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Alessandro Capone

The Pragmatics of Indirect Reports

Socio-philosophical Considerations



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*This book is dedicated to my great friends
Wayne Davis and Istvan Kecskes.*

Preface

Motto (U. Eco on indirect reporting)

‘Messe le virgolette, quelle affermazione diventano fatti, cioè è un fatto che quel tale abbia espresso la tale opinione’.

(‘Once the inverted commas are put in, these statements become facts, inasmuch as it is a fact that so-and-so has uttered the opinion in question’.) (Eco 2015: 55)

One of the earliest recorded instances of indirect reporting is found in Aristophanes’ play *The Birds* (414 BC), where a Thracian demigod, Tribballos, is put on the scene to help decide a dispute between the Olympians and their earthling supporters (who have threatened to cut off all sacrificial contributions, thereby bereaving the gods of their subsistence). In the course of the deliberations, Tribballos is several times asked for his opinion, which he delivers all right – but in ‘Triballian’, reproduced in the play as a nonsense language, written with Greek letters (*Ornithes* v. 1567ff). In turn, the other interlocutors take it upon them to interpret what this ‘Thracian’ is saying – but of course only to support their own side of the quarrel.

Indirect reporting occurs here at a double level: first, Tribballos’ utterances are ‘translated’ (e.g. his *Nabaisatreu* is indirectly reported by the interpreter uttering ‘You see? He approves’), whereupon this ‘translation’/interpretation is offered as a valid contribution to the common activity of decision-making. Of course, the indirectness involved here allows the reporter/interpreter to intercalate this level of ‘double-indirect speak’: what transpires as reported is adapted to the context of the conversation *and* to the intentions of the interpreter.¹

This case nicely illustrates the importance of the notion of indirect reporting. As the author, Alessandro Capone, argues on several occasions in the present volume, indirect reporting points up some troubles when it comes to teasing out the complicated relationship between pragmatics and semantics (still thought of as possibly

¹ Curiously, a few lines down in the play, Tribballos reveals himself as being what we today would call a ‘struggling’ L2 speaker of Greek: he uses authentic Greek words, but puts them together without regard to Greek syntax or morphology, in a kind of primordial pidgin (but even here, there is still room for some indirect reporting).

‘independent modules’ by an author such as Stephen Levinson, in 1983). In reality, the context of the utterance does not allow for any kind of strict, watertight separation between the two (see, e.g., Levinson 2000; Recanati 2010). For Capone himself, being a ‘contextualist’ trivially implies that in order to be understood, all utterances are to be placed in the context in which they were uttered, but in addition, whenever we *refer* to an utterance in this way, we cannot avoid producing some kind of indirect report.

The current volume also engages with the notion of indirect reporting by seeing it as part of a Wittgensteinian ‘language game’, where concepts such as presupposition, implicature and pragmatic vs. semantic inference play a major role. In addition, as Capone remarks in his ‘Introduction’ to the book, the desired ‘perlocutionary effect’ is essential in assigning the indirect report its proper value in the context. A particularly vivid instance of this is seen in the use of ‘slurs’, understood as denigrating expressions that do not directly attack the devalued person or institution but do so by implying and connoting. By calling an Italian a ‘spaghetti’, I indirectly associate him or her with a lot of things that for some people are less desirable, such as the smell of Italian cooking or the general disorder commonly thought (by non-*Napoletani*) to be associated with Neapolitan households.

‘Slurs’, one could say, are a particular type of indirect reporting, in that they furnish information, presented as commonsense or factual, while in reality they ‘report’ on a mental condition (such as a prejudice), proper only to the utterer and people of his or her ilk. But since the ‘slur/report’ did come to be uttered (albeit indirectly), it is very hard to counteract or neutralize it; for instance, in the US context, even if the infamous ‘n-word’ is uttered indirectly, and/or subsequently retracted, the offensive locution still stands as recorded (and indeed ‘reported’) and may (potentially or really) be used against the infelicitous utterer (as attested in numerous cases of this kind of ‘indirect reporting’ in academic contexts, such as dissertation defences or other scientific activities).

The current volume illuminates these tricky but important questions of language use in a number of novel and exploratory ways, while all the time paying tribute to, and engaging with, the vast literature that is available on the subject – among other topics, on the classic distinction between ‘de re’ and ‘de se’ reporting in utterances dealing with some factual event or belief, where the ‘de se’ report inevitably relies on the existence (or even presence) of a ‘first-person’ utterer. In this way, the *social* importance of indirect reports is once more affirmed, in contrast to certain contemporary tendencies to relegate the societal conditions (the pragmatics) of utterances to the ‘extralinguistic’ realm, inaccessible to any kind of theoretical approach.

In sum, Alessandro Capone’s book represents a valuable step in the right direction of facilitating a pragmatic synthesis, based on an innovative ‘symbiosis’ between the theoreticians of ‘la langue’ and the pragmaticists of the utterance, ‘le langage’, to adopt a often (mis-)used Saussurean terminology.

