in Sect. 1, my theory of meaning is Fregean in many respects. But my theory of saying and propositional attitude reports differs markedly from Frege's. Frege (1892: 58–59) maintained that words in that-clauses refer to their customary senses—the modes of presentation they express in independent sentences—and therefore are not used with their customary senses. This is the fall from "semantic innocence" that Davidson (1968: 108) decried.[30] In (15)(b) as well as (18)(b), 'Boeing makes planes' has the same meaning, and expresses the same proposition when used as an independent sentence to assert that Boeing makes planes. Frege's idea is especially problematic because a string of names or singular terms does not constitute a clause, and cannot follow 'that.' If 'Boeing' in (15)(b) and (18)(b) did refer to its sense rather than its referent, they would seem to mean that John said or believes something about a sense rather than a man. Frege's (1892: 65) later suggestion that in a that-clause, a sentence designates the thought it ordinarily expresses is more plausible. But that is hard to reconcile with the thesis that the words in the sentence refer to their senses. A sequence of names of the components

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[30]See also Barwise and Perry (1983); McKay and Nelson (2010: §3).

of an object is not a name of that object. A separate problem is that when indexicals like 'I,' 'here,' and 'now' are used in that-clauses, they clearly are used with their customary sense and reference. What could the object of saying in *Simpson said that I killed Nicole* be if 'I' refers to the speaker and 'Nicole' refers to a mode of presentation?

Davidson (1968: 105–108) proposed instead that the subordinate clauses in (15)(b) and (18)(b) are used exactly as they are used as independent sentences. And he took the 'that' to be a demonstrative pronoun. That is, he took (15)(b) and (18)(b) to mean the following:

(27)   (a)   Boeing makes planes. John said that.
        (b)   Boeing makes planes. John believes that.

Davidson's theory is like mine in maintaining that that-clauses are indexical. But his theory is linguistically untenable for two reasons. 'That' is not functioning as a demonstrative pronoun when it forms a subordinate clause. It is not a pronoun in either (15)(b) or (18)(b). Because 'that' is a demonstrative in (27), it could perfectly well be used to refer to a proposition other than the one expressed by 'Boeing makes planes.' It could also refer to something other than a proposition, such as the sentence 'Boeing makes planes,' to the speaker's utterance of that sentence (Davidson's suggestion), or even (nonsensically) to a cat, particularly if it were accompanied by an act of pointing. But (15)(b) and (18)(b) can only be interpreted as relating John to the proposition that Boeing makes planes. Finally, because (27)(a) and (b) contain 'Boeing makes planes' as an independent clause, they entail that Boeing makes planes. Neither (15)(b) nor (18)(b) entails that Boeing makes planes. Furthermore, anyone uttering (27)(a) or (b) to make a statement *says* that Boeing makes planes. But speakers uttering (15)(b) or (18)(b) do not say that Boeing makes planes. This problem can be eliminated by prefixing the first sentences in (27) with 'that.' But that leaves us where we started.

10   The Pragmatics of Saying Reports

Section 9 attempts to describe the semantics of sentences of the form 'S said ⟨p⟩'. Pragmatic factors—that is, facts about the context of their utterance—influence their truth conditions in two ways. First, the speaker's intentions determine whether the speaker is using English or some other language or code, and if English, the meaning of 'S,' 'p,' and 'S said ⟨ ⟩' on a given occasion of utterance. Second, when the report is illocutionary, what the speaker means by the subordinate clause determines the truth conditions of the report in the intended sense. When the report is locutionary, what the speaker means by the subordinate clause, if anything, is irrelevant to the truth conditions of the report. The first role of the context is common to the interpretation of all linguistic utterances. The second is common to all ideo-reflexive utterances, although what the speaker means by the subordinate clause in other speech act or propositional attitude reports determines different truth conditions.

In all cases, what is meant by an instance of the form 'S said $\langle p \rangle$' on the occasion of its use determines its truth conditions. The meaning of its components together with the syntax of the sentence determines its meaning and thereby its truth conditions. So saying reports are completely compositional.

Sentences, moreover, have more than truth conditions. Whether true or false, their utterance in a particular context can be appropriate or inappropriate, useful or point-less, polite or impolite, warranted or unwarranted, commendable or contemptible, and so on. These properties all depend on features of the context of utterance that are generally logically independent of the conditions that would make the sentence true.[31] To modify an example of Capone (2010), consider (28):

(28)   Billy: Joe voted for Obama.
       Tommy: Billy said that Joe voted for that Negro.

If Tommy is using 'that Negro' to refer to Obama, and using 'S said $\langle p \rangle$' transparently, then what Tommy says about Billy is true. Nonetheless, Tommy's report can be faulted in a number of ways. For one thing, by using 'that Negro,' Tommy is manifesting an attitude (racism) that is contemptible. Moreover, unless the context of utterance makes it crystal clear that Tommy intends his report to be interpreted transparently, it is liable to be interpreted as a false opaque report, and thus is prone to mislead hearers into thinking that Billy is a racist, when Billy's utterance had no such implication.

Saying reports are also like all other sentences in having many non-literal uses. Speakers regularly use them to mean something other than what the sentences mean. In particular, they are used with a wide range of common implicatures, both figures and modes of speech. *Implicature* is the act of meaning that one thing is the case by saying$_o$ that something else is the case.[32]

Like all other expressions, saying reports can be used loosely or strictly.

(29)   Peter: Mary lives in the Washington DC metropolitan area.
       (a)   Peter said "Mary lives in Washington DC."
       (b)   Peter said that Mary lives in Washington DC.

If Peter uttered the sentence given in (29), then neither (a) nor (b) is strictly speaking correct. This is true whether (a) is locutionary or illocutionary, and whether (b) is opaque or transparent. For the sentence Peter uttered does not express the proposition that Mary lives in Washington DC. The Washington DC metropolitan area includes many suburbs in addition to Washington DC. But speakers using (a) or (b) may be speaking loosely, and meaning that what Peter said (in either sense) is close enough to "Mary lives in Washington DC" for the purposes of the

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[31] See Capone (2010) for a discussion of the role played by the situation of utterance in shaping the obligations of the reporter.

[32] The technical term 'implicature' was introduced and defined by Grice (1975: 24). See also Neale (1992: 519, 528); Davis (2014, forthcoming a).

conversation. And the speaker's statement may be accepted as such. When (29)(a) is a locutionary report, the speaker is offering a *paraphrase* of what the speaker said$_L$ rather than a direct quote.[33] Propositional attitude reports may also be used loosely.

(30)   Peter believes that Mary lives in the Washington DC metropolitan area.
    (a)   Peter believes "Mary lives in Washington DC."
    (b)   Peter believes that Mary lives in Washington DC.

(30) is not equivalent to (a) or (b). But speakers can use either (a) or (b) to mean (30). In both examples, the speakers say one thing and mean another.

Capone (this volume, p. 59) maintains that 'say' sometimes means "say more or less" and sometimes "say exactly." If the word 'say' had these two meanings (if it were semantically ambiguous), then (29)(b) would have a sense in English on which it is strictly speaking true; but it does not. The sentences in (31) are all strictly speaking true in the case imagined above. Speakers can use (29)(b) to mean what the sentences in (31) mean. But (29)(b) itself has no sense on which it is synonymous with or entailed by the sentences in (31).

(31)   (a)   Peter more or less said that Mary lives in Washington DC.
    (b)   Peter said roughly that Mary lives in Washington DC.
    (c)   Peter said loosely that Mary lives in Washington DC.

If the different uses of (29)(b) did warrant positing an ambiguity in 'say,' we would be justified in doing the same for all or nearly all words. For it is hard to find an expression that cannot be used loosely. Note in this connection that Peter himself may have been speaking loosely. He may have known that Mary lives in Richmond Virginia, which is outside the Washington DC metropolitan area. But if Peter was speaking to someone from Australia, the difference between the Washington, Baltimore, and Richmond metropolitan areas may not be important. So Peter may have meant only that Mary lives close enough to the Washington DC metropolitan area for the purposes of the conversation. This does not imply that the predicate *lives in the Washington DC metropolitan area* has *lives close enough to the Washington DC metropolitan area* as one of its meanings in English. Loose use is one of the most common forms of implicature. It is what I have called a "mode of speech" in contrast to figures of speech (see Davis forthcoming a §3).

Soames (2008: 458ff) would maintain, on the contrary, that (29)(b) is "semantically incomplete," meaning that it does not itself express a truth evaluable proposition. Only the result of "enriching" the sentence with 'exactly/strictly speaking' or 'approximately/loosely speaking' has a truth value. This view wrongly entails however that (29)(b) does not express a true proposition even if the sentence

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[33]Capone (this volume: §6 and §7) notes a number of quotation practices that involve loose use: "purging" quotations of irrelevant grammatical errors, which serves to avoid distracting the reader and embarrassing the subject; summarizing as opposed to paraphrasing; and avoiding taboo words. In each case the result is a locutionary report that is not strictly speaking true but is close enough to being true for the purposes of the context.

Peter uttered was 'Mary lives in Washington DC.' And it entails that a sentence like *If Peter said that Mary lives in Washington DC, then he strictly speaking said that Mary lives in Washington DC* does not express a true proposition. Soames likens 'say' to numerical predicates like 'weighs 175 lbs,' which is sometimes used to mean "weighs exactly 175 lbs" or "weighs at least 175 lbs." But numerical predicates are different. *John weighs 175 lbs* has a sense in which it can be true even though *John weighs exactly 175 lbs* is false. Note too that in either sense, 'weighs 175 lbs' can be used loosely, as when a speaker applies it knowing that the subject weights 174.9 lbs. The same goes for 'weighs exactly 175 lbs.'[34]

Other modes of speech are also common with saying reports. For example, people commonly use 'S said that p' to make the stronger claim that S *asserted* that p; this is a strengthening implicature (an "R" implicature in Horn's (1989) terminology, an "I" implicature in Levinson's (2000)). 'S said that p' can also be used with a limiting ("scalar," "quantity") implicature. If Jane reports that Steve asserted that Josephine is erratic, I could correct her by saying "Steve *said* Josephine is erratic." If Mary does not get what I meant, I might go on to explain that since Steve meant that Josephine was erotic, he said but did not assert that she is erratic.

Propositional attitude and illocutionary act reports are often figurative as well.

(32)   Peter: The temperature outside is 40°F.
    (a)   *Hyperbole*: Peter said that it is freezing cold out.
    (b)   *Irony*: Peter said that it is positively balmy out.
    (c)   *Metaphor*: Peter said that it is a refrigerator outside.

Thus (32)(a) would most naturally be hyperbole. What Peter is reported to have said is stronger than what he actually said, so (32)(a) is literally false. But the speaker may have been exaggerating, to good effect. Similarly, since 40°F is far from balmy, what Peter said was quite the opposite of what he was reported to have said in (32)(b). But the speaker's point in uttering (32)(b) might be very clear. In all three cases illustrated in (32), the speaker said that Peter said one thing and thereby meant that Peter said another. So the speaker was engaging in implicature.

One form of loose use occurs when the subject spoke figuratively and the speaker tries to capture what the speaker meant. For example, Peter may have said *The Yankees have no chance of winning*. If Sue recognizes that Peter was exaggerating, she might say *Peter said that the Yankees are highly unlikely to win*. Strictly speaking, Peter did not say that the Yankees are just highly unlikely to win, which might well be true, but rather that there is a zero probability of their winning, which is surely false.

Loose use, irony, hyperbole, and metaphor are conventional forms of conversational implicature. They are used with sentences generally, not specifically those containing *say*. So they do not give rise to sentence implicatures—what Grice

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[34]I discuss sense-generalist and pragmatic explicature theories at greater length in Davis (2013b), and discuss numerical predicates in Davis (forthcoming b: §7.3).

(1975: 37) called "generalized" implicatures.[35] One implicature I believe is attached to the word *say* is the strengthening implicature, whereby *S said that p* is used to mean *S asserted that p*. Since this is a conventional use, it is *prima facie* plausible that *say* has *assert* as a specific sense. But there is no interpretation of *S said that p, but did not assert that p* on which it is contradictory. The but-clause simply cancels the generalized implicature.

On the semantics I sketched in Sect. 9, what S meant by the expression S uttered and what that expression meant in the language S was using tightly constrain the truth conditions of an illocutionary report of what S said. When speaker meaning and word meaning coincide, the proposition expressed is what S said in the opaque illocutionary sense. Cappelen & Lepore argue on the contrary for "Speech Act Pluralism," according to which by uttering a sentence, "we assert an indefinite number of propositions only one of which is the proposition semantically expressed" (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 207). In particular, they claim that the truth conditions of 'S said that p at t' may be determined by features of the context in which that report is uttered, even if the report is uttered years after t (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 206). Here is one of their principal arguments, which I reworded slightly to keep subject, speaker, subject's utterance, and speaker's report straight:

> To take a simple illustration, suppose Frank uttered (u) several weeks ago:
>   (u) The table is covered with books.
> Suppose that whatever table was under discussion currently sits comfortably in Father's office (though it did not sit there when Frank uttered (u)). Didn't Frank say with his utterance of (u) that the table in Father's office is covered with books? Note that no other account we are aware of can factor being in Father's office into what was said by Frank's utterance of (1), since Frank himself was ignorant or misinformed about what would or wouldn't be in Father's office now – maybe the table got moved there right after Frank spoke (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 201).

Their assumption is that (33) is true:

(33)   Frank said that the table in Father's office is covered with books.

This report is ambiguous, however. On one interpretation, the opaque, it is plainly false. Frank did not mention father's office in any way. On the transparent interpretation, though, (33) is true because the table Frank was referring to is in fact the table now in Father's office. My account of transparent illocutionary saying delivers this result. Note that if 'S said that p' is interpreted transparently, then to say that the table in Father's office is covered with books and say that the table Frank was referring to is covered with books is not to assert two different propositions. So the truth of (33) as a transparent report does not does not support Speech Act Pluralism anyway.

Cappelen & Lepore go on to ask a pointed question. Suppose there is a second table under discussion in our context in addition to the one in father's office. If (33) is not a correct report of what Frank said, they ask, how would we report it? The

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[35] See Davis (1998: 6–7; 2014: §2; forthcoming a: §4).

problem is that we cannot use simple "disquotation." That is, we cannot use (34) to report what Frank said.

(34)   Frank said that the table is covered with books.

This problem arises because (u) contained an indexical description, 'the table.' Like 'I,' its referent in a that-clause must be fixed by the context of utterance. But in our context, there are two tables. So (34) would have either a false presupposition or an unclear reference. Cappelen & Lepore ask "Should we conclude that we cannot correctly report Frank's utterance?" They seem to be suggesting, questionably, that such a conclusion would be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the view that (33) is not a correct report of what Frank said. Be that as it may, we can provide a correct report of what Frank said in the opaque illocutionary sense, but we have to use quotation marks:

(35)   Frank said "The table is covered with books."

(35) is also true as a locutionary saying report, of course, but only because (u) happened to be the exact English sentence Frank uttered. If (u) were instead in French, or a synonymous English sentence like 'Covered with books the table is,' (35) would be true as an illocutionary report only.

Another argument Cappelen & Lepore offer for Speech Act Pluralism assumes that someone said "She's happy," referring to *b*. Let the speaker be Sue.

(36)   Sue: She's happy.

Then in one sense (the transparent), (37) is true.

(37)   Sue said that *b* is happy.

> This proposition [i.e., the proposition that *b* is happy] is not the only proposition that the speaker said or asserted in uttering [(36)]. The speaker [Sue] might, for example, be saying that *b* is no longer angry or that her medication is working or that she's ready to meet her sister. If the speaker's utterance of [(36)] is ironic, it can be used effectively to say that *b* is in a bad mood. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 146)

None of the illocutionary reports in (38), however, is literally true.

(38)   (a)   Sue said that *b* is no longer angry.
        (b)   Sue said that *b*'s medication is working.
        (c)   Sue said that *b* is ready to meet her sister.
        (d)   Sue said that *b* is in a bad mood.

If we used any of the reports in (38), we would most likely be engaging in metaphor with a touch of hyperbole. What we believe and mean is that Sue *meant these things by what she said*. We convey that metaphorically by saying that she *said* them. Saying something is like meaning it by what one said in relevant respects, only more direct. Note that Sue can utter 'She's happy' ironically only if Sue does not

thereby *say* that *b* is in a bad mood. Irony involves saying one thing and thereby meaning the opposite. If Sue meant and said that *b* is in a bad mood, then she was not being ironic.

Cappelen & Lepore's case of trivial logical implications is trickier but similar. (24) allows that S said what is expressed by conjuncts of conjunctions S uttered, as (39) illustrates.

(39)   Caesar: Caesar came, Caesar saw, Caesar conquered.
        (a)   Caesar said that Caesar conquered.

But other entailments of what is said are not strictly speaking said. Consider (40):

(40)   Warren: Oswald assassinated Kennedy on his own.
        (a)   Warren said that Oswald assassinated Kennedy.

(40)(a) would certainly be a natural thing to say given what Warren uttered. But someone could reject (a) by saying, "No. Warren said something stronger than that. What Warren said is highly controversial, but (a) claims he said something uncontroversial." This is also a case in which (a) is used to mean that Warren implied that Oswald assassinated Kennedy, a slightly hyperbolic metaphor. A slightly different case arises in (41)[36]:

(41)   Mary: Mt. Kilimanjaro is snow covered.
        (b)   Mary said that a stratovolcano is snow covered.

If the speaker of (41)(b) realizes that Mary has no idea what kind of mountain Kilimanjaro is, he is unlikely to mean that *Mary implied* that a stratovolcano is snow covered. What he would likely mean is that *Mary said something implying* that a stratovolcano is snow covered. This would also be a case of metaphor with some hyperbole. Note that unlike the transparent interpretation, the implicatures illustrated by (40) and (41) are not preserved under negation. If Mary said "Mt. Kilimanjaro is not snow covered," we would be unlikely to describe her as saying that a stratovolcano is not snow covered, unless we meant a *certain* stratovolcano.

In each of the cases in (38)–(41), then, the speaker giving the saying report is saying one thing and implicating another. Cappelen & Lepore emphatically reject this Gricean move:

> There is no fundamental theoretical divide between sayings and implicatures. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 204)

This literally makes no sense. 'Implicature' is a technical term. It is *defined* as something that is *meant but not said*. Logic therefore prevents implicatures from being sayings. That what people mean is often not what they say is moreover a fundamentally important fact about the use of language.

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[36]Cf. Cappelen and Lepore's (2005: 202) French woman case.

Cappelen & Lepore also respond to the general objection that reports like (38)(a)–(d) are not literally or strictly speaking true. They provide a verbatim transcript of Richard Nixon's famous "Smoking Gun" speech.

> When you get these people, when you get these people in, say: 'Look, the problem is that this will open the whole, the whole Bay of Pigs thing, and the president just feels that' ah, without going into the details . . . don't, don't lie to them to the extent to say there is no involvement, but just say this is sort of a comedy of errors, bizarre, without getting into it, 'the president believes that it is going to open the whole Bay of Pigs thing up again, and ah because these people are plugging for, for keeps and that they should call the FBI in and say that we wish for the country, don't go and further into this case.' Period. That's the say to put it, do it straight.

A key fact about the context of utterance is that 'these people' referred to the CIA director and his deputy.

> So what did Nixon say? Well, the current standard reports on this tape go something like this (found in many history books, innumerable contemporaneous newspaper articles and investigative reports, etc.):

(42)   Nixon told Haldeman to tell the CIA to tell the FBI not to pursue their investigation into the Watergate burglary.

This is not exactly a saying report, but that does not matter. What does is that given Nixon's words, this report is not strictly speaking true. Cappelen & Lepore respond as follows:

> We know this particular utterance was the cornerstone of the impeachment case against Nixon. It was, in effect, one of the central causes of Nixon's resignation. Imagine the absurdity of a defense of Nixon that he didn't, strictly speaking, ask the CIA to block the FBI investigation. Or that he didn't *really* ask it. Or that he didn't *literally* order it. Any such defense would have been just plain silly. (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: 196ff)

Such a defense would have been silly. But why? Because given the legal, moral, and political issues raised by Nixon's utterance, the distinction between telling the CIA to tell the FBI not to investigate and saying what Nixon actually said is immaterial. (42) is close enough to what Nixon said for the purposes of the conversation. Insisting on greater precision is silly because it is pointless. Nixon was guilty of serious wrongdoing if (42) is anywhere near the truth. So (42) would be another example of loose use, one that illustrates well its value as a mode of speech. Given Nixon's rambling and somewhat incoherent utterance, any greater precision in reporting what he said would actually obscure its moral, legal, and political import.

Cappelen & Lepore's maneuver can be turned against them. Suppose the issue is not how unfaithful Bill Clinton was in the Lewinsky affair, but whether he lied to the American people. The sentence he famously uttered was 'I did not have sex with that woman.' Suppose someone attempted to defend Clinton against the charge of lying by claiming that what Clinton said was that he did not have vaginal sex with her, which was evidently true. Such a defense would fail badly. That may have been what Clinton meant, and how he expected people to interpret him. But that is not what he

said. What he said is something he knew to be false, so he was lying. The claim that Clinton said he did not have vaginal sex with Lewinsky is not close enough to being true for the purposes of this context.

Consider finally Cappelen & Lepore's moronic clown example.

> Suppose A is a philosopher we tend to describe as a moronic clown even though we both know A is neither really a clown nor really moronic. It's just how we tend to affectionately describe A. Suppose Cappelen hears B utter 'A just wrote a book.' Cappelen could naturally report B's utterance to Lepore with:

(43)   B said that the moronic clown just wrote a book. (Cappelen and
       Lepore 2005: 196)

Cappelen's report is as figurative as *The moronic clown just wrote a book.* Neither is literally true. Assume that A did just write a book, and that 'A just wrote a book' is the only sentence B uttered. If we insist that (43) is true, we get an absurd result: the only sentence B uttered ('A just wrote a book') is true; yet B nevertheless said something that is not true. How could that be?[37]

Carston has offered a number of arguments to show that there is more "pragmatic intrusion" into what is said than my theory allows.[38] Her paradigms include conjunctions like (44):

(44)   S: A took a shower and got dirty.

In a typical context of utterance, I take the following to be uncontroversial

(45)   S said that A both took a shower and got dirty.
(46)   S meant that A took a shower and then got dirty.
(47)   The sentence S uttered does not mean that A took a shower and then
       got dirty.

The dispute is about whether (48)(a) or (b) is true:

(48)   (a)   S said that A took a shower and then got dirty.
       (b)   S implicated that A took a shower and then got dirty.

Given the definition of implicature, the truth of (45) and (46) implies (48)(b). (47) and (23) imply that (48)(a) is false. On my view, when S utters the same conjunction in a different context, perhaps followed by 'Fortunately, he took the shower after he got dirty,' S says the same thing but does not mean the same thing. Carston maintains on the contrary that (48)(a) is true rather than (b)—that S "explicated" rather than implicated that the man jumped off the cliff. What S said, on Carston's view, is a "pragmatic enrichment" of what the sentence she used means.

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[37]In another appearance of the moronic clown, Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 200) claim that *"B said that the guy we (in such and such contexts) tend to describe as a moronic clown wrote a book."* This report would be literally true on the transparent interpretation.

[38]Carston (1988, 2002, 2004a, b); See also Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995); Recanati (1989a, b, 1993, 2004); Capone (2008: §1).

One reason Carston (1988: 40) offers is that S cannot implicate "A took a shower and then got dirty" by saying "A took a shower and got dirty" because the former entails the latter. There is no warrant for this claim. An implicature is defined as something that is meant by saying something else. It follows that an implicature must be *distinct* from what is said, which means the two propositions must not be *identical*. But nothing in the definition implies that an implicature cannot *entail* or *overlap* what is said.[39] On the contrary, many strengthening implicatures ("R-based" or "I" implicatures) fit the definition. The classic gas example with which Grice began the study of implicature is a case in point. When asked, "Where can I get gas?" the speaker replies *There is a station around the corner*. The speaker clearly means, but did not say, *there is a station around the corner where you can get gas*. So that is an implicature, and it entails what the speaker said. The form of understatement known as litotes is another clear case. By saying *The performance was not bad*, a speaker may mean *The performance was outstanding*. Hence the speaker implicated *The performance was outstanding,* something that entails what the speaker said. One supporting argument Carston (1988: 41) gives is that if the implicature entails the explicature, then the explicature is "redundant." Nothing in the definition of implicature makes this a relevant consideration. Besides, what is said always has at least two functions: an implicature is something meant *by* saying something; and what the speaker implicates is typically *inferred from* what the speaker said. If our only reason for speaking were to convey information, then it would be pointless to say one thing and mean something stronger. We should just say the stronger thing. But speakers have many other purposes, including politeness, style, and deniability, which are promoted by indirection.

A second reason Carston gives is that what the hearer will remember from the utterance is the message that the man jumped off the cliff. This is completely compatible, however, with that message being an implicature. Hearers are often more interested in what is implicated than in what is said. The driver who needed gas is likely to remember that he can get some at the station around the corner. He may forget entirely what the speaker actually said. In the litotes example, the take away message should be that the speaker loved the performance.

A third reason is that what S implicates (e.g., "A needs another shower") will be worked out from "A took a shower and then got dirty" rather than "A both took a shower and got dirty" (cf. Wilson and Sperber 1981: 159; Carston 2004b: 73). But this begs the question in assuming that S's meaning "A took a shower and then got dirty" is not (also) an implicature worked out from S's saying "A both took a shower and got dirty." Nothing in the definition of implicature entails that just one thing is implicated by saying something, nor that one implicature cannot be inferred from another. A hierarchy of implicatures is not uncommon. An intermediate implicature in the gas example is surely "The station is open."

A fourth reason might be based on characterizing what is said or explicated as "the truth-conditional content of the utterance"—the proposition that is true

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[39]Contrast Bach (1994: 140).

iff the utterance is true (Carston 1996: 316, 2004b: 81, 2010: 243, 244). This characterization is problematic because in a typical utterance, the speaker expresses a number of different propositions, and the sentence uttered may express yet another proposition (cf. Bach 2006: §7). In the gas example, the speaker expresses both what is said and what is implicated. If *"Is that true?"* were asked after the utterance, 'that' could refer to either *There is a station around the corner* or *You can get gas at the station around the corner*, although I think it would most likely be used to ask about the former. In the verbal slip example, Steve expressed the proposition that Josephine is erotic but the sentence Steve uttered expressed the proposition that Josephine is erratic. *"That's true"* could be used to endorse either proposition, but in this case I think it would most likely be used to agree with what Steve meant. So the fact that after (44) is uttered, we would most likely take *"Is that true?"* to be asking whether A took a shower and then got dirty does nothing to support (48)(a) over (b).

The most influential reason Carston offers for the truth of (48) is that it allegedly explains why the proposition that A took a shower and then got dirty appears to be expressed by the sentence S uttered in (44) when it is embedded in conditionals and other compounds.[40] Consider:

(49)   a.   If A took a shower and got dirty, he needs another shower.
        b.   If A took a shower and then got dirty, he needs another shower.
        c.   If A both took a shower and got dirty, he needs another shower.

Someone who used (49)(a) in all likelihood meant what (49)(b) means rather than (c). If "A took a shower and then got dirty" is a mere implicature of (44), Carston believes, it would not be part of the antecedent of the conditional proposition expressed by uttering (49)(a). We need to be clear, though, on what sort of "embedding" is illustrated by (49)(a). The proposition expressed by the *sentence* (49)(a) is that expressed by (49)(c), not (b). It is easy to imagine cases in which sentence (49)(b) is true while (49)(a) is false. There is no "pragmatic intrusion" here (Levinson 2000: 198). It would nonetheless be normal for *speakers* to use (49)(a) to express the proposition expressed by (49)(b). It is therefore as natural to hold that (49)(b)—the whole conditional—is a generalized implicature of (49)(a) as it is to hold that *A took a shower and then got dirty* is a generalized implicature of *A took a shower and got dirty*. In general, "If p′ then q" is often a generalized implicature of 'If p then q' when "p′" is a generalized implicature of 'p.' The same is true of other compounds containing 'p,' unless the rest of the compound serves to cancel the implicature (as in *A took a shower and got dirty, but not in that order*).

A fundamental problem is that on Carston's account of what is said, it is not clear how the truth of (48)(a) would explain why (49)(a) can be used to express what (49)(b) expresses. For Carston denies that there is a close connection between what is said and what a sentence means. If what is said is related to what a sentence

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[40]Carston (1988: 44–46, 2004a: 74–8, b: 646). See also Cohen (1971), Recanati (1989a, b, 1993), Neale (1992: 536–7), Levinson (2000: 214), Wilson and Sperber (2004: fn. 18), Romero and Soria (2010: 5). Contrast (García-Carpintero 2001: 113; Davis 2013b: §6).

means by the same sort of pragmatic factors as what is implicated, why should one embed and not the other? If what a sentence says is what it means, in contrast, then embedding is a consequence of semantic compositionality: the meaning of 'If p then q' is a function of the meanings of 'p' and 'q,' and the proposition expressed by 'If p then q' contains the proposition expressed by 'p' as its antecedent and that expressed by 'q' as its consequent. But if what is said can be as distinct from what the sentence means as Carston maintains, there is no more reason to expect embedding of what is said than there is to expect embedding of what is implicated.[41]

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Pretend Reference and Coreference

Manuel García-Carpintero

1 Preamble

Stacie Friend (2011, 2014) points out that we have intuitions of "co-identification" about, say, a debate confronting Nabokov, who asserts (2), with other critics, who had stated instead (1) (the novel says that Samsa is transformed into a gigantic "vermin"):

(1)   Critic: Gregor Samsa is transformed into a cockroach.
(2)   Nabokov: No, Samsa is transformed into a beetle.

As she (2014, 308) indicates, Nabokov naturally "takes himself to identify the same character that Kafka invented and that his opponents misconstrue". How should we account for such intuitions, if we are not to dismiss them as confused? Now, there is a natural connection between Friend's worry and Geach's problem of intentional identity; Friend's impressions of co-identification correspond to Geach's (1967, 147) attitudes "with a common focus, whether or not there is something at that focus".[1] We can easily report Friend's case with a claim corresponding to Geach's famous "Hob-Nob" example, discussed below in the next section:

(3)   A critic thinks Samsa/a character of Kafka's has been transformed into a
        cockroach, but Nabokov believes he/the same character has been
        transformed into a beetle.

In her work, Friend provides an account of the phenomenon compatible with the anti-realism about fictional characters she espouses. To that end, she focuses

M. García-Carpintero (✉)
Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència, Universitat de Barcelona,
Barcelona, Spain
e-mail: m.garciacarpintero@ub.edu

on accounts that appeal to the "communication chains" that have figured prominently in contemporary debates about reference in general and on accounts of intentional identity in particular. Everett (2013a) offers an alternative pretense-theoretic account, which Friend questions. In this paper I will discuss both accounts. I'll argue that, although we can learn much from both, they are flawed. I will suggest an alternative account, based on recent proposals to deal with the Frege-Geach problem.

Underlying this discussion are issues concerning the nature of reference. In previous work, I have defended a "reference-fixing" form of descriptivism for expressions such as names and indexicals. Now, it is natural to invoke forms of descriptivism to explain how claims involving empty names such as (1)–(3) can be true. The very example that Friend uses is already intended to put pressure on such proposals, which she rejects, allegedly in favor of orthodox Millian views. The debate between Nabokov and the other critic shows that they have different descriptive information associated to 'Samsa'; simple-minded descriptivist accounts would then wrongly imply that they are talking past each other. It will become manifest that the form of descriptivism that I hold is not exposed to this criticism. In fact I will be suggesting that a proper account will have to rely on the kind of descriptivist features that my own account envisages.

2 Intentional Identity

In setting up the problem posed by what he (1967) called *intentional identity*, Geach was interested in attitudes correctly ascribed by (4), on a reading that would be best captured by (5) or (6) if we disown the ontological commitment associated with '∃' since Quine (1948):

(4) Hob believes a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob believes that she (the same witch) killed Cob's sow.

(5) $\exists \alpha \, (W(\alpha) \wedge$ Hob believes that $B(\alpha, b) \wedge$ Nob believes that $K(\alpha, c))$.

(6) $\exists \alpha \, ($Hob believes that $W(\alpha) \wedge B(\alpha, b) \wedge$ Nob believes that $K(\alpha, c))$.

The interpretation that Geach pointed out is one on which (4) would be true in a world without witches, in which Hob and Nob are nonetheless thinking of the same witch, even though they have not heard of each other's beliefs. The following scenario – taken from Glick (2012, 387), cf. also Edelberg (1986, 2) – provides an intuitive basis: Hob and Nob live on opposite sides of town, and their social circles do not overlap at all; they have never heard of or encountered each other. But Hob and Nob have independently read and been persuaded by the local newspaper's claim that "Samantha, a witch, has been terrorizing the town." Each thinks he has discovered the cause of local livestock trouble, though the newspaper story was actually a complete fabrication.

Over the years, several writers have expressed skepticism about the availability of this reading (see Braun (2012) for a recent expression), but their doubts seem unfounded. If Hob and Nob construct their independent beliefs about an actually existing corrupt politician rather than about a witch reported in the newspaper (say, that the politician bribed Bob's son and that he wooed Cob's daughter), or if we happen to inhabit a world in which there in fact are witches, there is no problem in accepting the *de re* reading formalized by either (5) or (6).[2]

In both empty and non-empty cases, what seems to ground the relevant reading of the reports is (helping ourselves to Grice's (1969) already well-established metaphor) that the "mental dossiers" in both subjects' attitudes would be about the same individual, were one to exist.[3] Elaborating on Kripke's notion of a *communication chain* by means of which he provided a non-descriptivist outline of an account of reference-fixing, Burge (1983, 91–98) develops a notion of "quasi-anaphoric links", and justifies the Geachian intuitions in terms of it. Intra-subjectively, the relations between referential vehicles that mental files are intended to capture constitute such links. Intersubjectively, as in Kripke's picture, they are constituted by intentions to use referential devices in accordance with the meaning that corresponding expressions have in the usage of the interlocutors on whom one relies. Unlike Kripke's story, the links might involve referential expressions other than proper names; and they can ultimately depend on an unsuccessful act of reference.[4]

Like Burge's, most recent discussions dismiss skepticism, and attempt to develop the idea that (5) or (6) provides a good regimentation of the relevant truth-conditions, understood in such a way that it does not commit us to the actual existence of witches. Most recent proposals are consistent with Burge's appeal to quasi-anaphoric links, and provide elaborations of it.[5] Some adopt variants of what Edelberg (2006) calls *realism*: Edelberg (1986) and Cumming (2014) give accounts in terms of an ontology of "thought-objects", individuated by entities equivalent to Fregean senses, which might or might not coincide with actual referents; Salmon (2002) posits actually existing abstract objects; Glick (2012) and Pagin (2014) give modal accounts, taking the quantifier to range over possible objects including non-actual ones. Other approaches such as Priest's (2005) and Azzouni's (2010) question instead that quantifiers have the standardly assumed ontological commitments. I will come back to some of these accounts below.

3 Fictional Discourses: Realism and Anti-Realism

It will be convenient to distinguish three types of fictional discourse, which pose their own specific problems. Consider these sentences:

(7) When Gregor Samsa woke, he found himself transformed into a gigantic vermin.

(8) According to *Metamorphosis*, when Gregor Samsa woke, he found himself transformed into a gigantic vermin.

(9) Gregor Samsa is a fictional character.

Take firstly an utterance of (7) by Kafka, as part of the longer utterance by him of the full discourse which, with a measure of idealization, we can think constitutes the act of putting forward his creation *Metamorphosis* for us to enjoy. It is distinctive of such uses, which I will be calling *textual*,[6] that they are not intuitively truth-evaluable. The other two uses differ in that they intuitively appear to be truth-evaluable. There is, firstly, the use of sentences such as (7) that we make when we are stating the content of a fiction. I will call these content-reporting uses *paratextual*; according to Lewis (1978) and others, they are simply elliptic for intuitively equivalent ascriptions of propositional content such as (8). Finally, I will call the uses of sentences such as (9) *metatextual*; they are similarly intuitively truth-evaluable but not directly content-reporting, in that they are not (or at least not obviously) equivalent to propositional content ascriptions like (8).

Kripke (2013) argues that a proper account of metatextual uses requires interpreting names such as 'Gregor Samsa' in them as referring to fictional entities. The most influential, fully developed argument for such realism about fictional entities after Kripke's is van Inwagen's (1977) Quinean appeal to non-eliminable quantification over, and reference to, such entities in *prima facie* serious, truth-evaluable discourse, such as utterances of (9) and related metatextual uses in contexts of literary criticism. Such *ficta* could then be taken to be Meinongian non-existent entities, concrete non-actual *possibilia*, or (as both Kripke and van Inwagen prefer) abstract existent entities of various sorts, fully-fledged Platonic *abstracta* as in Wolterstorff (1980) or rather created artifacts, as in Salmon (1998), Thomasson (1999) and Schiffer (2003). Fictional entities of any of these sorts could also be invoked to account for either of the other uses, textual and paratextual, but this requires extra work; for neither of those entities can be straightforwardly taken to be the sort of thing capable of eating birds' inner organs.[7]

The intuitive obviousness of negative existentials involving fictional names counts against non-Meinongian realist views, a point that Everett (2007, 2013a ch. 7) forcefully presses. Everett (2005, 2013a ch. 8) provides an interesting elaboration on equally well-known indeterminacy concerns about fictional realism, echoing Quine's (1948, 23) indictment: "the possible fat man in that doorway; and, again, the possible bald man in that doorway. Are they the same possible man, or two possible men? How do we decide? How many possible men are there in that doorway? Are there more possible thin ones than fat ones? How many of them are alike?" He (2013a ch. 7) and Sainsbury (2010, ch. 3 & 4) also elaborate familiar problems for the Meinongian and possibilist alternatives.

Focusing on metatextual uses leads us naturally to think of the referential expressions in (7)–(9) as in fact referring to some entities, and hence to some form of realism. Focusing instead on textual uses leads to an altogether different, anti-

realist picture. When the creator of a work of fiction uses declarative sentences such as (7) (as, indeed, when she uses sentences of other types, imperatives, etc.), we do not feel tempted to think of her as really performing the speech acts one typically performs with them in default contexts. In such cases, the sentences are used in some form of *pretense*, the way we take the acts that actors perform on stage: they do not need to be drinking whisky, for they are merely pretending to do so; hence, we do not evaluate them by invoking any norms we would apply to the real models.

Now, if the apparent assertions are merely pretend, the same might apply to the apparent ancillary acts of reference; and in this way an avenue is opened to account for such uses without the need to posit actual referents for fictional singular terms. Walton (1990) has provided a very elaborate and deservedly influential account of textual uses along such lines, which he then extends to deal with both paratextual and metatextual uses; Everett (2013a) has recently advanced an illuminating elaboration of the program. As before with the realist picture, the extension from the model for the approach – textual uses in this case – is not straightforward, here because there does not appear to be any pretense in assertions of (9). Perhaps a better option would be to combine fictional realism for the latter with a pretense-theoretic account of authors' uses of sentences like (7); but, in addition to the resulting profligacy, (8) occupies a problematic middle ground for this ecumenical rapprochement, and, as Everett (2013a, 163–178) emphasizes, there are many mixed cases such as 'Anna admires Holmes'.

In previous work (García-Carpintero 2010a, 286–287) I have argued that, when combined with a Millian view of singular reference as in Walton's work, the pretense-theoretic account fails; I'll invoke this point below when I discuss Everett's view. Nonetheless, I (García-Carpintero 2010b) have defended a form of anti-realism for metatextual discourse, a version of Yablo's (2001) *figuralist* brand of fictionalism. The proposal is, basically, that in metatextual uses the syntactic features that Quine calls a language's *referential apparatus* (a complex set including occurring in argument-position, openness to existential generalization and substitutivity of identicals, etc.) is used in a loose, hypostatizing figurative way. However, the metaphors in question are pretty much "dead"; they are, say, like the use of prepositions with a basic spatial sense ('on', 'out') for abstract relations. Thus, in contrast to the case of true pretense-theoretic fictionalist proposals, on this view utterances in metatextual discourse are straightforward assertions with straightforward truth-conditions.[8] This might suggest that the view is after all realist.

Nonetheless, the figuralist proposal is fictionalist in spirit. We use 'lion' in a loose way to refer to lion-statues ('I'll meet you beside the lion'), etc. Now, even if the figures of speech we rely on in such uses are not at all creative, and they should be counted as literal, deploying the lexical meaning of the expressions involved, it would be quite unwarranted to worry about the ontological status of the sort of property we literally mean with 'being a lion', its degree of naturalness, and so on and so forth. The facts of those uses, even if they should be counted as literal, "semantic", not "pragmatic", do not stand in the way of a view that, strictly speaking, 'being a lion' designates a natural (biological) kind, while in such uses it is applied to things that, in a variety of respects, *count as* such. It is with this

dismissive attitude that the defender of the figurative view of metatextual discourse looks at debates among fictional realists as to whether characters are non-existent *concreta*, *possibilia*, or rather created or Platonic *abstracta*.[9]

Be this as it may, what matters for present purposes is that, even if a form of realism, the figuralist view of metatextual discourse does not offer by itself an answer to our problem. In the terms of this proposal, an illuminating answer should take the form of an account of the figurative content of (3), ultimately of the nature of the attitudes that (3) reports – the judgments that (1) and (2) express. As is in general the case with such contents, we should not count on anything like a "translation recipe", a general procedure for articulating it in any particular case; perhaps this can only be given on a case-by-case basis. What is clear is that we will not (and had better not) find reference to any posit of realist accounts in an acceptable characterization of such figurative contents. I will outline below one for claims such as (3).

Suppose that we embraced instead a more straightforward form of fictional realism. This will not prevent the same result, I will now want to suggest: namely, that we would still have to provide an account of judgments of co-identification independent of the posited objects. To illustrate, take Salmon's (2002) account (the point I will make can be easily extended to the possibilist, Meinongian, or Platonist forms of realism). Salmon explains the Geachian reading of (4) (and would hence analogously explain the judgment expressed by (3)) by contending that the longest-scope quantifier binding the objects of the attitudes ranges over abstract entities or mythical or fictional objects. The following articulates the proposal:

(10)   There is a mythical witch such that (i) Hob believes: she has blighted
         Bob's mare; and (ii) Nob believes: she killed Cob's sow.

A mythical witch is an abstract, existent object, of the sort realists like Kripke, van Inwagen and the other writers previously mentioned take fictional objects to be. Now, Braun (2012) sensibly objects that (10) does not provide a good analysis of (4), because they have different semantic contents: (10) makes crucial use of an expression, 'mythical witch', whose (theoretically stipulated) semantic content differs from that of any expression in (4). I think a reasonable defense from this objection can be provided for the proposal[10]; but it will show why realism on its own will not supply us with the account of judgments of co-identification we are after.

To develop the defense, I'll rely on two observations I have already broached. The first is the previous point in favor of figuralism, that we sometimes use 'lion' to denote lion-statues. As I pointed out, these metonymical extensions have sometimes become conventionalized aspects of the lexical meanings of expressions, accounting for some cases of polysemy; witness, for instance, the type/token ambiguity for 'novel' and related expressions. For our present purposes we need not worry whether the relevant meanings should count as "semantic" (a feature of the lexical meaning of the expression) or rather "pragmatic" (a creative meaning that speakers manage to endow their utterances with, trading on the rationality of their audiences). The second is that the Geachian reading of (4) is on a par with those cases in which

there really is a witness for the binding existential quantifier in (5). That is to say, (4) would also be true in a possible world in which there is a real witch about whom Hob and Nob both have certain attitudes.

Putting these two observations together, the defender of the realist analysis can reply as follows to Braun's objection. When we have the intuition that (4) is true in the Geachian reading, we are taking for granted that 'witch' might have one of its extended senses; thus, for instance, it would be true if the reports about "Samantha" in the story we envisaged are in fact about a real woman who, even though not (strictly speaking) a witch at all, is thought to be one, or perhaps represents herself as being one. Analogously, *mutatis mutandis*, the real object with witch-related features sufficient to count as a witch in the extended sense might not be any concrete entity, but an abstract one, created when the mythical theory of witchcraft was articulated. And, it in fact transpires, in the ultimately most accurate philosophical analysis, this sort of case would always be the one obtaining in the properly Geachian examples. It is only this that is meant in claiming that (10) provides a good account of (4), as opposed to an (obviously unwarranted) claim of immediate synonymy.[11]

When elaborated in this way, few (if any) differences remain between this realist proposal and the fictionalist one outlined before.[12] But now I want to stress the point that I have mentioned briefly above; namely, that this required elaboration shows that, without further work, the realist account does not offer a satisfactory account of co-identification. For the truth-conditions for (4), in the interesting case, ultimately explain co-identification as the having of attitudes about the same "witch-like" abstract object; but we obviously still need to know what this amounts to, especially given that (in the typical case) we are talking about the attitudes of people who have no articulated theory of mythical objects, nor therefore any explicitly articulated attitudes about them.

This is in fact a particular case of a well-known problem that realists of all stripes should confront. They typically want to say that content-reporting, paratextual uses of (7) can be straightforwardly true, without the need to take it in such uses as short for (8) – which, for most of them, in any case raises the same concerns as (7) does if assumed to include a non-referring expression, irrespective of its occurring in a subordinate clause. This is achieved by taking 'Gregor Samsa' to refer to one of the realist's posits. But this creates a problem: how can such entities fall under the extension of the predicate? Neither abstract nor non-existent objects are true verminous insects. Realists deal with this problem by either distinguishing two types of properties, or two types of predication.[13] On the latter proposal, for instance, the realist would say that the subject-predicate combination in (7) does not mean that the referent of the subject-term truly instantiates the property expressed by the predicate, but merely, say, that such property *is ascribed to it* in some fiction. Obviously, this in turn raises the legitimate request to explain how fictions ascribe properties to the sort of object posited by realist theories, given that typically neither their creators nor their intended audiences have an elaborated view of them; and this is again the challenge raised in the previous paragraph.

I also think that the realist can plausibly answer this more general form of the challenge (without relying, as she should not, on the posited objects themselves); in fact, once more, as I'll show below, what she can say will be very close to what I will say on behalf of the figuralist approach. But the challenge must be met, which was the present point: just positing a Meinongian non-existent object, a *possibile*, or an abstract entity to witness the existential quantifier in (3), without further explanatory work, will not ease our qualms. We still need to explain what is it to have attitudes about a common witch-like Meinongian non-existent, *possible*, abstract entity, or in general about a single witch-in-an-extended-sense "entity"; and we need to explain this independently of these posits.

4   Friend's Account

So Friend is entirely right to put fictional realism aside in her pursuit of an account of co-identification. Let me now present and appraise her proposal. As I mentioned before, accounts of intentional identity have pursued the idea that what (correctly) explains impressions of co-identification is the fact that the attitudes in question (Hob's and Nob's, Nabokov's, and those of the other critic) rely on converging communication chains, of the sort made familiar by contemporary discussions of reference-fixing in the tradition of Kripke's causal-historical "picture", whether the chains converge on a successful "baptism" (if, say, our skepticism is unfounded, there in fact are witches, and the newspaper's use of 'Samantha' in the story imagined above does pick one out) or instead on one of Donnellan's (1974) *blocks* (if, as assumed, the story was a fabrication). Burge (1983), for instance, develops such an account.

Friend does not discuss accounts of intentional identity in general, but she ends up defending a proposal for her cases that is close to Burge's.[14] She distinguishes "name-centric" approaches from "info-centric" ones. Name-centric approaches invoke the name-transmission chains that figured in Kripke's account, whose links are constituted by intentions to use tokens of the name as referring to whatever they did in the use from which the name is taken. Info-centric approaches focus instead on "networks of information (and misinformation) transmission" involving particular mental representations ("files" or "dossiers"), and the intentions to deploy them in order to think about whatever they are about, which is also assumed to have etiological underpinnings. Perry (2012, 196–234) provides a detailed account, and Everett (2000, 2013a, 89–92) an elaboration that applies to our specific case.

Info-centric approaches are initially favored by examples like Evans's (1973) famous 'Madagascar', involving an intuitively uninterrupted communication chain along which the mental file users typically associate with the name change referents. More recent users of 'Madagascar' intuitively do not use it to talk about the land originally baptized thus, but (in Evans's terms) about the "dominant source" of the information in their associated dossiers – to wit, the island. Friend provides other considerations in support of info-centric approaches; an additional important

one is that correct judgments of co-identification might involve names belonging in independent communication chains, such as, in the fictional case, 'Father Christmas'/'Santa Claus', 'Odysseus'/'Ulysses', or 'Clark Kent'/'Superman'. Moreover, we have indistinguishable impressions of co-identification in cases that do not involve names at all (say, cases involving fictions with nameless characters) but rather other referentially used expressions, such as indexicals, demonstratives, and definite or indefinite descriptions.

Now, talk of the dominant source of information will not help in the empty case. Friend resorts to Evans's (1982) variant proposal, which in the case of names distinguishes between the roles of "consumers" and "producers"; consumers intend reference in their uses to be determined relative to producers' files. However, Evans's (1982, 388) object-dependent account characterizes producers for a name *NN* as a "core group of speakers who regularly and reliably recognize an individual, *x*, as NN". This will not do for the empty case. Hence, Friend (*op. cit.*, 325) suggests "that we take the defining feature of producers to be their capacity legitimately to introduce new information in the network ... in some non-referring networks, the producers will be those who are in an authoritative position, for example with respect to a literary practice".

Friend does not explicitly state her account of co-identification; we are left to infer it from her diagnoses of different cases, like this: "On this account, the reason that 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' identify the same character is that the creators of that character were guided by a single notion in introducing (or re-introducing) those names" (in footnote: "alternatively one might say that there are two notions, but the flow of information between the notions is unrestricted") (*ibid.*). I will state the idea behind this suggestion thus:

(CI$_F$) Two attitudes have a common focus if and only if the dominant source of information in the files they deploy is a single producer's notion in the network.[15]

This obviously would not do without revision, as the 'Clark Kent'/'Superman' case already shows. Notions and their associated files are mental particulars, while the story in which the character was put forward had two authors, writer Jerry Siegel and artist Joe Shuster; when we move to collective undertakings such as films, the problem is magnified. This is not unrelated to some of the problems I'll raise right away. But I will stick to this articulation, because it gives us a proposal that is sufficiently clear-cut to allow a critical examination.

There are problems with both the sufficiency and the necessity of the condition for co-identification in CI$_F$. I'll start with the latter. Friend insists that she wants an account that, in itself (i.e., abstracting from the details of each particular case) applies equally to the empty (fictional in particular) and non-empty (non-fictional) case. I think she is entirely right about this. For, as I have been insisting, nothing intuitively changes regarding our impression of the truth of (4) in the relevant reading when we imaginatively move from a witch-believer perspective to another that is disabused of superstitious beliefs; nor regarding (3) when we pass from taking the contenders to be speaking about an actual individual to realizing that they are

speaking of a fictional character. But this creates a problem for the left-to-right part of CI_F, as Edelberg (1992, 574–575) and Everett (2013a, 93–96) point out. In the non-empty case, convergence in a single individual of the chains leading to the two representations suffices for co-identification, but it is not required. Two attitudes might co-identify by deploying files of the same individual, even if they rely on independent chains. Thus, in an undated letter to Jourdain, Frege (1980, 44) has the following example:

> Let us suppose an explorer travelling in an unexplored country sees a high snow-capped mountain on the northern horizon. By making inquiries among the natives he learns that its name is 'Aphla'. By sighting it from different points he determines its position as exactly as possible, enters it in a map, and writes in his diary: 'Aphla is at least 5000 m high.' Another explorer sees a snow-capped mountain on the southern horizon and learns that it is called 'Ateb'. He enters it in his map under this name. Later comparison shows that both explorers saw the same mountain.

Here we would underwrite claims with the structure of (3) and (4): *an explorer thinks that a mountain is at least 5000 m high, and another learns that it is called 'Ateb'*. Why should we not have similar impressions in empty cases? In fact we do. Edelberg (*ibid.*) has a nice example involving two 'Vulcan'-like baptisms, by two independent teams of scientists who come up with a theoretically similar non-existent posit, baptizing it with two different names, and he shows that we would find co-identification judgments justified in such a case. Everett (2013a, 96) has a similar case involving two inattentive spectators of Hamlet who do not realize that Ophelia is Polonius' daughter, and hold thoughts about, respectively, the mother of Ophelia and Polonius' wife – a character who is not explicitly mentioned in the play.

Let me move now to objections to the sufficiency of the condition for co-identification stated in CI_F. Here the problem lies in an assumption we are, I think, entitled to make, given Friend's (correct) insistence on dealing with the problem in a general way applying also to non-fictional cases, together with her sympathy towards Evans's (1982) info-centric account. The assumption is that in the non-empty case we should just appeal to Evans's unmodified account. The problem this creates lies in that, as Kroon (1994) pointed out, attitudes regarding real objects as portrayed in fictions are a complex matter. Imagine that, while reading Carmen Laforet's *Nada* and with respect to that novel, A judges what can be expressed with 'Barcelona is a gloomy, seedy city'; B, living in Barcelona at the same time (or reading a different novel) judges 'Barcelona is a fun, buoyant city'.[16] B might actually be A herself. Now, given the indicated assumption, CI_F appears to validate straightforward judgments of co-identification such as (11):

(11)   A thinks Barcelona/a city is gloomy, but B believes it/the same city is fun.

The situation is reminiscent of Kripke's (1979) famous 'Paderewski' example, in that the utterances appear to express conflicting contents, which (11) reports, while intuitively no tension is felt in the expressed judgments. But there is an important difference; against what Kripke insists applies to his case, here we have in ordinary parlance, with no need to resort to technical notions, an easy way of dissolving the appearance of a tension. I think we intuitively find report (11) at the very least

dubious. In fact, the kind of semantics for the attitudes that I will suggest in Sect. 6 will count relevant utterances of (11) as false, and not merely misleading as other accounts would have it.[17] Only reports such as (12) are strictly speaking correct:

(12)   A thinks Barcelona – (as it is portrayed) in *Nada* – is gloomy, and B believes it is fun.

Let me introduce a second example, before considering what Friend could say about both cases. Author C of novel N uses her file for a real entity (herself, say) to create what competent readers of N would as a matter of course judge to be two different characters. Reader A thinks that the first character is gloomy, reader B (who as above could be just A) thinks that the second character is fun. Now the problem is that, under the assumption, CI_F appears to validate judgments of co-identification such as (13)[18]:

(13)   A thinks C/someone is gloomy, but B thinks she/the same person is fun.

Once more, if apprised of the situation, we would only underwrite reports such as (14):

(14)   A thinks C – as represented by X in *N* – is gloomy, but B believes she – as represented by Y in *N* – is fun.

Friend (2014, 316) discusses a related case: "Thomas Kyd based his Hamlet on a Norse legend about the (possibly real) Prince Amleth of Denmark. Suppose that Amleth was real, and that Kyd intended to use 'Hamlet' to identify the same individual, if any, represented in the Norse legend; perhaps the English name is just a variation on the Norse one. And suppose (just for the sake of argument) that Shakespeare, mistakenly assuming Hamlet to be invented or perhaps not caring one way or the other, intended to use the name 'Hamlet' to identify the same character as Kyd. Then it turns out that all this time we who talk about Hamlet are referring to a real individual. This looks like the wrong result." Later she wonders whether her account commits her to saying that Shakespeare, and by extension readers who defer to him, refer after all to Amleth and have as a result co-identifying attitudes. She (2014, 329) argues that it does not, on the basis of these considerations:

> Shakespeare's Hamlet-notion would include a crucial item absent from his Amleth-notion: the fact that Hamlet was a fictional character that he invented. Most consumers in the Hamlet-network associate fictionality with Shakespeare's character, and we could argue that this feature is sufficiently important to offset other descriptive similarities between Hamlet and Amleth. We might also think that it is just a fact about the relevant artistic and entertainment practices that an author's intention usually suffices to establish that a character is based on, rather than identical to, a real individual. (...) Moreover there are likely to be other factors to consider in determining reference in fiction, such as the extent to which information about the real individual is relevant to understanding a work, or the likelihood of recognition among the intended audience.

The three considerations here can be reasonably applied to the second example: C's additional files for herself, as represented by X and Y in her novel, should include fictionality, because this is what sensible readers will assume. Whether or

not her psychology has created the two files (perhaps we should not speculate on these matters) it is reasonable to expect her to have the intention that X and Y be considered fictional. It is also reasonable to think that conventions for properly engaging with fictions such as N discourage using information about C in thinking about X and Y in N. Thus, it is reasonable to invoke Friend's sort of consideration in somehow limiting the application of CI_F. However, for this not to be *ad hoc*, a replacement for CI_F should be stated, which still has the desired generality – i.e., which still applies equally to empty and non-empty instances of co-identification.

The problem is compounded by the fact that none of Friend's suggestions help with the first sort of example; for, as *Nada* is a realist novel, it is clear that (in some sense: more on this below) its author intends 'Barcelona' in the novel to be about the real Barcelona, and expects competent readers to take it that way, in part on the basis of the conventions of such novels. As I mentioned, Kroon (1994) discussed related issues. He considers utterances expressing what he calls *reflective appreciator-attitude statements*, such as 'Smith admires Garrison (in the movie *JFK*) because (in the film) he is humble'. Among other things, they have the merit of making it more difficult to deal with the problem posed by (11) by contending that it is short for (12), and then treating '(as it is portrayed) in *Nada*' as an operator: A thinks that according to *Nada* Barcelona is gloomy. In so far as I understand it, my own proposal below is close to Kroon's.

Now, Friend (2000) has considered Kroon's (1994) cases. She argues that a Millian who takes non-empty names in fictional discourse as having their ordinary semantic content, i.e., their referents on such accounts, can deal with them by accepting the resulting semantics and providing a psychological explanation of the intuitions against it. This sounds like a version of either Salmon's (1986) and Soames's (1989) or Braun's (2005) views for attitude ascriptions in general on behalf of the Millian view. Applied to (11), the idea is that, although it is literally true, 'Barcelona' when it occurs in expressions of A's and B's relevant attitudes is associated with different modes of presentation. We can then say that (11) conveys the wrong implicature that A and B think of Barcelona under the same mode of presentation – this would be the Salmon-Soames line. Or we can use this fact to explain why we have the wrong impression that the unvarnished (11) is false, adopting instead Braun's view. I have already said that, as other philosophers, I take this to be a hard bullet to bite, so I prefer accounts like the one I'll provide below which make utterances of (11) straightforwardly false in the indicated circumstances.[19]

5   Everett's Pretense Account

I mentioned above the Walton-inspired pretense-theoretic account of all discourse (textual, paratextual and metatextual) involving fictional referring expressions. Everett's (2013a) recent book is a compelling, clear-cut proposal along those lines, informed by the debate in the past three decades. Among other issues, Everett

tackles the problem of co-identification, offering a pretense-theoretic account of the judgments that utterances such as (3) express. On such a view, they are correct, but not because the utterances are true assertions; rather they are proposals to imagine – or some such speech act – "true" only under the relevant pretense. Everett does not provide "principles of generation" which might generate such games of make-believe. Instead, he offers "specifications of the circumstances in which, intuitively, we count two representations as being about the same fictional thing" (2013a, 96 fn.). They go as follows (*ibid*., 96):

(CI$_E$)   If two representations . . . are associated with the same fiction then we will take them to be 'about' the same thing if and only if, within the scope of the pretense associated with that fiction, they count as being about the same thing.

Corresponding specifications are provided for representations that count as being about different things, or producing indeterminate identifications. This gives the right results for the cases we have considered. The networks to which Nabokov's and the critic's representation belong explain why their aboutness (pretend, because, there being no referent, according to Everett there cannot be true aboutness) is to be determined relative to the (pretend) use of a single name in Kafka's fiction. Then CI$_E$ establishes that they count as being about the same thing. In the case of Everett's *mother of Ophelia/Polonius' wife* counterexample to accounts such as Friend's that rely on convergence of networks, it would be part of the intentions of the subjects deploying each notion that they are "of" a character in *Hamlet*. Then CI$_E$ establishes again that they count as being of the same individual.

I do not strongly disagree with this proposal, as far as it goes; the main problem I will raise is that it does not go sufficiently far. Let me quickly say something about the minor disagreement, before moving on to state that main one.

I said before that the account I favor of paratextual and metatextual discourse invokes a form of lexicalized, dead metaphor, and takes as a result utterances such as (3)–(4), (8)–(9) to be straightforwardly true. Everett, as pretense theorists tend to do, denies this; utterances like (7) in its textual use are not assertions. Nevertheless, Everett points out that, on the Waltonian account of fictionalizing he favors, they do have (objective) correctness conditions. Even more importantly, he also follows Walton (1990) and Evans (1982) in explaining (in much more detail than they do) how utterances made only in the fictionalizing mood can nonetheless be intended to convey information about the actual world, through the "prop-oriented" (Walton 1993)) mechanism that, following Richard (2000), he calls 'piggybacking'.[20] He (2013a, 81–86) invokes these two points to explain away intuitions that the relevant utterances have genuine truth-conditions and can be genuinely true or false. But he agrees that the two points can instead be taken to conclude that "these correctness conditions . . . have become conventionalized, so that they have become semantically encoded as the truth conditions of the relevant utterances"; and he declares that he "would not be too concerned if, in the end, you preferred to opt for this approach" (*ibid*., 81). This is exactly what my figuralist proposal does.[21]

I will now move on to the main criticism. As I mentioned above, in previous work (García-Carpintero 2010a, 286–287) I have criticized the combination of a pretense-theoretic account of paratextual and metatextual discourse with an object-dependent view of contents in Evans's and Walton's work. I should say that, although he declares sympathies with Millian views, in the respects that matter here (see the next section), Everett's views are once again more nuanced, because he (*ibid.*, 89 fn.) accepts that there might be singular thoughts based on a mere descriptive cognitive fix, thereby rejecting acquaintance accounts. But in any case, the problem remains that Everett's account just puts the cart before the horse.

My objection to Walton is that he needs to explain the content of the pretense that creators of fictions – such as Kafka in producing the Czech equivalent of (7) – engage in. Such pretenses are on Walton's view (and correctly so) representational acts with representational contents, propositional imaginings that proper appreci-ators should entertain. But the strict Millian view that Walton holds, on which such utterances do not have propositional contents, makes it difficult to explain how such contents are generated. Now, the general shape of this worry is the one I already raised in the third section for realist proposals: even if we accept them for metatextual discourse, they require an independent account of aboutness in textual discourse. The same applies to pretense-theoretic accounts such as Everett's. He provides an account of aboutness in metatextual co-identification claims such as (3); but any such account requires a previous, independent account of aboutness or reference in the fiction that CI_E invokes.

As I said before, Everett's *mother of Ophelia/Polonius' wife* example is analo-gous to an example by Edelberg in a non-fictional context, which equally suggests that we take co-identification claims to be true even when the representations in the two attitudes we claim to co-identify do not belong in the same anaphoric chain. This highlights the worry just raised, in that there is no fiction that the two representations are associated with, but just two different failed theoretical pursuits. Hence, without further ado we cannot apply Everett's CI_E recipe to such a case – unless we (implausibly) claim that the relevant theoretical pursuits count as fictions, just because they have posited non-existent theoretical entities. In any case, justifying this would involve confronting the problem I am raising. This is one more manifestation of the cart-before-the-horse concern. What we need in the first place is an account of aboutness or reference that uniformly applies to straightforward assertions, such as those in theoretical claims, and the pretenses of textual discourses, on which our account of co-identification can then rely.[22]

6   Pretend Reference and Presupposings

Let me sum up the main claims of the previous sections. Our target utterances (3), (11) and (13) are pieces of metatextual discourse. Whether we give them a realist treatment like Salmon's (2002), a pretense-theoretic one like Everett's (2013a), or the somehow intermediary figuralist one I favor, a full understanding of their truth-

conditions is dependent on an account of aboutness in the original representations to which the relied-upon "quasi-anaphoric links" ultimately lead – in our case, the relevant pieces of textual discourse. In this respect, Friend's account is on the right track. However, it should be elaborated adequately, in order to confront the problems we raised.

Let us consider some recent accounts of the truth conditions of claims of intentional identity. Along the lines already suggested by Evans (1982, 362), Pagin (2014, 94) points out that the intuition which seems to guide our judgment and which different accounts have tried to capture over the years seems to be something like (CI_M):

(CI_M)   Two attitudes have a common focus if and only if, if one had been about a real object of the relevant kind, then both would have been about the same object.

Modal accounts such as Pagin's (2014) and Glick's (2012) aim to capture the intuition (CI_M) in a straightforward way, by providing analyses along the lines of (5)–(6) above on which the Greek variables range over a domain of *possibilia*.[23] Now, in spite of efforts by Stalnaker and others, there are very good reasons not to take possible worlds as primitive entities in our semantic endeavors; the particular case of fictions multiplies standard concerns.[24] It is perfectly ok to use them as a semantic tool, and not just for instrumental reasons; the presence of modal expressions in our languages, in addition to the need to account for semantically grounded modal notions like logical validity, sufficiently establishes that. But possible worlds need not be primitive entities; they might be (determined by) structured propositions, for instance. Because of this, I prefer accounts expressed in a Fregean ideology, such as Cumming's (2014).[25] On this view, the Greek variables range over thought-"objects" corresponding to *de jure* referential "expressions" in language or in thought, i.e., objects *prima facie* determined by them; on the figuralist interpretation I favor, "they" might well not exist, our references to "them" and quantifications over "them" just being a hypostatizing figure of speech.[26]

Relative to these accounts, the question I have raised is this: When do the textual discourses to which the ascribees' mental representations ultimately lead underwrite positing a common thought object, and thus the counterfactual in (CI_M) when it is sufficiently well defined? The answer depends on what we take the nature of textual discourse to be. On the view that Lewis's (1978) account of "truth in fiction" assumes, we should consider worlds in which the textual discourse is uttered as presenting known facts, and some other restrictions obtain – the world is otherwise as similar as possible to the actual world, or to the world according to common beliefs in the context in which the discourse is produced.[27] The representations co-identify if they pick out the same referent in those worlds. On Currie's (1990) alternative view, we should consider instead the belief-worlds of a fictional narrator of the textual discourse. I have questioned both accounts and provided an alternative one (García-Carpintero 2007, 2013), assuming a presuppositional account of reference (García-Carpintero 2000, 2006b). Here is a short summary of the main relevant ideas.

Although the states of information we end up in by accepting 'John stole the camera' and 'it was John who stole the camera' are the same, these two sentences pack the information they convey in different ways. The second, cleft sentence *presupposes* that someone stole the camera, while the former, plainer sentence does not. For present purposes, it will do no harm to think of presuppositions along the well-known lines that Stalnaker (1978) has suggested.[28] Speech acts like assertion take place against a *common ground*, a set of already accepted propositions. Linguistic presuppositions are requirements on the common ground, whose satisfaction should be checked at an ideal time just after the utterance is made (because it might well be that it is the utterance itself that generates the common ground information that satisfies them) but before the ensuing assertion is accepted – in which case it then goes to conform the common ground, licensing further presuppositions in the ensuing discourse. The difference between our two sentences lies in the fact that an utterance of the cleft sentence will feel inappropriate (at presupposition evaluation time) if it is not common ground that someone stole the camera. But the state of information that we get into by accepting either of our sentences will be the same.

Consider then an utterance of 'he is hungry'. The proposal agrees with the *direct reference* theorist that the asserted content is a singular proposition, *x is hungry*, for some contextual assignment to *x*. It is expressed, however, in a context in which another singular proposition is presupposed – in this case, one semantically triggered by something akin to a Kaplanian character for 'he' – which we could express thus: *x is the male picked out by the demonstration associated with he*,[29] where the bold-face 'he' refers to the relevant token. This semantically triggered presupposition will be typically supplemented by further pragmatically triggered presuppositions, specifying additional features of the intended demonstrated referent, perceptually accessible or accessible from previous discourse.[30] (These presuppositions, by the way, illustrate the point made in the previous paragraph about the time at which presuppositions are to be appraised.) The descriptive identification embodied in such presuppositions is "reference-fixing" and not "meaning-giving", in Kripke's (1980) sense.

This is not, it should be clear, a reductive descriptivist view: far from aiming to reduce singular representations to descriptive general ones, it assumes primitively singular attitudes. The suggestion is only that general descriptive information helping to fix the individuals the utterances are about is a constitutive feature of them. This information figures in associated presuppositions. But the presuppositions are themselves singular, and not just because they may mention singular token representational states; the intended referents, if there are any, also figure in their contents. Singularity, like presuppositionality, is understood here as a constitutive feature of the representational devices, a "semantic requirement" (Fine 2007) on them – a fact to be embedded in a theory of such representations, which must be grasped for them to be fully comprehended.[31] It is thus that singular terms are *de jure* rigid, in Kripke's (1980) sense.

Now, on the Stalnakerian picture of presuppositions I partially assume, presupposition and assertion interrelate in dynamic ways. Presuppositions are checked

against a "common ground", a set of propositions that are common knowledge among conversational participants. Asserted contents, if accepted, become part of the common ground, and thus legitimize presuppositions later on in the discourse. Consider an utterance of (7) in its assumed context. This is a declarative sentence that would be used by default to make an assertion. The assertion is merely pretend, which is why we would not complain that it cannot be true or impart knowledge by its including an empty name. The speaker, the fiction-maker, is just using it to make a different speech act, a sort of invitation or proposal for audiences of a certain kind to imagine certain contents. However, it behaves with respect to the dynamics of discourse exactly like the corresponding assertion would have, legitimizing presuppositions; thus, the next sentence could have been "it was not just gigantic, it was also frightening" – a cleft construction presupposing that the insect was gigantic – and it would feel entirely felicitous (unlike "it was not just tiny . . . "). It is in virtue of examples like this that the common ground is not taken to consist of propositions that are strictly speaking common *knowledge*, but is merely commonly "accepted" (Stalnaker 2002). I suggest we take such an "acceptance" to be a matter of further pretense: accepted pretend assertions become pretend presuppositions. Now, fully understanding fictional discourse involves additional pretend presuppositions to the ones created by pretend assertion: the singular reference-fixing presuppositions that my proposal associates with empty names such as 'Gregor Samsa' are similarly merely pretend presuppositions. It is thus irrelevant that they cannot be true, nor therefore matters of common knowledge.[32]

Not all presuppositions that a piece of textual discourse assumes are pretend, of course. Even the most fanciful tales assume facts that truly are (taken to be) common knowledge, in order to determine their contents. Special among them are presuppositions constitutive of the meaning of the terms the tale uses; these cannot be pretend. Singular presuppositions associated with names already in use also belong in this category of non-pretend presuppositions. They interact with pretend presuppositions to determine the content of the fiction, in ways that have been famously explored by Lewis (1978) in his already mentioned analysis of "truth in fiction", by Walton (1990) for his "principles of generation" and by many others under their influence.

Let us call all of them together "the presuppositions of the fiction".[33] My proposal then goes as follows: the singular mental representations in the ascribees co-identify just in case they pick out the same referent in the presupposition-worlds taken for granted by the fiction-maker in making the invitation to imagine that constitutes the fiction:

(CI$_{GC}$)   If two representations are associated with fiction F then they co-identify if and only if they pick out the same referent in the relevant worlds fitting the presuppositions of F.

I understand this deals adequately with the clear cases we have considered before, such as the truth of (3) or Everett's mother of Ophelia/Polonius' wife example. In the relevant presupposition worlds that the thinkers intend, there is just one Gregor Samsa (whether a beetle or a cockroach) and just one mother of Ophelia who is

also Polonius' wife. I will now conclude by showing how the proposal handles the objections I raised above for Everett and Friend, and how it deals with an alleged counterexample by Pautz (2008).

This proposal is compatible with Everett's (CI_E); my objection to his account was not that it was incorrect. However, the proposal explicitly assumes an account of pretend reference in textual discourse that, although a form of a direct reference account, is also in a clear sense a (reference-fixing) descriptivist Fregean account. This is essential to make sense of the account of singular thought I assume, on which this is a matter of the nature of the referential vehicles, and it is compatible with their failing to pick out an object (cf. García-Carpintero 2014b). This is also not inconsistent with Everett's moderate view on singular reference; the virtue of the proposal is only that it makes explicit its reliance on such an account of aboutness in textual discourse.[34] The proposal thus puts the horse before the cart, as it should. Also, it is part of a general account of the truth-conditions of the Geachian sentences that can be easily extended to non-fictional cases, not associated with fictions but with other sorts of representations – such as Edelberg's example of the two communities of theoreticians independently postulating failed theoretical posits. The two communities make singular reference-fixing presuppositions that, although independent of each other, we reasonably take to co-identify in relevant worlds.

This point also deals with the objections to the necessity of Friend's (CI_E). Regarding the objections to the sufficiency, as I indicated above they constitute even less of a fundamental disagreement than the ones to Everett's account; the problem I raised was rather one of formulation. We agree that what matters for co-identification is what some singular representations are, or pretend to be, about. I think the present account improves on Friend's Evans-inspired proposal on how that idea is developed. If (11) and (13) are false – unless they contextually suggest the qualifications made explicit in (12) and (14) – this is because it is not the reference-fixing presuppositions associated with ordinary representations of Barcelona or author C that matter for the truth of the intended claim, but those made in the textual discourse constituting the relevant fictions. This is not as much a matter of the file structure of the psychology of the producer of the fiction, but of the nature of the representational acts that constitute the fiction. Or, to be fairer, it is a matter of the former kind only to the extent that issues about the file-structure of the producer's psychology are relevant for the latter.

Pautz (2008) objects to pretense-theoretic accounts of (3), (12) and (14) by means of an alleged counterexample that would also be one to the present proposal. The present proposal is not that they are part of some extended pretense, but rather that they are figurative assertions; however, as I have already granted the figurative content is very much like the contents asserted by "piggybacking" in pretense-theoretic accounts. Moreover, on the presuppositional account the crucial condition grounding the truth of (3) is akin to Pautz's (2008, 152) (iii*c*), *mutatis mutandis* (she is discussing a Sherlock Holmes example): that the critic's and Nabokov's uses of their respective singular representations causally lead back (through the relevant "quasi-anaphoric links") to the referential pretenses associated with 'Gregor Samsa' in Kafka's text.

To this sort of account, she provides an alleged counterexample of the following form (*op. cit.*, 152–153): "There is an initial pretend use of an empty name by the author of the fiction. Subsequently, two individuals ... use tokens of the same name ... where their uses of the name are causally related to the initial pretend use. One individual acquires the intended pretend beliefs [these are the beliefs that a proper appreciator of the fiction should pretend to have, M G-C]. But the other individual acquires beliefs which are substantially different from the intended beliefs". Thus, in her Sherlock Holmes example, the second speaker believes that Sherlock Holmes lives in California, drives a Ferrari, and is a surgeon who makes a large amount of money by helping the police solve murder cases. Under these circumstances, Pautz contends that, while the account would underwrite judgments of co-identification concerning the beliefs of the two speakers, these judgments would intuitively be untrue.

In response, I suggest that Pautz's alleged counterexample is essentially underdescribed.[35] The crucial claim is not just that the uses of the singular representations are causally related to the pretend uses in the fiction; the causal relations should be of the proper form. The question is, does the speaker with the wrong beliefs use 'Sherlock Holmes' as *de jure* coreferential with the uses of the speakers from which she has taken it? i.e., does she intend to use it as it has been used by previous speakers? If so, I do not share her intuition that the co-identification judgments are false. On the contrary, my intuition is that she has mistaken beliefs about the character that Conan Doyle created, and that she would accept corrections in that regard. If, on the other hand, she lacks these intentions, then the account does not support the co-identification judgments, even if her use of 'Sherlock Holmes' is ultimately causally dependent on Doyle's: when it comes to underwriting co-identification judgments, such causal dependence is beside the point.

Notes

1. Pautz (2008, 149) also points this out. I discuss below her criticism of a view close to the one I will defend.
2. Braun (2012, 171–174) assumes that the analysis (5) is ontologically committal to witches, and uses the structural similarity with *de re* readings with actual witnesses to "explain" why those of us who have the intuition that (4) is true under Geach's interpretation are confused. This is peculiar. Our intuitions about successful cases are perfectly reliable data for semantic theorizing, Braun accepts. Indistinguishable intuitions about referent-absent cases are instead confusions engendered by the similarity with the former, because he assumes that such readings are ontologically committal to witches. I think it makes better methodological sense to accept the intuitions in all cases, and seek an account on which (5)/(6) are not so committal.
3. Cf. Evans (1982, 362).

4. The links are the relations of *de jure* or *internal coreference* that have received extensive discussion; cf. Fine (2007, 40, 68) (who speaks instead of objects "being represented as the same"), Lawlor (2010), Schroeter (2012), and references there.

5. We should distinguish the debate about the semantics of ascriptions such as (4), from the one about the nature of the relations between the ascribed attitudes, even though they are related. For most writers, including Geach, the 'intentional identity' label covers both. This applies also to more recent discussion. I will be mostly discussing the second, philosophical issue, assuming the accounts of the first, semantic one that I find more promising.

6. I take this and the other two related labels from Bonomi (2008).

7. Voltolini (2006) provides a helpful recent exploration of the alternatives.

8. To circumvent the problems that this causes, in more recent work Yablo (2014) has developed an alternative framework to his earlier figurativism to present the fictionalism he favors. I like this work, and, given the role that presuppositions play on the view I present below, it would be straightforward to articulate the form of fictionalism about fictional characters I support by means of it; but I have stuck to the figurativist framework for reasons of familiarity and consequent ease of exposition.

9. The dismissive Wittgensteinian attitude applies only to the *ontological* worries. There are very interesting difficult theoretical issues, in linguistics and in philosophy, in understanding the lexical processes involved in these cases. García-Carpintero (2010b) includes references to some work on those matters. For the understanding of the semantics/pragmatics divide I assume, cf. García-Carpintero (2006a).

10. It is a specific elaboration of the "modified Salmonian pragmatic theory" which Braun discusses in section 6 of his paper.

11. Salmon (2015) provides something close to this reply to Braun's criticism.

12. I say "if any" because, for technical reasons, the figuralist might want to accept "objects" witnessing the existential quantifiers (to belong, say, in the "outer domains" of the positive free logic she might want to rely on), for which analogues of the realist's *ficta* might be handy.

13. Cf. Everett (2013a, 170–177) for an excellent discussion of the two options and their problems.

14. As I said, we should distinguish accounts of the semantics of sentences ascribing intentional identity, such as (3) and (4), from accounts of the nature of the judgments of co-identification they express. Burge, like Geach and most other writers, was interested in both; they provide more or less detailed semantics, guided by more or less articulated views about the constitutive issue. Here we are mostly concerned with the latter, and (as emphasized below) I will put aside semantically relevant complexities that need not concern us.

15. I have benefited from conversations with Stacie Friend, but the responsibility for the statement is mine.

16. In fac *Nada* was an accurate realist fiction, and hence A's judgment, if taken as a straightforward claim about the city itself (perhaps inferred by extrapolation

from reading the novel while taking it to be accurate realist fiction), would have been correct, while B's at the very least would be one based on a very limited view. But this is neither here nor there; in the example, A's is a paratextual judgment about what goes on in *Nada*.

17. Salmon (1986) and Soames (1989) notoriously defend that 'Hammurabi believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus' has the same semantic content and hence truth-value as 'Hammurabi believed that Hesperus is Hesperus', although the former conveys a false implicature. Braun (2005) provides an alternative explanation for the (in his view) misguided intuitive impression that the two reports differ semantically. Hawthorne & Manley (2012, *passim*) provide excellent summaries of the reasons why such proposals are very dubious. Of course, the indicated authors might prefer other accounts for (11); they might, say, take 'Barcelona' in (11) to refer to an abstract fictional entity, and explain the failure of co-identification on that basis.

18. Note that it is irrelevant whether C's mental file system "manager" has "opened" two additional files for herself, one for each character modeled after her in the novel, to keep track of "them" and avoid confusions, as long as the new files represent the author – as in fact they would, because she will obviously keep them "linked" to her SELF file. (Thanks here to Miguel Hoeltje and Manolo Martínez for pressing me on this.)

19. Friend (2000) ends up arguing that reports such as 'Smith admires Garrison (in the movie *JFK*)' cannot be straightforwardly true assertions; she takes them to be only true under a pretense. The corresponding proposal about (11) is more plausible; it is the sort of view that Everett defends and I'll discuss next. Friend, however, rejected that line with respect to judgments of co-identification in a talk she gave at the *LanCog Workshop on Fiction and Imagination* (Lisbon, December 6–7 2012), "Creating Nothing", in part for the sort of reason I'll provide below to prefer my own account to Everett's.

20. This is what happens when the mother tells her child "the cowboy should now wash his hands for dinner"; i.e., it is to make an utterance which would be true-in-the-pretense if certain conditions obtained (mother and child are playing a game of cowboys and Indians, with specific principles of generation), with the intention of asserting such conditions (i.e., that the boy dressed as a cowboy – now has certain obligations).

21. The closeness between the two views is made even greater by my minimalist views about semantic (i.e., compositionally determined) content (García-Carpintero 2006a).

22. Here I agree with the main point that Friend (2011) was emphasizing in raising the issue of co-identification, namely, that we take textual discourse to be as singular as ordinary assertoric discourse. She also previously questioned Walton's account along similar lines, and raised the "cart-before-the-horse" problem for Everett's account in her talk in the Lisbon conference mentioned in footnote 16. Everett (2013b, fn. 25) admits the connection between co-identification judgments involving fictional entities and Geach sentences, thanking a referee for pointing it out to him, and insists that those who want to count them as

true on the relevant readings without adopting realism should offer their own account. I agree; but someone who, extending his views, offered instead a pretense-theoretic account of Geach sentences would equally be required to explain aboutness in the representational origins to which the pretense at stake leads us back.

23. Edelberg (1986) pointed out a *prima facie* asymmetry in our intuitions of intentional identity with a much discussed example. I follow Cumming's (2014, 373) exposition: Smith and Jones have been found dead in different parts of Chicago. Detectives Onesky and Twosky conclude that both were victims of homicide. Onesky believes that a single man killed both of them. Twosky maintains instead a two-killer theory. In truth, neither man was murdered; they died in unrelated accidents. In this context, it seems true to report "Twosky thinks that someone murdered Smith, and Onesky thinks he murdered Jones". However, it feels wrong to report "Onesky thinks someone murdered Jones, and Twosky thinks that he murdered Smith". But if we analyze both reports along the lines of (5)–(6), they should be logically equivalent. All contemporary analyses try to account for this apparent asymmetry as resulting from some contextual effect; Glick resorts to a counterpart-theoretic metaphysics of modality in order to deal with it. Here I will ignore these complications, which are orthogonal to my concerns.

24. Sainsbury (2014) expresses a more wide-ranging skepticism about possible worlds as a tool to understand fictional content.

25. I take it that this sort of Fregean account is in a position to handle the concerns raised by Salmon (2002, 111), but I cannot go into them here. Also, like Glick's, Cumming's account is made more complex than I can adequately represent here with because it also aims to account for Edelberg's apparent asymmetries.

26. Cumming (2014, 381) appears to concur.

27. Of course, there is not just one "world of the fiction" to underwrite (CI_M). This issue affects the other proposals below, including my own. My inclination is to deal with this by adopting one of the two solutions that Lewis (1993) offers for Unger's "problem of the many"; cp., however, Wright (2014) for some challenges.

28. My own views, although strongly influenced by him, differ at some points (cf. García-Carpintero 2014a). I think of all speech (and mental) acts, including ancillary acts such as *presupposing* and *referring*, as constitutively normative; in particular, I think of presuppositions as normative requirements, constitutive of some representational acts, that knowledge already in place includes them. I also think that some linguistic presuppositions are semantically triggered.

29. This statement of the presupposition contains another presupposition associated with the definite description, which I do not unpack further for the sake of clarity.

30. Proposals along these lines are quite standard nowadays in the linguistic semantics literature; cf. Heim (2008), Maier (2009) and Hunter (2012).

31. Crucially, singular representations thus understood may fail to have an object; there are singular presuppositions associated with singular terms in fictions that

are merely pretend, as I contend immediately below. Our theoretical claims are to be understood as made in the framework of a free logic.

32. Cf. Sainsbury's (2010, 143–148) related discussion of "truth under a presupposition" – which is not, however, put in the framework of a general theory of reference involving presuppositions.

33. On the view I have outlined, the text constituting a fiction proposes that its readers imaginatively presuppose some contents. But this does not entail that such contents are *eo ipso* contents of the fiction. The text constitutes an act of fiction-making; but not everything that the reader should imagine in order to comprehend the text needs be part of the content made fictional by it. There are imaginative acts required to understand the text that are merely ancillary to the determination of the contents that the text invites proper appreciators to imagine. Let us consider a story beginning thus: "this is the tale of a little dragon, Urkul, who lived at a time when there were no people around and things still did not have names". The reader is to imagine that *x* is the dragon picked out by the naming-practice on which that token of 'Urkul' relies; but this is clearly not intended to be part of the content of the fiction. What is to be part of the content of the fiction is determined by relevance-like factors, relative to the nature of the act of fiction-making, including the intentions of the author, related conventions, etc.

34. My proposal is very close to Kroon's (2004), which I understand elaborates in the intended way the account in terms of a distinction between "prescriptive" and "descriptive" pretense in Kroon (1994). Kroon would treat (3), (12) and (14) as involving a form of "shallow pretense"; the figuralist view is in the same spirit. Kroon (2004) also emphasizes one of my main points, the need to rely on an account of reference which includes appropriate descriptivist elements.

35. Alternatively, it might be thought that her appeal to causal relations in her principle (iii*c*) is not sufficiently specified. However, she models this appeal on Kripke's non-descriptivist outline of an account of reference, which crucially mentions the need to appeal to referential intentions in characterizing the causal links; and she mentions as subscribers of the principle works by Everett (2000) and Kroon (2004), which do understand the causal links in such terms.

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Indirect Discourse and Quotation

Michel Seymour

Davidson's paratactic theory of indirect discourse constitutes a first attempt to account for the opacity of indirect discourse locutions while preserving at the same time semantic innocence, i.e., the intuition that expressions occurring in an intensional context very often behave as they ordinarily do in other non-intensional contexts. Its interest in this regard lies in part in the way it successfully avoids any recourse to intensional entities and paves the way for a vindication of sentential theories of propositional attitude sentences. It is also the first theory that is at the same time able to satisfy the constraints imposed by a semantic account that would meet the requirements of a finitely axiomatized, compositional, recursive theory of truth for the language.

I am convinced that these different features of the theory are important and that they should be met by any good semantic theory of indirect discourse sentences. I am less certain though that the paratactic account can overcome the difficulties with which it is confronted and this is the reason why I would rather seek for another solution and argue for a substantially different account of indirect discourse. In what follows, I will first rehearse the very long list of criticisms that have been raised against the paratactic theory. By doing so I do not mean to suggest that none of them can be answered and I do not intend to discuss any of them in detail. The interest of running them together is rather that they all raise questions concerning the Davidsonian hypothesis according to which an indirect discourse sentence can

M. Seymour (✉)
Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, Montreal, QC, Canada
e-mail: seymour@videotron.ca

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be paraphrased in terms of two extensional sentential components, one of which contains a demonstrative referring to the other.

These criticisms provide at the very least a motivation for looking once again at so-called "quotational theories". Some of them have quite justifiably been dismissed by Davidson but, given his own account of quotation, the paratactic theory itself is not very different from a quotational theory. I shall however be concerned to show that the criticisms raised against the paratactic theory would reoccur in a new guise and would affect a revised Davidsonian quotational theory.

I shall therefore try to formulate an alternative account of quotation, understood as a functional device belonging to a substitutional language. I will briefly indicate how this new approach enables one to circumvent the difficulties of the paratactic theory while preserving its virtues. I should stress that my rejection of the paratactic theory is not meant to reveal the failure of the Davidsonian program as a whole. This is the reason why I shall particularly be interested in showing that the quotational theory that I favour does indeed meet the requirements of a finitely axiomatized theory of truth for the language.

1   Davidson's Paratactic Theory of Indirect Speech

Davidson's paratactic theory, it will be remembered, involves an hypothesis concerning the logical form of indirect discourse according to which a sentence like

(1)   Galileo said that the earth moves

is paraphrased as

(2)   Galileo said that. The earth moves (Davidson 1968–1969)

In such a paraphrase, the expression "that" is used as a demonstrative. The correct analysis of the analysandum is one in which an utterance of the first sentence in (2) involves an act of demonstrating an utterance of the second sentence. The first part of the analysis also represents Galileo's utterance as being in a relation of samesaying with the demonstratum. This, however, is not something that belongs to the logical form of (1). It is rather revealed by a conceptual analysis of the verb "says". The so called "intensionality" of indirect discourse is then accounted for as a phenomenon that has nothing to do with the failure of extensionality principles. This is so because the original sentence is broken up into purely extensional sentential components. The application of principles such as the substitution of identicals, existential generalization, and truth functionality is allowed in both of the sentential components. It is just that its application in the case of the second sentence can lead to a variation in the truth value of the first sentence. But this has no longer anything to do with opacity.

I shall now enumerate some of the most important objections made to Davidson's theory:

(i) Davidson is committed to the view that we have been misled all along in supposing that an indirect discourse sentence is a single sentential unit. Against

our intuitions in this regard, it is claimed that we should count a single indirect discourse sentence as an aggregate of two separate sentences, moreover logically independent of one another. They are only paratactically joined together. This is because the paratactic view sees "that" as a demonstrative in "Galileo says that . . . ". Our intuition about how to count sentences tells against Davidson's hypothesis (Burge 1986, 191).

(ii) Understanding the "that" as a demonstrative is also problematic for the following reason. It will be translated in french as "que" and it does not seem that there is a demonstrative use of "que" in French (Schiffer 1987, 125). Even if we were to grant that there is a *use* in English sometimes justifying the demonstrative interpretation, and even if it were admitted that there once was a similar use made with "que", the fact remains that now we do not use "que" in a demonstrative way. Their intertranslatability must therefore mean that "que" and "that" share a certain feature in common that has nothing to do with a demonstrative function and that the word "that" does not literaly behave as a demonstrative.

(iii) Our intuition suggests also that a sentence like (1) could be true even if it were not uttered. Its utterance is not a condition that it must satisfy in order to be true. But this is precisely what is required if Davidson's account is correct. A sentence containing a demonstrative can only be evaluated relative to a context in which it is uttered and where the demonstrative expression is completed by an act of demonstration. Once again the problem is related to the fact that a demonstrative component is postulated in the sentence.

Even if the appropriate framework for the semantics of natural languages containing demonstratives were one in which some sentences need to be uttered in order to be true, it would not follow that only sentences that have been uttered could become true or that truth should be understood in general as a property of utterances. But even we were to make such a drastic move, our objection could be reformulated as saying that, in general, the utterance of a propositional attitude or an indirect discourse sentence (not containing a demonstrative in the subordinate clause) does not affect the truth value of the sentence, while Davidson's paratactic paraphrase can have a different truth value from one context of utterance to another.

(iv) It has often been claimed against the theory that the analysis of (1) "implies" the existence of an English utterance while (1) itself does not (Baldwin 1982, 273). Of course one could answer, along with Lepore and Loewer, that such an inference cannot be made if we rely solely on the logical form of the sentence itself, e.g., (2) (Lepore and Loewer 1989, 347). But this reply is clearly unsatisfactory. The problem is that the literal utterance of the analysandum does not "imply", in the sense of a conversational implicature, the existence of such an English utterance while its *purported correct analysis*, which is the result of combining a certain hypothesis concerning the logical form *with* a particular use of the demonstrative, clearly does have such an conversational implication.

Even the analysandum is not the sentence type (1) but rather an utterance of a sentence type and that, as such, it also "implies" the existence of an English utterance, there is still a discrepancy between (1) and (2). The existence of an English utterance is implied by the utterance of (1) only because (1) has been

uttered, while the same "implication" in the case of the analysans results from there being a demonstrative reference to an English utterance. Once again the problem stems from assuming the presence of a demonstrative in the sentence.

(v) There seems to be a problem in claiming that occurrences of "that" are to be understood as demonstratives in the context of iterated indirect discourse locutions (Brian Loar, as reported by Schiffer 1987, 131–132; see also Burge 1986, 193–197). As a demonstrative expression, "that" should behave as a purely referential term. If so it should be used only to refer to a particular individual. This should be the case for all its occurrences in the context of a sentence like

(3)   Laplace said that Galileo said that the earth moves

which, when properly paraphrased, amounts to

(4)   Laplace said that. Galileo said that. The earth moves.

Now if, as Davidson suggests, the utterance made by the reporter is only meant to samesay what has already been said, it follows that the demonstrative should refer to the same thing as what is referred to by Laplace. If the report is accurate, and if the demonstrative is purely referential, Laplace should have referred to the same thing. According to Davidson, the second occurrence of "that" refers to an English utterance. If it is purely referential, Laplace also should have referred to that English utterance. But this is clearly false.

There is indeed a way out of the difficulty (Burge 1986, 195–196). We could argue along with Burge that the demonstrative is not purely referential and goes hand in hand with a self-referential claim. Instead of (4), we would have

(5)   Laplace said that, taken in the context of this very utterance. Galileo said that, taken in the context of this very utterance. The earth moves.

The idea is that when we are ascribing a certain content, we are in a way achieving a translation of that content into our own dialect. The correctness of our indirect discourse ascriptions will then intimately be connected with our translation practices. Now there are clear cases where our translations practices require the preservation of self-reference instead of reference (Burge 1978). And cases like (5) are precisely of that sort.

This is surely a legitimate answer but one that also reveals the fact that the demonstrative is not purely referential. Burge's solution reveals that the expression is at best a demonstrative expression referring to an utterance under a certain description. It is interesting to notice that under such circumstances, the demonstrative would not be interchangeable with a purely referential demonstrative expression referring to the same utterance. In the case where, in (5), the demonstrative is used as a purely referential expression, our translation practices require that it refers to the thing referred to by Laplace. Since in the Davidsonian analysis, the demonstrative refers to an English utterance, the result of substitution would yield a false sentence since Laplace never referred to this English utterance. This reveals the failure of the substitution of identicals and, therefore, the intensionality of the context "Galileo said that . . . ".

(vi) According to Davidson, (1) and (2) are semantically equivalent under an interpretation where the demonstrative refers to an utterance of "the earth moves". Now there is nothing to prevent us from reporting, for instance, Galileo's utterance by saying: Galileo said that. La terre bouge. If the paratactic reading is equivalent to a "said that" locution, it follows that we should allow a sentence like "Galileo said that la terre bouge", but we don't (Baldwin 1982, 274). There is clearly a violation of grammatical rules here and the restriction cannot be explained on the basis of convenience alone, or other pragmatic considerations. But dismissing these mixed sentences by invoking pragmatic considerations seems to be the only available option left to the Davidsonian.

It is tempting to use once again Burge's solution in order to explain why the demonstratum has to be in the language to which the sentence containing the demonstrative belongs (Recall that the self-referential condition associated with the use of such a demonstrative requires that the utterance that follows be in the language of the very utterance containing the demonstrative). Instead of (2), we would have

(6)   Galileo said that, taken in the context of this very utterance. The earth moves.

Burge alludes to such a move, but he also correctly points out that this solution threatens the so called logical independence of the two component sentences in (2), which is at the heart of the paratactic theory (Burge 1986; footnote 4).

It cannot be replied that the self-referential condition is something involved only in the conceptual analysis of "said", and that it should not be spelled out explicitly in the logical form, because this only transfers the source of the intensionality and does not remove it. The self-referential condition is perhaps indeed imposed by the word "said" understood in its indirect sense and we can accept in general a distinction between a direct and an indirect sense of the word. But in the second reading, indirect discourse remains intensional because it does not allow for the substitution of identicals. For instance, it does not allow for the substitution of a demonstrative construction involving a self-referential condition by a purely referential demonstrative.

(vii) It has been claimed that there is a rigid reference to content in the subordinate clause of (1) while the reference to a particular content is at best contingent in (2) (See for instance Baldwin 1982, 275–277). The answer to this, as suggested by Peter Smith, is to treat the demonstrative as involving a reference to an utterance, taken as an utterance having the content that it has in the actual world. (Smith 1976) (2) would then be paraphrased as something like

(7)   Galileo said that, taken in the context of expressing the content that it
      actually expresses. The earth moves.

I shall take for granted, for the sake of argument, that contrary to what is argued by Baldwin (1982), the adverb "actually" rigidly refers to the world of utterance. Still, the remarks that were made concerning Burge's solution seem to apply once again. The demonstrative, used as involving a reference to an utterance under a certain description, could not be interchangeable with a purely referential

demonstrative referring to the same utterance, although such a substitution should be allowed if the context were extensional. Suppose for instance, that in the actual world but on Twin Earth, the sounds "the earth moves" do not mean anything. In that case (2), when interpreted as (7), is true on Twin Earth, since the sentence rigidly means there what it means for us in English, while it can be meaningless when the demonstrative is purely referential, since it can refer to the meaningless sounds of Twin Earth. This is at least the conclusion that we should draw when the word "said" is understood in its indirect sense. And so the substitution of a coreferential expression does not garantee the preservation of the truth value.

Of course one could want to stipulate that all demonstrative expressions referring to utterances refer to them as expressing the content that they actually express, but this seems to be an ad hoc stipulation. It is certainly possible to refer demonstratively to the inscription of a certain verbal form as such, without referring at the same time to the content that it actually expresses. Inscriptions are not individuated in terms of the content they actually express. This is, in essence, a variant of Ferdinand de Saussure's "arbitraire du signe".

(viii) The paratactic analysis is too weak. Certain valid inferences made on the basis of (1) are no longer valid when it is paraphrased as (2). This point has been made by numerous philosophers (See for instance Platts 1979; Burge 1986, 200–206; Schiffer 1987, 134–135; and even Lepore and Loewer 1989, 350, who defend the paratactic account but acknowledge this disparity between (1) and (2)). Some of the problematic inferences are:

(A) Galileo said that A and B are wrong.
     Therefore, Galileo said that B and A are wrong.
(B) Galileo said that the earth moves.
     Therefore, Galileo said that the earth moves.
(C) Galileo said that the earth moves.
     The earth moves.
     Therefore, Galileo said something true.
(D) Galileo said that the earth moves.
     Everything said by Galileo is true.
     Therefore, the earth moves.

The paratactic paraphrases of these sentences turn (A), (B), (C) and (D) into non-valid inferences, if validity is understood as formal validity, i.e., validity in virtue of logical form. It is not formally valid because formal validity is only a function from the context of interpretation in which the meanings of logical connectives are fixed and it is unsufficient to determine the validity of formulas containing demonstratives. These can only be valid relative to a context of application in which demonstrative expressions acquire their reference. (A) and (B) are not semantically valid either, where an inference from α to β is semantically valid only if, in all possible worlds in which α is true, β is also true. It is easy to stipulate a possible world in which the intended demonstrata in the first formulas of (A) and (B) exist, while the demonstrata in the second formulas do not.

An argument to the effect that (A), (B), (C) and (D) themselves are not either formally or semantically valid is not satisfactory (This is especially so in the case of (B). See Burge 1986 for a discussion). It is true that in logic we are very often misled by our intuitions. But our intuitions also serve as a parameter for the evaluation of a particular proposal in logical form. It is certainly not a "tribunal ultime" but it plays a role in the overall evaluation of a particular theory.

(ix) The extension of the theory to propositional attitude sentences is problematic. A first approximation is to interpret the paratactic theory as implying only the existence of a relation of samesaying between inscriptions in general and not necessarily between utterances (See for instance Lepore and Loewer 1989, 353). In the ascription of a particular belief, we would be committing ourselves only to the existence of belief states, inscriptions in the head, and not necessarily utterances, as in the case of indirect discourse (Davidson 1975, 167). But this has the unfortunate consequence that one cannot believe sentences that one has never heard or that we postulate the existence of tokens in the head that are isomorphic with sentences that were never heard. These would somehow already be registered in the brain although they have never been produced before.

Even if, instead, we only wanted to commit ourselves to the existence of a belief relation between the agent and a quoted sentence-type in a certain language that samesays a particular utterance, we would in any case be confronted with the same difficulty, given Davidson's paratactic theory of quotation according to which quotes implicitly involve a demonstrative reference to a token. But it seems that believers can believe sentences they never "parsed" before.

(x) The paratactic account cannot be right because, according to it, we could all at once be semantically competent in the use of (1) and know what Galileo said, but also fail to understand what was said. This is indeed a feature of Davidson's paratactic analysis. According to it, the logical form of (1) is given by (2). A semantically competent speaker that uses (2) in a semantically competent way could understand what the words "Galileo said that" means, utter "the earth moves", know that this utterance is the demonstratum of the demonstrative, although he did not understand what the words "the earth moves" mean. This is at least a consequence that one draws if the demonstrative is behaving as a purely referential expression. Its purpose is to refer to an utterance, a particular event, and not an event under a description, i.e., an utterance described as expressing a particular content (Schiffer 1987, 133–134; Lepore and Loewer 1989, 351).

Of course, the paratactic account also involves the claim that the speaker utters the sentence in order to express a certain content and therefore understands what is expressed by the demonstratum. But this is an additional (pragmatic) feature that could have disappeared without affecting the semantic competence of the speaker in his use of (2). The understanding of what was said depends upon there being, in addition to the semantic competence required for an understanding of the sentence, certain pragmatic features that accompany accidentally our utterance. It seems however obvious that if someone is semantically competent in his use of (1), he has access to the content of the subordinate clause and that his access to the content does not stem from pragmatic features that accidentally accompany his use of the sentence.

The criticism we are now making is not the trivial claim that one could fail to grasp the full content of the subordinate clause, as when we report in indirect speech someone as saying that he conducted three experiments with Bell inequalities, not knowing what Bell inequalities are (See Lepore and Loewer 1989, 352). It is rather that even if one has a complete understanding of the semantic content of the paratactic paraphrase, he can fail to grasp the content expressed by the demonstratum. If the demonstrative is purely referential, a competent user of (2) needs to be able only to utter the sounds "the earth moves" and refer to those sounds. The rest belongs to additional accidental features of his use, for instance being able to understand what those sounds mean. By contrast, a semantically competent speaker of (1) will have complete access to the semantic content of the subordinate clause. In short, where the demonstrative is understood as purely referential and refers to the utterance that follows it, a complete access to the semantic content literally expressed by (2) does not provide access to the content one would have access to if one were to have full access to the semantic content expressed in (1).

(xi) It is also a feature of the paratactic account that one can competently use (1) without referring at all to the subordinate clause contained in it (Lepore and Loewer 1989, 347). This is because the reference to an utterance of the subordinate clause is only an accidental feature of some uses made with the demonstrative "that" in (2). According to the paratactic account, it seems to be logically possible to utter (1) without referring to (the content of) the subordinate clause. Once again there seems to be good reasons for believing that a semantically competent speaker using (1) must be referring to (the content of) the subordinate clause.

(xii) The previous criticisms seem to indicate that the word "that" cannot be understood as a purely referential demonstrative expression. If it works as a purely referential term, then it only refers to a mere utterance, and not to an utterance described as expressing a certain content. There are ways out of the difficulty, but they immediately create other important problems that the theory sought to resolve.

We could be inclined for instance to treat the demonstrative as an abbreviation for a description (instead of a demonstrative construction such as "this so and so" similar to the ones that were introduced in formulating Burge's and Smith's solutions to criticisms (v) and (vii) respectively). This move is motivated by the requirement to incorporate first the self-referential condition, but also the condition according to which the demonstrative refers to an utterance as something that expresses what it *actually* expresses, and finally the condition of referring to *what* is expressed by the utterance.

But as soon as we do this, we create an intensional context within the scope of "Galileo said …". We seem also vulnerable to Church's translation argument and we lose the appeal that the paratactic theory initially seemed to have when it was suggested that, according to it, the two sentences in (2) are paratactically joined and are logically independent of one another.

Another option would be to treat these additional conditions as belonging to what is *shown* and not to what is *said* in our use of (2). It could be argued, for instance, that the use of the demonstrative "that" in (2) is completed by an

act of demonstration expressing a certain mode of presentation rendered by those conditions. But this move would not achieve much. The initial criticisms raised against the demonstrative use of "that" in indirect discourse sentences would still remain (Criticisms (i)-(iv)). In addition, since the self-referential condition, required in order to answer Criticism (v), now appears to be part of the non-literal content of the use of (2), the demonstrative would behave as a purely referential expression at the semantic level and we would be asserting something which is literally false. We are also forced to exclude sentences belonging to another language from occurring as subordinate clauses in English by relying solely on convenience or other pragmatic considerations (Criticism (vi)). We are in addition unable at the semantic level to account for the rigid reference to content involved in (1) (Criticism (vii)). On top of this, the paratactic paraphrase remains semantically too weak and fails to account for some intuitively valid inferences (Criticism (viii)). The extension of the analysis to propositional attitudes remains problematic (Criticism (ix)). And by failing to make explicit the different conditions associated with the use of the demonstrative, we are still vulnerable to the criticisms that were raised in (x) and (xi). A discrepancy would remain between the *semantic* contents of (1) and (2).

And yet, these additional conditions are not implicitly contained in the conceptual analysis of the verb "says". There is no concept of the saying relation requiring that we understand the sentence uttered as belonging to the language in which the report is made, or requiring that it expresses the content that it actually expresses, or even requiring that it be understood under a description of the content that it expresses. It would be an ad hoc move to stipulate a sense of "says" that had all of these features. Whether "says" is analysed or not as Davidson suggests, involving the existence of a samesaying relation, it always remains possible to ascribe a saying without imposing any such constraints on the content of what is said.

So the only remaining option seems to be to maintain the purely referential character of the demonstrative and explicitly add the missing conditions while trying to formulate them as extensional sentences. The result would yield an analysis of (1) as

(8) Galileo said that. That is in the context of this very utterance. That is with
     the content it actually expresses. (Ex) (x is a theory of truth for English
     meeting certain empirical constraints which stipulates this.) (That is true
     if and only if the earth moves.) The earth moves.

The analysis works only if "that" refers to the utterance of "The earth moves". Of course, there are many problems involved in choosing this paraphrase. One of them is the fact that another demonstrative has occurred (the term "this") which reintroduces all the previous difficulties. The other problem is the one raised by Schiffer (Schiffer 1987, 137). According to the new proposal, an explicit reference is made to a truth theory for English. This creates a tension with the Davidsonian hypothesis according to which a knowledge of a theory of truth is only a sufficient condition for semantic competence and not a necessary condition (Davidson 1976). The truth theory is interpretative in the sense of Foster and it is not claimed that the competent speaker has a propositional knowledge of the truth theory. But how could

it be so if, in the appropriate paraphrase of indirect discourse sentences, there was a need for an *explicit* reference to such a theory ?

It is hard to see how Davidson could answer all of these criticisms. Perhaps the solution lies in questioning an assumption that was presupposed all along concerning the delimitation between semantics and pragmatics. Maybe all the missing conditions I alluded to do belong to what is shown and not to what is explicitly said, but that they nevertheless must be understood as part of the literal meaning of what is said, since literal meaning is determined by speakers' intentions. Davidson has expressed his sympathies for Grice and this may indicate the line of answer he would favour (Davidson 1990). According to this view, the literal meaning of (1) would depend not only upon the speaker's intention to use the word "that" as a demonstrative and his intention to refer with it to the subordinate clause, but also upon his intentions to refer to it in the context of the language of his utterance, with the meaning that it actually expresses, and with a particular intended meaning. I guess the idea would be that when speakers use indirect locutions, they all implicitly have these meaning intentions.

Apart from the intrinsic implausibility of the proposal, this solution seems to me to go against Davidson's idea that there is a fundamental interdependence between beliefs and meaning (Davidson 1975). Choosing the Gricean approach suggests that meaning has to be ultimately explained in terms of speakers' beliefs and intentions and we would lose sight of Davidson's suggestion according to which we could not have beliefs unless we were not able to interpret others. In any case, all of this fails to evacuate intensionality. It is perhaps now located into what is shown and not into what is made explicit, but it is still there.

2   A Davidsonian Quotational Theory

The criticisms that have been raised suggest that it is problematic to treat "that" as a demonstrative in "Galileo said that . . . ". It might then be useful to consider once again sentential theories which avoid this consequence. But before doing so, I shall consider a quotational theory in which quotation is accounted for paratactically. As Davidson suggests, a sentence like

"Alice swooned" is a sentence

should be understood as

Alice swooned. The expression of which this is a token is a sentence.

Davidson's paratactic theory of quotation meets three important criteria that any good theory of quotation should be able to meet. First it enables us to account for quotation marks in the context of a general theory of truth for the sentences of the language. This will be true as long as we are able to accommodate demonstratives within the language and provide an extensional theory for them. The expressions that are mentioned by quotes do not have to be interpreted in a way that differs from

the way in which they behave in ordinary extensional context. We shall therefore be able to account for cases in which what is quoted is used and not only mentioned. Second, it is also a theory that treats quotations as semantically structured linguistic devices. Quotation marks are linguistic devices capable of endless applications and learning to use them involves a mastery of a general rule. It is only in this way that we will be in a position to account for quotations within the general framework of a finitely axiomatized theory. And third, quotations are descriptive devices, picturing what is being referred to and enabling one, for instance, to introduce novel pieces of notation and new alphabets (Davidson 1979, 89–90).

As noted by Baldwin, the paratactic theory of indirect speech is a notational variant of a quotational theory incorporating a paratactic account of quotation (Baldwin 1982, 273). The difficulties mentioned against the paratactic theory in the previous section should reoccur. And as expected they do.

An application of Davidson's theory of quotation to indirect speech would yield an analysis of (1) as

(9)   Said (Galileo, "The earth moves").

Applying the paratactic theory of quotation, we get

(10)   The earth moves. Galileo said a sentence of which this is a token.

which clearly seems to be false, since Galileo never said anything in English. Perhaps a more appropriate rendition would be

(10*)   The earth moves. Galileo uttered something which samesays a sentence of which that is a token.

But since Davidson precisely understands "said" as "uttered something which samesays" (10), would seem to be right after all.

In any case, the same sort of difficulties can be raised against this new account:

(i)   It still goes against our intuition concerning the number of sentential components involved in an indirect discourse sentence.
(ii)   Even if "that" now seems to be analysed in terms of quotation marks, they, in turn, are ultimately analysed in terms of a demonstrative expression and our intuition suggests that an expression like "que" which translates "that" does not involve any demonstrative component.
(iii)   (10) could not have been true without being uttered. But (1) could have.
(iv)   As a new analysis of (1), (10) still "implies", in the sense of conversational implicature and relative to a context in which an appropriate demonstrative reference is made, the existence of an English utterance. But the utterance of (1) does not.
(v)   Since the referent, under such an account, still is an utterance, the demonstrative expression implicitly involved cannot be purely referential. For if it were in the context of iterated indirect discourse constructions such as (3), it would falsely imply that Laplace referred to an English utterance.

(vi) We are still forced to allow constructions like "Galileo said that la terre bouge" since, according to the Davidsonian quotational theory, it is equivalent with the following grammatically correct formula:

 La terre bouge. Galileo uttered something which samesays a sentence of which this is a token.

(vii) We still find ourselves with a disparity between a rigid reference to the content of the attitude in (1), since the subordinate clause comes fully equipped with the semantical rules that are generally associated to it, and an accidental reference to them in (10).

(viii) (10) is weaker than (1) for essentially the same reasons. The new paraphrases of the valid inferences (A), (B), (C), and (D) are still formally non-valid (in virtue of logical form) because the demonstrative refers only relatively to a context of application. And (A) and (B) are not semantically valid (in all possible worlds) essentially for the same reasons we alluded to.

(ix) The account is problematic in its application to propositional attitudes. If belief, for example, is understood as a relation between an agent and a quoted sentence type, it implies the existence of a sentence-token of which it is a type, and therefore implies either that one cannot believe sentences that she has never heard (read), or that there are somehow already in her brains tokens that are isomorphic with sentences that she has never heard.

(x) In the subordinate clause of (1), the expressions are used and not only mentioned. This is a semantic feature of the sentence. But in the purported correct analysis, a speaker that competently uses (10) needs not do anything but utter the demonstratum. If she expresses a certain content while uttering the sentence "the earth moves" (as is required in the correct analysis of (1)), it is because of a feature that accidentally accompanies her utterance and it is not in virtue of a semantic feature of the sentence uttered.

(xi) It is also in virtue of a semantic feature of (1) that a reference is made to (the content of) the subordinate clause. This contrasts with (10), where we could have failed to refer to the demonstratum. It is always because of referring intentions that accidentally accompany our utterance of (10) that a reference is made to an utterance of "the earth moves".

(xii) Schiffer's criticism will also apply if we choose to render the missing informations explicit in order to make them part of the semantic information contained in the sentence.

However, the source of the problem is not the quotational theory of indirect discourse, but rather the paratactic account of quotation. Let me just mention a few of the problems associated with such a theory:

(i) We are willing to admit that many sentences have never been uttered. For any such true sentence "p", it is also obvious that a meta-linguistic sentence of the form ""p" is true" has also never been uttered. But it follows from the paratactic theory of quotation that quoted sentences cannot be true unless they have been uttered.

(ii) A related problem is that, according to the paratactic account, an utterance of a sentence like ""The earth moves" is true" seems to imply pragmatically the existence of an English utterance of the sentence "The earth moves" because of a pragmatic reference made to it. As a matter of fact, any statement containing an English quotation pragmatically implies the existence of an English utterance.

(iii) One of the "raison d'être" of the paratactic theory of quotation is to allow for the possibility of quotations that involve simultaneously a use and mention of the sentence quoted. This is certainly one of the highlights of Davidson's theory. However, when we look closely, it appears that an occurrence of a sentence within quotation marks can be used and not only mentioned only if appropriate intentions accidentally accompany the utterance made by the speaker. At the semantic level the speaker only needs to utter the sounds of the sentence quoted in order to be speaking literally. It is only if, in addition to this, he intends to utter those sounds with the appropriate intention to express a certain meaning that the quoted sentence appears to be used and not only mentioned. According to the paratactic account of quotation, a quoted sentence *can* be used in perfect accordance with the literal meaning of the whole sentence. But the fact that it is used and not only mentioned is not something that can be explained at the semantic level. It is rather something that is explained by appealing to certain pragmatic factors accompanying the utterance.

(iv) Another problem concerns the fact that the paratactic theory treats references to sentence types as a function of the references to their sentence tokens. As a justification, it could be argued that types are nothing but sets of tokens. Now of course many sentences have never been uttered, but this is not a problem since we can analyse sentences (or perhaps only those that have never been uttered) as sequences of classes each containing tokens of the constituent expressions. But if we proceed in such a fashion, quoting a sentence will be nothing but an act of describing such a sequence of classes of tokens. This account does not seem to be compatible with the view that quoted expressions are, in certain sentential contexts, literally being used and not only mentioned.

(v) Finally, if we grant that at least some of our beliefs and other propositional attitudes take sentences as objects and so are represented as relations between an agent and a quoted sentence, then all the problems that were raised in relation with a Davidsonian quotational theory of indirect discourse and propositional attitudes can also count against the paratactic view of quotation itself.

3   A Substitutional Theory of Indirect Speech

It seems therefore appropriate to look for an alternative account of quotation and indirect speech. I submit that the appropriate account is one in which quotation marks are understood as functional devices belonging to a substitutional language. The interest of adopting a substitutional language in general is that substitutional

formulas very often presuppose as a precondition for their meaningfulness the existence of expressions belonging to particular languages. This is particularly evident in the case of a substitutional formula like

(11)   (Σp) (Snow is white & p)

where the particular quantifier is substitutional and the substitutional variable is propositional, i.e., replaceable in particular substitutional instances only by closed formulas. It is clear that (11) can only be meaningful if all its substitutional instances are meaningful and that the substitutional instances can only be meaningful if the substitutes themselves are meaningful. It is also clear that in the substitutional instances of a formula like (11), the substitutes occur in use, i.e., they bring with them their associated semantical rules.

Even if belonging to a system of semantical rules is not always a necessary condition for becoming a member of a substitutional class, it is true that the elements belonging to a substitutional class against which a formula like (11) is evaluated must themselves be meaningful if (11) is to count as meaningful for the reason that I just gave.

Now the same kind of remarks apply in the case of a substitutional formula like

(12)   (Σ p) (Galileo said "p")

where the substitutional variable occurs within quotation marks and is being quantified from the outside. The expressions occurring inside quotes are very often not occurring *qua* expressions (either as concrete marks or sounds or as abstract verbal forms) but rather as expressions in "use", i.e., presupposing their semantical rules. This is at least what would happen if the word "said" in (12) were understood in its indirect sense.

The substitutional variable occurs in a quotational context, but it is natural to allow substitutional quantification in these contexts. The result of putting a substitutional variable into quotes does not yield a name for the variable. It is rather more like a quotation function occurring all by itself. Quantifying substitutionally into a quotation context is simply binding the variable of the quotation function. Quotes are like descriptive functions that take linguistic objects as arguments and have also linguistic objects for values, unlike propositional functions whose values are truth values. One last feature is that the quotation function does not have an independent interpretation and it behaves like the functors and predicates of a substitutional language. It will indeed be remembered that, in a substitutional language, propositional functions containing a free substitutional variable do not denote a function that, when applied to the value of its arguments, yields a certain truth value, therefore denoting a certain intensional entity which is a function of denotation into truth value. Nor are they satisfied by sequences. As Kripke puts it, they have no satisfaction only truth (Kripke 1976, 330). Now quotation marks similarly, as substitutional functors or "descriptive functions", have no semantic values independently of an application to particular bits of language, when the substitutional variable implicitly contained in them is replaced by a particular substitute.

The constraints of meaningfulness must very often be satisfied by the substitutes even when they occur within the context of quotation marks as in (12). This peculiar feature is present not only when a substitutional variable occurs within quotes, but also whenever a particular lexical item does. Reports like "Galileo said "the earth moves"" must be seen in a substitutional language as substitutional instances of the formula "(Σp) (said (Galileo, "p"))" and so whatever I have to say about the behavior of quotes in a general formula also applies to quotes in particular substitutional instances. A particular quotation is to the quotational function what 2^2 is to x^2.

Now whenever a sentence occurs within quotes in a substitutional instance, it is very often as though it were simultaneously used and mentioned. We have already seen that the substituenda very often enter the substitutional instances while presupposing their semantical rules. We must now see that they behave a bit like "values" of the quotation function. When a quotation occurs in a substitutional formula, the only way to decode it is very often first to understand the quoted expression as used, and then take it as a "value" of the quotation function.

I submit that, when the verb "said" is used in its indirect sense in (1), the appropriate logical form for (1) is either

(13)   Saidind (Galileo, "the earth moves")

in which the word "that" behaves as a quotation function and the verb "said" is used in its indirect sense, or

(14)   ($\sum$p) [(saiddir (Galileo, "p")) $\wedge$ ("p" is translated by "the earth moves")]

in which the expression "that the earth moves" behaves as a pseudo proper name and is contextually eliminated in terms of a quantified formula. The verb "said" occurs here in its direct sense. We would choose (13) or (14) as a correct paraphrase of (1) depending on whether the reporter chooses to represent the saying in the subjective perspective of the agent or from his own objective perspective (Seymour 1992). In (13), the reporter describes an act of saying in the indirect sense while, in (14), she describes an act of saying in the direct sense, but translates it according to the conceptual scheme in her own translation manual. I will shortly return below to the distinction between subjective and objective reports.

The account differs from Carnap's own analysis in many different ways. The "existential" quantifier is substitutional and not objectual. I do not quantify over linguistic expressions *qua* expressions and, for this reason, do not need to make an explicit reference to languages. In this new approach, expressions presuppose their associated semantic rules and presuppose the existence of a language (a system of syntactic rules) to which they belong. Moreover, contrary to Carnap, I need not construe the belief predicate univocally in terms of a disposition to assent. Finally, I do not appeal to a relation of intensional isomorphism but rather to a weaker relation of translation.

The formulas are substitutional and I have chosen to introduce a new notation (Kripke's) to represent this kind of quantifier. The informal reading of (14) is that the result of replacing "p" is true for at least one substitutional instance. It is equivalent

to the disjunction of formulas that result from replacing the variable by a sentence in the substitutional class (A universal substitutional formula is equivalent to the conjunction of the same atomic formulas).

This account of indirect discourse is not confronted with the difficulties that plagued the paratactic account:

(i) It is not committed to break a sentence like (1) into two logically independent sentential components.

(ii) The expression "that" does not behave as a demonstrative but rather as a primitive quotational function and we are in this way able to capture the information conveyed literally by "that" and "que".

(iii) We are also in a position to explain why (1) could be true without being uttered. It is clear that (13) or (14) could be true without being uttered.

(iv) We are no longer committed to the existence of an English utterance. But are we committed to the existence of an English sentence type ? Perhaps we are, but the reference to the sentence "the earth moves" takes place in the context of a self-referential function performed by quotation marks. If we understand Galileo's own saying as a relation between him and a quoted sentence type self-referentially implying the existence of an Italian sentence, the disparity between Galileo's utterance and our report of his utterance is explained by what is going on in any translation of self-referential sentences.

(v) The quotation function is, in a substitutional language, a "self- referential" device since the value of the function applied to a certain sentence in use is that very sentence itself with the semantical rules that are attached to it. This explains why, in certain cases, a good translation need not preserve reference but rather self-reference, and why more specifically, in the context of iterated indirect discourse like (5), we are not committed to the view that Laplace uttered an English sentence.

(vi) We are also in a position to explain why 'saying that' locutions do not allow subordinate clauses in a foreign language. Since the subordinate clauses are substitutes already belonging to languages and the grammatical constraints applying to those languages prevent the formation of expressions belonging to different languages, the same constraints should apply to sentences containing expressions occurring in the context of quotation marks, if the broader sentential context requires that they be used and not only mentioned. In a substitutional language, quoted expressions are in certain sentential contexts not only mentioned but also used and have in these contexts an occurrence similar to the one that they have in other contexts. If these expressions are used, then they are part of the whole sentence in which the quotation occurs and the grammatical constraints that apply to the language as a whole will also apply to these particular instances.

Therefore, we cannot allow foreign expressions to be used and mentioned in quotations occurring in our own language if they are not at the same time expressions of our language. When an expression is being used and mentioned in our language, it cannot belong only to a foreign language because it would then violate the grammatical constraints of our language. Now since, in the case of an indirect discourse sentence such as (1), the subordinate clause is used, the appropriate analysis is one in which the quoted expression must be used and mentioned. This is

what happens in sentential contexts like (13) and (14) and this is the reason why the quoted expression must be in the language in which it occurs.

We must not, from the preceding remarks, conclude that the only possible quotations in a substitutional language are those of expressions belonging to the language in which the quotation occurs. Quotations can serve lots of different purposes, among which the introduction of a new notation or the presentation of a foreign alphabet. It shows only that the sentential context is very often what determines the grammaticality of an expression. If the sentential context requires that the quoted expression be used and not only mentioned, then the quoted expression must be in the language in which the quotation occurs. But there are cases where the quotation function can take foreign expressions as arguments. The most important case, if we leave aside the cases that were just invoked, are those in which an explicit reference is made to a translation. If the result of the translation, since it is used and mentioned, must be in the language in which the translation is taking place, the expression translated, by contrast, since it is only mentioned, can be in a foreign language even if it is the argument of a quotation function.

Nothing prevents us from allowing sentences of a translation manual within a single language even if they involve the quotation of expressions belonging to different languages. The foreign expressions need not be treated as expressions belonging to our own language and the reason is that they are not being used. A necessary condition for belonging to a language is to be used and not only mentioned and quotation marks, understood as a quotation function, do not automatically require that the quoted expression be used and mentioned. It all depends upon the general sentential context in which the quotation occurs. It is true that they very often help to explain why an expression can in a certain sentential context be used as well as mentioned. But there are contexts in which this constraint does not hold.

The preceding remarks enable us to explain why, in a substitutional language, the quotation function, applied to a foreign expression, does not force us to treat it as an expression belonging to our own language. If an expression is to belong to our language, there must be at least one instance in which it is used. In (13), the quoted expression is in a sentential context in which it is used, since the verb "said" occurs in its indirect sense. It is also the case in (14) since the quoted expression plays the role of a translation. But it is not the case for the expressions that are the object of the translation and this is the reason why we can, without violating the grammatical constraints of the language, allow that the substitutional variable be associated with a substitutional class containing expressions that belong to different languages. These foreign expressions do not run the risk of becoming expressions of our language since they occur in a sentential context in which they are the objects of translation. The same remarks apply to a the quoted sentence in "Galileo said "Eppur si muovo"" when the verb "said" is understood in its direct sense, in which case it serves to report a truth concerning the exact phonemes that were uttered by Galileo.

(vii) Since in the context of quotation marks, substitutes can occur as they ordinarily do in other contexts, we can claim that a rigid reference to content takes place in (13) or (14) as in the case of (1). The reference to the content of the sentence

is not mediated by a reference to the verbal form of a sentence-type, as it was the case in traditional theories similar to the one held by Carnap, nor is it mediated by a reference to an inscription, as it is the case for Davidson. Semantic properties are accidentally attached to abstract verbal forms or concrete inscriptions. Our solution is to exploit the fact that, in a substitutional language, the quoted expression may behave as it ordinarily behaves in other contexts.

(viii) We can now explain the validities in the inferences (A), (B), (C) and (D). We no longer are dealing with sentences containing demonstrative expressions. The inferences can now be evaluated relatively to the context of interpretation only. If we represent them according to a logical form such as (14), we get the following result:

(A*) $\underline{(\Sigma\ p)\ ((Said\ (Galileo,\ ``p''))\wedge(``p''\ is\ translated\ by\ ``A\ and\ B\ are\ wrong''))}$
       $(\Sigma\ p)\ ((Said\ (Galileo,\ ``p''))\wedge(``p''\ is\ translated\ by\ ``B\ and\ A\ are\ wrong''))$

(B*) $\underline{(\Sigma\ p)\ ((Said\ (Galileo,\ ``p''))\wedge(``p''\ is\ translated\ by\ ``The\ earth\ moves''))}$
       $(\Sigma\ p)\ ((Said\ (Galileo,\ ``p''))\wedge(``p''\ is\ translated\ by\ ``The\ earth\ moves''))$

(C*) $(\Sigma\ p)\ ((Said\ (Galileo,\ ``p''))\wedge(``p''\ is\ translated\ by\ ``The\ earth\ moves''))$
       $\underline{The\ earth\ moves}$
       $(\exists x)\ ((Said(Galileo,x))\wedge(x\ is\ true))$

(D*) $(\Sigma\ p)\ ((Said\ (Galileo,\ ``p''))\wedge(``p''\ is\ translated\ by\ ``The\ earth\ moves''))$
       $\underline{(\forall\ x)\ ((Said\ (Galileo,\ x))\supset(x\ is\ true))}$
       $The\ earth\ moves$

If we exploit a reading in which the verb "said" is partially transparent, the four inferences become valid (Seymour 1992) According to such a reading, the report purports to capture what was in fact said by Galileo. It establishes a relationship between Galileo and the content (i.e., the truth conditions) of the quoted sentence. (A*) is valid because the two subordinate clauses express the same truth conditions. (B*) is obviously a similar case. (C*) is valid by a successive application of existential generalization, Tarski's Convention-T and the principle according to which, in general, truth is preserved under translation. Finally, (D*) is valid by universal instantiation, Tarski's Convention-T and the principle according to which truth is preserved under translation.

(ix) We are no longer committed to the view that belief contents must involve tokens of sentences instead of sentence types and we are therefore able to explain why speakers can believe sentences that were never uttered.

(x) Since in (13) and (14), the quoted sentence is a sentence in use that also behaves as an argument for the quotation function, and therefore enters the quotation function with its semantic rules, these are part of the semantic content of the sentence. It follows that a perfectly competent speaker who utters (13) or (14) has access to the content expressed by the quoted sentence.

(xi) The reference to the content of the quoted sentence in (13) or (14) is not accidental. The word "that", as a quotation function, has no meaning in isolation and must therefore be understood as quoting the subordinate clause if the sentence as a whole is to be treated as meaningful.

(xii) It is not necessary to state explicitly the self-referential character involved in (1), nor is it required to state explicitly the rigidity of the reference to the content, or even less to refer explicitly to the content itself. The reasons for this are threefold: self-reference is already explicitly made by putting the sentence in quotation marks; second, the quotation refers to a sentence in use and not to something (a pure verbal form or an inscription) that contingently has the semantic properties that it has; third, as a sentence in use, the quoted sentence already expresses a certain content.

4   Indirect Discourse, Quotation and Truth

I will end this paper by showing very briefly how the approach that I favour for the semantics of indirect discourse sentences can satisfy the constraints of a finitely axiomatized theory of truth. As it was suggested above, there are at least two ways of representing the logical form of (1) and therefore two different ways of characterizing its truth conditions (vz. (13) and (14)). In order to have full access to the truth conditions of (1), we have to know in addition what the truth conditions are for the subordinate clause, i.e., know that

(15)   «the earth moves» is true if and only if the earth moves,

as a theorem entailed by a theory of truth for English (I use a new style of quotation marks in order to represent a structural description of the sentence).

It is possible to determine the truth conditions of (1), granted that we know, along the lines of (13), in addition to (15), that (1) is true if and only if Galileo said in the indirect sense "the earth moves", where quotation marks are understood as the quotation function in a substitutional language and the quoted sentence behaves as a substitute. This reading involves the idea that the speaker shares the same minimal vocabulary with Galileo, or at least that Galileo's belief can be expressed by making use of a minimal vocabulary. It is one in which the speaker applies an acceptance principle according to which the speaker "surrenders", as it were, to what is said by the agent. The truth conditions of (1) along the lines of (14), together with (15), enables one to determine that (1) is true if and only if there is a substitute such that Galileo said "p" in the direct sense and "p" is translated as "the earth moves". This reading is one in which the speaker is trying to maximize agreement with the agent.

The two sets of truth conditions are partly determined by different analyses of the word "that" in "Galileo said that the earth moves". In the first case, it behaves as quotation marks surrounding the subordinate clause. In the second case, the expression "That the earth moves" is understood as a pseudo proper name and is eliminated *à la Russell* in terms of a quantified substitutional formula.

These two sets of truth conditions are adequate as long as the verb "said" is used in the material sense or, if one prefers, in a quasi transparent sense. There is a material as well as an intentional use of the verbs in indirect discourse (Seymour 1992). The material use serves to report functional states of the agents, whether

or not she is ready to acknowledge the truth of those reports. This is a perfectly legitimate use since it serves to report what she *in fact* said. When an act of saying is given a functional characterization, the only thing that matters are the truth conditions of the sentence she uttered and the content of what was said may be appropriately characterized by any sentence expressing the same truth conditions. The intentional use, by contrast, serves to report the intentional states of the agent and these entail that she would have a disposition to assent to the subordinate clause if she knew the language in which the report is being made.

The distinction between the intentional and material uses of the verb "said" is made possible by the fact the object of the saying relation are sentences and because they ramify their sense into linguistic meaning (dictionary senses) and content (e.g., truth conditions). An indirect discourse report can serve to describe a relation between an agent and a linguistic meaning or between an agent and a content.

When the verb "said" is used in a quasi transparent sense, it is possible to show that the truth conditions of the subordinate clause play a role in the determination of the truth conditions of the sentence as a whole, in accordance with the requirements of a Tarskian truth theory. This is made possible because quotation marks are represented as a quotation function and because the language involves substitutional quantification. This is what partly explains why, under a particular use of the verb "said", quoted expressions may behave as they ordinarily do in an extensional context. Those who wish to argue that the meaning of sentences is nothing over and above truth conditions should therefore be satisfied with the solution that is now being offered.

The difference between the two sets of truth conditions represented by (13) and (14) lies in the fact that, in the first case, the report tries to capture Galileo's subjective perspective while, in the second case, the report is an attempt to maximize agreement with Galileo. (13) is an application of a general acceptance principle concerning what was said by the agent, while (14) is an application of a general principle of charity. In a subjective report, the speaker imposes only a minimal vocabulary (expressions with a primitive linguistic meaning) on his characterization of what was said by the agent. She is in a position to give room to the subjective perspective of the agent and ascribe a belief while conforming to the conceptual scheme of the agent. By "conceptual scheme", I mean a complete dictionary, a theory of truth and a theory of rationality. In the case of an objective report, the speaker now tries to maximize agreement and therefore tries to impose her own dictionary, truth theory, or rationality principles.

These two kinds of report are possible whether or not the agent shares the same language. Even if Galileo, for instance, expressed himself in Italian, it does not follow that the only adequate representation of (1) is (14). I just pointed out that the main difference between (13) and (14) is that, in (13), the reporter puts her own conceptual scheme into brackets, while she imposes it when she uses (1) to express (14). An English speaker could use (1) as (14) in order to report an assertion made in English, because two English speakers may have two quite distinct conceptual schemes. Conversely, one could use (1) as (13) in order to report what was asserted

in a different language, using a sentence in her own language. This is because the reporter is bracketing her own conceptual scheme and is assuming only the possibility of making use of her own minimal vocabulary. Of course, one could not make sense of an assertion made by someone else if it were not possible to express it with the aid of a certain minimal vocabulary. In such a report, one is assuming either that the agent shares that minimal vocabulary or that she would if she had known the language in which the report is being made.

Whether the report is interpreted as an attempt to capture the subjective perspective of the agent as in (13), or as an attempt to describe the assertion "objectively" as in (14), we will be in a position to provide truth conditions for (1) as long as the verb "said" is given a quasi transparent reading. The only problematic cases are those in which the verb receives an intentional reading instead. If, for instance, we tried to capture Galileo's own subjective perspective in our use of (1) with an intentional sense attached to the verb "said" and that we did not even take it for granted that Galileo has a complete understanding of the words he used, then the only way to report correctly what was said would be to use an Italian sentence. For as we all know, what Galileo really said is : Eppur si muovo.

It is true that by distinguishing as I do two different kinds of reports for (1), (viz. (13) and (14)), I am significantly departing from Davidson's program. For Davidson, the principle of charity is an a priori condition on radical interpretation. It occurs as a presupposition in the practice of ascribing propositional attitudes or indirect discourse to others and it would not occur explicitly in our reports. In that sense, Davidson would not want to represent (1) as (14). On the other hand, since the principle of charity is behind all of these kinds of reports, he would not want to distinguish between subjective and objective reports. For him, it is as though all indirect discourse reports are objective. In that sense, he would reject the interpretation of (1) as (13), or at least an interpretation of (13) as "subjective".

Distinguishing those two different sets of truth conditions for (1) rests on an assumption concerning the translatability into one's own language and within the confinement of one's own conceptual scheme. The principle of charity is not, according to me, an a priori condition that constrains the meaningfulness of indirect discourse. There are certainly cases where it is an explicit assumption involved in the very content of 'saying that' locutions. But it is only in circumstances such as (14) that we make a claim to the effect that Galileo's assertion can be translated into our own conceptual scheme. We allow for a distinction between two readings only because we allow for the logical possibility of a language that cannot be translated into our own conceptual scheme. I agree with Baldwin that even if the limits of my language are the limits of my world, there is no reason why the limits of my language should fix the limits of the worlds of others (Baldwin 1982, 279).

In any case, Davidson does not invoke the principle of charity in order to justify his own analysis of (1). His own analysis is meant to show how a statement like (1) can be incorporated into a recursive, compositional, finitely axiomatized theory of truth for the language. Now this is precisely what is made possible if we represent (1) into a substitutional language, use a quotation function and allow for a quasi transparent sense of the verb "said". And in the particular case where the statement

as a whole is used to report objectively what was said by making use of a principle of charity (viz. (14)), we arrive at a stance which is similar to the one reached by the Davidsonian radical interpreter.

In order to complete our account of the truth conditions for (1) when it is understood as (14), we only need to determine the circumstances under which "p" can be translated as "the earth moves" and these are given by the translation manual of the speaker. As far as the first half of (14) is concerned, it will be true iff

(16)   «Galileo said "La terra trema" or Galileo said "Eppur si muovo" or . . . » is true

And (16) will be true if and only if

(17)   «Galileo said "La terra trema"» is true or «Galileo said "Eppur si muovo"» is true or....

which, in turn will be true if and only if

(18)   Galileo said "La terra trema" or Galileo said "Eppur si muovo" . . .

And finally (18) will be true if and only if

(19)   (Σp) (Galileo said "p")

which is our desired homophonic truth conditions for the first part of (14). It will be noted that (19), as a substitutional formula, is equivalent with the (possibly) infinite disjunction of substitutional instances. It will be observed also that the substitutes need not belong to a single language since the substitutional formula is an existential generalization from substitutional instances occurring in a context where an explicit claim is made concerning the translation of a sentence as "the earth moves". As it was mentioned above, substitutional classes need not be restricted to classes of expressions belonging to a single language when they are used to evaluate formulas that belong to a manual of translation.

I conclude that our account of quotation and indirect discourse can be incorporated within the larger framework of an axiomatized truth theory for the language. The application of the theory was made possible by a partially transparent reading of the verb "said". I am however also committed to the view that the verb has an intentional, and therefore intensional or opaque reading as well. Our approach does not involve, like Davidson, an attempt to make use only of extensional resources in the analysis of indirect discourse. We did not try to replace intensional locutions by extensional ones. Quite the contrary, indirect discourse statements are intensional when the verb "said" receives an intentional reading. Moreover their intensionality seems to be irreducible. The intentional sense of indirect discourse or attitudinal verbs is what explains the failure of extensionality principles. Intensionality is a property of sentential contexts governed by verbs used in an intentional sense.

As in Davidson's theory, the solution here offered is one in which intensionality is not explained by the loss of semantic innocence of the expressions occurring in the intensional context. We do not appeal to intensional entities and do not

adopt a Quinean view of quotation according to which it is the opaque context *par excellence.* Intensionality is explained by the presence of a psychological verb understood in the intentional sense. Where a material or quasi transparent reading is made of the psychological verb, some of the inferences that were not permitted are now available to us. Among other things, we can then apply under certain restrictions the different extensionality principles. Once a material reading is made of the verb "said", we can then show how the truth conditions of the whole sentence are a function of the truth conditions of the sentential components. A semantically competent speaker who makes a material use of the verb "said", who understands the truth conditions of the subordinate clause and understands the truth conditions of (13) or (14) will have access to the truth conditions of (1). The only major difference with Davidson is that it no longer involves an attempt to remove intensionality from the language.

It is true that there are inevitable complications in trying to account for the truth conditions of indirect discourse formulas in the intentional sense. Those truth conditions will vary depending on whether we presuppose that the agent has full access to the linguistic meanings of the sentence asserted, and whether we presuppose that there is a one to one mapping between our vocabularies. These truth conditions will also depend on whether we presuppose that the agent has a minimal rationality, and finally whether this rationality is subjective or objective (Seymour 1992). Moreover, there are cases where the truth conditions of the indirect discourse sentence can only be represented by making use of the actual statement made by the agent and where it does not seem that the truth conditions of the whole indirect report is a function from the truth functional contributions of the sentential components. For a Davidsonian, the failure to account for the truth conditions of a particular statement is certainly a failure to make sense of it, since the meaning of a sentence is according to him given by its truth conditions. And if we take for granted that the only appropriate semantical framework is the one provided by truth conditional semantics, then chances are intensional sentences will turn out to be meaningless. But the general framework that I would favour is rather the one provided by a semantics of assertability conditions. A statement which is deprived of determinate truth conditions can still be meaningful if it is associated with appropriate assertability conditions.

This is certainly a major difference with Davidson, but the answer given above remains appropriate. To the question concerning the possibility of formulating a semantic account within the framework a finitely axiomatized truth theory, we can still provide an affirmative answer. It is just that we also recognize that indirect discourse is meaningful independently of that fact. Indirect discourse reports have different assertability conditions and their expressing determinate truth conditions is only one among a wide variety of available uses. In order to account for all of those uses, we need a more flexible framework like the semantics of assertability conditions and allow both for cases in which they are irreducibly intensional as well as those in which they are available for a Tarskian truth theory.

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The Syntax-Pragmatics Merger: Belief Reports in the Theory of Default Semantics

Kasia M. Jaszczolt

1 Truth-Conditional Pragmatics and Pragmatics-Rich Semantics

This paper is a voice in the ongoing discussion on the source and properties of pragmatic inference that contributes to the representation of discourse meaning. One of the most promising orientations in this debate is *truth-conditional pragmatics* (TCP, Recanati 2002, 2003, 2004). TCP recognizes so-called 'top-down' pragmatic processes that contribute to the truth-conditionally evaluable representation of meaning while not being grammatically controlled. It subscribes to contextualism, a standpoint according to which this pragmatic contribution is always present. In other words, utterances are always processed in context and this context affects their interpretation (see Recanati 1994, 2004). In contextualism, 'there is no level of meaning which is both (i) propositional (truth-evaluable) and (ii) minimalist, that is, unaffected by top-down factors' (Recanati 2004: 90). In this paper, I start off from the contextualist standpoint and develop a proposal of representations of utterance meaning, the so-called merger representations, that incorporate the output of such pragmatic inference. The move from TCP to pragmatics-rich *semantics of acts of communication* is facilitated by rethinking the compositionality of meaning

K.M. Jaszczolt (✉)
Department of Theoretical and Applied Linguistics, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, England, UK
e-mail: kmj21@cam.ac.uk

and predicating compositionality of such pragmatics-rich structures. I argue that the advantage of 'semanticizing' the output of pragmatic sources of meaning is that we can relax the view on compositionality of meaning and offer an algorithm of the interaction of such sources where the requirement of compositionality is imposed on the output of the interaction rather than on the output of the syntactic processing of the sentence. This proposal is applied to belief reports for which it offers representations of their various readings.

2 Truth Conditions for Sentences or Utterances?

In the past three decades there has been a growing division in the field as regards the unit of which the truth value should be predicated. Traditionally, truth and falsity were predicated of sentences in that they applied to the output of the syntactic processing, standardly known as the logical form. The truth value resulted from assessing this logical form with respect to a particular model.[1] Subsequently, ever since Grice (1978) observed that some pragmatic processing may be necessary before the truth-evaluable representation is attained, the role ascribed to this pragmatic processing in establishing the truth-evaluable representation has been steadily increasing. Grice identifies in this respect the assignment of reference to indexical expressions and the disambiguation of ambiguous sentences. His successors are responsible for what is now the wide-spread view, namely that there is a multitude of processes that contribute to the truth-conditional representation. For example, the precisification of the meaning of connectives such as *and* results in its enrichment to *and as a result* in (1'):

(1)   Laura watched *My Fair Lady* and decided to study phonetics.
(1')   Laura watched *My Fair Lady and as a result* decided to study phonetics.

It is now widely acknowledged that the outcome of pragmatic processes, be it conscious pragmatic inference or pragmatic defaults (depending on the orientation) contributes to the truth-evaluable representation. Truth conditions are predicated of utterances, speech acts, or other units whose representation is enriched with the output of pragmatic inference.

Furthermore, one has to establish whether pragmatic enrichment can be traced to the syntactic form or rather comes from a separate, truly pragmatic domain of inferring speaker's intentions.[2] In this paper I adopt the latter perspective and assume that the pragmatic enrichment is not syntactically controlled. In that I follow Recanati's TCP. However, as I shall claim in Sect. 8, exactly the same theoretical assumptions can be maintained while preserving the traditional label of truth-conditional semantics. This may be just a matter of terminological preferences and being more, or less, reverend towards tradition. On the other hand, the choice may also indicate the degree of importance that the theorist attaches to formalization.[3]

In TCP, the pragmatic process that produces (1′) out of (1) is a so-called 'top-down' process, a process of free enrichment that is not triggered by slots in the syntactic representation:

> ...various contextual processes come into play in the determination of an utterance's intuitive truth-conditions; not merely saturation – the contextual assignment of values to indexicals and free variables in the logical form of the sentence – but also free enrichment and other processes which are not linguistically triggered but are pragmatic through and through. That view we henceforth refer to as 'Truth-conditional pragmatics' (TCP). Recanati (2002: 302).

One of the core advantages of TCP for our analysis is that it relaxes the dependence of the meaning of an utterance on the logical form understood as the output of syntactic processing. And, according to the assumption just adopted, it is the representation of the *utterance meaning* that constitutes the unit of which truth conditions should be predicated.

3   The Three Readings of Belief Reports

The object of my investigation will be sentences reporting speaker's beliefs such as (2):

(2)   William believes that the author of *Oscar and Lucinda* is a genius.

Belief reports belong to the category of intensional contexts in that they give rise to various well-known puzzles when we try to assess their meaning by considering the extensions of the referring expressions in the embedded clause, without taking notice of the way in which these extensions are taken by the reporter or by the owner of the belief.[4] For the purpose of this investigation, I shall narrow the field further and consider reports in which the way in which the object is thought of, or the mode of presentation of the referent that is of interest is the one pertaining to the holder of the belief rather than to the reporter. In other words, in (2), we will look at different ways in which William, not the person uttering (2), can think of 'the author of *Oscar and Lucinda*'. Within such confines, we can distinguish the following two readings of (2). First, there is a reading on which William's belief is about a known, intersubjectively identifiable individual, Peter Carey. This is the *de re* reading. Next, there is a reading that can be distilled from the following scenario. William read the novel *Oscar and Lucinda* some time ago, and, while remembering the novel very well, he forgot who wrote it. In full ignorance of who the author was, he utters (3).

(3)   The author of *Oscar and Lucinda* is a genius.

This is the *de dicto* reading – the reading on which William holds a belief about whoever happened to write *Oscar and Lucinda*.

If we approach the report in (2) with the objective of modelling the primary meaning intended by the speaker (and recovered by the addressee), we must also distinguish the scenario on which William holds a belief *de re* but is mistaken as

to the identity of the novelist.[5] Say, William is convinced that Ian McEwan wrote *Oscar and Lucinda*. Here we have a mistaken reference assignment which will make the report in (2) *de dicto* in virtue of being opaque to substitutions of coreferential expressions, but at the same time it is a sub-type of a report *de dicto* that corresponds to a belief *de re*. This is the report that I shall now refer to as *de dicto with a referential mistake*.[6] The other *de dicto* reading will be referred to as *de dicto proper*.

The question that arises at this point is whether belief reports are three-way ambiguous. In post-Gricean pragmatics, it is generally acknowledged that one should not postulate semantic ambiguities where a more economical explanation is available. This principle is spelled out by Grice (1978) as *The Modified Occam's Razor*, according to which one should not multiply senses beyond necessity. In the case of belief reports, the principle suggests that one should not postulate the readings *de re*, *de dicto proper*, and *de dicto with a referential mistake* as evidence for semantic ambiguity when a more economical treatment of such constructions is available. By an independent but equally valid principle, it also seems that one should not postulate ambiguities when there is no evidence from utterance processing that resolving an ambiguity indeed takes place. It has been common practice in such cases to postulate an underdetermined representation. This representation is the output of syntactic processing and is subsequently enriched with further determinations of meaning that come from pragmatic inference and/or other context-dependent sources to be identified more precisely below.

The next question to answer is whether all three readings are equally salient in processing, i.e., whether they are all equally likely to occur, and whether they all rely on pragmatic inference to an equal degree. It is feasible to search for an answer in an experimental way. However, an empirical enquiry does not seem the best place to start. Current experimental pragmatics relies largely on testing the time of processing of utterances.[7] This is tangential to our purpose because the question that has to be answered first is whether the pragmatic process that enriches the underdetermined representation is a conscious process of inference or rather some subdoxastic enrichment.[8] Both can take time and the discrimination between them will not yield to methods such as testing the duration of processing. I propose to begin with a hypothesis. I shall put forward a theoretical argument in favour of distinguishing between the statuses of the three readings. In order to do that, we shall use the framework of Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005a, b, 2006c) and its concept of a *cognitive default*.

It can be safely assumed that the three readings of (2) differ with respect to the salience that the individual referred to as 'the author of *Oscar and Lucinda*' has for William. On the *de re* reading, William holds a belief about an identifiable person, known to him by name and also by some facts about him such as that he is a famous writer, known for his novels such as *Jack Maggs*, *The True History of the Kelly Gang*, or *My Life as a Fake*. William has a clear picture of who he is thinking about and a clear, strong intention to convey some thought about this individual, namely about Peter Carey. On the *de dicto proper* scenario, William holds a belief about whoever might have written *Oscar and Lucinda* and is communicating this thought

with a referential intention that is not as strong and clear as the one in the first case. Finally, the scenario *de dicto with a referential mistake* falls in-between. William has a clear idea who he is thinking and talking about: he is thinking and talking about Ian McEwan. However, it is obvious that William must have a rather weak idea of who Ian McEwan is, since he is mistakenly attributing to him the authorship of *Oscar and Lucinda* that does not, even to someone with very perfunctory knowledge of contemporary fiction, share any recognizable features with McEwan's novels. William's 'belief storage' about the referent contains some false beliefs and hence makes the belief expressed in (3) 'weaker', defective. William's expression of this belief is also weaker with respect to its referential intention. This gradation of the strength of the referential intention is founded on the property of mental states called *intentionality*, meaning 'aboutness': mental states such as beliefs are *about* an object, or *have* an object. By default assumption, this intentionality is strong: mental states have objects about which we don't assume misconceptions or missing information. The referential use of a definite description reflects such default, strong aboutness, while the mistaken referential and the attributive uses reflect degrees of departure from this standard intentionality and from the standardly assumed referential intention: in the case of the mistaken referential use intentionality is 'scattered' so to speak and it does not reach the correct object (see Jaszczolt 1997, 1999), while on the attributive reading it reaches no object at all.

We can now move to the classification of the readings of belief reports within the confines imposed here.[9] On the basis of the above observations, I propose that these readings can be graded on a scale of the strength of the speaker's referential intention. The *de re* reading comes with the strongest referential intention, then the *de dicto with a referential mistake*, and finally *de dicto proper*.[10]

At this point we can go back to the question posed earlier concerning the cognitive statuses of these three readings. There are two main options. First, one can make an initial assumption that whatever interpretation the hearer assigns to (2), this interpretation is triggered by the context. Syntactic processing gives us an underdetermined representation, and pragmatic inference, immersed in the context, supplies the rest. But there are problems with this option. As I mentioned earlier, even a cursory glance at these three readings of attitude reports suffices to classify them as more, or less, likely to occur. The *de re* reading is the most salient reading in virtue of having associated with it the strongest referential intention. This reading is associated with the mental state of belief that has the strongest intentionality. The property of strong intentionality of the mental state warrants the strong intentionality of the surfacing speech act (here: belief report), and hence we can generalize that strong intentionality pertains to *de re* reports.[11] Now, when a speaker issues an utterance with an intention to communicate some content, this intention is normally the strongest one that can be associated with this type of expression. For example, when a speaker uses a definite description, it can normally be assumed that the speaker has a particular individual in mind, unless the co-text or context signals that this is not the case. Otherwise, the speaker would have used an expression with a weaker referring property such as an indefinite description. By this reasoning we can assume that the strongest communicative intention (and *referential* intention

where applicable), and hence also the strongest intentionality, are the norm, or the *default* for that expression. For belief reports, the *de re* interpretation is such a default: the act of referring is aimed at a particular, identifiable individual. I shall call this reading a *cognitive default*. A cognitive default is a default interpretation that arises in virtue of the properties of mental states. The mental state of belief has intentionality, is *about* a certain individual. When the addressee interprets a report on a belief, he/she automatically (by default) associates the strongest intentionality that can in principle be associated with the act of belief reported on.

To sum up, the *de re* reading of (2) is the cognitive default that corresponds to the utterance associated with the strongest referential intention, while *de dicto with a referential mistake* and *de dicto proper* are progressive departures from the default. The output of pragmatic inference and defaults contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance: cognitive defaults account for *de re*, and pragmatic inference for the two varieties of *de dicto*. I return to this analysis in more detail in Sect. 6. Note that we are departing here somewhat from the model of what is said proposed in TCP where *all* pragmatic additions to the output of the syntactic processing are subdoxastic. The full scale of such departures is presented in Sect. 5 where I discuss the sources that contribute to the representation of utterance meaning distinguished in Default Semantics.

4   In Search of a Metalanguage

Even if the proposal as developed so far is on the right track, it will not be complete unless we provide an algorithm for the interaction of the output of syntactic processing and pragmatic sources of meaning such as conscious inference and the subdoxastic enrichment. Contextualism about meaning, i.e., the admission of the 'top-down', compulsory pragmatic processes, is not a formal account, but it is not incompatible with a reformulation of the proposal in a clear, formal metalanguage. On this assumption, the next task is to see whether such formalization can be provided. I shall utilise for this purpose a formal account of belief reports that is already present in dynamic semantics, that is the account of attitude reports in Discourse Representation Theory (DRT, see Kamp and Reyle 1993) as proposed by Kamp (2003). Although DRT does not share all the theoretical assumptions with contextualism, it is compatible with it to an extent that suffices for our purposes. DRT allows for pragmatic input to semantic representations and construes this input rather freely. It is also, by definition, sensitive to information from changing context: it builds representations of discourses incrementally, incorporating information that becomes available at various stages of processing. All this will allow us to utilise the slightly modified and adapted language of discourse representation structures (DRSs), while starting with the contextualist orientation. In other words, what we are proposing is to attempt to spell out the default-based contextualist account of belief reports by using the language of DRT, but using it with preserving the overall assumption of TCP that truth conditions that are of real interest are the ones predicated of utterances.

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                          w x                              │
│                                                           │
│  William (w)                                              │
│  author of Oscar and Lucinda (x)                          │
│                                                           │
│                    ┌────────────────────┐                 │
│  <[ANCH, x'],      │         x'          │          >     │
│                    │                     │                │
│                    │  author of O&L (x') │                │
│                    └────────────────────┘                 │
│                                                           │
│                        ┌──────────────────────┐           │
│  s:     Att(w, <BEL,   │          s'           │   >,  {<x', x>}) │
│                        │ s':  ┌───────────────┐ │         │
│                        │      │ x' is a genius│ │         │
│                        │      └───────────────┘ │         │
│                        └──────────────────────┘           │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Fig. 1 DRS for (2), modelled on Kamp (2003)

In DRT, attitudinal states such as belief are represented as follows. Let us assume that MOD is a set of so-called 'mode indicators' such as BEL (belief), DES (desire), INT (intention), or [ANCH, x] for an internal anchor. An attitude description is then <MOD, DRS> (see Kamp 1990, 1996, 2003). <[ANCH, x], DRS> is an *internal anchor* for a discourse referent x, linking x to some information within the representation of the mental state. Next, we introduce so-called external anchors for discourse referents. An *external anchor* is a function whose domain is the set of internally anchored discourse referents in a <MOD, DRS>, and whose range is a set of referents that do not occur in the <MOD, DRS> (after Kamp 2003). External anchors connect a (singular) proposition with the entities in the domain established by the discourse. A DRS can only have truth conditions if such external connections can be found. Further, a predicate *Att* for attitudinal state is added to the language of DRT. Attitudinal states can now be represented as states *s*: Att (x, DRS, external anchor).[12] Discourse referents *w, x, x′, s*, and *s′* are described by the conditions given in the DRS. Sentence (2), repeated below, obtains a DRS as in Fig. 1.

(2)   William believes that the author of *Oscar and Lucinda* is a genius.

Figure 1 represents the *de re* reading of (2). The discourse referent *x* is externally anchored, and the sentence can be evaluated as to its truth or falsity in a standard, truth-conditional, model-theoretic manner. In DRT, the other readings are not (and need not) be represented: in order for a DRS to express a proposition, an internally anchored discourse referent also has to be externally anchored (cf. Kamp 2003: 7). The readings of (2) that we called *de dicto with a referential mistake* and *de dicto proper* are thus left out.

First, let us consider *de dicto proper*. The reading de *dicto proper* does not have external anchors. Kamp (1996: 10–12) allows for the possibility that attitudinal states of belief may have no external anchor when the holder of the belief "is under the illusion that he is standing in a relation of acquaintance to some object – he thinks that he is acquainted with an object in the given way but in fact there is no such object." (Kamp 1996: 12). The belief then is not 'truly *de re*' – as Kamp says, it is only 'formally *de re*', because the object of belief is not intersubjectively recognizable. On this classification, our category of a report *de dicto with a referential mistake* fits within the category of *formally de re* beliefs: there is an object of belief, i.e., there is an internal anchor, but the object so-described does not correspond to an entity in the world and there is no external anchor. But some of our readings described as *de dicto proper* also correspond *to formally de re* beliefs, while others are truly *de dicto*. Readings *de dicto proper* correspond to Kamp's *formally de re* beliefs when the object is imaginary. They are truly *de dicto* when the believer has no, even imaginary, object in mind. This is the case, for example, when the belief is held without being fully understood. Sentence (4) is a good candidate for a belief that is held in spite of not being fully understood.

(4)   Hyperbolic geometry does not satisfy the parallel postulate.

For most lay persons, the description 'hyperbolic geometry' does not correspond to any entity, be it concrete or abstract. The belief is acquired, stored and held in its entirety: it is not a belief *about* an identifiable object called 'hyperbolic geometry'.

These distinctions between truly *de re*, formally *de re*, and truly *de dicto* beliefs are, nevertheless, very fuzzy and are not easily applicable in representing belief contexts. This much is obvious even from looking at (4): 'hyperbolic geometry' may trigger absolutely no representation in the believer's mind, or, if the holder of the belief is like us, the description will trigger a rather fuzzy idea of a set of laws concerning a curved space. In short, formal anchors can be more, or less, well defined and the borderline between beliefs formally *de re* and truly *de dicto* is therefore naturally hazy. This fact is well discussed in Sperber's (1985, 1997) account of semi-propositional beliefs that are acquired through metarepresenting. It is also well captured in Asher's (1986: 142) statement that the *de re/de dicto* distinction is only a generalization over a more detailed taxonomy in which we can distinguish (i) beliefs without any anchors; (ii) beliefs with only external anchors; (iii) beliefs with only internal anchors; and (iv) beliefs with both internal and external anchors. For our purposes, it will suffice to conclude that what started as a *de re/de dicto* dichotomy is more likely to be a gradation of well-definedness of internal anchors. In addition, however, we shall follow Kamp (1990, 1996) and Asher (1986) who added, as a condition to the construction algorithm for DRSs, that definite referring terms have some, even if only 'schematic', internal anchor.

However, these readings need not be left out when our aim is to model acts of communication, as in TCP. In TCP, truth conditions are predicated of utterances. When what is true or false is the entire act of communication, the reason for treating *de re* on a special footing disappears. In Sect. 6, I put together the insights of TCP and the metalanguage of DRT in order to model all three possible interpretations

Fig. 2 Internal anchoring for
'the author of *Oscar and
Lucinda*'

$$<[\text{ANCH, a}] , \boxed{\begin{array}{c} a \\ \hline \text{author of } O\&L \text{ (a)} \end{array}} >$$

of belief reports. I try to adopt the language of DRT and the available types of
anchorings and 'shift' them, so to speak, to the level of interactive representations
of Default Semantics. The reading *de dicto proper* of (2) will now make use of the
anchor as in Fig. 2, to capture the sense of 'the author of *Oscar and Lucinda*' as 'the
author of *Oscar and Lucinda*, whoever s/he might be.'

De dicto with a referential mistake is more difficult to represent. It corresponds
to a *de re* belief, but a belief about a referent whose identity is misrepresented by the
believer. The representation has to capture the fact that there is an intersubjectively
accepted referent for the belief, but this individual is not who is referred to by
the description on this occasion. This is the situation in which William believes
that Ian McEwan wrote *Oscar and Lucinda* and refers to Ian McEwan while
uttering the description 'the author of *Oscar and Lucinda*'. This scenario cannot be
represented in DRT and, in fact, the problem does not even arise for DRT because
this information is not part of the proposition expressed. DRT cannot represent
de dicto with a referential mistake in that sentence (2) has the same DRS for
the readings *de re* and *de dicto with a referential mistake*: there is an external
anchor, there is a unique individual that corresponds to the description 'the author
of *Oscar and Lucinda*', and the DRS has truth conditions. Identifying a referential
mistake has nothing to do with representing the meaning of the *sentence*. But this
information about mistaken reference or the lack of a clear referent *is* relevant for
a theory of modelling acts of communication. This reading has to be represented
in Default Semantics that accounts for merging information about meaning coming
from different sources.

5   Merger Representations of Default Semantics

Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005a, b, 2006c, 2010) allows for various domains of
information to partake in assigning the meaning to the utterance. In addition to the
sentence structure and word meaning, information can also come from pragmatic
input. This input can be of various types. First, there is conscious pragmatic
inference. Second, according to Default Semantics, there is pragmatic input that
does not amount to conscious processing of contextual clues but rather makes use
of standard, presumed meanings. These can be caused by the very design of the
human processing system, such as the default *de re* discussed above that arises due
to the property of intentionality of mental states, or by the frequently encountered
scenarios, stored in the mind as default, presumed, ceteris paribus 'normal' ways
things are. We have called the first *cognitive defaults,*[13] and we shall call the latter
social, cultural and world-knowledge defaults.[14] An example of a social, cultural

and world knowledge default is given in (5). While 'Picasso's painting' can be enriched contextually to mean 'the painting executed by Picasso', 'the painting owned by Picasso', 'the painting selected by Picasso' and a variety of other types of relationship, the first one is indubitably more salient than others, to the extent that it is reasonable to postulate that it normally goes through without any conscious processing of the context, in virtue of the shared cultural knowledge.

(5)   Picasso's painting is of a crying woman.

The expression 'social, cultural and world-knowledge default' is a broad, umbrella term for all those enriched senses of expressions that arise out of the experiences we collect in our lifetime and that have become sufficiently entrenched to 'click in' automatically, without conscious inference. Some of these experiences pertain to cultural knowledge, as in (5), others are of social provenance, such as that nannies and nurses are normally female, yet others pertain to scientific facts such as that timber floats on water but metal does not. It is not clear at this stage of theorizing where the boundary between such presumed, fast-occurring enrichments and conscious inferential enrichments lies.[15] But this does not mean that such a category should not be present in a model of utterance interpretation. There are sufficient theoretical grounds for distinguishing between conscious, effortful processing of expressions and fast, automatic, effortless 'jumping to conclusions', to use Kent Bach's apt phrase. The onus of proof lies on those who assume costly processes where intuitively there is only such jumping to conclusions facilitated by a frequently occurring scenario, common experience, or other sources of defaults. Although the exact properties of default meanings are still subject to debates, it seems very likely that a category of such shortcuts through costly pragmatic enrichments will be experimentally corroborated.[16]

All in all, in spite of some attempts in experimental pragmatics to discredit default interpretations by appeal to the length of processing, these presumed meanings are not to be disposed of so lightly. In the absence of satisfactory experimental design and, a fortiori, experimental evidence, we can safely resort to a rational principle of not postulating effortful inference without compelling evidence, following the line of Levinson (1995, 2000), Recanati (2003, 2004), Asher and Lascarides (e.g. 2003), and many others.[17] And, in the case of social, cultural and world knowledge defaults, there is indeed no evidence of such costly processing.

Cognitive defaults and social, cultural and world-knowledge defaults are two out of four sources of information about meaning distinguished in Default Semantics that contribute to creating what is said by the utterance: the utterance meaning. Information from these four sources interacts and produces a so-called *merger representation* ('Σ' for 'summation'). The main task of Default Semantics is then to produce an algorithm for this interaction.[18] Diagrammatically, the sources of information about meaning that contribute to the merger representation can be represented in Fig. 3.

To sum up, the picture that emerges is this. There is a representation of meaning that is constituted by word meaning and sentence structure (WS), merged with and any combination of conscious pragmatic inference (CPI), cognitive defaults

Stage I: Processing of the truth-conditional content

Stage II: Processing of implicatures

- social, cultural and world-knowledge defaults$_2$ (SCWD$_2$)
- conscious pragmatic inference$_2$ (CPI$_2$)

Fig. 3 Utterance interpretation in Default Semantics (adapted from Jaszczolt 2005a and 2010)

(CD) and social, cultural and world-knowledge defaults (SCWD) – allowing, of course, for situations in which the contribution of these sources is null and utterance meaning can be equated with the output of WS. WS is to be understood as the output of syntactic processing. Following DRT, we assume that a generative grammar such as Generalised Phrase Structure Grammar (GPSG) serves this purpose with a satisfactory degree of cognitive reality, but we leave the issue of a choice of an adequate syntactic theory open. Next, cognitive defaults (CDs) are effortless, automatic enrichments that are the result of the mental architecture: in short, they arise because the intentionality of mental states is normally the strongest intentionality that pertains to the particular type of expression. Definite descriptions and propositional attitude reports discussed above are good examples of a CD. Social, cultural and world-knowledge defaults (SCWDs) were introduced in the discussion of example (5). This leaves us with pragmatic inference which I dubbed 'conscious' (CPI) in order to distinguish it from automatic enrichments in CD and SCWD. CPI is an ordinary process of inference in conversation, modelled on Grice's particularized conversational implicature. The representation that results from the interaction of these four sources is called a merger representation and is

by stipulation compositional: compositionality is a methodological requirement on semantic theories (see Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991)[19] as well as an empirical assumption about the nature of human languages (see Szabò 2000). I return to this topic briefly in the concluding section.

The next distinction to be introduced is that between $SCWD_1$ and CPI_1 on the one hand, and $SCWD_2$ and CPI_2 on the other. Merger representation is not the only content conveyed by an utterance. There can also be additional meanings recovered by the addressee that can be called implicatures in virtue of being *secondary intended meanings* but that, in fact, cut across the explicit-implicit divide (see Jaszczolt 2009a). Again, these arise as the output of CPI or as SCWDs – let us give them distinct names of CPI_2 and $SCWD_2$.[20] We shall now reserve CPI_1 and $SCWD_1$ for contributions to the merger representation representing the *primary intended meaning* (be it explicit or implicit).

In the current analysis of belief reports, we shall focus on WS, CD and CPI_1 as these sources of meaning are relevant for their processing. In what follows, I present a Default Semantics account of propositional attitude reports and attempt to provide the basic formalism for the merger.

6   The Analysis

In the interactive semantics of merger representations, unlike in DRT, we do not start by mapping only from the syntactic structure of sentences into DRSs. Instead of the DRS construction algorithm, there is mapping from WS, CD, CPI_1 and $SCWD_1$ into merger representations. Unlike in DRT, merger representations for the reading *de dicto with a referential mistake* and *de dicto proper* will have truth conditions because compositionality is, in virtue of our initial assumption, a property of these representations, that is of the output of all these four sources.

Asher (1986: 129) metaphorically says that discourse referents are 'pegs' on which the hearer can 'hang' the ascriptions of properties that the DRS-conditions specify. We adopt this view of the semantic role of discourse referents. In merger representations, the discourse referent *x*, standing for the person who wrote *Oscar and Lucinda* ('the author of *Oscar and Lucinda*'), is an argument of the following three conditions:

(i)   for the default *de re* reading: $[Peter\ Carey]_{CD}(x)$
(ii) for the *de dicto* reading *with a referential* $[Ian\ McEwan]_{CPI1}(x)$
      mistake:
  and
(iii) for the reading *de dicto proper*: $[the\ author\ of\ O\&L]_{CPI1}\ (x)$

The options (i)–(iii) best capture what we are trying to do in merger representations: we model communicated meaning by using an interactive representation

that pays only limited attention to linguistically controlled sources of this meaning, while accounting also for those aspects that are not linguistically controlled.

A brief disclaimer is now due. All this discussion may lead one to conclude that we are proposing here an alternative to the DRT account. This is, however, a false conclusion. By adopting the language of DRSs and some of their construction rules we are not suggesting that there is a problem with DRT as such. We have 'raised', or 'pragmaticized', the object of analysis to that of the interaction of various sources of information, detached this level substantially form the output of grammar and lexicon, and as such we have been pursuing an enquiry that is substantially different from that of DRT. We are not suggesting that it is a weakness of DRT that it can represent only one reading of attitude constructions. Within the assumptions concerning compositionality and meaning construction followed in DRT, this is not a weakness: in the example under consideration, one has to have a referent (and a singular proposition) in order to have a truth-evaluable DRS. All we have done here is suggest an alternative way of thinking about utterance interpretation – a way that utilises the insights of the TCP with its top-down pragmatic inference to the full, retaining at the same time the possibility of a formal account of how the utterance is composed.

Next, we have to introduce the semantics of the belief predicate. Let us assume that the utterance reporting a belief of the form 'x believes that C' can be represented as Bel (x, C). Bel (x, C) has the following satisfaction conditions: the individual that corresponds to x on a certain interpretation has the cognitive state that corresponds to C on that interpretation. We are now ready to propose merger representations for the three readings of the belief report in (2), repeated below.

(2)   William believes that the author of *Oscar and Lucinda* is a genius.