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Chapter 1

Putting the Threads Together

This book has been written after many detours, represented by my previous monographs and doctoral thesis (Capone 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003). All these steps (as I am now aware, although I was not aware of this when I wrote the previous works) led in the direction of this monograph on indirect reports. On my way, I also found some companions whose work led in this direction (although they too were probably unaware of this): James Higginbotham, Yan Huang, Ernie Lepore and Kasia Jaszczolt. Their considerations on linguistics and philosophy of language were essential input to the current work.

In this book I have presented several essays I wrote in the course of several years in an order which is didactic. Materials that are easier and introductory or close to introductory are presented first. The most surprising chapter is placed last. One can make little progress in understanding indirect reports without reflecting on language games and the relationship between indirect reporting and quotation. One also needs to know a bit about footing to make progress in the understanding of belief reports (see Wettstein 2016 for parallel considerations in the philosophy of language). Some of these chapters clearly belong to societal pragmatics, while others to linguistics and philosophy. I am afraid the chapters on belief reports, ‘de se’, immunity to error through misidentification, implicit indirect reports and embedding explicatures are much more complicated and cryptic than the preceding materials. But there is little I can do about this. All in all, I am happy I wrote this book, as this is an adventure into my thought (As Mark Janse once made me understand, the most important stimuli for my research had to come from my own mind). Nobody could have predicted I was going to write these things. And many of the ideas proposed should not be completely uninteresting or totally tedious. These ideas – adventurous though they are – were influenced by materials presented by James Higginbotham during his lectures at Oxford. For example, like him, I still believe that the notion of opacity has some work to do in indirect reports and belief

reports, although I explain that pragmatically. His ideas, though, were contaminated by societal pragmatics, but this is no serious harm, if, after all, societal considerations can explain some of the examples which appeared mysterious to Higginbotham (see the chapter on the social practice of indirect reports).

The issue of indirect reports is of crucial importance to the pragmatics of language, first of all, because it helps us define what is said (and what is said is of crucial importance to the semantics/pragmatics debate); second, because it will lead us to a societally inspired view of pragmatics. In previous papers on indirect reports, I made an effort to discuss this issue in connection with Mey's (2001) notion of *pragmemes* (units of language use incorporating reference to the context in which they occur and to the culture in which they are embedded) and with Wittgenstein's notion of language games (Wittgenstein himself, in *Philosophical Investigations*, tells us that an indirect report is an example of a language game, as presumably it was clear to his mind that indirect reports follow a *praxis* involving defeasible constraints, although he did not say much else about indirect reports, apart from saying that they are a case of language game). I will return later to the issue of the semantics/pragmatics debate to sketch a view of the semantics/pragmatics debate hinging on our understanding of indirect reports. Suffice it to say for the time being that I am inclined to accept a view that indirect reports, usually or normally, report an interpreted utterance and thus encapsulate features of the context of utterance, although I would probably have to concede that in the presence of insufficient clues, an indirect report may be taken to minimally report the locutionary content of what was said. However, this is not the default interpretation of an indirect report, and we need abundant clues to discard the default interpretation involving a reference to the (original) speaker's meaning. Intuitively, one reports an uninterpreted locutionary act only if there are ambiguities and one is not able to settle the ambiguity by coming to a plausible (and preferred) interpretation. Proffering an indirect report that is very close to the literal act amounts to a surrender: one is not able to report speaker's meaning because there are irreducible ambiguities and one wants to get the hearer involved in settling the ambiguity, requiring an investment in responsibility.

At this point, a sketch of what a pragmatic theory should look like is not irrelevant, as we may clarify a number of concepts likely to turn out to be useful later, although I do not attempt to provide a complete or close to exhaustive picture of pragmatics. There are too many theories around in pragmatics and I am not going to say which theory the reader is going to choose, apart from guiding her in the (possibly difficult) enterprise of avoiding serious conceptual errors and of forming a few central notions around which pragmatic theories have to be built.

Although I am a contextualist (in the generic sense that I recognize that meanings are modulated in context, to use terminology by Recanati (2004), and that there are numerous cases of pragmatic intrusion), I recognize that sentential semantics (as well as lexical semantics) is of importance, as it provides a track around which pragmatic interpretation is built. I agree with Carston (2001), Sperber and Wilson (1986), Wilson and Sperber (2002) that linguistic semantics provides skeletal information to be fleshed out in context (by context we can also minimally intend aware-