Figure 4 represents the default *de re* reading. The subscripts CD (cognitive default) and WS (word meaning and sentence structure) stand for the source of meaning, and their scope is marked by []. The figure is annotated by a superscript 'p' that stands for the fact that the representation is 'partial' in the sense that temporality of the eventualities is omitted.[21]

$$\Sigma \quad \begin{array}{l} x \; y \; C \\[4pt] [\text{William}]_{\text{CD}} \, (x) \\ [\text{Peter Carey}]_{\text{CD}} \, (y) \\[8pt] [[x]_{\text{CD}} \, [\text{believes}]_{\text{CD}} \, C]_{\text{WS}} \\ C\!: [[y]_{\text{CD}} \, \text{is a genius}]_{\text{WS}} \end{array}$$

ᵖFig. 4 Merger representation of the default *de re* reading of (2)

$$x\ y\ \mathcal{C}$$

[William]$_{CD}$ (x)
[Ian McEwan]$_{CPI\ 1}$ (y)

Σ

[[x]$_{CD}$ [believes]$_{CD}$ $\mathcal{C}$]$_{WS}$
$\mathcal{C}$:   [[y]$_{CPI\ 1}$ is a genius]$_{WS}$

ᴾFig. 5 Merger representation of the reading *de dicto with a referential mistake* of (2)

$$x\ y\ \mathcal{C}$$

[William]$_{CD}$ (x)
[the author of *Oscar and Lucinda*]$_{CPI\ 1}$ (y)

Σ

[[x]$_{CD}$ [believes]$_{CPI\ 1}$ $\mathcal{C}$]$_{WS}$
$\mathcal{C}$:   [[y]$_{CPI\ 1}$is a genius]$_{WS}$

ᴾFig. 6 Merger representation of the reading *de dicto proper* of (2)

The default status of this reading is clearly represented. The discourse referent *x* is associated with the person called Peter Carey by means of CD. By the same argument from intending, presented in Sect. 3, the belief is *de re* by means of CD. Now, *Bel (x, C)* corresponds here to the condition [[x]$_{CD}$ [believes]$_{CD}$$\mathcal{C}$]$_{WS}$. This is to be read as follows: 'the individual that corresponds to *x* on this interpretation (William) has a cognitive state that corresponds to $\mathcal{C}$ on this interpretation'. In other words, 'Peter Carey is a genius'. $\mathcal{C}$ stands for William's *representation of the eventuality* e: [[y]$_{CD}$ is a genius]$_{WS}$.

Figure 5 depicts the merger representation of the reading *de dicto with a referential mistake*. Just as on the default *de re* reading, the belief is *de re* by means of CD. The difference is that the discourse referent *x* is associated with the person (Ian McEwan) by means of CPI$_1$. The result of CPI$_1$ allows the hearer to associate the description with Ian McEwan, while the default association remains that represented in Fig. 4. Finally, the reading *de dicto proper* of (2) is represented in Fig. 6. On the reading *de dicto proper*, CPI$_1$ is responsible both for the belief (*de dicto*) and for the attributive reading of the description. The fact that CPI$_1$ applies twice makes this reading more distinct from the default *de re* than the one represented in Fig. 5.

7   Towards a Formal Account for Interactive Semantics

Since merger representations take the formalism of DRT and 'kick it upstairs' to serve for representing the interactive conception of semantics, the formalism for the semantics for merger representations has to differ from the relational semantics used for DRSs in DRT.[22] The main difference is that mental representations are created with regard to the four sources of meaning: WS, CPI_1, CD, and $SCWD_1$. In other words, in merger representations, the predicative conditions draw on the four sources and compositionality is assumed to obtain at the level of the merger.[23] In order to provide the semantics for the belief predicate, we have to start with 'believe' as a two-place operator on terms and representations of eventualities (C). In Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005a), I assume that C is the second argument of a two-place, first-order predicate.[24] The relational semantics for *believe* is modelled on that for *n*-ary predication, as in (i). $[\![\ ]\!]$ stand for semantic value; P for predicate; *t* for terms (discourse referents, variables in DRT and Default Semantics); *s* and *s′* for the initial and final context in the dynamic-semantic perspective; *M* is a model; and *I* is the interpretation (adapted from Jaszczolt 2005a: 141–142).

(i) $_s [\![Pt_1,...,t_n]\!]\ _{s'}^M$ iff s= s' and $\{\ [\![t_1]\!]\ _{M,s},...,\ [\![t_n]\!]\ _{M,s}\} \in I(P)$

If we assume for '*x* believes C' the structure *Bel* (x, C) and, despite all the problems with intensionality, take *Bel* to be an ordinary two-place predicate P (t_1, t_2), we obtain (ii).

(ii) $_s [\![Pt_1,t_2]\!]\ _{s'}^M$ iff s = s' and $\{\ [\![t]\!]\ _{M,s}\} \in I(P)$

This is not entirely satisfactory, though: t_2 is not a satisfactory substitute for C. C is an intensional object that subsumes various degrees of referential intention with which the utterance comes, and *a fortiori* various degrees of intentionality of the belief itself. There is a continuum of degrees of contribution of William's way of thinking about the author of *Oscar and Lucinda* to the merger representation, starting with no contribution on one end (*de re*), to some very detailed mode, whatever it may be, on the other (*de dicto proper*). To elaborate, the role of the way of thinking, also known as a mode of presentation (MoP), is as follows. The *de re* reading does not make use of it, its role in the semantics is null and there is no argument slot for it in the semantic representation. The role of MoP increases for the *de dicto with a referential mistake*: it matters for this reading whether in (2) William thinks about Peter Carey or about Ian McEwan. But, this identification of the referent is *all* that matters. The semantically relevant MoP is fairly coarsely-grained, it does not contribute any finer details pertaining to the novelist that may be present in William's belief. In the reading *de dicto proper*, the granularity of the semantically relevant MoP increases further: any fine detail from William's belief may be relevant. For example, in our scenario for (2), all that William knows about the author of *Oscar and Lucinda* may be that there was one, unique person responsible for writing this novel. In this case, no substitution of coreferential expressions can go through *salva veritate*. To sum up, the granularity of MoP starts

from value 0 for *de re*, and gradually increases through *de dicto with a referential mistake* to *de dicto proper*.

Such gradation is not formalizable by (ii). It is quite plausible that no formalization for such degrees of granularity can be produced. The closest generalization we can obtain is by capturing the imaginary set of all the possible MoPs by means of an intensional object C, as in (iii). The advantage of such a move is that we can retain the appearance of *Bel* as a binary predicate and, at the same time, reflect the variability of MoP.

(iii) $_s$ $[\![P_t, C]\!]$ $_{s'}^M$ iff s = s' and $< [\![t]\!]$ $_{M,s}, C > \in$ I(P)

where

(iii.a) C is a merger representation of a mental state of *t* modelled on a DRS for an extensional context and constructed according to the reanalysis of a DRS for an extensional context in interactive semantics;

(iii.b) P $\in$ {Bel$_{CD}$, Bel$_{CPI\,1}$}

(iii.c) t$\in$ {t$_{CD}$, t$_{CPI\,1}$}

Parts (iii.a)–(iii.c) are to be read as follows. (iii.a) says that C is a merger representation and hence is constructed by means of the interaction of any of WS, CD, SCWD$_1$ and CPI$_1$. It is constructed in a language modelled on that of DRT. Thesis (iii.b) says that the belief operator is *de re* or *de dicto$_1$* when CD is in operation, or *de dicto proper* when CPI$_1$ is used. Naturally, mental states other than *Bel* can be accounted for analogously. Condition (iii.c) reflects the thesis that reference assignment to discourse referents can proceed by means of CD or CPI$_1$.

At this point, a word in defence of the object C is needed. C is an intensional object and as such does not easily fit into formal semantic accounts. Let us compare briefly our analysis with that of DRT. DRT employs eventualities, i.e. discourse referents for events (*e*) and states (*s*) as objects of beliefs. Events and states are there formal objects with variable subjects and variable spatiotemporal location. To follow this route would mean to have to resort to anchoring. However, in our approach, we replaced anchoring with the arguments for the belief predicate: the application of CD or CPI$_1$ resulted in an unambiguous assignment of a reading to the description. We have also managed to retain the intuitively correct representation of belief reports as relations between a believer and a mental state. But the price to pay is an intensional object C that functions as an umbrella category for all those readings that incorporate varying degrees of the mode of presentation of the referent. This works well in merger representations but would not work in DRT. DRT ascribes compositionality to the structure of the sentence. This structure is indeed enriched in a dynamic way, but nevertheless compositionality remains a property of the linguistic string. The level of which compositionality is predicated is sentence structure. Default Semantics, on the contrary, 'raises' the requirement of compositionality to the level of the merger. Hence, an object such as C, as well as the resolution of reference within C by means of CD or CPI$_1$, is allowed there. It is the product, the merger representation Σ, rather than the WS source, that is

compositional. Within this model, c^{25} can also be regarded as compositional, in the pragmatics-rich sense of compositionality.

8   Final Remarks and Conclusions

Merger representations require substantial rethinking of compositionality in semantic theory. In the general spirit of TCP,[26] in Default Semantics, compositionality is conceived of as a property of merger representations:

> **Principle of Compositionality for Merger Representations**
> *The meaning of the act of communication is a function of the meaning of the words, the sentence structure (WS), defaults (CD and SCWD$_1$), and conscious pragmatic inference (CPI$_1$).*

In other words, the representation of the speaker's act of communication that the model hearer can be predicted to construct is composed of the merger of information specified by these four sources. In principle, there is nothing to stop us from 'lifting' compositionality to the level of the merger of meaning components that come from various epistemic domains. But the important question is: what does it exactly mean to 'lift' compositionality in this way? Is semantics still conceived of as compositional? And if so, how are we to construe a semantic theory that would be truthful to this 'compositionality raising'? TCP should have no problem with the composition of the merger. Recanati (2004: 132) says the following:

> ... the semantics of natural language is not insulationist. ... [T]he meaning of the whole is *not* constructed in a purely bottom-up manner from the meanings of the parts. The meaning of the whole is influenced by top-down, pragmatic factors, and through the meaning of the whole the meanings of the parts are also affected. So we need a more 'interactionist' or even 'Gestaltist' approach to compositionality.[27]

Compositionality is understood here as a methodological principle for a theory of meaning. We make this claim even stronger: compositionality is to be assumed as a necessary property of any semantic theory where 'semantics' is understood as subsuming such top-down pragmatic input. The proof of the feasibility of composition so-conceived will lie in providing algorithms for merger representations for a variety of English constructions.

All that remains is to address the question that on the surface seems merely terminological: Is the analysis of meaning in terms of merger representations to be classified as truth-conditional pragmatics or, as we suggested above, as truth-conditional semantics? There are two possible construals. On one, widely accepted type of account, the output of pragmatic processing contributes to the semantic representation and we have a truth-conditional semantic theory that allows for the

intrusion of pragmatic input. We have argued here for a greater role of the pragmatic input than just an 'intrusion' to the grammatical structure: instead of 'intrusion', we opted for a 'merger' or an 'interaction'. So, on this construal, we would have an interactive, truth-conditional semantics of merger representations. On the second type of account, we obtain merger representations that have truth conditions in the sense in which utterances have truth conditions in truth-conditional pragmatics. The difference between the two construals lies, as I understand it, in the feasibility of a formal account. If I am on the right track, truth-conditional pragmaticists do not aim at a formalization of the account of utterance interpretation because the top-down processes eschew formalization by definition. Truth-conditional semantics, on the other hand, leaves the possibility of a formal account open – just as various versions of post-Montagovian dynamic semantics try to incorporate pragmatic input into a formal account of discourse.[28]

Let us take stock. In order to represent the readings of attitude reports as constructed by a model speaker in a conversation, we applied merger representations of Default Semantics where the sources of meaning from which the semantic representation is built are treated on a par. There is a long way to go before we can resolve finally how a merger representation for *Bel* (x, C) is constructed. But, equally, many tools and ideas are already there: the language of DRSs, and the contextualist stance of Default Semantics. Building on these foundation stones, I have proposed a representation of utterance meaning that rests on the four sources of meaning information and on their merger. This required a rethinking of compositionality and 'raising' it from the domain of sentence structure (however dynamically understood) to the domain of merger representation. The syntax-pragmatics interface became a syntax-pragmatics merger of the output of WS, CPI_1, CD and $SCWD_1$.

Notes

1. See Montague (1974), and e.g. Dowty et al. (1981), Partee (2004).
2. The literature on this topic is vast. See e.g. Stanley (2000, 2002), Stanley and Szabó (2000), King and Stanley (2005), vs. Recanati (1989, 1993, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005), Bach (2000), and many others. See also Jaszczolt (2002): chapter 11, and (2005a): chapter 1 for an overview and discussion.
3. From the current 2013 perspective, we can observe that the debate has moved on. For Recanati (2007, 2010, 2012), semantics has to remain grammar-driven and allows only for those pragmatic intrusions that are compatible with the syntactic form. Unlike in Default Semantics, he means by 'grammar' the grammar of the natural-language sentence rather than the conceptual structure. See also Jaszczolt (2010) and (2016) for the latter alternative.
4. For extensive references and an overview of the research on propositional attitude constructions see Jaszczolt (2000a).
5. Note that the radical contextualist approach of Default Semantics which I introduce briefly in Sect. 5 (see also Jaszczolt 2005a, 2010) takes semantic

representations to be conceptual representations to which all linguistic and non-linguistic sources of information about utterance meaning contribute on a par. Hence we have to recognise the 'middle' reading with a referential mistake.

6. See also Jaszczolt (1999, 2000b, 2005a).
7. See e.g. Noveck and Sperber (2004).
8. I.e., below the level of consciousness.
9. See e.g. Jaszczolt (1997, 1999, 2000b, 2005a).
10. It can be argued that in the middle reading the referential intention is equally strong as that in the first, *de re* reading in that reference is made to a salient, identifiable (albeit incorrect) person. However, for the purpose of modelling discourse, the referential intention in the middle reading can be represented as 'dispersed', so to speak, between the individual mistakenly intended by William (Ian McEwan) and the objective correlate of the description in this situation (Peter Carey). I owe this disclaimer to François Recanati.
11. For a discussion of this 'inheritance' of intentionality see Searle (1983: 27–28), and, for an amended view, see Jaszczolt (1999: 104–111).
12. Adapted from Kamp (2003).
13. See Sect. 3.
14. Until the 2010 version of Default Semantics, these were called social/cultural defaults.
15. But see Jaszczolt (2012) on flexible inferential bases and what I call 'fluid characters'.
16. See Jaszczolt (2006b/2010) on the disputes concerning the properties of default interpretations.
17. I provide more extensive arguments for cognitive and social/cultural defaults in Jaszczolt (2005a, b), and subsequently for social, cultural and world-knowledge defaults in Jaszczolt (2010).
18. This task has been attempted for a variety of constructions including referring expressions, propositional attitude constructions, anaphoric dependencies, modalities, and some others in Jaszczolt (2005a).
19. Cf.: ' . . . it is always possible to satisfy compositionality by simply adjusting the syntactic and/or semantic tools one uses, unless that is, the latter are constrained on independent grounds.' Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991: 93). For a discussion of compositionality of semantics see Zeevat (1989) and Dekker (2000).
20. Note that there is no CD_2. Cognitive defaults are default interpretations that come from the properties of the underlying mental states and hence are always constitutive of the main semantic representation, i.e. the merger representation.
21. The analysis of belief reports along these lines was first suggested in Jaszczolt (2005a, chapter 5). For a discussion of temporality in terms of merger representations see Jaszczolt (2003, 2005a: chapter 6; 2006a), and in particular 2009b and 2013.
22. The principles of relational semantics will not be presented here. Suffice it to say that its core feature is accounting for the changing context. See van Eijck and Kamp (1997), or, for a summary, Jaszczolt 2005a: chapter 3.

23. See also Jaszczolt (2010) for a subsequent distinction between sources and processes.
24. In my subsequent work this embedded representation is dubbed Σ'.
25. To repeat, currently referred to as Σ'.
26. And also Schiffer (2003).
27. But see Recanati (2012) where he, unlike Default Semantics, rejects the strong version of this interactive compositionality. For him, semantic representation has to be contextually enriched but remain grammar-driven.
28. See e.g. Kamp and Reyle (1993) and van Eijck and Kamp (1997) on DRT; Asher and Lascarides (2003) on Segmented DRT; or Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) on Dynamic Predicate Logic.

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Speaking for Another

Howard Wettstein

An eminent philosopher was once asked why he bothers with faculty governance instead of spending his time exclusively on matters of philosophic substance. "I started reflecting on attitude reports and the attendant puzzles over 40 years ago," he replied, "and I'm still thinking. At the end of a long day working on Academic Senate matters, it's sometimes the case that we have improved significantly the lives of faculty members." David Kaplan, the hero of this saga, was also known to have said that, in connection with those same puzzles, "a new idea is needed."

The puzzles, in the late twentieth century, induced a small industry, industrial both in terms of breadth and depth. Counterexamples to the latest proposals were met with new and sometimes ingenious ways to sophisticate the theory, followed by new counterexamples … seemingly without end. At the 1990 Kaplan conference in Israel, a philosopher presented a particularly baroque account, prompting the late linguist Tanya Rinehart to quip that God would not be that cruel. Kaplan's plea for a new idea was issued against this background.

I worked for some years on the puzzles: those concerning attitude reports but also concerning empty names and, surely not least, Frege's original puzzle about identity sentences. In this paper I explain my dissatisfaction with the industry and explore my candidate for the new idea, one based on some remarks of Quine.

H. Wettstein (✉)
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, CA, USA
e-mail: Howard.wettstein@ucr.edu

1   Part I: The Problem

1.1   Introduction

1.1.1   Belief—A Topic in the Philosophy of Mind

Belief Reports—A Topic in the Philosophy of Language

Frege, in "On Sense and Reference", expounded a (probably the) dominant picture of belief, the history of which extends, no doubt, to the ancients. The idea is that to have a belief, to believe something, is to stand in a certain relation—roughly, the "accepting as true" relation—to a representation. Not just any representation will do here. Concepts are representational entities, but they are not of the sort that possess truth values; they don't tell us, so to speak, how things stand. So the sort of representation in question must have propositional form. Let's say that to believe something is to stand in a relation to a proposition, or to a propositional content.[1]

It is worth focusing on this core idea—**belief: a relation between a person and a propositional content**—since this is *the* focal idea in an large and confusing literature. The "relation to a content" idea, moreover, can get lost in its very different implementations, that is, in the different conceptions of propositional content. In Frege's own realization of the core idea, propositional contents are (what he calls) *thoughts*, thoroughly conceptual entities constituted by senses. On the direct reference alternative, propositional contents are constituted (at least partially) by references, Kaplan's *singular propositions*. Propositional contents have also been identified with sets of possible worlds, and even with linguistic entities: sentence types, or tokens, of a natural language or of a hypothesized language of thought. Whatever one does with the notion of propositional content, the core idea is that to believe is to stand in a relation to a propositional representation.

That believing is so constituted is a thesis in the philosophy of mind, not in the philosophy of language. It is a thesis, that is, about the character of the mental or psychological phenomenon of believing; it does not address the character of our discourse concerning those phenomena. Frege also advanced a closely related thesis about our discourse, a natural correlate to his philosophy of mind picture of believing, a second core idea. A belief report is, for Frege, a relational statement. When we say "John believes that Cicero is an orator," we refer to John (the believer), to the belief relation (by means of the verb), and (by way of "that Cicero is an orator") to the proposition believed.[2]

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[1]This latter expression, "propositional content," should not be taken to suggest that the propositions themselves possess contents. Indeed, a proposition is the same thing as a propositional content. "Propositional content," then, should not be taken as "the content *of* a proposition," but rather as "a content of the propositional kind."

[2]On Frege's approach, *that p* not only designates the proposition believed. In an important sense the *that p* phrase articulates the proposition believed. That is, one can read off the propositional

And, as we will see, just as Frege's philosophy of mind idea has proved generally attractive, so too his semantic idea about belief reports.

It's easy to suppose that the two core ideas—believing as a relation to a content and belief reports as formulating that relation—are more than closely connected. The philosophy of mind idea, it might be supposed, entails its mirror image in the philosophy of language; or at least it does so on minimal, uncontroversial assumptions. But no such tight connection exists. Even granting the first core idea, it may well be that ordinary belief sentences are not aimed, so to speak, at what philosophers may be most interested in, propositional content. Our belief reporting practices have evolved to serve social, communicative ends that, for all one knows ahead of time, do not include getting the propositional content well formulated—philosophically apt as that would be. The gods who were responsible for our practices might well have had, to mix metaphors, other fish to fry. More naturalistically, evolution does not always keep its eye on our favorite ideas.

Accordingly, there is no simple route from the first core idea to the second; from the philosophical account of believing to the semantics of belief reports. Here as elsewhere, there is no substitute for a sustained look at linguistic practice. In fact, given that belief is one of those phenomena that is hardly out in the open,[3] perhaps scrutiny of our reporting practices might usefully come first and might help with our thinking about belief, the psychological phenomenon.[4] This suggests that perhaps traditional philosophy of language/mind gets things backwards in this domain.[5] But I'm getting ahead of myself.

1.2   Enter Direct Reference

Frege's two core ideas have been more than influential. Details aside, they have seemed to go almost without saying. But we should remember that Frege's general orientation in the philosophy of language, his sense-reference approach, appeared in the same light some years ago. Nevertheless, one finds in the early direct reference writings of, for example, Donnellan and Kripke, radical criticisms of the Fregean general orientation; they appear to reject the core Fregean contention that reference

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content believed from the *that p* phrase. This is not true of all ways of designating propositions, e.g. naming a proposition, say, "Elisabeth," or designating it by means of a description, e.g. "the last proposition enunciated by Schneerson."

[3]Cf. Walker Percy, *The Message in the Bottle* . . . .

[4]This is not to suggest that an account of the semantics of belief sentences entails an account of believing.

[5]This is not to suggest that Frege et al. have given little thought to our practices of reporting belief. That's not so. At the same time, as the counterexamples on both sides of the debate, explored below, will show, actual linguistic practice does not fit very well with how the tradition has construed belief reports. Indeed, I'll argue that our practices suggest an entirely different picture of belief, of believing.

needs to be cognitively mediated.[6] In the domain of belief and belief reports, however, direct reference has come to mean a mere implementation of Frege's approach. This may not be easy to discern from the later stages of the debate; the implementations, responsive to a myriad of counterexamples, became more and more complex. A look at the early history is of help here. To believe, it was at first suggested by direct reference advocates, is to stand in the *accepting as true* relation to a *singular* proposition. And, turning from philosophy of mind to semantics, to report a belief is to refer to the believer, to the belief relation, and to the *singular* proposition believed. Frege's structure is thus left intact; singular propositions are substituted for Fregean thoughts.[7]

The project for direct reference in the domain of the "propositional attitudes" has thus been a rather conservative one. But from the outset, that project has been troubled. The problems begin with a powerful class of counterexamples from actual linguistic practice offered early along by neo-Fregean critics. There is irony here. Direct reference, virtually born of Frege's difficulties with actual practice, ends up taking Frege's lead in the domain of the attitudes. Suddenly, actual practice is the problem, a problem pointed out no less by Fregeans. What's more, Frege's own implementation of the core ideas seems to sit much better at least locally— concerning attitude sentences—with actual practice. Revenge of the Fregeans!

In the end a very large literature of counterexamples and responses was generated, a new Gettierology, as it were. I will come in the next section to the famous counterexamples. But first something more basic, the implications of taking singular propositions to be the objects of belief. Much of the subsequent literature is concerned, explicitly or implicitly, with the implications of the shift from Fregean thoughts to singular propositions. And despite the fact that the shift occurs in the service of a mere implementation of Frege's core ideas, it is quite startling.

On Frege's own realization of the core ideas, propositions—the things believed— are meaning-like entities. Direct reference philosophers reject Frege's conception in favor of a Russell-inspired one: Objects, particulars, things like you and me can be constituents of propositions. But what they accept is not Russell's approach; it is Russell-without-acquaintance, that is Russell without the Russellian epistemology. Russell himself insisted that for a thing to be a constituent of a proposition that one can entertain, the thing needs to stand in a particularly close epistemic relation to the mind, the relation of direct acquaintance.[8] Whereas for contemporary direct reference advocates, the propositions believed may include ordinary "external" objects. The move from Fregean thoughts to singular propositions is thus no mere

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[6]Or so I have always read them, as fellow travelers. Others interpret them in other ways and develop direct reference along more Frege-friendly lines.

[7]Kripke's views are another story. His seminal paper, "A Puzzle About Belief," although it does not articulate a positive picture, clearly distinguishes him from most direct reference advocates—and from the position I'm discussing, on the question at issue.

[8]Interestingly, the epistemological intimacy in question is, for Russell, something like that enjoyed, for Frege, by the mind and senses.

move from Frege to Russell. It represents a very significant departure from tradition, the sort that breeds incredulity and talking at cross purposes.

To Frege and his followers, of course, the very idea that singular propositions could be belief contents seemed bizarre, even incoherent. The direct reference twist also seemed wacky to orthodox Russellians, since the propositions believed were alleged to contain external things like Aristotle, tables, and chairs. For traditionalists generally, the direct reference outlook on the objects of belief was as bad as, if not worse than, its signature outlook on reference, the idea of cognitively unmediated reference. That's pretty bad.

The move to singular propositions was so radical that even its advocates were not quite prepared for it. How, for example, was one to understand our cognitive/epistemic relation to the new sorts of belief contents? Might one still talk in traditional ways about grasping concepts and propositions? What indeed is it to *grasp* a singular proposition? It just isn't self evident what's going on here.

One might proceed, as some did, by taming the radical idea; bringing it into the orbit of traditional philosophical thought. Inspired by the Fregean side of Kaplan,[9] one might posit modes of presentation that connect the mind with the externally constituted propositions. One would thus see the mind's grasp of such propositions as mediated; *ways of apprehending* the propositionsnow become the immediate and direct objects of thought.[10] This, as noted earlier, is not of a piece with the more radical tendency in direct reference that I prize, its (sometime) radical denial of modes of presentation for example.

But there is another way, even if it was rarely if ever considered. It is not, in the end, my preferred way; but it's one that will prepare the ground. Why not give up on grasping propositions? I don't mean: Give up on grasping propositions because what we grasp is something else, closer in. Why not give up the grasping picture altogether, as I suggested when it came to reference? When one refers to, say, Boethius, one may lack acquaintance not only with Boethius himself, but also with anything closer in, for example a sense or body of information that might constitute a cognitive connection to Boethius. I can talk and think about him because I am a member of a linguistic community that has a name for him.

So the singular propositions theorist, implementing Frege's core ideas about belief, need not adopt the "taming" strategy. If one is with me on cognitively unmediated reference, singular propositions can function as objects of belief without the agent grasping either them or their associated modes of presentation. Belief

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[9]I've argued in several papers and in Chapter 6 of *The Magic Prism* that Kaplan, in "Demonstratives," provides a kind of conservative approach to direct reference, one that pays great respect to Frege's sense-reference picture.

[10]As David Braun points out in his paper in (1998), there are many alternatives for filling out the picture of the intermediate entities. One might take them to be linguistic meanings, or (if this is different) Kaplan's characters, or sentences of a natural language, or mental representations, or mental states. Approaching believing in terms of such intermediate entities has implications for, and may be at least in part motivated by, the famous puzzle cases. I will return to this below.

in externally constituted propositions is thus no more of a special problem than is cognitively unmediated reference. That is, no special problem at all.

In the end I will reject Frege's core ideas and their implementations, Fregean and direct reference. Indeed, singular propositions will play no role in my account. So I won't explore the current proposal further.

1.3   The Famous Puzzle

The puzzle pivots on Frege's relational conception of belief reports. "Sam believes *that p*," formulates, according to Frege, a relation between Sam and the proposition he believes. *"That p"* is thus seen as a referring expression; it designates the proposition that the sentence *p* ordinarily expresses. For example, if I say, "Sam believes that John Wayne is an actor," the phrase "that John Wayne was an actor," designates the proposition that the sentence "John Wayne is an actor," ordinarily expresses. It's this proposition that Sam is said to believe.

There are, as noted, Fregean and direct reference implementations of this relational conception. For the moment, lets stick with the direct reference version. I'll return to make trouble for the other side soon.

The singular proposition that Sam is said to believe consists of the person, Wayne, and the property of being an actor. Notice that it does not matter by what name one refers to Wayne, say, the actor's actual given name, "Marion Morrison." "Marion Morrison was an actor" and "John Wayne was an actor" express the same singular proposition. But then "Sam believes that Marion Morrison" attributes to Sam precisely the same belief—that is, belief in the same proposition—as does the "John Wayne" belief sentence. The new report still says that Sam stands in the belief relation to the same singular proposition, the one that consists of this particular person—Wayne, Morrison—and this property—being an actor. To use a liturgical flourish, substituting co-referring proper names in the embedded sentence of an attitude report can never alter the belief ascribed—according to the singular propositions theorist. But if the same belief is ascribed, then the two reports must of course have the same truth values.

This is nothing but trouble. It can't be that switching the name is so insignificant, that there is no difference in the belief ascribed, no difference in the truth values. For it's easy to generate examples in which, intuitively speaking, the following reports have different truth values, and so would have to express different propositions:

(a) Sam believes that Wayne was an actor.
(b) Sam believes that Morrison was an actor.

For example, imagine that Sam doesn't know that the famous John Wayne was none other than his boyhood friend, Marion Morrison. He assumes that Marion spent his life back in Winterset, Iowa, pumping gas or some such thing. Marion Morrison, he tells us, was certainly no famous actor; he even failed to make the cut in various high school productions.

Direct reference looks to be refuted for contrary to its dictates, substitution of one proper name for another with which it co-refers can turn a true report into a false one.[11] Moreover, Frege's own implementation is supported. The example suggests that substituting co-referring names can change the propositional content, something that fits well with Frege's approach.

This difficulty for direct reference is not specific to belief; it arises for the attitudes generally. If Sam uttered "John Wayne was a famous actor," one could correctly report not only that Sam believed that John Wayne was a famous actor but also that Sam *said* this. But for Sam to have said this, according to direct reference, is for him to have asserted the singular proposition that John Wayne was a famous actor, that is, the singular proposition that Marion Morrison was a famous actor, these being the same singular proposition. But—here again is the rub for direct reference—it is (perhaps even more obviously) false that Sam said that Marion Morrison was a famous actor.

I am ready to accept this criticism of direct reference—its unfaithfulness to ordinary linguistic practice. But it is important that we pinpoint the source of the difficulty. It is not direct reference *per se*—for example, the Millian thesis that names are purely denotative—that causes the trouble. This Millian idea, as I'll try to convince you, can comport well with what I agree is the plain fact that Sam can believe that Wayne is an actor without believing that Morrison is. When I say that direct reference is in trouble, I should be understood as speaking about the singular propositions implementation of the basic Fregean picture.

This criticism of the singular propositions approach seems to me very powerful, a function of its directness and simplicity. The sort of counterexample considered does not involve philosophical exotica—no puzzle cases, not even a modal context—just ordinary garden-variety reports of belief.

The recalcitrance of actual practice should have signaled that we were on the wrong track. What it did instead was to engender defensiveness, as in the unfortunate tendency among direct reference theorists to deny the data, to insist that if Sam believes that Wayne was an actor, then it's just plain true that he believes that Morrison was as well, no matter what Sam says on the topic, and no matter what we, in our non-theoretical moments, would ordinarily say on the question of Sam's belief. Later, when the stubbornness of actual practice began to outrun theoretical stubbornness, what ensued was not a thorough reevaluation, but many new rounds of increasingly sophisticated theoretical refinement.

By contrast with the notorious difficulties for direct reference, Frege's approach to belief reports seemed, at least early along, unproblematic. Indeed, had we only belief (or attitude) sentences to explore, or so it was supposed, Frege's semantic

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[11]There are two contexts in which talk of substitution arises in discussions of these topics. First, there is the question of inference from one report to another, the question of which substitutions preserve truth. Second, and equally important, there is the question of the latitude enjoyed by the reporter in substituting another name (or other singular term) for the name (or other singular term) uttered by the original speaker, the believer. I am not being careful to discriminate these different kinds of substitution since in much of the discussion it doesn't matter of which we are speaking.

outlook would have been the approach of choice. This does not mean that Frege's was actually the approach of choice. For many, the old problems with Frege remained decisive. Frege's view fell short, very short, far before we came to belief sentences; it could not provide an adequate account of "Aristotle was wise."

1.4   Frege Upschlugged

Like some movies that initially receive rave reviews, Frege's approach to belief reports didn't hold up well. In retrospect, we were focused upon too limited a range of examples.

Imagine two communities each of which uses a different name for the same individual. In America, let's imagine, we always refer to the famous Roman as "Cicero"; in England, he is known only as "Tully." Further assume that while there is considerable overlap among the respective communities' characteristic beliefs about the man Cicero/Tully, their beliefs are different enough to constitute a difference in the sense of the names. Sam, an American, says "Cicero was an orator"—to pick an especially juicy example. I travel to England where Sam's views are of great interest, and I report Sam as having said or as believing *that Tully was an orator*. In many such examples, truth is preserved, and this does not sit well with Fregean scruples.[12]

We often correctly report a person's remarks, or beliefs, in very different terms than those in which the agent expressed, or would express, herself. Nor, in many such contexts, contrary to the dictates of Fregean theory, need we concern ourselves with the question of whether the new expressions are associated with the same information as the old. Fregeans were quick to point out that the latitudinarian approach of direct reference to substitution of co-referring names was inconsistent with actual practice. We now see that the more restrictive Fregean view is not much better off.

Here's a second sort of difficulty for Frege. Frege maintains that ordinary proper names often, perhaps usually, do not have community wide senses. Even individual speakers will often associate different senses with the same name in different contexts, presumably depending upon the salient properties of the referent in the context. Given the lack of shared senses, a listener often will not be able to tell which sense the speaker attaches to a name. Practical problems do not ensue, Frege tells us, so long as we use the same names with the same references. I imagine what Frege had in mind was that as long as we use the names with the same references, our practices of applying the names remain coordinated. But if a listener cannot

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[12]Whether or not the substitution intuitively preserves truth may depend upon subtleties of the context. But there are many such contexts in which truth is indeed preserved, e.g. where what's important in the context is whether Sam takes the individual in question, i.e. Cicero/Tully, to be an orator (rather than how Sam refers to or conceptualizes this individual).

tell which sense a speaker attaches to a name, then the listener's understanding of the speaker's thought is incomplete—even if their uses of the name are coordinated in practice. How then can the listener report the speaker's remarks in an indirect discourse, "*S* said that *p,*" report; how can the listener report the speaker's belief? Remember that for Frege, such reports require getting the proposition—the Fregean thought—right. Moreover, if someone does report Sam as having said (believed) that John Wayne was an actor—surely a true report—the report will, on Frege's theory, probably turn out false: If the reporter uses his own preferred sense for 'John Wayne', then his utterance of "Sam said (or believes) that John Wayne was an actor" attributes to Sam the assertion of or belief in a Fregean thought that may well be not the thought expressed by Sam.

So far, two problems for Frege:

1. substitution of co-referring names often does preserve truth, and
2. it's mysterious how we ordinarily correctly report the sayings and beliefs of another (when names are involved).

Notice that both difficulties suggest that in reporting speech or belief what is often important are the references of the names used by the speaker, not the senses. So it's not only that the highlighted examples pose problems for Frege. It's also that they support the intuitions of the singular propositions theorist.

Still another problem for Frege is created by his own implementation of the relational conception of belief reports. Here is the idea. On Frege's view, when I say "Sam believes that John Wayne was an actor," I refer with the clause *that John Wayne was an actor* to a Fregean thought. Specifically I refer to the thought that this embedded sentence would ordinarily—that is, when the sentence occurs unembedded in a belief (or other attitude) report —express as its sense. So the ordinary sense of "John Wayne was an actor," becomes the referent of 'that John Wayne was an actor' when the latter (that *p*) clause occurs in a belief report.

Furthermore, in such a report, the linguistic constituents of the embedded sentence (the name 'John Wayne' for example) refer not to the person, Wayne, but to the constituents of the ascribed thought. This makes sense; for if "that John Wayne was an actor" refers to a proposition, then the name 'John Wayne' (in that context) refers to a part of that proposition.

This is Frege's doctrine of indirect sense and reference. One arrives at this doctrine in reasonable enough ways. But one may look up a bit astonished when one arrives. One potential problem is that according to this doctrine of Frege, singular terms and predicates are systematically ambiguous. An expression, when embedded in a "that *p*" clause refers to something altogether different than usual, to a sense. Here is Davidson's reaction:

> Since Frege philosophers have become hardened to the idea that content-sentences in talk about propositional attitudes may strangely refer to such entities as intensions, propositions, sentences, utterances and inscriptions. What is strange is not the entities, which are all right in their place (if they have one), but the notion that ordinary words for planets, people, tables and hippopotami in indirect discourse may give up these pedestrian references for the exotica. *If we could recover our pre-Fregean semantic innocence, I think it would seem*

to us plainly incredible that the words "The earth moves," uttered after the words "Galileo said that," mean anything different, or refer to anything else, than is their wont when they come in other environments. [Italics added.] No doubt their role in *oratio obliqua* is in some sense special; but that is another story. Language is the instrument it is because the same expression, with the semantic features (meaning) unchanged, can serve countless purposes.[13]

Davidson emphasizes ambiguity: For Frege the words when embedded have new meanings and references. As Kripke quips in "Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference,"[14] "positing ambiguities is the lazy man's way in philosophy." Surely Frege's posit of such systematic ambiguities is a theoretical liability.

But there is also the suggestion in Davidson's remarks of another Fregean offense here. Perhaps even worse than the ambiguity, *per se*, is the unnaturalness of the new semantic properties, especially the unnaturalness of the new references. Imagine that I say, "Jonathan thinks that Eve [here I point to Eve] acts like a *pezzonevante*." Intuitively, I refer to two people, a believer and the person to whom I point, the person the belief is about. On Frege's theory, however, I never refer to Eve; I rather use her name to refer to its ordinary sense.[15]

Embedded sentences with indexical expressions provide maybe an even more striking example of the same phenomenon. I say, "Jonathan thinks that she [again pointing to Eve] acts like a *pezzonevante*." Again, on Frege's proposal, I am not referring to Eve, but to a sense. This seems altogether unacceptable.[16]

I've explored a number of reasons why Frege's own implementation of the core ideas does not hold up—and there are more in the literature. I say this not in defense of the at least equally troubled direct reference implementation. In fact let me mention an additional issue for direct reference. Rafi believes, we correctly say, that Dentor (the tooth fairy) is coming this very night. When Rafi uses the name, Dentor, he fails to refer. Accordingly, it seems plausible to maintain that he fails to assert a singular proposition. Nevertheless our report of Rafi's belief can be true. This is a severe problem for the singular propositions implementation. We just do not seem to be reporting a relation between a person and a singular proposition.

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[13]Davidson (1969).

[14]Op. Cit.

[15]My point is not that senses *per se* are unnatural—although that's so also. As Davidson says, "What is strange is not the entities, which are all right in their place (if they have one), but the notion that ordinary words for planets, people, tables and hippopotami in indirect discourse may give up these pedestrian references for the exotica."

[16]There is the additional problem of what to make of the idea of the ordinary sense when indexicals are at issue. I assume that Frege would say that the relevant sense is not the native (incomplete) sense of 'she', what 'she' expresses in every context, but the complete sense that the indexical obtains in a particular context. This is an idea that has it own problems that are independent of my concerns here.

1.5   The Real Problem

Frege's basic picture of the attitudes has proven very difficult to adequately implement. Could it be that the problem is not with this or that realization, but with the Fregean core?

The idea that there may be trouble at the core receives support from additional counterexamples. These counterexamples are directed not at one implementation or the other, but rather at what they share, what they agree upon. Both sides agree that when the contents of two expressions are the same (read "content" here as what gets contributed to the proposition) then those expressions may be substituted (in the embedded sentences), preserving truth. The idea is that such content-equivalent substitutions can affect only the linguistic surface, not the propositional essence. That the two approaches disagree about substitutivity of proper names reflects their disagreement about the content of names. However, both sides agree about the content of definite descriptions; a definite description, even according to the direct reference advocate, contributes to the proposition not its denotation, but rather descriptive information.[17] So they agree that when a definite description is substituted (for a name or another description), co-reference is not enough to preserve truth.[18]

There are, however, plenty of examples in which even this sort of substitution is unproblematic; truth is indeed preserved. You say to me that Bill (our dean and former colleague) is a jerk, something that you firmly believe. I say to my wife that you mentioned to me, or that you believe, that Joan's husband is a jerk. (My wife, let's assume, doesn't know Bill but knows Joan.) This will often be a perfectly acceptable, correct report. But it shouldn't be acceptable and may well turn out false not only according to Frege but even according to direct reference. For according to both of those approaches, the proposition I'm attributing to you is one in which Joan (according to direct reference), or some description of Joan (according to Frege), figures. This proposition will be false if Joan fails to figure in your thinking. Intuitively, however, the truth of the report does not require any such figuring of Joan in your thought. Similar remarks apply to a report, based on Sam's remark that John Wayne was a great actor, that Sam believes that the son of Mary Morrison was a great actor. In the right context, for example said to someone in Winterset Iowa, such a report is unproblematically true.

The suggestion of this sort of counterexample is that both approaches—even direct reference—fail to appreciate just how latitudinarian our practices are. There

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[17]Donnellan's referentially used descriptions function in many ways like names and so possibly substitution of co-referential ones would preserve truth. What I say, then, in the text may not apply to referential uses, for those who accept Donnellan's distinction.

[18]More fully stated, when a definite description is substituted in the embedded sentence of an attitude report, say for another definite description that denotes the same thing, the truth value is not necessarily preserved. Similarly when a definite description is substituted for a name that refers to the same thing that that the description denotes, they agree that truth is not necessarily preserved.

is another sort of counterexample that militates in the opposite direction: Our practices can be even more restrictive than the Fregean appreciates, or can easily accommodate. Take any two expressions that share the same associated information, perhaps "doctor" and "physician," or "fortnight" and "period of 2 weeks." There are well known examples—adduced many years ago, and much discussed— that suggest that even such synonyms are not always inter-substitutable: Someone can wonder whether a fortnight is a period of 2 weeks while being certain that a fortnight is a fortnight, someone can be certain that all (medical) doctors are (medical) doctors without being certain that all (medical) doctors are physicians.

This is of course not to say that these last or in fact any of the counterexamples are decisive. My aim so far has been to display the significant pressure that many ordinary examples exert on the Fregean core. I would hardly be disappointed, though, if the reader were to begin to suspect that perhaps something other than what Frege supposed is going on with our practice of reporting belief. Could it be that ordinary reports of belief do not formulate relations between persons and propositional contents?

Another way to focus this pressure on Frege's relational conception of belief reports is to attend to the role of the context of the belief report. In some kinds of reporting situations, Frege's construction of propositional content seems to yield the right substitution patterns. In others, those intuitions produce just the wrong results and direct reference intuitions are just the ticket. In still other situations, both sorts of explications of propositional content, both sorts of implementation of Frege's picture, seem to miss the mark. It seems to be a matter of context. Indeed, the very same belief attribution can be true in one context and false in another. "Sam believes that Marion Morrison is a great actor," for example. If we are reflecting on Sam's remarks about famous actors and his subsequent response to queries about his high school classmates, we will judge this sentence false. Clearly he would deny that Morrison was a great actor. If we are speaking to Morrison's relatives in Iowa, trying to encourage pride in Morrison's achievement, it will be natural and correct to quote the famous Sam as having said, or as believing, that Marion made the grade.

Context sensitivity looms large. But this is not something that Frege's relational picture suggests. Whether a report is true should depend upon, and just upon, whether it gets the content believed right, whether it accurately depicts what's going on in the head of the believer.

Here's what seems to me a natural way of thinking about the character of the contextual dependence. Let's begin with contexts in which substitution of co-referring names preserves truth. Think about the true report issued to Marion Morrison's relatives, that Sam believes that Marion—or that Mary's son—was a great actor. The communicative aim of the report was to inform that a certain person was taken by Sam to be a great actor. The way the believer was thinking about Marion is not important given the communicative end; all important is that it was Morrison, that is Wayne, under discussion. In such contexts, truth is preserved by substitution, presumably since substitution preserves what is crucial, that this individual is in question. On the other hand, it's sometimes quite important for purposes at hand how the believer is thinking of her referent, as "John Wayne" or

as "Marion Morrison." Perhaps we have been discussing the fact that some people know of this identity and some don't, and someone says "Sam doesn't believe that Marion Morrison is an actor." Such contexts are very sensitive to the substitution of one name for the other. In short, sometimes it's important for us to get into the believer's head more deeply than others. And our intuitive judgments track this, perhaps among other factors.

This sounds plausible enough, but how are we to assimilate it theoretically? Are such observations compatible with the Fregean basic picture, or are they suggestive of another?[19]

2 Part II: The Resolution

2.1 *Desiderata*

Davidson's Semantic Innocence One would naively suppose—Davidson argues, and I agree, that we should suppose—that linguistic expressions in the embedded sentences function as they normally do. We should not posit ambiguities here, attributing new meanings to expressions when so embedded. Names, for example, are in ordinary contexts Millian; they remain so in belief sentences. 'John Wayne' directly refers to John Wayne whether I use the name to attribute to him a certain height, or to say that you believe that he had creepy political views.

No Fudging on Truth-Values Semantic innocence has sometimes been seen to conflict with another desideratum that seems equally correct: *No fudging on truth values*. We should insist on the truth-values provided by ordinary intuitive judgments. What we want is an account that not only accommodates this data but one to which the data are congenial. The truth-values provided by ordinary judgments should seem like what we would have expected.

This second constraint yields a closely related one that is worth enumerating as a third. Belief sentences are highly context sensitive. Indeed, the same sentence—for example, "Sam believes that Marion Morrison was a great actor"—can be true in one context and false in another. *Context cannot be an afterthought in our thinking about the linguistic function of reports, any more than context can be an afterthought in our thinking about indexicals*.

How does one accommodate these constraints? Or more to the point here, how might a Millian accommodate them? Kripke, in *Naming and Necessity*, effected an elemental change in our thinking about reference and proper names. True, it was only a picture, one that needed further development. But it represented a radical departure from the received view and pointed the way forward. I believe that nothing

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[19]Were there world enough and time, I would append here a discussion of various ways both direct reference and neo-Fregean attempts to defend against the sort of criticisms I've been offering.

less is needed in the domain of the attitudes. My aim is to provide a conception that is thoroughly Millian, that is to say, it is semantically innocent and utilizes no Fregean or neo-Fregean notions: no senses, modes of presentation, or the like. It is one, moreover, to which the data from actual practice are congenial. It should not seem gerrymandered, engineered to avoid counterexamples.

2.2 Quine as Martian Anthropologist: Speaking for Another

Quine, in §45 of *Word and Object*, provides what I see as a master key to the domain. But Quine's ideas on the subject are embedded in his complex and controversial overall outlook. To distill the insights and to render the resulting picture as natural as I believe it to be, I'll present the material in my own way. Quine treats belief reports not in isolation, but in their connections with reports of sayings, direct ("John said '*p*'") and indirect ("John said that *p*"). In this section, I'll say a word about direct discourse and then explore indirect at more length. In Sect. 3. I'll turn to belief reports.

What follows is a kind of philosophical or armchair history of our practices, treating the more sophisticated forms as developing from the simpler. Indirect discourse is thus the child of direct, and belief reports the grandchild. While I intend no serious developmental claims, such plausible schemes—like imagined social contracts—can illuminate the phenomena and help break the hold of received views.[20]

Imagine then a primitive linguistic culture, one in which language has nevertheless progressed quite far. Speakers here are sophisticated relative to those in Wittgenstein's primordial situations. They refer to all sorts of things—people, places, events and the like—and predicate all sorts of things of the items to which they refer. Perhaps they even have devices of quantification. (It won't matter for what follows.) But they are, you might say, attitudinally impoverished; their practices do not include reporting on the speech or mental lives of their fellows, or indeed of themselves. They can say "The cat is on mat," but not that John said such a thing, or that he believes it.

2.2.1   Direct and Indirect Discourse

Imagine now a simple enhancement of their practice developed by a linguistic engineer or, less mythically, by his natural counterpart—linguistic evolution: the ability to quote someone. Quine says that

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[20]See Burns (2000), see esp. Chapter 7. Burns is attracted to eighteenth century stories about the development of language, stories that illuminate linguistic practice in general and help to break the hold of the sort of time Frege has become the classical spokesman.

> When we quote a man's utterance directly we report it almost as we might a bird call. However significant the utterance, direct quotation merely reports the physical incident and leaves any implications to us. (p. 219)

Driving Quine's remark is the idea that in quoting a person's words, our business is not interpretation. The reporter has no real latitude with respect to the sentence that she embeds in the quotation marks. For the most part, one's direct discourse report is true just in case one gets the sentence uttered just right. Still, matters may be slightly less stark than Quine suggests. We might allow, say, the substitution of words in our own language for a foreigner's words, enclosing what we attribute to him in quotation marks. Similarly, for grammatical and other trivial corrections.[21]

Direct quotation represents an important advance for the linguistically impoverished culture. But even on my liberal rendering, it is subject to severe limitations. It puts great demands on memory, indeed a kind of eidetic memory. And its limiting the reporter to the exact words of the speaker cramps communication. If, say, the reporter's audience has trouble with the original speaker's vocabulary, or if they are unaware of relevant features of the original speaker's context or his culture, audience uptake may fail. The reporter's ability to convey the speaker's point would be increased substantially were we to allow her to alter her formulation dynamically.

Thus arises "indirect discourse," relating that someone *said that p*. We don't use quotation marks, perhaps to signal that we are not providing, or may not be providing, the speaker's words, even more or less. The reporter chooses a sentence that in the current context conveys the original speaker's point and, as it were, puts this sentence into the original speaker's mouth.

Putting a Sentence in the Speaker's Mouth   —this is Quine's master key. Suitably developed, it will furnish a natural way of making intelligible our reporting of speech and belief. We focus on the sentence that the reporter embeds, not on its "content."[22] At the same time, the embedded sentence, I just said, must "convey the original speaker's point." And this might seem like propositional content in another guise. As we will see shortly, that is not so.

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[21] Of course, the minute one allows any corrections to the original words, one starts down a slippery slope. How much difference is there between the sort of corrections I'm envisaging in the text and, say, correcting for the use of indexicals in the speaker's original context—the reporter can "update" the speaker's use of "I" by using the speaker's name in the quoted report? Does this make it indirect quotation, or is this still direct? Quine's policy apparently is to allow no variation at all in direct quotation. Thus the bird-call remark. The distinction between direct and indirect is a distinction of art—or philosophy—since in actual practice we use quotation marks with varying degrees of correction. And so lines need to be drawn.

[22] It will come as no surprise that Quine—who has no use for "propositional content"— is focused on the sentence that the reporter embeds.

2.2.2   Translation and Indirect Discourse

Quine associates indirect discourse with translation: Putting words in someone's mouth is like translating his words for the current context. In philosophy we often oversimplify both of these practices, translation and indirect quotation. We think of translation on the model of "capturing literal meaning in different words." For a more adequate conception, don't think of translating a single sentence, as in an exercise for a student. Reflect instead on translating the bible or some great work of literature, literature that needs to be retranslated from time to time and from culture to culture. While different vocabularies separate cultures, the divide almost inevitably goes deeper. To make the original work available, a translator often needs to do more than, or something other than, simply finding words that get the literal meaning right.

In such actual translation maintaining the integrity of the original is of course paramount. But there is a second goal—bringing the original into contact with the new culture. And as noted, the gap to be overcome is not merely one of vocabulary. These two objectives—two constraints on translation—stand in tension with one another. The first militates towards using words very close in literal meaning to the original. The second encourages variations. How exactly are these to be balanced, integrated?

As if it were not difficult enough for a translator to discern the product of these two vectors, there are further complications. First, these aren't exactly vectors and there may not be a unique product. There may be several different ways of balancing the two constraints—perhaps each with drawbacks—and there may be no obvious choice. Moreover, the fit between the old language and the new is almost always imperfect. For example, the language of the original may not go quietly into the new language—there may be some unwanted implications in the various available formulations or some remainder from the original that the new language does not quite capture. To make this all explicit, even if one could, might be a major undertaking. And so the translator will often find herself deciding which features of the original she wants to preserve. And even where none of these issues arise, our practices give the translator considerable latitude over which aspects of the original to stress or to play down.

It's no accident that the rules for such subtle business have never been written. Reflection on translation can indeed inspire awe at cultural/linguistic evolution; at the fact that something so elaborate and functional has found its way into our practice. It's not only the fact of inheritance that is arresting; think about what it must take to learn such a complex business, or to teach it.

Just as translation, real translation, is no simple matter of capturing literal meaning, so too indirect discourse. In the last chapter I explored substitution patterns in the embedded clauses of belief sentences. The same sorts of patterns occur in indirect discourse reports, and are similarly not explicable in terms of literal meaning, nor of propositional content. Whatever your favorite explication of propositional content, it produces the wrong expectations of what we can and cannot substitute. But those substitution patterns—for both indirect discourse and as we will see,

belief—make much more sense when one is thinking in terms of real translation. The reporter picks a sentence to embed that, in contextually appropriate ways, counts as a good *paraphrase* of the original. To so paraphrase is not—certainly not necessarily and not even typically—to capture literal meaning or propositional content. Indeed, the term "paraphrase" is even better here than "translation," since the former is less suggestive of anything like capturing literal meaning.

There are striking further parallels between translation/paraphrase and indirect discourse. The two primary and often divergent goals of translation are also primary, and often divergent, goals of indirect reports. The reporter must be faithful to the original speaker's remark. At the same time the reporter needs to choose a sentence that in the current context conveys the original speaker's point. And there may well be no uniquely correct way to satisfy both desiderata. Moreover, there is the problem of fit: No way of putting the matter in the current context may get the original remark just right. And the reporter's latitude—which features of the original to highlight or downplay—seems just like that of the translator. Finally, as with translation, the rules for how to balance all of this, how to correctly report speech, have never been written.

If reflection on translation can inspire awe, indirect discourse is in a way more amazing. Only the highly qualified translate great works of literature, but we all report one another's speech. Do we actually manage to learn this, to teach it?

2.2.3   Quotational Latitude and Truth Values

To return to my fanciful history—we are at the stage of indirect discourse— the ability to quote roughly and appropriately to current context represents an impressive gain. But there is a cost. It is much less clear with indirect discourse than with direct quotation what counts as getting it right. Consider the all-important faithful rendering of the original speaker's remark. What about that remark's subtleties; what if it encapsulates a number of related points? What exactly does the truth of the reporter's rendition require? Moreover, given that the reporter will want to update the original speaker's sentence to facilitate communication, how much deviation do we allow, and of what sorts? At what point does acceptable deviation deform into misrepresentation, a false report?

It begins to seem almost miraculous how effortlessly we judge indirect discourse reports true or false, at least most of the time. But to what standards do we appeal? Let's deepen this difficulty before trying to resolve it. When one thinks of translation as a model, truth and falsity can begin to seem inapplicable to indirect discourse. Although we sometimes judge translations as correct or incorrect, more usual categories are better and worse, more or less nuanced, more or less sensitive. Why then don't we evaluate indirect discourse in such terms, on such a sliding scale?

That we actually evaluate indirect discourse as true or false should not incline us to suppose that real translation is the wrong model. Nor should we suppose that truth and falsity are, in the context of indirect discourse, anything less than real truth and falsity. It's helpful here to reflect on the claim that a certain expression

translates another, or that a certain translation is a good one. Despite the vagaries of translation, such claims are true or false. If the translation counts as good enough for present purposes then the claim that it's good—or the claim that a certain expression translates another—counts as true in the current context. Analogously, while a reporter's choice of a sentence to embed is better or worse, her overall report can be judged true or false, at least in the clear cases.

Here's what Quine says—he is an astute if unlikely anthropologist of linguistic practice—about evaluating indirect discourse reports:

> Commonly the degree of allowable deviation [from the original utterance] depends on why we are quoting. It is a question of what traits of the quoted speaker's remark we want to make something of; those are the traits that must be kept straight if indirect quotation is to count as true. (p. 218)

He continues,

> Evidently we must recognize in indirect quotation and other idioms of propositional attitude a source of truth-value variation comparable to the indicator words . . . . (p. 218)

The idea is that an indirect discourse report counts as true just in case the embedded sentence paraphrases the original remark in a way that is satisfactory, good enough, for present purposes. All manner of substitutions are in principle allowed; the limits are set by contextual considerations.

What sorts of contextual purposes come into play? Here's an example from earlier in this paper, when I was doing a bit of linguistic anthropology myself. Where what is important in the context is the individual to whom the original speaker refers—and it is not contextually important how the speaker refers, what terms or concepts he uses—then substitution of co-referential expressions, and not only names, is proper; it preserves truth. Imagine that the famous orator is called "Cicero" in America; in England he is "Tully." Sam, an American, says "Cicero was an orator"; he is unfamiliar, let's assume, with "Tully". To an English audience I can report Sam as having said that Tully was an orator. Turning to a case that involves descriptions—if my English audience is up on Tully's accomplishments, I could also report Sam as having said that the author of *De Fato* was an orator. Similarly, to return to an example of the last chapter, imagine that you say to me that Bill (our dean and former colleague) is a jerk. I can say, truly, to my wife that you mentioned to me that Joan's husband is a jerk. (My wife, let's assume, doesn't know Bill but knows Joan.) Such substitutions preserves truth; the reference of the original speaker is, as Quine says, what we wanted to make something of.

By contrast, think about this case: I report Sam's remark to other Americans who are interested in whether Sam knows that Cicero and Tully are one. In such a context, "Sam said that Tully was an orator" would be false. The context mandates, as it were, that we don't allow this sort of variation. Where it is all important how the speaker was thinking of the referent, substitution of a co-referring name can turn a truth into a falsehood.

2.2.4   Some Semantical Detail

I've spoken impressionistically of putting words in the original speaker's mouth. And I've suggested translation/paraphrase as a model for the choice of words to embed. But how does it work semantically? How do we describe the semantic function of the embedded sentence, and that of the sentence's constituent expressions?

Quine writes suggestively but somewhat darkly that quoting someone indirectly is "an essentially dramatic act."

> ...in indirect quotation, we project ourselves into what, from his remarks and other indications, we imagine the speaker's state of mind to have been, and then we say what, in our language, is natural and relevant for us in the state thus feigned. (p. 219)

Indulging in some drama of his own, Quine throws a spotlight on the reporter's utterance of the embedded sentence. The function of that sentence in the mouth of the reporter is for Quine unique. No assimilation of indirect discourse sentences to ordinary subject-predicate, relational, or quantificational sentences will do. An indirect report involves a radical shift in mid-sentence. When the reporter utters the first part of the sentence, "Sam said," she speaks normally. But when she hits the embedded sentence, something startling happens, she speaks in a different voice. She becomes an actor, feigning an utterance of the original speaker.[23]

But there is a simpler way. For the real punch of Quine's remark is not his neo-fundamentalist reading of "putting words in another's mouth," the alleged theatrical performance. The real punch concerns the function of the embedded sentence. To highlight that function, think about an actor's utterance on stage: He produces a sentence which might ordinarily be used to make an assertion. The actor himself does not, of course, assert anything. He acts like that's what he's doing without doing it. Notice that despite the actor's slightly exotic use of the sentence, the parts of the sentence—proper names, predicates, etc.—do not take on anything like new meanings. What's new about the actor's utterance is at the level of the speech act. Like a *Begriffsschrift* sentence without an assertion sign, like a sentence that occurs as the antecedent of a conditional, there is a lack of assertive force. My idea, then, is to see the indirect discourse reporter's utterance of the embedded sentence as expressing without asserting. The embedded sentence's parts occur semantically intact.

I want to consider for a moment another context in which assertible sentences occur unasserted: quotation. Frege's way with quotation posits an ambiguity; in this way, it's just like his treatment of the embedded sentences of indirect discourse.[24]

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[23]What happened to 'that' in "that p? Quine doesn't address this. And not having any good idea about it, I'm happy to let it go for now. This needs to be a future agenda item, a detail, but an important one.

[24]"...a word standing between quotation marks," he writes in "On Sense and Reference," "must not be taken as having its ordinary reference." All references to Frege on this page are to "On Sense and Reference," p. 58–59.

But there is a difference: Embedded in indirect discourse, expressions stand for their ordinary senses. Quoted expressions are, as he says, "signs of signs."

Quine's use-mention approach to quotation is a specification of this approach. For Quine, as for Frege, a quotation like

"Botwinnik uses the French defense"

names, mentions, the sentence that is contained within the quotation marks. One way to achieve this result—perhaps Frege's own way—is for the words in the context of quotation to refer to themselves. The other way—Quine's—is to view the whole quotation as indissoluble, as naming the sentence inside the quotes, but not, so to speak, word by word. This Quinean idea—that the word 'French' fails to have any more of an occurrence in the above quotation than 'cat' has in 'category'— is on a continuum with, but farther out than, ambiguity. You take the sentence, put it in quotes, and the words, as it were, not only don't function quite as usual, they disappear; they yield to a complex name of a linguistic expression.

Ambiguity and its cousins are one way to go with quotation. But as Kripke quips, ambiguity is "the lazy man's way in philosophy."[25] How else might we proceed? Consider another sort of quotation-device, *display*—where one sets off a sentence on a new line in order to speak about it. While it's perhaps customary to assimilate display to quotation—as does Quine—it seems more natural to assimilate quotation to display. Here's what I mean.

First, think about display this way: When one sets off a sentence on its own line, one draws attention to the sentence. That is not to say that one refers to the sentence. One makes it a subject of discourse without linguistic reference to it. One does not need an expression to refer to it, for one has something better, the item itself.[26] One can just, as it were, hold it up. The displayed sentence—appearing on the stage, as it were—need not be seen as having anything but its ordinary semantics, including truth value, references and meanings of the parts, etc.

Now for quotation, assimilated to display: Given the story just told about display, why not think of quotation as similarly setting off a sentence—holding it up, presenting it? If so, a sentence set off by quotation marks is semantically innocent.

I've been reflecting on contexts in which sentences express without having their "normal," assertive function. Returning to indirect discourse, the first part of my idea was to adapt Quine's remarks so as to see the reporter's utterance of the embedded sentence as expressing without asserting. But our discussion of unasserted occurrences of assertible sentences suggests a further step: Indirect discourse as a context of display. Well, not exactly display.

Consider this actual practice. Someone asks (rhetorically, speaking in London), "What was Sam's point?—assume that Sam uttered, back home in America, "Cicero was an orator." The rhetorical questioner answers himself, "Tully was an orator." Now imagine the following variant. One writes, "Sam's point is" and then on the

[25]Kripke, "Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference" op. cit. p. 268.

[26]Cf. Searle in (1969); and Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* §16.

next line one writes a sentence that provides a contextually appropriate paraphrase of Sam's original utterance. Or one writes, "Sam's said," in a context in which it's clear that a paraphrase rather than an exact quotation is in question, and then on the next line the paraphrase.

My idea about indirect discourse is that "says that" creates just such a context. It's a bit like display in that the embedded sentence occurs unasserted, but with its semantics intact. It's unlike display in that the embedded sentence is not just an object of attention, it's actually used to express something, although not to assert. Perhaps what this comes to is this: In contexts of ordinary display and quotation, the properties of the displayed or quoted expressions that are relevant and of interest are just the syntactic properties. That is, I put the sentence on a separate line to draw attention to that sentence—not to its truth value, or to what it normally expresses. In the context of indirect discourse, it's the expressive properties of the sentence that are of interest.

To sum up, I don't take the embedded sentence of an indirect discourse report as a device of reference,[27] nor do I take an indirect discourse sentence to be relational. "Says that" rather creates the sort of context just described—quasi-display—and signals that what follows is a contextually appropriate paraphrase.[28]

2.3   Extending the Account: Reporting Belief

2.3.1   Preliminary Sketch of a New Practice

The formerly primitive linguistic culture is increasingly sophisticated; indirect discourse is in place. But the linguistic engineer is hardly done. In a moment of epiphany he envisages a vastly more powerful use of putting words in people's mouths. The engineer's inspiration is this: Even when someone has not spoken on a topic, we are often in a position to speak for him, to put words in his mouth. Perhaps it never occurred to the agent to address the topic. Perhaps he has his reasons for reticence.[29] Still it may be evident to someone—or worth someone's speculating— what his verdict would be.

The new practice may begin with an eye to those who haven't spoken on a topic, but this hardly exhausts its range or significance. For even when one has spoken on

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[27]Nor is it part of such a device as on the view that it's the expression that p that refers to the proposition asserted.

[28]My picture is a bit like Davidson's. Davidson says that the "that" in "He said that p" is a demonstrative, followed by a saying that is demonstrated. I don't have views about the precise function of the "that" and I want to avoid Davidson's (and the tradition's) idea that the sentence is relational. But I like the idea that the reporter does a unique kind of saying of the embedded sentence.

[29]The Ba'al Shem Tov, founder of Hasidism, suggested that each of us has a pre-determined, quite finite number of words allotted. A person expires with his last word. A word to the wise.

a topic, one's remark may or may not be representative of one's overall view, one's verdict. The new sort of report may thus provide a person's all-things-considered view on a topic.

The reporter may thus have to distill a number of the agent's remarks. She may need to place those remarks in the context of the agent's behavior, and of his life and culture. The embedded sentences of the new reports formulate what someone would say on the matter, whether or not one has said it.

In a word, the new reports ascribe *belief*, a term that originally connoted trust in someone or something. They do so by naming the agent, using the verb "to believe," and then adding a "that *p*" clause, embedding a sentence that formulates the view of the agent. Belief reports greatly exceed both ancestors—direct and indirect discourse—in power and utility. They are pivotal in explaining and predicting action and in keeping track of people's cognitive whereabouts.

To anticipate my philosophy of mind discussion in Sect. 3, notice that my way of distinguishing indirect discourse and belief reports does not make the first merely a matter of the outer—speech—while the second reports on the inner phenomenon—believing. Instead I'm emphasizing the wide variety of considerations—speech, behavior, etc.—to which belief reports are responsive; *said-that*-reports are responsive to something more local, more narrowly circumscribed. Certainly there are times that a person's verdict—her coming to a certain conclusion—on a topic does reflects something inner, perhaps various things that are inner in various senses. But the same can be said about a person's utterances.

2.3.2 Reporting Belief: A Conjuring Trick

Let's revisit Quine's "reporting as theater" idea. First, the reporter, as if she were preparing to act a part, engages the agent's perspective. Then, she goes on to act the part. In her utterance of the embedded sentence she plays the agent, feigning his state of mind, speaking not only for him but as him.

I'll come to the second aspect in a moment. But the first aspect—making contact with the agent's perspective—plays a special role in reporting belief. The basis of an indirect discourse report is of course the original utterance. But with belief there may be no such generating utterance. And even where there is such an utterance, its role is, as we have seen, less focal than with indirect discourse. In the absence of a generating utterance—or even in its presence—there are a variety of considerations to which the reporter might attend: the agent's remarks on related matters, his behavior, affective reactions,[30] features of his culture.

In discussing indirect discourse, I criticized the second aspect of Quine's reporting-as-theater idea. In our account of the reporter's utterance, we can settle

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[30] When we consider the evidence for someone's believing something, we tend to emphasize the agent's behavior, verbal and other. But his affective reactions are also important, like his surprise at coming upon certain states of affairs, etc. Eric Schwitzgebel emphasizes this in his paper (2002).

for less than acting, less than feigning. And this is so for belief reporting as well. In both sorts of reports the embedded sentence—like a sentence in the mouth of an actor—expresses without asserting.

I want to highlight something distinctive—different than indirect discourse—about the embedded sentence in belief reports, or about the way such embeddings are produced. This is especially dramatic when there is no generating utterance, no sentence provided to ground the reporter's activity. The reporter then needs to engage in something of a conjuring trick. She throws into the hopper, as it were, the jumble of considerations mentioned above—related speech, behavior, affective reactions, culture. She factors in the reporting context. And out pops a sentence to embed.

The conjuring trick is dramatic when we are considering cases in which the believer has not spoken on the topic. But something similar is involved even when the agent has spoken. Since to report a belief is to report a verdict, the reporter's eye always needs to be ready to take in—and sometimes it will take in—a wider field than a single utterance. And so even when the agent has spoken on the topic, the conjuring abilities of the reporter may be called upon.

The magical aura is only increased when we reflect on the fact that in an important sense the reporter doesn't know what she is doing. She couldn't even begin to articulate many of the factors that go into her production of the to-be-embedded sentence. Of course this is true of all of us all the time in so many of our activities, linguistic or not. But here the level of complication seems even more fantastic than usual.

There is a hint of this magical quality even in indirect discourse reporting. To digest the original utterance, the reporter may need to consider a similar miscellany: the original speaker's behavior, other things he may have said, various aspects of his culture. But in reporting speech, these factors need to be digested merely to help us interpret the agent's specific utterance, not to figure out what, more generally, he thinks.

The paraphrase idea from indirect discourse, although it has some purchase in the case of reporting belief, is not quite the right idea for belief. It is **as if** paraphrase were the right idea; **as if** we begin the belief reporting process with a sentence from the agent's repertoire which we then paraphrase. But we don't really do that. What we do instead is what I've been calling the conjuring trick.

But the analogy with the paraphrase phenomenon of indirect discourse remains powerful. For there are similar constraints on the choice of a sentence to embed. First, the sentence must exhibit faithfulness to that which it, as it were, glances backward. In the case of belief, this may include an utterance, if there was one, on the topic in question; it definitely includes the miscellany, the constellation of utterances, behavior, cultural considerations, and so on. Second, the chosen sentence must be appropriate to the current context, with all that involves.

2.3.3   Belief Reports as Summary Judgments and Kripke's Data

Sometimes things are simple. Someone remarks on a topic. His other utterances, behavior, etc. provide no reason not to take him at his word. And so we attribute the relevant belief to him. But not always. As I've said, attributing belief often involves distillation, summing up, an "all things considered" judgment.

Consider Kripke's example.[31] The bi-lingual Pierre says in Paris, "*Londres et jolie.*" Back in the slums of London, speaking English and not realizing that the same city is in question, he denies that London is pretty. How is one to report, to distill, what Pierre believes? It seems wrong to say of him either that he believes that London is pretty or that he believes that it is not. Pierre's take on this question seems to resist formulation in the usual way.

To say that it resists formulation in the usual way is not to say that it's ineffable, that it cannot be formulated. As Kripke points out, we can tell the whole story, so to speak, as I have told it in the last paragraph. What Kripke emphasizes, and what I'm emphasizing, however, is the unavailability of an all-things-considered judgment, a formulation in terms of whether or not Pierre believes that London is pretty.

The problem, I think, is that Pierre's remarks in their various contexts don't fall in with one another in a way that allows a summary judgment. Nor, as Kripke says, can we put some of those remarks aside as no longer representing what he thinks. In more felicitous cases, an agent's remarks, behavior, and the rest, cohere; they feed more or less smoothly into an all-things-considered judgment. Kripke shows that such a verdict-formulating sentence is sorely lacking in Pierre's case.

Kripke's puzzle is what to say about Pierre's belief. But that there is no verdict is, I'm arguing, hardly puzzling. The ingredients of the miscellany fail to cohere with one another. Their failure, moreover, is not one that we can make good on given our knowledge of the circumstances, people's ways, and so on. There just is no verdict.

Similarly, imagine that an agent has only made one pronouncement on the topic at hand, "*Londres et jolie.*" But he lives in an ugly part of London, as in the Kripke story. And although he has never explicitly denied that London is pretty, it is obvious to his friends that he would deny it. Again, the inputs fail come together so as to yield an output sentence.

Somewhat similarly we might imagine a situation is which one could not produce a correct report of speech. Here the problem would not be an incoherent miscellany. One would instead think about cases in which the goals of reporting speech cannot be simultaneously met, in which faithful paraphrase seems to be incompatible with making the original speaker's point accessible. Every good paraphrase seems obscure in the new context, and every one that adequately communicates misses something important about the speaker's point.[32] This is related to the phenomenon

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[31] See his paper, "A Puzzle About Belief" op. cit.

[32] Such a phenomenon seems possible also in cases of reporting belief. The problem in such a case would not be the indigestibility of the inputs, but rather the problem of simultaneously satisfying the goals of reporting belief.

mentioned by Quine, cases of indirect discourse in which it's impossible to render a judgment of truth or falsity.

I'm not sure that in the end Kripke would disagree with any of this. His view is that our belief reporting practice breaks down in cases like Pierre's. "Hard cases," he reminds us, "make bad law," a worthwhile reminder in a time when it's fashionable in philosophy to think of philosophical theorizing as pointedly focused on puzzle cases. This remark of Kripke's is, I'm betting, another way of making the sort of point about reportage that I'm making.

Kripke and I perhaps disagree over his principle of disquotation. Kripke sets out this principle as having the force of necessity.[33] According to this principle, given a sincere utterance we can infer a corresponding belief report, obtained by embedding the uttered sentence or a translation of it.[34] I agree that inferring belief from sincere utterance is something we do with ease in most contexts. But as I see the matter, such "disquotation" always involves a certain risk. This because of the "all-things-considered" character of belief reports, the fact that they are potentially responsive to much more than a single utterance.[35]

2.3.4   The Desiderata

My account of belief reports, like that of indirect discourse, is meant to provide a natural way to accommodate the desiderata mentioned earlier. No such account was forthcoming from the traditionalists, Fregean or direct reference. The traditionalists' problem, as I see it, was not one of detail. It was rather a consequence of taking propositional content—whether explicated in terms of Fregean thoughts or singular propositions—as the master key. One makes the data from actual practice into a problem if one supposes that to report belief is to formulate a relation between a person and a propositional content.

Notice that the data from substitutivity patterns now fall into place without a struggle. As Quine taught, the substitution patterns reflect what is important in the context. There are contexts in which the agent's mode of identifying the person about whom he has a belief may not be of great interest. And so, in such contexts, substitution may be the rule. In terms of one of the examples I gave, when speaking to Brits, the reporter may freely substitute 'Tully' for the American speaker's 'Cicero'. But where the agent's characteristic identification of the referent is very much in question, the same substitution may turn a truth into a falsehood.

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[33] Although given his resolution, perhaps that was a kind of plausible assumption Kripke advances, one that does not quite make it through Kripke's conclusion.

[34] When Kripke speaks of translation—he enunciates a "principle of translation,"—my sense is that he speaks not about what I called actual translation, but of the philosopher's ideal of capturing literal meaning in alternative words.

[35] My view thus has the consequence that a sincere utterance is not necessarily one in accord with one's belief.

Another desideratum is semantic innocence. As with indirect discourse, names that occur in the embedded sentence of a belief report do their regular Millian thing. The reporter just speaks the embedded sentence, expressing without asserting its point.

Turning to empty names, sometimes such a name seems just the ticket for a belief report—say the agent expressed himself with a name like 'Zeus'. If we divert our focus from propositional content and see the reporter's goal as something more like paraphrase—or finding an output sentence that properly attends to the miscellany—then the use of an empty name ceases to present a problem. This feels right: We do think that various people believe in gods that do not exist, and we can say so using the gods' names. We thus capture their beliefs. Singular propositions seem beside the point.

Finally, something that is not quite a desideratum. I feel a great deal of sympathy for Wittgenstein's idea that classic philosophical problems—according to me, at least some classic problems—stand in need of dissolution. But *dissolution* is a delicate business, easily subject to misuse. Dissolution, on my view, is not something at which we aim. It's rather something that can emerge from a sustained look at a classic problem and its classic solutions.[36] What I've been arguing yields something like dissolution with regard to the notorious puzzle about substitutivity. Direct reference, we were told, founders on the rocks of substitutivity; a Millian view cannot accommodate the obvious fact that someone can believe that Cicero was an orator without believing that Tully was. We have now seen, or I have now argued, that my sort of Millianism faces no such threat; no special help is needed with substitutivity.

3   Part III: Finally, Terra Firma

Is our study of belief reporting suggestive about believing, the mental phenomenon? Does what we have seen of our practice of reporting belief have implications for the philosophy of mind.

To begin: belief reports are—like their indirect discourse forebears—non-relational. The verb "to believe" does not refer to a relation between an agent and a content believed; rather it indicates that what follows is the agent's take on the question at hand. Such a non-relational semantic account suggests that the subject matter under discussion is, whatever else it is, not a relational phenomenon. But what is it, this phenomenon under discussion?

Traditionally, views that don't see believing as constituted by a relation between a person and a proposition tend to suppose that believing is something like a dispositional state. To believe that *p* is to be disposed to say certain things (in

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[36]In my book, *The Magic Prism,* I so conclude about many of the allegedly fatal problems for the Millian.

certain circumstances), to have certain kinds of thought episodes, to do certain things, and the like. Indeed, whether or not believing is relational, it's natural to wonder about the place of certain tendencies or dispositions. In the prior discussion, I haven't spoken of dispositions. But I have spoken of something closely related, of a miscellany of factors to which belief ascription is responsive, including speech, behavior, and the like.

In what follows I will refer to the miscellany of factors as coherences. The idea is that associated with a particular belief will be a certain constellation of typical kinds of remarks, thought episodes, behaviors, perhaps affective reactions, and the like, in various ways keyed to circumstances.

I just spoke of an association of believing with the coherences. Certainly there is such an association. The question is how to further specify that association, to situate the coherences properly with respect to belief, neither to slight their role nor to elevate it. I'll argue in a moment that some discussions in the philosophical literature tend to do one or the other. But before plunging in, let me say a bit more by way of setting up the discussion.

I noted earlier what I hope is uncontroversial, that we look to the coherences in attributing belief, that we use as evidence for belief facts about how someone has behaved, what one has said, and so on. But there is a more fundamental (and non-evidential) relation between belief and the coherences: Belief-talk—certainly in its paradigm applications—presupposes such coherences. Those to whom we paradigmatically attribute belief are creatures who exhibit such coherences. Belief-talk applies with a certain strain to creatures who partially exhibit such patterns but whose equipment and/or development precludes the full range—for example, non-linguistic animals or pre-verbal infants. Some philosophers deny belief to such creatures. This seems excessive but it provides evidence—even if unwittingly—of an attenuated application of belief-talk.[37]

Back to situating the coherences vis-à-vis belief. Philosophers of language influenced by Frege (or by the traditional ideas that influenced Frege) tend to slight the coherences. If one construes believing as mental assent to a grasped content one may relegate the coherences to mere causal consequences of believing. On the other extreme, there is a tradition in the philosophy of mind in which one elevates the coherences. In the spirit of Ryle, one might thus identify believing with a particular range of coherences—or dispositions.

To begin with Frege's way, the assent-to-a-content idea may slight the coherences by making them inessential. For according to it, believing becomes not essentially embodied, something that could be going on with an unembodied Cartesian mind. Angels—who according to St. Thomas think without the use of language—might

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[37]Think of the application of belief-talk to animals and infants as an extension, natural enough, of the concept. Somewhat similarly, talk of unconscious belief can be seen as a natural—even if a late and ingenious—extension. Unconscious believers exhibit enough of the sort of coherent pattern with belief that p to be counted among the believers, even if their "belief" is not, in the ordinary course of things, available to them.

thus believe as we do; their differences from us would pertain only to the causal consequences of belief, the coherences. (This may or may not bother one. It bothers me since it presumes the ability to have some sort of grip on the mental life of a creature whose mental life is not connected with our world and our ways of making contact with the world.)

Nowadays the assent-to-a-content picture is likely to be wedded to the idea that the cognitive action actually takes place at the neurological level. Thus the charge of disembodiment looks to be mooted. But not quite. As Putnam[38] and others have pointed out, Cartesian-spirited views of the mind often find up-to-date versions in brain and neurological terms. Such views attend to the letter but not the spirit of essential embodiment. A closer connection between believing and the coherences seems to me called for.

Now for the other extreme: To identify believing with the having of a constellation of tendencies gives the coherences too prominent a role. While the practice of reporting belief gives an evidential role to the coherences, a belief report does not have such coherences as its subject matter. It does not make a claim about the coherences. To say what someone believes is not—as the first view of belief would have it— to take a stand on a mental state that underlies the surface phenomena in question. But it's also not to assert anything about a constellation of tendencies. It is rather just to speak for the agent on the question at hand.

If what the reporter articulates in the name of the agent is in fact the agent's view, then the agent will exhibit the pattern in question. But this doesn't make the pattern the subject matter of the belief report. Compare indirect discourse. When an indirect discourse report is true—when the reporter correctly articulates something said by the agent—there may be various things that must be true about the agent, things that are involved in assertion. But that doesn't mean that the reporter refers to those things in her report. She merely speaks for the agent, articulates the point of his utterance (or at lease a currently relevant point of that utterance).

Our belief reporting practice represents our way of keeping track of one another with respect to such patterns, coherences. We keep track by uttering the embedded sentence and thus exemplifying the constellation of tendencies. That we do it this way is telling about us. One can imagine other ways of tracking cognitive location; for example by acting out scenes in the name of—or as—the "believer." But our practice is not like that. We are inveterate talkers, and our tracking practice writes this large, involving as it does putting words in the agent's mouth.

But what has happened to **believing** in all this? That was our topic, after all. We know that it's not that which underlies the symptoms nor is it the constellation of tendencies. What's left? Here's my radical suggestion: Taking our cue from the reports, perhaps we have been looking in vain for some sort of state or process of believing. For we refer to no such state or process when we report belief. We just speak for the person.

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[38]See Putnam (1994) for a discussion of this well-discussed but still insufficiently appreciated phenomenon.

What I am proposing coheres nicely with something that Arthur Collins has been arguing for years.[39] While my concern here has been with third-person belief ascription, Collins has been largely focused upon first-person expression of belief—"I believe that *p*." He has argued forcefully that the subject matter of such assertions is only *p*, not some state, process, or condition of the agent's mind. From Collins's point of view, a dispositional account of belief is not much better than one that sees belief as a state of a Cartesian mind. For both views take the subject matter of first-person belief locutions to be something about the agent. Collins sometimes puts his view by saying that belief has no inner constitution. And that's what I'm arguing. Just as Collins sees first-person remarks as ways of asserting *that p*, I see third person belief ascriptions as ways of putting *that p* in the agent's mouth, of expressing *that p* on behalf of the agent.

My view here certainly does not represent the way I approached this matter at first, or even long after. Fairly late in the day, even having come to reject Frege's semantic approach, I couldn't imagine an alternative to Frege's first core idea. That's in part because I thought of believing as, so to speak, a piece of nature, to be explained like any other. Compare the concept of *water*. There is the substance, water, and then linguistic practice evolves so as to make room for, to take notice of, this natural item. Similarly, I supposed that in the (relative) beginning, there was believing, and our practice of reporting belief evolved to report the facts about believing. But if I am right, believing is very different. With believing, the linguistic practice of belief ascription—to use J. L. Austin's happily outdated expression—wears the pants. That practice evolved as a way of keeping track of people cognitively, that is with respect to the coherences. But the reports do not involve reference to the coherences, nor as I've argued to a content believed, or even to a belief relation.[40]

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[39]Collins should not get the credit for my version of it. I'm joking; he does not agree that we agree.

[40]Thanks to Megan Stotts for very helpful editorial assistance. My reorientation of our thinking about belief and reporting belief raises questions that the received view seemed to accommodate en passant, questions like the following: What becomes of belief-desire explanations of action? Are they causal explanations? How can they be on such an ethereal picture of belief? What becomes of the usual philosophical idea that sincere speech is speech caused by belief? And of course many others. Some of these I have pondered and could almost write about; others await study.

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On the Inferential Structure of Indirect Reports

András Kertész and Csilla Rákosi

1 Introduction

As Wieland (2013: 389) puts it, "an indirect report typically takes the form of a speaker using the locution 'said that' to report on an earlier utterance".[1] Consider the following example:

(1) (a) Professor Gardner: I didn't meet any top models at the airport.
     (b) Reporter: Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport.
     (c) Professor Gardner didn't meet Katie at the airport.

We make a simple terminological distinction between the original utterance, the indirect report, and the processed report. In the above example (1)(a) is the *original utterance*, (1)(b) is the *indirect report*, and the complement of the report, i.e. the statement in (1)(c), is the *processed report*.

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[1]See also Capone (2013), Davis (2015) and Holt (2015).

A. Kertész (✉)
MTA-DE Research Group for Theoretical Linguistics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and University of Debrecen, Institute of German Studies, H-4010 Debrecen, Pf. 47, Hungary
e-mail: andraskertesz@yahoo.de

Cs. Rákosi
MTA-DE Research Group for Theoretical Linguistics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H-4010 Debrecen, Pf. 47, Hungary
e-mail: rakosics@gmail.com

The classical literature on indirect reports following Davidson's (1968) seminal essay (see e.g. Kaplan 1989; Soames 1989; Platts 1979; Burge 1986; Rumfitt 1993; Segal 1989 etc.) handled them as phenomena with systematic and generalizable properties raising problems to be solved by semantic theories. This view can be summarized, in a very simplified manner, as (A1):

(A1) (a) Indirect reports are basically semantic in nature.
      (b) Indirect reports have semantic properties that are *systematic* and *generalizable*.
      (c) There is a samesay-relation between the original utterance and the indirect report in the sense that they have the same semantic content.[2]

However, today there is wide agreement on the assumption that indirect reports cannot be analysed properly without a substantial consideration of pragmatic factors. A second position acknowledges that, though indirect reports undoubtedly have important semantic properties, they are shaped by the peculiarities of particular communicative situations that are neither systematic nor generalizable. We subsume this standpoint under (A2) which has been put forward in Cappelen and Lepore (1997b: 289):

(A2) (a) Indirect reports are basically *pragmatic* in that the reporters convey information about a particular act in a particular context to a particular audience situated in a different context.
      (b) Indirect reports share some stable, not context-sensitive semantic features but they also have pragmatic properties that are *neither systematic nor generalizable*.
      (c) There is a samesay-relation between the original utterance and the indirect report whose characteristics, however, can be revealed only partially by making use of semantic analyses.[3]

According to the third view, although indirect reports are basically pragmatic, their constitutive properties are systematic and generalizable (see, e.g., Wieland 2013: 390f.). This stance is shared by, among others, Wieland (2013) and Capone (2010). Its essence can be summarised as follows:

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[2]For the characterisation of the samesay relation, see Cappelen and Lepore (1997b: 280ff.).

[3]Cf. "But unlike what others conclude, we believe our data establishes that the perfectly viable practice of indirect speech requires the samesay relation to be broader than MA [= the assumption that an adequate semantic theory T for a language L should assign p as the semantic content of a sentence S in L iff in uttering S a speaker says that p – AK & CsR] permits; it's no role for semantic theory to place a priori constraints on what can samesay what. Whether two utterances samesay each other often depends on non-semantic considerations." (Cappelen and Lepore 1997b: 291)

(A3) (a) Indirect reports are basically *pragmatic* in that the reporters convey information about a particular act in a particular context to a particular audience situated in a different context.

  (b) Indirect reports have properties that are *systematic* and *generalizable*.

  (c) There is a pragmatic equivalence relation between the original utterance and the indirect report. This relationship results from a kind of metarepresentation which is analysable with the help of the combination of some pragmatic framework such as the theory of pragmemes and Relevance Theory.

Against this background, the linguistic analysis of reports in which there is no semantic equivalence between the original utterance and the report but there is some kind of inferential relation, is especially challenging. For example, let's consider two examples put forward in the literature (Cappelen and Lepore 1997b: 285; Wieland 2013: 396):

(2) *A*: I didn't fail any students.
     B: Professor *A* said Maryanne passed her exam.

(3) *A*: It's awfully stuffy in here.
     B [to *C*]: *A* said that she would like for you to open the window.

Wieland calls (2) an "inferential indirect report" and contrasts it with (3), which is an indirect report based on implicature. For Wieland and Cappelen and Lepore, (2) is an appropriate report in contexts in which *B* knows that *A* is one of Maryanne's professors. In contrast, Wieland believes that (3) has a natural felicitous reading and an equally natural infelicitous reading, because, although the implicature that *A* would like for you to open the window is natural, it is not clear whether it is felicitous to say that *A* said that he/she would like for you to open the window.

In both cases, it is the linguists' own linguistic (pragmatic) intuition on the basis of which the acceptability of the reports has been evaluated. Nevertheless, it may be the case that other native speakers of English are of the opinion that these are inferences by *B* rather than loose but correct reports of *A*'s words, and that in (2) *B* should have used, for example, the formulation "Professor *A* said that he didn't fail any students" so that the listener could draw the conclusion, or perhaps "From Professor *A*'s words I conclude that Maryanne passed her exam", etc.

One might raise the objection that Wieland (2013: 397) provides a theoretical criterion which allows us to distinguish between (under appropriate conditions) felicitous and (under normal circumstances) clearly infelicitous indirect reports. According to her, if there is a logical consequence relation between the original utterance, the report, and knowledge of the context, then the report will be totally acceptable. With implicatures such as those in (3), however, this is not the case.

   The problem is, however, that this criterion does not seem to be viable because it is in both cases possible to add "other facts known in context" to the original utterance so that the report "logically follows from them" (Wieland 2013: 397). Compare (4) and (5):

(4)   *A* didn't fail any students.
       [Maryanne is one of *A*'s students.]
       [For every *x*, if *x* is not failed in an exam, then *x* passed it.]

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       Maryanne passed her exam.

(5)   It's awfully stuffy in here.
       [If it's awfully stuffy in the office, *B* would always like for the youngest colleague to open the window.]
       [*C* is the youngest colleague in the office.]

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       B would like for *C* to open the window.

   Consequently, a point of departure differing from Wieland's as mentioned above is needed.
   Capone (2010) touches upon an aspect of indirect reports that we consider to be of utmost importance but which has, as far as we know, not received as much attention in the literature as it deserves:

> "The way an indirect speech report can bear on a certain decision to be made by the hearer is that it proposes what another person said (asserted) *as a source of knowledge*. If the original speaker qualifies as a *reliable informer*, then what he said can be counted on for the formation of appropriate beliefs that have a bearing on the formation of current decisions relating to the current complex of cognitive states, goals, desires." (Capone 2010: 383f.; emphasis added)

The quotation puts forward the idea that indirect reports *transmit the authority* from the original utterance to the report. That is, the reporter indicates with the help of the phrase "said that" that the source of the statement at issue is not herself but the original speaker, and the latter is made responsible for its information content. Thus, the acceptability of the report depends crucially not only on the accuracy of the reporter's interpretation of the original utterance but also on the reliability of the original speaker as an information source.
   These considerations imply that *reliability* is one of the factors which are relevant for the creation and usage of indirect reports. Against this background, we will raise the following problem:

(P)   (a)   What is the inferential structure of indirect reports?
       (b)   What is the function of indirect reports?
       (c)   How can indirect reports be evaluated?

   In Sect. 2, we will introduce our approach to indirect reports insofar as we propose that certain aspects of the relationship between original utterances, indirect

reports and processed reports could be grasped with the help of a model of plausible inferences. In Sect. 3, we will show how the function of indirect reports can be described with the help of the p-model. Section 4 will provide some criteria which seem to be relevant in the evaluation of indirect reports. Section 5 will summarise our results.

2   On the Structure of Indirect Reports

2.1   First Approximation

We will assume that indirect reports come into being as a result of *two successive inferential processes*. The *first inferential process* is conducted by the *reporter* and establishes a connection between the original utterance and the indirect report. As a first approximation, we present it as (6):[4]

(6)   Professor Gardner said, *as far as I can recall it*, "I didn't meet any top
         models at the airport".
         [Katie is a top model.]

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         Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport.

The reporter's starting point is not the original utterance itself but a direct report, or its reconstruction on the basis of the reporter's memories. It may be more or less reliable depending on whether the reporter heard Professor Gardner's words directly or knows them only from hearsay; whether he can recall the latter's words exactly, or merely remembers an earlier event. It may also happen that the reporter read the reported words and summarizes their essence. Thus, its reliability depends on a series of factors and may range along a relatively wide spectrum, from "somewhat plausible" to "totally certain". In contrast, the credibility of the original utterance is not relevant: the reporter may report it even in cases when he/she casts doubt on it or knows that it is false:

> "Making an indirect report is a language game that is more specific than making an assertion. In asserting P, a speaker merely offers his own voice [. . .]; by contrast in reporting that P, the speaker offers two voices: the speaker's own and that of the speaker in the original speech event [. . .]. *The reporter does not take responsibility for the embedded voice* (except in so far as it is being attributed to one speaker or another." (Capone 2010: 381; emphasis added)

Of course, it might happen that the reporter does not recall perfectly the speaker's words. We will suppose that the transformations made by the reporter when trying

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[4]For a more elaborated reconstruction, see Sect. 2.3.

to recall the original utterance are basically identical to the transformations used to convert the recalled version of the original utterance into the indirect report.[5]

Clearly, (6) is sketchy and does not intend to capture the cognitive processes themselves; rather, it tries to grasp those features of the inferential process which are related to the *reliability* of information involved. In many cases, the recalled original utterance is complemented with further statements about which it is reasonable to suppose that they are accepted by the reporter, such as, in our case, "Katie is a top model". Such statements will be called *latent background assumptions*. Nevertheless, this is not the only possibility. It is often the case that the identification of the latent background assumptions is uncertain and remains incomplete (see e.g., Walton et al. 2008: 189). Thus, (6) should also be extended with further latent background assumptions pertaining to the transformation of Professor Gardner's words into its reported version.

The *second inference* is an inference conducted by the *listener*, as roughly reconstructed in (7):

(7)   Reporter: "Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport."

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       Professor Gardner didn't meet Katie at the airport.

The second inference has only one premise and, similarly to the first inference, also relies on latent background assumptions (not yet indicated in (7)). From a broader perspective, we may interpret this inferential process in such a way that it shows that the listener accepts a statement of the original speaker on the basis of the reporter's trustworthiness and transforms it from an indirect report into a statement whose source is compound. Namely, the information content of the conclusion is ascribed to the reporter and the person whose words have been reported. The latter's roles are not symmetrical but both seem to contribute to the *reliability of the conclusion*. It may also happen that the listener does not accept the report but calls the original speaker's trustworthiness into question, while he/she does not doubt the correctness of the reporting process. Thus, the acceptability of the report depends on both the reporter's and the original speaker's reliability; the listener may ask either

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[5]Thus, for example, instead of (6) we might have two inferences as in (6'):

(6')   Professor Gardner: "I didn't see any mannequins at the airport."
        [Mannequin means top model.]
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        Professor Gardner said, *as far as I can recall it*, "I didn't see any top models at the airport".

        Professor Gardner said, *as far as I can recall it*, "I didn't see any top models at the airport".
        [Katie is a top model.]
        _____

        Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport.

"Are you sure that he [the original speaker] said this?" or react with "Oh no, he is completely wrong about this!"

In the next sections, our task will be

  (i) to find theoretical tools that allow us to interpret the wording "as far as I can recall it" in (6),
 (ii) to capture the difference between assertion and indirect reporting,
(iii) to describe the compound source of the conclusion of (7),
(iv) to grasp the uncertainty of the latent background assumptions along these lines, and
 (v) to characterize the strength of the certainty/uncertainty of the premises and the conclusions.

2.2   Motivating the Application of the P-Model

In order to solve (P), we will attempt to reveal systematic and generalizable structural properties of indirect reports, but the scope of our considerations will be restricted to their inferential structure. Thereby, Kertész and Rákosi's (2012, 2014a) p-model will be chosen as a research framework.[6] The p-model is a metatheoretical approach to linguistic inquiry focusing on the data/evidence problem widely discussed in linguistics. Its central notions are partly motivated by Rescher's (1976) seminal work on plausible inferences. Nevertheless, the literature assumes that scientific and everyday reasoning may rest on the same patterns of plausible inference, therefore it is not excluded at the outset that the p-model might capture the inferential structure of particular pragmatic phenomena even if originally it has been a metatheoretical enterprise (see Kertész and Rákosi 2005).[7]

Thus, the solution to (P) by the application of the p-model will have some important corollaries: it might yield novel solutions to a series of further problems discussed in the literature on indirect reports e.g. in Capone (2010), Cappelen and Lepore (1997a, b) and Wieland (2013).

We do not claim that communication is a plausibilistic system. Nevertheless, we assume that certain features of communication can be modelled by plausible inferences.

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[6]For first applications of the p-model to pragmatics see Kertész and Kiefer (2013), and Kertész and Rákosi (2014b).

[7]Psychological investigations into the nature of plausible inferences point to the same direction:

> "*Plausible reasoning is pervasive in daily life as well as in scientific activity*. While inductive reasoning and probabilistic thinking have been the object of much interest among psychologists for a long time, the frequent case where people process *uncertain premises and draw an uncertain conclusion* [. . .] has remained relatively neglected. This is so despite the recognition of its importance by logicians and mathematicians [. . .] (Rescher 1976) and by philosophers [. . .] and the development of non-monotonic reasoning formalisms in Artificial Intelligence." (Politzer and Bourmaud 2002: 346; emphasis added)

In the next subsections, we will introduce some central notions of the p-model and their applicability to the analysis of indirect reports in a simplified, informal manner. For the precise definitions of the notions to be introduced see Kertész and Rákosi (2012, 2014a).

2.3 Sources, Reliability, and Plausibility

Let us first turn to the premise of (6). In order to capture their inherent uncertainty, the p-model proposes to assign statements a structure consisting of an *information content* and a *plausibility value*. The plausibility value shows to what extent a statement is *supported by a source*; that is, to what extent one is *willing to accept* it on the basis of the source at issue. We distinguish between two kinds of sources. A source is *direct* with respect to a statement if the statement is assigned a plausibility value based on the *reliability* of the given – intellectual or physical – source. In this sense, for example, perception, memory, particular persons, conjectures (as intellectual sources), the linguistic intuition of native speakers, books, videotapes, corpora, experiments, the Internet etc. are direct sources. Thus, for example, the direct source of the plausibility of the premise of (6) is the reporter's memory, which may be more or less reliable. Or one may deem a hypothesis somewhat plausible if it is solely a conjecture but to a greater extent plausible if its source is an experiment or a well-founded theory. If the plausibility value of a statement is assigned on the basis of the (already known) *plausibility* of other *statements*, that is, if it is determined with the help of an inference, then we speak of *an indirect source*.

The plausibility value of a statement is not absolute, but source-dependent, gradual and comparative. A particular statement may be plausible with respect to a given source and less plausible relative to another. Nevertheless, even low plausibility values indicate that on the basis of the given source, the statement is acceptable to a certain extent.[8] It may also happen that a statement is plausible according to a source but another reliable source supports its negation, that is, it makes the statement at issue *implausible*.[9]

We introduce the notational convention according to which plausible statements will be set within '|' and sources will be indicated by subscripts. Thus, '$|p|_S$' should be read as 'the plausibility value of statement p on the basis of the source S'. Then, the plausibility value of a statement p with respect to the source S can be characterized as follows:

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[8]For instance, conjectures may receive a low plausibility value on the basis of an intellectual source, because certain careful considerations provide some support to them.

[9]For example, it may happen that the statement "Structure X is grammatical in English' is plausible on the basis of the linguist's linguistic intuition, but implausible on the basis of corpus data, because no utterances can be found in a given corpus with this structure. Thus, on the basis of the corpus as a direct source, the statement "Structure X is not grammatical" should be accepted.

(8) $|p|_S = 1$, if p is true with certainty on the basis of S;

$0 < |p|_S < 1$, if p is plausible on the basis of S;

$0 < |\sim p|_S < 1$, if p is implausible on the basis of S, that is, if the negation of p is plausible;

$|p|_S = 0$, if p is of neutral plausibility on the basis of S, i.e., if it is neither plausible nor implausible on the basis of this source.

Now let's turn to the reconstruction of (6) with the help of the p-model's plausibility indexing techniques as summarized in (8). (9) shows the *first step* of our reconstruction of the first inference process:

(9) (a) $0 < |$Professor Gardner said "I didn't meet any top models at the airport."$|_{R_1} < 1$

(b) $[0 < |$Katie is a top model.$|_{R_2} < 1]$

_____

(c) $|$Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport.$|_{(9)} = ?$

The index R_1 means the direct source of the premise, which may be the memory of the reporter and his/her hearing, or an ear-witness who heard Professor Gardner's utterance. It is not a completely reliable source but it is capable of providing support for the premise. Thus, the statement in (9)(a) can be deemed plausible on the basis of R_1. The latent background assumption in (9)(b) receives its plausibility value from the direct source R_2 which is the reporter's background knowledge.

The question is, of course, whether on the basis of this plausible premise and latent background assumption, one is entitled to claim that the conclusion in (9)(c) can be judged to be plausible, too. That is, we need criteria for deciding whether (9) is an indirect source that makes its conclusion plausible.

2.4   From the Original Utterance to the Indirect Report

Inferences capable of providing partial support to their conclusions and making them plausible are called *plausible inferences*.

If we accept that there is some kind of inferential relation between (9)(a)–(b) and (9)(c), and realise that the plausibility value of the conclusion is directly proportional to the plausibility of the premises, then it seems to be reasonable to say that the plausibility of (9)(c) stems from this inference as *an indirect source*. That is, with plausible inferences, if the plausibility of the premises changes, then the conclusion's plausibility increases or decreases with them. In our case, for instance, if the reporter has a defective memory, then the premise in (9)(a) will have a low plausibility value, and, as a consequence, the conclusion has to be assigned a relatively low plausibility value, too. If, however, the reporter has overheard Professor Gardner's words in a conversation just now, then (9)(a) should receive a high plausibility value, and (9)(c) will be more plausible as well. From this it follows that the plausibility of the premises is necessary but not enough to ensure

the plausibility of the conclusion. There has to be some *semantic relation* between the premises and the conclusion as well, such as causality, analogy, necessary or sufficient condition, part-whole relation, whole-part relation etc. that secures a linkage among the premises, latent background assumptions and the conclusion so that changes in the plausibility of the premises and background assumptions can influence the plausibility of the conclusion.

Deductive validity, in contrast, is not a necessary criterion. It is often the case that the inferences we make use of are *enthymematic*.[10] This means that one can *draw* plausible inferences without completing the set of the premises with latent background assumptions in such a way that there is a logical consequence relation between this extended set of statements and the conclusion. Nevertheless, regarding the *evaluation* of plausible inferences, we may stipulate the requirement that the premises should be completed with latent background assumptions that are at least of neutral plausibility in the given context in the sense of (8) and make the inference, together with the premises, deductively valid. This means that the latent background assumptions must not be known to be implausible or false in the given context. Even so, plausible inferences are *fallible*. That is, it may happen that the premises of a plausible inference are plausible but one of the latent background assumptions which was deemed plausible or of neutral plausibility turns out to be implausible or false. In such cases, the conclusion loses the plausibility it gained from this inference, too.

On the basis of the above criteria, (9) is a plausible inference in contexts in which the premise is plausible or true with certainty and the latent background assumption can be assigned a plausibility value (that is, it is true with certainty, plausible or at least of neutral plausibility):

(10)(a) $0 < |\text{Professor Gardner said "I didn't meet any top models at the airport."}|_{R_1} < 1$

   (b) $[0 \leq |\text{Katie is a top model.}|_{R_2} \leq 1]$

   _____

   (c) $0 < |\text{Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport.}|_{(10)} < 1$

Nevertheless, indirect reports seem to require stricter stipulations against latent background assumptions. It is clearly unsatisfactory, for example, if (10)(b) is merely a conjecture raised by the reporter; he/she must have strong evidence for this claim. If the plausibility of the latent background assumptions is low, then the indirect report has to face the objection that it is solely a speculation, and the reporter falsely ascribes the report to the reported person. The indirect report as a

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[10]See e.g. Rapp (2010) for the history of this notion. See Rescher (1976: 60ff.), Polya (1948: 221ff.) for enthymematic plausible inferences. For an overview of the problems they raise and the argumentation schemes in which they participate see Walton et al. (2008).

speech act can be felicitous only if *all background assumptions are assigned a very high plausibility value so that the conclusion's plausibility value approximates the premise's plausibility value*. Similarly, the premise should have a reasonably high plausibility value, too.

One might raise two objections at this point.

(a) The first objection is that (10) is still enthymematic. It is not deductively valid but contains unidentified latent background assumptions. Basically, this problem can be handled in three different ways.

The first solution is a rather formal and trivial one. Namely, a further latent background assumption may be added to this inference that transforms (10) into a deductively valid inference:

(11) $0 < |$Professor Gardner said "I didn't meet any top models at the airport."$|_{R_1} < 1$
   $[0 < |$Katie is a top model.$|_{R_2} < 1]$
   $[|$If Katie is a top model, and Professor Gardner said "I didn't meet any top models at the airport, then *one can say that* Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport.$|_? = ?]$

   _____

   $|$Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport.$|_{(11)} = ?$

The question is, of course, whether and how a plausibility value can be assigned to the second latent background assumption. It requires us to judge how plausible it is that the reporter's interpretation of Professor Gardner's words in the given situation is correct. This, however, would mean that we as linguists make a decision about the acceptability of (10) solely on the basis of our *linguistic intuition*, without taking into consideration the *situation* in which the indirect report was produced.

A second possibility is that we leave (10) incomplete and assign the plausibility value 0 to the missing and unidentified latent background assumptions. As a consequence, the conclusion would obtain a low plausibility value. This method might be viable insofar as it often happens that we make use of enthymematic inferences and it is not always necessary or possible to reveal all background assumptions. From a theoretical point of view, however, this solution would not be satisfactory, either. While a reporter may draw enthymematic inferences without consciously identifying all the details and steps of his reasoning, the modelling of linguistic behaviour cannot dispense with revealing the things *reporters should know or believe* when uttering a given indirect report in a given situation.

Thus, the third possibility is to complement (10) with latent background assumptions identified not through formal logical considerations but by trying to *elaborate on the situations* in which the original utterance was put forward and in which the indirect report has been created, respectively. Consider the following example:

(12) $0 < |$Professor Gardner said "I didn't meet any top models at the
        airport."$|_{R_1} < 1$
        $[0 < |$Katie is a top model.$|_{R_2} < 1]$
        $[0 < |$Katie usually does not look like a top model because she wears square
        clothing and ugly old trainers and does not wear any make-up.$|_{R_2} < 1]$
        $[0 < |$Professor Gardner does not know Katie.$|_{R_2} < 1]$

        _____

        $|$Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport.$|_{(12)} = ?$

   (12) seems to be odd: one does not want to call its conclusion plausible on the
basis of its premise and latent background assumptions. That is, if the reporter
knows or believes that Katie does not look like a top-model and that Professor
Gardner does not know her, then he/she should not interpret the original utterance
as "Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport". This motivates
the following extension of (10):

(13) $0 < |$Professor Gardner said "I didn't meet any top models at the
        airport."$|_{R_1} < 1$
        $[0 < |$Katie is a top model.$|_{R_2} < 1]$
        $[0 < |$Katie always looks like a top model.$|_{R_2} < 1]$

        _____

        $0 < |$Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport.$|_{(13)} < 1$

    At this point one might raise the objection that (13) is still enthymematic and
further latent background assumptions should be revealed and evaluated. Thus, it
is not clear how latent background assumptions can be identified and whether, and
if so, where the process of their identification terminates. This is, however, not a
deficiency of the application of the p-model but one of the essential features of
indirect reports. Neither the reporter nor the listener is in possession of all relevant
information and they may disregard factors which are capable of influencing the
conclusion's plausibility. The possibility that new latent background assumptions
may be revealed is one of the reasons why the acceptability of indirect reports is
often controversial among speakers (and linguists, of course).
    (b)   The second objection against (10) is that one cannot rule out that the
reporter relied on some other background assumption such as:

(14) $0 < |$Professor Gardner said "I didn't meet any top models at the
        airport."$|_{R_1} < 1$
        $[0 < |$Katie is not a top model but she looks like a top model and everybody
        thinks that she is one.$|_{R_2} < 1]$

        _____

        $0 < |$Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport.$|_{(14)} < 1$

As we have seen, in each indirect report there is only one explicit premise – namely, a statement related to the original utterance – and all further information needed to infer the conclusion is provided by latent background assumptions. Thus, it is both the relatively great number of latent background assumptions joining the premise and the relatively great variety of possible selections of the latent background assumptions that may yield a possible explanation of the great number of correct indirect reports of a reported utterance.[11]

Thus, the analysis of (9) should cover *a series of variants*, making use of different extensions of the premise and the conclusion with latent background assumptions, creating and examining as many situations as possible in which this indirect report could have emerged. The moral of these considerations is that the linguist should try to *identify as many latent background assumptions* and *create as many contexts as possible* in order to find out which factors are relevant in principle for the production of an indirect report.

2.5   From the Indirect Report to the Processed Report

Let us now turn to the reconstruction of (7), that is, the second inference process, conducted by the listener of the indirect report. With the help of the p-model's plausibility indexing tools, a possible reconstruction is (15):

(15) $0 < |$Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport.$|_R < 1$

$0 < |$Professor Gardner didn't meet Katie at the airport.$|_{(15)} < 1$

The premise of (15) corresponds to the conclusion of (10) but they are not completely identical. Namely, the listener cannot reconstruct the inference drawn by the reporter. Therefore, the listener cannot adopt the plausibility value of the conclusion of (10), either, although he/she may know its rough structure. What does this mean? We may suppose that on the basis of generalizations gained from situations in which indirect reports were used by other speakers, as well as from his/her own experience, the listener will assume that the reporter's starting point was an utterance of Professor Gardner and that the reporter might have modified the original utterance to some extent. If this is so, then we can identify several factors which influence the reliability of the premise of (15).

First, the trustworthiness of the reporter's memory and background knowledge influences the reliability of (15) because it is one of the subsources that determine the plausibility of its premise. Therefore, the listener has to evaluate the reliability of these subsources (and eventually re-evaluate their reliability). For example, if the

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[11] "[. . .] indirect reports are sensitive to innumerable non-semantic features of reported utterances and even of the context of the report itself. As a result, typically there will be indefinitely many correct indirect reports of any particular utterance." (Cappelen and Lepore 1997b: 291)

listener knows that the reporter's power of recall is very weak or if the reporter is known for misunderstanding everything he/she hears then he/she may be less ready, or even not ready at all, to accept the report.

Second, the range of alternative formulations and their usage is one of the factors that might have been taken into consideration by the listener. It should be relevant information for the listener that the reporter has chosen the utterance "Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport" and not, for example,

Professor Gardner believes/thinks/seems to think that he didn't meet Katie at the airport.
Professor Gardner cannot remember having met Katie at the airport.
To the best of my knowledge, Professor Gardner didn't meet Katie at the airport.
Professor Gardner didn't meet Katie at the airport.
On the basis of our personal communication I can say that Professor Gardner didn't meet Katie at the airport.
Professor Gardner said: "I didn't meet Katie at the airport." etc.

These considerations indicates that the conclusion of the inference drawn by the reporter and the premise of the inference produced by the listener are not identical. The difference between them is that their plausibility value is evaluated on the basis of different sources; or, to put it another way, the listener *re-evaluates* the plausibility of the indirect report.

(15) indicates that there is only one relevant source in this case: the reporter (R). Nevertheless, for instance, Professor Gardner's visual perception and his knowledge of what top models should look like are relevant factors in determining the plausibility of the conclusion as well. Therefore, in an implicit way, with the help of a latent background assumption, our reconstruction should also introduce the original speaker into the set of sources. This motivates raising the following improvement of (15):

(16) $0 < |$Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport.$|_R < 1$
       $[0 < |$Professor Gardner informed R about the events at the airport
       correctly.$|_L < 1]$

       $0 < |$Professor Gardner didn't meet Katie at the airport.$|_{(16)} < 1$

If the listener knows that Professor Gardner is extremely short-sighted, then the latent background assumption in (16), and, as a consequence, its conclusion will have a low plausibility value. Or, alternatively, Professor Gardner may be one of the most eagle-eyed linguists who have ever shown up at an airport, but if he is also known for being very absent-minded and thus often not realizing what he actually sees, then the plausibility value of the statements mentioned is again low. However, if Professor Gardner is neither short-sighted nor absent-minded and is famous for his precise observations, then the latent background assumption has to be assigned a high plausibility value; but even in this case, it is not true with certainty, for humans may err and human perception is, as the history of science has shown during the past centuries, not absolutely reliable.

Clearly, this latent background assumption is at a meta-level: it does not pertain to a statement relating to the situation but to the description of a situation by the original speaker. That is, the listener cannot judge the plausibility of the original utterance because he/she knows it only indirectly, from the indirect report. Thus, he/she can only assess the reliability of the original speaker as a source in relation to the situation at issue.

On the basis of the above considerations, we might also say that (7)/(16) can also be described as a kind of transformation:

(17) $0 < |$Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport.$|_R < 1$

$$\downarrow$$

$0 < |$Professor Gardner didn't meet Katie at the airport.$|_R$ & $_O < 1$,

where R is the reporter and O is the original speaker, that is, Professor Gardner. (17) displays transparently that the indirect report is assigned a plausibility value on the basis of two sources: the reporter and the original speaker. It does not indicate, however, the role of the latter. (16) is more informative in this respect because it mirrors the asymmetrical role of the reporter and the original speaker, and shows why the listener may react in two different ways, as we have seen in Sect. 2.1. Namely, he/she may bring into question the reliability of the original speaker as a source and that of the reporter. In the first case, the listener may not be casting doubt on the accuracy of the reporter's interpretation but on the correctness of the original speaker's statement. In the second case, in contrast, the listener will regard the reporter's reformulation with suspicion.

2.6   The P-Context-Dependence of Indirect Reports

2.6.1   The Concept of the 'P-Context'

In the light of the recent literature underlying (A2) and (A3), the context-dependence of indirect reports goes without saying. In order to capture this, we introduce the notion of *p-context*. The p-context differs from the notion of 'context' as normally used in pragmatics. The prefix 'p' serves to restrict the contextual information merely to those factors that may influence the plausibility value of statements. The *p-context* includes, among other things, the available reliable sources in terms of which the plausibility value of statements can be judged. It also covers a set of statements together with their plausibility values with respect to the sources in the p-context.

Indirect reports involve three different p-contexts corresponding to the three speech acts involved: that of the production of the original speaker's utterance, that of the reporter's production of the indirect report and that of the listener's processing of the report. These three p-contexts usually cover different statements and different sources, and statements may be assigned different plausibility values within them. It

may also happen that, for example, a statement is plausible in the original speaker's p-context but it is implausible in the listener's p-context. The different evaluation of the plausibility of premises and latent background assumptions leads inevitably to differences in the evaluation of the conclusion of plausible inferences as well. Since indirect reports come into being as two successive plausible inferences, variance in the plausibility of the premises or latent background assumptions may result in variance in the judgement of the felicitousness of the report and/or cause failures in the communication process.

Let us examine this in detail.

2.6.2   The P-Context of the Original Speech Act

The original speech act includes Professor Gardner's utterance "I didn't meet any top models at the airport". The plausibility of the related statement depends, among other things, on how Professor Gardner arrived at this statement. For example, if he asked every woman at the airport without exception whether she was a top model and each time he got the answer 'no', then this investigation is a very reliable source that can make the statement at issue highly plausible; or, if we have no reason to doubt the women's answers and can be sure that nobody tried to keep her occupation secret by giving a false answer, it may be deemed true with certainty. If, in contrast, Professor Gardner should have visited his optician because his eyesight has deteriorated recently, then only a rather low plausibility value seems to be appropriate. Nevertheless, this plausibility value does not percolate to the recalled version of the original utterance or to the indirect report. That is, the plausibility value of the statement "Professor Gardner said that he did not meet Katie at the airport" or the statement "Professor Gardner said 'I did not meet any top models at the airport'" may be very high even though the statement "I did not meet any top models at the airport" has low plausibility or is implausible or even false with certainty.[12]

2.6.3   The P-Context of the Reporting Speech Act

The inference process producing the indirect report does not make use of the original utterance itself as a premise, as we have seen with (10)/(13) in Sect. 2.4 as well as in Sect. 2.1. Neither does the reporter treat it as a statement whose plausibility value he/she should be re-evaluate, either. Its judgement is put aside. The reason for this step lies in the circumstance that the information content and its source are equally important and have to be referred to. For instance, it may be the case that the reporter deems an utterance of the original speaker relevant in the given situation but he/she is reluctant to accept its content, does not want to take responsibility for

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[12]Of course, the former utterance belongs to the p-context of the reporting speech act.

it, or agrees with it but thinks that the original speaker is considered to be a more reliable or more accepted source than him/herself, etc. For example, suppose that the listener asked the reporter whether Katie was at the airport. In the p-model's terminology this means that the initial state of the p-context of the reporting speech act is burdened with informational underdetermination. In order to resolve this, the reporter seeks relevant pieces of evidence. He/she was not present at the airport, but knows that Professor Gardner was there, thus he can be a reliable source of information. Therefore, he/she extends the p-context by a direct source (Professor Gardner) and a statement he made that seems to be relevant.

In such cases, the reporter focuses first on the locution by recalling the original utterance (at least ideally) as accurately as possible. Then, he/she makes the source of the plausibility of the statement at issue explicit and raises it into the information content of the related statement, producing the recalled version of the original utterance:

(18)   Professor Gardner: "I didn't meet any top models at the airport."

$$\downarrow$$

Professor Gardner said [as far as I can recall it] "I didn't meet any top models at the airport."

As we have seen in Sect. 2.1, the recalled version of the original utterance receives a plausibility value depending on the accuracy of the original utterance's recall. For example, if the reporter is a person who herself heard Professor Gardner saying what he said, then this plausibility value is higher than if it were reported by someone who heard it from another person. Nevertheless, it must have an appropriate plausibility value, although this may differ from situation to situation.

As a next step, the recalled version of the original utterance is transformed into the indirect report with the help of a plausible inference which we reconstruct here as a kind of transformation, too:

(19)   Professor Gardner said [as far as I can recall it] "I didn't meet any top models at the airport".

$$\downarrow$$

Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet Katie at the airport.

There are situations in which the reporter merely changes the indexicals and demonstratives. In other cases, this might be (felt) insufficient. Namely, it may be the case that the reporter utters the recalled version of the original utterance "Professor Gardner said that he didn't meet any top models at the airport" without any change and leaves the task of elaborating the relationship between this information and the answer to the question of "Was Katie at the airport?" to the listener. This is, however, a viable alternative if the listener can be reasonably supposed to share the latent background assumptions of (13) and be capable of elaborating the conclusion (for example, the implication). If this is not the case, then either the latent background assumptions have to be made explicit, or there should be a bigger

gap between the recalled version of the original utterance and the indirect report –
that is, it is the reporter who draws the inference and presents only the resulting
conclusion.

Thus, if the reporter infers the indirect report from the original utterance, then
the latent background assumptions applied also belong to the p-context of the
indirect report. There are p-contexts in which the plausibility value of the premise
as well as that of the conclusion has to be near to 1, and there are situations in
which a greater distance between the original utterance and the report is allowed.
But in certain situations, the original utterance and the indirect report have to be
practically identical. Moreover, under certain circumstances, the choice of other
linguistic means may be more appropriate. For example, if the reporter accepts
Professor Gardner's utterance and is inclined to take on the responsibility for its
truth or plausibility, he/she may simply say "Professor Gardner didn't meet Katie at
the airport." In other cases, exact quotation may be required.

2.6.4   The P-Context of the Report Processing

The original utterance and its recalled version by the reporter, as well as the latent
background assumptions made use of by the reporter usually do not belong to
the listener's p-context; or there may be considerable differences between their
plausibility. However, if we assume that the general structure of indirect reports
belongs to one's linguistic knowledge, then we may risk the hypothesis that the
listener may have guesses about the contribution of the original speaker and the
reporter to the report, and, if there are useable clues, he/she may be capable of
separating their role to a greater extent. Capone puts this as follows:

> "The practice of indirect reports involves being able to separate out what is attributable to
> the original sayer and what is attributable to the current speaker, even if both appear in a
> that-clause. So a useful principle is the following:
>
>   Do not take everything that appears in the that-clause of an indirect report as belonging
> to the voice of the original speaker whose speech act is being reported.
>
>   A complementary principle is the following:
>
>   Separate the elements of the that-clause that contribute to the voice of the original
> speaker from those that embody the voice of the reporter; do this by exploiting the
> contextual clues that are available for this purpose." (Capone 2010: 388)

For instance, if the listener knows both the original speaker and the reporter, then
he/she might identify correctly whom a given wording belongs to, that is, whether
the original speaker chose a phrase, or it results from the reporter's interpretation.
In other cases, however, this is not possible. In general, our reconstruction in (16)
and (17) is based on the idea that the listener's p-context contains the indirect
report in such a way that its plausibility value is re-evaluated by the listener. The
resulting indirect report is a plausible statement if the reporter is deemed to be a
reliable source insofar as he/she remembered and interpreted the original utterance
correctly. The latent background assumption stating that the original speaker is a
reliable source in relation to the information content of the report also belongs to

Fig. 1 The inferential structure of indirect reports

this p-context. The exact amount of their contribution to the report, however, in most cases cannot be indisputably determined.

2.7 The Solution to (P)(a)

To sum up our considerations in Sect. 2, the following solution to the subproblem (P)(a) presents itself:

(S) (a) The relationship between the original utterance and the processed report can be described as two consecutive plausible inferences as in Fig. 1.

The first plausible inference starts from the recall of an utterance of the original speaker. Both the information content and the source of this utterance are relevant in the given situation. The plausibility value of this statement is determined by the peculiarities of how the reporter became acquainted with the original utterance, as well as by the reliability of the reporter's memory. The reporter may rely on latent background assumptions as well, whose plausibility value has to be appropriately high. The conclusion of this first inference is the indirect report that also makes the source of the original utterance explicit with the help of the phrase "said that".

The second inference starts from the indirect report but its plausibility value is re-evaluated by the listener, crucially on the basis of the reliability of the reporter as a direct source. If both the reporter and the original speaker are regarded as reliable sources, then the listener will arrive at the processed report as a plausible

conclusion on the basis of a compound source covering both the original speaker and the reporter.

3   The Function of Indirect Reports

3.1   First Approximation

In Sect. 2, we have tried to reveal several aspects of the structure of indirect reports but have not systematically touched upon the question of why and how indirect reports are used. In this section we will argue that the creation and interpretation of indirect reports is at least partially guided by a strive for the elimination or reduction of informational over- or underdetermination. In the next subsection, we will briefly present the tools the p-model offers for the description of informational under/overdetermination and how these concepts can be applied to the use of indirect reports.

3.2   P-Problems: P-Inconsistency, P-Incompleteness

The p-context may be informationally *overdetermined*. This means that the sources in the p-context yield too much information in the sense that there is a statement which is made plausible by some source while its negation is made plausible by another. In such cases, the set of the plausible statements in the p-context is *p-inconsistent*. Look at the following example from Wieland (2013: 394):

(20)   *A*: This morning I had pancakes, toast, and coffee.
         B: *A* said that she had breakfast this morning.

Let us suppose that *C* wants to invite *A* to breakfast but the p-context consisting of his/her knowledge is p-inconsistent because it is both plausible and implausible that *A* has already had breakfast. Namely, it is 9 a.m., and in the hotel *A* is staying at, breakfast is served between 6 and 8. This piece of information makes the conjecture that *A* has already had breakfast that morning plausible. On the other hand, *C* might know that *A* usually does not get up earlier than 8 a.m. From this he/she may conclude with reason that *A* did not eat that morning because she arrived late in the dining room.

Nevertheless, the p-context may be informationally *underdetermined* as well. Specifically, a p-context is *p-incomplete* if it contains statements which are neither plausible (in the extreme case: true with certainty) nor implausible (in the extreme case: false with certainty) with respect to any source given.

Let us suppose that in the above example, *C* does not know whether *A* has already had breakfast and does not possess information about her hotel and habits.

In both cases, *B* may remember a relevant utterance of *A* and interpret *A*'s words in such a way that she uses a shorter co-referential phrase instead of the exact listing of the breakfast menu:

(21) $0 < |A$ said "This morning I had pancakes, toast, and coffee."$|_{B_1} < 1$
        $[0 < |$If one has pancakes, toast, and coffee in the morning then this means that one has breakfast.$|_{B_2} < 1]$
        _____

        $0 < |A$ said that she had breakfast this morning.$|_{(21)} < 1$

With the help of (21), *the reporter makes it possible for C to resolve the p-inconsistency or p-incompleteness* by making the statement '*A* said that she had breakfast this morning' plausible. Namely, starting from *B*'s indirect report, *C* may draw the following plausible inference:

(22) $0 < |A$ said that she had breakfast this morning.$|_B < 1$
        $[0 < |A$ informed *B* about her morning correctly.$|_C < 1]$
        _____

        $0 < |A$ had breakfast this morning.$|_{(22)} < 1$

If *B* has recalled *A*'s words genuinely (but not necessarily exactly), and her background knowledge includes the above latent background assumption which can be assigned a high plausibility value and, furthermore, *C* deems both *A* and *B* trustworthy, then this will be a felicitous indirect report. Since (22) increases the plausibility of the statement '*A* had breakfast this morning' considerably, the p-inconsistency can be resolved in such a way that this statement is kept while its negation is rejected.

Nevertheless, there are situations in which (20) would be infelicitous. For instance, if *C* required detailed information about *A*'s breakfast because he has to supervise her diet, then *B*'s report will be infelicitous because the report cannot resolve the informational underdetermination of the listener's p-context, although the original utterance could have done this. This means that under these circumstances, the information loss between the information content of the original utterance and the report is severe. The context-dependence of indirect reports (see Sect. 2.6) also means that relevant information must not vanish. 'Relevant' means that *if the original utterance is suitable for resolving the starting p-problem, then the processed report has to be capable of doing this, too.*

3.3   The Problem Solving Efficacy of Indirect Reports

At this point the question emerges of why speakers use indirect reports instead of producing "normal" utterances. Thus, instead of putting forward an indirect report as in (20), *B* might have simply said that '*A* had breakfast this morning'. This statement seems to be identical with the processed report. This is, however, not

the case because they obtain their plausibility values from different sources. To wit, *C* would assign a plausibility value to *B*'s statement '*A* had breakfast this morning' on the basis of *B*'s supposed well-informedness. If, in contrast, *B* makes use of the indirect report as in (20), then *C* will reckon the plausibility of the statement at issue is very high, because its information content originates partly from *A*, and *B* is regarded rather as the mediator of this information.

As a consequence, the use of an indirect report may lead to a higher plausibility value, which makes the problem solving process more effective. Therefore, indirect reports may be *effective tools of problem solving* if the reporter knows that a statement is relevant for the decision but the original speaker's authority is greater than his/her own authority with respect to this statement, or he/she cannot judge the plausibility of the statement at issue, or thinks that it is implausible or false and wants to shift the responsibility for its acceptance to the original speaker.

3.4   The Solution to (P)(b)

On the basis of the above considerations we propose the following solution to (P)(b):

(S)   (b)   The expression "said that" is the *indicator* of the shared responsibility for the information content and formulation of the indirect report. It highlights one of the direct sources of the report, and evinces that the statement at issue stems from *multiple sources*: from the original speaker and the reporter. Therefore, indirect reports may be effective tools of problem solving in cases in which the original speaker's authority is greater than that of the reporter, or if the reporter does not want to take responsibility for its truth. See Fig. 2.

4   Criteria for the Evaluation of Indirect Reports

4.1   First Approximation

In the literature, there is general consensus within pragmatic accounts of indirect reports that the original utterance and the processed report need not have the same semantic content. Thus, several cases have been discussed in which the relationship between the processed report and the original utterance is characterised by *inter-substitutability of expressions*, *co-reference generated in the reporting context*, *partial semantic overlap* (elimination or addition), or *inferential relationship*, while the report is felicitous (cf. Cappelen and Lepore 1997b; Capone 2010; Wieland 2013). It is less clear, however, how to distinguish between felicitous and infelicitous cases:

Fig. 2 Indirect reports and problem solving

> "What has not been accounted for in this paper [. . .] is the way in which reporting is an
> act that has standards of evaluation. [. . .] I have used the broad term 'felicity' to describe a
> successful report. Context may vary with respect to the required strength of fidelity between
> the original utterance and the report of this utterance. In some, but not all, cases it is
> appropriate to assess whether the report is *true*. In some, but not all, cases it is appropriate
> for there to be *identity* between the original utterance and the report. In other cases, the
> two utterances, whether in content, form or something else entirely paralinguistic, need to
> resemble each other in some other way altogether." (Wieland 2013: 410; emphasis as in the
> original)

Therefore, our next task will be to propose some criteria which seem to be relevant
in judging indirect reports.

4.2   The Role of Background Knowledge

The first criterion of the efficacy of indirect reports has been put forward in Sect. 3.2
in relation to (20):

I.   *If the original utterance is suitable for resolving the starting p-problem, then*
     the processed report has to be capable of doing this, too.

Let us see what happens if we change *A*'s and *B*'s words in (20):

(23)   *A*: This morning I had breakfast.
         B: A said that she had pancakes, toast, and coffee this morning.

The reason why (23) may fail is that in this case the reporter's inference when creating the indirect report presumably relies on the latent background assumption (24):

(24)   If *A* had breakfast this means that she had pancakes, toast, and coffee this morning.

Under normal circumstances, this is a statement with a very low plausibility value. Nevertheless, it may be the case that *A* usually does not have breakfast but if she has then she always eats pancakes, toast, and coffee. Or *B* may be informed about the breakfast menu of the hotel. In these cases, (24) belongs to the p-context of the reporting speech act and, on the basis of his background knowledge pertaining to *A*'s habits or the hotel's menu, *B* is a highly reliable source with respect to this statement. From this it follows that (24) has a high plausibility value. Thus, the indirect report will be correct:

(25) $0 < |A$ said "I had breakfast this morning."$|_{B_1} < 1$
        $[0 < |$If A had breakfast this means that she had pancakes, toast, and coffee this morning.$|_{B_2} < 1]$

        _____

        $0 < |A$ said that she had pancakes, toast, and coffee this morning.$|_{(25)} < 1$

(26) $0 < |A$ said that she had pancakes, toast, and coffee this morning.$|_B < 1$
        $[0 < |A$ informed B about her morning correctly.$|_L < 1]$

        _____

        $0 < |A$ had pancakes, toast, and coffee this morning.$|_{(26)} < 1$

This does not mean that (25) is felicitous in every context. If, for example, *A* does not want to specify her menu because she is on a diet and does not want to reveal that she did not follow it, then the information growth of the processed report in comparison to the original utterance is not tolerable. That is, adding the latent background assumption (24) was not licenced by the original speaker; it contradicts her intentions. To put it differently, while the original utterance does not make it possible to assign a plausibility value to the statement "*A* strictly follows her diet", the report in (26) can be used as a premise of a plausible inference that makes this statement implausible.

From this two criteria arise:

II.   *The latent background assumptions used by the reporter must have a high plausibility value.*

III.   *The reporter must not add information to the original utterance which was intentionally omitted by the original speaker.*

4.3 Adding Contextual Information

Wieland (2013: 395) exemplifies with (27) cases in which the reporter extends the original utterance with information pertaining specifically to the context of the reporting speech act:

(27)   *A*: My favorite tapa is patatas bravas.
       B: A said that her favorite tapa is the third item on your menu.

The inference drawn by the reporter can be reconstructed as (28),

(28) $0 < |A$ said "My favorite tapa is patatas bravas."$|_{B_1} < 1$
       $[0 < |$Patatas bravas is the third item on C's menu.$|_{B_2} < 1]$

       $0 < |A$ said that her favorite tapa is the third item on your menu.$|_{(28)} < 1$

while the listener's reasoning is reconstructed in (29):

(29) $0 < |A$ said that her favorite tapa is the third item on my menu.$|_B < 1$
       $[0 < |A$ informed B about her favourite meal correctly.$|_C < 1]$

       $0 < |A$'s favorite tapa is the third item on my menu.$|_{(29)} < 1$

Here, the listener's reaction to the report crucially depends on his/her linguistic knowledge that the source of plausibility of the premise of (29) is a compound of *B*'s memories of the original utterance and the way he interprets and reformulates this utterance. Thus, it should be clear for the listener that the situation-bounded part of the report stems from the reporter and it functions as a kind of pointing gesture. In this way, the reporter merges two statements into one: instead of the original speaker's words giving the name of the meal, and a second utterance that it can be found on the menu, he uses only one sentence. Thus, the listener realises that the reporter's voice interferes with the original speaker's voice but the proportions and aim of this intervention are clear for him.

This strategy may fail or be found odd or funny in other cases, such as in the following example by Higginbotham, cited by Capone (2010: 384):

(30)   (a)   Galileo: "The earth moves."
       (b)   Galileo said that the planet in which Arnold Schwarzenegger is a
             governor moves.

The original utterance in (30)(a) is well-known and is probably part of the listener's p-context, too. Thus, one might raise the objection that since the original speaker could not have uttered the complement of (30)(b), because it refers to a person who lives about 500 years later than he, it is an easy task to distinguish between the original speaker's and the reporter's voices. Despite this, the original utterance is a scientific claim, and in the context of science, exact citation is a

strict requirement. Moreover, it is not clear what motivates the reformulation of the original utterance in this way. A possible explanation is gained if we interpret (30)(b) as a kind of joke.

From this the following criteria present themselves:

IV. *The reporter may add situation-dependent elements to the original utterance.*
V.   *In scientific contexts, almost any change to the original utterance counts as intolerable.*

4.4   Elimination of Parts of the Original Utterance

Parts of the original utterance are often *eliminated* in the indirect report. Wieland (2013: 395ff.) argues that the felicity of such reports cannot be judged by semantic analysis but that contextual, i.e. pragmatic, factors have to be accounted for. With the help of the analysis of (31) we will show how the p-model handles this problem:

(31)   *A*: I went to the taco stand and bought a soda.
         B: *A* said that she went to the taco stand.

Eliminations can lead to a statement with a high plausibility value, since the latent background assumption the reporter makes use of is true with certainty:

(32) $0 < |A$ said "I went to the taco stand and bought a soda."$|_{B_1} < 1$
         $[|$If A went to the taco stand and bought a soda, then she went to the taco stand.$|_{B_2} = 1]$

         _____

         $0 < |A$ said that she went to the taco stand.$|_{(32)} < 1$

Despite this, the decisive factor with eliminations is the p-problematicness of the p-context of the report processing. Namely, if the report is not capable of resolving its p-incompleteness or p-inconsistency because the reporter has eliminated the information that would be relevant, then the report will be infelicitous. Thus, if the listener needs information about *A*'s whereabouts, then (31) will function properly. In contrast, if he wants to be informed about all *A*'s actions, then this will be an infelicitous report.

Another example by Wieland (2013: 396) leads to an unsuccessful report because the original utterance and the processed report lead to contradictory consequences due to the elimination of a crucial piece of information:

(33)   *A*: I had some low-fat nachos for lunch.
         B: Did *A* have anything healthy to eat today?
         C: A said that she had nachos for lunch.

It does not really seem natural that the inference drawn by C was as in (34), even though it relies on a latent background assumption with a maximal plausibility value:

(34) $0 < |A$ said "I had some low-fat nachos for lunch."$|_{C_1} < 1$
       [[If A had some low-fat nachos for lunch, then she had nachos for lunch.$|_{C_2} = 1]$

       _____

       $0 < |A$ said that she had nachos for lunch.$|_{(34)} < 1$

Rather, the premise C relied on might have been (35):

(35) A said, as far as I can remember, "I had some nachos for lunch."

C might think (of course, wrongly) that he remembers A's words correctly and deem (35) plausible. This information loss, however, leads to an infelicitous report because B will come, as (36)–(38) show, to a conclusion that is in conflict with A's original utterance:

(36) $0 < |A$ said that he had nachos for lunch.$|_C < 1$
       $[0 < |A$ informed C about her lunch correctly.$|_B < 1]$

       _____

       $0 < |A$ had nachos for lunch.$|_{(36)} < 1$

(37) $0 < |A$ had an nachos lunch.$|_{(36)} < 1$
       $[0 < |$Nachos are unhealthy.$|_B < 1]$

       _____

       $0 < |A$ had an unhealthy lunch.$|_{(37)} < 1$

The conclusion of (37) is p-inconsistent with the conclusion of (38) which is built on A's original utterance:

(38) $0 < |A$ had low-fat nachos for lunch.$|_A < 1$
       $[0 < |$Low-fat nachos are healthy.$|_B < 1]$

       _____

       $0 < |A$ had a healthy lunch.$|_{(38)} < 1$

From this it follows that the p-incompleteness (that is, informational underdetermination) of the listener's p-context as indicated by her question is resolved by the report in the opposite way than it would be with the help of the original utterance.

Yet this is not the only possibility. If both B's and C's background knowledge contain (39), then (33) will be felicitous:[13]

_____

[13] That is, they reject A's opinion that low-fat nachos are healthy.

(39)   All kinds of nachos are unhealthy.

To sum up what we can learn from these considerations, we obtain the following criterion:

VI. *Parts of the original utterance may be eliminated from the indirect report if the resulting information loss does not prevent the latter from solving the starting p-problem in the same way.*[14]

4.5 Adding Parts to the Original Utterance

We agree with Wieland (2013: 396) that *modifier introductions* may be felicitous under appropriate circumstances, too. For example, (40) may also be, under appropriate circumstances, a correct indirect report:

(40)   *A*: I met a woman at the party.
       B: *A* said that he met a beautiful woman at the party.

A's words are clearly incorrect if we take them literally, since he must have met many women (and men) at the party, some of them unknown to him. Therefore, *B* might conclude that *A*'s utterance is fragmentary. If *A* does not provide further information then this means that he empowers *B* to interpret his words on the basis of his non-verbal communication and *B*'s knowledge about him. Therefore, if *B*'s background knowledge includes the information that *A* always produces a pleased smile when he speaks about beautiful women, then *B* is entitled to assign a high plausibility value to the latent background assumptions of (40) and draw the following plausible inference:[15]

(41) $0 < |A$ said "I met a woman at the party". $|_{B_1} < 1$
       $[0 < |A$ produced a pleased smile when uttering these words. $|_{B_2} < 1]$
       $[0 < |A$ always produces a pleased smile when he speaks about beautiful women. $|_{B_2} < 1]$
       _____

       $0 < |A$ said that he met a beautiful woman at the party. $|_{(41)} < 1$

Nonetheless, even if *B* interpreted *A*'s utterance correctly, *A* may make the objection that he hasn't uttered these words. This situation seems to be similar to cases in which someone refuses to acknowledge the implicatures of his words.

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[14]Of course, this is a special case of Criterion I.

[15]Nonetheless, if *A* is a woman, as in Wieland's original example, and/or *B* is in no possession of clues that make it possible to draw highly reliable plausible inferences from the original utterance (such as *A* is extremely envious of every woman who is more beautiful than she is, and she made an angry face when uttering her words), then the report in (40) will not be felicitous.

If, in contrast, *B* has no firm clues about how to interpret *A*'s fragmentary utterance and behavior, then he won't be able to complete this inference with latent background assumptions with an appropriately high plausibility value.

It may also be the case that the reporter adds a modifier to the original utterance that is in conflict with the original speaker's views. For instance, Capone (2010: 388) refers to the following example by Potts:

(42)   Edna is at her friend Chuck's house. Chuck tells her that he thinks all his red
       vases are ugly. He approves only of his blue ones. He tells Edna that she can
       take one of his red vases. Edna thinks the red vases are lovely, selects one
       and returns home to tell her housemate:
       'Chuck said I could have one of his lovely vases!'

The inference drawn by Edna can be reconstructed as (43):

(43) $0 < |$Chuck said "You can have one of my red vases."$|_{Edna_1} < 1$
       $[0 < |$Chuck's red vases are lovely.$|_{Edna_2} < 1]$

       _____

       $0 < |$Chuck said that I could have one of his lovely vases.$|_{(43)} < 1$

while her housemate's reasoning is reconstructed in (44):

(44) $0 < |$Chuck said that Edna could have one of his lovely vases.$|_{Edna} < 1$
       $[0 < |$Chuck informed Edna about his vases correctly.$|_{housemate} < 1]$

       _____

       $0 < |$Edna can have one of Chuck's lovely vases.$|_{(44)} < 1$

Clearly, the report contradicts one element of the original speech act's p-context, namely, Chuck's claim that his red vases were ugly. If this statement were contained by the p-context of the production of the indirect report, it would be p-inconsistent, and the statement "Chuck said that I could have one of his ugly vases" could have been inferred, too. This is, however, not the case, because Edna has not accepted Chuck's evaluation and rejects his opinion that his red vases were ugly. If this statement does not belong to the p-context of the report processing, that is, if Edna's housemate is not familiar with Chuck's stance regarding his vases, no p-inconsistency will arise in the p-context of the report processing, either, and the report will be accepted without further ado by the listener.

One might raise the objection that this is incompatible with Capone's Paraphrasis Principle:

> "Should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a *fair paraphrase* of his original utterance." (Capone 2012: 599; emphasis as in the original)

The problem is that Chuck may accept Edna's report because he may find that her words are kind and he may interpret them in such a way that her re-formulation simply shows her admiration, which is something he should not reproach her

for. Similarly, positive modifier introductions may be interpreted as gestures of politeness (but despite this, such modifications will not always be accepted as correct reports). A further problem with the Paraphrasis Principle is that it may happen that the original speaker changed his/her mind and regrets his/her reported utterance, or simply can no longer recall his/her words exactly. Thus, under particular circumstances, factual approval of one's earlier words might be not a criterion that is reliable enough, unless the reporter has evidence relating to the original utterance. A modified version of the principle saying "he should not take issue with [the indirect report]" does not solve the problem, either.

Therefore, it seems to be more appropriate to say that if it is not the judgment of the beauty of Chuck's red vases that is in focus but that what is important is whether he gave one of his red vases to Edna, then the indirect report at issue can be regarded as felicitous. In such cases, Criterion 1 in Sect. 4.2 is not infringed. Despite this, the original speaker may reproach the report and cancel the added information content, although if it is clear for the listener that the added content is related to the reporter's voice, then this will be rather pointless. In contrast, if the extension influences the resolution of the starting p-problem, then the report has to be regarded as infelicitous.

Thus, if we change Chuck's and Edna's judgments of the vases (that is, if it is Chuck who thinks that his red vases are beautiful and Edna speaks of them as being ugly), then the report can still be felicitous if it is obvious that Edna has re-evaluated Chuck's opinion and if the aesthetic judgment is irrelevant in the given situation. The evaluation of the indirect report, however, is not straightforward if the listener cannot differentiate between Edna's and Chuck's voices. The situation is even less clear in cases in which it is the original utterance itself that contains the opposed evaluation – that is, if the report contradicts the original utterance.

To put it more generally:

VII.   *The original utterance may be extended by new elements felicitously if the added information does not influence the resolution of the starting p-problem (i.e., if the extension is irrelevant in the given situation).*

VIII.   *Additions to the original utterance are, similarly to implicatures, cancellable by the original speaker.*

4.6   Inferential Indirect Reports

It is often the case that there is a larger gap between the semantic content of the original utterance and the processed report; Wieland (2013: 396) calls such instances "*inferential indirect reports*". (2) from Sect. 1 also belongs to this group:

(2)   *A*: I didn't fail any students.
       B: Professor *A* said Maryanne passed her exam.

In this case, the latent background assumptions used by the reporter may not be deemed plausible by the original speaker. That is, (2) may be judged to be felicitous

even if Professor A does not remember Maryanne because 120 students attended his courses and there were only written exams:

(45) $0 < |A$ said "I didn't fail any students."$|_{B_1} < 1$
       $[0 < |$Maryanne is one of A's students.$|_{B_2} < 1]$
       $[0 < |$For every x, if x is not failed in an exam, then x passed it.$|_{B_2} < 1]$

       _____

       $0 < |A$ said that Maryanne passed her exam.$|_{(45)} < 1$

Nevertheless, there are circumstances under which (2) will be an infelicitous report. For example, it may be the case that Maryanne did not try to take part at the exam at all, or she may have dropped out of the university without informing her parents. This suggests that (45) has to be extended by a further latent background assumption:

(46) $0 < |$Professor A said "I didn't fail any students."$|_{B_1} < 1$
       $[0 < |$Maryanne is one of Professor A's students.$|_{B_2} < 1]$
       $[0 < |$For every x, if x is not failed in an exam, then x passed it.$|_{B_2} < 1]$
       $[0 < |Maryanne\ took\ part\ in\ Professor\ A's\ exam.|_{B_2} < 1]$

       _____

       $0 < |A$ said that Maryanne passed her exam.$|_{(46)} < 1$

If the third latent background assumption were implausible or false, then (46) would not be capable of making its conclusion plausible. Of course, the first latent background assumption might turn out to be false, too: B may be mistaken about the identity of Maryanne's professor. All background assumptions must have a high plausibility value in the reporting speech act, that is, on the basis of the reporter's background knowledge. Moreover, if they are relevant for the resolution of the starting p-problem, they have to be at least of neutral plausibility according to the original speaker's background knowledge. That is, if the reporter's additions lead to an opposite resolution of the starting p-problem, then the report is clearly an incorrect interpretation of the original speaker's words.

From this the following criterion is obtained:

IX.   *The reporter's latent background assumptions have to be plausible or of neutral plausibility in the original utterance's p-context, whenever the information content of the statements at issue contributes to the solution of the starting p-problem.*

4.7   Indirect Reports and Conflicting Information

Cappelen and Lepore (1997b: 284) mention an example whose evaluation is especially difficult. Suppose that A was looking fixedly at Stanley when he uttered his words, and both B, the reporter and Mathilda, the listener are convinced that

Stanley is not Smith's murderer. The question is how to evaluate the following report under these circumstances:

(47)   *A*: Smith's murderer didn't comb his hair today.
       B: *A* said that Stanley didn't comb his hair today.

According to Cappelen and Lepore, (47) is a felicitous report. This is, however, not necessarily so. The pitfall with this example is that from the reporter's point of view, there is a conflict between the original speaker's gestures and utterance on the one hand, and on the other, his own background knowledge. Thus, *B* may keep his background knowledge that Stanley is not Smith's murderer and suppress a *presupposition* of *A*'s statement according to which Stanley is Smith's murderer in such a way that he/she ascribes it to *A* without accepting it. This results in (48) and (49), respectively:

(48) $0 < |A$ said "Smith's murderer didn't comb his hair today". $|_{B_1} < 1$
       $[0 < |A$ looked at Stanley when he uttered these words. $|_{B_2} < 1]$
       $[0 < |A$ looked at Stanley when he uttered these words, because he thinks that Stanley is Smith's murderer. $|_{B_2} < 1]$
       $[0 < |$If A thinks that Stanley is Smith's murderer, then by 'Smith's murderer', he meant Stanley. $|_{B_2} < 1]$
       $[0 < |$If by 'Smith's murderer', A meant Stanley, then he wanted to say that it is Stanley who didn't comb his hair today. $|_{B_2} < 1]$

       _____

       $0 < |A$ said that Stanley did not comb his hair today. $|_{(48)} < 1$

(49) $0 < |A$ said that Stanley did not comb his hair today. $|_B < 1$
       $[0 < |A$ informed B about the person at issue correctly. $|_M < 1]$

       _____

       $0 < |$Stanley did not comb his hair today. $|_{(49)} < 1$

The indirect report successfully transmits the information that Stanley's hair was uncombed on that day but cancels a presupposition of *A*'s utterance and leads to information loss. Thus, if *A*'s aim consists solely in pointing out that there was an untidy person present, then the report can be deemed felicitous. Nevertheless, *A* might have wanted to alert *B* that there is a murderer in the room or that Stanley is a murderer. In this case, the report does not allow Mathilda to draw the conclusion that there is a murderer in the room, neither does it preserve the speech act type because it is – in contrast to the original utterance – not a warning, which infringes the principle of speech act type maintenance.[16]

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[16]Cf. "A reasonable constraint on the practice of reporting is that consistency of speech act type be maintained." (Wieland 2013: 401)

Another possible constellation is this:

(50) $0 < |A$ said "Smith's murderer didn't comb his hair today".$|_{B_1} < 1$
[$0 < |A$ looked at Stanley when he uttered these words.$|_{B_2} < 1$]
[$0 < |A$ looked at Stanley when he uttered these words, because he thinks that Stanley is Smith's murderer.$|_{B_2} < 1$]
[$0 < |$If A thinks that Stanley is Smith's murderer, then by 'Smith's murderer' he meant Stanley.$|_{B_2} < 1$]
[$0 < |$If by 'Smith's murderer', A meant Stanley, then he wanted to say that it is Stanley who is Smith's murderer.$|_{B_2} < 1$]

$0 < |A$ said that Stanley is Smith's murderer.$|_{(50)} < 1$

Thus, Mathilda may draw (51), and arrive at, a different conclusion than in the previous case:

(51) $0 < |A$ said that Stanley is Smith's murderer.$|_B < 1$
[$0 < |A$ informed B about the person at issue correctly.$|_M < 1$]

$0 < |$Stanley is Smith's murderer.$|_{(51)} < 1$

That is, she will be informed about A's suspicion that Stanley killed Smith but she will obtain no information about Stanley's untidiness.

We might also examine what happens when B reports A's words without any change:

(52) A: Smith's murderer didn't comb his hair today.
       B: A said that Smith's murderer didn't comb his hair today.

This indirect report will not be felicitous in every situation. For example, this will be the case if Mathilda does not meet Stanley today and A's utterance was a warning that Stanley is a murderer, or if she sees another person with uncombed hair and misidentifies the killer. This can be avoided if the reporter extends his utterance with the information that A looked at Stanley when uttering these words.

4.8   The Solution to (P)(c)

Our considerations yield the following solution to (P)(c):

(S)   (c)   Among the criteria pertaining to indirect reports, there are ones that
              are related to the *reliability of information sources* made use of in the
              production and processing of indirect reports. These criteria concern
              –   the plausibility of the latent background assumptions on which
                     the reporter or the listener rely (Criteria II, IX);
              –   the problem solving efficacy of the report in comparison to that
                     of the original utterance (Criteria I, VI, VII);
              –   changes in the information content of the indirect report in
                     comparison to the original utterance (Criteria III, IV, V, VIII).

Nevertheless, there are some caveats which concern the applicability of this list. First, our analyses can be regarded solely as the first steps towards the elaboration of a system of criteria pertaining to the inferential structure, the reliability of information sources, and the efficiency of indirect reports. Second, there are several other types of criteria for the evaluation of the felicitousness of indirect reports related to other aspects of indirect reporting. Thus, our list is by no means exhaustive. Third, we have not touched upon the question of the relation between the criteria. We have not raised the question of whether these criteria are of the same rank or there is a hierarchy among them. Fourth, we have not examined whether these criteria are hard rules which have to be followed in every case, or soft rules which can be infringed in order to satisfy other (eventually higher-ranked) criteria.

5   Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we have tried to reveal the inferential structure, the functions and the felicity conditions of indirect reports by the application of the p-model as drawn up by Kertész and Rákosi (2012, 2014a). We have attempted to show how this approach can shed light on certain pragmatic aspects of the relationship between the original utterance, the indirect report and the processed report.

Our results are in accord with the pragmatic turn in the analysis of indirect reports. In particular, there are at least two reasons why indirect reports reconstructed as plausible inferences should not be analysed in terms of truth conditional semantics. First, since they are uncertain and the report is not true but plausible, per definitionem analysing them via truth conditions does not seem to be well-motivated. Second, due to the role of the p-context in shaping both the inferential structure and the plausibility value of the report, indirect reports are basically pragmatic in nature.

Nevertheless, we emphasised that our investigations have been narrowed down to certain aspects of indirect reports, namely, to the issues of reliability, plausibility, informational states, and problem solving. Therefore, our approach neither provides a comprehensive model of indirect reports nor can be broadened towards a general pragmatic theory. Although it could partially touch on several of the problems

discussed in the literature, basically it approaches indirect reports from a novel perspective, thus raising and partially solving problems that have not been reflected upon in the literature so far. Accordingly, it serves to introduce a possible problem shift into the discussion.

However, we have not raised *methodological issues* related to the reconstruction and evaluation of indirect reports. We think that future investigations on this topic should not and could not dispense with the question of the *data handling techniques* of semantic and pragmatic research into indirect reports.[17]

The data base of research into indirect reports consists predominantly of two data types: *introspective data* and *data resulting from thought experiments*. Semantic approaches make use solely of the first type; their starting point is acceptability judgements, as is typical in the field of formal semantics. These acceptability judgements are produced by the linguist and pertain to the isolated, context-free evaluation of sentences. Pragmatic approaches, in contrast, typically make use of results of simple thought experiments insofar as they do not investigate isolated sentence pairs but utterances within their imaginary context. These thought experiments are, however, poorly designed and also rely heavily and crucially on the linguist's own linguistic intuition. The reliability of these data types has, however, been seriously questioned in the last two decades in linguistics.[18]

Our analyses relied heavily on thought experiments, too. Thus, although we have elaborated on more sophisticated thought experiments by trying to reveal as many factors as possible that may influence an indirect report's felicitousness, the final arbiter of the acceptability of the report was our own semantic and pragmatic intuition. From this it might follow that we should reject our results because they do not meet our own methodological standards. This would, however, be a premature decision. As we have shown in other publications, such as Kertész and Kiefer (2013) and Kertész and Rákosi (2014c), thought experiments are, and still remain, unavoidable tools of linguistic theorising in pragmatics. Nevertheless, the above diagnosis motivates the *extension* of the data base by new data types stemming from sources such as real experiments or corpora. Both the collection and the treatment of such data and their integration, however, raise serious methodological problems whose clarification is by no means straightforward and requires further research.

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[17]For a comprehensive overview of the problem of data and evidence in linguistics see Kertész and Rákosi (2012, 2014a).

[18]Thus, for example, people may have conflicting opinions about the correctness of linguistic items. Moreover, in many cases their judgements do not result in a firm and clear 'yes' or 'no' but seem to be gradual and uncertain, ranging from 'perfectly acceptable' through 'rather acceptable' towards 'dubious' or even 'totally unacceptable'.

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Integrated Parentheticals in Quotations and Free Indirect Discourse

Alessandra Giorgi

1 Introduction

In this chapter I consider the syntactic properties of a particular kind of parentheticals, those introducing Quotations – henceforth, QU – and Free Indirect Discourse – henceforth, FID. Consider the following examples:

(1) I will leave tomorrow, *said John*

(2) The new ration did not start till tomorrow and he had only four cigarettes left, *thought Winston* (adapted, from Orwell 1984)

Example (1) is a QU structure and the parenthetical in question is *said John*. Example (2) is a FID construction and the parenthetical is *thought Winston*. As already well known, they have special properties from an interpretive, syntactic and phonological point of view. QU and FID parentheticals are alike under many points of view, even if the two constructions must be kept separate, especially with respect to the interpretation of pronouns and verbal forms. For the purposes of this work, I will in general consider them alike.

Observe now the following paradigm:

(3) John said that Mary left

(4) John said: "Mary left"

(5) Maria, said John, left

It seems to me that the most important goal for a syntactic analysis is to provide a coherent analysis of the similarities and differences among the constructions in (3)-(5). At first sight, these structures seem very much alike, both from the point of view

A. Giorgi (✉)

Department of Linguistics and Comparative Cultural Studies, Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Ca' Bembo, Dorsoduro 1075, 30123 Venice, Italy

e-mail: giorgi@unive.it

of their meaning and their syntax – to the extent that some scholars have proposed a direct syntactic derivation (Emonds 1973; Ross 1973), for instance of (5) starting from (3). I will show here that the situation is indeed much more complex than that. In particular, in this paper I show that example (5) is closer to (4) than to (3). The approach I will develop here is an integrated view of parentheticals, complying with Kayne's (1994) Linear Correspondence Axiom (LCA).

This article is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, I briefly illustrate the properties of parentheticals relevant for the present analysis. In Sect. 3 I discuss the main hypothesis, i.e., the existence of prosody oriented heads. I argue that parentheticals are base generated in phrases projected by such heads. In Sect. 4, I analyze some syntactic phenomena having to do with word order and the distribution of topic and focus. Finally, in Sect. 5, I provide possible lines for further investigation.

I consider examples in the English language for the obvious cases and when they are taken from the literature. Otherwise, I rely on my native judgments about Italian and provide examples in that language.

2   Parentheticals: Generalities

Parentheticals are expressions interpolated in another clause, the so-called *host* clause. In some cases they are connected to the host clause only because they appear in the same utterance, but are otherwise unrelated, as in the following case:

(6)   The doctor, please take a seat (*uttered to somebody entering the room in that moment*), visited the patient 3 days ago.

Conversely, they might fulfill various functions, such as clarifying the host content, adding information, and, as in the cases I'm going to analyze here, introducing the host clause. I'm not going to illustrate here the characteristics of the various possible kinds; for this purpose, I refer the reader to important works on the topic, such as the collection edited by Dehé and Kovalova (2007). Suffice to say that parentheticals come in a variety of syntactic forms: single words such as *probably*, or *what*, short sentences – often called *comment clauses* – such as *I think, I hope, you know*, or longer clauses such as *as every body knows*, or, *and everybody knows that*. Consider for instance the following examples:

(7)   John, *as everybody knows*, likes to go to parties
(8)   John, *and everybody knows that*, likes to go to parties
(9)   John, *probably*, likes to go to parties
(10)   John, *you know*, likes to go to parties

Parentheticals have interesting features form the prosodic point of view in that they all share a similar intonation. Selkirk (2005) points out that a [+comma] feature is responsible for the *comma intonation* in *as* parentheticals, as well in

non-restrictive relatives and nominal appositives, also identified as *supplements* in Potts' (2002, 2005) work. According to Selkirk's theoretical proposal, Comma Phrases are then mapped into Intonational Phrases. For instance in example (7) above, *as everybody knows,* according to Selkirk's proposal, is a Comma Phrase, to be mapped into an Intonational Phrase.

In the literature, supplements have been analyzed as syntactic units that are structurally independent from the surrounding sentence. Two main accounts have been developed in the literature so far: (a) supplements are totally external to the syntactic structure of their host, giving rise to a sort of three-dimensional tree (cf. among the many others Espinal 1991; Haegeman 1991; Burton-Roberts 2006), or (b) supplements are adjoined to the host, for instance right-adjoined as in Potts (2002, 2005).

There are indeed arguments for claiming that supplements are largely independent from their host. For instance, they can have an independent illocutionary force, as in the following examples (examples quoted in Cinque 2008):

(11)   She may have her parents with her, in which case where am I going to sleep? (Huddleston and Pullum 2002)
(12)   My friend, who God forbid you should ever meet!, . . . (Andrews 1975)

Moreover, as pointed out by Selkirk (2005), the supplement might be false, while the sentence remains true:

(13)   The Romans, who arrived before one hundred AD, found a land of wooded hills (Selkirk 2005, ex. 5)
(14)   The Romans who arrived before one hundred AD found a land of wooded hills (Selkirk 2005, ex. 6)

Example (13) clearly contrasts with (14) to this extent.

On the other hand, in spite of these observations, there is a sense in which the host clause, especially in the case of QU and FID, looks like the *complement* of the supplement and cannot be simply considered an independent unit. In a sentence such as (5) above, *Mary left,* is indeed what John said, much as in (3), and analogously in the FID example in (2) *the new ration did not start till tomorrow and he had only four cigarettes left* is the content of Winston's thoughts.[1]

Moreover, consider also that, even putting inversion aside for the moment, neither *John said* in the quotative examples above, nor *Winston thought,* in the FID one, are grammatical clauses. They are more properly fragments, in that they lack a complement and could not stand by themselves without the presence of the host clause.

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[1]We actually attribute to Winston, i.e., the character present in the narration – thoughts in the first person: ". . . and *I* have only four cigarette left". This is however a separate issue, much investigated in the literature on the topic, which I will not further consider here. See, for instance Banfield (1982), Guéron (2006; 2008), Sharvit (2004), Schlenker (2003, 2004).

From these considerations we are led therefore to a contradictory conclusion, in that on one hand parentheticals are largely independent form the host sentence, on the other however, the host must in some way satisfy the syntactic requirements of the missing object.

In the following section I argue in favor of a proposal aiming at reconciling this contradiction.

3   A Syntactic Proposal for QU and FID Parentheticals

In this section I briefly illustrate the proposal in Giorgi (2014, to appear a, to appear b), where I argue that parentheticals are syntactically represented as a layer – i.e., a coherent set of hierarchically ordered syntactic positions – in the left periphery of the clause, headed by prosody oriented heads.[2] This proposal is quite general and might be taken to hold for many, if not all, kinds of parentheticals.

Recall that the first theories on this issue, most notably by Emonds (1973) and Ross (1973), aimed at capturing the similarities between the complement clauses introduced by *that* and the ones with the parenthetical by means of transformations, starting from the *that*-clause and ending with the parenthetical one. However, as amply discussed later by many scholars, a transformation, or movement, derivation is not tenable and theories based on non-derivational accounts must be proposed.[3]

The proposal according to which parentheticals are totally independent from the host clause, to the extent that they give rise to an independent syntactic tree, exhibits several weak points as well. The final tree in fact is supposed to be a three-dimensional one – where the host and the supplement trees are located on different planes and meet in only one point – giving rise to obvious problems concerning linearization, in that the underlying structure must be realized as a single sentence.[4]

Finally, let's consider adjunction theories. This is the place to look for a possible alternative account.

Adjunction in syntax is a device which makes it possible to add non-arguments to the structure by recurring on a maximal projection. However, adjunction as well raises some important problems, in particular in the light of Kayne's (1994) Linear Correspondence Axiom, henceforth LCA.

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[2]This proposal is quite general and might be taken to hold for several kinds of parentheticals, besides QU and FID one.

[3]To this extent, see among the many others Banfield (1982), who criticized a movement derivation for FID parentheticals. For reasons of space, I do not reproduce the relevant evidence here, taking for granted the reasons already discussed in the literature.

[4]Even if a linearization algorithm for three-dimensional trees can indeed be hypothesized – see Moltmann (1992) – a theory encompassing such an algorithm would be extremely powerful and therefore to be disfavored on principled grounds.

Kayne's (1994) LCA – a linearization algorithm – is in fact a very important proposal, in that it provides a solution to some long-standing puzzles dealing with asymmetries in various areas of syntax in different languages. Many theoretical accounts are based on this principle, which I think is at present a basic tenet of syntactic theory.[5]

According to Kayne's (1994) LCA, linear precedence reflects asymmetric c-command. The LCA can be (roughly) formulated as follows:

(15)   LCA: A precedes B iff A asymmetrically c-commands B

A structure not satisfying the LCA cannot be linearized – meaning that ultimately it cannot be pronounced, in that it fails at the syntax-phonology interface – and hence must be excluded. Adjunction, if not further qualified, violates the LCA, given that the adjoined phrase and the structure it adjoins to do not give rise to an asymmetric structure:

(16)   [XP YP]

In this configuration, c-command between XP mad YP is symmetric, in that XP c-commands YP and vice versa; hence, linearization cannot obtain. On the contrary, in the following configuration, where a head intervenes, an asymmetric relation obtains and the structure can be linearized:

(17)   [XP [H YP]]$_{HP}$

The phrase is a projection of the head H and XP and YP are in an asymmetric relation.

Applying this proposal to parentheticals, a structure such as the one in (16) is ruled out, be the supplement either XP or YP, i.e., independently of right or left adjunction, whereas (17) is a possible structure.[6]

The relevant issue at this point is establishing the nature of the head H. In previous work (Giorgi 2014, to appear a, to appear b), capitalizing on Selkirk's (2005) idea, I proposed that this head is a *prosody oriented head*, corresponding to the *comma feature* hypothesized by Selkirk (2005, p.6, see also Dehé (2007, 2009) for a discussion):

(18)   "Root sentences and supplements form a natural class, in that *they both are comma phrases*, and so [. . .] set off by Intonational Phrase edges from what surrounds them." (from Selkirk 2005, p.6)

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[5]The so-called cartographic approach, developed by Cinque (1999) and scholars, is based on such a principle. The present work is developed largely in the same framework. According to the cartographic approach, in the spirit of Kayne's (1994) proposal, adjunction is never available and a head H must intervene when a non-argument, as for instance an adverbial, is added to the structure.

[6]Coherently with these considerations, in the cartographic approach – cf. Cinque (1999) – adverbs appear as Specifiers of a dedicated head, in a structure like (17). See also fn5.

According to my proposal, *comma* is not just a feature, but a head, K, and projects a constituent. K is then read off at the interface with prosody as the characteristic comma intonation of parentheticals. I.e. as far as the projection of the tree goes, K is a head as any other, projecting its own phrase containing the parenthetical, but as far as its content is concerned, it is not a lexical item, but a prosody oriented one, namely to be interpreted in the prosody.

Note also that as Selkirk points out – cf. (18) above – according to her hypothesis, there are two comma features: one associated to the root sentence and one associated to the parenthetical. Coherently, in the syntactic account I am proposing, in order to project the structure in question, two K heads are needed, one at the left and one at the right of the supplement.

Let's exemplify now the hypothesis. Consider quotations first:

(19)   I will leave tomorrow, *said John*

According to the hypothesis above, the starting structure is the following:

(20)   [$_{KP}$**K** [*said John* [$_{KP}$**K** [I will leave tomorrow]]]]

Selkirk's (2005) comma features are represented here as heads. I'll address the problem of the labeling of the parenthetical clause in Sect. 5.

Word order in (19) is however not the one immediately obtained on the basis of the structure in (20). A possibility would be to say that topicalization of the host takes place, topicalizing it in the spec of KP[7]:

(21)   [$_{KP}$ [I will leave tomorrow] **K** [*said John* [$_{KP}$**K** ~~[I will leave tomorrow]~~]]]

The derivation for FID parentheticals proceeds along the same line:

(22)   The new ration did not start till tomorrow and he had only four cigarettes left, *thought Winston* (adapted, Orwell, 1984, ch. 5)
(23)   [$_{KP}$**K** [*thought Winston* [$_{KP}$**K** [$_{CP}$ The new ration . . .]]]]

With topicalization of CP in KP:

(24)   [$_{KP}$ [$_{CP}$ The new ration . . .]$_i$**K** [*thought Winston* [$_{KP}$**K** ~~The new ration~~ . . .]]]

This proposal has some advantages. Most notably, beside being compatible with the linearization algorithm proposed by Kayne (1994), in this representation the host sentence is syntactically the complement of the parenthetical, and therefore this proposal is able to account for the *gap effect* – i.e., the apparent violation of the lexical requirements concerning the presence of the object. The object of the saying verb is in fact present in the structure, though not realized as a sentential expression – i.e., a CP – or a nominal one, as in *Gianni ha detto la verità* (Gianni said the truth), but as a KP. Importantly, however, there is no *subordination* relation,

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[7]In this section I am ignoring the problems connected with subject inversion. I will briefly mention this issue below in section 5.

due to the nature of the head K, which is *not* a complementizer. I will discuss this point with more details in the next section.

However, in order to obtain the correct linear order, topicalization might not be the best option. Consider in fact the following examples[8]:

(25)   John, said Mary, will leave tomorrow
(26)   John will, said Mary, leave tomorrow

As far as sentence (25) is concerned, a topicalization analysis might still be tenable. The subject *John* could in fact topicalize in Spec, KP. The fragment *John will* is however not a constituent, hence the topicalization I proposed above would not work.

There are two possible ways out. According to the first, a more complex topicalization derivation can be hypothesized: the VP *leave tomorrow* is moved first to the left periphery of the host, for instance in the Specifier of a head F, and then remnant movement of the whole clause to Spec, KP takes place, as illustrated below[9]:

(27)   [$_{KP}$**K** [*said Mary* [$_{KP}$**K** [John will leave tomorrow]]]]
(28)   [$_{KP}$**K** [*said Mary* [$_{KP}$**K** [[$_{FP}$ leave tomorrow F [John will ~~leave tomorrow~~]]
(29)   [$_{KP}$ John will **K** [*said Mary* [$_{KP}$**K** [[$_{FP}$ leave tomorrow F [~~John will~~]]

This derivation is possible under current theoretical assumptions, but faces an empirical problem. As shown by the data collected in corpora – besides my personal experience as a native speaker – parentheticals exhibit the so-called *backtracking* phenomenon, in that the same fragment can be in some cases pronounced twice, once on the left and once on the right of the parenthetical. The following examples are taken form corpora and have been discussed in the literature (the repeated portion appears in bold):

(30)   But a different role <,> uh because **when we get to the time of Ezra**, as with the more classical Wellhausen uh hypothesis, **when we get to the time of Ezra** we have the further narrowing of the office of priest (International Corpus of English-GB: s1b-001, #9) (from Dehé and Kavalova 2007, 3)
(31)   But **I believe that if** at this stage, and it isn't too late because it's only what 6 months since your brother died, **I believe that if** you can bear . . . (Diachronic Corpus of Present-Day Spoken English: DL-D08, #135) (From Kavalova 2007, 160).

In a topicalization analysis there is no possible account for backtracking phenomena, because the structure hypothesized for what appears on the right of the parenthetical is different from the structure hypothesized for what is on its left.

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[8]Here I discuss quotations, but the same reasoning holds for FID clauses. See also Matos (2013) for a discussion of topicalization in quotations.

[9]The term *remnant movement* refers to the movement of a phrase already affected by movement, containing therefore a copy of a phrase already moved out of it.

Ellipsis seems a better candidate for explaining this pattern:

(32)   [_KP John will ~~leave tomorrow~~ **K** [*Mary said* [_KP**K** [~~John will~~ leave
       tomorrow]]]]

According to this proposal, in (32) there is a double ellipsis, deleting a fragment
on the right and a fragment on the left. The fact that the same structure is present in
both positions can easily account for the backtracking facts described in examples
(30) and (31).[10]

Consider finally another important advantage with respect to adjunction theories,
usually adjoining the parenthetical next to the constituent appearing on its left,
or on its right. Independently from the position in which the parenthetical is
linearized, being base-generated on the extreme left of the sentence insures that
the parenthetical always has scope on the host.

Trivially, in the cases under scrutiny, the presence of the parenthetical permits
the correct interpretation of the host as a QU or a FID structure, with respect for
instance to the reference of indexicals. Consider in fact example (33):

(33)   I, said John, will leave tomorrow

Both *I* and *tomorrow* are interpreted with respect to *John* and not the speaker,
even if *I* precedes the parenthetical, being therefore outside its scope, and *tomorrow*
follows it. As discussed in Giorgi (2010) in the syntax the speaker coordinates must
be represented in the C-layer, i.e., in the leftmost position in the clause. Hence,
according to the hypothesis I am arguing for here, the parenthetical must be base-
generated in a position having scope on it, hence on the left of the C-layer. On the
contrary, under the adjunction hypothesis, the parenthetical would be hierarchically
lower than the subject.[11]

Consider also the following case, having to do with the reciprocal scope of the
epistemic adverb *probabilmente* (probably), in its parenthetical usage, and negation,
discussed in Giorgi (to appear a)[12]:

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[10]For reasons of space, I will not provide here a full discussion of ellipsis in these cases. Further
work is indeed required. Note also that, as often observed in ellipsis phenomena, the fragment on
the right and the one on the left might be not hundred percent identical. This issue should be more
carefully investigated especially by means of corpora of spoken language, where these phenomena
are more likely to occur. Furthermore, from the analysis provided in the text, it also follows that
the host sentence is always inserted twice: once in the KP on the left of the parenthetical and once
as the KP complement, on its right, even in those cases where no fragment appears on the right –
as for instance in *I will leave tomorrow, said John*. Actually, nothing so far seems to run against
this conclusion, but, again, further study is required.

[11]Note that the necessity of a coherent interpretation of *I* and *tomorrow*, might seem a trivial fact.
It might be so from a semantic point of view, but it is far from being such from a syntactic one.

[12]Adverbs such as *probabilmente* (probably), *fortunatamente* (fortunately) and *francamente*
(frankly), etc. also allow a non-parenthetical usage. For an analysis of their positions in the
non parenthetical case, see Cinque (1999); for a comparison between the parenthetical and non-
parenthetical one, see Giorgi (to appear a).

(34)   Probabilmente, Gianni non ha mangiato la torta
       Probably, Gianni not has eaten the cake
       'Probably, Gianni did not eat the cake'
(35)   Gianni non ha, probabilmente, mangiato la torta
       Gianni not has, probably eaten the cake
       'Gianni did not, probably, eat the cake'

In both cases, parenthetical *probabilmente* (probably) has scope over negation. However, according to adjunction theories, in (35) the adjunction site would be lower then negation. Hence, these examples as well support the proposal sketched above.

4   More on the Syntactic Properties of Quotations and Free Indirect Discourse

In this section I illustrate some other syntactic properties of these constructions and I will then go back to the paradigm (3)-(5) given in Sect. 1, to point out similarities and differences among the various constructions.

The most salient property of QU and FID parentheticals is that they cannot be embedded:

(36)   *Luigi crede che Maria, disse Gianni, partirà domani
       Luigi believes that Maria, said Gianni, will leave tomorrow

This sentence contrasts with direct discourse, as shown in example (37):

(37)   Luigi crede che Gianni abbia detto: "Maria partirà domani"
       Luigi believes that Gianni said: "Maria will leave tomorrow"

Moreover, example (36) also contrasts with (38) and (39), where the parenthetical is constituted by the whole structure *Luigi crede che Gianni abbia detto* (Luigi believes that Gianni said)*,* instead simply *Gianni disse* (Gianni said)[13]:

(38)   Maria partirà domani, Luigi crede che Gianni abbia detto
       Maria will leave tomorrow, Luigi believes that Gianni said
(39)   Maria, Luigi crede che Gianni abbia detto, partirà domani
       Maria, Luigi believes that Gianni said, will leave tomorrow

This means that the ungrammaticality of example (36) is neither due to the impossibility of embedding a direct discourse, nor to the impossibility of having a complex parenthetical, where the saying verb is itself embedded. Analogously in the case of FID:

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[13]In Italian *credere* (believe) selects the subjunctive in the subordinate clause, hence the form *abbia detto* (has-subj said). This fact however does not have any import on the argument considered here.

(40)   *Luigi ha detto che Gianni, pensò la ragazza, sarebbe partito domani
        Luigi said that Gianni, thought the young woman, would leave tomorrow

An embedded FID parenthetical gives rise to ungrammaticality, contrasting with example (41):

(41)   Luigi, pensò la ragazza, ha detto che Gianni sarebbe partito domani
        Luigi, thought the young woman, said that Gianni would leave tomorrow

These parentheticals are therefore a root phenomenon. From a syntactic point of view, let's consider the following explanation.

In Giorgi (2010) I proposed that the speaker's coordinates are represented in the leftmost position in the C-layer. In Italian this position is realized, simplifying somewhat, in indicative clauses, even when they appear as subordinates. In main clauses the representation of the speaker's coordinates is obligatory, whereas this in not the case in embedded ones, given that, for instance, in Italian subjunctive clauses the speaker's coordinates are not present. Several data support this view as far as Italian is concerned: complementizer deletion phenomena, the distribution and interpretation of the subjunctive and the distribution of the Double Access Reading. I will not reproduce here the relevant discussion and refer the reader to the reference mentioned above.

Capitalizing on this idea, I propose that FID and QU parentheticals modify the content of the projection dedicated to the speaker's coordinates in the C-layer. In fact, in both cases, the interpretation of the sentence is not to be related to the speaker's temporal and spatial location, but to the location of the subject of the parentheticals.[14]

According to the proposal above, this result can be easily achieved, given that the parenthetical takes as its immediate complement the main CP and the leftmost position in the C-layer appears in its immediate domain. At the interface with the semantics, the interpretive process shifts the coordinates from the speaker to the parenthetical subject.

If this is correct, therefore, QU and FID parentheticals can only appear at root level, because they are crucial in identifying the relevant coordinates. Such coordinates might, or might not, appear also in embedded clauses, according to Giorgi (2010), but must be identified in the main clause.[15]

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[14]As already mentioned above, Quotations and Free Indirect Discourse have different properties, even if they share the characteristics of substituting totally – in the case of QU – or partially – in the case of FID – the speaker's spatial and temporal coordinates. Many scholars considered this and related issues. Cf., among the many others, Doron (1991), Giorgi (to appear b), Guéron (2006; 2008), Sharvit (2004), Schlenker (2003, 2004).

[15]Note that in examples (38) and (39) above, the relevant argument is not the parenthetical main subject, but the subject of the *saying predicate*. The correct generalization therefore might be slightly more complex than the one provided in text. Note in fact, that in all the examples the relevant argument is the *closest* one to the leftmost position in C. The notion of *minimal distance* therefore is presumably relevant in this domain as well, as in many other cases in syntax.

Let's consider now the interactions with topic and focus. Here I will adopt a very loose definition of topic as given information, and will consider only contrastive focus, which in Italian appear in the left periphery of the clause (cf. Rizzi 1997).[16]

A topic can appear both on the left, and on the right of a QU parenthetical:

(42)   A Maria, disse Gianni, un libro, glielo regalerò
         To Maria, said Gianni, a book, I to her it will give

Note that both topics are Clitic Left Dislocations. A Focus is allowed, but is interpreted as a literal citation of what Gianni said (contrastive focus in capital letters):

(43)   A MARIA (non a Paola), disse Gianni, Luigi non farà più regali
         TO MARIA (non a Paola), said Gianni, Luigi will give no more presents

In other words, the focus appearing in (43) is itself topicalized, corresponding to sentence (44):

(44)   Gianni disse: "A MARIA (non a Paola) Luigi non farà più regali"
         Gianni disse: "To MARIA (not to Paola) Luigi will give no more presents"

It is important to remark that it is impossible to interpret the focused phrase as a focus due to the utterer. This pattern is also found with FID parentheticals:

(45)   A Gianni, pensò la ragazza, quel libro, gliel'avrebbe finalmente venduto
         To Gianni, thought the young woman, that book, to him it would eventually
         sell

A Gianni (to Gianni) and *quel libro* (that book) are topicalized phrases (clitic left dislocation). A Focus on the left of the introducing predicate is ungrammatical/very marginal:

(46)   ?*A MARIA, pensò la ragazza, Gianni non avrebbe fatto più regali
         To Maria, thought the young woman, Gianni would give no more presents

In this case it is more difficult – for me it is indeed impossible – to attribute the Focus to the young woman, given the different interpretive nature of FID with respect to Quotations. Since the focus cannot be attributed to the utterer, the sentence is ungrammatical.[17]

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[16]Rizzi (1997) hypothesized for the left periphery the following structure:

i. FORCE Topic* Focus Topic* FIN IP

Force is the complementizer for finite clauses, whereas FIN is the complementizer of non-finite clauses. Left-peripheral focus in Italian can only be a contrastive focus. Note that topics can appear either on the left or on right of contrastive focus; the star signals that more than one topic can appear on either side.

[17]Note that for the speakers that can attribute the production of the focus to the subject of the parenthetical, the sentence is not totally ungrammatical.

These observations – i.e., the contrast between topic and focus – can be accounted for considering the nature of the two constructions in conjunction with the hypothesis sketched above.

One of the most interesting theories explaining the properties of the topics like the ones appearing in the examples above – i.e., CLLD – is that these items are not moved in the position they occupy, but base generated there. In this respect, topic contrasts with focus, which on the contrary is always moved in the left peripheral position of the clause. Topics are therefore base-generated in Spec-KP.[18]

Consider also the following structures with multiple topics[19]:

(47)   A Paolo, quel libro, disse Gianni, glielo darò domani
        To Paolo, that book, said Gianni, I to him it will give tomorrow
(48)   Domani, disse Gianni, a Paolo, quel libro, glielo darò
        Tomorrow, said Gianni, to Paolo, that book I to him it will give

Multiple topics can both precede and follow the parenthetical. Each topic is base-generated in the spec position of a head K, as can also be inferred from the peculiar prosody – i.e., the *comma intonation* – associated with each topicalized phrase. The structures are therefore the following ones:

(49)   [$_{KP}$ A Paolo **K** [$_{KP}$ quel libro **K** [*disse Gianni* [$_{KP}$**K** [glielo darò domani]]]]]
        To Paolo, that book, Gianni said, I to him it will give tomorrow
        'To Paolo, that book, said Gianni, I will give tomorrow'
(50)   [$_{KP}$ Domani **K** [*disse Gianni* [$_{KP}$**K** [$_{KP}$ a Paolo **K** [$_{KP}$ quel libro **K** [glielo darò]]]]]]
        Tomorrow, said Gianni, to Paolo, that book, I to him it will give
        'Tomorrow, said Gianni, to Paolo, that book, I will give'

A (contrastively) focused phrase cannot appear in these positions because a KP is not a suitable landing site for movement. A focused item can appear in this position only if it is considered a topic, as shown in examples (43) and (44) above. This conclusion is indeed coherent with what is in general assumed about parentheticals.[20]

Concluding, a KP contains, besides the parenthetical, either base generated topics or ellipsis fragments, but not moved phrases. Consider finally, that QU and FID parentheticals must be preceded by an ellipsis fragment or a topic:

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[18]Cf. for instance Cinque (1990), Frascarelli (2000), Frascarelli and Hinterhölzl (2007), Benincà and Poletto (2004). For an important different analysis of focus constructions, in particular with respect to the hypothesis of movement to the left periphery, see Samek-Lodovici (2015). The issue deserves further inquiry, to properly reconcile contrasting empirical evidence.

[19]Note that *domani* (tomorrow) is a topic as well, in pre-parenthetical position. On the necessity of a pre-parenthetical topic, see below in section 5.

[20]See Dehé and Kavalova (2007), in particular, the discussion in De Vries' chapter (2007, pp. 203–235).

(51)   *Said John, I will leave tomorrow
(52)   *Thought Winston, the new ration did not start till tomorrow and he had only four cigarettes left.

This can easily be attributed to the fact that a head K must be realized in prosody and the only way to realize a comma intonation is in between lexical items.

Let us go back now to the problem addressed in Sect. 1. Given the sentences (3)-(5), reproduced here for simplicity, how can we account for similarities and differences?

(53)   John said that Mary left
(54)   John said: "Mary left"
(55)   Maria, said John, left

Sentence (53) instantiates a subordination relation. As is well known, sentences (54) and (55) differ from (53) with respect to several parameters: the interpretation of indexicals, sequence of tense, the properties of the complementizer etc. The differences between (54) and (55) are more subtle, in that for instance the interpretation of indexicals is the same, as is the case with respect to sequence of tense, the absence of complementizer and many other properties. The main obvious difference between the two concerns the intonation, given that *John said* in (54) is not associated to a comma intonation, even if *said* is followed by something which could be – simplifying a complex debate (cf, Döring 2007) – identified as a *pause*.

Consider also that a similar construction, where the introducing clause precedes the host, can also be found in FID structures, as for instance in the following case:

(56)   **Lo ricordò dopo uno sforzo di memoria anzi di ragionamento**: [*pro*] doveva essere passata per quella via essendo giunta a quell'altra da casa mia.
       *She remembered **it** with a memory effort, or better to say of reasoning*: (she) should have passed through that street reaching that other house from my home.

Note that the introducing clause – **Lo ricordò dopo uno sforzo di memoria anzi di ragionamento** (She remembered **it** with a memory effort, or better to say of reasoning) – includes the clitic *lo* (it), which refers to the FID sentence that follows. This is totally impossible in FID sentences with a parenthetical:

(57)   The new ration did not start till tomorrow and he had only four cigarettes left, *Winston thought* **it/*that* (adapted, from Orwell, 1984)

Analogously, in quotations the clitic is impossible with the parenthetical:

(58)   Io, Gianni **lo disse, partirò domani
       I, Gianni said it, will leave tomorrow

The clitic can appear in the structure without the parenthetical:

(59)   Gianni **lo** ha detto ieri: "Io partirò domani"
       Gianni said it yesterday: "I will leave tomorrow"

Therefore, the syntax of the sentences where the introducing clause precedes the host differs from the other case, in spite of the similarities. As a matter of fact, in these cases we do not have a parenthetical but a clause, possibly with a gap, but not obligatorily, preceding it.

I capitalize here on an intuition by Cinque (2008), who claims (p.59) that "Discourse fragments do not consist of just concatenations of CPs". Cinque (2008) considers the following discourse fragments:

(60)   John is no longer here. He left at noon. (Cinque 2008, ex.59)

(61)   A pink shirt? I will never wear any such thing in my life! (Cinque 2008, ex.61)

He proposes the following trees for (60) and (61) respectively:

(62)   [$_{HP}$ CP [H CP]] (Cinque 2008, ex.59)

(63)   [$_{HP}$ DP [H CP]] (Cinque 2008, ex.61)

Where H is the *discourse* head, connecting two sentences, in the case of example (60), or a DP and a CP in example (61).

A possible explanation for the pattern observed above with respect to sentences such as *John said: "Mary left"* is that they instantiate the structure in (62), in the sense that they are discourses, where each clause, or phrase, is connected to the next one by means of a head. *John said* occupies the specifier position of H, whereas *Mary left*, occupies the complement one. In this case the head H is a prosody-oriented head, associated with a peculiar intonational pattern, devoid of lexical content.

The head H therefore resembles the head K. However, in *Maria, said John, left*, the KP containing the host sentence is the syntactic complement of *say*, whereas this is not the case with *John said: "Mary left"*. For this reason, an overt object pronoun can be inserted, as for instance in the Italian example above *Gianni **lo** ha detto ieri: "Io partirò domani"* (Gianni said it yesterday: "I will leave tomorrow").[21]

5   Further Issues

In this section I briefly consider a couple of remaining issues, and highlight some ideas for further study.

Let's first consider subject inversion. Matos (2013) points out that subject inversion is obligatory in Spanish and European Portuguese, whereas it is optional

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[21]In the discourse *John said: "Mary left",* where no object pronoun appears, we can either hypothesize the presence of a null pronoun referring the following sentence, or, perhaps more plausibly, an ellipsis process, similar to the one taking place in question answering: *Who left? John left*, taking place in the specifier phrase:

i. [John said ~~that Mary left~~ [H [Mary left]]]

in English. Italian patterns with Spanish and Portuguese.[22] Matos' proposal is that the subject is inverted in Spanish and Portuguese, because in this construction the subject must be an informational focus and in Spanish and Portuguese, and Italian as well, informational focus only occurs post-verbally – the preverbal position being obligatorily contrastive. In English, on the contrary, preverbal focus can be an informational one as well, hence in this language both positions are admitted.

I endorse here Matos' (2013) proposal, even if further suggestions might be taken into account, due to the fact that the structure inside the KP is not necessarily a full clause, hence we might wonder if the requirements on the presence of a subject are the same as in non parenthetical clauses. In principle, in fact, it does not seem to be necessary to hypothesize a full clausal structure for the phrases projected inside a prosody oriented head. In particular, it is not clear in this case what the role might be for the left periphery of the clause. Recall also that, as amply discussed in the literature, these parentheticals are highly deficient. For instance, in English auxiliaries cannot appear, adverbs exhibits a peculiar distribution, pronominal subjects can be inverted only under special conditions, etc[23].

Alternatively, let me suggest that these parentheticals can either appear as full sentences, or as truncated structures – as is normally the case. The whole structure might be truncated at the level of the aspectual projections above the verbal ones. In this case, the subject would occupy a position lower than the preverbal one – along the lines of Collins and Braninang (Collins and Branigan 1997) –and hence be able to appear on the right of the verbal form.

An argument in favor of this view is the – quite odd – presence of the simple past in Italian. The nature and the properties of the verbal forms occurring in these parentheticals is in fact another interesting issue, not very much investigated so far.

In Italian, there are two past forms: a periphrastic present perfect – aux + past participle: *ho mangiato* (I have eaten) – and a synthetic simple past: *mangiai* (I ate). In Central and Northern Italy, the periphrastic form is very strongly favored, whereas the opposite situation holds in Southern Italy, where the synthetic form is the one vastly adopted.[24]

With FID and QU parentheticals, however, even Central and Northern Italian speakers normally accept, and use, the synthetic simple past, both in written and spoken sentences – as far as these kind of sentences occur in spoken language. A possible line of investigation entails a more refined analysis of the syntax of the

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[22]According to my intuition, inversion is not really obligatory, especially when the parenthetical is "heavy", i.e., containing other items beside the subject and the verb. Consider for instance the following example:

i. L'azienda venderà la sua filiale a Parigi, il presidente comunicò alla commissione durante la riunione
   The company will sell its brunch in Paris, the president told the committee during the meeting

   It is not clear however whether this factor is relevant in Spanish and Portuguese as well.

[23]For a discussion, see Collins (1997) and Collins and Braninang (1997).

[24]See also Giorgi and Pianesi (1997) for a discussion.

simple past in contemporary Central and Northern Italian, the basic hypothesis being that in this language the simple past is a pure aorist, expressing only an aspectual value and not a temporal one. The verbal form therefore could be not higher than the relevant aspectual, not temporal, projection and the remaining part of the sentence might be dispensed with.[25]

Therefore, the labeling of the intermediate node in example (27), repeated here for simplicity, is AspP:

(64)   [$_{KP}$**K** [$_{AspP}$ *said Mary* [$_{KP}$**K** [John will leave tomorrow]]]]

Alternatively, a full clause, i.e., a TP, can be projected, with a preverbal subject:

(65)   [$_{KP}$**K** [$_{TP}$ *Mary said* [$_{KP}$**K** [John will leave tomorrow]]]]

6   Concluding Remarks

In this article I illustrated the syntactic properties of the parentheticals found in FID and QU contexts. I argued that these phrases are integrated in the structure of the host, being always generated at the left of the clause, in a layer headed by prosody oriented heads, which are the syntactic equivalent of the comma feature hypothesized in phonology. This proposal is compatible with Kayne's (1994) Linear Correspondence Axiom and can account for the various word orders, by means of ellipsis processes. This hypothesis, combined with the peculiar interpretive properties of QU and FID parentheticals, can also account for their root nature. Capitalizing in fact on the proposal by Giorgi (2010) – i.e., that the speaker's coordinates are syntactically realized in the leftmost Complementizer position – I suggested that these parentheticals must appear on the left of the main C-layer, in order to have the relevant position in their minimal domain. When the introducing predicate is not realized parenthetically, as in example (2) above, the structure is the one of a discourse. A discourse shares with the parenthetical case the main properties of being headed by a prosody oriented head.

I also suggested that the internal syntactic structure of QU and FID parentheticals can be a truncated one, i.e., a structure smaller than a full clause.

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[25]For an analysis of the past forms in Italian, see Bertinetto and Squartini (1996) and Squartini and Bertinetto (2000).

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Faithfulness and *De Se*

Samuel Cumming and Yael Sharvit

1 Introduction

At a certain level of abstraction, an occurrence of the first-person pronoun in DIRECT DISCOURSE and a *de se* pronoun (such as PRO) in INDIRECT DISCOURSE are semantic kin. They both refer[1] to the subject of the report. Moreover, they do so under the same mode of presentation, that of self-attribution.

Thus there is a rough correspondence in meaning between the following reports:

(1)   a.   Whenever Alice begins a game of chess, she expects PRO to win.
         b.   Whenever Alice begins a game of chess, she thinks 'I will win'.

The matrix clause in (1-a) is an attitude report in the indirect discourse mode. According to standard linguistic theory, the embedded infinitive clause 'to win', has

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[1]One might not think the direct discourse pronoun refers at all. One might prefer to say that, while the expression *represented by* that pronoun referred to something in its original context, the pronoun itself does not refer. Instead, its semantic role is to delineate certain aspects of a component of the original utterance (see Sect. 3 below). This preference is supported by the following consideration. Suppose we think of referring as an act of coordinating (or attempting to coordinate) with an audience on a particular referent (see, e.g., King 2014). Pronouns, even first-person pronouns, can occur felicitously in direct discourse without facilitating such referential coordination, suggesting that they are not used referentially there. Consider:

(i)   The graffiti read, 'I love you, Wanda.'

If the graffiti is not attributed to anyone, then the audience cannot resolve the reference of 'I' to any familiar entities. However, this doesn't make the direct report above infelicitous. The same cannot be said of referring expressions in indirect discourse.

S. Cumming • Y. Sharvit (✉)
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
e-mail: louise.cummings@ntu.ac.u; ysharvit@gmail.com

an understood subject, the pronoun PRO. This pronoun is *controlled* by the subject of the report verb, which results in the *de se* interpretation (Chierchia 1989). The matrix clause in (1-b), by contrast, is a report in the direct discourse mode. The embedded subject, in this case, is the first-person pronoun 'I'.

Both sentences in (1) report mental states that involve self-attribution. Intuitively, they report Alice's expectation that *she herself* will win. They contrast truth-conditionally with the following non-*de se* forms of indirect report:

(2)   a.   Whenever Alice begins a game of chess, she thinks that *she* will win.
        b.   Whenever Alice begins a game of chess, she thinks that Alice will win.

The difference is subtle, but the sentences in (2) have an interpretation on which they are each true in the following situation. Suppose Alice always thinks to herself at the beginning of a game that whoever plays White in that game will win. Moreover, unbeknownst to her, it is always determined in advance that she (perhaps due to her seniority) will play White. So in fact, in a certain sense, she is thinking that she, *qua* player of White, will win. This situation verifies both sentences in (2) – on a certain reading – but falsifies those in (1), which require that her prediction transparently self-apply.

Semantic accounts that treat (1-a) on a par with (1-b)[2] emphasize the fact that some of the same communicative options are available in the direct and indirect modes of report – an important observation. Indeed, it is often helpful, in first getting to grips with the *de se* interpretation, to compare it with various reports in direct discourse. So while (1-a) could be used for the situation described in (1-b), it could not be used for that described in (3):

(3)   Whenever Alice begins a game of chess, she thinks 'White will win'.

Having conceded so much to the analogy, we must nevertheless observe that the conventional mechanisms generating what looks like a common semantic outcome are not identical. Let's confine our attention, for the moment, to reported *speech,* and to how the conventions determine reference (or *who* the speech is reportedly about).

The first-person pronoun 'I', when embedded in a direct discourse report, picks out the subject of the report. This is because (i) an expression occurring in a direct discourse context is understood as a verbatim – or at least FAITHFUL[3] –

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[2]For example, Bittner (2007).

[3]Direct discourse need not involve a verbatim recapitulation of speech. In fact, all that is required is *faithfulness* to the original along certain salient dimensions. For example, if the original discourse was in a different language, then a first-person feature in the report will (most likely) indicate a first-person feature in the language of the original. (The qualification exists because there may not be a neat one-one mapping between the person-marking systems in the two languages, or else because that particular dimension of faithfulness to form was not incorporated into the meaning of the report.) An example of a positive account of faithfulness that handles these complications will be given in Sect. 3. A further intricacy, which we do not address in this paper, is already present in our example (1-a). This is a direct report of thought, rather than speech, and so it far

representation of the corresponding expression in the original utterance, and (ii) a first-person pronoun conventionally refers to the one uttering it. Fact (i) guarantees that the expression originally uttered was a first-person pronoun, which, by fact (ii), means that it referred to the one who made the original utterance: that is to say, the subject of the report.[4]

The *de se* pronoun PRO in indirect discourse also indicates the (controlling) subject of the report, but the conventions securing its reference are altogether different. They consist of (a) the rule that says PRO must corefer with its controlling argument,[5] and (b) the lexical convention that the report verb in question controls PRO with its subject.[6]

Furthermore, it is clear that neither (i) nor (ii) applies in the latter case. In the first place, indirect discourse is not required to be faithful to the form of the reported utterance (Partee 1973; Anand 2006).[7] But even if it were, and the occurrence of PRO in the report represented an occurrence of PRO in the original utterance, that would not automatically mean that it referred to the subject of the report. The reference of PRO in the original utterance would depend, not on who uttered it, but rather on what occupied the syntactically controlling argument in that sentence.

1.1 Free Indirect Discourse

The conventions of *de se* reference and those of the faithful representation of discourse must be carefully distinguished in a further discourse mode where they both have application together: free indirect discourse (FID). FID contains *de se*

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from obvious what counts as faithful reporting, unless the subject's "thought" is understood as a subvocal utterance in a natural language. We think it is telling that direct reports of thought are generally found in fiction, where the standard is mimesis, or the compelling evocation of a palpable reality, rather than accuracy.

[4]The reliance on fact (ii) already suggests a scenario in which (1-b) might be true, while (1-a) is false. Suppose Alice's use of 'I' is nonstandard: for instance, it could be the name she has bestowed on the chess program that will be her opponent in the game.

[5]See Capone (2010) for a possible account of the rise of this convention.

[6]If the verb had belonged to the lexical type of object-control verb, then PRO would refer instead to the verb's direct object. If the verb were additionally a report verb, such as *ask*, then the pronoun would take on the closely related *de te* interpretation, on which the mode of presentation transparently represents the addressee (rather than the author) of the reported speech act. For simplicity, we will use the general epithet *de se* to cover both author- and addressee-directed interpretations.

[7]Indirect discourse (as a first rough pass) only characterizes the import – not the letter – of what was said or thought; hence it is tolerant of content-preserving variation in linguistic form. This is notwithstanding a tradition in philosophy that analyses the "referential opacity" of indirect contexts as a form of lexical or syntactic faithfulness (Quine 1956, Kripke 1979, Kaplan 1990, Fine 2007). From our standpoint, this is simply a mistake. Opaque indirect discourse is not the same thing as faithful direct discourse: the identification ignores the comparative freedom of the indirect form.

pronouns and is also – for the most part – faithful to form, so it shares characteristics of both direct and indirect modes.[8]

Interestingly, *de se* pronouns are an *exception* to the general rule that expressions in FID must faithfully represent the original discourse.[9] We illustrate this with a passage from Henry Miller's *Sextus* (also quoted in Ron 1981: 31):

> "Where were you?" I ask. "What was the matter? Why didn't you come?"
> She seemed surprised that I should get so upset over so trivial a thing. *What had kept her?*
> *Oh, it was nothing at all. She had been out late, a rather wild party* [...] *not with Carruthers*
> [...] *he had left shortly after me. No, it was Florrie who had organized the party. Florrie*
> *and Hannah – did I remember them?*

The italicised part is an FID report of the character Mara's speech. We can infer a likely reconstruction of Mara's words, which differ slightly from those in the report. The pronouns that are not faithfully represented in the FID passage are underlined:

(4)   What kept <u>me</u>? Oh it was nothing at all. <u>I</u> was out late, a rather wild party [...] not with Carruthers [...] he left shortly after <u>you</u>. No, it was Florrie who organized the party. Florrie and Hannah – do <u>you</u> remember them?

The unfaithful pronouns refer to the two participants in the reported conversation, Mara and Henry (the narrator). Furthermore, they indicate that those individuals were represented transparently *as* participants (hence our reconstruction of them as first- and second-person pronouns). In other words, the unfaithful pronouns are all interpreted *de se* (in the general sense). By contrast, the pronouns that are faithfully represented in the FID passage all refer to non-participants: Carruthers, and the pair of Florrie and Hannah.[10]

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[8]See Cohn (1978) for further comparison of the three modes.

[9]The other exception, not unrelated, is tense marking. See Banfield (1982), Doron (1991), Ron (1981), and Sharvit (2008).

[10]Sharvit's (2008) generalization was similar to what we note here, except that first- and second-person pronouns in FID were (i) always exempt from the faithfulness requirement, yet (ii) could sometimes occur without transparently representing participants in the reported discourse (i.e. they had unfaithful yet non-*de se* occurrences in FID). It is now the offical view of the authors that the coincidence of unfaithfulness and *de se* extends to the first and second person. Indeed, we maintain (i) and reject (ii), believing – in line with Doron p.c., Doron (1991) and Ron (1981) – that all first- and second-person pronouns in FID are *de se*. For suppose there were non-*de se* occurrences of the first and second person in FID; then, according to the generalization observed in the main text, they would have to represent the original discourse faithfully; and hence would be used to represent original occurrences of the first and second person. But it is a convention of FID that it always represents the first and second person with (possibly unfaithful) *de se* pronouns, and never by the method (used in direct discourse) of obligatorily faithful first- and second-person pronouns.

Our stance is supported by a contrast in felicity to be observed in the following pairs (we have added report tags to make the intended interpretation explicit):

(i)   a.   I opened the envelope; the letter was from John. Was it true, did I_2 really despise him_1?[, he^1 had written to $me.^2$]
      b.   Alone once more, John paused to reflect. *Was it true, did I really despise him_1?[, he^1 wondered to himself.]

The correct account of *de se* pronouns in FID cannot require them to be faithful. The third person pronoun 'her' is simply not a faithful reproduction of the word Mara used to transparently refer to herself (which was presumably 'me'). Imposing faithfulness here would make it seem as though she was talking about someone other than herself, or at least someone that she did not recognise as herself (as is customary for the third person).[11]

(ii)   [*Yael tells Sam, who suffers from memory loss, a story about himself:*]

    a.   Mary opened the envelope. The letter was from you. Was it true, did she$_2$ really despise you$_1$?[, you^1 had written to her.^{2}]

    b.   Alone once more, John paused to reflect. *Was it true, did you really despise him$_1$?[, he^1 wondered to himself.]

To the extent that (i-b) and (ii-b) are acceptable, they have the flavour of an imagined dialogue between the subject of the report and the speaker (or hearer). Hence acceptability appears to coincide with the *de se* interpretation of the pronouns.

[11] The quoted passage illustrates the fact that *de se* pronouns in FID are exempted from matching their counterparts along the dimension of person. Sharvit (2008) makes the related point that *de se* pronouns need not reflect the report subject's conceptualization of the referent as far as gender and number are concerned (cf. Doron and Ron 1990; Doron 1991).

Suppose Sandy, a man, is on Alice's class roster, but is not present on the first day. Alice guesses that Sandy is a woman, and inquires of her class: 'Does anyone know who she is, and whether she plans to attend?'. If we report Alice's utterance in FID, we must use the feminine pronoun, which accurately reflects her mistaken idea of Sandy's gender:

(i)   When no-one answered to the name 'Sandy', Alice looked up.

    a.   Did anyone know who she was, and whether she planned to attend?

    b.   ??Did anyone know who he was, and whether he planned to attend?

Next suppose Sandy, a man, is Alice's new teaching assistant, and (perhaps less plausibly) that Alice mistakes him for a woman. No-one answers to the name 'Bob' during roll call. Alice turns to Sandy and asks: 'Do you know who Bob is, and whether he plans to attend?'. In this case – where the pronoun replaces one that refers transparently to a participant in the conversation – we must use 'he', reflecting Sandy's true gender, rather than 'she', which would reflect Alice's mistaken apprehension of Sandy's gender.

(ii)   When no-one answered to the name 'Bob', Alice turned to Sandy for help.

    a.   *Did she know who Bob was, and whether he planned to attend?

    b.   Did he know who Bob was, and whether he planned to attend?

Sharvit's observation is of course consistent with the generalization that pronouns are required to be faithful unless they are *de se*. The judgments in (i) are straightforwardly predicted by the faithfulness requirement; the fact that they match Alice's conception of Sandy's gender follows from the fact that her choice of pronoun was determined by that conception.

The contrast in (ii), while it conforms to Sharvit's observed generalization, does not establish that *de se* pronouns are exempt from faithfulness along the dimension of gender. This is because the original pronoun used by Alice – 'you' – was not marked for gender, and so its replacement in FID could not be unfaithful to its gender marking. Since all (English) pronouns that transparently refer to discourse participants are unmarked for gender, we cannot argue from Sharvit's observation about gender to a claim about exemption from faithfulness.

1.2   Faithfulness in the Analysis of Indexical Shift

The distinction between faithfulness and *de se* may be upheld even when the *de se* expression also *happens to be faithful* to the original discourse. This is how things stand in indexical-shifting languages, such as the Indo-European language Zazaki. These languages use the first or second person where English would use subject- or object-controlled PRO – as an obligatorily *de se* pronoun in certain forms of indirect discourse.

(5)   Hɛseni va   kɛ ɛz dɛwletia
      Hesen said that I   rich.be-PRES
      'Hesen$_i$ said that he$_i$ is rich.' (Anand 2006, Ex. 219a)

(6)   Hɛseni Ali-ra   va kɛ tɨ   dɛwletia
      Hesen Ali.OBL-to said that you rich.be-PRES
      'Hesen said to Ali$_i$ that he$_i$ is rich.' (Anand 2006, Ex. 219b)

Since the speaker and addressee are indicated by the *unembedded* first and second person, it follows that a *de se* pronoun normally matches the corresponding item in the original discourse:

(7)   a.   Hesen said that I rich.be-PRES (*de se* report)
      b.   Hesen: I rich.be-PRES (original)

(8)   a.   Hesen Ali.OBL-to said that you rich.be-PRES (*de se* report)
      b.   Hesen to Ali: you rich.be-PRES (original)

  However, even for such languages, the *de se* interpretation cannot be attributed to faithfulness. As Anand (2006: 88) cleverly demonstrates, *de se* pronouns in Zazaki are not required to be faithful. Consider the following report:

(9)   Rojda va   kɛ braya mɨ dɛwletia
      Rojda say-PERF that brother I-EZ rich.be-PRES
      'Rojda$_i$ said that her$_i$ brother was rich.' (Anand 2006, Ex. 249a)

Now suppose Rojda's brother is called Hesen. According to Anand's Zazaki informants, the report is true even if what Rojda said was: 'Hesen is rich' (it does not require the verbatim 'My brother is rich').

(10) a.   Rojda say-PERF that brother I-EZ rich.be-PRES (*de se* report)
      b.   Rojda: Hesen rich.be-PRES (original)

A fortiori it is not faithfulness that secures the *de se* interpretation of shifted indexicals in indirect discourse.

2 Conflation

It is common in the literature to provide analyses of *de se* and faithfulness that are indistinguishable. For instance, both *de se* pronouns and indexicals in direct discourse have been treated as contributing something like an INDEXICAL CHARACTER[12] to the DIAGONAL CONTENT[13] attributed by the report.

Thus Schlenker (2003) gives the denotation of a *de se* pronoun (such as subject-controlled PRO) as the function taking a context to its speaker (the same as the character of the first-person indexical).[14] Meanwhile, Doron (1991) approximates faithfulness (in FID) by having each expression denote a function corresponding to its character, modulo a distinction she draws between context and "point-of-view." For instance, she gives the denotation of 'now' as, in effect, the function mapping a point-of-view to its time coordinate.[15]

Another way to conflate *de se* and faithfulness is to treat both as a species of QUOTATION. Thus Maier (2011) analyses *de se* shifted indexicals as selectively quoted items in an otherwise indirect report, on the model of the quoted indexical 'us' in the following mixed direct/indirect report (taken from Cappelen and Lepore 1997):

(11)   Their accord on this issue, he said, has proved "quite a surprise to both of us."

Maier (2014b) also models faithfulness using quotation. For him, FID is a form of quoted discourse, with selected regions (those exempted from faithfulness) invisibly *unquoted*. For example, he would reanalyse the FID passage from *Sextus* as follows (with square brackets marking unquotation):

(12)   "What [had] kept [her]? Oh, it [was] nothing at all. [She] [had been] out late, a rather wild party [...] not with Carruthers [...] he had left shortly

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[12]The character of an expression, such as indexical pronoun, is a mathematical function representing (i) its linguistic meaning, (ii) the way its content depends on context and (iii) what can be determined a priori or, in a certain sense of the word, logically (without any knowledge of the situation in which it was uttered) about the commitments of its author (Kaplan 1989).

[13]The diagonal content of a clause is the set of *utterance contexts* at which it is truly uttered. This set may be derived from its *character* by diagonalization (Haas-Spohn 1994). We note in passing that standard diagonalization only applies to the characters of declarative sentences (those that can be true or false), and hence won't apply to the full range of sentences and sentence fragments occuring in direct and free indirect discourse.

[14]We are cutting to the chase here. See Anand (2006), Sect. 2.4.1, for a fulsome exposition of Schlenker's account of *de se* pronouns in indexical-shifting languages.

[15]On Doron's semantics, pronouns have a special clause rendering them insensitive to the point-of-view parameter (relaxing the requirement of faithfulness) whenever they refer to the "subject of consciousness," or in other words are interpreted *de se*. Note that Schlenker himself has a foot in both camps, adopting a Doron-like account of FID in his 2004.

after [me]. No, it [was] Florrie who [had] organized the party. Florrie and Hannah - [did] [I] remember them?" said Mara.

All accounts that conflate faithfulness and *de se* are alike in their failure to properly distinguish the modes of reporting discourse. Indirect discourse, which is supposed to characterize its target by its content, bleeds into the other modes, which directly represent its formal features. Once the general problem is seen, it is not hard to discover specific empirical flaws (for an example, see the next section).

Every account that distinguishes faithfulness and *de se* does so in its own way. We won't canvass all the different combinations that evade our criticism. Instead, we will sketch one exemplary pair of heterogeneous analyses: the *demonstration* account of faithfulness (Clark and Gerrig 1990; Recanati 2001) and the *binding* account of *de se* (Chierchia 1989; von Stechow 2003; Sharvit 2008; Cumming 2014). These accounts are flexible enough to capture a variety of linguistic phenomena; we don't need to posit a new notion of content for each variant style of report (contra, for example, Doron on FID, and Schlenker on *de se*). So it may be said in favour of this combination that it doesn't multiply *varieties of meaning* above necessity.

2.1   An Argument Against Conflation

Any uniform analysis of faithfulness and *de se* encounters empirical difficulties. With a little stage setting, we can provide two utterances that may be reported using the same *de se* locution, but which have different direct discourse reports. It follows that the contribution of a *de se* pronoun does not coincide with that of any expression occurring in direct discourse.

Suppose Charles de Gaulle, characteristically referring to himself in the third person,[16] makes a request by uttering,

(13)   De Gaulle wants to be buried at Colombey.

In that case, only the first of the following direct reports is true:

(14)   a.   De Gaulle said, "De Gaulle wants to be buried at Colombey."
         b.   De Gaulle said, "I want to be buried at Colombey."

For (14-b) to be true, de Gaulle would have to have uttered instead,

(15)   I want to be buried at Colombey.

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[16]See the objection attributed to Joseph Almog in footnote 28 of Schlenker (2003) for the inspiration for this argument.

Note, however, that either utterance may be reported using a *de se* pronoun (since de Gaulle is transparently referring to himself):[17]

(16)   De Gaulle asked PRO to be buried at Colombey.

The interpretation of the *de se* pronoun PRO in (16) differs from that of both the faithful use of 'de Gaulle' and the faithful use of 'I'. Faithfulness here requires that the same, or a relevantly similar, *expression* occur in the original utterance. By contrast, the use of a *de se* pronoun specifies a more abstract *mode of presentation* (in the case of subject-controlled PRO, this is the mode of transparent self-reference). Since dissimilar expressions ('de Gaulle' and 'I') can be used to transparently self-refer, while the same expression (e.g., 'de Gaulle') may present an object in different ways, the precise contribution of a *de se* pronoun cannot coincide with the precise contribution of any expression used in the faithful representation of discourse.

More detailed analyses of faithfulness and *de se* follow.

3   The Demonstration Account of Faithfulness

How is direct discourse similar to the mock performance of a famous tennis player's serve? Both are nonserious actions that selectively depict – or *demonstrate* – something else (Clark and Gerrig 1990). In direct discourse, the quoted words are not seriously uttered (with their proper assertive force),[18] but instead are used to depict a person in the act of speaking (or thinking). This is no different from pantomiming a famous tennis player's serve, not as a serious part of a match, but as a means of informing or instructing others.

Depiction here takes the precise sense of ICONIC REPRESENTATION, which Clark and Gerrig assume works by resemblance (see also Bonami and Godard 2008). A quotation characterizes its source discourse by purporting to resemble it in some respects (and not others). Thus we usually expect the *words* in a quotation to match those used in the source, but we don't necessarily expect the *typeface* to be an accurate copy (instead, we expect it to conform with the surrounding text).

As Greenberg (2013a) argues, iconic representation goes beyond selective resemblance. Its full scope includes transformations that distort, as well as preserve, features of the original. Greenberg's examples are maps or models to a particular scale and colour-shifted images. However, consider the following from Flannery O'Connor's "Living with a Peacock":

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[17]The same goes for the italicized FID portion of the following passage:

(i)   De Gaulle spoke up. *He wanted to be buried at Colombey.*

[18]Recall our earlier point that referring expressions in direct discourse need not be used, in a serious way, to refer to something (see fn. 1 above).

(17)   "Whut is thet thang?" one of the small boys asked finally in a sullen voice.

The phonetic spelling represents certain sound properties of the utterance. Perhaps in a loose sense we could say that the spelling 'whut' *resembles* the depicted pronunciation, but it is hard to make this notion of resemblance precise. Better to say that O'Connor is relying on a particular *transformation* from (nonorthographic) spelling to phonetics in her depiction of the boy's utterance, one that she presumes will be evident enough to the reader.

Clark and Gerrig distinguish between those aspects of a demonstration selected to indicate properties of the thing depicted (DEPICTIVE aspects) and those that have some other explanation (SUPPORTIVE aspects). The typeface that a quotation is printed in might be chosen for reasons of clarity and style. In that case, it is a supportive aspect of the demonstration, and is not there to represent a corresponding aspect of the depicted target.[19]

What we have been calling the faithfulness requirement amounts to the claim that such-and-such aspects of the reporting discourse are *depictive*; that is to say, they indicate, via specific transformations, aspects of the discourse reported on. Indirect discourse is not required to be faithful because, as Clark and Gerrig themselves comment, it *describes* discourse without depicting it. The other discourse modes – direct and free indirect – do depict discourse (using discourse!) and hence carry the faithfulness requirement in some form.[20]

Since depiction is selective and since there are many combinations of features of the reporting discourse that could be selected as the depictive ones, faithfulness should not be thought of as a uniform constraint. Instead, there is a cluster of conventions for depicting discourse that fall under the broad banner of direct (or free indirect) discourse, each carrying its own version of faithfulness. It is no surprise, on the demonstration account, that different nuanced conventions might predominate at different epochs and across different cultures.

The transformation that yields the semantic content of a demonstration may be formalized – in a similar manner to Greenberg's (2013b) *systems of depiction* – as a function from a specification of the features of a demonstration to the set of possible items that fit the depiction.

Let δ be a function of this sort, and let F_q be a specification of all of the features of a discourse segment q. Then δF_q is a set of discourse segments: the set that q would accurately depict under the transformation captured by δ. Hence the schematic

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[19]Of course, typeface and font *can* be depictive aspects. For instance, a MICR typeface (the sort found at the bottom of cheques) might be used to depict the mechanical intonation of a robot in a comic strip. More commonly, italic font is used to represent emphasis in pronunciation.

[20]Some aspects that can be depictive in direct discourse are less frequently so in FID. For instance, it is unusual to represent a spoken accent using spelling in FID (Fludernik 1993; Maier 2014b). This may be connected to Cohn's (1978) position that FID is an intermediary mode between direct and indirect discourse, which perhaps means that its depictive aspects are generally a strict subset of those in direct discourse.

truth condition for direct speech reports of the form '*S* said, *q*' – incorporating the faithfulness requirement connected with δ – is:

(18)   There is a discourse segment d such that S uttered d and $d \in \delta F_q$

   Let's go over some examples.

(19)   a.   'What is that thing?' said Alice.
         b.   There is a discourse segment d such that Alice uttered d and $d \in \delta_0 F_q$, where q = 'What is that thing?'

Suppose the transformation δ_0 in (19-b) preserves the syntax of its argument, and ignores all other aspects (such as typeface, etc.). Thus $\delta_0 F_q$ is the set of all possible discourse segments with the same syntax (arrangement of words) as q. In that case (19-b) is true if and only if Alice uttered the English sentence 'What is that thing?'.

(20)   a.   'Whut is thet thang?' said Alice.
         b.   There is a discourse segment d such that Alice uttered d and $d \in \delta_1 F_q$, where q = 'Whut is thet thang?'

On the intended reading of (20-a), Alice's utterance was a piece of (verbal) discourse, an interrogative sentence, consisting of a word pronounced *whut*,[21] followed by the word 'is', followed by a word pronounced *thet*, and so on. The transformation δ_1 must be one that takes 'Whut is thet thang?' to the set of all such segments.

(21)   a.   De Gaulle said, 'De Gaulle wants to be buried at Colombey.'
         b.   There is a discourse segment d such that de Gaulle uttered d and $d \in \delta_2 F_q$, where q = 'De Gaulle wants to be buried at Colombey'

Suppose (21-a) means de Gaulle uttered a sentence that *translates* the English sentence 'De Gaulle wants to be buried at Colombey' (it is only on such an interpretation that the sentence is likely to be true, as de Gaulle would have expressed this particular wish in French). This interpretation is still more specific than any related formulation in indirect discourse, since it requires de Gaulle to have referred to himself in the third person (using his surname) and not, for instance, with the French first person 'je'. The transformation δ_2 is similar to δ_0, but less stringent, in that it doesn't treat the *language* of the quotation as depictive.

   Clark and Gerrig note that nonserious demonstrations usually form parts of serious actions, often actions belonging to the contrasting class of linguistic *descriptions* (which includes, as noted above, reports in indirect discourse). When a chunk of faithful discourse is embedded in an indirect report, it is called *mixed quotation*. We saw an example earlier:

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[21] Actually, it seems that only the vowels are phonetic; so more carefully the next word is normally spelled 'wh-t' and has the vowel sound u (as in 'butter').

(22)   Their accord on this issue, he said, has proved 'quite a surprise to both of
         us.'

The puzzle is that if we parse the sentence into its direct and indirect components,
we get an indirect report that is incomplete ('He said that their accord on this issue
has proved. . . '). Yet in reading the sentence, we tend to fill in the content of the
indirect component with guidance from the direct part ('He said that their accord on
this issue has proved *quite a surprise to both of them*').

   Systematic approaches to this puzzle have taken the form of compositional
linguistic analyses (Geurts and Maier 2005; Maier 2014a; Shan 2011). However the
general problem, of which mixed quotation is a special case, is that of the integration
of depictive and linguistic content. While methods derived from linguistics go a
long way in accounting for mixed quotation,[22] we might naturally expect a general
solution to belong to the study of the *interface* between representational types, rather
than linguistics proper.[23]

4   The Binding Account of *De Se*

Sharvit (2008) accounts for the fact that *de se* pronouns in FID are not required to be
faithful by assuming (i) that *de se* pronouns are bound by a silent operator appended
to the FID passage, and (ii) that the features on bound pronouns are deleted (von
Stechow 2003), and so exempted from the faithfulness requirement. A less technical
way of putting Sharvit's insight would be to say that the features on *de se* pronouns
are *supportive*, rather than *depictive* aspects of the representation.[24] Their purpose is
to aid the resolution of anaphora, and this precludes any role in depicting the target
discourse.

   Let's apply her analysis to the passage from *Sextus*.

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[22]Some ingenuity is required to handle "overlap" cases like the following:

(i)   An exhibitor gave his customers photographs of "the Vitagraph girl, who, by the way, is
        quite a favorite with our people." (Bowser 1990: 113)

Here the quote settles who the photograph is of, but also depicts an utterance that is not otherwise
referred to in the sentence. We are able to work out that the utterance was made by the exhibitor,
but its relationship to the described action could be understood in different ways (for instance, it
could be an extract from the advertisement describing the photograph giveaway). Note that the
example, like our earlier case, contains a quoted indexical.

[23]See Stone et al. (2013) and Greenberg (2014).

[24]Of course, the presumption in plain *indirect* discourse is that all aspects of the indirect context
are, as Clark and Gerrig put it, supportive (and hence so *a fortiori* are the features on any *de se*
pronouns therein). Depictive aspects of indirect discourse are exceptional (Cohn 1978; Coulmas
1985).

(23)   What had kept her? Oh, it was nothing at all. She had been out late, a rather
        wild party [...] not with Carruthers [...] he had left shortly after me. No,
        it was Florrie who had organized the party. Florrie and Hannah – did I
        remember them?

We begin by adding the embedding operator; we indicate it with an explicit report
verb (which can optionally tag such passages – see Reinhart 1983):

(24)   Florrie and Hannah – did I remember them?[, *Mara asked me.*]

The operator introduces a speech event. Such events have participants: speakers
and (optionally) addressees – also explicitly marked in the tag.[25] We assume
the operator can bind pronouns occurring in its scope (anywhere within the FID
passage) from either of its argument positions. So for instance, in the example above,
the pronoun 'I' is bound by the addressee slot:

(25)   Florrie and Hannah – did I$_i$ remember them?[, Mara asked (me)^i.]

For the FID operator to bind a pronoun, the features on the latter must agree
with its antecedent. In the example above, the first-person feature on the embedded
pronoun matches the first-person feature on the pronoun occupying the addressee
slot, and so satisfies the requirement for agreement with that slot.[26] We note in
passing that agreement extends to gender and number, which helps explain the
observations in Sharvit (2008). It accounts for the fact that the speaker's conception
of Sandy's gender (male) trumps Alice's conception (female) in the example below:

(26)   When no-one answered to the name 'Bob', Alice turned to Sandy for help.
        a.   *Did she$_i$ know who Bob was, and whether he planned to attend?[, she
             asked (him)^i.]
        b.   Did he$_i$ know who Bob was, and whether he planned to attend?[, she
             asked (him)^i.]

The second part of Sharvit's account explains why the features used for determining
binding relationships are faithfulness-exempt. Recall the faithfulness constraint for
the direct speech report '*S* said, *q*':

(27)   There is a discourse segment *d* such that *S* uttered *d* and $d \in \delta F_q$

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[25]Something similar goes for FID reports of thought, which may only have an experiencer
argument.

[26]In an indexical-shift language, by contrast, a pronoun bound by the speaker argument slot would
be required to carry the first-person feature, no matter what feature occurred on the noun phrase
occupying that slot; while a pronoun bound by the addressee argument position would have to
carry the second-person feature.

The faithfulness constraint for our FID passage (25) might be given as follows (where [-1P-SG] indicates the deletion of the first-person and singular features from the adjacent pronoun):

(28)   a.   Florrie and Hannah – did I$_i$ remember them?[, Mara asked (me)^i.]
        b.   There is a discourse segment d such that Mara uttered d to the speaker and $d \in \delta F_q$, where q = 'Florrie and Hannah – did I[-1P-SG] remember them?'

All that remains is to account for the fact that pronouns bound by the arguments of the FID operator are interpreted *de se*. Our explanation is the same as in the case of indirect discourse, where pronouns bound by the argument slots of the report verb, such as PRO, take on a *de se* interpretation.

First, it is necessary to treat the distinctive anaphoric relationship borne by a pronoun (and not just its referent) as relevant to the truth condition of the report in which it is embedded (Cumming 2014). There are numerous ways to carry this out. We will only mention the most straightforward, which is to label that relationship with an *anaphoric denotation* (following Karttunen 1976). Pronouns bound to different antecedents denote different *discourse entities*. Hence there are discourse entities associated with each argument position of a report verb (Sells 1987). Since *de se* pronouns are always bound from one of these argument positions, they always denote one of these distinguished discourse entities.

We capture the distinctive contribution of a *de se* pronoun by having it co-denote with any pronoun or other expression that *transparently refers* to the appropriate participant in the original discourse. So subject-controlled PRO (in the report) will co-denote with any expression – such as the first-person pronoun – that transparently refers to the speaker (in the original discourse).

Let's see these ideas at work in an example. Suppose two modes of referring to de Gaulle are available in a particular conversation, a transparent one, and another under an opaque guise that is (temporarily) available. When de Gaulle says 'I', or, in his degaullish way, 'de Gaulle', he refers to himself in the first mode. When he says 'that man' while pointing to what he doesn't recognise as his own reflection in a mirror, he refers to himself in the second mode. Each mode of presentation corresponds to a different discourse entity in the universe (or file) of the conversational context. Let's keep them straight by naming them u_1 and u_2, respectively.

We can now suppose that the *de se* reading of a pronoun referring to de Gaulle contributes u_1 to the content attributed in the report: it requires that de Gaulle referred to himself in the first mode. A non-*de se* reading might contribute u_2 instead, specifying that he referred to himself in the second.[27]

If de Gaulle is the subject of a report, any pronoun bound by the subject position of the report verb will denote u_1. More generally, a pronoun bound by

---

[27]We could capture the non-commital *de re* reading by existentially quantifying over modes of referring to de Gaulle, as in Kaplan (1968).

the argument slot of a report verb will denote the discourse entity that corresponds to the transparent mode of referring to the relevant participant in the original discourse. This goes for PRO in indirect discourse, shifted indexicals in indexical-shift languages, and any pronoun bound by the FID operator.

Anand (2006) argues against binding accounts of the *de se*. He observes that in certain indexical-shift languages either all or none of the shiftable clause-mate pronouns must be interpreted *de se*, and points out that the binding account does not predict this *en bloc* behaviour. This is an interesting challenge for the theory, but one that it seems possible to meet – by producing a detailed account of rule-governed anaphora that predicts Anand's data.

Anaphora resolution is, of course, not unconstrained. Indeed, it is certainly influenced, and possibly even determined, by discourse-level information structure and coherence. Whether or not the first-person pronouns in a report context are shifted to a *de se* interpretation might depend on the topical status of the reported event or its content (Bittner 2014). Moreover, the detailed binding account (that we leave to future research) would in principle have the flexibility to account for examples that run counter to the general trend to shift together (Anand 2006: 100–101).

4.1 Partial Analysis of Some Examples

(29) a. (De Gaulle)^1 asked PRO$_1$ to be buried at Columbey
     b. ask (dg, ⟨buried-at-cb, u_1⟩)
     c. NB: u_1 represents the mode under which de Gaulle refers transparently to himself – the anaphoric denotation of both 'I' and 'De Gaulle' in the original utterance.

(30) a. (De Gaulle),^{1} pointing to the man^2 in the mirror, asked that he$_{1/2}$ be buried at Columbey
     b. ask (dg, ⟨buried-at-cb, $u_{1/2}$⟩)
     c. NB: u_2 represents an alternative mode of referring to de Gaulle (as the man in the mirror he doesn't recognise as himself).

(31) a. He$_1$ wanted to be buried at Colombey[, (de Gaulle)^1 said.]
     b. *Faithfulness constraint:* There is a discourse segment d such that de Gaulle uttered d and $d \in \delta_2 F_q$, where q = 'He[-3P] wanted[-PST] to be buried at Colombey'
     c. NB: The expression in the original utterance corresponding to the pronoun 'he' is required to denote u_1.

(32) a. *She$_1$ wanted to be buried at Colombey[, (de Gaulle)^1 said.]
     b. NB: 'De Gaulle' cannot bind a pronoun that doesn't agree with it. Alternatively, 'she' could be unbound (and so faithful), or bound by the addressee argument of the FID operator.

(33) a. 'I want to be buried at Colombey', de Gaulle said.

     b. *Faithfulness constraint:* There is a discourse segment d such that de Gaulle uttered d and $d \in \delta_2 F_q$, where q = 'I want to be buried at Colombey'

(34) a. 'De Gaulle wants to be buried at Colombey', de Gaulle said.

     b. *Faithfulness constraint:* There is a discourse segment d such that de Gaulle uttered d and $d \in \delta_2 F_q$, where q = 'De Gaulle wants to be buried at Colombey'

(35) a. (De Gaulle)[1] asked (France)[3] PRO_3 to bury $him_{1/2}$ at Columbey

     b. ask (dg, fr $\langle$bury-at-cb, $u_3, u_1\rangle$)

     c. NB: In transitive 'ask', control switches to the object ('France'); u_3 represent the mode under which France is transparently represented as a participant (the addressee). There may not be an available u_2 (alternative mode of representing De Gaulle) in the context; the subscript is there to indicate that the overt pronoun is not under obligatory control.

(36) a. I opened the envelope; the letter was from John. Was it true, did I_2 really despise him_1?[, $(he)^1$ had written to $(me)^2$]

     b. *Faithfulness constraint:* There is a discourse segment d such that John wrote d and $d \in \delta F_q$, where q = 'Was[-PST] it true, did[-PST] I[-1P] really despise him[-3P]'

     c. NB: The expression in the original utterance corresponding to the pronoun 'him' is required to denote u_1, while that corresponding to the pronoun 'I' is required to denote u_2.

(37) a. John looked at my picture. *Was it true, did I really despise him_1?[, $(he)^1$ wondered.]

     b. NB: This is out because of the unbound occurrence of 'I' (see fn. 10).

(38) a. [*Yael tells Sam, who suffers from memory loss, a story about himself:*]

     b. Mary opened the envelope. The letter was from you. Was it true, did she_2 really despise you_1?[, $(you)^1$ had written to $(her)^2$.]

     c. *Faithfulness constraint:* There is a discourse segment d such that Sam wrote d and $d \in \delta F_q$, where q = 'Was[-PST] it true, did[-PST] she[-3P] really despise you[-2P]'

(39) a. [*Yael tells Sam, who suffers from memory loss, a story about himself:*]

     b. John looked at your picture. *Was it true, did you really despise him_1?[, $(he)^1$ wondered.]

     c. NB: This is out because of the unbound occurrence of 'you' (see fn. 10).

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She and Herself

Eros Corazza

1 Reporting 'I'-Thoughts

If we were to report Sue's utterance:

(1)   I am rich

we could say:

(2)   Sue said that she is rich

This report, however, fails to fully capture what Sue said. (2) could accurately report Sue's utterance "Sue is rich" as well. If Sue is amnesiac, for instance, she may know that Sue is a multimillionaire without realizing that she (herself) is a multimillionaire and thus without being disposed to utter, "I am rich". A report such as (2) could continue:

E. Corazza (✉)
Department of Philosophy, ILCLI, The University of the Basque Country UPV-EHU,
Donostia, Spain

IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao, Spain

Philosophy & Cognitive Sciences, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada
e-mail: eros_corazza@carleton.ca

(3)   Sue said that she is rich *but does not know that she (herself) is rich*

To capture the fact that Sue referred to herself using the first-person pronoun, we can report (1) as:

(3)   Sue said that she (herself) is rich

where 'she (herself)' is termed a *quasi-indicator* by Castañeda which he abbreviates as 'she*'. According to Castañeda, 's/he*' is an artificial pronoun introduced because English is not rich enough to capture an 'I'-thought in a report; the very same token, 'she', can be used to perform different roles:

> It is a mere accident of grammar that the same physical objects are used in different logical roles. The underlying rationale is this: Indicators are a primary means of referring to particulars, but the references made with them are personal and ephemeral; quasi-indicators are the derivative means of making an indexical reference both interpersonal and enduring, yet preserving it intact. (Castañeda 1967: 207)

Another, maybe less dramatic, way to view 'she*' is to assume it to be the abbreviation of 'she (herself)'. After all, in English we do have the possibility of using 'she (herself)' to capture what 'she*' is supposed to convey. Castañeda, though, is right in remarking that in English the very same expression, 'she', can be used to perform different logical (and syntactical) roles. 'She' can work as a demonstrative (e.g.,: "She [pointing to Jane] is rich"), it can work as an anaphoric pronoun (e.g.,: "Jane is rich but she is nice") and as a quasi-indicator (e.g.,: "Jane believes that she (herself) is rich").[1] It is worth noticing that some languages (so-called pure logophoric languages) morphologically mark the distinction between 's/he' as a demonstrative, 'she' as a simple non-logophoric anaphora and 's/he*' as a logophoric (quasi-indexical) pronoun. Logophoric pronouns are used to refer to the person whose attitudes are being reported. Pure logophoric languages are languages in which these pronouns are used *only* as logophors and not as other reflexives or in emphatic uses. Tabury, for instance, distinguishes between the third person pronoun *qua* anaphoric pronoun, '*à*', and the third person pronoun *qua* quasi-indicator (logophoric pronoun), '*sέ*', while Igbo marks the difference between '*yá*' (third person logophoric pronoun and '*ọ*' (third person demonstrative pronoun).[2]

One could ask why in English a single pronoun can be used to perform very different roles. That is, why in English, as in most Indo-European languages, we don't distinguish between 'she' as a demonstrative, 'she' as a mere anaphoric pronoun and 'she' as a quasi-indicator. A possible answer could be that for economical reasons these distinctions need not be marked at the surface, grammatical, level and, thus, that a single morpheme can perform different tasks. The context of the utterance helps in deciding which role the pronoun performs. If one points to someone while

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[1]More on this distinction later on.

[2]See Hagège (1974). On logophoric pronouns and the way some languages mark them, see also Culy (1994, 1997), Corazza (2004a, 2004b, 2005) and Huang (2000).

uttering 'she', it will be used as a demonstrative, while in a reportive context like "Mary believes that she is rich" the default reading will be the quasi-indexical one, i.e., 'she' works like a quasi-indicator. The default reading, though, can always be cancelled and one can always end up with a report of the form "Mary said that she is rich but didn't realize that she herself is rich". In that case the first occurrence of 'she' is not quasi-indexical. It works like a mere anaphoric pronoun stressing that Mary did not think of herself in the first person, but does not attribute to Mary any specific way of thinking about herself. It goes without saying that a discourse situation where a report like this is appropriate must be envisaged. It could be, for instance, the case when Mary, knowing that the recently appointed director of the NXY Company will inherit millions of dollars, says "The new director of NXY is rich", without knowing that she herself has just been appointed director of NXY.

The main features of a quasi-indicator like 'she*' are: (i) it appears in attitude reports, i.e., an *oratio obliqua* construal; (ii) its reference is inherited from the reference of the antecedent it is linked with and (iii) it attributes a use, maybe only implicitly, of the first-person pronoun to the referent of the antecedent it is linked with. As Castañeda put it:

> In the sequel we shall concentrate almost exclusively with third person statements that ascribe self-knowledge to others, like:
>
> (3)   The Editor of *Soul* knows that he (himself) is a millionaire
>
> and
>
> (4)   The Editor of *Soul* knows that Mary knows that her niece knows that he (himself) is a millionaire.
>
> In these cases the attribution of self-knowledge is made by means of the third-person pronoun 'he (himself)' to be abbreviated '*he**', which has here the following characteristics: (i) it does not express indexical reference made by the speaker; (ii) it appears in *oratio obliqua*; (iii) it has an antecedent, namely 'the Editor of *Soul*', to which it refers back; (iv) its antecedent is outside the *oratio obliqua* containing 'he*'; (v) 'he*' is used to attribute, so to speak, implicit indexical reference to the Editor of *Soul*; that is, if the Editor were to assert what, according to (3) and (4), he knows, he would use the indicator 'I' where we, uttering (3) and (4), have used 'he*'. (Castañeda 1968: 440–41)

2   The Unanalyzability Thesis

A quasi-indicator cannot be substituted *salva veritate* by a co-referring term:

> There is no individual constant '*a*' containing no occurrence of the quasi-indicator 'he*' such that: "The Editor of *Soul* knows that he* is a millionaire" either (i) entails or (ii) is entailed by its corresponding statement of the form "The Editor of *Soul* knows that *a* is a millionaire. (Castañeda 1968: 442)

Furthermore, in the case of multiple embedded sentences such as:

(4) a.   Sue said that she* said that John said that she* is rich

Castañeda's position is that, although both occurrences of 'she*' have as their antecedent 'Sue', only the first occurrence depends on it immediately. The second occurrence of 'she*' depends on the preceding occurrence of 'she*' and it is only via this first occurrence that it goes back to 'Sue'. Since the first occurrence is separated from its antecedent by only one psychological prefix, Castañeda characterizes it as an *occurrence of degree 1*. The second occurrence of 'she*' is separated from its antecedent by two psychological prefixes. It is, thus, an *occurrence of degree 2*. (4a) can be represented as:

(4) b. Sue said that [she* believes that [John said that [she* is rich]]]

A report like this is silent on the way in which John referred to (and thought about) Sue. John may have said "You [addressing Sue] are rich", "Sue is rich", "The woman in this picture [pointing to a picture of Sue] is rich", etc. Castañeda claims that a quasi-indicator occurrence of degree 2 is analyzable via an occurrence of degree 1 and the occurrence of an existential quantifier ranging over possible ways of referring. It is important to note that Castañeda claims that occurrences of degree 1 are unanalyzable. I call this the *Unanalyzability Thesis*:

> T1. The occurrences of 's/he*' of degree 1 are unanalyzable; they constitute a peculiar and irreducible mechanism of reference to persons
>
> T2. Each occurrence of 's/he*' of degree greater than 1 is analyzable in terms of both occurrences of 's/he*' of degree 1 and occurrences of one existential quantifier per pseudo-antecedent. (Castañeda 1968: 447)

To understand the unanalyzability thesis, I introduce some useful notation. Following the well-established convention, I shall adopt subscript numbers to signal co-reference, such that coreferential terms will be coindexed. I shall use the superscripts 'i' and 'd' to signal referentially independent and referentially dependent terms respectively. A term is referentially dependent when its semantic value is inherited from an antecedent to which it is linked. It is referentially independent when its value does not depend on another term. To illustrate this notation, let us consider:

(5)   a.   Sue believes that she is rich but she does not believe that she is rich

One possible, consistent, reading of (5a) is represented as:

(5)   b. $Sue_1{}^i$ believes that $she_1{}^d$ is rich but $she_1{}^d$ does not believe that she* is rich

where the reference of both occurrences of 'she' depends on the reference of 'Sue' to which they are coindexed. The quasi-indicator 'she*' helps to stress that Sue does not believe herself to be rich in the first person point of view, i.e., that Sue is not disposed to express her belief using 'I'. Another possible (and maybe more natural) reading of (5a) would be:

(5)   c. Sue_1^i believes that she_1^d is rich but she_1^d does not believe that she_2^i is
   rich

where the last occurrence of 'she' is as a demonstrative pronoun; hence it need not
be coindexed with 'Sue' and it is referentially independent. If, however, (5a) were
represented as:

(5)   d. Sue_1^i believes that she_1^d is rich but she_1^d does not believe that she_1^d is
              rich

we would ascribe contradictory beliefs to Sue, for we would state that Sue both
believes and does not believe that she (herself) is rich. The only way Sue can
consistently and rationally both believe that she is rich and not believe that she is
rich is to entertain the first belief from a third person point of view and the second
from the first person point of view, or *vice versa*. The quasi-indicator 'she*' in (5b)
helps to stress this very fact. If we aim to capture Sue's different attitudes *vis-à-
vis* herself, we cannot avoid using the quasi-indicator 'she*'. The reference of the
quasi-indicator 'she*' in (5b) also depends on the reference of 'Sue'.[3] (5b) could
thus be represented as:

(5)   d. Sue_1^i believes that she_1^d is rich but she_1^d does not believe that she_1^{d*}
              is rich

The anaphoric chain at work here could be represented as follows:

(5) e. Sue_1^i believes that she_1^d is rich but she_1^d does not believe that $she_1^d *$ is rich

So far, it seems that Castañeda is right in claiming that the occurrence of a quasi-
indicator is unanalyzable. We are left with the following notations:

- '$she/he/it_n^i$' = an independent pronoun working like a free variable.
- '$he/she/it_n^d$' = a pronoun inheriting its reference from the noun phrase it is
  coindexed with.
- '$he/she/it_n^{d*}$' = a quasi-indicator inheriting its reference from the noun phrase
  it is coindexed with *and* attributing an 'I'-thought to the referent of this noun
  phrase.

As a first approximation we could say that, while attributions containing '$she/he/it_n^i$'
and '$she/he/it_n^d$' represent *de re* attributions, attributions containing '$she/he/it_n^{d*}$'
represent *de se* attributions. This classification, however, is far from exhaustive, for
we can have mixed cases, i.e., attributions that are partly *de re* and partly *de se*. To

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[3]To be precise, we should say that the occurrence of the quasi-indicator depends on the second
occurrence of 'she', which itself depends on the first occurrence of 'she', which finally depends of
the occurrence of 'Sue' (cf. Castañeda 1966).

illustrate this we can consider plurals with split antecedents, such as "John told Sue that they are rich". They are represented as:

(6)   a.   John$_1$ told Sue$_2$ that they$_{1 \oplus 2}$ are rich

where the subscript '$1 \oplus 2$' signals that the index of the plural is the fusion of the indices of its antecedents. It is an open question whether the predicate of being rich holds of the antecedents individually or collectively in our example, i.e., whether the plural reference is distributive or collective (see Fiengo and May 1994: 39). Overhearing John say, "Sue and I are the only winners of last night's multi-million lottery", Sue can report:

(6)   b.   John believes that we are rich

which, using the notation introduced, can be represented as:

(6)   c.   John$_1$ believes that [we$_1{}^{d}*_{\oplus 2}{}^{i}$]^{i} are rich

A report like this attributes an 'I'-thought to John and, as such, it is *de se*. At the same time, however, the pronoun 'we' also works as an independent pronoun, picking out the reporter, Sue and, as such, it is *de re*. In other words, a report like (6b) is a *mixed* report for it specifies the attributee's (John's) attitude *vis-à-vis* himself, yet it is silent on the way John thought about Sue. To understand this difference, we could argue that a report such as (6b) is short for:

(6)   d.   John$_1{}^{i}$ believes that he$_1{}^{d}*$ is rich and that I$_2{}^{i}$ am rich

where the first person pronoun 'I' makes it clear that the reporter does not specify the way in which John thought about the attributer, i.e., 'I' does not attribute a specific mechanism of reference to John. 'I' is merely used by Sue to refer to herself without specifying how John referred to Sue. I characterize this phenomenon the *Attribution Indeterminacy Thesis*. As we have already seen, multiple embedded reports introduce indeterminacy as well. Consider:

(7)   a.   Sue believes that John knows that she (herself) is rich
        b.   Sue$_1{}^{i}$ believes that John$_2{}^{i}$ knows that she$_1{}^{d}*$ is rich

where the quasi-indicator 'she*' is an occurrence of degree 2, attributing an 'I'-thought to Sue and, thus, specifying the way she thought about herself, but it is silent on the way John thought about Sue. All we can stipulate is that there is *a* way John referred to/thought about Sue, although the report cannot specify which one. For this reason, the report is indeterminate; it is indeterminate precisely because the quasi-indicator 'she*' is of degree 2, *viz.* it is separated from its antecedent by two psychological prefixes.

3   Analyzing 'Herself'

Reinhart and Reuland (1991) propose an analysis of 'self'. They characterize *self*-anaphors as a relational noun rather than a determiner. Hence, the structure of 'self' has two arguments and can be represented as: SELF<x, y>. Semantically, SELF

is an identity relation (identifying x and y). When SELF combines with a pronoun determiner, we obtain the noun phrase:

- Herself = $her_1[SELF<x_1,y>]$

This noun phrase contains an unsaturated argument, 'y', which must be saturated in order for the reflexive to have a semantic value: "Under this view, it is this missing argument which is responsible for the defective nature of SELF-NPs, i.e., for their anaphoric status". (Reinhart and Reuland 1991: 286). In other words, following this interpretation the value of a self-anaphora is provided by the unsaturated argument.

In favor of treating SELF as an identity relation, we can also appeal to empirical evidence. If we translate 'him/herself' into Italian or French, for instance, we obtain 'lui/lei *stesso/a*' and 'lui/elle-*même*', where the Italian 'stesso' and the French 'même' translate into English as 'same'; the literal translation of 'lui/lei *stesso/a*' and 'lui/elle-*même*' into English is 'him/her *same*'.

The first question that springs to mind is whether we can adopt Reinhart & Reuland's proposal in analyzing Castañeda's notion of quasi-indicators. In particular, can quasi-indicators be explained away as self-anaphors? Let's consider:

(8) a.   Sue believes herself to be rich

which, following Reinhart & Reuland's suggestion, is analyzed as:

(8) b. Sue_1^i believes $[her_1^d SELF (x_1^d, y_1^d)]_1^d$ to be rich

where the anaphoric link (and thus the reference of the reflexive 'herself') is secured by the argument 'y'. This, however, does not capture a report like:

(9) a.   Sue believes that she (herself) is rich,

for (8a) represents a *de re* attribution, while (9a) is a *de se* report. Following the traditional notation, (8a) could be represented as:

(8) c.   Of Sue, Sue believes her to be rich
   d. $\exists x (x = Sue \& Sue$ believes x is rich)

(8a) could continue as:

(8) e.   Sue believes herself to be rich but she does not believe that she herself is rich

But (9a) cannot be continued in this way, for it is a *de se* attribution, i.e., an ascription attributing an 'I'-thought to Sue. If (9a) were to continue as:

(9) b.   Sue believes that she (herself) is rich but she does not believe that she (herself) is rich,

then we have a contradiction. This provides further evidence that (9a) is not equivalent to (8a) and, therefore, that unlike (8a), (9a) is not a *de re* ascription. The moral, so far, is the following: since (8a) does not represent a *de se* ascription and since *de se* ascriptions do not reduce to *de re* ones, (8a) cannot constitute a good analysis of quasi-indicators. (9a) should be analyzed as:

(9) c.   Sue$_1{}^i$ believes that she$_1{}^d$ [her$_1{}^d$ SELF (x$_1{}^d$, y$_1{}^d$)]$_1{}^d$ is rich

where the anaphoric link, and thus the reference, of the quasi-indicator 'she (herself)' is secured by 'she' being anaphoric on 'Sue'. The reference of the reflexive still depends on the argument 'y', but the latter is linked to 'she' which happens to be anaphoric on 'Sue'. Following this analysis, a quasi-indicator can be viewed as an anaphoric pronoun. The anaphoric nature of the quasi-indicator, unlike the anaphoric nature of a self-anaphor, is not secured by the argument 'y' but by the pronoun 'she'. This, as we will see in the next section, turns out to be an important difference between self-anaphors and quasi-indicators. It turns out to be *the* difference.

4   Quasi-Indicators qua Attributive Anaphors

To begin with, let's consider:

(10)   a.   Mary believes that Sue (herself) is the culprit
(11)   a.   Mary believes that she (herself) is the culprit.

What is the difference between (10a) and (11a)? In particular, what is the difference between 'Sue (herself)' in (10a) and 'she (herself)' in (11a)? The main difference is that in (10a), 'Sue' is a proper name and, as such, it is referentially *independent*. Proper names are not anaphors. Thus, as far as reference-fixing is concerned, they are always independent. On the other hand, (11a) can have two interpretations, depending on whether the pronoun 'she' is a (referentially independent) demonstrative used by the reporter to single out an object of discourse, or an anaphoric (referentially dependent) pronoun inheriting its reference from the antecedent it is linked with ('Sue', in our example). The presence of the reflexive 'herself', however, strongly suggests the latter interpretation—I do not know whether an utterance like (11a) allows a demonstrative interpretation of 'she', i.e., whether it allows us to interpret 'she' as an independent NP, or whether the reflexive 'herself' forces the anaphoric reading. However, for argument's sake let us assume that the two readings are allowed—(11a) can be represented, at least in principle, in the following two ways:

(11)   b.   Mary$_1{}^i$ believes that she$_1{}^d$ (herself) is the culprit
         c.   Mary$_1{}^i$ believes that she$_2{}^i$ (herself) is the culprit.

(11b) gives us the quasi-indexical interpretation, while in (11c) 'she' works like a demonstrative. The difference between (10a) and (11b), like the difference between (11b) and (11c), does not explain the fact that quasi-indicators are attributive anaphoric pronouns. It only stresses that the quasi-indicator 'she (herself)', unlike the noun phrase 'Sue (herself)', is an anaphoric pronoun. Its reference depends on the antecedent it is co-indexed with (and dependent on). The difference between 'she (herself)' in (11b) and 'Sue (herself)' in (11a) does not stress the fact that 'she (herself)' in (11b) also attributes an 'I'-thought to the referent of its antecedent, Mary.

In order to capture the attributive feature of a quasi-indicator, it may be worth focusing on (10a) and, in particular, on the role that the reflexive 'herself' plays when it is coupled with a proper name (or a pronoun used demonstratively), i.e., when it is coupled with an independent NP. The analysis that comes to mind is to treat the reflexive as being used in an *emphatic* way. That is to say, 'herself' is used to bring the stress and focus on the NP it is coupled with and, thus, to stress that the referent of the NP is the focus of attention. Can we tell the same story (or a similar story) when the reflexive 'herself' is coupled with an anaphoric pronoun? In other words, could quasi-indicators be explained as *emphatic anaphors*? If so, where or on what would the emphasis be put? One might be tempted to claim that, from a semantic viewpoint, a quasi-indicator is nothing but an anaphoric pronoun performing an emphatic act. In other words, a quasi-indicator is an anaphoric pronoun that *pragmatically* conveys that the subject of the attitude thought of her/himself in the first-person mode. This information, however, is *not* semantically encoded. Hence, from a semantic viewpoint, quasi-indicators and anaphors should be treated on a par. Let us call this *the pragmatic strategy*.[4] This is, for instance, Böer & Lycan's stance:

> Of course 'he himself' refers, not just referentially, but in a further special way. Our claim is that it refers in a *pragmatically* special way. There is a pragmatic constraint on the use of 'he himself' to the effect that an occurrence of 'he himself' inside the scope of a verb of propositional attitudes denotes the subject of that verb; there may be further pragmatic

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[4]If we understand quasi-indicators along the lines of logophoric pronouns, though, the pragmatic explanation cannot be correct, for a logophoric pronoun is specifically used to attribute an indexical thought and can only be so used. Cross-linguistic evidence seems to prove that quasi-indicators should be treated on a semantic level. No doubt more should be said on the way quasi-indicators compare to logophoric pronouns. But the fact that some languages present specific pronouns designed to attribute indexical thought should bring in some evidence in favour of the existence of quasi-indicators in natural languages and their semantic relevance. In Ewe, for instance, the pronoun 'yé' is used exclusively as a logophoric pronoun and appears exclusively in attitude reports. As such it differs from the pronoun 'be' (see Clements 1975):

 (i) Kofi be yé-dzo
      [Kofi say LOG-leave]
      [Kofi say LOG-leave]
      (Kofi said that he (himself) left)
(ii) Kofi be e-dzo
      [Kofi say s/he-leave]
      (Kofi$_1$ said that she/he$_2$ left)

constraints on the use of indexical pronouns that will explain why (1a) [John believes that
he himself is in danger] implies or suggests that John is willing to assert "I am in danger".
(Böer and Lycan 1980: 441)

On this understanding, the reflexive 'herself' does not play any relevant semantic
role and the quasi-indicator 'she (herself)' does not semantically differ from the
anaphoric pronoun 'she'.[5] In particular, it can be substituted *salva veritate* by its
antecedent.[6] Hence (12a), (12b), (12c) and (12d) would not differ in truth value:

(12) a. $\text{Mary}_1{}^i$ believes that $\text{she}_1{}^d$ (herself) is the culprit
      b. $\text{Mary}_1{}^i$ believes that $\text{she}_1{}^d$ is the culprit
      c. $\text{Mary}_1{}^i$ believes that $\text{she}_1{}^i$ [pointing to Mary] is the culprit
      d. $\text{Mary}_1{}^i$ believes that $\text{Mary}_1{}^i$ is the culprit

Is this a plausible conclusion? Can one be happy with the view that Castañeda's data
must be explained away pragmatically?

    Before going further it is worth mentioning the existence of what I take to be a
powerful argument against the pragmatic strategy I just described. It comes from
the behavior of the unpronounced subjects of infinitive clauses, which linguists call
PRO.[7] In many cases PRO can only be understood in a quasi-indexical way, i.e., as
attributing an 'I'-thought or *de se* thought to the subject of the attitude.[8] To stress this
point, let us consider the following scenario. Imagine that Venus Williams, looking
at a tennis match on television, does not realize that the powerful tennis player she
is admiring playing in the semifinal is herself. She believes herself to be watching
her sister, Serena. Venus comes to wish that Serena would lose the semifinal so she
will avoid a family fight in the final. In this situation, a self-ascription like (13a) will
be appropriate, while a self-ascription like (13b) would not:

(13) a. I hope that she will lose the semifinal
      b. I hope to lose the semifinal

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[5]Crimmins, among others, embraces the pragmatic strategy: "[T]here is nothing mysterious here,
and there is no reason to postulate two different pronouns 'he'. What happens in these cases is
simply that the agent is claimed to have a belief about herself *via her self-notion*. The puzzle
about indexical belief reports really amounts to just that." (Crimmins 1992: 165) Perry (1983) also
denies the semantic pertinence of quasi-indicators and explains away the phenomenon as being
pragmatic.

[6]Not all anaphoric pronouns, though, can be replaced *salva veritate* by their antecedent. In some
cases the grammar itself prevents such replacement. In "John bought some wine and Mary drank
it" we cannot replace the anaphoric pronoun 'it' with its antecedent 'some wine' and obtain "John
bought some wine and Mary drank some wine". For an up to date discussion of this and related
phenomena see for instance Neale (1990).

[7]PRO represents the null pronominal element acting as the syntactic subject of infinitives and
gerunds, that is, PRO is viewed as the null analogue of lexical pronouns.

[8]An attribution like "Pavarotti very much wants to get help" entails "Pavarotti very much wants
for Pavarotti to get help" but not conversely. That is, a *de se* attribution entails a *de re* one, but a
de re ascription does not necessarily entail a *de se* one. "This explains why PRO, the subject of
infinitives, will in general be interpreted *de se*, and unambiguously so" (Chierchia 1989: 16).

From a third person-perspective (13a) and (13b) could be reported as:

(13)   c.   Venus hopes that she will lose the semifinal
   d.   Venus hopes to lose the semifinal

While (13c) captures Venus's mental state, (13d) does not.

The unpronounced subject (PRO) in (13b) and (13d) can only be understood as attributing an 'I'-thought to the referent of the antecedent it is linked with; it forces a *de se* reading. On the other hand, (13a) and (13c) must be understood *de re*. If we represent this peculiarity of PRO by adopting Castañeda's notation and add a '*' to form 'PRO*' (13d) can be represented as:

(13)   e.   Venus$_1$ hopes [PRO_1* to lose the semifinal]

If I am right in claiming that (13d) forces the quasi-indexical interpretation represented by (13e), we have, therefore, convincing syntactic evidence campaigning against the pragmatic strategy as it is advocated by Böer & Lycan, Crimmins, Perry, etc.

I am now going to show how the analysis of the 'self' of self-NPs I have proposed (following Reinhart and Reuland) furnishes further compelling evidence against the pragmatic strategy. If 'self' can be viewed as a relational noun (as an identity relation), then the attributive nature of a quasi-indicator cannot be explained away as a mere pragmatic fact. The fact that 'self' is an identity relation is semantically conveyed, for the structure of a compound noun phrase like 'NN (herself)' or 'she (herself)' corresponds to:

- NN/she (her [SELF<x, y>])

The argument 'y' of SELF is linked to either the proper name 'NN' or the pronoun 'she'. Because of this (syntactic) link, 'herself' cannot be discharged as a mere pragmatic phenomenon. It is *syntactically* linked to the name or pronoun it is coupled with. Since one of the arguments of the identity relation (of SELF) is saturated by the NP to which the argument 'y' is linked, the self-nature of the compound noun phrase cannot be dismissed. In other words, the (syntactic) link is build into the meaning of 'herself'. In these cases, emphasis is part of the meaning of a self-NP; it is, therefore, semantically conveyed. It is for this reason that a quasi-indicator cannot, *pace* Böer and Lycan, be explained away as a pragmatic phenomenon. For this very reason, quasi-indicators are best viewed as attributive anaphors.

I can tentatively conclude by proposing the following two considerations, which should help us understand the difference between a self-anaphor and a quasi-indicator:

- *Self anaphor*: When the argument 'y' of the relational noun SELF of a self-NP is saturated by an independent noun phrase (e.g., a proper name: 'John (himself)',

a demonstrative: 'you (yourself)', a description: 'the girl (herself)'), reference is fixed/selected by the independent NP and the self-NP is used in an emphatic way, i.e., to put the stress on the NP that 'y' is linked to. E.g.:

(14) a.   In last night's accident, *Jane^i* injured *herself^{tl}*
       b.   *That politician^i* takes *himself^{tl}* very seriously
       c.   I believe that *John^i himself^{tl}* ate all the cookies
       d.   *The woman^i* you just saw considers *herself^{tl}* to be very intelligent

• *Quasi-indicator*: When the argument 'y' of the relational noun SELF of a self-NP is saturated by an anaphoric pronoun, we have a quasi-indicator. Reference is fixed/selected by the antecedent of the anaphoric pronoun and the self-NP plays an attributive role; it attributes to the semantic value of the anaphoric pronoun an 'I'-thought. E.g.:

(15) a.   *Mary* believes that *she^d* (*herself*)^d is a queen
       b.   *John* thinks that Jane believes that *he^d* (*himself*)^d is handsome
       c.   *Jeff* did not think that *he^d* (*himself*)^d was the culprit[9]

To put it in a nutshell, when '(him/herself)' is linked to a *dependent* pronoun (an anaphor), the whole noun phrase is a quasi-indicator and thus a kind of attributive anaphor. When it is linked to an *independent* noun phrase, we merely have a self-NP.

Last, but not least: a third-person quasi-indicator always takes as its antecedent a NP referring to the *subject* of an attitude (it always appears in *oratio obliqua* construals), while the value of a self-NP need not be the subject of an attitude. As the examples I have given above show, quasi-indicators like 'she (herself)' attribute an egological perspective to the protagonist, the subject, of an attitude ascription.

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[9]It goes without saying that when a quasi-indicator appears in the scope of a negation, it used to deny that an 'I'-thought was entertained by the referent of its antecedent.

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Impure 'de se' Thoughts and Pragmatics (and How This Is Relevant to Pragmatics and IEM)

Alessandro Capone

1 Introduction

A 'de se' thought is a thought such that the subject of the thought thinks about herself through a mode of 'presentation' which is distinctly 'de se' in so far as it does not include a descriptive component (other than a first-personal mode of presentation). Laborious though this presentation of the issue might be, it is a step forward in the right direction, as it points out that after the inclusion of the first-personal component, no descriptive components or modes of presentation like *proper names* have to be included. Typical reports of 'de se' thoughts are:

1) Mary thinks she* is clever;
2) I think I am happy;
3) John thinks he himself is happy;
4) John remembers walking in Oxford.

It is interesting that the first-personal mode of presentation of the thinking subject need not include a name (even in the form of apposition), because even an amnesiac can have the thought:

5) I think I am happy

without having to recognize her name as part of the first-personal mode of presentation (of the subject) that she uses in thought. (We may return to this issue later).

A. Capone (✉)
Department of Linguistics, Faculty of Cognitive Sciences, University of Messina, Messina, Italy
e-mail: Alessandro.caponis@gmail.com

'De se' modes of presentation have a bearing on action (see Davis 2013, Perry (1979, etc. on this). If I realize that the chandelier is falling and there is an impending danger on myself, I may take action and escape; however, if I were to realize that the chandelier is about to fall on Alessandro Capone, whom I take to be someone possibly different from myself and were an amnesiac, I would fail to take action. A similar story was discussed by Perry (1979) to show the intimate connections between ('de se') thoughts and action.

In this paper we are going to discuss pure[1] and impure 'de se' thoughts. While (pure) 'de se' thoughts are associated with essential indexical modes of presentation (that have a bearing on action), which do not involve a descriptive component (they are pure indexical modes of presentation), impure 'de se' thoughts involve subjects that can be associated with descriptive components (the question arises whether 'pure' de se thoughts correlate with Davis (2013) generic self concepts while impure 'de se' thoughts correlate with Davis' specific self concepts (concepts which are determined by one's introspective awareness (does not one's introspective awareness include proper names as modes of presentation? I find evidence in Davis's text that they do)). Impure 'de se' thoughts are also associated with some actions in some related way (hence the definition of pure 'de se' attitudes as involving a motivational component (see Davis 2013) needs to be qualified further). Pragmatics is involved in this discussion because in context we need to know whether a purely 'de se' or an impurely 'de se' thought is involved and we need to distinguish between the two distinct modes of presentation through pragmatic information. Semantic information is not sufficient to discriminate among them. Pure 'de se' thoughts also have a characteristic which can be called IEM (Immunity to error through misidentification).[2] This characteristic depends on the fact that, as modes of presentations associated with subjects of thought are essentially indexical, in that they do not depend on any identification component (being associated with no descriptive component (Following Evans 1982)), the lack of a descriptive component leads to the impossibility of error through misidentification. However, if there is a species of 'de se' thoughts which are not purely 'de se' (in other words they need not exclude a descriptive component), it goes without saying that these should be associated with lack of IEM.

I shall start with some generic considerations on the pragmatics of 'de se' thoughts and I will then move on to the distinction between pure and impure 'de se' thoughts, which clearly involve some pragmatic discriminatory ability. Since impure 'de se' thoughts need not be IEM, it must be clear that IEM is not a semantic characteristic of psychological predicates but is available only after intervention of some pragmatic considerations. Anyway, the issue of IEM is to be considered

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[1] 'Purity' in connection with reference unmediated by some descriptive component is a term used by García-Carpintero (2013, 76). Reasonably enough, the term 'impure' has been coined by myself in opposition to such a term.

[2] I am largely following Higginbotham (2003) in the thought that there is a connection between 'de se' thoughts and IEM.

as only tangential to the issue of 'de se' and thus, with the exception of the next section, I will only reserve a final section for the definitive demonstration that IEM applies to certain psychological predicates only in the background of contextual considerations. IEM, in other words, is only pragmatic in nature. Although this is an important conclusion, it is deduced merely as a consequence of the analysis of 'de se' thoughts. The D-tour we are making is considerable, but not improper and without consequences.

2   On the Connection Between IEM and 'de se' Thoughts

Before proceeding, I want to dwell briefly on the connection between 'de se' thoughts and IEM. This clarification will turn out to be useful in subsequent discussions. Consider an utterance such as:

6)   I believe I feel a pain in my leg.

I may be wrong in so far as the pain is not in my leg but in my arm, but I cannot be mistaken in so far as it is not myself who feels the pain (wherever it is). This is immunity to Error though Misidentification. I cannot be mistaken about the identity of the person who feels the pain.[3] Now, it is interesting that (6) is a locus of the intersection of a 'de se' thought and of IEM. WE can provisionally say that if a thought is 'de se' then it must be characterized by IEM. However, if there is IEM, we are not 'ipso facto' confronted with a 'de se' thought. There are theorists like Evans (1982), who connect IEM with demonstrative utterances. These, according to Evans, illustrate the phenomenon of IEM, as these are cases in which a speaker makes a judgment about an object, as it takes a certain predicate to be instantiated in the object identified through a fundamental idea (controlled by an information link) (but not through a descriptive component).

So in a demonstrative thought, like 'P (a)', there is no question of identifying a through an equation like a = b, where b is a descriptive component. Now while demonstrative thoughts exhibit the feature of IEM, they are clearly not 'de se' thoughts. In the case of 'de se' thoughts the source of the information that controls the identification of the subject comes from 'inside', whereas in demonstrative thoughts like 'That is white' the source of information that controls the identification of the subject (through some fundamental idea) comes from outside.

It is true that Evans wants to demonstrate that knowledge of ourselves must be modeled after knowledge of the external world, as in utterances such as:

(7)   I believe there is a tree

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[3]As Recanati (2012) says, "to be immune to error through misidentification, a first-person judgment must be truly subjective. The subject must not be thought of as an object which one identifies as oneself; for, if it is, the judgment rests on an identity ('b = myself') and is subject to identification errors".

the procedure utilized to obtain information concerning the external world is what controls the thought and gives us the content of the belief. Evans is categorical about semantic ascent, the procedure whereby by being confronted with thoughts about the external world, we automatically obtain thoughts about our own minds.

If such were always the case, there would be no doubt that there should be some overlap between 'de se' thoughts and demonstrative utterances, as, after all, saying 'That is black' would amount to accepting that the speaker thinks that he sees a black cat (if that is a black cat).

But the overlap is only partial.

There are cases in which we are disconnected from the outside world (either because we wear black spectacles or special earphones producing no sound), and yet we have thoughts about the world and about ourselves. In these cases, Evans' semantic ascent procedure is not available. These are cases of purely 'de se' thoughts, in which a speaker is connected to the subject of thinking only in thought. He knows that he is thinking that p not because he is connected with the world which furnishes some information that p, but because the thinking (or the thought) is immediately available to him in his mind.

Thus, I would like to propose that these are genuinely 'de se' thoughts and that IEM, as occurs in such thoughts, is not necessarily identical to IEM as manifested in demonstrative utterances. A précis is required. In both cases, IEM is caused by the fact that the link with the source of information concerning a certain subject (or object) does not proceed through a descriptive component (if there is identification of the object, that is through a fundamental idea, as Evans says). However, in the case of a demonstrative judgment, the link with the information source which provides an identification (however fundamental) of the object is external to the mind. Instead, in the pure cases of IEM in 'de se' thoughts the source of information is inside the mind (or at least the body)[4] of the thinking subject (and an appropriate channel for this information source is the subject's own thinking). So perhaps we could distinguish between type IEM1 and type IEM 2, or we could opt for an abstract type, remembering that it is instantiated differently depending on whether the thought is 'de se' or demonstrative.

Before closing this section, I briefly address a point made by Davis, in noting that Higginbotham says that "a characteristic of 'de se' beliefs is "immunity to error through misidentification"" (Davis 2013). Davis says:

> Higginbotham is certainly on to something. With amnesia, Reagan can wonder whether Ronald Reagan is in pain without wondering whether he himself is. But Higginbotham overstates the difference. First, if I misidentified the sensation I am experiencing as pain, so that I mistakenly believe that I am in *pain*, then I also mistaken believe that *I* am in pain. (Davis 2013)

Now, I attach great importance to this example, because, even if it is different from the ones I will offer on contextual evaporation of IEM (or sensitivity of

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[4]The source of information may come from inside the body (proprioceptive information, as 'I feel a pain in my leg' (see Recanati 2012) or from the flow of throught (inside the mind).

IEM to context), it mainly shows the same point. In some contexts, IEM gets through, in some contexts it doesn't. This is a context in which a state cannot be falsely attributed to the subject without making an error about the identification of the subject (the subject is necessarily the subject of the pain if the ascription is successful and not the subject of the pain if the ascription is not successful). However, there is a context in which IEM is unscathed. I do not just believe that I am in pain but I also believe that I believe that I am in pain. (Luminosity, to use a term by Williamson 2000). Then, although I can be mistaken as to the identity of the subject of the pain, I cannot doubt (and it cannot be doubted) that I am the person of whom I think that I think 'I am in pain' (whether or not it is correct that I am in pain). Now, if adapting the example a bit could preserve IEM, it is open to us to believe that similar or related strategies could show that in some cases IEM evaporates or is not stable. So is the tie with 'de se' a semantic or a pragmatic tie? It could be useful to start with the assumption that it is a logical tie, related indirectly to the semantics.

The issue of the (possible) connection between 'de se' thoughts and IEM has also been the object of considerations by García-Carpintero (2013). Since these considerations are offered at different points in the paper, I need to extrapolate them (perhaps in a way which need not be approved of by the author). These considerations seem to me to be of considerable importance, though I think we are still some way from complete understanding of the issue. At one point, García-Carpintero says that he connection between 'de se' and 'IEM' is only indirect. I have myself said previously that the relationship is a logical one (or may be a logical one), although we are not clear yet how to define it. Provisionally I said that IEM need not imply a 'de se' statement (demonstrative utterances, which according to Evans involve IEM, if we follow García-Carpintero only involve circumstantial (and not absolute) IEM). Instead, a 'de se' statement seems to me to imply IEM (however, if the 'de se' statement is one in which the 'de se' component is added through pragmatics (e.g. John knows he* is happy), I quite agree that the connection between the 'de se' statement and IEM is indirect. It could also be 'indirect, in the sense that a 'de se' statement implies some yet to be specified proposition and this implies IEM. We are open to this possibility as well.

Now, I believe that my view converges with García-Carpintero's in that I too believe that a conception of 'de se' which only takes into account token-reflexive thoughts (e.g. The person who has this thought) is necessarily incomplete (see Capone 2010). The reasons given in García-Carpintero's article are compelling. The author takes ideas by Recanati (2007) on schizophrenic subjects, who are capable of holding thoughts such as 'The owner of this thought is happy', while being skeptical on the possibility that the thought really belongs to the patient's mind (perhaps it was inserted there by someone else (a problem which is not only theoretical but practical as thought-insertion is part of the practice of indoctrination, but I cannot go into this). In normal human beings, 'the 'de se' thought has both a token-reflexive part and a component reflecting the mental state underlying the content of the thought (some perspectival character-like component). In Capone (2010) I argued that this component is central and is provided through conversational

implicature (being part of an explicature). García-Carpintero, instead, seems to be happy with the view that the coincidence of the token-reflexive component and of the perspectival component is a presupposition, which works in normal subjects but not in the schizophrenic patient. The other reason for thinking that the token-reflexive components cannot be part of a motivational account relating thought to action (through maximal rationality) comes from a dialogue between Perry and another customer in the supermarket (think of Perry's supermarket story). The customer says 'You are the messy shopper' and then it dawns on Perry that he* is the messy shopper. However, there might be identification involved, as Perry needs to know that he is being addressed by the other customer who uses 'You are the messy shopper' (meaning 'The person I am addressing is the messy shopper). I suppose the second explanation is a reason why García-Carpintero uses the term 'character-like' to describe the perspectival meaning of 'de se' statements. I have myself proposed in Capone (2010) that the word 'I' must appear in a 'de se' report of propositional attitude and this is probably what the author has in mind when he says that 'de se' perspectival states are character-like.

Now, the moral of this story is that, if we follow the considerations above, we are to connect IEM with token-reflexive statements, rather than with 'de se' statements (according to García-Carpintero). It follows that the link between 'de se' statements and IEM is indirect, as the author said (without explaining this if not by implication of his other considerations). Now, I believe that we should be clear that the story by Recanati is more a story about clinical pragmatics than a story about how the mind usually works in normal cases. Thus I suppose that the story about the dialogue in the supermarket seems to be more solid and foundational. So my idea that a 'de se' statement involves a report of IEM needs to be qualified with the view that the identification between a token-reflexive component and a perspectival component is due to a conversational implicature or a (pragmatic) presupposition.

But now I think we need an additional part of the story. I suppose the following must be true. Consider the possibility of using a genuinely 'de se' individuator (we may identify it through some symbol, such as #de se. This is a genuinely perspectival component. However, in ordinary conversation one may use, rather loosely, a non-genuinely 'de se' individuator, say *de se. Let us call these individuators a and b respectively. Then we may suppose that the use of individuator b depends epistemically on a, just in case the reporter of the 'de se' thought believes or knows that for a property P, P applies to b in the thought by reported thinker on the basis of believing or knowing that the reported subject would attribute the thought he had to himself by applying P to a. But this means that if the reported thinker/speaker self-attributed an IEM thought, the reporter also attributed to her an IEM thought. Individuator b depends epistemically on individuator a if the reporting speaker in using b *simulates* some mental process of the reported speaker in which he is assumed to be using a. Now this reminds us of Sosa (1995)'s treatment of the attributive/referential distinction (reported in García-Carpintero 2013). There too pragmatic processes were involved, and I take Sosa's treatment as a basis for a treatment of indirect reports involving 'de se' thoughts and IEM.

2.1 Is There Actually Any IEM?

The issue of IEM as related to 'de se' thoughts is terribly complicated. Recently, two scholars have questioned its importance or real usefulness. Campbell (1999) and Howell (2007). Without getting into much detail, the main objection is that there is what appears as IEM only in the cases of psychological predicates, and this is highly suspicious, as the phenomenon may well be related (as I proposed) to such predicates. In short, Campbell proposes that IEM is related to the fact that the processes involved in the application of psychological predicates are dedicated. Now, the term 'dedicated' reminds us of issues pertaining to the Modularity of Mind (Carruthers 2006). A modular process is a dedicated mechanism, in that it has some dedicated procedure, and is encapsulated, in the sense that it cannot have access to procedures outside it (say what happens in other modules of the mind). Thus, to provide an example, perception is encapsulated from the reason-ing module (reflective procedures that produce inference through reasoning and deductive devices). Certain optical illusions exploit and show this encapsulation. Now, activities such as thinking are dedicated, as they occur in the mind, they are probably based in some encapsulated module, and they are strongly constrained. One such constraint – or dedicated process – is that the 'I' needs no descriptive component information before or in the process of its operation in judgment. If there are descriptive components, these are necessarily 'thin' (see Rosenthal (2011) on the coindexing between different occurrences of mental tokens of 'I'). If there is any such coindexing, it works either on the basis of a presupposition (and again we bump into the notion that these processes are dedicated and thus presuppose identity of the thinker in every subsequent and linked act of thinking) or on the basis of a linguistic rule, the character of 'I' which allows the speaker (or thinker) and the hearer to refer to an objective body, whose persistence guarantees continuity and linking of the selfs (the Kantian transcendental self). The quality of being dedicated mental processes, allows attributions of psychological predicates to escape a potential objection to IEM, the fact that some identification, however thin, must be required.

But then, if these processes are dedicated, what is the role of IEM? Is that a mere consequence of the fact that the process (say, of thinking) is dedicated?

But, of course, a problem for Campbell (1999) could be that there are indeed cases of IEM which are not linked to psychological predicates, the cases of demonstrative judgments discussed by Evans in three chapters of his impressive book 'The varieties of reference'. In fact, contrary to Howell (2007), I have proposed that demonstrative judgments have in their grammar of use the application of psychological predicates, as any use of a demonstrative presupposes an information link between an object and the subject of thought – and this information link is, as Devitt (2013) says, a matter of being *in rapport* with an object, say through perception. In any case, Howell does well to say that IEM is a spurious category, including cases that are very different. I am inclined to side with Campbell who says that IEM is just the consequence of the assumption that a psychological process is dedicated – having its characteristic standard procedures. Nevertheless,

with this important qualification, I will continue to use the term IEM. This is not particularly problematic, since in this paper I want to show that IEM depends on genuinely 'de se' thoughts and that it is controlled by pragmatic information. Of course, the considerations by Campbell and Howell square perfectly well, with what I am going to say about IEM, since the cases of 'pure' 'de se' thoughts are genuinely cases where the processes in question are dedicated and work on a presupposition that the thinking subject does not need to know anything about itself. Instead, the cases in which the thinking subject needs to be associated with some descriptive component, due to pragmatic intervention (and we remember that according to Louise Cummings (2009) cases of pragmatic inference involving world-knowledge are not genuinely encapsulated, thus presumably they cannot really count as dedicated processes) cannot really be said to be cases of dedicated processes. Pragmatic information providing an identification component through a descriptive feature militates against the status of dedicated processes.

3   What Does It Mean to Have a Purely 'de se' Thought

When I have a 'de se' thought, I attribute a property to a subject of the very thought that occurs to me (and which I describe when I vocalize the utterance in the first person (a direct report) or which is described when someone else vocalizes the thought (by describing it through an indirect report based on what I said or on some behavior which licenses the indirect report). The property is instantiated in the subject of the thought (I may think 'I am in pain'). When we have a demonstrative thought (or a thought involving an object which I can see), it will be said that I am in rapport with that object (Devitt 2013). To be in rapport with some salient object is to be governed (or controlled, to use Evans' (1982) words) by information coming from that object. It is not clear whether it can be said (or whether it is useful to say) in the case of a 'de se' thought that the subject of the thought is in rapport with himself – certainly he must be aware of himself as a subject of thought – but this time this cannot occur through semantic ascent; in other words, it is not necessary that the subject of the thought becomes aware of some object which he perceives to come to the conclusion that there must be a subject of thought in addition to the experience of thinking that thought. I have already said that opting for semantic ascent and immediate introspective knowledge depends on the circumstances. Even if in some case it suffices for me to have the thought that the sky is blue that I have observed the sky and seen that it is blue, Evans' position that semantic ascent also serves to identify the subject of thought sounds incredible, as the subject is always there from the beginning. Even if my senses were not functioning well or were not functioning at all, there is a subject of my thoughts and that is myself. Myself is available regardless of what I see or hear or of whether I really see something or hear something (Although in case I am tortured or humiliated too much, the self may come under attack and become so exiguous that it will run the risk of being annihilated (a consequence of this may be suicide)). Thus, I take that the subject of

thought is provided by the thinking activity in the sense that without the subject of thought, there could be no thinking activity. We could say that the subject of thought is presupposed by the thinking activity but also that the thinking activity (if we have evidence of it) is evidence for there being, somewhere, a subject of thought.

Thus, when we have a thought such as:

(8)   Mary thinks she is happy

There must not only be happiness (instantiated, as Evans would say), but there must be a thinking subject thinking that she herself is happy. I suppose that a fundamental identification of the thinking subject is that it is somewhere, and exactly where the thought is, and that she is thinking something. Now, it is possible that a fundamental component of 'de se' is that it is a thinking subject, while other descriptive components would have to be expunged from this *fundamental* identification. Presumably this is a 'de se' mode of presentation – rather exiguous, one could say. I may be criticized for allowing into the 'de se' concept a minimal identification component – yet, if we follow Evans this is no great harm provided that we are prepared to allow that this is a fundamental identification component, which may involve some thin kind of identification but not an identification by description which would destroy IEM, which, we have said, is a necessary accompaniment of *pure* 'de se' thoughts. We have IEM when it is not reasonable to ask (after having the thought 'I think I am in pain') 'Someone is in pain, but is it myself who is in pain?'. Analogously we have IEM when it is not reasonable to ask (after one has the thought 'I think I am in pain') 'Someone thinks he is in pain, but is it myself who thinks he is in pain?' Here we have identified the thinking subject as someone who thinks, but nevertheless there cannot be any doubt as to who the thinking subject is, provided that he is characterized minimally, through a minimal and fundamental component (the person who is thinking this thought). (The objections by Davis apply to this characterization of IEM, but these can be surmounted by resorting to luminosity and to recursion (if one has the IEM thought 'I think I think that I am in pain', it is not legitimate to ask the following question: 'One(3) thinks(1) that one(3) (he) thinks (2) he is in pain, but is it myself who is doing the thinking (2)?')).

It will be helpful, to avoid confusion, to say that even if a fundamental identification of the thinking subject is required for a 'de se' thought to be occurrent, it is necessary that no additional, non thin (thus thick) identification components should be added (to the fundamental identification of the reference), especially if they are of a descriptive type. Thus, although I may have all sorts of knowledge about myself – such as names, status, jobs, relations – I will not be using these identification components as part of the identification of myself – apart from (or on top of) my mode of presentation as a thinking subject. The reason for this is that I can have pure 'de se' thoughts, in other words I can think of myself in ways that are neutral as to who I am, except for the basic information that I am a thinking subject. Thus, when I think that I am clever (or stupid), I am not (necessarily) thinking that Alessandro Capone is clever. This essential identification of the reference is useful – we will call it a *modest* or *pure* identification. It is useful when we want to

keep our thought skeletal – we may add information pragmatically, if needed. But in some cases it is useful to have a modest characterization of the self. For example, we must allow that an amnesiac in having the thought 'I think I cannot remember anything' has a modest or minimal mode of presentation of the self – certainly one that cannot include 'John' or 'Mary' or 'Joseph'. In fact, the semantics of 'I think I cannot remember anything' is in potential conflict with the attribution of a mode of presentation such as 'Alessandro Capone'. If the speaker/thinking subject cannot remember anything, she cannot remember her name either – general amnesia includes amnesia about names. But of course, we need not consider only cases in which the semantics of the sentence expressing the thought precludes us from having a mode of presentation that includes a name. Consider, in fact:

(9)   Mary thinks she has pretty hair

In a background in which we know that Mary is amnesiac, we must exclude that she thinks of herself under the mode of presentation 'Mary'.[5]

Now we understand, why Castañeda (1966) or Perry (1979) or the others were inclined to call 'de se' pronominals essential indexical. They certainly wanted to account for cases like amnesia or the absent-minded shopper who follows a trail of sugar and wants to find the person losing sugar. In Perry's case, the problem is not caused by a mode of presentation equivalent with a Proper Name, but by a definite description like 'the absent-minded shopper'. Perry can finally remedy the situation and remove the sack of sugar with a hole in it, when he realizes that he himself is the messy shopper. In this case, it appears that too much information (like: The messy shopper) will be a distraction, whereas when he realizes that he himself is the messy shopper, he will find a solution to the problem.

4   Towards a Pragmatics of 'de se'

In two previous articles I have argued that 'de se' modes of presentation in many cases are provided through pragmatics. Now, I must admit the pragmatic demonstration is not easy. Surely there are easy cases, where there is an interpretative

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[5]García-Carpintero (2013, 80) says that "the amnesiac cases suggest also that descriptive individuators, whether or not they allow for for 'de re' thought on the strictures of N, are unnecessary, for amnesiacs are able to think about themselves in a fully self-conscious way by using and understanding 'I' and related expressions for first-personal reference while ignoring everything about themselves". However, this looks like a simplification. When I discuss Kant's transcendental self, I present data to the effect that the 'I' must keep a file of what he said before to monitor his own speech for contradiction. Thus a truly amnesiac subject which only retains the 'I' mode of presentation of himself cannot successfully embark on the enterprise of making a coherent discourse devoid of contradictions. It is necessary that the 'I' should always come accompanied by a file on what he has said before.

ambiguity and pragmatics will be responsible for resolving the ambiguity in question. Thus, to illustrate an easy case, consider the following (from Capone 2010) :

(10)   Mary thinks she is clever

Now, it is clear (at least to those who are familiar with the 'de se' literature and Castañeda) that the sentence (10) shows up an interpretative ambiguity and can be understood as:

(11)   Mary thinks she herself (or she*) is clever
(12)   Mary thinks she (that woman there) is clever.

We may add a third interpretation which is both 'de se' and demonstrative:

(13)   Mary thinks that she (herself/that woman) is clever.
        (The speaker points to Mary through a demonstrative
        gesture)

The interpretation (13) is not one that usually comes to mind and is possibly an interpretation which could only come to a logician's mind. I propose to ignore it, for the time being (there may be other places for this discussion). Now, if we only concentrate on (11) and (12), it is clear that, since there is an interpretative ambiguity, pragmatics must come into the picture to furnish an interpretation (either a default interpretation or a contextual interpretation). Here scholars may be at a fork, Relevance Theorists may invoke the power of the context to modulate meaning and to resolve interpretative ambiguities; neo-Gricean scholars, instead may opt for scalar mechanisms and, anyway, for default (conversational) implicatures/explicatures. Ambiguity resolution seems to me a matter of explicature, mainly following Grice (also Huang (2007) or Carston 2002)). Now, let us leave aside the issue of actual interpretation, as I said there might be controversy about this. What is indubitably clear is that 'de se' attitudes provide room for pragmatic treatments – and without pragmatics it would be difficult to assess what kind of thought is produced by uttering a sentence which is potentially ambiguous.

Another pragmatic problem, to be sure, is offered by sentences such as:

(14)   Mary believes that she is happy

Even when we know, for some reason, that the interpretation the speaker has in mind is:

(15)   Mary believes that she herself is happy.

The problem here, of course, is that (15) is an indirect report of some utterance by Mary or of some thought by Mary which we were somehow able to deduce. This interpretative issue is not easy. We are at a quandary. Which is the source of the indirect report, an utterance or some salient state by Mary which allowed some inference on the part of the speaker?

In other words, the choice here is between an indirect report or a description. After all, if something similar to semantic ascent is a strategy available at least

sometimes (as Evans says), an observer, by seeing Mary happy and believing that she cannot herself fail to notice that she is happy, comes to the conclusion that Mary believes she herself is happy. The issue is not uninteresting from a theoretical point of view, although we may be inclined to settle this issue by adopting the view that since Mary said that she is happy, someone reported that Mary believes she is happy (in case contextual clues militate in favor of this direction in interpretation (see Dascal 2003). And thus (15) is something like an indirect report. Some pragmatic explanation must lie behind these considerations. It is not impossible that the hearer will run a simulation process and come to the conclusion that (15) is an indirect report. As I implicated, this might be a superficial explanation, but for the time being it will do. Because if we establish that this is an indirect report, then the pragmatic problems besieging indirect reports will recur.

Now suppose we can establish that the subject 'she herself' corresponds to 'I' in the equivalent direct report (remember that part of the pragmatic machinery concerning indirect reports consists in simulating the direct report which is the basis for the indirect report). Thus, we think that the original speaker used 'I' (corresponding to 'she herself') in the 'de se' thought and that 'I' was first-personal. Now we should warn our readers that we cannot easily equate 'first-personal' with a 'I'-mode of presentation, even if to begin with I was inclined to think them equivalent. It cannot be doubted that if a thought is 'de se', it requires a first-personal mode of presentation. However, as Higginbotham (2003) says, there are modes of presentation which are more first-personal than 'I' or 'she herself' (for example 'PRO' is more first-personal than 'I' or 'she herself'). Other authors warn us against too easy an identification of 'first-personal' with 'I' (see Coliva 2003; but also García-Carpintero (2013) based on Burge 2007). Bezuidenhout (1997), for example, lets us notice that 'I' could be ambiguous between a referential and an attributive interpretation (The Founding Father attributed these powers to me = The President).[6] Jaszczolt (2013) also warns us against the equivalence between 'I' and 'first-personal'. There may be controversy about these uses – could not, in fact, someone claim that these are loose uses? If these uses are loose, they are not grammatical, and the equivalence between 'I' and 'first-personal' is not jeopardized. I will opt for the solution for which I have least sympathy, aware as I am that an obstinate opponent might want to argue against the equivalence of 'I' and 'first-personal'. Thus I adopt the view that 'I', which undoubtedly has a semantic potential for being first-personal, in some cases is interpretatively ambiguous and may sometimes receive interpretations that are not first-personal. But then this amounts to accepting that a 'de se' thought, even though first-personal, need not be expressed by 'I'. But this, despite all my concessions, I am not inclined to accept. And the reason for my obstinacy is that, after all, in context it is clear whether 'I' is first-personal or not. Given that we have accepted so far that a 'de se' interpretation

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[6]García-Carpintero (2013) says that "believers in a substantive singular/general distinction will have to accept that some 'de re' ascriptions (those meeting Quine's criterion) report what in fact are general thoughts and viceversa ...".

in some context or in some default case is the consequence of a pragmatic process of interpretation (or disambiguation) resulting in an explicature, there is no reason not to accept as well that 'I', even if it occurs in the course of interpretation, may itself be in need of interpretation – the explicature consists in fixing not only the 'de se' interpretation but also the mode of presentation of the 'first-personal' component of the 'de se' thought. Since I am confident that when we say that Angela thinks she is sad, we report a situation of the type: Angela thinks: 'I am sad'. I have a presumption that 'I' is of paramount importance in 'de se' interpretations, because it reflects our usual mental processes and the mental words that are used in those processes. Even if we are not quite ready to adopt the mentalese hypothesis, we may safely adopt the view that in thinking, people use mental occurrences of words. Now, this may not necessarily occur, but it may occur in some cases, and thus it would be realistic to describe those cases by using the words which the thinkers had in mind when they thought something. Now, although there are points that would deserve deepening, this rather sketchy view of the pragmatics of 'de se' attitudes will do (I have written more in Capone (2010)).

Before closing this section, I want to discuss a case brought to our attention by Recanati (2012). This too is a case where pragmatic information is essential to bring out the dimension of a thought's being first-personal. Recanati discusses the example: My legs are crossed. This is a case of an implicit 'de se' utterance. Contextual information must be brought to bear on the utterance to bring out its 'de se' meaning. The utterance can be construed as 'de se', if it receives the following interpretation: I feel as if my legs are crossed. The alternative interpretation could be: I see those legs crossed, which happen to be mine. In seeing those legs crossed, which I judge to be mine, I could make a mistake of identification: in fact they may not be my legs but someone else's legs. Only in the case of a 'de se' thought (the subject is thinking about himself that he feels as if his legs are crossed) can there be no error of identification and thus IEM is guaranteed. However, notice that only a pragmatic interpretation can bring out the 'de se' interpretation, hence IEM depends on pragmatic information. (Notice that no talk of IEM as a merely epistemic condition is going on; we are talking of IEM as being expressed through the statement. This is NOT surprising since if IEM is an epistemological state, then it can be transmitted through statements (although I agree that talk about IEM being communicated through a statement has not been standard; however, Recanati's point made me think of this issue).

5   The Pragmatics of Impure 'de se' Thoughts

I got the impression that to press a pragmatic story, we need to go beyond the boundaries of ordinary views about 'de se' attitudes. There is a consensus that 'de se' thoughts are pure 'de se' thoughts involving essential indexicals as modes of presentation of the reference. Essential indexicals are first-personal modes of presentation, more or less coinciding with 'I' or with other formal ways of marking

the fact that they are essential indexical (e.g. he*, according to Castañeda). The fact that there are essential indexicals as modes of presentation is a guarantee of IEM, because such pronominals are very skeletal from an informational point of view and do not include a descriptive component (if not a minimal one). Now that I think of it, even a pronominal may carry more information than an essential indexical may provide; thus 'she*' is not good enough to be an essential indexical because we may have a case like:

(16)   Mary believes she* is happy

which does not fit well the case of the essential indexical. Given that 'she*' includes information that the subject of the thought is female and considering that the subject of thought may be amnesiac (or may not have noticed sex differences), Mary1 may believe that X1 is happy without believing that she is female or that happiness can be predicated of her body, which is female. This is not a trivial point, one which was probably not noticed by philosophers who mainly write in English, because after all, as I have myself insisted many times, she herself or she* is equivalent to a first-personal pronoun and first-person pronouns in English are not inflected for the (gender) feature female/male. Perhaps it is an accidental fact about English that things stand in this way, but if we were to find a language which has a first-personal pronominal inflected for male/female features, then the first-personal pronominal could no longer be an essential indexical.

But now my question is: is it really important or indispensable that a 'de se' thought should be a pure 'de se' thought (expressible through a first-personal pronominal (non inflected for female/male features))? The answer should be that sometimes a purely 'de se' thought is required, as without it we could not grasp the thought in question. This is the case of the amnesiac. Or the case of John Perry's messy shopper, who must discard all other forms of modes of presentation, to come to the identification the messy shopper = myself. This must surely be also the case of 'now' because if I must go to an appointment at 12 o' clock and I do not realize that 'now' is 12 o' clock, I can miss the appointment (also see Davis 2013).

But are all cases like this? And are not there cases where the use of the essential indexical allows us to come to conclusions that cannot be applauded (by the proponents of the essential indexical)? Consider the following case.

Mary asks me: Are you John Smith?
I reply: Yes, I am John Smith.
Then she insists: Are you sure you are John Smith?
And I reply: Yes, I think I am John Smith (Or: Yes, I know I am John Smith).

And now I wonder what role does the essential indexical play in all this. If I thought that I (the person I only know through 'I') was John Smith, then my answer would appear like a guess.[7] On the one hand I am saying I know who I am, on

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[7] 'Am I John Smith' and 'I am John Smith' would have to share a neutral (or minimal) mode of presentation of 'I'. But this neutral mode of presentation needs saturating information in the

the other hand it must be assumed, to follow the essential indexical story, that I am allowed to think of myself only through the mode of presentation 'I' and attribute a Proper Name to this thin mode of presentation (plus reference). And this is a bit surprising, because a person who attributes himself the name 'John Smith' must at least know himself to have the name 'John Smith' and must use a first-personal mode of presentation which is not exactly an essential indexical. Of course, John can repeat the words just uttered by his sister, who knows he is amnesiac and say 'I am John Smith' (roughly meaning, I am John Smith, if what you say is true). In this further case, it is not implausible that 'I' should be the mode of presentation usable by an amnesiac and, thus, that 'I' should ONLY be first-personal and an essentially indexical mode of presentation. But the two cases appear to me to be different. We now also have a third case: 'Am I John Smith?', said by John. Here John, though not amnesiac, may be open to the possibility that he has another name (say in a different island, where he was brought up, he was known by a different name). And in this case John may use 'I' associating it with the mode of presentation 'Fred' and may possibly mean 'Is Fred John Smith?'. Now, this interpretation, perhaps a bit stretched but not impossible, is not that of an essential indexical.

Now consider a different kind of case.

John believes he is rich. Can John just think of himself in a first-personal way? For sure, supporters of 'de se' attitudes will insist that John has just been imparted the information that he is rich (that he has become rich), thus, although he does not know anything about whether in the past he was rich or poor, he now believes that he himself is rich. The case is, I admit, thorny because this is not just a belief report, but a case of belief-change. It may well be interpreted as 'John has come to the belief that he is rich'. There was a change in the beliefs and thus John who initially believed that he was poor now believes that he is rich. In this case he may use a neutral mode of presentation. Despite the complexity of this contrived explanation, my considered opinion is that John cannot believe that he is rich if he thinks of himself through a neutral mode of presentation (neither rich nor poor) expressible as 'I'. If you think of it a bit, if John had available in thought such a neutral mode of presentation (I, who know of myself nothing, let alone that I am poor or rich), he could not think that he is rich, because such a mode of presentation is compatible with his being poor. According to such a mode of presentation, for all he knows he could be poor, but then how can he believe that he is rich? There is clearly a clash between 'rich' (or believe-he-is-rich) and the presuppositions of his neutral mode of presentation of himself (for all he knows of himself, he could be either poor or rich).

Now consider John Perry's example again. Why is it that John Perry cannot have knowledge that the messy shopper is himself by saying or thinking 'Oh, John Perry is the messy shopper'? Surely there are cases like amnesia, but why should we be ready to concede so hastily that one of the most famous philosophers in the world

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question 'Am I John Smith?', while in the answer the information in the predicate comes through antecedent knowledge that the speaker knows the identity of the subject.

should be amnesiac? Certainly he could be amnesiac, in which case the mode of presentation 'John Perry' will not switch on any light in his mind and he may fail to take appropriate actions to remedy the problem (sugar would continue to be spilled on the floor). But why should we invoke cases of amnesia so easily, if we know that in the real world where we and John Perry lives, these cases are extremely rare? In the normal cases, I may very well think 'I think I John Perry[8] am the messy shopper' and nothing wrong occurs. The thinking subject –despite the thick and non-necessarily indexical mode of presentation can obtain knowledge of the appropriate facts and take action.

The last – but decisive – case I want to discuss derives from Rosenthal's (2003, 2011) considerations on Kant's transcendental self. The 'I' I consider in thought, whenever I have thoughts of the type "I believe that p" is not a single, unrelated occurrence of the mental token 'I' and is not merely referring to the self, intended as Davis (2013) says, as an event of introspective awareness (I am responsible for introducing (or adding) the word 'event' in association with 'introspective awareness, which is mine and not Davis'). The occurrence of the word 'I' in other words does not merely select a slice of my mental life (which has some continuity) but should be identified (and this identification is taken by Rosenthal to be thin) with previous occurrences (in thought) of the word 'I'. The identification between the various slices of mental life selected by different occurrences of 'I' is crucial in eliminating contradictions (or in attributing contradictions).[9] Suppose I

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[8]Where the apposition 'John Perry' may be an implicit constituent, something one does not have an occurrent thought of (to use words by Davis) but one could have an occurrent thought of, had one a chance to make this constituent explicit.

[9]Rosenthal (in a p.c.) writes the following:

You assert that the I in the the 'I think' that Kant thinks must be able to go with every thought is not a sequence of tokens of the mental analogue of 'I', but something that has the capacity to tie all one's thoughts together.

I certainly agree that that's something like what Kant had in mind. But there's a question about whether any such thing is there to be had. Simply stipulating that there is a mental item that will do the relevant unifying job doesn't show that there is any such mental item.

Note in that connection Kant's methodology: Establishing what is necessary for what is actual even to be possible. Kant takes the relevant unity of the self through time and across thoughts to be actual. He therefore argues that a unifying 'I' is necessary for that unity even to be possible.

That's fine – except that assuming that strong unity – we might in the context of my own article call it a thick unity – is question begging. I argue that there is an appearance of such strong unity, but that we have no reason to suppose that that strong unity is also real, in addition to being apparent.

My reply to Rosenthal is that from a philosophical point of view, I am certainly sympathetic to Kant's considerations, which derive, on a priori grounds, the unity of different slices of the thinking subject. However, in a linguistic paper, like the present one, not as much as this is required. We can be sympathetic with Rosenthal that only a thin identification is required, as this may well occur through anaphoricity, that is to say coindexation. Coindexation need not involve stipulation, but is normally a pragmatic interpretative matter (the hearer associates the 'I' of a thought with the producer of that thought and then anaphorically links one 'I' to the next). Of course, the thinking subject need not interpret occurrences of 'I' (in his own thoughts) as anaphorically linked. They are are already linked by the fact that they are uttered by the same voice (if just thought is considered,

have, in my past, supported the view that the environment comes before everything else. The person who issued this kind of statement can be identified with an environmentalist's position. However, today I argue that a certain speedway running from France to Northern Italy, must be built and this has priority over everything. The person who holds this second position, in contradiction with my previous position, is a different slice of myself and one who cannot easily be identified with my previous self. When I say: I believe the speedway between France and Northern Italy must be built, some kind of pragmatic intrusion must occur at the level of the subject. And this pragmatic intrusion must aim at reconciling my previous self with my subsequent self. Unless the two selves are reconciled, it can hardly be said that there is continuity between the two different slices of 'I'. For continuity to occur (or for non-contradiction to hold) it is necessary that some identification component must be added to the subject. Rosenthal thinks this identification component is thin. Instead, as I have demonstrated, it is not thin at all, but thick, since non-contradiction depends essentially on this identification component. If eliminating contradiction can be considered an action (albeit of a mental type, some kind of hygienic action as Igor Douven (2010) proposes), then it is clear that the impure 'de se' thought is relevant to action.[10]

In short, if we have to decide case by case whether 'de se' thoughts are genuinely first-personal (through an essentially indexical mode of presentation) or, otherwise, are associated with thick or impure 'de se' modes of presentation (which can be associated with rich information on top of the essentially indexical mode of presentation) a strong case has been made for pragmatics which will intervene to decide case by case whether we are faced with an essential indexical or not. Nothing but pragmatic information can tell us whether 'she' is a merely essential indexical or otherwise associated with rich information (a description). Now, it is interesting that these considerations are backed up independently by García-Carpintero's (2013) general considerations:

> The content is just a traditional proposition, *de dicto* or *de re*. The state is a specific condition of the subject by being in which a content is believed. Contents help accounting in coarse-grained way, for the role that propositional attitudes constitutively have in appraising the rationality of the subject, the adequacy of his beliefs to his evidence and of his actions to his beliefs and desires . . . but only ina coarse-grained way. To have a full account of rational

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we may just assume that the thinker remembers whether his thoughts are his own and coindexes the 'I's of his thoughts with his own thoughts, from which it follows that the different occurrences of 'I' of his thoughts refer to the same person).

[10]Rosenthal (in a p.c.) replies that the case of a person who cares (or actually manages) not to contradict herself is pretty rare. I agree with that. I agree that people can change their minds, over time. However, there are cases to conform to the one I have described, such as that of the rational law-maker who has to avoid and eliminate contradictions (Dascal 2003; Capone 2013). There are, furthermore, also contexts in which one is held to certain assumptions, as in the course of a logical demonstration.

action, for instance, we need not just the content but also the specific *state* through which the content is accessed, because, as Frege's puzzles already established, traditional contents are not enough to appraise rationality and cognitive significance, ways of accessing them should be taken into consideration (p. 82).

Now, this quotation appears to me extremely important, because even if it was presumably intended to cover cases like Frege's puzzles, and is presumably aimed at showing that a first-personal mode of presentation can explain its motivational force in action, it can be used for the opposite purpose, to show that even a first-personal ('de se') mode of presentation is not enough and this must be accompanied by other modes of presentations, such as e.g. proper names or files on information previously accepted by the subject of thought and which would allow the subject to monitor his speech for self-contradiction. After all, a coherent non-contradictory discourse is a way of instantiating the rationality of the speaker (or thinker) and considering that contradiction-elimination can be considered a mental action aimed at preserving the rationality of the speaker, we probably need to have tighter requirements than making use of a pure 'de se' mode of presentation of the subject. Other additions (additional baggage) is needed, as we are often faced with impure 'de se' thoughts. However impure 'de se' thoughts can be, they must still retain a feature of the 'de se' thought, which is anaphoricity to a self which preserves the self-reflexive nature of the thought. However many additional modes of presentation we can use in referring to ourselves, we need in a sense to keep track of the self by some anaphoric coindexation of the thinking subject with the subject of the thought (e.g. I think I am happy). In this sense, this paper is in line with Higginbotham (2003).

6   Conclusion: IEM Again

And now we are back to the issue of IEM. How can we know whether a thought (and thus a statement) is IEM? It is IEM if a descriptive component is lacking from the mode of presentation used. Thus if a genuinely 'de se' pronominal is being used, there is likely to be IEM associated with it. But if the 'de se' thought is not really a pure 'de se' thought, then pragmatically a descriptive component can accrue on top of the first-personal mode of presentation. If we accept considerations by Evans, the presence of descriptive features in a mode of presentation guarantee that IEM is destroyed. Why is it destroyed? It is destroyed because due to a descriptive component, questions about the identity of the referent can be asked. We have seen that IEM can be sensitive to pragmatic information. But this is, of course, a consideration that is based on a communicative approach to language – since language can be used to model mental representations, as Devitt (2013), says, it should not be excluded that epistemology and linguistics intersect at some point.

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Reporting Practices and Reported Entities

Nellie Wieland

1 Introduction

The starting point of this chapter is that when speakers report they make assumptions about the kind of linguistic entity being reported. This can be very roughly captured in the distinction between direct and indirect reports—or those about language and those about a state of affairs. Interestingly, speakers seem to operate with many more finely-grained distinctions. For example, to start with a simple case, when speaker *A* says, in English and with an Italian accent, that it is raining outside, speaker *B* need not report what *A* said *with* an Italian accent because, presumably, the accent is not part of *what A said*. However, in another case, if the accent is not part of *what A said*, it may still be what *B* would like to report using *what A said* as a more or less arbitrary vehicle for this report. Given this, discerning the semantic conditions governing *what is said* can only get us so far in a full understanding of reports.

Before going forward, it is worth defending this approach to analyzing reports. Speakers use expressions like 'said that' in fairly liberal ways, and it is unlikely that they do so in ways that are semantically faithful. So, we might think that an analysis of speakers' use of, for example, 'said that' does not reveal anything interesting about linguistic reality—but instead merely reveals speakers' conceptions of linguistic reality—unless it is the case that linguistic reality only consists of speakers' conceptions of language and their use of language (in addition to other subpersonal facts about those same speakers). This paper is not the place to sort out these kinds of meta-theoretical issues. But it is worth investigating the variety of speakers' reports as possible data, even if we do not take them as incontrovertible evidence for some-such view.

N. Wieland (✉)
Department of Philosophy, California State University, Long Beach, CA, USA
e-mail: nellie.wieland@gmail.com

2 Reporting as an Ability

It is assumed that reporting is a complex ability, and one that draws on multiple cognitive functions. Different abilities are brought to the fore depending on what a reporter is attempting to accomplish. Some of what a reporter needs to be able to do includes:

- An ability to understand and represent the locutionary content of the speech being reported.
- An ability to understand and represent the illocutionary content of the speech being reported. For example: in order to faithfully report, a reporter should understand whether the speech being reported was uttered figuratively or sarcastically.
- An ability to represent the way in which the original utterance was produced. For example: in a loud or soft voice, with an accent, with hesitation.
- An ability to have a theory of mind for both the speaker being reported and for their audience (Cummings 2015).
- An ability to organize the above functions in a kind of narrative structure (Norrick 2015). This structure is, in part, what permits movement between kinds of reports (direct, indirect, mixed) as long as adequate markers are present to guide the hearer. These markers may be syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and prosodic.

On the other side, a corresponding set of cognitive functions is required by the audience in order to demarcate that which is being produced by the reporter and that which is being imported from the original utterance. This demarcation needs to be navigated for syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, and prosodic elements of the report. For example, the audience needs to understand when a reporter is sarcastically reporting the original utterance, and when a reporter is reporting a sarcastic utterance.

It is possible that philosophical confusion about quotation and other kinds of reporting results from isolating certain features of the larger structure of an exchange, given the complexity of the abilities involved in producing and interpreting reports.[1] For example, to use one of the most common examples in the philosophy of language, if we say:

(1)   "Bachelor has eight letters" is false, and
(2)   "'Bachelor' has eight letters" is true

we might be posturing as if there is a peculiarity about quotation in natural languages when in fact we are not analyzing natural linguistic events in this example. In natural settings, (1) and (2) would be marked in various ways to eliminate confusion: using air-quotes or other framing gestures when uttering the term 'bachelor', raising or

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[1]This confusion also arises from treating pure quotations as phenomena similar to other kinds of reporting practices. They ought to be treated as different in kind, despite the fact of their shared use of quotation marks; they are not operating according to the same linguistic mechanisms. See discussion in Sect. 3 for additional remarks.

lowering the voice when uttering a portion of the sentence (Holt 2015), assuming certain background knowledge on behalf of the audience (e.g., that we never talk about how many letters people have, but we ordinarily talk about how many letters words have).

3   Terminology of Reporting Practices

Reports can be divided up in a few ways.[2] *Direct reports* are faithful representations of what a speaker said as the speaker said it. Ideally, direct reports do not deviate from the linguistic form of the original utterance (although it is assumed that they survive translation across languages). They should not paraphrase the original utterance, nor should they alter tense or indexicality. In written discourse, they are usually marked in English with quotation marks. Written direct reports in English can also be marked in other ways as well—including with dashes, italics, and line breaks. Across languages, there are, of course, variations in both punctuation as well as the expectations governing the felicity of direct reports to their original source.[3]

Indirect reports allow for some amount of paraphrase and require shifts in tense and indexicality.[4] In written discourse these are marked through a variety of phrases (cognates to 'said that *p*') and are not uniformly marked with any form of punctuation.

Mixed reports are usually understood as combinations of the forms of direct and indirect reporting. For example, the overall structure of the report might be indirect, even though certain terms or phrases might be set apart as direct quotes for various reasons.[5]

Free indirect reports typically have a third-person construction and are common in literary works and ordinary acts of storytelling. These kinds of constructions move between direct and indirect reports; for instance, they adopt the narrative perspective of the original speaker without adopting that speaker's grammatical perspective. These are more complicated than the first three categories introduced in this section, so a few examples are in order to illustrate:

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[2]I do not include *pure quotation* on this list because it's not a proper *reporting* practice. Instances of pure quotation involve using language to talk about a piece of language (e.g., "'Bachelor' has eight letters") rather than to report an utterance.

[3]See Maier (2015) for examples from ancient Greek. See also Schlenker (2011).

[4]There are interesting exceptions to this. Consider Ann Banfield's (1973) examples:

(i) Mary said yesterday that she would be in Chicago (by) now.
*(ii) Mary said yesterday that she is in Chicago (by) now.

[5]For a helpful overview, Maier (manuscript draft).

(3)
Mrs. Dalloway said she would buy the flowers herself.

    For Lucy had her work cut out for her. The doors would be taken off their hinges; Rumpelmayer's men were coming. And then, thought Clarissa Dalloway, what a morning — fresh as if issued to children on a beach.

    What a lark! What a plunge! For so it had always seemed to her when, with a little squeak of the hinges, which she could hear now, she had burst open the French windows and plunged at Bourton into the open air. How fresh, how calm, stiller than this of course, the air was in the early morning; like the flap of a wave; the kiss of a wave; chill and sharp and yet (for a girl of 18 as she then was) solemn, feeling as she did, standing there at the open window, that something awful was about to happen; looking at the flowers, at the trees with the smoke winding off them and the rooks rising, falling; standing and looking until Peter Walsh said, 'Musing among the vegetables?'—was that it? 'I prefer men to cauliflowers'—was that it?[6]

In this case, the passage portrays the direct narrative perspective of the speaker, in some lines of her reflecting on her own thoughts, with the indirect reporting of third-person narration. In the case where Peter Walsh's utterances are directly reported, they are followed by an interior reflection from Mrs. Dalloway's perspective. If we treat Virginia Woolf as the speaker, then she is engaged in free indirect reports of Mrs. Dalloway's thoughts and Peter Walsh's utterances. Here is another case:

(4)
Hurray! Tomorrow she would be home and she would never have to see this place again, she thought to herself. (Maier 2014, pg. 2)

Here again the narration is third-person, but the passage is written from the first-person perspective of the character.

    That there are multiple sub-categories of reporting practices suggests that reporters are likely to take different kinds of attitudes to the entity they take themselves to be reporting. A rough division would look something like this: since direct reports require faithfulness to the linguistic form of the original utterance, this indicates that speakers take themselves to be reporting a linguistic entity. They take their report to be *de dicto* or strictly about the linguistic form and content of an utterance. Indirect reports permit a range of transformations (under shifts in indexicality, tense, paraphrase, point of reference, etc.) (Wieland 2013; Capone, draft manuscript). This suggests that, in indirect reports, speakers take themselves to be reporting something non-linguistic or something indirectly linguistic. In most such cases speakers take themselves to be reporting what was meant rather than what was said. Both mixed reports and free indirect reports involve aspects of direct and indirect reports to varying degrees. It depends on whether the governing structure of the report is direct or indirect in determining whether the report will involve significant transformations. Similarly, it will depend on this governing structure whether the speaker will primarily take herself to reporting a linguistic entity. For example, *unquotation*—which is a variety of mixed quotation—is described (Maier 2014, 2015 manuscript draft) as a case when an utterance is directly reported but with gaps where the original utterance is deviated from or omitted. In this case, it

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[6]Woolf (1969); quoted and analyzed in Banfield (1973).

seems right to say that the report is about a linguistic entity, even if it has an indirect frame superimposed on the direct report, and the audience is expected to recognize that this is what the report is transmitting, even given the deviations. In cases of mixed reports that have an indirect governing form and only insert the occasional directly quoted word or phrase, it seems likely that the reporter takes herself to be reporting something non-linguistic (such as information or a state of affairs), or indirectly linguistic (i.e., using a paraphrased locution in order to convey that which is non-linguistic).

This set of distinctions drawn from the basic terminology of reporting practices is still quite general. It does not reflect the variety of speech acts speakers use reports to perform. This claim is explained in the next section.

4   Conceptions of Language

Reporters take themselves to be performing a variety of tasks when they report. Each of these tasks can take a different object. Philosophers of language, in particular, have adopted a narrow interpretation on the task of reporting. The narrow interpretation is that reporting is an entirely linguistic event, and linguistic events are exhaustively syntactic, semantic, and, to an extent, pragmatic. Speakers do not behave in ways that reflect this narrow interpretation. Whether or not they regard a report as a linguistic event narrowly construed depends on their conversational goal. Speakers are sometimes interested in linguistic accuracy, and sometimes in storytelling or recreation of mood or feeling, and sometimes in exploitation for the purpose of furthering a conversational goal (e.g., reporting for the purpose of irony or mocking).

The family of activities analyzed under the reporting headline is quite diverse. Examples of specific reporting goals include:
utterances used to talk about utterances:

(5)   Mary asked, "why so many examples about bachelors?"

utterances used to ridicule:

(6)   Pam said that she voted for Caribou Barbie.

utterances used to set a tone or mood such as in the use of an epigram:

(7)   To love oneself is the beginning of a lifelong romance —Oscar Wilde

utterances used to imitate (including in non-linguistic ways):

(8)   And then he said, "*I vill be back!*"

utterances used to structure a story:

(9)   And then she was like "*no way!*"

This final item on the list is one of the most interesting, and one of the most common. This kind of ordinary story-telling occupies a great deal of our conversational lives.

This is described as "utterances used to structure a story" rather than "utterances used to tell a story" because reports are not used in story telling *only* to convey what is said, or even merely to convey non-linguistic information about what happened, but they can also be used to mark shifts in the story including changes in setting, changes in narration, changes in action, or provide commentary, punctuation, or interpretation to highlight aspects of the story.

This suggests that speakers take reported entities to be linguistic and non-linguistic entities,[7] depending on the needs and stipulations of the reporter. Only some of the actions that speakers are engaged in when they report are metalinguistic. But by referring to all of them as kinds of reports, it seems as if speakers in these contexts are all engaged in a kind of metalinguistic task, and the goal is to determine how the tasks can be unified in a single theory of reporting.

If speakers primarily took reporting to be a metalinguistic task—where the object of the report is merely a linguistic entity—then it seems like speakers would track the felicity of reports by their linguistic fidelity. Yet, fidelity is neither necessary nor sufficient for perceived felicity. What does this mean for how we think about metalinguistic concepts like same-saying, reporting, quoting, and shared content? Varieties of reporting practices tell us something about the pragmatics of the reporting setting, the reporter's goals, audience expectations, and even the possible parameters for contextual modification. But they could also tell us more about the original utterance, where it leaves itself open to transformation, and the ways in which linguistic and non-linguistic content interact in order to make available reportable content.

It is certainly the case that many reports contain the minimal propositional content of the original utterance in addition to a plurality of speech act content. But we do not need to assume this is the case for all reports. Speakers could instead index their reports to para-linguistic goals. A reporter might not report minimal semantic content, but might report the *way* something is said (e.g., with an accent, in a low voice, with a certain cadence). It is easy to dismiss this phenomenon as irrelevant to *true*, semantically significant reporting, same-saying, or even quoting, but it is difficult to do so in a way that is not circular—for example, by just assuming that reporting, same-saying, and quoting have one kind of content rather than another. Take a look at the following exchange (difficult to reproduce in written form):

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[7]A note to explain the use of 'linguistic' and 'non-linguistic' here: the analysis of this paper is meant to hint at some metaphysical conclusions. These are that it might not be possible to exhaustively analyze the content of a report by linguistic means. The reporter might take her report to convey moods, feelings, or events in addition to linguistic content. Elsewhere I describe this as a problem of describing the individuation and containment conditions of language. Ben Caplan has suggested to me that I am actually interested in the individuation and containment conditions of *content*. In either case, the problem is how to determine the limits of the entity being reported and the extent to which it is linguistic (as ordinarily understood).

(10)

A	I love Paris in spring.
[sings]	
B₁:	*A* said [singing] "I love Paris in spring."
?*B₂:*	*A* said [not singing], "I love Paris in spring."

We could imagine various reasons for B_1's report. Perhaps B_1 does not think that *A* is a very good singer and B_1 wants to share a laugh with her audience about *A*'s performance. Perhaps B_1 is using *A* to model the correct notes to hit in a song. But it is less clear how felicitous B_2's report is.[8] It is possible that *A*, so taken with Paris in spring, expressed her affection in song, and the affection was correctly reported in ordinary speech. But it is also possible that *A* was singing for reasons other than communicating her beliefs in which case B_2's report feels inappropriate at best, or worse, false. We can see the incongruities of analyzing indirect reports with limited semantic criteria in this report from *C*:

> **C:*   *B* reported that *A* said that she loves Paris in spring. But this is false. Everybody knows that *A* dislikes Paris in every season.

In most cases this report feels incongruous because speakers would recognize two things: *A* is most likely not saying anything about her preference for Paris and its seasons; *B* is most likely not reporting anything about *A*'s preference for Paris and its seasons. And finally consider another possible report:

> *?D:*   *A* said, "I love Paris in spring," but said nothing about her affections for the capital of France.

This illustrates something similar to what Grice calls the 'cancelability principle'. He uses this principle in his determination of conversational implicature: if q is an implicature of p then we couldn't (or wouldn't) say p and add, 'but not q'. Similarly we might ask whether we can treat an utterance as quoted if we can reject its entailment in the very same report, as in the case of speaker *D* in example (10). This example might show that *D*'s utterance is felicitous despite being immediately canceled. (Admittedly, this intuition may be weak or atypical.)

What, if any, pragmatic explanations are available to explain how this plurality of practices can all be varieties of reports? There are two general ways of accounting for the plurality of attitudes speakers can take toward the object of their report. One way is to regard all reporting practices as metalinguistic, and then to regard that which does not appear to be metalinguistic as not an example of a proper report.[9] A single semantic analysis such as this (which is perhaps still unsettled) says

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[8]Neither may be a report. I don't know if singing can be reported. But it is interesting to consider whether it can be, and how.

[9]A discussion of this possibility can be found in Cappelen and Lepore (1997). Here they consider a view called *MA*: "an adequate semantic theory T for a language should assign p as the semantic content of a sentence S in L iff in uttering S a speaker says that p" (1997, 278). They conclude that the plurality of ways that speakers use the locution 'said that' do not pose a problem for semantic theory (although they appear to have changed their view on this by Cappelen and Lepore (2007)).

that whatever follows the *that* clause in some way refers to, demonstrates towards, echoes (etc.) the utterance being reported. In this case the analysis of reported entities would not follow the practices of speakers—regarding them as, perhaps, confused. A unified account would make the most of the similarity of structure— e.g., the use of quotation marks, or phrases such as 'said that' to mark the varied reports.

The second way of accounting for the plurality of attitudes speakers can take toward the object of their report would be to treat reporting practices separately and offer semantic and pragmatic analyses for each. The pluralistic account would emphasize the differences in speech act, conversational goals, and context-specificity. Wilson (2000) uses the expression "the exploitation of resemblances" to explain the cognitive processes in play when interpreting an indirect report. The interpreter takes into consideration some collection of clues that are linguistically encoded and takes into consideration contextual information that would lead to the most salient, least taxing interpretation.

The suggestion here is that reporting practices are not uniformly metalinguistic, so any single theory that approaches indirect reports from this assumption will misdescribe the practices themselves. However, this is not to say that the proper solution is to propose a semantic account of quotation and indirect reports, and then to suggest that speakers use reporting practices loosely or misunderstand the semantics of a phrase such as 'said that'. It is an open question whether the plurality of speakers' conceptions of reported entities calls for a plurality of analyses of indirect reports or for a unified account. It is worth emphasizing, again, that the unified account does not need to be semantic in its assumptions. The prospects and barriers to unification are assessed in the next section.

5   Prospects for Unification

Proposing a unified theory of reports is attractive, even despite the worries posed here. One of the reasons it is attractive is because any theory that is sufficiently inclusive of all of these kinds of reporting practices would need to have a similarly inclusive conception of language and linguistic entities. Linguistic entities (like meanings) would need to be situated in settings, contexts, stories (and so on) to be fully-realized, truth-evaluable entities. They would need to be constructed *out of* their situations, rather than despite them.

Instead, they concur that there are probably an indefinite number of correct indirect reports for any given utterance. They do not defend a formal mechanism for generating or explaining this but suggest, reasonably, that it will be governed by pragmatic constraints. In this paper I use variations on some of their examples, in part in order to illustrate the same point that there are indefinitely many correct indirect reports for any given utterance, my goal differs. I think the indefinite number should prompt reflection about how to individuate and contain the content of the original utterance; I'm neutral as to whether this is a proper concern for semantic theory.

How we distinguish between different kinds of reports differs depending on what we think the reported entity could possibly be. Providing a view of this goes beyond the scope of this paper, but here are a few additional considerations followed by a tentative pragmatic suggestion for how unification would look.

Presumptively, there are reasons against a unified account of direct and indirect reports based on the examples of reporting practices presented here. To see this clearly, consider the difference between (11a) and (11b):

(11a)   Oedipus cried out that he has done something horrible with his mother, but I won't repeat what he actually said.

?(11b)   Oedipus cried out, "I have done something horrible with my mother," but I won't repeat what he actually said. (Banfield 1973)

(11b) is problematic because the speaker makes a claim to direct quotation and then cancels the implication of directness in the following clause. The speaker in (11a) is entitled to do this because the speaker makes no claim to direct reporting. This is not cancelability of content, as with example (10), but cancelability of the semantic force of quotation marks. Any unified theory of reporting practices would need to take into account the barriers to transformation, as well as to cancelability.

Could an account of the plurality of reporting practices account for the variety of transformations across content, speech act type, inference, implicature, and allow for the use of reports as vehicles for non-linguistic content? One possibility would be to treat the range of reporting expressions—'said that', 'cried out that', 'asked whether', etc.—as indexical predicative expressions. The idea here is that these expressions point to an initially unspecified aspect of the original content. Jane Heal describes this account of indirect discourse in this way:

Davidson's earlier proposal was that the 'that' of indirect discourse refers indexically to the particular utterance which follows it. The alternative view to be defended here is that a that-clause refers indexically to some non-particular item of which the particular utterance is an instance. (Heal 2001, 433; see also, Davidson 1968)

This is the best contender for a unified account of reporting practices. As Heal conceives of it, it resolves a number of puzzles about indirect discourse including the plurality of propositional content, translation, transformations, using the linguistic content as a vehicle to report or emphasize tone, temper, emotion, to teach know-how, and the like. If the indexical predication is expanded further it can also predicate conversational devices, the elements of narrative structure, and changes in speech act, as in some of the examples discussed here. In this passage, Heal describes this kind of indexical predication as:

involv[ing] the use of an indexical expression not to refer to a particular, but rather to characterize or describe. Indexical predication may, consistently with this, be effected through indexical reference to a non-particular, for example, a colour, property, kind, action, number, etc. (Heal 2001, 435)

Using these assumptions about indexical predicative expressions, we can—in part, following Heal—treat quotation marks and frames such as 'said that' as indexical expressions, but one whose use and interpretation requires know-how.

This kind of know-how captures the cognitive abilities introduced in Sect. 2 of this chapter. These are the abilities to track transformations, changes in speech act, and inferential relations. Importantly, this know-how also involves the ability to detect the metaphysical assumptions of the speaker: e.g., what does she think the boundaries of the report are? Is she using the report functionally in the telling of the story? Does she intend to report content, or tone, or mood? Treating the reporting frame ('said that') as an indexical predicative expression resolves readings of more difficult cases such as (6), (8), (9), and (10). It might be objected that this is a much more expansive view of reporting practices than most views, but it is no more expansive than what is allowed in the case of ordinary indexicals, and especially demonstratives.

It may seem as if this solution still leaves out cases like the resolution of (11), as well as the puzzles raised by free indirect reports and mixed reports, including unquotation. Although there is a bit to say about each of these cases separately, as a first pass we should think about the know-how involved here as a matter of discerning the appropriate frame for constructing and interpreting each kind of report. For example, in the case of the mixed report, the speaker and interpreter each need to discern the manner in which to integrate the semantic indexical reference of the entities captured in quotation marks with the non-semantic entities referred to only indirectly. If it is the case that the utterance is principally framed as indirect report, then this integration will involve some kind of translation between the non-semantic aspects of the indexical reference and the semantic insertion (e.g., in the case where a single word or phrase is directly quoted in an indirect framing structure).

If it is the case that the utterance appears to be framed as a direct report, but with omissions—as in the case of unquotation—then the speaker and interpreter have the same kind of task before them: interpreting the quotation marks as indexical references to semantic content, while the omissions indicate that the supervening structure is being imposed by the reporter and does not bear fidelity to the semantics of the original utterance. In the case of free indirect reports and narrations that move between direct, indirect, and mixed reports, the cognitive ability required is the ability to impose interpretive frames for the character of indexical predication in each case.

6   Conclusion

The difference between clear cases of direct and indirect reports are examples where speakers take themselves to be performing different kinds of tasks. In the case of a direct report, the reporter takes the report to be *de dicto*; in the case of in indirect report the reporter takes the report to be about (something like) the attitude of the original speaker. In the mixed report, the attitude of the original speaker is reported, interpolated with some portion of the language used in the original utterance. The result is that the sentence in incomplete under both *de dicto* and *de re* interpretations.

But if we re-think the tasks of direct and indirect reports as natural parts of language, mixed reports don't present themselves as a puzzle anymore. Reporters are merely interested in language that was used or what the speaker meant to say (or some such variation on this); so there isn't a puzzle when they combine the two of these in a mixed report.

It has been emphasized in this paper that reporting of all kinds involves a number of cognitive abilities including varieties of know-how. To borrow Heal's example, teaching movements in a dance choreography is an obvious case of transmitting know-how through indexical reference. But in these cases, the dance movements cannot (easily) be articulated into a linguistic symbol system. In cases where we report the speech of others, it seems obvious that their speech *can* be reported in a linguistic system, and so the indexical references are explicitly marked within this system. But this is what makes indirect reporting so interesting. As a kind of storytelling, there is more to be told than what can be said, and the report often takes on the reproduction of the earlier scene or context. So, in answer to the question of *what* speakers take themselves to be reporting in an indirect report, one possibility is that they take themselves to be reporting whatever is salient from the earlier context, including linguistic and para-linguistic events.

This paper has considered the possibility that speakers use reports for a wide variety of linguistic and non-linguistic tasks, and in doing so, make a range of assumptions about the kinds of entities that it is possible to report. The speculative conclusion considered here is that this range of entities cannot be fully captured by an analysis of the semantic function of quotation marks or the phrase 'said that' and its correlates. Instead, the range of entities will best be captured if all reports are treated as something like indexical predicative expressions such that quotation marks and phrases such as 'said that' demonstrate toward some-such entity made salient in context.[10]

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Indirect Reports, Information, and Non-declaratives

Javier Gutiérrez-Rexach

1 Introduction

The study of indirect reports has gained momentum in the last few years and a variety of philosophical and linguistic proposals have provided a very intriguing picture of what appears to be a very complex phenomenon, comprising several interrelated properties. As is usual in the literature, we can distinguish the utterance of a proposition such as (1) by an agent (John) at a given time from a quotation of said utterance (2) and an indirect report of it (3)

(1)　　Columbus is in Ohio.
(2)　　John said, 'Columbus is in Ohio'.
(3)　　John said that Columbus is in Ohio.

Quotations require using specific intonational means (a pause) or graphical notation (comma or colon plus quotation marks) as explicit devices to introduce the quoted utterance, whereas a sentence expressing an indirect report requires the presence of a verb indicating the type of report. For example, the agent uttering (3) presents (1) as John's verbal utterance, but he could also present the report not as a saying event but as transmitted in writing or by other means, depending on whether the report is an actual verbal utterance or a written statement:

(4)　　John wrote that Columbus is in Ohio.

Other varieties of verbal utterance are possible, and the potential alternative reports accurately reflecting these modalities are also allowed:

(5)　　John muttered/sang that Pavarotti was the best.

J. Gutiérrez-Rexach (✉)
Department of Linguistics, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
e-mail: gutierrez-rexach.1@osu.edu

There are linguistic issues that play a critical role in how indirect reports are built. Typically, reporting requires changing first person pronouns to the third person form, second person forms to the first person, etc. Reporting an utterance of (6) or (7) would respectively require the substitutions in (8) and (9):

(6)   I am the best.
(7)   I will give it to you.
(8)   Bill said that he was the best.
(9)   Susan said that she will give it to me.

The rationale for these substitutions is obvious. Deictic or directly referential terms receive their content at the utterance point; for example *I* refers to the utterance agent, etc. Thus, preserving this utterance information requires a pronominal shift. Other deictic elements such as tenses and temporal adverbs are also shifted and preserve the information relating them to the reported utterance's information (more specifically, the speaker and time coordinates of its evaluation index, cf. Kaplan 1989). If a reporting agent is reporting Susan's utterance of (10) the very same day of her utterance, he would then utter (11). On the other hand, if such a report takes place 2 days later, (11) would be a false report and (12) would preserve the required utterance information.

(10)   I will buy a car tomorrow.
(11)   Susan said that she will buy a car tomorrow.
(12)   Susan said that she would buy a car yesterday.

There are thus two factors that seems to conspire in getting the attested referential shifts. First, the need to preserve the relevant information of the reported utterance (who was the agent, time and place of utterance, etc.). Second, the fact that directly referential terms (demonstratives, deictic elements, etc.) have to be anchored to the corresponding coordinates of the evaluation index of the actual utterance in which they occur (the matrix clause).

Free indirect discourse represents an exception to some of these generalizations, in that certain terms with indexical content appear to shift whereas others do not. Consider (13):

(13)   Susan was enthused, tomorrow she was buying a car.

Free indirect discourse, common in narratives, departs from standard indirect discourse in several respects (Maier 2014): the presence of the reporting verb is not required; not only utterances but also thoughts can be reported; and, finally, there is a mixture of indexical perspectives on the reported deictic content. As (13) shows, pronouns and tenses are shifted to the reporting index but the temporal adverb preserves the index of the matrix clause.

In this paper we address the issue of how the nature of the information to be transmitted through an indirect report conditions several speaker-based linguistic alternatives. This is especially true when the reported content is of a non-declarative nature. In Sect. 2 we discuss how the same-saying relation is sometimes not enough

to be informationally faithful, leaving the speaker room to perform certain linguistic choices in order to accurately report the voice of the other agent. In Sect. 3, we introduce the content associated with non-declarative speech acts and claim that an indirect report of a non-declarative is more complex in nature. Nor only the "same-saying relation" has to be preserved, but also information about the particular speech act instantiated by the reported utterance. In general, reporting non-declaratives requires not only the use of verbal expressions communicating the report and its propositional content but also certain pertinent information about the reported speech act and its preconditions, such as the emotive state or intentions of the agent. In Sect. 4, we argue that reporting the utterance agent's original intent takes precedence over reporting the literal content of the non-declarative expression. In order to achieve this goal, certain presupposition or background assumptions of the initial utterance have to be made explicit and some other aspects that are not necessary for the communicative purpose can be eliminated. Finally, in Sect. 5 slurs and epithets are argued to be difficult to report in non-declaratives since, as has been observed, they are generally attributed to the agent of the utterance in an asymmetric fashion.

The overall goal of the paper is to show that reporting non-declaratives requires taking into consideration not only the literal content of the proposition but also the emotive/knowledge state of the reported agent. This makes the reporting dynamics a non-linear process in which several pragmatic and linguistic decisions produce potentially different outcomes.

2   Varieties of Reports, Information, and the Interplay of Voices

Davidson's (1968) proposal on the semantics of indirect reports can be considered the starting point of contemporary theories on the issue. According to Davidson, sentence (3) above would be equivalent to the paraphrase in (14):

(14)   John said that, Columbus is in Ohio.

In this latter sentence, the complementizer *that* is replaced with the distal demonstrative *that*, An utterance of (3), or the equivalent (14), includes a demonstration of the reported content, namely an utterance of (1). The truth conditions for (3/14), according to Davidson would be represented in the following logical form:

(15)   ∃u [U(j,u) & SS (u, that)]: [Columbus is in Ohio]

An utterance of (3/14) would be true if John's utterance of (3/14) is in the same-saying relation (SS) with an utterance of (1). Although our goal here is not to undertake an analysis of Davidson's extensional demonstrative theory and ulterior developments and criticisms pertaining to it (Cappelen and Lepore 1997, 2003; Seymour 2015), it is worth noticing that the above theory needs refinements in several areas in order to be taken as a starting point for a linguistic account of

indirect reports. An obvious point of interest would be an extension that tackles free indirect discourse, as illustrated in the previous section. Several accounts of this type of reporting have adopted more complicated indexing mechanisms, according to which the relevant index that fixes the reference of the relevant deictic or pronominal terms can be either the matrix or the embedded index (cf. Schlenker 2003, 2004; Sharvit 2008).

Additionally, there are instances of mixed quotations or reports (Cappelen and Lepore 1997), where one of the constituents of the reported sentence becomes part of the reporting statement. Typical examples in the literature take the subject of the reported statement to be such element:

(16)   John said of Columbus that it is in Ohio.

Nevertheless, linguistically, nothing prevents other reported constituents from becoming part of the reporting fragment. Actually, it seems that the main requirement that a constituent has to satisfy to be promoted to the reporting segment of the sentence is that it is the informational topic of the sentence (Büring 1998; Asher and Lascarides 2004). Thus, an alternative mixed report for (1) could be the following, if the discourse topic were not Columbus but Ohio in general:

(17)   John said about Ohio that Columbus is in it.

The topical element could be a salient discourse referent in the common ground (Kamp and Reyle 1993) and it is not required that it is explicitly mentioned in the utterance. For example, if John utters (1) in a discussion about USA state capitals, the reporting individual could choose (18) as an indirect report:

(18)   John said about the USA that Columbus is in Ohio.

In this case, the report brings to the fore or makes explicit certain background or implicit information about the discourse topic or question under discussion (Roberts 2012). Mixed reports of the sort considered in the literature can be argued to preserve to same-saying relationship. In this type of reports it could be argued that the reporting agent informational goal can play an important role in reporting a given utterance as an indirect or a mixed report.

Similarly, the reporting agent may choose to add hedging qualifications to the reporting verb. In (19), the reporting verb may be modified by several adverbial expressions:

(19)   John reluctantly/hesitantly/forcefully said that Columbus is in Ohio.

It is clear that in this case the 'same-saying relation' still holds, given that the reported content is exactly the same as the original utterance. Nevertheless, the reporting agent may choose to add additional information about circumstances surrounding the original utterance. Some of these additionally reported circumstances could be more or less uninformative in a given situation (whether the original utterance took place at a certain time in the afternoon or whether the sun was shining at that moment, for example). The additional circumstances included in (19) do not

seem to be completely orthogonal or irrelevant with respect to the reported content. Quite the contrary. They appear to highlight a manner of presentation or delivery that the reporting agent finds significant or relevant for the addressee to reconstruct the agent's intentions or goals with respect to his utterance. Thus, subject-oriented adverbials (Jackendoff 1972) clearly add information on the agent of the reported utterance's original intent, attitude, manner of delivery, etc. Reporting this or not might be deemed as irrelevant for a narrow theory of the connection between reported content and the reporting act. Nevertheless, this is not always the case. Consider (20):

(20)   I was the killer.

Reporting (20) as (21) would appear maximally informative in a context-neutral or 'out of the blue' situation.

(21)   Bill said that he was the killer.

On the other hand, if a police interrogator has to report that the killer finally admitted to his crime after an strenuous process, sentence (22) would seem like a more accurate or informative report of the utterance:

(22)   Bill reluctantly admitted/confessed that he was the killer.

These considerations seem to support a theory of indirect reports in which not only the sameness of content between the initial utterance and the report are taken into account but also linguistic features such as information structure (topic/focus relations) and also the reporter's assessment about what additional information is required in order to maximize the accuracy and faithfulness of the report. Notice that so far we are not considering the possibility that the reporter might want to cast doubts, neutralize or question the information in the report. We are simply arguing that in order to ensure that the information is maximally accurate, the reporter usually resorts to linguistic means that might help him in achieving this purpose.

Reporting or not a pronominal element as such also depends on the speaker's assessment about the status of the entity referred to by the pronoun as information in the common ground. For example, if John, Jane and Jill are talking about Jane's complaint, John may utter (23) and Jill report it as (24) to Jane.

(23)   I hate it.
(24)   John says that he hates it.

Nevertheless, in a situation in which Jane is not an actual conversation participant or is not aware of John and Jill's preceding conversational exchange, Jill would normally report (23) as (25), where the reference of the pronoun is spelled out as a definite description:

(25)   John said that he hates your complaint.

Thus, the reporting agent again has discretion over whether to spell out pronouns as the corresponding coreferential definite description, proper names as full names,

or add more specific information about a particular discourse referent. The main reason for doing so, assuming the participants share the same conversation goals, is to be maximally faithful to the intentions of the reported utterance's agent and to transmit the reported content in a maximally informative fashion. For example, a reporting agent may choose to spell out the reference of the locative adverbial *there* in (26) not only as a definite description but also adding further location information:

(26)   I went there.
(27)   Joe said that he went to his mother's farm, in Northern Iowa.

In all, we have to conclude that the connection between the reported content and the reporting agent is not merely an issue of determining whether the report is identical in content to the reported utterance. Rather, there seems to be an interplay between the reporting agent, the reported content and the reported utterance's agent. This would seem to suggest that a more dynamic model is required to capture the relevant interactions between agents and reported content. In this vein, Capone (2012) advocates a language-game model for indirect reports, where these are viewed as the result of an interplay of voices. In principle, the voice of the reporting agent has to allow hearers to reconstruct the voice of the reported speaker. Several of the strategies that we have considered in this section illustrate how the reporter has a variety of linguistic devices at his disposal to make this reconstruction possible and informationally faithful to the best of his capacities.

3   Reporting Non-declaratives

Non-declarative sentences represent an ideal ground for the application of some of the ideas that we have begun to spell out in the previous section, since we will be arguing that reporting non-declaratives requires additional efforts on the part of the reporter to accurately convey the voice or communicative intentions of the agent of the reported utterance. The following examples respectively instantiate different types of non-declarative sentences and also have different illocutionary force:

(28)   What did you buy?
(29)   Bring me the chair!
(30)   I wish I had more money.
(31)   How tall Billy is!

Sentence (28) is a matrix question and expresses a question; an utterance of (28) would constitute an interrogative act from an illocutionary perspective. Similarly, sentence (29) is an imperative sentence. It expresses a command and its utterance constitutes a directive speech act. Example (30) is a desiderative sentence and expresses a modal preference (a desire). Finally, (31) is an exclamative sentence expressing an exclamation whose utterance would constitute an exclamatory speech act.

Krifka (2014) claims that a sentence is able to express assertional mood if its logical form includes an assertion predicate, *ASSERT*. This predicate takes an index *i*, an addressee variable *y*, a proposition *p* and a speaker variable *x*, and gives the value *TRUE* iff at *i*, *x* has assertive commitments with respect to the proposition *p* to the addressee *y*. This means that *x* has taken up responsibility to defend the truth of *p*.

(32)   ASSERT (i) (y)(p)(x) $\iff$ at i, the speaker x has assertive commitments with respect to the proposition p towards the addressee y.

ASSERT corresponds to the state of an agent, namely, the state of having an assertive commitment. The assertive utterance of a proposition is viewed by Krifka as involving a change of state, more specifically, a change of index from one at which the state of having assertive commitments does not hold to one at which it does. In addition to *ASSERT*, there are other illocutionary operators that are grammaticalized in many languages. One of these operators is *DIRECT*, which is present in directive speech acts, and is expressed by the imperative, as exemplified above. Krifka assumes that the sentence radical of the imperative is a property referring to the agent of an action. The logical form of an imperative speech-act expression would be as in (33):

(33)   DIRECT (i) (P)(y)(x) $\iff$ at i, there is an obligation of the addressee y towards the speaker x to perform P, that is, to make it to come about that P(y) becomes true.

Questions, as expressed by interrogative clauses, are encoded by another speech-act operator. One of the most widely accepted analysis of questions (Hamblin 1973) proposes that they denote sets of propositions, namely, the set of possible answers. This would be what is taken to be the denotation of an interrogative sentence. These sets of propositions can be used to ask a question, something which is made explicit by an illocutionary operator, *QUEST*. On the speech-act level, the speaker of a question puts the addressee under an obligation to react with an assertion of those propositions that are true.

Exclamatives can also be subject to a similar analysis. When uttering an exclamative, a speaker expresses a contextually-dependent emotive attitude toward the content of his utterance. By uttering (31) above, the speaker is expressing an emotive attitude (e.g., surprise) toward the fact that Billy is tall (to a point that exceeded his expectations):

In Gutiérrez-Rexach (1996), it is claimed that the logical form of exclamative expressions is characterized by having a force operator, *EXC*. Semantically, the exclamative operator *EXC* introduces an emotive property *P* which holds of (is true of) an agent *a* (the speaker) and the proposition *p* expressed by the exclamative expression at the utterance world *w* –cf. also Grosz (2012)– if the speaker holds such an emotive property towards *p* at *w*. Formally:

(34)   EXC (a) (w) (p) iff $\exists P_{emot}[P(w)(a)(p)]$

Summarizing, questions, imperatives and exclamatives constitute genuine speech acts and have illocutionary force. Thus, the speaker expresses an illocutionary

attitude and makes certain commitments, generally encoded as presuppositions, when uttering a non-declarative expression. Within a dynamic framework of conversational exchanges, a speaker would utter sentences such as (28–31) above felicitously in a given situation if and only if he has received new information or assessed all information leading him to an update or revision of his beliefs. It is the accommodation of this information in the common ground that would serve as the proper context for uttering a given sentence. More specifically, a speaker may utter (31) when he realizes that Billy is tall to a degree that exceeds his expectations. For instance, in a situation where the speaker's expectation is that Billy is $5'.7$ ft. tall but he learns that in the world of evaluation, Billy is indeed 6.1 ft. tall, then he can felicitously utter (31) to express his surprise.

Context cannot be understood here just as the set of propositions subject to the dynamic update process constituting the background that will satisfy or not the constraints associated with presuppositional and inferential expressions. Context also plays an important role in the way the addressee is able to represent the information elicited in a non-declarative expression and present it eventually as reported content. More precisely, if a context fails to satisfy the presuppositional requirements of an incoming sentence, the sentence is undefined relative to such context, and the update process cannot proceed. The relevant presuppositions have to be part of the information which an addressee uses to construct the intended interpretation of an incoming utterance. As Simons (2003) points out, accommodation must be constructed as a belief shift undertaken individually by each discourse participant, but with the same goal, namely that of bringing the actual common ground in line with the presuppositional requirements of utterances. According to Simons, accommodation is clearly a process undertaken by the discourse participants, and is indeed an integral part of the overall interpretation process. However, it cannot be driven by the common ground, as claimed by Stalnaker (1974). Accommodation is not driven by a hearer's recognition of the presuppositions of the speaker but by the requirements of interpretation. A cooperative speaker should utter a presupposing sentence only if he believes that his addressee has or can construct an information state that can be updated by the utterance.

Reporting a non-declarative utterance brings to the fore the dynamic and multi-agent perspective suggested in the previous section. The reporting agent has to represent the voice of the reported agent in a given context but cannot reproduce the utterance as the same type of speech act. In other words, an indirect report of a question is not a question itself, and an indirect report of an imperative expression is not an imperative utterance either. Formally speaking, the speech-act operators considered above are not preserved as matrix or embedded operators when they are indirectly reported:

(35)   Let *Op* be a speech-act operator, then if *Op(p)* holds for a given *p*, neither
       Report(op(p)) nor *Op(Report(p))* are possible

What this means is that an indirect report of a non-declarative faces an additional hurdle. Nor only the "same-saying relation" has to be preserved, but also informa-

tion about the particular speech act instantiated by the reported utterance. Consider the following non-declarative sentences and their respective reports:

(36)   Who ate the banana?
(37)   John asked who ate the banana.
(38)   Bring me the book!
(39)   He demanded that I bring him the book.

For example, sentence (36) is a question, and the indirect report in (37) not only reports the propositional content '*x* ate a banana' but also that there is a request for such an information by the agent of the utterance. Similarly, a faithful report of (38) should convey that 'x brings the book' is requested by an agent. This latter component is encoded in the reporting verb (*ask, demand*). Exclamatives in general seem to be somewhat peculiar in that the indirect exclamative report is rarely introduced by the verb indicating the type of speech act. The exclamative utterance (40) is rarely reported as (41):

(40)   What a lovely pie!
(41)   ?Paul exclaimed that it was a lovely pie.

The reporting agent normally conveys the reported utterance using a verb expressing the type of emotive attitude associated to such reported utterance. Sentence (42) is a more standard report of (40):

(42)   Paul was amazed at how lovely the pie was.

This is particularly interesting, since it sets the role of the reporter squarely at the center of the process of constructing what the relevant attitude of the reported agent was. For example, in (42) the reporting agent believes that Paul's emotive attitude when uttering (40) was one of amazement whereas he could as well have reported it as (43):

(43)   Paul was astonished/intrigued/flabbergasted at how lovely the pie was.

It seems thus that the embedding verb not only introduces the report in a transparent fashion, as the verb *say* might do with declaratives, but also conveys additional information about the mental state of the agent of the reported utterance and his intentions or background attitudes. This would fit well with the theory of exclamatives sketched above, according to which this type of utterance critically presupposes the emergence of an emotive attitude from an agent toward a particular propositional content. Reporting an exclamative as such requires not just reporting the relevant propositional content but also the nature of the emotive attitude. Summarizing, whereas verbs of saying can still be used when introducing exclamative expressions as direct reports, a specific set of verbs has to be used (*regret, be amazed, be astonished*, etc.) for the reported content to be identified as the proper expressive subtype, in the sense of Kaplan (1999) and Potts (2005).

In the case of interrogative sentences, it has been observed that several embedding verbs might establish different relationships between the reported agent and the question. Consider (44) and the alternative reports in (45–48):

(44)   Who was late to the party?
(45)   John asked who was late to the party.
(46)   John wondered who was late to the party.
(47)   John found out who was late to the party.
(48)   John knows who was late to the party.

These different verbs report alternative relationships between the agent of the utterance and the propositional content of the interrogative sentence. The verbs *ask* and *wonder* relate to a question denotation, in other words, report either an explicit request for an answer or the representation of an internal state (of not knowing or wondering) but without a particular request for a specific answer. Notice that *wonder* can be used to reflect this latter type of scenario in which there is no interrogative speech act *per se*. Still, both verbs report a knowledge gap of a given agent. On the other hand, *find out* and *know* relate to the answer to a question. Although these two latter verbs select for or embed interrogative sentences in the same fashion as *ask* or *wonder* and seem to be syntactically similar to these other interrogative-selecting verbs, semantically and pragmatically they are not equivalent (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984 and Heim 1994 for more details on the semantics aspects of the contrast). Verbs such as *know, find out, discover*, etc. actually do not report a particular question utterance or the mental state corresponding to such utterance. They just report that an individual is in a certain relation with the answer to a question but do not assert or presuppose an utterance of the question corresponding to such an answer.

Indirect reports of imperative utterances such as (49) can be constructed with a verb of communication, such as *say* (50) or *tell* (51):

(49)   Stay there!
(50)   John said that I should/had to stay there.
(51)   John told me to stay there.

The verb *say* is of a more bleached or neutral nature. It just transmits that an act of saying has taken place. In order to be part of a faithful indirect report of an imperative utterance, its complement has to be a modalized version of the proposition. This is essential to report the relevant obligation component in the original utterance. The verb *tell*, on the other hand, can in English incorporate an inherent obligation component ('tell someone to do something'), so its complement proposition does not require additional modalization.

As was the case with interrogatives, there are also more "transparent" reporting verbs such as *demand, request, require*, etc. These verbs all report different degrees of necessity with respect to the reported request or demand. The first two presuppose or are clearly associated with a previous utterance of the reported command, whereas this presupposition is not a precondition for a felicitous utterance of *require*. Compare (53), as a report of (52), and (54) below:

(52)   Come here!

(53)   John demanded/requested that I go there.

(54)   It is required that you bring your test scores with you to the appointment.

Sentence (53) would be a faithful indirect report of the imperative in (52). On the other hand, (54) may well be an indirect report of a statement that the reporting agent has read, etc.

To summarize this section, reporting non-declaratives normally requires not only the use of verbal expressions communicating that a given utterance is being reported and introducing the pertinent propositional content but also certain relevant information about the reported speech act and its preconditions, such as the emotive state or intentions of the agent. This forces the reporting agent to make certain critical decisions in order to be faithful to the reported utterance and to use (or not) certain linguistic tools that are available to him for this specific purpose.

4   What Is Reported and What Is Not

One of the claims presented in the previous section is that while it is true that certain verbs of saying can still be used when introducing exclamative expressions as indirect reports, a specific set of verbs have to be used for the reported content to be identified by the addressee as a report of a given speech-act type. Most prosodic/phonological properties that identify certain speech acts as questions, commands or exclamations are normally not transferred in indirect reports. These have the same intonation no matter what the nature of the embedded complement is. This is expected since a report is, after all, a declarative sentence and expresses an assertion. More interestingly, other identifying grammatical properties may be transferred or not. For example, it is well-known that matrix questions require verb inversion whereas indirect reports of questions do not:

(55)   Who is the winner?

(56)   Bob asked who the winner was.

The imperative mood form is used only in direct commands in Romance, whereas in reports the subjunctive is used, as the following examples show:

(57)   Ven a la fiesta!
        'Come to the party!'

(58)   Dijo que vinieras a la fiesta.
        'He said hat you should come to the party.'

These properties have received a variety of explanations, some of them purely syntactic and based on the contrast between root and embedded contexts and on the different requirements that such configurations impose. Nevertheless, there are other

properties of root non-declaratives pertaining to the semantics/pragmatics interface or to pragmatics more properly that are not preserved in the corresponding indirect reports of such non-declarative sentences. For example, sentence (59) is identified as a confirmation or tag question (by the tag phrase *is it*):

(59)   It is not late, is it?

Sentence (60) is a so-called "quiz question", as shown by the *guess wh-/I bet you didnt know wh-* introductory segments:

(60)   Guess which team/I bet you don't know which team won the football game last night.

Finally, (61) is a rhetorical question (indicated by the presence of the negative polarity items *ever* and *any*):

(61)   Has he ever read any book from beginning to end?

As we will show, what appear to be the most significant properties of these question types are not preserved when such questions are reported. An adequate report of (59) would not be a literal rephrasing of the question as an indirect question, as in (62). Rather, the indirect reports (63) or (64) would be more faithful in capturing the intent of the speaker:

(62)   John asked whether it was late or it was not.
(63)   John requested confirmation of whether it was not late.
(64)   John wanted to be assured that it was not late.

It seems clear that more than the particular form of the report what is critical in reporting a confirmation question is to present it as a request for confirming certain information. Representing such request as an embedded question is secondary, as the proper requests above illustrate.

Quiz questions are not appropriately reported as literal questions either. The above quiz question in (60) would not be appropriately reported as (65):

(65)   John asked me whether I knew which team won the football game.

A more faithful report of the agent of the utterance's voice would be the following:

(66)   John quizzed me about the winner of last game.

Identifying the reported utterance as a quiz question is more important than preserving the particular form of such question or even than presenting it as a full proposition. The report in (66) becomes an accurate report of (60) just by mentioning the individual on which the question is based.

Finally, rhetorical questions are not considered genuine questions in the literature, since they presuppose a negative answer (Krifka 1995). Thus, a report of (61) above as (67) would simply indicate that the reporting agent has misunderstood the nature of the interrogative expression:

(67)   John asked me whether Bill had ever read a book from beginning to end.

It is impossible to reproduce a rhetorical question as an indirect report literally, not only because the specific prosodic contour associated with this type of inter-pretations (Escandell 1996, 1999) is only characteristic of matrix interrogatives. It is also the case that doing so would actually go against the true intentions of the speaker, which are not related to satisfying an informational gap in his knowledge base. Rather, what rhetoricity implies (Andueza 2011) is an ironic stance on the part of the agent, who highlights a proposition by asserting or asking about the complementary proposition (normally, its negated variant). Thus, one felicitous report for (61) would be (68):

(68)   John ironically pointed out at the fact that Bill had never read a book from beginning to end.

This assertion, or any other similar to it, would actually report the content of (61) much more accurately than (67). Sentence (68) reports the voice of the speaker by informing the addressee of the ironic or rhetoric nature of John's utterance and the proposition driving the rhetorical utterance (Bill never read a book in its entirety). Any alternative containing these two ingredients would be faithful to the intended content of John's utterance, whereas one that merely preserves the 'form' of such an utterance would be not. The reason for this seems obvious. The ironic intent associated with a rhetorical question is inextricably associated to certain formal properties related to prosody and syntax, so even if those properties cannot be transferred because of a variety of factors (their relation to root or matrix contexts, etc.), the reporting agent still has to find alternative ways to represent the intent or voice of the agent.

Reporting exclamative utterances is subject to a similar tension between what can be transmitted and what cannot. Consider the exclamative utterances in (69–70):

(69)   What a wonderful time we had!
(70)   Boy, is pragmatics easy!

There are several instances where the report of an exclamatives utterance is not possible because there are very strict restrictions on the embedding of exclamatives cross-linguistically (Gutiérrez-Rexach and Andueza 2015). Embedding of the literal exclamative sentence under a verb of speech (*say/exclaim*) as an indirect report is not possible:

(71)   *He said/exclaimed what a wonderful time they had.
(72)   *John said that is pragmatics easy.
(73)   #John said that pragmatics is easy.

Notice that the contrast between (72) and (73) is indicative of the fact that whereas (72) is clearly ungrammatical, even if we fix the syntactic issue related to verb placement, as in (73), the sentence is now grammatical but infelicitous as a faithful report of the speaker's intent. What should be reported is not only that

pragmatics is easy but also that it is extremely easy and this fact triggers and emotive attitude in John.

Even the use of reporting verbs containing speech-act information about the expressive nature of such act does not always make the report possible in its literal form. Consider a report of (69) using the predicate *be amazed*:

(74)   *John was amazed at what a wonderful time they had.

In addition to the requirement that reporting verbs also convey information about the emotive state of the agent, direct mention of the entity or degree triggering the exclamative utterance is usually required too. This has been related to a *de re* reference requirement on embedded exclamatives (Gutiérrez-Rexach and Andueza 2015): Exclamatives require *de re* reference to an entity or degree. Embedding or reporting such utterances also needs to make the relevant entity immediately identifiable. This is why the following reports clearly identify a particular entity (a point in time) and degree (how high is pragmatics in the easiness scale, etc.).

(75)   John was amazed at the time they had together.
(76)   John is surprised at how easy pragmatics is.

Making explicit the factive nature of exclamations (Elliott 1974) also makes the report possible.

(77)   John was amazed at the fact that they had a great time together.
(78)   John is surprised at the fact that pragmatics is very easy.

This brings us to an additional issue that complicates reporting exclamatives. Predicates such as *be amazed* or *be surprised* are also factive (they presuppose their complements). Thus, when reporting an exclamative utterance using such verbs, agreement between the reporting agent and the reported content is presupposed. If an agent reports (70) as (76) or (78), it is presupposed that he agrees on the fact that pragmatics is very easy. This is why factual corrections are not possible:

(79)   #John is surprised at how easy pragmatics is, but it is not.
(80)   #John is surprised at the fact that pragmatics is very easy, but it is not.

Disagreements with a presupposed fact are not possible because they would entail a contradiction (a presupposed fact *p* is part of the belief state of the conversation participants and asserting its negation would result in a background context where both *p* and *not p* are true). What is possible is to disagree with the emotive attitude at the root of the reported agent's exclamative utterance. The following reports of (70) would be felicitous and also express the reporting agent's complete or partial disagreement with the emotive attitude of the other agent (surprise):

(81)   John is surprised at how easy pragmatics is, but I am not.
(82)   John is surprised at the fact that pragmatics is very easy, but this does not completely surprise me.

In this section we have seen that the grammatical form and certain semantic and pragmatic aspects of the reported content not only do not need to be transmitted in the reporting statement but actually may be required not to be reported. The overarching principle at play seems to be the primacy of reporting the utterance agent's original intent. This may require making explicit certain presuppositions or background assumptions of the initial utterance.

5   Exclamatives and Reporting Expressive Content

Exclamative utterances are sometimes associated with other items with expressive content. Such items can be argued to contribute to the interpretation of the utterance and sometimes might even be essential to its content. Consider expressive degree enhancers such as *such, so, way,* etc. The presence of these items is sometimes critical for the addressee to interpret the utterance as exclamative. This is especially true when constructions that have a primary use as declaratives are used. For example (83), (84) and (85) are declarative sentences, but the presence of degree enhancers allows for an exclamatory interpretation, as shown in (86–88):

(83)   He is tall.
(84)   He is a nice guy.
(85)   He is smart.
(86)   He is sooo tall!
(87)   He is such a nice guy!
(88)   He is way too smart!

These degree enhancers can be included in an indirect report. As we previously discussed, verbs such as *say* report the propositional emotive content as attributed to the reported voice, whereas with *be amazed* the content is presupposed and part of the common ground, and what is attributed to the reported agent is the emotive attitude (amazement).

(89)   John said that Bill is such a nice guy.
(90)   John is amazed at the fact that Bill is way too smart.

Thus, in (90) there has to be agreement between both agents on Bill's high degree of intelligence. This would explain why certain enhancers that have a high expressive content the speaker (such as *sooo*, with the characteristic emphatic intonation associated to vowel lengthening) are problematic with certain verbs. They can be attributed to the reported agent in indirect reports introduced by verbs of saying, as in (91):

(91)   John said that Bill is sooo tall.

On the other hand, in the case of verbs with emotive reporting content such as *be amazed*, they tend to be attributed to the reporting agent exclusively:

(92)   John is amazed at the fact that Bill is sooo tall.

These asymmetries lead us to a topic that has gained increased attention in the recent philosophical and pragmatic literature: the analysis of slurs (cf. Anderson and Lepore 2013; Capone 2013; and Allan 2015, among others, for a more detailed discussion). There is a strong debate on whether they only have expressive content (Potts 2005, 2007) or also include descriptive aspects (Croom 2014). Although assessing the issues in this debate would be beyond the purposes of this paper, what is of interest to our purposes is that it has been observed that slurring and taboo words, as well as pejorative epithets in general, are not transparent items in the reporting process. Their content is normally not interpreted as reported information but rather it is ascribed to the individual reporting such information. Consider sentence (93), containing the epithet *the idiot*, and the literal report in (94):

(93)   The idiot didn't wait for me.
(94)   He said that the idiot didn't wait for him.

The problem with the report in (94) is that the expressive pejorative content of the epithet is understood as coming from the reporting agent, not from the original speaker. This makes sense if one assumes the Kaplan/Potts theory of expressives according to which these epithets are part of the character of an expression, in other words, their interpretation is index-dependent. More specifically, their evaluative content is associated to the agent (speaker) coordinate of the evaluation index of the utterance. Thus, in (93) and (94) the evaluative (pejorative) content of the epithet *the idiot* is to be associated to the respective agent of the utterance. As expected, when an exclamative utterance containing an epithet, such as (95), is reported both its transparent and emotive reporting variants in (96) or (97) entail the attribution of the epithet to the agent of the utterance.

(95)   How nicely she behaves with that jerk!
(96)   He said that she behaves really nicely with that jerk.
(97)   He is amazed at how nicely she behaves with that jerk.

This restriction is so strong that even in a report such as (97) where, as we have argued before, there is normally agreement between the reporting agent and the reported one with respect to the expressive content, there is no necessarily agreement with respect to the evaluative content of the epithet. Agreement takes place in (97) with respect the extreme degree of nicety of the behavior, but there is no presupposition that the individual referred to is evaluated by the original agent as a jerk.

Interestingly, not only slurs or negative epithets have this asymmetrical attribution to the agent of the utterance (reported or reporting). Epithets with a positive evaluative content such as *goddess* are also asymmetrically associated with the agent of the utterance. Consider (98) and the reports in (99) and (100):

(98)   How poorly Bill behaves with that goddess!
(99)   He said that Bill behaves really poorly with that goddess.
(100)   He is disgusted at how poorly Bill behaves with that goddess.

It seems clear that although these reports are faithful in reporting the extreme degree of Bill's behavior, as perceived by the original speaker, the positive evaluative epithet is in both cases attributed only to the agent of the report. The only way in which epithets or slurs can be attributed to the original reported speaker is by using certain linguistic mechanisms, such as adding hedging expressions:

(101)   He said that Bill behaves really poorly with that so-called goddess.
(102)   He is disgusted at how poorly Bill behaves with who he deems a goddess.

Notice that evaluative expressions (positive or negative) are problematic to report when they occur in a definite description, but when they occur in indefinite descriptions or bare-noun terms some of them can be successfully reported as part of the initial utterance, whereas others are still attributed to the agent of the report. Consider the contrast between the pejorative *jerk* and the slur *wetback* (referring to Mexican immigrants to the USA). The exclamative utterance (103) can be reported as (104), where the pejorative is not necessarily attributed to the author of the report and can successfully be attributed to the reported agent:

(103)   What a jerk he is!
(104)   He said that he is quite a jerk

This is proven by the fact that a continuation such as ... *but I disagree* is possible. On the other hand, in a report of the rhetorical question/exclamative in (105), the use of the slurring term will not be easily construed as attributed to the reported utterance, in line with what happened to definite descriptions.

(105)   Boy, isn't it true that Joe never hires wetbacks!
(106)   He said that Joe never hires wetbacks.

6   Conclusions

In this paper we have looked at how reporting utterances of certain sentence types, especially non-declaratives, allows to consider new possibilities for the proper analysis of the relationship between indirect reports, the reported content, the agents participating in the reporting situation, and the pertinent information exchange. In declarative sentences, it is usual to adapt deictic or pronominal elements to reflect perspective shifts, or to include or exclude other elements to represent informationally-relevant aspects. Non-declaratives require reporting something that can be considered more complex. On the one hand, a report is a declarative utterance, so speech-act operators are lost in the reporting process. This entails that the relevant speech-act information has to be reported in a different fashion: using

verbs enriched with speech-act or emotive information, etc. Some non-declaratives cannot be reported in a literal fashion either, and the reporting agent has to make some adjustments to ensure that a faithful report is produced. Finally, certain evaluative elements introduce requirements that make difficult or interfere with the reporting process.

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Reports, Indirect Reports, and Illocutionary Point

Keith Allan

1 Reporting

Essentially a report is X's re-presentation to Y of what Z said. Z can be identical with X (*what I said/did was* …) and, less commonly, with Y; in some personal diary entries, X fulfils all roles.[1] These situations are parasitic on the commonest state of affairs in which the three roles are distinct.

Because, typically, X is not identical with Z, what Z said is necessarily transmuted by X. If what Z said was clever, witty, or shocking it has a better chance of being remembered and reproduced almost verbatim (Lehrer, 1989). However, X's memory for meaning will be better than her memory for verbatim textual recollection (Bartlett, 1932; Lehrer, 1989). X may use a different medium from Z, e.g. written in place of spoken. X will have a different voice – literally and figuratively – from Z. Normally, X will re-present what Z said using different lexis and grammar, even when attempting a verbatim quote. Lehrer found changes in word order, substitution of nouns for pronouns and vice versa, swapping of one determiner for another, simplification and clarification through the omission of hedges, repetition, conjunctions, and removal of clefts (e.g. *What he did was buy a car* is changed to *He bought a car*). An important consideration for reports is that

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[1]A diary is often treated as an addressee, cf. 'I don't want to jot down the facts in this diary the way most people would do, but I want the diary to be my friend, and I'm going to call this friend Kitty.' (Anne Frank, 1929–1945, Saturday June 20, 1942, Frank, 1997)

K. Allan (✉)
School of Languages, Cultures and Linguistics, Department of Linguistics, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia

The University of Queensland, St. Lucia, QLD 4072, Australia
e-mail: Keith.Allan@monash.edu

the reporter may choose to render the report more coherent by rearranging what was said, and/or more vivid by embellishing the original to attract and/or maintain audience attention.

On the other hand, X may have misheard or misinterpreted Z's utterance: she may deliberately misinterpret Z's utterance to save Y's feelings or to mislead Y maliciously. X will often report what Z said with some affective gloss, e.g. describe Z himself as an angel, a jerk, etc. and Z's manner as joyous, boastful, boring, or whatever.

All of these transmutations distinguish X's report ρ from Z's utterance υ in both form and content, which renders every report "indirect" to some extent; but there are different degrees of indirectness, compare the near verbatim report (2) of (1) with the more indirect version in (3).

(1) It's never stopped raining since we arrived.
(2) Z said that it's never stopped raining since they arrived.
(3) Z complained about the terrible weather there.

This suggests that we should speak of *indirectness in reports* rather than of *indirect reports*; however, as always, the truth is more complicated.

We need to maintain a distinction between *quotation* and *report*, which sometimes seem to be conflated (e.g. by Recanati, 2001; Wieland, 2013). It makes sense to speak of direct quotation if there is verbatim representation of the speaker's words, e.g. (4) directly quotes Galileo. But (5) is not an indirect quotation, it is a report; and so is (6), despite the quotation marks.

(4) Galileo ha detto del mondo '*Eppur si muove*'.
(5) Galileo said of the earth that, nonetheless, it moves.
(6) Galileo said of the earth 'And yet it moves'.

Quotation marks are a feature of punctuation in written language. As Recanati (2001) and Saka (2011) point out: in spoken language there is no difference between *Alice said that life is difficult to understand* and *Alice said that life is '*difficult to understand*'*. Both are reports of what Alice said, and neither is more indirect than the other. The same holds true for (8)A, B which, if Sue has the role of Z and 'you' = Harry, are both reports of (7).

(7) I'm leaving you, you bastard!
(8) A. While I was there Sue yelled 'I'm leaving you, you bastard' at Harry.
     B. Sue told Harry she was going to leave him.

When X's report ρ is compared with Z's utterance υ, the accuracy of ρ depends on whether or not Z's message in υ can be reconstructed from it. In other words, the content of ρ is dependent on the content of υ.[2] Under the principle of charity (or

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[2]This is assumed by all those who have sought to explain it, e.g. Davidson (1969), Platts (1979), Cappelen & Lepore (1997), Wieland (2013), among many others.

something like it[3]), we have to allow that in uttering υ, Z most probably spoke accurately according to his intention. However, Z may have accidently or even deliberately misspoken (e.g. said *left* when he should have said *right*). None of this necessarily vitiates X's report ρ, though it may mean that if υ deviates from the truth in respect of what Z speaks of, then ρ will also deviate from the truth unless X recognizes the deviation and repairs it.

This essay makes frequent reference to illocutionary point, which is what the speaker intends to achieve by making the particular utterance υ in the particular context in which it is uttered (see Allan, 1986b, 1998 for more detailed discussion). For present purposes, we might gloss this as 'Z's message in υ'. There is a distinction to be made between illocutionary point and perlocutionary intention: typically, the illocutionary point (and illocutionary intention) of *I bet you ten dollars I can jump that fence* is to offer a bet; its perlocutionary intention is to achieve the perlocutionary effect of getting the bet taken up and making $10.

The embedded clauses of reported speech have the illocutions of the direct speech they report.[4]

(9)   A. Sue said, 'Turn left!'   B. Sue said to turn left.
(10)   A. Henry asked 'Can I leave?'   B. Henry asked to leave
(11)   A. Jo asked 'Will Ed come?'   B. Jo asked whether Ed will come.
(12)   A. Max wondered 'Does she ever   B. Max wondered if she ever smiles.
       smile?'

(9)B is the report of Sue's imperative clause instruction. There is no doubt that the imperative contributes to the illocutionary point of this utterance – Hearer is intended to heed the instruction, see the discussion of (27)–(29) below. So, in (9)B the infinitive clause has the same illocutionary force as the direct speech in (9)A. Similarly, for the illocutionary forces of questioning in (10)A and (10)B, (11)A and (11)B, or wondering (self-questioning) in (12)A and (12)B.

This essay examines the properties of reports and the diagnostic value of illocutionary points in reports. §2 illustrates that indirect reports result from pragmatic enrichment in that X goes beyond Z's illocutionary point as sanctioned by the locution. §3 examines the fact that an accurate report faithfully re-presents the illocutionary point of the source utterance, though it may add to that. §4 investigates the effects of entailments, implicatures, and implicitures on reporting. §5 discusses the value of a report as a diagnostic for the illocutionary point of the source utterance. §6 Summarises and concludes the essay.

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[3]None of Wilson (1959), Quine (1960), nor Davidson (1984) specifically allow for this, but perhaps Dennet (1987) does.

[4]This was recognised in Allan (1986b, Vol. 2: 215ff), Allan (1986a), and elsewhere. A similar idea can be found in the work of Alessandro Capone since Capone (2010).

2   Indirect Reports Result from Pragmatic Enrichment

Under many circumstances (3), *Z complained about the terrible weather there*, is an appropriate report of (1), *It's never stopped raining since we arrived.* If (1) were uttered when Z was in a locality that had been undergoing severe drought it is possible that Z would not have been complaining and the weather would be the antithesis of terrible, in which case (3) might be an inaccurate or at least infelicitous report. I'll return to that shortly. First let's assume that Z was on a beach holiday and this was known or suspected by X. The illocutionary point of (1) is based on the standard illocutionary intention that 'Speaker reflexively intends the utterance of the clause to be recognized as a reason for Hearer to believe that Speaker has reason to believe that Φ' (Allan, 2006); notice Z's purported commitment to the truth of what he's said. Applying this definition to (1) we get (13), which is accurately reported in (2).

(13) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *It's never stopped raining since we arrived* to give X reason to believe that there has been almost continual rainfall in the locality where Z is currently situated since Z's arrival there.

   A speaker has an illocutionary intention to create a perlocutionary effect by means of a reflexive intention to have the hearer (addressees and ratified participants (Goffman, 1981: 131)) recognize this intention via an understanding of the locution and illocutionary point of the utterance. A speaker's reflexive intention towards the hearer is the intention to have the hearer recognize that when uttering U in context C, the speaker intends U to have a certain effect on the hearer partly caused by the hearer recognizing that the speaker has the intention to communicate with him or her by means of U.[5]

   (13) is unaffected by whether or not anyone thinks the continual rainfall a good or bad state of affairs, so if (3) is a felicitous report it must arise from X's assessment of the circumstances of Z's utterance and perhaps of Z's intention to inform her of an unwelcome state of affairs. In other words, X may be imposing her own interpretation on Z's circumstances, or she could be adopting his view based on additional cues from him such as tone of voice and/or other things Z said along with υ. The significance here is that if the term *indirect report* is to have any value it must be to refer to reports in which there is pragmatic enrichment. Pragmatic enrichment results from X going beyond Z's illocutionary point as sanctioned by the locution (cf. (2)) to additional inferences arising from the context of Z's utterance or some external context. Consider Nellie Wieland's example (adapted from Wieland, 2013: 395 to my participants).

(14) Z to X: My favourite *tapa* is *patatas bravas*.
(15) X to Y: Z said that his favorite *tapa* is the third item on your menu.

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[5]Reflexive intention was first recognized by Grice (1957) and has been revised by others, notably Recanati (1987). The speaker has a reflexive intention towards the hearer but not towards an overhearer (Allan, 1986a, 1986b).

If (15) is to be a felicitous report of (14), one must assume that 'patatas bravas' appears as the third item on Y's menu. (15) is an outlandish exploitation of the cooperative principle that would be unusual in language exchange between people other than philosophers or linguists; but it is nonetheless acceptable because it allows the illocutionary point of Z's utterance to be recovered by Y from X's locution plus the context of X's report.

Let's backtrack to reconsider the illocutionary points of (2) and (3) spelled out in (16) and (17) respectively.

(16) In (2) X reflexively intends utterance of the locution Z *said that it's never stopped raining since they arrived* to give Y to believe that Z gave X reason to believe that there has been almost continual rainfall in the locality where Z is currently situated since Z's arrival there.

By contrast:

(17) In (3) X reflexively intends utterance of the locution Z *complained about the terrible weather there* to give Y to believe that Z gave X reason to believe, or at least surmise, that Z had expressed feelings of discontent about the bad weather Z was experiencing in the locality where Z is currently situated.

Whereas (16) clearly reflects the illocutionary point of (1) as spelled out in (13) such that Z could not honestly dispute it, (17) offers instead X's reinterpretation of (1) in terms of what she takes to be the context of its utterance, and her report could be disputed by Z, e.g. by him responding *I wasn't complaining*, *I was just saying we had a bit of rain*. Alternatively Z might accept (3) as an accurate account of his perceived state of mind at the time of uttering (1).

What we see in (3) is a pragmatic enrichment of (1) such that the report almost amounts to commentary. It is X's re-presentation to Y of what X took Z's message to be, namely, continuous rain during a beach holiday implicates bad weather for a beach holiday and to make the report more vivid (sensational) X exaggerates from 'bad weather' to 'terrible weather'. A further implication is that such weather motivates discontent in the holiday-maker, who may therefore justifiably be said to be complaining about it if s/he draws attention to it.

Next, consider a peculiar case where a woman seemingly had an identity problem on (Australian) ABC News 24, 11th November, 2010 (www.youtube.com/watch?v=GEn1mffc).

(18) Virginia Trioli: Good morning, you're watching ABC News 24, I'm Michael Rowland.

Trioli was reading from the auto-cue intended for her male co-presenter and obviously not self-monitoring. Possible reports of (18) are the verbatim (19) without comment and the indirect (20) with X's comment included.

(19) Virginia Trioli said 'Good morning, you're watching ABC News 24, I'm Michael Rowland'.
(20) Virginia Trioli mistakenly said she was 'Michael Rowland'.

Some sort of comment seems to be required for a felicitous report since, if (21) is an acceptable report of (18), it has to be jocular because of the apparent contradiction – which of itself implies unspoken comment.

(21) Virginia Trioli is Michael Rowland.

We should compare (18) with, say, Trioli on ABC1 on 26/05/2013 (www.abc. net.au/siness/content/2013/s3767571.htm) where she identifies herself correctly.

(22) Virginia Trioli: Good morning, welcome to Inside Business. I'm Virginia Trioli.

It is appropriate to report this either verbatim or as in (23). However, (24) is inappropriate as a report of self-introduction. Although true, the indirect reports in (25) and (26) are pragmatically inappropriate: (25) because it misleadingly indicates that being the wife of Russell Skelton is somehow relevant to the program that she is introducing and (26) because reporter, X, is introducing extraneous content unless the context of the report was such that being the wife of Russell Skelton makes Trioli more readily identifiable – for example if addressee, Y, was familiar with Skelton but not Trioli.

(23) Virginia Trioli introduced herself.
(24) Virginia Trioli introduced Virginia Trioli.
(25) Virginia Trioli introduced the wife of Russell Skelton.
(26) The wife of Russell Skelton introduced herself.

What I have shown in the foregoing is that material introduced in an indirect report as a pragmatic enrichment must be strictly relevant to the matter being spoken of by the reporter.

3   Reports and Illocutionary Point

An accurate report ρ re-presents the illocutionary point of the source utterance υ. Thus, as we shall see, a report can function as a diagnostic of the illocutionary point of the source utterance.

Suppose X asks directions of Z who says, inter alia, (27).

(27) Turn left at the second set of traffic lights.

As they approach the second set of traffic lights X says (28) to Y.

(28) He said to turn left here.

(28) is an accurate report of (27). So is (29).

(29) He told us we need/have to turn left at these lights.

But because they have different illocutionary points from (27), none of (30)–(34) is an accurate report of it.

(30) He suggested we turn left here.
(31) He demanded we turn left at these lights.
(32) He ordered us to turn left here.
(33) He asked us to turn left at these lights.
(34) He persuaded us to turn left at these lights.

Let's consider (27) as the basis for (28)–(29). (27) is an instruction given in response to a request for directions; it is not, therefore, surprising that the primary illocutionary force of (27) is directive employing the default clause type for directives for which the standard illocutionary intention is that 'Speaker reflexively intends Hearer to take the utterance of the clause as a reason to do A' (Allan, 2006). Unfortunately, this turns out to be insufficiently explicit because, applied to (27), Z reflexively intends X (and Y) to take the utterance of (27) as a reason to turn left at the second set of traffic lights on whatever path they are pursuing at the time this instruction is relevant – something that will be contextually determined in readily predictable ways. However, it seems reasonable to argue that all of (30)–(34) also reveal Z's (reflexive) intention that X (and Y) take the source utterances to be reason to turn left at the second set of traffic lights. They differ from (28)–(29) in ascribing marked illocutions to Z that are not justified by (27) and the circumstances under which it was uttered. In order for (30) to be accurate, Z would need to have said something like (35)A–B.

(35) A. I suggest you turn left ...
      B. Why don't you turn left ...

The basis for (31) would need to have been, e.g. (36) (upper case indicates the main stress):

(36) You MUST turn left ... (as distinct from *Y'must turn LEFT* ...)

The basis for (32) would require a different situation of utterance than that described for (27), e.g. where there was no request from X, but Z instigated the giving of directions for his own benefit. (33) reports a request from Z. (34) reports an act of persuading which is entirely absent from (27) and the circumstances of its utterance.

There are also more problematic reports of (27):

(37) He advised us to turn left at these lights.
(38) He directed us to turn left here.

(37)–(38) are infelicitous reports of (27) because although the giving of directions in response to a request to do so has something in common with the giving of advice and also the issuing of a directive, to spell this out in a report goes beyond the constraints of accurate reporting. For instance if (37) were reported back to Z, he might very well respond with (39).

(39) I didn't (exactly) adVISE them to turn left at the second set of traffic lights; I
      told them they SHOULD turn left.

(38) is trickier because undoubtedly Z was giving directions in (27); on the other
hand, the verb 'directed' in (38) seems imply that Z commanded X (and Y) to
undertake an act: the giving of directions under the circumstances described for
the utterance in (27) is more advisory and less peremptory than *Z directs X to do A*.
Thus if (38) were reported back to Z, he might respond with something like (40).

(40) I didn't diRECT them to turn left at the second set of traffic lights, I told them
      that if they want to reach their goal, they SHOULD turn left there.

The foregoing discussion shows that the true illocutionary point of (27) is not
fully captured by 'Speaker reflexively intends Hearer to take the utterance of the
clause as a reason to do A'. This description needs to be elaborated into 'Speaker
reflexively intends Hearer to achieve the requested outcome by electing to take the
utterance as a reason to do A'. (41) makes this specific to (27).

(41) Z reflexively intends X (and Y) to achieve the requested outcome by electing
      to take Z's utterance of the locution *Turn left at the second set of traffic lights*
      as a reason to turn left at the second set of traffic lights they encounter.

This revision still omits an expectation arising from what may be variously called
the principle of charity, optimal relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1995), and Levinson's
Q-principle (Levinson, 2000): Z is recommending the most convenient route for
X to take. For instance, it may be that Z knows that X could have arrived at her
destination by turning right at the first set of traffic lights and taking the second left
and travelling straight ahead to pass through the second set of traffic lights, but this
would have involved an unnecessary deviation from the simplest path, so it would
have been uncooperative of Z to have recommended it unless, say, Z knew that the
road between the first and second set of traffic lights was blocked.

The reason that (28), *He said to turn left here*, is an appropriate report of (27) is
that in it X takes the locution in (27) to be the reason to turn left at the second set of
traffic lights they have encountered, as per (41). More specifically:

(42) X reflexively intends utterance of the locution *He said to turn left here* to be
      recognized as a reason for Y to believe that X has reason to believe that Z's
      uttering *Turn left at the second set of traffic lights* is reason to turn left at these
      second set of traffic lights.

Suppose that instead of (27), Z had uttered (43).

(43) If I were you I'd turn left at the second set of traffic lights.

The illocutionary point of (43) is sketched in (44).

(44) Z reflexively intends X (and Y) to achieve the requested outcome by electing
      to take Z's utterance of the locution *If I were you I'd turn left at the second
      set of traffic lights* as a reason to believe that X (and Y) should turn left at

the second set of traffic lights they encounter because that is what Z (says he) would do in order to arrive at their stated destination.

Problematically, all of (28), (29), (30), and (37) could be acceptable reports of (43). The reason that (28) is acceptable may be seen when comparing (45) with (42) and (44).

(45) X reflexively intends utterance of the locution *He said to turn left here* to be recognized as a reason for Y to believe that X has reason to believe that Z's uttering *If I were you I'd turn left at the second set of traffic lights* is reason to turn left at these second set of traffic lights because, according to Z, that's what he would do.

The reason that (30), *He suggested we turn left here*, is an appropriate report of (43) is that a suggestion is the putting forward of an opinion to be acted upon (see Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). The opinion put forward in (43) is that if Z were X he would act in a certain manner, namely turn left at the second set of traffic lights. Thus (46) captures the illocutionary point spelled out in (44).

(46) X reflexively intends utterance of the locution *He suggested we turn left here* to be recognized as a reason for Y to believe that X has reason to believe that in uttering *If I were you I'd turn left at the second set of traffic lights* Z was putting forward the opinion that to turn left at these second set of traffic lights would be a good way to achieve their goal.

And (37), *He advised us to turn left at these lights*, is an appropriate report of (43) because:

(47) X reflexively intends utterance of the locution *He advised us to turn left at these lights* to be recognized as a reason for Y to believe that X has reason to believe that in uttering *If I were you I'd turn left at the second set of traffic lights* Z was offering his advice as to the best course of action to undertake to achieve their goal, namely to turn left at these second set of traffic lights.

Again, the illocutionary point of (43) sketched in (44) forms the basis for (47).

In this section I have argued through discussion of (27)–(47) that an accurate and felicitous report ρ of source utterance υ must capture the illocutionary point in υ.

4   Reporting Entailments, Implicitures and Implicatures

All entailments, implicitures, and implicatures of a proposition within the utterance are communicated, giving rise to indirect (and occasionally unintended) illocutions: a speaker does not exactly *tell* the hearer these things, but *lets them be known*. For example, (48)A entails (48)B. Let's assume that Z utters (48)A as an out-of-the-blue bit of information, i.e. it is not a response to *What colour is John's new car?*

(48)   A. John's new car is red   B. John has a new car

The illocutionary point of (48)A is (49).

(49) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *John's new car is red* as a reason
      for X to believe (it is true) that John has got a new car which is red.

X can report this directly to Y as in (50).

(50) Z says John's new car is red.

X can also report (48)A as in (51) where the colour is ignored perhaps because it
is less relevant to Y than the fact that John has just acquired a new car.

(51) Z says John has got a new car.

This does not rely on pragmatic enrichment, so it is also a direct report. So what
about (52)–(53) with the semantic paraphrase of (48)A? These too are direct reports
because there is no pragmatic enrichment.

(52) Z says John's got a new car and it's red.
(53) Z says John's got this new car, which is red.

On the other hand, using (48)A as the source, there is pragmatic enrichment in
(54)–(55):

(54) Z says John's driving a new car.
(55) Z says John's bought a new car.

I said earlier that for the term *indirect report* to have any value it must be
used of reports in which there is pragmatic enrichment in that X goes beyond
Z's illocutionary point as sanctioned by the locution. If Z was speaking about a
matchbox-sized toy car or John was incapable of driving himself then (54) would
be false; therefore, if true, (54) augments the source with additional information. So
does (55), because it would be an inaccurate report if in (48)A John were a driver
for his boss, the car's owner. (54)–(55) are indirect reports not entailed by (48)A.

A report of *What he did was, he bought a car* entails *he bought a car*, which can
function as a direct report. However supplying a name or pronoun for a description
or replacing a description with a name or pronoun is pragmatic enrichment; but it is
pragmatic enrichment that does not go beyond Z's illocutionary point as sanctioned
by the locution. We saw an example of this in (28) as an accurate report of (27)
in which 'here' substitutes for the coreferent 'the second set of traffic lights'. For
another example, if Susan is Z's daughter and Y doesn't or may not know this
fact, then X's report of (56) in (57) arises from the co-reference of 'Susan' and
'[Z's] daughter' arises from the situation of utterance and is therefore built into Z's
locution in (56), so it is what Bach (1994a) would call an 'implicature' (Bach, 1994a,
1994b). Although it constitutes pragmatic enrichment, X does not go beyond Z's
illocutionary point as sanctioned by the locution and therefore (57) does not qualify
as an indirect report.

(56) Susan has just told me she's engaged.
(57) Z says his daughter has just got engaged.

Another instance of impliciture is where Z phones X from Liverpool and says *It's snowing*. X might turn from the phone to report this to Y as *It's snowing in Liverpool*. The apparent indirectness arises from the impliciture sanctioned by Z's locution, whose illocutionary point is to have X believe that it is snowing wherever it is that Z is located.

As a final example of reporting impliciture: suppose my wife and I have been invited to a wedding and my wife exclaims (58).

(58) I've got nothing to wear!

Clearly this is not a literal statement and the illocutionary point encompasses pragmatic enrichment via an impliciture.

(59) Z [my wife] reflexively intends utterance of the locution *I've got nothing to wear* to give X [me] to believe that Z believes she has nothing that she considers suitable for her to wear to the wedding to which she has been invited.

Once again reports like those in (60) and (61) do not go beyond the illocutionary point sanctioned by the locution in (58), though (61) spells out the impliciture.

(60) We've been invited to a wedding and my wife says she's got nothing to wear.
(61) My wife says she's got nothing suitable to wear to a wedding we've been invited to.

Whereas (60) and (61) only report the pragmatic enrichment implicit in (59), (62) goes further by picking up on the real reason utterances like (58) are made and thus adds X's assessment of it.

(62) My wife wants a new outfit to attend this wedding we've been invited to.

Whereas (60) and (61) are direct reports, (62) is indirect in that it goes beyond the locution and the illocutionary point elaborated in (59).

Finally, consider reports of implicatures. The difference between implicitures and implicatures is that the latter constitute additional propositions external to the locution but not the illocutionary point in what is said. Consider the illocutionary point of (63)Z, given in (64).

(63) X: I need to get some fish.
      Z: There's a supermarket down the hill.
(64) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *There's a supermarket down the hill* to have X believe that there is a supermarket down the hill where the fish X says she needs can most likely be bought.

If X were to later to report what Z had said to Y in terms of (65) it would not be an indirect report because she does not go beyond the illocutionary point of (63)Z.

(65) Z said there was a supermarket down the hill where I could buy some fish, but it was closed.

The additional clause 'it was closed' is not part of the (direct) report of what Z said, but a comment that constitutes part of the (direct) report on the whole situation. Consider (67) as a report of (66).

(66) Z to X: If you'll mow the lawn I'll give you the $10 you were asking for.
(67) X to Y: Z says if I don't mow the lawn he won't give me the $10 I need.

The illocutionary point of (66) is (68).

(68) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *If you'll mow the lawn I'll give you the $10 you were asking for* as a reason for X to believe that Z has (truly) stated a commitment to the future act of paying her the $10 she has asked him in exchange for her mowing the lawn.

In (66) there is an invited inference (van Canegem-Ardijns, 2010; Geis and Zwicky, 1971, inter alios) from 'if' to *if and only if*. In (68) this invited inference is captured by the notion of payment in exchange for service, i.e. the lawn must be mowed for the exchange to take place; if X fails to mow the lawn she will not get the $10. Thus, until the final clause, 'I need' (67) counts as a direct report. If this final clause were *that I asked him for* the whole of (67) would be a direct report. But it does not necessarily hold true that if one asks for something, one needs it – even though this will often be the case. Consequently, when X says '[that] I need' she is adding a perfectly plausible motivation for having asked Z for $10, but it nonetheless augments (66) and (68). So (67) is in fact an indirect report by the criteria established in this essay.

In this section 4, I have sought to refine the notions of directness in reporting when a report ρ takes account of entailments, implicitures and implicatures arising from source utterance υ. It turned out that they do not have any direct bearing on the criterion for distinguishing indirect from direct reports.

5   The Diagnostic Value of Illocutions in Reports

Even when it adds some additional information, a felicitous report accurately reflects the illocutionary point of the source utterance and so may be used as a diagnostic tool when trying to determine that illocutionary point. Consider (69)–(70):

(69) I promise to take Max to a movie on the weekend.
(70) Z said that he'll take Max to a movie on the weekend.

There is firm evidence that explicit performative clauses like the one in (69) have the primary illocution of a statement (declarative), see e.g. Allan (1986b, 2006), Bach (1975), Cohen (1964), Lewis (1970). Part of the evidence lies with reports

like that in (70).[6] In (69) Z states a commitment to a future action and, if 'I' = Z, that is what X reports in (70). The illocutionary point of (69) is elaborated in (71) and that of (70) in (72).

(71) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *I promise to take Max to a movie on the weekend* as a reason for X to believe (it is true) that Z commits to the future act of taking Max to a movie on the upcoming weekend.

(72) X reflexively intends utterance of the locution *Z said that he'll take Max to a movie on the weekend* as a reason for Y to believe that Z has (truly) stated a commitment to the future act of taking Max to a movie on the upcoming weekend.

An utterance of *Out*! can have the quite distinct illocutionary functions as recognized in the reports in (73) and (74).

(73) The umpire declared the ball out, though Serena Williams disputed it.

(74) Having chewed up the new cushion, the miscreant dog was expelled with a horrified yell of 'Out!'.

Interpreting these reports we reconstruct a declaration (verdictive) from a tennis umpire in (73) and a command (order) from the cushion owner in (74).

Similarly, reports of the imperatives in (75) and (77) show them to be of different kinds, the former commanding, (76), the latter invitational, (78).

(75) Get out of my house, Sonia.

(76) Z ordered Sonia out of his house.

(77) Come and sit down, Phoebe.

(78) Z invited Phoebe to seat herself.

More controversial is the argument in Allan (1986b, II: 216–218) disputing the widely accepted 'whimperative analysis' in Sadock (1970, 1974) which was based on the assumption that questions are not themselves requests. Allan claims that 'questions' are requests to tell, e.g. *What's your name*, *sir*? is a request for 'sir' to speak (or write or sign) his name. Any kind of directive may be met with a verbal response, e.g. Sonia might have responded to (75) by either the refusal *No I bloody well won't*! or the acceptance *Can't wait*, *you fucking asshole*. Many requests get a verbal response, too, though it is not obligatory; e.g. (79) may get an assent *Certainly* or refusal *Certainly not* which respond to (80) rather than (81).

(79) Will you come with me, sir?

(80) Z requests that 'sir' accompany him.

(81) Z asks 'sir' to tell him whether or not 'sir' will accompany him.

The report that should be sanctioned by the 'whimperative' hypothesis is the almost incoherent (82) which contrasts with the normal (83).

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[6]In a different context Cappelen and Lepore (1997: 280) write: 'The content of (i.e., the proposition expressed by) an utterance u of a sentence S is p iff ⌜It was said that p⌝ is a true report of u.'

(82) Z asked 'sir' to tell him whether or not 'sir' will accompany him and in doing
     so requested that 'sir' accompany him.
(83) Z asked/requested that 'sir' accompany him.

In Allan (1986a) I used reports as evidence against the claim in Clark & Carlson
(1982) for their so-called 'informative analysis', which I briefly sketch. There is
often more than one hearer, and the speaker may have different intentions toward (=
messages for) different hearers. All those who can reasonably consider themselves
hearers are expected, as part of the cooperative endeavour, to keep tabs on what is
said, so that if called on to participate in the discourse they may do so appropriately.

> [T]he speaker performs two types of illocutionary act with each utterance. One is the
> traditional kind, such as an assertion, promise or apology; this is directed at the addressees.
> The other, called an informative, is directed at all participants in the conversation – the
> addressees and third parties alike. It is intended to inform all of them jointly of the assertion,
> promise, or apology being directed at the addressees. (Clark & Carlson 1982: 332)

My point in this essay is not to challenge Clark and Carlson's informative analysis,
but to show the value of reports in trying to establish what is going on in the
utterances being reported. Suppose Z utters (84) to Jo, Sue, and X.

(84) Will the last one of you to go to bed please turn out the light?

The informative analysis postulates the following illocutions:

(85) Z informs Jo, Sue, and X that Z requests the last one of them to go to bed to
     please turn out the light.

The Clark and Carlson claim is that the primary illocution is an informative and
other illocutions are indirect; thus in (84) all hearers are informed of the request,
but for the last one of them to go to bed (suppose it is Sue) the illocutionary point
is that of a request; in their scenario, no request is made of Jo or X. The traditional
and simpler view is that in (84) the request is made of all three hearers because at
the time of utterance it is unknown who will eventually comply with the request
(perhaps none of them). This view is justified by a realistic true report of (84) in
(86). It would be logically correct but pragmatically inappropriate for any of Jo,
Sue, or X to report (87) or (88).

(86) Z asked that the last one of us to go to bed should turn out the light.
(87) Z asked me to turn out the light.
(88) Z informed us that the last one of us to go to bed should turn out the light.

In the light of the discussion of (84), consider the illocutionary force of the
placard in (89). The context is that in late May 2013 Ford Australia announced
that in October 2016 it will close its Australian manufacturing plants including one
in Geelong where the Ford plant is the major industry. The protester pictured in
(89) makes the ironic statement *the last person to leave Geelong please turn out the
lights*.

(89)

The placard is a hyperbolic play on the figurative meaning of *turning the lights out*, namely shutting the place down. An indirect report of (89) would be something like (90).

(90) Z is protesting against the Ford plant closure by implying that it will cause Geelong to be abandoned because there will no longer be any jobs in the city.

The illocutionary point of (89) is equally indirect and it calls on contextual knowledge of public affairs in order to be understood – which is common for protesting banners.

(91) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *the last person to leave Geelong please turn out the lights* to be a reason for the reader ('hearer') to believe that everyone will have to leave Geelong because there will no longer be any jobs in the city once Ford Australia shuts its plant down.

In this section I have demonstrated that felicitous reports enable us to identify the illocutionary point of the utterance reported on. Because the felicity of a report ρ is determined by the faithfulness with which it re-presents the content of source utterance υ there is an unavoidable circularity. The only justification for using a report ρ as a diagnostic for the illocutionary point of υ is an appeal to what is

variously called the principle of charity, the cooperative principle, or relevance: the default assumption is that an utterance is felicitous unless there is good reason to believe otherwise.

6   Concluding Remarks

In this essay I have established a criterion for distinguishing indirect from direct reports with the proviso that all reports are in some measure indirect in that they re-present the source utterance with transmutations of voice and expression and perhaps also medium and perspective. I have suggested that the term *indirect report* be limited to just those reports in which the reporter X pragmatically enriches source Z's illocutionary point as sanctioned by the locution, its entailments, implicitures and implicatures. However, there is a constraint that material introduced in an indirect report as a pragmatic enrichment must be strictly relevant to the matter being spoken of by the reporter. Let me reaffirm this point and point to problems with the restriction 'strictly relevant' by adapting an example from Cappelen and Lepore (1997): 293; assume that (92) is the source for (93) and (94):

(92) Z to X: Names are not rigid designators.
(93) X to Y: Z said that Kripke is wrong about names.
(94) X to Y: Z said Mill is wrong about names.

Both the pragmatically correct (93) and the false (94) are pragmatic enrichments of (92). (93) relies on the correct information that the theory of names as rigid designators was proposed by Saul Kripke (in Kripke, 1972) and is a proper indirect report of (92). The Millian theory of names (roughly that the meaning of a proper name is the bearer of that name, see Mill, 1843) is not evoked by Z in (92). The reason is that an accurate and felicitous report ρ of utterance υ must capture the illocutionary point in υ such that Z's message in υ can be correctly reconstructed from X's report ρ. Because the accuracy of the content of ρ is dependent on the illocutionary point of υ, and on the default assumption that an utterance is felicitous unless there is good reason to believe otherwise, a felicitous report ρ functions as a diagnostic for the illocutionary point of υ.

Let's briefly review these findings in the light of an utterance of (95).

(95) Z to X: I won easily.

Depending on the circumstances of utterance, (95) can be felicitously reported in various ways.

(96) Z said that he won easily.
(97) A. Z quite rightly said that he won easily.
      B. Z mistakenly believed that he won easily.
      C. Z lied that he won easily.
      D. Z boasted that he won easily.

(96) is a direct report. All of (97)A–D add X's perspective that pragmatically enriches the report and so they are indirect reports. All the reports include the illocutionary point of (95) – that of statement (with a truth value), even those with additional comment by X that might be judged to have a force such as *X **opined** that Z quite rightly/mistakenly/lied/boasted that Z won easily*.

Let's compare reports of (98) with those of (95).

(98) Did I win easily?

Given the right prosody this form of words could constitute a boastful rhetorical question, in which case its illocutionary force would be (99).

(99) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *Did I win easily*? to be recognized as asking X to agree with Z's presumption that Z won easily.

The direct report would be something like (100) and an indirect one (101).

(100) Z wanted me (X) to concur that he had undoubtedly won easily.
(101) Z boasted he'd won easily.

But (98) might also sound like a genuine question such that its illocutionary force is (102).

(102) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *Did I win easily* to be recognized as asking X whether or not Z won easily (on the presumption that X can respond appropriately to what is asked).

In this case, direct reports are (103)A–B.

 (103) A. Z didn't know whether or not he had won easily.
        B. Z wanted me (X) to tell him whether or not he'd had an easy win.

The first conjunct of (104) is also a direct report of (98) and (102) but the second conjunct augments the report with additional information that refutes the presumption in (98) and (102) that Z had won.

(104) Z asked me (X) whether he'd won easily and I had to tell him he'd been disqualified.

In going beyond the locution and illocutionary point of (98), the second conjunct in (104) appeals to relevant context or background information to refute Z's presupposition but this does not render the report indirect because it is simply additional information that reports on the situation and not on what Z had said.

I have also argued for the diagnostic value of report ρ in identifying the illocutionary point of the utterance reported on, υ, with a default assumption that the source utterance is felicitous. For one additional example, take (101), *Z boasted he'd won easily*, as a report of (98), *Did I win easily*? Assuming it is an accurate report of a felicitous utterance we must construe (98) as a boastful rhetorical question rather than a genuine polar question, which is a reasonable conclusion.

Hopefully, this essay has succeeded in revealing some new and worthwhile properties of reports, indirect reports, and illocutionary point.

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Reporting and Interpreting Intentions in Defamation Law

Fabrizio Macagno

The relationship between quoting and indirect reporting another's words is an issue that connects the field of pragmatics to the studies in the areas of rhetoric, argumentation, and law. There is nothing more effective for establishing someone's commitments than referring to his own words (Boller 1967). However, for dialectical or rhetorical purposes, a quote can be distorted, or reported incorrectly (Walton and Macagno 2011). Commitments to positions that are scandalous or hard to defend can be attributed to an individual in order to arouse attention, discredit him, or attack him. Clearly, when words become directly connected with reputation or courtroom battles, the problem of establishing what a quote means exceeds the boundaries of pragmatics and rhetoric and becomes a legal issue. Quotes or misquotes become relevant in law when they are used for specific argumentative purposes, as instruments of defamation or powerful tools for attacking the opponent's case or defending against accusations. However, such argumentative uses presuppose a fundamental interpretative step. In these cases, a quote is not a mere repetition of a portion of another's text or speech; it is the use of another's utterance to support the speaker's viewpoint. For this reason, every quote used argumentatively is the outcome of an interpretative process. A reporter can report directly or indirectly a public figure's words to accuse, criticize, or negatively evaluate him or his behavior explicitly or implicitly, or to trigger a specific reaction in the audience. When a defamatory quote is brought before the court, its meaning is interpreted and explicated or reported to support the accusation. Similarly, the same quote needs to go through the same interpretative process to rebut the charges. The fundamental problem is to describe and provide rules and mechanisms governing the

F. Macagno (✉)

ArgLab, IFILNOVA, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Av. de Berna 26C, Lisbon 1069-061, Portugal

e-mail: fabriziomacagno@hotmail.com

expression of the content of an utterance at various levels, from the propositional to the perlocutionary one (Solan and Tiersma 2005: 181–183).

In the United States, in defamation law quotation and interpretation are strictly interrelated. At common law, under the doctrine of neutral report, fair and accurate indirect reports are treated like literal quotes and protected against liability when they "accurately convey" the speaker's communicative intention (*Edwards v. National Audubon Society Inc.*, 556 F. 2d 113, at 120, 1977; *Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.* 497 U.S. 1, 1990). Quotations, paraphrases and indirect reports fall under the same problem of interpreting what the speaker intended to communicate. The interpretative passage from a quote to an indirect report, corresponding to making explicit the intended meaning, becomes thus crucial. The legal rules of interpretation are aimed at regulating specific strategies of misquotation, in which an individual's words are not necessarily distorted or misrepresented, but simply reported or paraphrased out of their co-text or communicative context. The principles of legal interpretation set out in *Masson* and other leading cases and the application thereof are extremely important for pragmatics and argumentation theory. To what extent is it possible to wrench a quote out of its context? How to represent and establish the relationship between an utterance, and its dialogical setting and co-text?

The various strategies used to misrepresent communicative intentions will be analyzed and used to underline the various dimensions of the contextual reconstruction of the meaning of an utterance. In particular, the issue of interpreting and distorting communicative intentions will be addressed from an argumentative and pragmatic perspective. Dialogical intentions will be represented as higher predicates, called dialogue-game predicates, which establish the role of the various speech acts performed by the interlocutors. On this view, the effectiveness of the strategies of misquotation (or misrepresentation of intentions) will be shown to be related with the conflict between presumptive interpretation and the non-presumptive one, which is drawn from an analysis of the relationship between an utterance and the higher predicate governing it.

1   Reporting Intentions

The passage from a quotation to an indirect report constitutes an extremely important issue for the semantic-pragmatic distinction, and the problem of semantic underdeterminacy and the reconstruction of what is said. Recanati (2004) underscored that what is said cannot be separated from the contextual information. On the contrary, "saying" is seen as a matter of intention recognition, in which primary pragmatic processes (as distinct from the ones leading to implicatures) intervene to determine the explicit, accessible meaning. In order to reconstruct the propositional form of a sentence, its logical form needs to be saturated, i.e., its indexicals need to be assigned semantic values. However, in addition to this linguistic process, other pragmatic ones intervene to determine the speaker's intention: free-enrichment

Fig. 1 What is said and what is communicated

(including specification of meaning), loosening (or widening of the conditions of application of a predicate, Carston 1997), and semantic transfer, generating ad-hoc concepts starting from the lexical concepts. In this sense, what is said becomes a component of what is communicated, together with what is implicated (Recanati 2004: 50) (Fig. 1).

What is said, or explicit meaning, needs to be determined based on the intuitions of the interlocutors in a normal conversational setting, i.e., as the outcome of an inferential process of reconstruction from textual and pragmatic indicators (Carston 2002). Such a process is usually treated in pragmatics under the label of explicature, i.e., an assumption by an utterance U that is a development of a logical form encoded by U (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 54). Explicatures fix and represent the speaker's communicative intention by reconstructing both what the speaker intends to communicate, and the illocutionary force of the utterance expressing it (Capone 2009: 73). In this sense, a truth-evaluable proposition results from combining the linguistic materials of the sentence with the pragmatic elements of the explicature, adding to the former the pragmatic assumptions drawn from the context (Burton-Roberts 2006).

In the passage from a quotation to its interpretation in an indirect report, the representation of the possible implications thereof becomes extremely problematic. The distinction between what is said and what is implicated cannot be traced at the explicit vs. implicit level, but at the level of commitments, focusing on the problem of the possibility of retracting them. The assertion of a sentence p, with the intention to "assert or convey p involves doing so with the intention of committing oneself to p" (Soames 2002: 73). While explicit meaning is reconstructed by taking into account the individual communicative intention, the implicated meaning can be more problematic. The commitment to implicit meaning is the result of a further process of reasoning, in which the reconstructed explicit meaning is processed by taking into account the conversational presumptions (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 162; Lascarides and Asher 1991: 57; Rescher 1977: 26) and the purpose of a communicative move within a dialogue game, namely the joint communicative purpose (Rocci 2005: 103; Walton and Macagno 2007; Macagno 2008). In this latter

case, the explicitly intended meaning may be claimed to conflict with the implicated one, so that the commitment to the latter is retracted. A leading case is *Bronston v. U.S.* (409 U.S. 359, 1973), in which, during the cross-examination phase the lawyer asked the witness a question, which was answered in a pragmatically ambiguous way:

Case 1: Interpretation and dialogue games – Implicatures

"Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?"
"A. No, sir."
"Q. Have you ever?"
"A. The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich."

From a communicative point of view, the witness is engaged in a dialogue game in which he has to answer the questions made by the examiner. In this case, the question allows for the possibility of a positive or negative reply, or a refusal to answer (which needs to be motivated) (Ducrot 1972: 20; Ducrot and Anscombre 1986: 88). The witness, in order to take part in the dialogue game, needs to comply with the rules of the joint dialogical game, and provide an answer falling in the possible options that the question opens up. Since the explicit meaning is irrelevant to the purpose of the joint dialogical activity, the examiner reconstructed the individual communicative intention in coherence with the joint one that he presumed to be in contradiction with the dialogical context. The implicature, namely that the witness never had a bank account in a Swiss bank, was the result of a wrongful reconstruction of the dialogue game (interpreted as an ordinary conversation and not as a cross-examination). In this case, the lawyer held the interlocutor committed to a proposition that the latter could retract. The witness did have a bank account in a Swiss bank, but he never said so explicitly, and was found to have testified truthfully.

The distinction between explicature and implicature, and the crucial problem of representing the speaker's communicative intention lies beneath the mechanism of indirect reports and the paraphrases of what is said. Indirect reports may have the practical purpose of eliminating opacity by providing the implicit assumptions needed to reconstruct the explicit meaning of an utterance (Wieland 2013). However, the reconstruction of the explicit meaning of quotations may lead to altering the possible implicit meaning that an interlocutor may draw from it (Capone 2013: 170). A mere paraphrase of a quote, consisting in the free replacement of co-extensive terms, can lead to, or make explicit, unwanted inferences, or cancel wanted ones, leading to a misrepresentation of the communicative intention (Capone 2010). The subtle line between explicature and manipulation in the interpretation of quotes goes back to the crucial issue of representing the intended communicative intention. If an indirect report risks manipulating the speaker's intention by reporting a different intention, a quote wrenched from its co-text and context can be explicated by attributing to it a meaning not intended by the speaker.

The problem of defining, representing, and reconstructing communicative intentions becomes fundamental for establishing when a quote has been correctly explicated or instead altered or manipulated. In particular, in defamation law these problems become extremely relevant, as they are directly linked with the

notions of falsity and liability. To what extent is it possible to explicate (or rather indirectly report) the meaning of a quotation without altering the speaker's intended commitments and his intentions? When does a literal quote become a misquotation, and when does a quote wrenched from its context lead to explicatures different from the intended ones (Capone 2013: 166)? The criteria that are used at common law in the United States can point out some fundamental aspects of interpretation.

2 Quotations and Meaning Reconstruction in Law

The line between explicating and altering the content of a quotation was traced in law by the leading federal case *Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.* (501 U.S. 496, 1991). The petitioner, the Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud Archives (Masson), granted a reporter of the New Yorker Magazine a series of interviews in which he narrated his experience at the archives. Based on these interviews, the reporter published an article in which he used quotation marks to attribute to him comments that, however, Masson had never made. Masson pressed charges and sued the magazine for defamation. The court had to establish to what extent a paraphrase of the speaker's words can be considered as deliberate falsification.

The first crucial issue was to take into account the relationship between the context and the quote. While in a legal discussion quotations are expected and required to report the speaker's actual words, in an ordinary context, such as a newspaper article, quotations may not "convey that the speaker actually said or wrote the quoted material" (*Masson v. New Yorker Magazine*, 501 U.S. 496, 1991), as writers "often use quotation marks, yet no reasonable reader would assume that such punctuation automatically implies the truth of the quoted material" (*Baker v. Los Angeles Examiner*, 42 Cal. 3d at 263, 1986). In journalistic writing if no clues or explicit declarations are provided, the reader is led to believing that the quotations are being used as a rhetorical device or to paraphrase the speaker's actual statements. However, verbatim repetition needs to be distinguished from rational interpretation: "the quotation marks indicate that the author is not interpreting the speaker's ambiguous statement, but is attempting to convey what the speaker said" (501 U.S. at 519). When quoting, a reporter is presumed to convey the communicative intention of the speaker, without altering the intended meaning. By focusing on the "substantial truth" of the quote, the Court overlooked the distinction between indirect and direct quote, basically equating a verbatim repetition of someone's words with an explicated quote (namely containing all the necessary explicatures) and an indirect report (De Grazia 1995: 282–283).

By considering the explicature of a speaker's statements as equivalent to a quotation, the court incurred a further problem, i.e., determining the boundaries of explicatures. The legal rationale used to draw these distinctions was the concept of "material alteration." As the Supreme Court maintained, "[. . .] when dealing with material that is portrayed as a quotation, we are to compare the quotation as published with the words the speaker actually said" (501 U.S. at 502); "<where>

the published quotation contains a material alteration of the meaning conveyed by the speaker, the published quotation is false" (Id. at 517). Such an intended meaning includes two fundamental dimensions in addition to the factual content: the illocutionary purpose and the possible inferences that can be drawn from an assertion.

The problem of establishing the illocutionary force of an utterance was dealt with in another important federal case, *Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.*, where the issue of determining whether a statement was defamatory or not depended on its pragmatic purpose, namely to convey an opinion or a statement of fact. In the aforementioned case, the two legally relevant pragmatic purposes are distinguished according to three standards (497 U.S. 17, 1990):

1. Is the language loose, figurative, or hyperbolic, which would negate the impression that the speaker was seriously maintaining the truth of the underlying facts?
2. Does the general tenor of the article negate the impression that the speaker was seriously maintaining the truth of the underlying fact?
3. Is the connotation sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false?

According to these standards, the reporter needs to convey the intended purpose of the utterance: he needs to establish whether the speaker intended to describe a state of affairs or to express a personal opinion on it. Whereas the pragmatic intention of expressing an opinion is protected by the First Amendment (freedom of speech and press), the one of uttering a statement of fact is not, and is actionable under the incremental harm doctrine. The reconstruction of the communicative intention is closely related with the retrieval and attribution of the possible inferences that can be drawn from an utterance and the reporting thereof. What are the boundaries of attributing intentions? The legal answer lies in the concept of commitment.

The first limit of attributing intention consists in the pragmatic ambiguity of an utterance. The quoter or the reporter cannot attribute to the speaker commitments that were merely suggested and covered by ambiguity. The speaker may have wanted to let the interlocutor draw possible inferences, without committing to them. Such a potential pragmatic ambiguity cannot be explicated without altering materially the speaker's statement, modifying his commitments (see Capone 2003). A leading example is the following misquotation in *Masson v. New Yorker Magazine* (501 U.S. at 504). The reporter quoted Masson as stating (emphasis added):

Case 2: Misquotation: "Place of sex, women, fun"

It was a beautiful house, but it was dark and somber and dead. Nothing ever went on there. I was the only person who ever came. I would have renovated it, opened it up, brought it to life. Maresfield Gardens would have been a center of scholarship, but it would also have been **a place of sex, women, fun**. It would have been like the change in The Wizard of Oz, from black-and-white into color.

Masson merely stated that "Freud's library alone is priceless," while in other passages he claimed that he and another analyst planned to have great parties at the Freud house and (in a context that may not even refer to Freud house activities) to

"pass women on to each other" (501 U.S. at 524, 525). Even if the reporter provided a possible interpretation of the speaker's words, such an interpretation was based on *possible* inferences and disambiguation. For this reason, the quote was considered by the Supreme Court as substantially different, reversing the opinion of the Court of Appeals.

The second limit concerns the possible inferences that a reasonable reader can draw from an utterance. The quoting or reporting party cannot attribute to the speaker more commitments than the ones intended. Not only does a material alteration consist in modifying the factual content of an assertion, but also the possible inferences, especially the evaluative ones. Even if a fabricated quotation or an indirect report asserts something that is true as a factual matter, the quote or the report may nonetheless "result in injury to reputation because the manner of expression or even the fact that the statement was made indicates a negative personal trait or an attitude the speaker does not hold" (Id. at 511). Using the terminology of Stevenson (1937, 1944), different statements may convey the same "descriptive" meaning, but different "emotive" one, i.e., they may trigger quite different inferences (Macagno and Walton 2014). A quote from the case *Masson v. New Yorker Magazine* was based on the different inferences, i.e., the intended and optimal inherent perlocutionary effects (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984: 25–28) of the petitioner's and the reporter's statements. Masson was quoted as stating in discussing an affair with a graduate student (501 U.S. at 503, emphasis added):

> Case 3: Misquotation: "Intellectual gigolo"
>
> Eissler and Anna Freud told me that they like me well enough "in my own room." They loved to hear from me what creeps and dolts analysts are. **I was like an intellectual gigolo** – you get your pleasure from him, but you don't take him out in public.

However, the actual statement was different (501 U.S. at 503, emphasis added):

> Case 3: "Intellectual gigolo" – Actual quote
>
> [Eissler and Anna Freud] felt, in a sense, I [Masson] was a private asset but a public liability. They like me when I was alone in their living room, and I could talk and chat and tell them the truth about things and they would tell me. But that I was, in a sense, **much too junior within the hierarchy of analysis, for these important training analysts to be caught dead with me**.

The quoted statement merely reported Kurt Eissler's and Anna Freud's opinions about petitioner, expressing no different factual contents or "descriptive meaning." For this reason, the district court claimed that "the descriptive term 'intellectual gigolo,' as used in this context, simply means that Masson's views were privately entertaining, but publicly embarrassing to Freud and Eissler." The Supreme Court took into account also the "emotive meaning" of the reported quote, expressing a value judgment that was absent in Masson's statement. In this sense, the New Yorker Magazine reported falsely an assessment, and for this reason the judgment was reversed, as the quoted and the original statement were materially different (501 U.S. 521): "fairly read, intellectual gigolo suggests someone who forsakes intellectual integrity in exchange for pecuniary or other gain." Even though the two statements conveyed the same descriptive meaning, the inferences and the value

judgment the quotation elicited were different, and this modification was held to be a material change, as it affected the evaluation of the speaker.

These rules of interpretation lead to a closely related issue, i.e., the contextual interpretation of an utterance, or rather the conflict between the effects the speaker intended his utterance to carry out and the ones that the utterance resulted in. At common law, the answer was found in the relationship between the quoted or reported speech, the reported context, and the average reader.

3 The Context, the Speaker, and the Limits of Interpreting Intentions

The aforementioned general federal rules establish how a linguistic "fact" (an utterance) cannot be modified by reporting it directly or indirectly, through a personal interpretation of the speaker's intention. Both the "descriptive" and the "emotive" meaning of an utterance need to be quoted or reported correctly, and the possible pragmatic ambiguities cannot be solved. In this way, the explicit intention of the speaker, i.e., his intended commitments, can be made explicit without possible alterations. However, what happens when the speaker claims to have intended his utterance to result in a specific effect (or inferences), which was not recognized? What happens when the recipient of an utterance interprets it contextually as carrying out effects that the speaker denies? The analysis of the context may risk blurring the line between *what* is said and *why* it has been said.

The relationship between a quote and its context is of fundamental importance in order to determine the defamatory, and thus communicative, intended effects of an utterance. A clear case in which the investigation of the context becomes relevant is *Webster v. Wilkins* (217 Ga. App. 194, 1995). A newspaper article quoted a professional basketball player Jacques Dominique Wilkins saying of his previous partner (Webster): "[Webster] gives women in general a bad name . . . I probably shouldn't say this, but I want to take that kid from her. She's unfit to have a kid." Based on this quote, Webster sued Wilkins and Cox for defamation, claiming that Wilkins' statement "unfit to have a kid" cannot be considered as an opinion, but a statement of fact. The plaintiff claimed that such an assertion is capable of being proved to be false because fitness as a parent could be determined by a court of law pursuant to criteria set forth by law. In this sense, Wilkins interpreted his own statement as, "<I said that> <Webster> is unfit <from a legal point of view> to have a child <as she does not meet the legal requirements for being considered to be fit to be a parent> ." The court, however, analyzed the statement in its original context, and calculated the possible effects that it could have meant to have on the average reader (217 Ga. App. 194, 195):

Case 4: Misquotation – "Unfit to have a kid"

Having reviewed Wilkins' statement in the context of the entire article, we cannot make this assumption. It is apparent from the context of the article that Wilkins did not use the phrase "unfit to have a kid" in its legal sense or as a legal conclusion, but used it only to

express his subjective opinion criticizing Webster's parental abilities. More importantly, the average reader would not have construed Wilkins' statement to be his legal conclusion that pursuant to OCGA §§ 19-7-1 and 19-7-4 Webster is an unfit parent. [. . .] Webster's reading of Wilkins' words is such a strained construction because the average reader, construing the statement in the context of the entire article, would have taken the statement for what it was, a subjective, hyperbolic opinion that cannot be proved to be true or false and that concerns a matter on which reasonable people might differ; i.e., Webster's parental capabilities.

The statement can be pragmatically disambiguated only by resorting to the original context in which it was uttered (a conversation between a basketball player and a reporter) and the possible interpretation thereof by an average reader (i.e., a person interested in gossip and sport news). If the context is taken into account, and the "emotive" meaning of a quote needs to be reported correctly or duly explicated, a further problem arises. What happens when a statement is quoted and explicated by taking into account the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it in the specific context in which it was uttered? This problem is directly connected with the issue of determining the distinction between the explicit and the implicit intentions (Raudenbush 1991: 1491).

In law, the reporting of a speaker's communicative intention needs to preserve the possible inferences, that is, "the natural and probable effect upon the mind of the average reader" (*MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co.*, 343 P.2d 36, 546, Cal. 1959). The explicature of a statement, in this sense, cannot go beyond the meaning that can be reasonably attributed by an ordinary reader or hearer, and cannot support the slanderous nature of a statement by resorting to the reasons underlying the judgment expressed by the speaker. A clear case is the interpretation of "disgrace" in *Bauer v. Murphy* (530 N.W.2d 1, Wis. Ct. App. 1995), where the plaintiff brought a defamation claim against the defendant based on an discussion between the two, in which Murphy called Bauer "a disgrace" to the team and the university, referring to an alleged relationship between Bauer and the team coach. The defamation claim was based on the interpretation of Murphy's quote (at 529):

> Case 5: Interpretation of "disgrace"
>
> Bauer next argues that Murphy's remark is slanderous per se because, when taken in the context of the discussion at the meeting, it "declare [d] that [Bauer] was guilty of disgraceful [sexual] acts with Coach Peckham," [. . .]. Bauer has not persuaded us that Murphy's "disgrace" remark imputed "serious sexual misconduct" to her within the meaning of the Restatement rule. Nor do we see that the context in which Murphy's remark was made adds a sexual misconduct gloss to her words. [. . .] As the court also recognized, however, [to be called "a disgrace"] is "equally discreditable as applied to all persons," id., and we believe in this case that the word does not reasonably carry with it an assertion of "unchastity" or sexual misconduct, whether taken in isolation or in the context in which the remark was made.

The indirect report (or interpretation) of the allegedly defamatory statement in this case repeats the quoted material and the context verbatim, making explicit the intentions of the speaker underlying the utterance. However, such an indirect report goes beyond the speaker's intentions, as it is not possible to attribute to the speaker commitments that he did not want to hold. For this reason, the classificatory

arguments that presumptively led Murphy to classifying Bauer as a "disgrace" cannot be reconstructed as an integral part of the explicit meaning. The explicature, and the speaker's intention, needs to be reconstructed according to what the uttered statement is intended to bring about on the communicative setting (in this case to attack directly and generally the interlocutor, leaving up to the hearers the retrieval of the reasons that led to such a discreditable classification).

In law the boundary between direct, verbatim quotations and paraphrases is blurred, and depending on the context it is possible to replace the exact quote with a report of the intended meaning of the speaker. Such an explicature of what the speaker said, however, needs to comply with clear contextual limits. A statement shall be interpreted according to what an average reader could understand from the utterance thereof in the specific context. In this sense, the speaker and the hearer are not privileged parties, but count only inasmuch as they represent the ordinary recipient of the message. For this reason, the speaker or the hearer cannot use the context to retrieve more or less commitments than the ones that an average reader would draw from the utterance. The interpreter of the intended meaning cannot "hunt for a strained construction in order to hold the words used as being defamatory" (*Webster v. Wilkins*, 217 Ga. App. 194, 195, 1995). The presumable or the possible speaker's communicative intention, not emerging from what he said, needs to be left out.

4   Ambiguity and Its Argumentative Uses

The strategic interpretation of a quote and the misrepresentation of the speaker's intentions in an indirect report are interrelated with the problems of ambiguity and its argumentative uses. Walton (1996: 262) distinguishes between three principal categories of ambiguity (Van Laar 2003): potential, actual, and imaginary ambiguity. Potential ambiguity concerns the logical form of a proposition, which results from a syntactic, inflective, or lexical ambiguity. Syntactic ambiguity arises from the possible ambiguity in the construction of the sentence, such as in the following case (adapted from Walton 1996: 113):

> I hope that you the enemy will slay.

This sentence can be interpreted or reported in two different ways, as "He hopes that you will slay the enemy" and "He hopes that the enemy will slay you." Inflective ambiguity can be considered as a kind of lexical ambiguity, based on two terms that are homographs but not homophones, such as in the following case:

> I resent that letter.

The sentence can be interpreted as "He said that he sent the letter again" or as "He said that he has a feeling of resentment towards the letter." The last type of potential ambiguity derives from the lexical ambiguity of a word (Engel 1980: 14), which has

been considered since Aristotle as the classical source of the fallacy of equivocation (*Sophistical Refutations* 165b29–30):

> Those who know grasp things; for it is those who know their letters who grasp what is dictated to them. For to grasp is homonymous; it is to understand by the use of knowledge, and also to acquire knowledge.

This type of ambiguity is related to the possible different definitions of a term, which can both occur in the same sentence.

Unlikely potential ambiguity, actual ambiguity and imaginary ambiguity concern the interpretation of a sentence in an utterance, i.e., a type of ambiguity that is pragmatic in nature (Jaszczolt 1999; Capone 2011). Actual ambiguity is generated by different contextual interpretations of the referents of indexical expressions. Aristotle analyzed the following case of ambiguity used in arguments as a source of equivocation (*Sophistical Refutations*, 166a1–5):

> 'The same man is both seated and standing and he is both sick and in health: for it is he who stood up who is standing, and he who is recovering who is in health: but it is the seated man who stood up, and the sick man who was recovering'. For 'The sick man does so and so', or 'has so and so done to him' is not single in meaning: sometimes it means 'the man who is sick or is seated now', sometimes 'the man who was sick formerly.'

Imaginary ambiguity can be distinguished in illocutionary and perlocutionary ambiguity, depending on the type of act that is subject to distinct interpretations. Illocutionary ambiguity arises when an utterance can be interpreted as instantiating two different possible speech acts (Walton 2006: 289), such as in the following case (Solan and Tiersma 2005: 184–185):

> Putnam: Do you have a suggestion for me?
> Crandall: Yes. I have a suggestion for you. Raise your goddamn fares twenty percent. I'll raise mine the next morning.

The interlocutors in this conversation are the presidents of two American airline companies, and are discussing about the possibility of monopolizing the airline business in the Dallas–Fort Worth area. However, what is Crandall saying? Is Crandall *requesting* Putnam to violate the antitrust laws setting prices? Or is this utterance a simple suggestion, which would not be a criminal offence? In this case, Crandall wants to say that he wants Putnam to raise the prices, in order to obtain a benefit. For this reason, this speech act labeled as a "suggestion" is in fact a request (Solan and Tiersma 2005: 185).

A speech act can be also ambiguous at a perlocutionary level, when the inherent effect (distinct from the consecutive one, corresponding to the optimal effect of the act) of the illocutionary act on the interlocutor can be misinterpreted. For example the following assertion (Blair Edlow 1977: 11) can be used to elicit different types of responses:

> I am in pain

This utterance is illocutionary unambiguous, but at a perlocutionary level it can be interpreted as aimed at arising empathy, informing the interlocutor (He said that he

feels pain), or requesting help (He said that he is in trouble and wants help). The different types of ambiguity can be summarized as follows:

Propositional ambiguity (potential ambiguity)			
Lexical	*Syntactic*	*Intonational*	
Homographs	Different definitions	Different syntactic construction	Different deep structures manifested by different intonations
Pragmatic ambiguity			
Actual ambiguity	**Imaginary ambiguity**		
Propositional	*Illocutionary*	*Perlocutionary*	

The different types of ambiguity correspond to various types of equivocation (Walton 1996, 2000; Copi and Cohen 1990: 115). From an argumentative point of view, ambiguity can be a powerful instrument when the speaker through it can alter the interlocutor's commitments (Walton and Macagno 2010, 2011). The speaker can exploit the possible interpretation of a proposition according to two distinct logical forms (resulting in the so-called *quaternion terminorum*), or take advantage of the possibility of interpreting in various ways the interlocutor's utterance. However, there is a clear difference between exploiting argumentatively an already existing ambiguity of a proposition, and introducing ambiguity. In this latter case, the speaker chooses to act non-cooperatively or uncooperatively (Macagno and Damele 2013; Paglieri 2007; Oswald and Lewinski 2013) in order to alter a viewpoint for dialectical purposes. The speaker can interpret or report the interlocutor's utterance in a distorted way in order to attack him or defeat his standpoint, or to provide a reading of his own utterance that can be used for defending himself or countering the interlocutor's attacks. Misrepresentation of intentions is an instrument for introducing pragmatic ambiguity by altering the context or the co-text in which the quote occurs, or by reporting indirectly an altered communicative intention. In the section below, the various types of pragmatic ambiguity will be analyzed as different types of strategies of meaning misrepresentation in law, used for both attacking and defensive purposes.

5   Strategies for Altering and Reporting Intentions

In defamation law, the subtlest strategies of misrepresenting the speaker's intentions concern the boundaries between interpretation and explicit meaning, i.e., the limits of explicatures. In particular, the goal of the author of a misquotation is to increase the burden of the interlocutor (the potential plaintiff) of proving that the original statement had a different meaning. While ambiguity at a propositional level can be easily assessed by looking at the propositional form of the quoted material, pragmatic ambiguity can be more complex to analyze, as the whole co-text, context,

and the dialogical setting need to be taken into account. As set out in *Ollman* v. *Evans* (242 U. S. App. D. C. 301, 1984), other factors shall be considered for the interpretation of a statement, in addition to the specific language used: the general context of the statement, and the broader context in which the statement appeared. Moreover, the possibility of proving the "material" or "substantial" change (see Kaltenbach 1992: 775) of the meaning of an utterance is directly linked with the issue of actual malice and liability in case of defense against possible lawsuits. Only reckless disregard for truth or falsity can prove malice, while a defendant cannot be condemned for minor inaccuracies.

By exploiting pragmatic ambiguity, a reporter can make more complex the task of showing falsity, as a statement pragmatically misquoted or misreported can be shown to be pragmatically ambiguous, or at least potentially interpretable in different ways. The same tactic can be used by the party acting as a plaintiff. By wrenching an apparently defamatory quote from its context and omitting the dialogical setting, the plaintiff can establish a *prima-facie* case for defamation, shifting the burden of disproving the alleged intention onto the defendant. The strategies used for pragmatically misrepresenting an utterance can be divided in three types, which rely respectively on the propositional, the illocutionary, and the perlocutionary ambiguity of an utterance.

5.1 Propositional Pragmatic Ambiguity

A clear case of propositional pragmatic ambiguity is *Price v. Stossel* (620 F.3d 992, 2010). The plaintiff, Dr. Frederick Price, an evangelic minister, was quoted in a clip broadcasted by the American Broadcasting Companies as having claimed the following during a sermon on the issue of lack of faith:

> Case 6: Misquotation and indexicals – Interpreting "I"
>
> I live in a 25-room mansion. I have my own $6 million yacht. I have my own private jet, and I have my own helicopter, and I have seven luxury automobiles.

ABC used this quote in a program on the financial openness of Christian groups, criticizing them for not revealing how they spent donations. The problem with this quote is twofold. On the one hand, it reports true facts, as Price's wealth was in fact substantial. On the other hand, the quote, taken out of context, suggested that Price was boasting about his own wealth, while in the original sermon Price was telling a parable, "speaking from the perspective of a hypothetical person who, though wealthy, was spiritually unfulfilled" (*Price v. Stossel*, 620 F.3d 992. 2010). The problem of falsity becomes in this case complex to assess, and the district court dismissed it, considering the truth of the facts reported (620 F.3d 992, 12701) and that the quote was in fact exact. The court of appeals, however, followed the rule set out in Masson, claiming that falsity needs to be assessed by considering the correspondence between the quote and the original statement. The ABC provided an accurate quote, but out of context, and "an exact quotation out of context can

distort meaning, although the speaker did use each reported word" (*Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.*, 501 U.S. at 515). The logical form of the statement is not ambiguous, but by not providing the needed explicature and by wrenching the quote from its context, the reporter exploited the presumptive interpretation of its propositional content (Bezuidenhout 1997; Jaszczolt 1999; Capone 2011). This utterance, when transferred to an indirect report (i.e., interpreted) or integrated through the needed explicatures, is reconstructed presumptively by attributing to the pronoun "I" the most common reference, i.e., the speaker ("Price said that he lives in . . . "). By omitting the more specific context, in which "I" is interpreted attributively as referring to a hypothetical person ("Price said that a person living in . . . "), the reporter reported the utterance as claiming that Price was boasting about his wealth. As the Court of Appeals found, considering the purpose of the statement and the pragmatic interpretation thereof, Price could prove actual malice.

Propositional pragmatic ambiguity can be used in the journalistic style to attract attention in the headline, providing a pragmatically ambiguous statement that can be presumptively reconstructed in a fashion that is later corrected by the rest of the article. However, the boundary between falsity and strategic ambiguity is sometimes very thin, especially when the reputation of a public figure is at stake, and the potentially defamatory words are attributed to someone else than the reporter. To what extent is it possible to suggest a false piece of news that can catch a reader's interest? A famous case was debated during the course of the criminal trial of O.J. Simpson, concerning Mr. "Kato" Kaelin, the houseguest at Simpson's estate. The National Examiner, a weekly newspaper published by Globe Communications Corporation, featured the following headline on its cover (*Kaelin v. Globe Communications Corp.*, 162 F.3 d 1036, 9th Cir., 1998):

> Case 7: Misquotation and indexicals – Interpreting "it"
>
> COPS THINK KATO DID IT!
>   he fears they want him for perjury, say pals.

This statement is pragmatically ambiguous, as the indirect reports of the police's and the friends' beliefs are apparently not connected (Siegel 2014: 79–80). For this reason the pronoun "it" could refer to the murders that O.J. Simpson was accused of, or the crime of perjury mentioned in the line below (162 F.3d 1036):

> The first-"COPS THINK KATO DID IT!"-states what the cops supposedly think. The second, "he fears they want him for perjury, say pals"-is what Kato's pals supposedly said. These two sentences express two different thoughts and are not mutually exclusive.

The headline was disambiguated only on page 17 of the newspaper, where the cover headline was explained indicating that Kato's friends are worried that the policemen are desperately looking for a way to put Kato behind bars for perjury. The problem with the cover headline is what an average reader could think in the context of the O.J. Simpson's trial for murder in which Kato was involved. The defendants interpreted the utterance within the co-text of the publication, showing that it was later explained in the article. However, the court took into account the broadest communicative context in which the headline appeared, i.e., among the headlines of other journals, since the front page of the tabloid paper is what the paper is

sold on, not what's inside it. For this reason, a reasonable reader is presumed to interpret the headline as referring to the murders, and for this reason the statement was considered as defamatory.

5.2   Illocutionary Pragmatic Ambiguity

The second type of pragmatic ambiguity that can be exploited for the purposes of misquotation is illocutionary ambiguity. According to the rule set out in *Masson*, in order to establish falsity it is necessary to determine whether there is "difference in effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced" (501 U.S. at 516–17). The problem with reporting intentions is that literal meaning is subject to different interpretations, depending on the intention of the speaker in a specific dialogical setting. In order to establish the individual intention, it is necessary to look at the dialogical context and the joint communicative purpose. By distorting, omitting, or misrepresenting the latter, it is possible to misquote a statement without altering its literal meaning, but only its illocutionary effect. This strategy can be used for both the purpose of pressing a charge of defamation and rejecting it.

As mentioned above, in order to interpret a quote it is necessary to consider not only the words used, but the communicative intention of the speaker, which can be drawn from the co-text and the context of dialogue. For attacking purposes, a quote can be taken out of its dialogical setting, so that a *prima-facie* defamatory statement is assessed without considering the possible intention with which it has been uttered. A clear example of the relationship between interpretation and dialogical intentions is *MacElree v. Philadelphia Newspaper, Inc.*. Further to an altercation at Lincoln University, Philadelphia Newspaper, Inc. published an article in which a quote by the university attorney was reported, calling MacElree (then the Chester County District Attorney) "the David Duke of Chester County" (437 Pa. Super. 598, at 601 1994):

> Case 8: Interpretation of metaphors
>
> Writing to a local newspaper, [University President Siara] Sudarkasa questioned remarks by the Chester County district attorney that one of the New Yorkers had been stabbed. When D.A. James MacElree replied with quotations from police reports, the university's lawyer, Richard Glanton, accused him of electioneering — "the David Duke of Chester County running for office by attacking Lincoln."

According to the plaintiff, the comparison was a statement of fact, which was explained (or rather reported) as follows: Glanton stated that MacElree was "a white supremacist, white separatist, racist zealot with neo-Nazi beliefs and practices." The plaintiff reported the statement explicating its meaning including the possible inferences that could be drawn from it. However, the court reasoned taking into account the context of dialogue reported by the newspaper, and the ambiguity of a metaphor (Macagno and Zavatta 2014). The Court noted that the plaintiff

took the quote out of the context of the article, in which the dialogical context (a quarrel between MacElree and Glanton) was clearly reported. In such a context, a heated discussion, the purpose of the speaker was merely to "give vent to insult" (see also *Greenbelt Pub. Assn. v. Bresler,* 398 U.S. 6, 1970). For this reason, the statement could be interpreted by an average reader as merely reporting an opinion ("Glanton name-called MacElree, comparing him with David Duke"). According to the provisions of law governing the analysis of the context of alleged defamatory statements (Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 566 comment e.), "a certain amount of vulgar name-calling is frequently resorted to by angry people without any real intent to make a defamatory assertion." The utterance, taken in its dialogical context, was interpreted and explained as amounting to an attack in a quarrel, bearing no defamatory intentions.

The interpretation of an utterance taken out of its dialogical context can be used as a powerful defensive strategy. In the leading famous case *Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.* (497 U.S. 1, 1990), the defendants managed to show that a *prima-facie* defamatory statement was in fact a mere opinion by selecting what counted as the relevant context. The case concerned a testimony given by the coach of the wrestling team Maple Heights, Mr. Milkovich, further to an altercation ended up in court. A columnist of the Lorain Journal Co. commented on the testimony in an article entitled "Maple beat the law with the big lie," using the following words (497 U.S. 1, at 5):

Case 9: Interpretation of the pragmatic purpose: fact or opinion

Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth. [. . .] But they got away with it. [. . .] Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learning from their high school administrators and coaches? I think not.

Milkovich accused the journal of defamation, as the journal reported an alleged false fact. The defendants rejected the accusation using a twofold strategy. On the one hand, they interpreted the disputed statement, "Anyone who attended the meet, [. . .] knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing" as indirectly reporting an opinion of the attendants, which could not be verified. On the other hand, they interpreted the statement within its broader context. Since "the article appeared on a sports page, a traditional haven for cajoling, invective, and hyperbole, the article would probably be construed as opinion." (497 U.S. 1, at 10).

However, the Supreme Court rejected both claims. Since the newspaper reported a verifiable fact, the statement needs to be considered as factual, and in this specific case as false. Moreover, the Court noticed that the "broader context" was limited to the type of publication, and did not take into account the actual context and co-text, namely the whole tenor of the article, and the presumptive interpretation that it could trigger. The Supreme Court analyzed the statement as a part of a communication to an average reader, and calculated the possible conclusions that can be drawn from it. Since the article never negated or tried to negate the impression that the writer

held facts supporting the opinion that Milkovich lied, the reporter's statement needs to be read as a false statement of fact (497 U.S. 1, at 19).

5.3   Perlocutionary Ambiguity

The problem of establishing the meaning of a speech act and its illocutionary force (to express a description of a state of affairs or to attack or praise the interlocutor) needs to be distinguished from a subtler issue, the intended perlocutionary effects that a statement can have on the audience. A statement of fact can be used for different purposes, i.e., to elicit directly different reactions. According to the law, a quote needs to be interpreted according to its intended effects, encompassing the perlocutionary effects that a statement is directly intended to produce on the hearer (believing in what the statement says; despising the individual attacked, etc.). A quote is regarded as false not only when its propositional content or its illocutionary force is altered, but also when the speaker has intended his assertion to produce an effect different from the one that has been wrongfully attributed to it.

A famous case of manipulation of the perlocutionary effects of an assertion is the lawsuit *Sherrod v. Breitbart* (case no. 000157 11, District of Columbia 2011). The complaint stems from a March 2010 speech that Ms. Sherrod, an African American former Georgia state director of rural development for the United States Department of Agriculture, gave to the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People), and the defendants' subsequent treatment of that speech. Breitbart posted an edited video of Sherrod's speech along with slides alleging that Sherrod carried out her USDA duties "through the prism of race and class distinctions," pointing out that her words elicited racial reactions in the audience. After the publication of the video, Sherrod was asked to leave her job because of the racist claims and ensuing media uproar. The excerpted video contained the following language (emphasis added)[1]:

Case 10: Interpretation of the perlocutionary purpose

The first time I was faced with having to help a white farmer save his farm, [. . .] he was taking all that time trying to **show me he was superior to me, was I was trying to decide just how much help I was going to give him**. [audience chuckled] I was struggling with the fact that so many black people have lost their farmland, and here I was faced with having to help a white person save their land. So, **I didn't give him the full force of what I could do**. I did enough so that when he — I — I assumed the Department of Agriculture had sent him to me, either that or the — or the Georgia Department of Agriculture. And he needed to go back and report that I did try to help him. [. . .] So I figured if I **take him to one of them that his own kind would take care of him**. That's when it was revealed to me that, ya'll, it's about poor versus those who have, and not so much about white — it is about white and black, but it's not — you know, it opened my eyes, 'cause I took him to one of his own . . .

The video was posted on a website addressing the debate on racial discrimination within the Tea Party and the NAACP. In this context, considering Breitbart's comments and his insinuation that the speech was received with applause by the audience, the excerpt sounded as clearly intended to convey a racial message, a personal story of discrimination. However, the post omitted the whole co-text and, more importantly, the intended effect that Sherrod wanted to elicit. Sherrod's purpose was to tell the audience how she changed her commitment to help black people, and decided to commit instead to the struggle against poverty. Her story was one of redemption from old resentments for the racial discriminations that she and her family suffered from since she was a kid. In addition to making clear later in the video that she helped the farmer as much as she could, she introduced her narration with the following words, describing her internal struggle when she was appointed as State Director of Rural Development:

Case 11: Dialogical context

But when I . . . made the commitment years ago I didn't know how — I didn't . . . I prayed about it that night and as our house filled with people I was back in one of the bedrooms praying and asking God to show me what I could do. I didn't have — the path wasn't laid out that night. [. . .]. And young people I just want you to know that when you're true to what God wants you to do the path just opens up — and things just come to you, you know. God is good — I can tell you that. When I made that commitment, I was making that commitment to black people — and to black people only. But, you know God will show you things and He'll put things in your path so that — that you realize that the struggle is really about poor people, you know.

The intended perlocutionary effect was to tell to the audience an almost religious experience on discrimination and poverty, and show them where the real problem was.[2] However, by wrenching the quote from its original context, Breitbart turned this intended purpose into a racist story.

6 Presumptive and Systematic Reasoning in Reporting Intentions

The rules used at common law in the United States for interpreting, explicating, and reporting quotations bring to light the essential relationship between the pragmatic purpose of an utterance and its meaning. The pragmatic goal, in particular, is reconstructed through the co-text and the context, which can reveal the speaker's communicative intentions. The complexity of the process of retrieving communicative intentions emerges from the strategies of reporting intentions, which are used by newspapers for proving a specific point, or, in a court of law, for defensive or attacking purposes. In particular, the most problematic and controversial cases are represented by pragmatic ambiguity, in which a different intention is attributed to

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[2]As a matter of fact, the intended effect was clearly perceived by the audience, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/frame_game/2010/07/amen_canard.html

the speaker by wrenching his statement from its dialogical context. This strategy for introducing ambiguity becomes relevant for the fields of pragmatics and argumentation theory, as it is strictly connected with the problem of representing intentions. In particular, the creation of ambiguity at a pragmatic level is grounded on a conflict between the presumptive interpretation of a speech act, and the non-heuristic one resulting from the analysis of its dialogical function (Macagno 2012; Macagno and Walton 2013). The process of interpretation of a speech act, or rather the explicative passage from a quote to an indirect report, needs to be described by accounting for the conflict between the presumptive and the systematic reasoning underlying meaning reconstruction. To this purpose, it can be useful to combine the studies in pragmatics with the insights from argumentation theory.

6.1   Indirectly Reporting: Individual Intentions

In argumentation theory, a speech act is regarded as a specific verbal act within an interaction, which can be a discourse or a dialogue. For this reason, it can be also referred to as a discourse unit when it is part of an act complex (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984: 34) or a dialogue move when part of a dialogue. On this perspective, communicative intentions are modeled as argumentative relations between speech acts and their conversational setting. A discourse move cannot be a "disconnected remark" (Grice 1975: 45) but rather an effort to reach a common dialogical purpose. For this reason, every speech act needs to be conceived as a move grounded on previous conditions (the co-text and the context), and aimed at achieving a specific dialogical purpose, i.e., a specific dialogical effect onto the interlocutor. Such effects can be defined both in dialectical terms as the limitation of the paradigm of an interlocutor's possible replies (Ducrot 1972; Macagno and Walton 2014, Ch. 7), and in dialogical terms as the intended, minimal and optimal, perlocutionary effects onto the hearer (Raudenbush 1991: 1463–1465).

This twofold relationship between a speech act, its co-text and context, and the further moves that it allows and leads to can be represented as an abstract pragmatic predicate called "rhetorical predicate" (Grimes 1975: 209), "coherence relation" (Hobbs 1979: 68; Hobbs 1985), or connective predicate (Crothers 1979; Rigotti 2005). Connective predicates can be conceived as a representation of the speaker's communicative intention, as it can be reconstructed from a text. Inasmuch as a predicate, it imposes a set of coherence conditions (or pragmatic presuppositions, see Vanderveken 2002: 47; Bach 2003: 163; Kempson 1973) on its arguments, i.e., the previous and the subsequent dialogue moves.

The idea of analyzing a speech act in its dialogical context allows one to reconstruct its permissible inferences and evaluate its interpretation, or its indirect report. For instance let us consider the following explicature of the aforementioned case 3 above:

   I. Masson said: "I was a private asset but a public liability."

This quote was interpreted (reported) as follows:

  I'. (A) Masson said that he was an intellectual gigolo.

The problem that this interpretation arises is that it can be justified (as it was) based on the possibility of drawing from it a non-defamatory inference:

  I". <Therefore, (B) his views were privately entertaining, but publicly embarrassing.>

This relationship between the two moves (A and the implicit one, B) consists in an argument from classification based on a classificatory principle (Walton, Reed and Macagno 2008; Walton and Macagno 2009, Macagno and Walton 2014) aimed at supporting a value judgment on the subject. An "intellectual gigolo" is commonly defined as a person who forsakes intellectual integrity in exchange for pecuniary or other gain. For this reason, the most common and direct evaluative inference would support a judgment on the dishonesty of the subject's intellectual behavior (which we can refer to as B'), rather than one on the social acceptability of his views. However, given the implicit nature of the conclusion, the reconstruction of the connective predicate becomes more complex. In this case, it is necessary to reconstruct the whole context (indicated as A^{-1}) and analyze and assess the possible alternatives, excluding the less reasonable ones:

  I"'. (A^{-1}) Masson said that they loved to hear from him what creeps and dolts analysts are. (A) Masson said that he was an intellectual gigolo. <Therefore, (B) his views were privately entertaining, but publicly embarrassing.>

In this case, A^{-1} specifies the meaning of the classification mentioned in A, pointing out that Masson was classified as an intellectual gigolo from a professional point of view. The epithet needs to be taken literally, as he revealed in breach of the professional code of conduct details concerning his colleagues that were entertaining, but harmful to their reputation. In this sense, the conclusion B that is drawn from the previous moves is unsupported by the meaning of "intellectual gigolo" that can be reconstructed from the context and that is commonly shared. While the features of being "entertaining" and "embarrassing" constitute respectively a feature of the concept of "gigolo" and a possible inference that can be drawn from it, the fundamental characteristic of "forsaking integrity for gain" (pointed out in A^{-1} and preserved in B') is lost. For this reason, in comparing B with B's for the purpose of assessing the implicit communicative intention of A, B needs to be considered as less supported by the co-textual and contextual information than B'.

6.2 Indirectly Reporting: Joint Intentions

The idea of modeling relevance relations as argumentative links between the various moves allows one to analyze the felicity of a possible continuation of a dialogue or conclusion that can be drawn from a speech act in terms of argumentative

reasonableness (Macagno and Damele 2013; Walton et al. 2008). However, the idea of representing intentions as predicates leads to the problem of representing joint intentions, i.e., the shared purpose in an interaction. Connective predicates represent the individual dialogical goal in a communicative exchange (Rocci 2005: 103). However, any individual intention in communication is formed within an interaction with interlocutors or an audience, i.e., a joint activity in which different individual goals need to adapt to and be coherent with a joint purpose (Rocci 2005: 104–106). This joint purpose can be imagined as a higher connective predicate, a dialogue-game predicates (Rocci 2005: 106; Walton and Macagno 2007) connecting the speech acts of a dialogue, and the individual communicative goals, with the purpose of a joint collaborative verbal activity (Grice 1975: 45; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 72). In this sense, the abstract higher predicate imposes his conditions on each speech act (Grosz and Sidnert 1986: 178; Walton 1989: 68). The text is thus thought of as a hierarchy of predicates connecting discourse units.

As every speech act has to provide a contribution to the achievement of a common goal, it must comply with specific requirements, namely the quality and the quantity of the provided contribution, its relation with what has been said before and the conversation goal, as well as the manner in which it is issued. The listener expects the received contribution to be meaningful and compliant with the dialogue game predicate, and triggers an interpretative reasoning aimed at retrieving the speaker's intention. If the presumptive meaning does not respect the requirements of the predicate, the listener begins to look for an alternative interpretation of speaker's intention (Macagno and Walton 2013, 2014).

Depending on the type of dialogue game, the dialogue-game predicate will impose different conditions on its arguments, which will guide also the process of interpretation. For example, we consider the following statement, uttered in the context of a heated discussion (*Greenbelt Pub. Assn. v. Bresler*, 398 U.S. 6, 1970):

II. Mr. Bresler is blackmailing the city council of Greenbelt.

The speaker uttered such words that were later indirectly reported by a local newspaper as follows (at 7):

II'. Various citizens had characterized respondent's negotiating position as "blackmail."

Mr. Bresler pressed charges for defamation, indirectly reporting the newspaper indirect quotation and explicating it as follows (at 7):

II". The newspaper published a false statement claiming that I have committed the crime of blackmail.

Bresler interpreted the citizens' statement (and the newspaper's indirect report) as an accusation of a crime, aimed at informing the audience of his alleged extortion by threat. Bresler disregarded the context in which the statement was made, which was carefully reported by the newspaper, that is, a heated discussion that can be represented as a quarrel, aimed at giving vent to insults and emotions. In such a dialogical condition, the statement needs to be read as having a purpose (insulting,

Fig. 2 Dialogue-game predicate and connective predicate

namely expressing a negative opinion on Mr. Bresler) different from the one that would be commonly attributed to it in a dialogue aimed at exchanging information. The relationship between the dialogue game predicate and the interpretation of the individual communicative intention can be diagrammed as in Fig. 2.

The presumptive interpretation of the speech act, i.e., to inform the interlocutor, needs to be analyzed in consideration of the dialogue-game predicate. In this case, the joint dialogical intention can be considered as engaging in a quarrel, and for this reason the individual moves are presumed to attack the interlocutor. This non-presumptive communicative intention will guide the interpretation of the propositional content of the move. In this case, the term "to blackmail" is interpreted metaphorically as a mere value judgment on Bresler's behavior (Macagno and Zavatta 2014):

> II'''. The city council of Greenbelt said that Mr. Bresler was (behaving extremely aggressively during the negotiations).

The joint dialogical purpose is a principle for establishing also the intended inherent (or minimal) and consecutive (or optimal) perlocutionary effects of a move (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984: 69; Trosborg 1995: 22–23). For example,

an assertion of a viewpoint can be aimed at placing the interlocutor in a situation where he can accept or reject the advanced position (inherent effect), and optimally at leading him to the acceptance thereof. In a specific dialogical setting, a speaker can aim to elicit a dialogical reaction such as to arouse pity, or indignation (Asher and Lascarides 2003). This dialogical goal can be used to reconstruct the inherent effect of each speech act. For example, depending on the dialogical goal of the discourse, the following assertion (case 10 above) can be interpreted as having distinct perlocutionary purposes:

> III. The first time I was faced with having to help a white farmer save his farm, [. . .] I didn't give him the full force of what I could do.

This statement can be presumptively interpreted as statement aimed at informing the public about the speaker's past racial behavior:

> III'. <Ms. Sherrod informed the audience of how she took revenge against white people, saying> the first time she was faced with having to help a white farmer save his farm, [. . .] she didn't give him the full force of what she could do.

However, in a context in which the speaker is talking about an almost religious discovery about the meaning of her work, the narration becomes a story of redemption aimed at teaching the audience a meaningful experience:

> III". <Ms. Sherrod told the audience how she understood her mission, saying that> the first time she was faced with having to help a white farmer save his farm, [. . .] she didn't give him the full force of what she could do <which revealed her that the problem was poverty and not race> .

Instead of arousing racial feelings, the assertion inherently wanted to elicit indignation against racism in general, and teach the audience a lesson on the struggle against poverty to be fought.

7 Conclusion

The interpretation of a speaker's communicative intentions is a crucial problem in law, where it traces the crucial boundary between defamation and correct reporting, and between relating one owns' claims or the opponent's ones and distorting the parties' commitments. The effectiveness of the strategies of misreporting depends on two dimensions. On the one hand, they need to have a communicative effect, which can be rhetorical or dialectical. A speaker's words can be misinterpreted or misreported to attack his character and arouse attention or criticize him. The claims of an opponent in a discussion can be reported incorrectly, so that it becomes easier to defeat his standpoint. A party to a dialogue can also distort a quote of his own, in order to disprove the interlocutor's accusations. On the other hand, such distortions need to be dialectically efficient. A misquotation or an incorrect report

has the dialectical effect of attributing to the speaker commitments that he never held, which the latter needs to reject by providing arguments. This shifting of the burden of persuasion can be increased by using strategically the conflict between the presumptive interpretation of an utterance and its actual communicative intention that can be retrieved through its dialogical context.

Effective strategies of misreporting are based on pragmatic ambiguity at different levels. By wrenching an utterance from its context, it is possible to lead the interlocutor or the audience to reconstructing its contextual logical form by retrieving the most accessible referents of the indexical expressions. This presumptive reconstruction is not stated, but simply suggested. Illocutionary ambiguity is exploited to turn personal opinions, value judgments, and attacks into statements of fact, which can fall under the provisions of defamation law. By omitting the dialogical context, an utterance can be interpreted presumptively as aimed at representing a state of affairs, and not at giving vent to emotions or personal judgments. Similarly, the same choice of wrenching a quote from its context can be used to misrepresent the perlocutionary inherent effects of an utterance, which can lead the process of interpretation. These three strategies are not on the same level. In particular, perlocutionary and illocutionary ambiguity can affect the interpretation of the propositional form of an utterance, especially when a term can be interpreted either literally or metaphorically.

The passage from a statement to its interpretation, or indirect report, is based on the strict relationship between dialogical intentions and the reconstruction of meaning at different levels, which can be represented through a hierarchy of predicates, dominated by the dialogical intention. The joint communicative goal can be determined by the type of dialogue (Walton 1998: 30; Walton and Krabbe 1995: 66) the interlocutors are engaged in. This higher predicate imposes the relevance conditions onto the various speech acts, which need to be interpreted according to their compliance with the requirements of the dialogical goal (Walton and Macagno 2007). The individual intention governing an utterance can be thus retrieved, and its felicity conditions can be reconstructed. This process can guide the interpretation of the propositional content, leading to a non-presumptive interpretation of meaning (Macagno 2012; Macagno and Zavatta 2014).

When an interpreter is confronted with an utterance taken out of its dialogical context, his interpretative process cannot rely on a systematic analysis of the actual dialogical predicate, which is thus reconstructed presumptively, according to the most frequent or prototypical dialogical setting in which the utterance could have occurred, or the most typical individual purpose that it could have served to achieve. This presumptive reconstruction can be carried out at all levels, and can be used to provide a *prima-facie* case that the other party needs to reject. The stronger the interpretative presumptions a speaker needs to rebut, the more effective the misrepresentation strategy.

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The Pragmatics of Indirect Discourse in Artificial Languages

Alan Reed Libert

In this paper I survey various pragmatic matters involving indirect discourse in artificial languages such as Esperanto: the way in which it is marked, how it is distinguished from similar structures, what happens to deictic items in it, and the choice between it and direct discourse. Ideally this will indicate that research into the pragmatics of artificial languages is of theoretical interest, and will show similarities and differences between artificial and natural languages: from a pragmatic point of view artificial languages do not seem very different from natural languages.

1 Introduction

This paper deals with the pragmatics of one type of construction, indirect discourse (henceforth ID; direct discourse will be referred to as DD), in artificial languages (henceforth ALs), the best known of which is Esperanto. One might think it absurd to consider studying the pragmatics of such languages, given that the vast majority of them have seen little or no use. However, I have previously argued (Libert 2013) that it is possible to speak intelligently of the pragmatics of ALs, even those which have not been used much (and several of them have been used to a large extent). For one thing, pedagogical materials on artificial languages often contain a large amount of textual material, some of which consists of (simulated) conversations, and this counts as a kind of language use. Also, although many pragmatic issues (e.g. conversational implicature) are never mentioned by AL designers or describers, these authors do sometimes give instructions about other pragmatic matters. Therefore it seems to me that investigating the pragmatics of

A.R. Libert (✉)
Department of Linguistics, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW, Australia
e-mail: alan.libert@newcastle.edu.au

ALs is a legitimate enterprise (and I should note that I am only interested in ALs created for serious purposes, generally international communication, and not in e.g. languages developed in connection with a work of fiction).

However, many ALs never got beyond the stage of being sketches, and thus much information may be lacking; in particular, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics are often neglected or are given minimal treatment (even in extensive descriptions of ALs), meaning that we do not have explicit information about the pragmatics of ID and DD. In such cases, for languages with extensive texts, the only way to discover what is going on is to go through the texts and try to form generalizations about when and why ID and DD appear. This would be a very difficult exercise: while languages such as Esperanto and Ido can be read fairly easily by anyone with knowledge of several Western European languages, some ALs, namely those of the *a priori* type (and to a lesser extent some mixed languages) would be extremely difficult to read,[1] given their lack of connection with natural languages. Further, knowledge of one such language would not help with reading another, as they are so different from one another, as well as being different from any natural language (at least on the surface). On the other hand, the *a priori* languages might be the most interesting to examine—if the pragmatics of a language which appears to be quite unlike natural languages is not that different from that of natural languages (bearing in mind that AL designers rarely give instructions about pragmatic matters, as already noted), we might be able to conclude that there are pragmatic universals applying across all human languages, no matter how artificial they might seem. Even if an AL designer does give instructions, what do users of the language actually do? They may not always follow such instructions (and this may apply to the designer himself). For those ALs for which we have both explicit instructions about some pragmatic matters and extensive texts, it would be interesting to compare the two to see whether there are any differences, i.e. what happens in the use of an AL. Since, for the reason given above, the large-scale textual investigation of ALs is a long-term project, here I will only give a sample of some of the issues and points that may come up in such an investigation.

As a preliminary study, there will be various limitations on what I cover. I will only deal with indirect statements (i.e. I will not treat indirect questions), nor will I discuss free indirect discourse, although it has received attention from pragmaticists and of course must be accounted for in a full description of indirect discourse. I will also only treat indirect statements in a narrow sense, i.e. with a matrix verb of saying or writing (and thus not those of thinking, supposing, etc.).

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[1]*A priori* artificial languages are those which are created without (consciously) using items from natural languages, as opposed to *a posteriori* languages, which are based on or take items from one or more natural languages. Mixed languages involve both *a priori* and *a posteriori* components. Esperanto is an *a posteriori* language, while Volapük is a mixed language.

2   Marking of Indirect Discourse

Part of pragmatics is making oneself clear, i.e. distinguishing what one is saying from other (potential) messages and other kinds of messages. With respect to indirect discourse this involves distinguishing it from direct discourse, and distinguishing it from other kinds of subordinate clauses with similar structures or semantics (e.g. clauses of wishing).

The former of these distinctions can be marked by the presence of an overt complementizer, e.g. *John said that Mary had arrived*.[2] However, in English (and presumably in various other natural languages), this complementizer can be dropped, e.g. *John said Mary had arrived*. This dropping comes at a cost, since the version without the complementizer (or with a null complementizer) is less easily distinguishable in spoken language from a similar sentence involving direct discourse, namely *John said*, "*Mary had arrived*". We thus see a tension between clarity, specifically unambiguousness, and conciseness, both of which are part of Grice's (1975) Maxim of Manner.[3] One might wonder, with regard to both natural and artificial languages, whether there are any (pragmatic or other) factors favoring overt or dropped complementizers. As we will see, some AL designers have opted to forbid the dropping of complementizers.

Somewhat similarly, there is a conflict between simplicity and clarity when distinguishing indirect reports from other types of subordinate clauses. Many natural languages, including English, use the same complementizer (*that* in the case of English) to introduce a range of subordinate clauses (e.g. *I said that he left*, *I thought that he left*, *I was angry that he left*). Although the matrix verb or adjective will

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[2]It must be noted that *that* can also introduce direct quotations; this is a feature of my own academic writing. One AL, Paqtatyl (an *a posteriori* language) apparently obligatorily uses a word, and the same word, before both indirect and direct speech, if I am correctly interpreting the following passage from Olfaa (2011: 48); although it occurs in the section entitled "Indirect or Reported Speech", one of the examples involves a direct quotation, and so I assume what is said applies to direct quotations as well:

> *Indirect speech* (also named 'reported speech') refers to a sentence reporting what someone has said.
>   – Whenever English uses *indirect speech* or sentences beginning with '*I think*', '*I suppose*', Paqatyl uses independent clauses, with the first one ending with the particle **eiske** (= as follows) followed by a semicolon.

Pvr. Tanaka foneq eiske; "**Terfoseq**".	Mr. Tanaka said he was sick.
(*Mr. Tanaka said as follows*: *I'm sick*)	
Fermaineq eiske; **nas rekteq**.	I think we're right.
(*I think as follows*; *we're correct*)	

[3]This fact was noted in another paper dealing with an aspect of pragmatics in a universal language; Traunmüller (1991: 37) states, "There is an antagonism between the maxims of clarity and of brevity".

often make it clear whether indirect discourse is involved, if there were a dedicated complementizer for indirect discourse, the level of clarity would be increased. On the other hand, languages which use the same complementizer for indirect discourse and other purposes might differ in which and how many other purposes they employ it for, and the narrower the range of use, the greater the level of clarity. Given that AL designers are often concerned with clarity, and with simplicity, it will be interesting to see what happens in ALs in this respect. Perhaps there are other devices used to improve clarity in this area. ALs are intriguing to examine since, unlike natural languages, they are under the complete control of a designer, at least until they start to be used, and so a designer concerned with e.g. clarity could create rules to (attempt to) maximize it.

Several AL sources say something about the former of these topics (complementizer dropping), either allowing it or forbidding it. We start with Esperanto; in his extensive grammar of this language Wennergren (2013: 487) says, "Kelkfoje oni forlasas *ke* antaŭ subfrazo" ('Sometimes one leaves out *ke* ['that'] before a subordinate clause'). He then (ibid.) gives three examples, two of which involve *diri* 'to say':

(1a)   Mi diras al vi, ŝi ricevos. = Mi diras al vi, ke ŝi ricevos.
          'I say to you, she will receive = I say to you that she will receive.'
(1b)   Li volas iri hejmen, li diris. = Li diris, ke li volas iri hejmen.
          'He wants to go home, he says.' = 'He says that he wants to go home.'
(1c)   La vetero baldaŭ malboniĝos, ŝajnas. = Ŝajnas, ke la vetero baldaŭ
          malboniĝos.
          "The weather will soon become bad, it appears." = 'It appears that the
          weather will soon become bad.'

Although the last of these examples does not involve ID, Wennergren (ibid.) says, "Forlaso de *ke* okazas preskaŭ nur en nerekta parolo" ('The omission of *ke* almost always occurs in indirect speech'). Thus one could say that in Esperanto ID is (almost) distinguished from other types of subordination by the possibility of complementizer deletion.[4] In the latter two examples the subordinate clause precedes the main clause, and one might think that this could make *that*-dropping more likely (or even compulsory, though I have no evidence for this).[5]

There are several possibilities with respect to complementizers: (1) they can never be left out (before any kind of (finite) subordinate clause), (2) they can

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[4]However, an older Esperanto grammar, Kellerman (1910), rules out the possibility of *ke*-dropping in indirect statements:

> In English the subordinating conjunction may sometimes be omitted, either "I think that he is good," or "I think he is good," being usually permissible. But in Esperanto there is no variation, and the conjunction *ke* is never omitted.

[5]The English equivalents of (1b) and (1c) seem to require the deletion of *that*: **That he wants to go home*, *he says*.

always be left out, and (3) they can be left out with some, but not all, types of subordinate clauses. Esperanto (with some exceptions) seems to follow the third of these; another *a posteriori* language, Hom-idyomo, is an instantiation of the first, as Cárdenas (1923: I: 138) says, "The conjunction *that* is very often supprimed [sic] in english [sic], which increases the clearness of the sentence. Do not omit *ke* ['that'] in Hom-idyomo". Note the reference to clarity. On the other hand, in the *a posteriori* language INTAL it seems that complementizer deletion is generally or always possible: in the subsection (of the syntax section) entitled "Praktik omision e brevite" ('Practical Omission and Brevity') Weferling (1974: 15) states, "On pot omisa le konjunktion 'ke'" ('One can omit the conjunction *ke*'). None of his examples involves indirect discourse, but we can assume that this holds for it. One of his (ibid.) examples is given below:

(2)   Me sava (ke) il es maladi.
      'I know (that) he is sick.'

In his book on Neo (also an *a posteriori* language) Alfandari (1961: 65) makes a similarly general statement, "La préposition *de* [*de* in Neo, 'of'] et la conjonction *que* [*ke* in Neo, 'that'] sont souvent omises après un verbe" ('The preposition *de* and the conjunction *que* are often omitted after a verb').

Thus all the possibilities mentioned above are found among ALs (if we leave aside some exceptions in Esperanto), perhaps indicating that different AL designers have different rankings for clarity and brevity (or ease of use), at least for this narrow domain. Let us now turn to the matter of how ID is marked as opposed to other types of subordination. One might not think that there would be any need for a dedicated ID marker, as a listener will be able to identify ID from the matrix verb (e.g. *to say*). This may be the case, but there are situations where a matrix verb will not indicate whether a subordinate clause is an indirect statement or an indirect command. Consider the sentence *He said to go*. In English this does not contain an indirect statement, but an indirect command, while in Ancient Greek a sentence with this structure (verb of saying plus infinitive without overt subject) would contain an indirect statement. What we find in natural languages is that sentences containing indirect statements can often share the same general structure as (some) other types of complex sentences, but languages differ in the extent to which there is overlap between them. We see from the following sets of sentences that they do not overlap completely in English:

(3a)   John said that Mary left.
(3b)   John thought that Mary left.
(3c)   John was happy that Mary left.
(4a)   *John said Mary to leave.
(4b)   John wanted Mary to leave.

In this light, consider the AL SPL. Although it is a modified form of Latin, it differs from Latin in how indirect statements are constructed; Dominicus (1982:

99) says, "In SPL, the infinitive is not used in indirect statements, but a clause is introduced by UT (that)". He then (ibid.) gives three examples, including the following one:

(5)   Latin: Dicit vias reparatas esse.
      SPL: Dicit ut viae reparatae sunt.
      English: He says that the roads have been repaired.

On the other hand, infinitives appear in various other constructions which appear similar structurally and/or semantically:

(6a)   Fin aúdio eum dícere ita.
        'I heard him say so.'
(6b)   Vídeo eam venire.
        'I see her coming.'
(6c)   Fin iúbeo eum abire.
        'I ordered (told) him to go.' (ibid.)

Now, is there any pragmatic consequence of this? Dominicus does not give the reason for his change to this feature of Latin, but it does make indirect statements look rather distinct, at least from certain other types of structures, such as those in (6). However, the SPL verbs *puto* 'I think' and *scio* 'I know' also take *ut*, as does *permitte* 'allow';[6] given in particular the last of these facts, indirect statements are not completely distinct from all other types of structures in this language.

One might argue that for maximum clarity indirect statements should be clearly marked as such, one way or another. Although clarity is a concern for at least some AL designers, among the large number of ALs which I have examined there are very few in which this is done. It might appear that the Blue Language (a mixed language) has a dedicated complementizer for ID: in this language the general marker of subordinate clauses is *ku*, but there is another word, *ko*, about which Bollack (1899: 168) says the following:

> Le connectif «que» (**ko**, en **B**) n'aura pas cette fonction de conjonction subordinative, mais servira uniquement à unir deux membres de phrases différentes. Cette répartition des sens si divers du mot «que» est une amélioration évidente.
>
>   ('The connective *que* ['that'] (*ko*, in **B** [= the Blue Language]) will not have this function of a subordinating conjunction [as *ku* does], but will serve only to join two members of different sentences. This division of the so different senses of the word *que* is a clear improvement.')

He then (ibid.) gives the following examples:

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[6]*Permitte* is an imperative form; I cite it because I have not seen the first person singular form or an infinitive form of this verb attested.

(7a)   Me sago ko че sero
        'Je dis que cela est'
        ('I say that it is')

(7b)   Me sago ku че sero.
        'Je veux que cela soit'
        ('I want that it be')

An interesting point is that Bollack apparently does not consider ID to be a type of subordination (if I understand the above quotation correctly). The "improvement" which he claims presumably has to do with clarity: the Blue Language appears to have a dedicated complementizer for indirect statements (in a broad sense, since on the following page there is an example of *ko* following the matrix verb meaning 'to know').[7]

It will be noticed that in the French glosses of (7a) and (7b) the verb in the ID clause (7a) is in the indicative mood, while the verb in the subordinate clause (7b) is in the subjunctive. However, one certainly cannot say that the indicative of French is a dedicated ID mood, but one might wonder whether any AL has such a mood—this would be another clear way (in addition to a dedicated ID complementizer) of distinguishing ID. Given the following remarks by Post (1890: 15), one might think that two tenses of the mixed language Volapük's subjunctive (though not the subjunctive in general) are dedicated ID markers:

> The subjunctive mode is used in Volapük *only* when doubt, uncertainty or supposition contrary to fact is expressed. The present and perfect subjunctive are seldom used and only to express, in indirect phrases, the words or ideas of others.

However, a slightly earlier source, Linderfelt (1888), seems to contradict this, by omission: although his words (p. 35) are quite similar to those used by Post, there is nothing expressing what is said in Post's last sentence above: he states that the subjunctive "is used *only* in subordinate clauses expressing doubt, uncertainty, indecision or a supposition contrary to fact". A secondary source, Couturat and Leau (1903), des not give the impression that any tenses of the subjunctive are restricted to indirect discourse (pp. 134–5): "Le subjonctif est très fréquemment employé dans les propositions subordonnées, et notamment dans le style indirect (comme en allemand et en latin)" ('The subjunctive is very often used in subordinate clauses, and notably in the indirect style [which one might assume means indirect discourse] (as in German and Latin)').

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[7]On p. 338 there is a footnote which makes the matter less clear:

> Lorsque la locution prépositive contient la conjonction «que», il faut employer le mot **ko**. Example: de peur que: si l'on ne connaît pas l'expression **B sti**, on peut rendre la penseé ainsi: **lo por ko**. Devant le verbe subordonné changer **ko** en **ku**.
>
> ('When the prepositive locution contains the conjunction *que*, one must use the word *ko*. For example, *for fear that*: if one does not know the **B**[lue Language] expression *sti*, one can render the thought thus: *lo por ko*. Before subordinated verbs change *ko* into *ku*.')

I thus know of no clear cases of an AL with a dedicated mood for ID. In any case, such a mood would probably not be as attractive to AL designers as a dedicated complementizer, since many or most ALs strive for simplicity at the morphological level (i.e. smaller paradigms—there are many ALs without a subjunctive mood).

3   Tense and Other Deictic Items in ID

Not many works on ALs mention what happens to the tense of verbs and to deictic words in ID, but there are some which discuss it in some detail. Not surprisingly, such matters have been brought up in writing on Esperanto. With respect to tense in ID in Esperanto Wennergren (2013: 519) states, "En iuj lingvoj oni devas ĉe nerekta parolo iafoje ŝanĝi la verboformon. En Esperanto oni ĉiam konservas la originan verboformon" ('In some languages in indirect speech one must sometimes change the verb form. In Esperanto one always keeps the original verb form'). Jespersen (1924: 294–5) makes the following (not very positive) comment on this:

> In Russian the rule prevails that in indirect discourse the same tense is used that would be used in direct discourse … This rule, which must always be felt as rather unnatural by Western Europeans, was (like several other Slavisms) introduced into Esperanto by its creator … and from Esperanto it was taken over into Ido … The only thing to be advanced in favor of this rather artificial rule is that otherwise it would perhaps be necessary to create a special tense form for the shifted future, for it would be against the logical spirit of such a language to use the same form for the shifted future as for the conditional … as our Western languages do (*viendrait*, *should come*, *würde kommen*).

Although Esperanto is rigid about preserving the original tense when creating ID, it is not so rigid about other deictic items. Wennergren (2013: 521) says:

> Se en citata frazo estas tempomontra esprimo, ĝi normale povas resti senŝanĝe en nerekta parolo. Kelkaj tempaj vortetoj tamen dependas de la absoluta nuno, kaj devas tial iafoje ŝanĝiĝi por eviti konfuzon. Tiaj vortoj estas *hodiaŭ*, *hieraŭ* … Frazoj, en kiuj oni devas ŝanĝi tian tempovorton, estas tamen sufiĉe maloftaj
>
> ('If in a quoted sentence there is a temporal expression, it normally can remain unchanged in indirect speech. However, some temporal minor words depend on the absolute present, and must therefore sometimes be changed to avoid confusion. Such words are *hodiaŭ* ['today'], *hieraŭ* ['yesterday'] … Sentences in which one must change time words are, however, quite infrequent')

Concerning pronouns in Esperanto ID Wennergren (2013: 522) says, "En nerekta parolo personaj kaj posedaj pronomoj ofte devas ŝanĝiĝi, se la parolanto aŭ la alparolato ŝanĝiĝis" ('In indirect speech personal and possessive pronouns often must be changed, if the speaker or the addressee has been changed'). It is interesting that Esperanto thus does not have a uniform policy about deictic items in ID: tenses are never changed while deictic temporal words (which like tense endings refer to time relative to the moment of speaking) and deictic pronouns sometimes are (and have to be).

The mixed language Algilez differs from Esperanto with respect to tense in ID in that it does not preserve the tense marking of the original sentence, and it also seems to be different with respect to other deictic items, since it always requires changes in them if there are relevant differences between the situation of the reported speech and that of the reporting sentence. Giles (2014: 74) states that in ID:

(a) Since the speech took place in the past, then the past tense must be used both for the comment (*He said that* …) and for the words said (requiring the words to be modified to suit).

(b) all comments (especially about possessives) must be from the point of view of the commentator, not the original speaker.

One might suspect that most ALs (and most natural languages) are like Algilez, and not like Esperanto, in these matters.

4   Choosing DD or ID

Determining whether ALs prefer ID or DD would be an extensive and very lengthy project, at least for some ALs, and I leave this for further research. However, I might note which one some authors say should be chosen (which of course is not necessarily what actually happens). Couturat and Leau (1903: 135) say, "Mgr SCHLEYER conseille-t-il de préférer le style direct" ('Monsignor Schleyer [the designer of Volapük] advises one to prefer the direct style [i.e. direct discourse, over indirect discourse]'). I have not been able to locate Schleyer's original remark, and so I do not know the reason why DD is seen as better.

There is a paper in Esperanto on "Dialogo en prozo" ('Dialogue in Prose'), Johansson (2011), and it does briefly give reasons for choosing DD or ID. (The paper is somewhat prescriptive, not from a grammatical point of view, but in the sense of offering advice to (potential) prose authors.) On p. 52 Johansson says:

> Rekta dialogo kutime estas pli elvokiva kaj estigas ĉe la leganto pli intensa senton de ĉeesto. Sed la nerekta dialogo tre uzeblas por ne tro longigi scenon, por ŝanĝi la ritmo kaj por koncentri la historion. Ĝi estas pli ekonomia maniero sciigi la enhavon de interparolo. Tre ofte verkistoj uzas ĝin alterne kun la rektan parolo por krei pli varian ritmo.
>
> ('Direct discourse usually is more evocative and brings about in the reader a more intense feeling of being present. However, indirect discourse can very well be used in order to not make a scene be too long, to change the rhythm and to make the story more condensed. It is a more economical way of making known the contents of the conversation. Very often authors use it alternately with direct speech in order to create a more varied rhythm.')

These remarks are, I believe, applicable not only to Esperanto but to other artificial and natural languages; thus at least in this way ALs are not that different from natural languages.

5   Conclusion

I have outlined what I think are the main pragmatic issues of ID in ALs. In a sense AL designers are concerned with pragmatic matters, specifically with Gricean ideas, even if they do not explicitly refer to pragmatics or Grice, as they generally try to design languages which are simple, clear, and easy to use. It may therefore be somewhat surprising that dedicated ID markers of one kind or another are lacking in most ALs, though this could be due to natural language influence—such markers also seem to be rare in natural languages, or at least in natural languages which are the native languages of most AL designers (e.g. English, French, German).

Concerning the treatment of deictic items in ID, ALs seem to differ, as do natural languages; again clarity or ease of understanding could be a motivation behind the choices that are made, though this is not explicitly stated. It is unclear to me at this point whether ALs (individually or in general) tend to choose DD or ID, or under what conditions one or the other is chosen. This will be, I believe, an interesting line of investigation in the pragmatics of ALs.

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The Proper Name Theory of Quotation and Indirect Reported Speech

Raphael Salkie

1   The Revised Proper Name Theory of Quotation in Outline

Few theories are more discredited than the Proper Name Theory of Quotation (PNTQ): in the words of Cappelen and Lepore (2012), 'the unanimous consensus is that it fails miserably'. This paper argues that a suitably revised version of PNTQ yields considerable insight into the nature of quotation, Direct Reported Speech (DRS) and Indirect Reported Speech (IRS). The paper draws heavily on the theory of names proposed by Richard Coates (2006; 2009).

The leading idea is that naming (strictly speaking *onymic reference* – see below) and quoting are speech acts, and they have one thing in common: speakers who perform these acts do not access the sense of any lexical item contained in the expressions they use to perform them. An expression used as a proper name, or as a quotation, has a referent but no sense. For our purposes, the key proposal is that quoting an expression is a way of referring to it but not via its sense. To avoid misunderstanding, I should emphasise here that I use *quoting* and *quotation* to refer to 'pure' or 'metalinguistic' quotation, and not to speech reporting (aka 'direct quotation' or 'direct speech'). Speech reporting will pre-occupy us later. So I am concerned for the moment with examples like (1), and not (2):

(1)   I like the sound of the word *bagel*.
(2)   Ruby said 'I want a bagel'.

Here is some initial reasoning in support of this proposal. The word *bagel* has the sense (or intension) 'dense bread roll in the shape of a ring, characteristic of Jewish baking'. I can use that word to refer to an instantiation of this sense – a particular

R. Salkie (✉)
School of Humanities, University of Brighton, Brighton BN1 9PH, England, UK
e-mail: r.m.salkie@brighton.ac.uk

bread roll. But when I put the word in italics (or equivalently, between quotation marks) as I did in (1), I am no longer referring to a bread roll but to a word. The sense of the word referred to is not, I shall argue, part of the word in italics. That parallels exactly what happens when someone uses takes an expression with a sense and uses it as a proper name. The expression *the seagulls* normally has the sense 'some contextually salient members of a class of bird', and can be used to refer to some such birds. As a proper name, however, *The Seagulls* can be used to refer to my local football team, Brighton and Hove Albion. In this use, the expression has lost its avian sense and only has a reference. It is no doubt true that (a) the capitalised expression retains an etymological link with the birds; (b) the football team was so called because Brighton is near the sea; and (c) the birds may come to the mind of the speaker or hearer of the capitalised expression. These facts do not threaten my claim about the senselessness of the capitalised expression, because etymologies, or factual knowledge about a proper name, or associations, are not senses (cf. Coates 2006: 364). (The same distinction could be made on a higher cultural level between *the seagull* and *The Seagull*, the latter being the [English] name of a play by Chekhov).

Now here's an obvious problem. The relationship between a name and its referent is normally said to be arbitrary, and the same is true of the relationship between the word *bagel* and its sense. The relationship between *bagel* (used to refer to the word), and its referent (the word) is not arbitrary. The only possible referent of *bagel* is the word 'bagel'. I cannot use *bagel* to refer to the word 'olive', and I cannot use *olive* to refer to the word 'bagel'. Cappelen & Lepore make the point this way:

> [we] call this the Strong Disquotational Schema (SDS):
>   (SDS) Only "e" quotes 'e'
>   (where 'e' is replaceable by any quotable item). For example, the semantics for quotation seems to make it impossible to use "Jason" to quote 'Quine'. (2007: 26)

Cappelen and Lepore describe the SDS as 'intuitively obvious' (2007: 26), which it is, but that does not make it correct. The SDS rests on two mistaken assumptions. Firstly, it assumes that one linguistic expression can quote another linguistic expression. The position argued for here is that quoting is a speech act in which a speaker uses one linguistic expression to refer to another linguistic expression. So the SDS as formulated by Cappelen & Lepore contains a category error. To repair the SDS, we should express it like this:

(Revised SDS) The only expression that a speaker can use to quote 'e' is "e"

This is an improvement, but it calls into doubt the second assumption, namely that the reason why the SDS is correct has to do with 'the semantics for quotation'. If the revised PNTQ is right, this is another category error. Speech acts, unlike linguistic expressions, do not have 'semantics', if that means 'a sense'. Whatever the explanation for the Revised SDS might be, it cannot involve the sense of "e", because "e" does not have a sense.

Let's address the problem from another angle. I said above that the relationship between a name and its referent is normally said to be arbitrary. That is an over-simplification: we need to distinguish three things that a speaker can do with a name:

1. Nomination (alias 'dubbing' or simply 'naming'): assigning a name to an individual.
2. Address: using the name to attract the individual's attention.
3. Reference: 'use it to ensure that others, with a high degree of probability in a particular context, will understand which [individual] I am picking out from all the others' (Coates 2009: 434)

(The second action only applies, of course, to individuals whose attention can be attracted, typically people and animals but not places or ships. Someone who gives the name 'Maurice' to his computer and then says 'Good morning Maurice' is pretending that the device has attention; and a performer at a live event in Prague who says 'Good evening Prague' is using *Prague* as a metonym for the people in the audience). The first of these actions, nomination, is clearly arbitrary in the case of proper names like *Beatriz* or *Alejandro*. It is less arbitrary with names that are semantically more transparent, like *Merseyside*, the name of an English county which includes part of the river Mersey. The second and third actions, in contrast, are not at all arbitrary. If I address Beatriz using the name *Alejandro*, I have made a mistake and my action is unlikely to succeed. Similarly, if I refer to Alejandro using the name *Beatriz*, my attempt at reference is unlikely to succeed. Actions do not have truth-conditions, but they can succeed or fail to a greater or lesser extent. (This is true of nomination as well: the English county could have been dubbed *Thamesside* or *Utopia* or *Noam Chomsky*, but that would have puzzled people in much the same way as an unsuccessful attempt to refer to Alejandro by using *Beatriz*).

Let's apply this to quoting. In example (1), the speaker is not nominating *bagel* as the name of the word 'bagel'. Nor is she addressing the word 'bagel'. She is referring to the word 'bagel'. This is not arbitrary, but it is likely to succeed. If she used *olive* to refer to the word 'bagel', she would no doubt fail. But that would be the same failure as using *Beatriz* to refer to Alejandro, or for that matter, using the word 'olive' to refer to a type of bread roll, or using the word 'bagel' to refer to the fruit of *Olea europaea*. So the close link between a quote and the word that it quotes, which Cappelen and Lepore formulate as the SDS, is not a semantic link. It's the same link which requires me to refer to Alejandro as *Alejandro*, and to refer to bagels as *bagels*, if I want my act of reference to succeed. It requires no more explanation than this.

We can use similar reasoning to dispose of another apparent problem for PNTQ, which Cappelen and Lepore (2012) state as follows (read '¥' as 'squiggle'):

> If quotations were proper names and lacked semantic structure altogether, then there would be no rule for determining how to generate or interpret novel quotations. To understand one would be to learn a new name. [. . .] But (3), e.g., can be understood by someone who has never encountered its quoted symbol before.

> (3)   '¥' is not a letter in any language

> Understanding (3) is not like understanding a sentence with a previously unknown proper name. Upon encountering (3), it would seem that you know exactly which symbol is being referenced in a way that you do not with a name you've never before encountered. (Numbering adapted)

(Cf. also Cappelen and Lepore 2007: 102–3). The error here is the notion 'learn a new name', which is not the same as 'understanding a sentence with a previously unknown proper name'. If I say 'Alejandro is delightful' to someone who doesn't know who Alejandro is, all they are entitled to understand is that some individual is delightful. (Their general knowledge might help them infer that the referent is likely to be a male human being from a Spanish-speaking background, but that is not guaranteed: Alejandro could be a racehorse or my computer or a town in darkest Peru). This is not 'learning a new name' but rather, learning that some contextually salient individual named Alejandro is delightful. To learn a new name, we would have to say something like 'That person over there is (called) Alejandro'. Cappelen & Lepore's example with '¥' parallels 'Alejandro is delightful' said to someone who doesn't know who Alejandro is, not 'That person over there is (called) Alejandro'. So contrary to what Cappelen & Lepore say, understanding (3) is exactly like understanding a sentence with a previously unknown (expression used as a) proper name.

If this is correct, then all that remains of Cappelen & Lepore's problem is the last part: 'Upon encountering (3), it would seem that you know exactly which symbol is being referenced in a way that you do not with a name you've never before encountered'. But this just restates the problem that we discussed above about the SDS: they are saying that the relationship between '¥' and ¥ is non-arbitrary whereas the relationship between *Alejandro* and Alejandro is arbitrary. We argued above that referring, as a speech act, may succeed or not. Someone who reads (3) is entitled to understand that there is a symbol ¥. Someone who hears 'Alejandro is delightful', but cannot identify the intended referent of Alejandro, is entitled to understand that some contextually salient individual named Alejandro is delightful. If the symbol was in fact ⊂, or the individual was named Beatriz, then the acts of referring would fail for the same reason.

Cappelen & Lepore summarise these two problems for PNTQ by quoting Davidson:

> As Davidson (1979: 83) puts it, '. . . on [the Proper Name Theory] quotation mark names have no significant structure. It follows that a theory of truth could not be made to cover generally sentences containing quotations.'(2007: 103)

Davidson is right in his conclusion, but for the version of PNTQ proposed here, this is not a weakness but a strength. A theory of truth has no business trying to cover the act of referring.

Cappelen and Lepore (2012) give one further reason to reject PNTQ: it cannot account for mixed quotation:

> . . . on the Proper Name Theory (4) has the same interpretive form as (5):
>
> (4)   Quine said that quotation 'has a certain anomalous feature'.
> (5)   Quine said that quotation Ted. (numbering adapted)

How can an expression simultaneously be a name and not a name? The answer is that it can't, but that's not what is going on in (4). What we have in (4) is an instance of mixed indirect and direct reported speech, not quotation in the narrow sense that

I am using it here. There is no such thing as 'mixed quotation' (i.e. the expression fails to refer to any individual in the real world) in this sense of *quotation*.

In their book, Cappelen and Lepore give a different argument under the heading *The Proper Name Theory and Mixed Quotation*:

> . . . quotation expressions often occur in syntactic positions that do not permit the substitutions of proper names (on the assumption that proper names are noun phrases), and so quotations cannot be proper names. Here is Searle's example (1983: 185): 'note the difference between "Gerald says: 'I will consider running for the Presidency'" and "Gerald said he would 'consider running for the Presidency'".' Inserting a name after 'would' in the second sentence results in ungrammaticality. (2007: 103)

Here again we have mixed indirect and direct reported speech, not the impossible 'mixed quotation'. In addition, Coates' analysis of proper names denies that they are a syntactic category at all, so the assumption that 'proper names are noun phrases' is not one that we need to accept:

> Any expression can be a proper name just in case the person using it for an individual does not, as part of the act of reference, access the sense of any lexical items contained in it. (Coates 2009: 437).

Many names are clearly not noun phrases. Names of racehorses include sentences (*Be my Trotsky*; *Oh No*, *It's My Mother-in-Law*), two sentences (*Iwinyougetnothing*) adjective phrases (*virile*, *Bare Naked*), prepositional phrases (*Before Breakfast*) and verbs (*Fabricate*, *Quit*, *Opt In*) (from Wordlab 2015). For another example, here is part of a traditional song:

> When I first came to this land,
> I was not a wealthy man,
> So I got myself a shack and I did what I could.
> And I called my shack: "Break my back".

Names are often used in typical noun phrase positions: we can say '*Break my back* is a great name for a shack', where the words in italics are the subject of the sentence, presumably therefore a noun phrase. That is different from saying that *Break my back* is (inherently) a noun phrase, which is false.

2 The Revised PNTQ in Detail

Many accounts of proper names are based on three assumptions:

(a) Names are a subtype of noun.
(b) Nouns can be divided into two classes, proper nouns and common nouns.
(c) Proper nouns denote their referents, whereas common nouns denote their senses.

Coates rejects these assumptions, starting with (c):

> . . . I shall make a crucial distinction between denotation and reference which is commonly made in linguistics, but not universally, and in philosophy often not. Both are terms for a

relationship between a linguistic expression and 'what it means'. Denotation is the semiotic relation between an expression and its extension, and/or between an expression and its intension: between an expression and 'what it stands for', a quasi-permanent relation. Reference is an act performed by a language user, in which an expression is used to pick out one or more entities in some world. Denotations are something which expressions have; reference is something that people do with expressions.

It has been difficult to develop a comprehensive theory of properhood, and I think there is one overriding reason for this: *It has been customary to think of the relation between a name and what it applies to as one involving denotation.* [...] The logjam can be broken by *reconceptualizing the relation between a name and what it applies to as one involving reference*, *not denotation*. A number of things follow from that at once.

A. Properhood, or being proper, is a mode of reference.
B. (therefore) Properhood is something speakers do, not something that expressions have.
C. (therefore) Properhood is not a structural or quasi-lexical category. (2009: 436–7; emphasis in original)

The kind of reference that speakers do when they use a name like *Beatriz* is called *onymic reference*. It is 'unmediated by sense' (Coates 2006: 371), and is different from *semantic reference*, the kind which is 'performed by expressions which are uncontroversially not proper names' (Coates 2009: 437), such as *olive* and *bagel*. The name *Beatriz* does not have a sense, but the word can be used onymically to pick out an individual. The word *bagel* does have a sense, and reference can be achieved semantically through paying attention to that sense. Coates proposes that onymic reference is the default in language use, because it is simple and often convenient.

Quotation is onymic reference applied to anything that can be written or spoken. We need to characterise quotation in this broad way, rather than limiting quotation to cases where speakers refer to an expression in a language, because of the squiggle in Cappelen and Lepore's (2012) example, reproduced above, and its spoken counterparts. In fact, examples like (6) suggest that we need to cast an even wider net:

(6)   A. Where were you last night?
      B. [shrugs]
      A: What does [mimics the shrug] mean?

Treating quotation as an instance of onymic reference has some immediate benefits, listed by Cappelen and Lepore (2012). Even though their positive assessment is based on a mistaken analysis of properhood, it applies to the revised PNTQ proposed here. The advantages are that PNTQ can easily accommodate the first three of their six Basic Properties of Quotation (BQ1 – 3):

BQ1. In quotation you cannot substitute co-referential or synonymous terms salva veritate. An inference from (7) to (8), for example, fails to preserve truth-value.

(7)   'bachelor' has eight letters
(8)   'unmarried man' has eight letters

BQ2. It is not possible to quantify into quotation. (9), for example, does not follow from (7):

(9)   ($\exists$x) ('x' has eight letters)

BQ3. Quotation can be used to introduce novel words, symbols and alphabets; it is not limited to the extant lexicon of any one language. (Cappelen and Lepore 2012, numbering adapted).

The revised PNTQ also captures the notion of 'semantic inertia', in Cappelen and Lepore (1997).

... there [are] contexts in which what an expression means is not in active use. So, even though "the United States" denotes the United States, it is semantically inert in (20):

(10)   "the United States" is a linguistic expression. (1997: 440, numbering adapted)

To summarise, naming is an act of referring which makes a link between a linguistic expression and an individual in some world. The link does not involve the sense of any parts of the expression – it is not a semantic link but an onymic link. Quoting in the revised PNTQ is an act of referring which makes an onymic link between a linguistic expression and anything that can be written or spoken – typically, another linguistic expression, but marginally also a squiggle or a shrug. The link is onymic and not semantic: an expression like *bagel* does not 'mean' (does not 'have the sense of') 'the word "bagel"', in the same way that *Beatriz* does not mean 'the person called 'Beatriz'.

For clarity, here again is a crucial sentence cited in the last section:

Any expression can be a proper name just in case the person using it for an individual does not, as part of the act of reference, access the sense of any lexical items contained in it. (Coates 2009: 437).

This does NOT mean that speakers of (1) who use *bagel* to refer to the word 'bagel', or their hearers, in the process become temporarily unaware that *the word 'bagel'* has the sense 'dense bread roll in the shape of a ring, characteristic of Jewish baking'. Quoting an expression does not deprive the expression of its sense, or any of its other properties for that matter. What this sentence from Coates emphasises is that the relation between *bagel* and the word 'bagel' is not a relation mediated by the sense of the word 'bagel': the relation is one of onymic reference. The sense of the expression referred to can be as salient as the speaker wants. In the same way, the name *Beatriz* does not include in its sense any of the properties of the person so named, because the name *Beatriz* does not have a sense. But when the person so named is referred to by a speaker who uses the name, any relevant properties of the person can be brought to mind.

One important difference between the revised and the traditional PNTQ is worth mentioning. Cappelen and Lepore write:

... what is crucial about the Proper Name Theory is that its proponents treat quotations as unstructured singular terms. (2007: 99)

This is correct in relation to the traditional PNTQ, associated with Tarski (1933) and Quine (1940). The revised PNTQ emphatically does not do this. Cappelen and Lepore (along with just about every writer on quotation with the exception of Saka 2011), think of 'a quotation' as a member of a class of linguistic expressions. This is the fundamental misconception which Coates' analysis of proper names tries

to correct. Quotation (more correctly, quoting) is a speech act, and any linguistic expression can be used to perform it. The grammatical and semantic status of expressions used in this way is a separate issue, one for grammar and semantics to deal with.

A word is in order about the distinction between *use* and *mention*, often thought to be crucial in the analysis of quotation, though difficult to apply consistently, as Cappelen and Lepore note (2007: 13). For the revised PNTQ, 'mentioning' an expression is understood as 'referring onymically' to it. So in example (1), the speaker 'mentions' the word 'bagel', − in our analysis, the speaker refers to the word without accessing the sense of the word. That is pretty close to the everyday notion of mentioning, and is harmless.

3   Direct Reported Speech

We turn now to the nature of speech reporting, which unsurprisingly we will analyse as a speech act. This section argues that a natural account of speech reporting can be constructed by building on the PNTQ. I will continue to use *quotation* to designate pure quotation as illustrated in (1) (repeated here), and I will use the terms *Direct Reported Speech* (DRS) and *Indirect Reported Speech* (IRS) for the phenomena illustrated in (2) and (11) respectively:

(1)   I like the sound of the word *bagel*.
(2)   Ruby said 'I want a bagel'.
(11)   Ruby said that she wanted a bagel.

Speech reporting is a speech act in which speakers attribute some or all of their utterance to a source other than the (current) speaker. (Henceforth *attribution* is used to mean 'attribution to another source'.) To elaborate this idea, consider the most extreme instance in which a speaker attributes all of their utterance to another source: play-acting, understood as what actors do on a stage or on screen. Suppose an actor named Guido playing the role of Hamlet in a performance of Shakespeare's masterpiece utters these words:

(12)   I will speak daggers to her, but use none.

Since this is part of the performance of a play, we understand (12) as attributed to Hamlet, not to Guido. The deictic (indexical) expression 'I' is interpreted as referring to Hamlet, the future time reference of the verbs is taken to be future in relation to Hamlet's time, and so forth. If Guido then has a bad moment and needs help from the prompter, he might say:

(13)   Oh hell, I can't remember the next line.

Now we would understand that this utterance is not part of the play, hence is not attributing the utterance to some other source: obviously, 'I' now takes Guido, not

Hamlet, as its referent, and so on for the verbs. (This example is adapted from Salkie and Reed (1997: 323), a paper that was comprehensively discredited in Declerck (1999), but which its optimistic first named author still thinks contains a few useful insights).

Play and film scripts and performances do not normally contain an explicit indicator of attribution, unless we count the cast list in the programme, or the closing credits of a film, as such an indicator. The conventions of play and film performance are understood by actors and audiences, and the conventions include fiction, pretence, role-playing and so on. Nonetheless, attribution is what is going on. We wouldn't normally say that Guido is 'quoting Hamlet' when he plays the part of Hamlet on stage, so this is attribution without quotation.

Speech reporting, however, combines quoting and attributing. In an instance of DRS like (2), the reporter (the person who speaks or writes (2)) quotes the words 'I want a bagel' and attributes these words to the reported speaker (Ruby). The act of quoting is signalled by the quotation marks, just as in instances of pure quotation like (1). The act of attribution is signalled by the reporting structure (*Ruby said*). In other cases, the act of attribution is signalled by intonation shifts or other forms of mimicry (in speech), and/or other contextual factors such as reporting structures in preceding text, or non-linguistic information: if someone utters (12) to me, my razor-sharp cultural knowledge means that I am likely to recognise that as implicitly attributed to Shakespeare.

There is nothing mysterious about this: in the right circumstances, an act of quoting can also be seen as an act of attributing. This is a well-understood phenomenon with speech acts. It is worth recalling here these words of Kent Bach:

> Consider that in general when one acts intentionally, one has a set of nested intentions. For instance, having arrived home without your keys, you might move your finger in a certain way with the intention not just of moving your finger in that way but with the further intentions of pushing a certain button, ringing the doorbell, arousing your spouse . . . and ultimately getting into your house. The single bodily movement involved in moving your finger comprises a multiplicity of actions, each corresponding to a different one of the nested intentions. Similarly, speech acts are not just acts of producing certain sounds. (Bach 2006: 149–50)
>
> . . . almost any speech act is really the performance of several acts at once, distinguished by different aspects of the speaker's intention: there is the act of saying something, what one does in saying it, such as requesting or promising, and how one is trying to affect one's audience. (Bach 2005: 984)

So much for attribution. I still need to justify the claim that in an example of DRS like (2), the speaker refers to the words between quotation marks onymically – that she treats these words as a name. This turns out to be easy. Firstly, these words are quoted in (2) just as much as in (14), an instance of pure quotation:

(14)   *I want a bagel* is a well-formed English sentence.

If the PNTQ works for (14), then it works for (2). Secondly, we need to abandon the idea that to treat something as a name implies that the thing in question must have a typical proper name like *Beatriz*. Proper names are not a grammatical or lexical class for Coates: naming is a mode of referring, and quoting is referring in

Table 1 DRS in the literature

Publication	DRS …
Clark and Gerrig (1990)	Is a demonstration of the original utterance
Thompson (1996)	Has a 'higher degree of faithfulness to an original (or possible) language event'
Cappelen and Lepore (1997)	Same-tokens another utterance
Saka (1998)	Mentions the original words
Huddleston and Pullum (2002)	Gives 'the actual wording of the original'
Vandelanotte (2004)	Is a full speech function re-enactment of the original
Leech and Short (2007)	'Quotes the words used [in the original] verbatim'
Keizer (2009)	Is a reproduced discourse act
Wilson (2012)	Involves metalinguistic resemblance to the original

that mode to a linguistic expression (with the caveat about squiggles and shrugs). A linguistic expression can be a single word or a whole text.

Consider some well-known features of DRS. In reporting Ruby's words in (2), the reporter is not subscribing to them, or asserting them, or agreeing with them: one of the purposes of DRS is precisely to dissociate the reporter from the reported words. Deictic expressions in DRS always take the reported speaker as the point of departure: in (2), 'I' refers to Ruby, the tense of the verb is understood as present in relation to the time of Ruby speaking, and so on. As in quotation, DRS can include non-linguistic items such as squiggles and shrugs, or words which the reporter does not understand (for example, I can successfully say *Ruby said 'I want a gezonnenplat'*, *but I have no idea what she meant*). These features all fall into place under the revised PNTQ. The literature on speech reporting contains a number of other attempts to explain them. All of these attempts do this by specifying the relation between the words surrounded by the quotation marks and the 'original utterance'. Table 1 gives a sample.

These are important studies, but the problem with all of them is the notion 'original utterance'. Salkie and Reed (1997: 321–2) give several examples of DRS, each of which clearly indicates that there was no 'original utterance'. Here is another one:

> … here I embarked on a mild imitation of Ollie Oliphant. '"Of course, you can believe that if you like, Members of the Jury, but use your common sense, why don't you?" (J. Mortimer, *The best of Rumpole*, 266. London, Penguin, 1993).

There is no suggestion here that the reported speaker ever said these exact words: the words between the double quotation marks are intended to be typical of the reported speaker, to give an impression of what he is like. These words are an imaginary construct by the reporter, not a verbatim or 'faithful to a high degree' reproduction of an actual speech event. On the basis of examples like this, the conclusion must be that 'what is needed is a coherent taxonomy of reported speech and thought which does not require the notion "original utterance" at all' (Salkie and Reed 1997: 323).

Of course, in many instances of DRS it is perfectly legitimate to conceive of an original utterance: it is in the nature of attribution that someone other than the current speaker uttered the quoted words before. The flaw in the proposals in Table 1 is that they conflate quoting and attributing. Viewed as an act of quoting, (someone who uses) DRS refers onymically to the words between the quotation marks. Viewed as an act of attributing, (someone who uses) DRS shifts the source of the words between the quotation marks. In those cases where the other source is specified and real, this combination of speech acts may signal a close resemblance between the words uttered by the original source and the words between the quotation marks: in some contexts, such as academic citation, the actual words may be reproduced verbatim. In those cases where the words between the quotation marks have a characteristic speech function (asking a question, giving an instruction, etc.), the original utterance will normally have had a similar or identical function – especially if the reporting structure explicitly indicates a speech function (*Ruby asked whether . . .* , and the like).

So where attribution is to a specified and real source, resemblance between the words quoted and the words used by the original source is certainly a feature of DRS. It is not, however, a necessary feature of DRS, let alone a defining feature. The essence of DRS is the combination of quoting and attributing, two different speech acts but both performed by the utterance of a sentence like (2).

One of the strongest challenges to theories of DRS which depend on an original utterance comes from instances where the reporting speaker and the reported speaker use different languages. Notions like 'same-tokening', 'the actual words' and 'quoting verbatim' are surely inappropriate for examples like the following:

(15)   In the famous words of the Spanish Republicans, 'They shall not pass'.

What the Republicans said was 'No pasarán' in Spanish (in fact, many of them probably said 'No passaran' in Catalan, but for sure they did not use English). The revised PNTQ has no problem with examples like (15): there is no reason why you can't use English words to refer onymically to words in another language. Using the name 'The Seagull' for Chekhov's play is very similar.

4   Indirect Reported Speech

IRS turns out to be quite simple to characterise in the light of the analysis put forward so far. Three principles are key:

1. IRS is a variety of speech reporting in which there is no quotation, but there is explicit attribution.
2. Examples like (2) are only one type of IRS. 'Explicit attribution without quotation' covers just about every type of speech report apart from DRS.
3. Since IRS covers a wide range of attribution strategies, it naturally involves a wide range of grammatical and semantic structures. No one grammatical or semantic structure is unique to IRS.

Principle (1) seems plausible since IRS does not use quotation marks. This claim enables us to state concisely what DRS and IRS have in common (they both involve attribution) and what distinguishes them (DRS involves quotation, IRS does not). Cases of so-called 'mixed quotation' such as those in (5) *Quine said that quotation 'has a certain anomalous feature'* are straightforward too: all of (5) involves attribution, but only in the part between the quotation marks does the speaker of (5) quote: that is, switch from semantic reference to onymic reference. This switch is not mysterious: it takes place in examples like this (in fact, whenever we use a proper name):

(16)   Chekhov wrote *The Seagull*.

Principle (2) basically says that we should think of the fundamental contrast in speech reporting as the one between DRS (the type that involves quotation) and every other type (because the others do not involve quotation). In part this is a minor terminological issue: if we use *IRS* for the entire range, then we will need another term for the subtype of IRS exemplified in (11), repeated here:

(11)   Ruby said that she wanted a bagel.

(I will use *IRS-Narrow* or *IRS-N*). The principle does, however, remind us that there are many different ways of attributing words to a source other than the current speaker without quoting them. Example (16) is one, given that *The Seagull* consists entirely of words. Another type is *Narrative Report of a Speech Act* (NRSA), the term used by Leech and Short (2007) for the two italicised instances in examples like this:

(17)   Mr. D'Arcy came from the pantry, fully swathed and buttoned, and in a
        repentant tone *told them the history of his cold*. Everyone *gave him advice*
        . . . (Joyce, *The Dead*, cited in Leech and Short 2007: 260)

NRSA is defined as 'merely [a] report that a speech act (or number of speech acts) has occurred, but where the narrator does not have to commit himself entirely to giving the sense of what was said, let alone the form of words in which they were uttered' (2007: 259–60).

Principle (3) generalises the point made by Huddleston & Pullum in relation to IRN-S:

> The constructions illustrated in [examples like (11) – RS] are not syntactically distinct from
> ones used for other purposes than to report speech and thought:
>
> (18)   This proves that he was lying
> (19)   These tests will determine whether he needs to be hospitalised. (Huddleston & Pullum
>   2002: 1024, numbering adapted)

The same is true of NRSA: in (17), *told them the history* and *gave him advice* are not distinct syntactic structures only used for speech reporting. IRS is not a natural grammatical class.

Table 2 DRS and IRS in the literature

Publication	DRS ...	IRS-N ...
Clark and Gerrig (1990)	Is a demonstration of the original utterance	Is a description of the original utterance
Thompson (1996)	Has a 'higher degree of faithfulness to an original (or possible) language event'	Paraphrases or summarises the original
Cappelen and Lepore (1997)	Same-tokens another utterance	Same-says another utterance
Saka (1998)	Mentions the original words	Uses other words
Huddleston and Pullum (2002)	Gives 'the actual wording of the original'	Gives 'the content of the original'
Vandelanotte (2004)	Is a full speech function re-enactment of the original	No speech function is enacted or re-enacted
Leech and Short (2007)	'Quotes the words used [in the original] verbatim'	Expresses what was said in one's own words'
Keizer (2009)	Is a reproduced discourse act	Is 'the (reformulated) communicated content of an earlier discourse act'
Wilson (2012)	Involves metalinguistic resemblance to the original	Involves interpretive resemblance to the original

IRS shares some features with DRS, but differs with respect to others. Above we noted three features of DRS:

1. The reporter dissociates herself from the reported words.
2. Deictic expressions in DRS always take the reported speaker as the point of departure.
3. DRS can include non-linguistic items.

The second and third feature are consequences of quoting, so we would not expect them to apply to IRS, and they do not The first one comes from attribution, which is a feature of IRS so it does apply to this type of speech reporting.

Previous attempts to distinguish DRS and IRS-N are shown by adding a column to Table 1, producing Table 2.

The problems noted above about the notion 'original utterance' in DRS apply to IRS too. A further problem, specific to the analysis of IRS-N in most of these studies, is the idea that IRS-N reproduces some or all of the propositional content of the original: this is the thought behind 'what was said' in Leech & Short, 'the content' in Huddleston & Pullum, 'same-says' in Cappelen & Lepore, and 'interpretive resemblance' for Wilson, who says of this notion 'interpretive resemblance is resemblance in content' (2012: 244); it also underlies 'paraphrases or summarises' for Thompson, since to paraphrase something is to restate its propositional content using different words. To the extent that the idea of 'reproducing some or all of the propositional content of the original' is accurate, my view is that this has more to do with the nature of sentential complements than speech reporting. IRS-N as in

(11) involves a verb taking a sentential complement, exactly like examples (18) and (19). The latter two have nothing to do with speech reporting, but it is in the nature of sentential complements (of verbs, adjectives or nouns) that they normally need to express a complete proposition. Indeed, one of the diagnostics for distinguishing relative clauses like the one in (20) from noun complement clauses as in (21) is that the latter do not have a gap:

(20)   The suggestion that you have made is ridiculous.
(21)   The suggestion that you have eaten is ridiculous.

   Here, the relative clause *you have made* is syntactically and semantically incomplete, whereas the noun complement clause *you have eaten* is complete.
   The nature of sentential complements may also be part of the explanation for another feature of IRS-N, the unusual interpretation of tenses. It is clear that in (11), repeated here, the past tense of *said* is interpreted differently from the past tense of *wanted*:

(11)   Ruby said that she wanted a bagel.

   The past tense in *said* is a normal past tense, referring to an event in a past time, but the past tense in *wanted* is not: in its most salient interpretation it is interpreted as 'simultaneous with the time of the past tense reporting verb'. Traditional pedagogical treatments of the phenomenon deal with this observation by invoking a rule of 'backshift' or 'sequence of tense', which takes the present tense verb of Ruby's original utterance and mechanically transforms it into a past tense form (cf. Thomson and Martinet 1986a: 269–70, or for a more current but essentially identical version, Hopkins and Cullen 2007: 125). Students learning English as a second language are often subjected to long exercises where they are given some sentences using DRS and asked to transform them into IRS (e.g. Thomson and Martinet 1986b: 105–6; Hopkins and Cullen 2007: 126). A more sophisticated version of the traditional analysis was proposed by Comrie (1986a: 104–117, 1986b).
   The consensus in recent work is that the traditional analysis is wrong, and that the interpretation 'simultaneous with the time of the past tense reporting verb' is a distinct sense of the past tense morpheme in English. This sense is called the 'relative past tense' in Declerck (1990; 1995; 2006) and Davidse and Vandelanotte (2011), Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 151–8) use the term 'backshifted preterite': although they call this a distinct 'use' of the past tense, their exposition makes it clear that the difference between the past time use and the backshifted use of the preterite is a semantic difference for them, not a pragmatic one. (They also make it clear that the word 'backshifted' does not presuppose a syntactic rule of 'backshift', but is just a convenient label for a distinct sense.)
   Space prevents a detailed critique of this work here, but some general comments are in order. Firstly, this analysis (call it the Special Sense Theory or SST) seems not to be an explanation. The SST tries to account for the special interpretation of the past tense in the complement clause of (11) by saying that it is an additional

sense of the past tense. Arguably, this just restates the facts. It would be preferable, if possible, to explain the unusual interpretation of the past tense in a particular context on the basis of some feature of the particular context. This is what Huddleston & Pullum do with their third use of the past tense, which expresses 'modal remoteness' in examples like these:

(22)   If you *liked* bagels, you would love this one.
(23)   I wish you *liked* bagels: I've just made some.

They comment: 'The interpretation of modal preterite clauses depends on the type of matrix construction containing them' (2002: 148): remote possibility in (22), counterfactuality in (23). A similar treatment of backshifted clauses would be desirable, unless there is a principled reason for treating these two special uses of the past tense in two different ways.

Another problem with SST is that it fails to account for the non-availability of the backshifted interpretation in IRS-N and other complements when the verb is not stative, as this contrast illustrates:

(24)   Ruby said that she wanted a bagel. (=11)
(25)   Ruby said that she ate a bagel.

The past tense of *ate* can only have the normal past time meaning, though it is not an absolute past (i.e., in relation to the speaker of (25)), but a past in relation to the (past) time when the reported speaker, Ruby, uttered her words. This gives a 'past in the past' sense, and hence the pluperfect is an alternative: *Ruby said that she had eaten a bagel* is another way of expressing the same sense. In (24), on the other hand, the backshifted meaning of *wanted* is salient; the past time meaning is possible too in (24), and is foregrounded if an appropriate time adverbial is added:

(26)   Ruby said that thirty minutes ago she wanted a bagel. (but now she's not hungry).

(The pluperfect *had wanted* is an alternative for this sense of (24) and (26), just as *had eaten* is for (25)).

For IRS-N constructions like (25), the traditional analysis, interestingly, works better than SST: a possible original utterance by Ruby is *I ate a bagel*, but not **I eat a bagel*, so there is no plausible DRS source for the backshifted sense. Notice, however, that the same pattern is found with non-IRS complements. Adapting example (19) above, we get:

(27)   This proved that she wanted a bagel.
(28)   This proved the she ate a bagel.

In example (27), *wanted* has the same two interpretations as in (24), while *ate* in (28) can only have a normal past time meaning, as in (25). The traditional analysis, formulated exclusively for reported speech, cannot extend to these examples. The SST seems to have no explanation for the difference between stative and dynamic verbs in the complement clause: all the examples in the section on backshift in

Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 151–8) use stative verbs. These observations suggest that an analysis which involves the aspect (stative vs dynamic) of the complement clauses, as well as features of the complement construction as a whole, is likely to be more explanatory than the traditional analysis or SST.

I do not have a developed analysis of this kind to offer, and so these critical remarks about SST and the need for a better explanation are merely suggestive. Arguments in support of SST, some of them quite cogent, are put forward by Declerck (1995; 2006: 363–426) and by Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 152–3). For syntactic treatments of tense in IRS-N, see Giorgi (2010) and related work by Hatav (2012) and Ogihara and Sharvit (2012).

5   Conclusion

This paper has suggested that the theory of names proposed by Coates can underpin a theory of quotation which avoids the problems of the much-derided Proper Name Theory of Quotation and has considerable explanatory power. Naming – strictly speaking, onymic referring – is the act of referring unmediated by sense. Like naming, quoting is consistently treated here as a speech act – something that speakers do, not a type of linguistic expression. This perspective underpins a clear distinction between three speech acts:

Quoting: Referring onymically to anything that can be written or spoken:

(1)   I like the sound of the word *bagel*.

Direct Reported Speech: Quoting and attribution to a source that is not the current speaker:

(2)   Ruby said 'I want a bagel'.

Indirect Reported Speech: Explicit attribution without quoting.

(11)   Ruby said that she wanted a bagel.

Indirect Reported Speech is conceived here as any speech report which does not involve quotation, including summarising and Narrative Reports of a Speech Act as well as the narrow type (IRS-N) illustrated in (11). Some of the particular properties of IRS-N are due to the fact that it involves a sentential complement, and shares some features with other sentential complements. I argued that a more satisfactory account of tense interpretation in IRS-N is needed, and I remain hopeful that future work will develop one on the basis of the revised Proper Name Theory of Quotation.

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