ness of principles of language use, whether they have been learned through social interaction or they are considered innate; scalar inferences, to provide a crucial example, need not have an actual context (textual context) in order to be computed but can be computed in a default context, although such inferences at some point in the inferential process need to be placed in the actual context of utterance and, in some cases, may be aborted or defeated). However, this skeletal information is not negligible and is not necessarily incomplete or such that it cannot be used without an actual context. When we hear a sentence, this can provide enough information for us to know what the world has to be like (for the statement of the sentence to be true), although there are possible completions and expansions leading us to a better grasp of the extra-linguistic situation the statement was used to represent – I imagine that completing an utterance in this sense is a more or less endless enterprise (as Cappelen and Lepore 2005 noted), considering that despite how much we add, there is always something we could add to make a proposition look more complete. If, out of context, we hear the sentence ‘He went to the cinema’, we minimally know that there is someone, who is male and went to the cinema, although we do not know which cinema he went to or who he was. Although at this point, we cannot (completely) flesh out the sentence, we can keep it in memory for further use and, should we find out later on that the speaker was speaking of John and of the Odeon, we can return to that sentence and say of it that it meant, in context, that John went to the Odeon. We could not have made such substitutions if the sentence had not meant anything for us or if we had thought that no use could be made of it. Why keep it in memory for some time, if the sentence is devoid of meaning? Contextualists should properly acknowledge that what minimalists have in mind is the fact that semantics has some degree of independence from pragmatics, that it is conventional and arbitrary and allows us to express (and communicate) thoughts to other people. Without semantics, communication would appear to be a miraculous process (Cappelen and Lepore 2005). There is another side of the question, even if one were to accept that semantics is independent of pragmatics and furnishes logical forms that can be useful in furthering communication: How is semantics acquired? One might have to resort to the answer that language acquisition minimally reduces to basic Wittgensteinian language games such as:

A: What is this?

B: This is a rabbit

Language is not always acquired in this way, through language games of the type Question/Answer, as the part of the lexicon dealing with philosophy or mathematics may require more explicit definitions of concepts. But even if we granted that the basic Wittgensteinian language games can be sufficient to acquire (or teach) a language, we would have to concede that some under-determinacy ruins the explicative potential of language games, as ‘this’ might refer to the whole rabbit or a part of it. Acquisition of semantics, in other words, takes us back to pragmatic underdeterminacy and to the role played by pragmatics in language (in providing full propositional forms). What is even worse, supposing that there is something like a semantics

that is completely independent of pragmatics, one would have to admit that this is arrived at through a process of sifting meanings (the invariant parts of meanings) through contextual variation (see Capone 1998, 2000). In other words, insensitive semantics is sifted by carefully analyzing the contexts which invariable semantics wants to get rid of (or be set apart from). Although a compromising statement is that semantics and pragmatics ought to coexist and work in tandem (as Levinson 1983 famously says), it appears to us that semantics and pragmatics are intricately connected. But the fact that they are connected is not a serious problem, if not for those who want to segregate semantics from pragmatics completely. Segregation is no good, because the two sides of communication (semantics and pragmatics) are two sides of the same coin and must have points of interconnection. (However, for methodological reasons, distinguishing semantic and pragmatic aspects of meaning might have some work to do).

Pragmatics deals with inferences (normally conversational and conventional implicatures and the corresponding explicatures, that is the contributions of pragmatics to full propositions). An utterance is usually produced with a speaker's intention¹ and it is the job of the hearer to reconstruct what the speaker meant in that context (as well as in a default context). Speaker's meanings are not conventional at least in the sense that they are not due to sentential semantics, though we may be open to the idea that there may be conventions of use determining at least part of conversational implicatures (Davis 1998). Conversational implicatures may be of two types: they may be the result of (possibly laborious) reflective processes; or they may be automatic, the result of innate mechanisms lodged in something that looks like a theory of mind module (busy with reconstructing other minds' thoughts and feelings) or otherwise the result of default inferences (which are not reflective, though using rationality principles) arrived at through principles of language use, which are not innate but are presupposed by rational beings in communication, since without them there can be, so the story goes, no successful communication. In my modest opinion, principles of language use (like the Gricean or neo-Gricean maxims) have to be seen not as conventions of language use, which may exist nevertheless side by side and explain other inferential phenomena, as Davis (1998) says, but as principles which a rational mind has to presuppose for communication to be able to occur at all. Without them, communication would be disorderly, random and inefficient. I suppose that Grice had this neo-Kantian view of the maxims. The maxims are not taught (although they could be taught and they could also be modularized, as the practice of law makers and their interpreters shows) and they need not be innate. Speakers grasp them because they are rational and they recognize that they are necessary for communication to proceed in the most rational way. Speakers need not make an effort to grasp the maxims. It would not be surprising if principles of rational communication ended up either being modularized or being wired into brain in an appropriate mind-reading module. This is not an issue that can be easily resolved, but we shall work with the persuasion that modularity, modularization and the rationality of communicative principles are interconnected.

¹ It is animated by an intention, as Dascal (2003) would put it.

Two other points need to be stressed in connection with our way of understanding pragmatics. Pragmatic inferences are not arbitrary or conventional, in most cases, apart from some pragmemes which Capone (2005) dealt with or the cases brought to our attention by Davis (1998). They are usually promoted by the context of utterance (more on this later). Pragmatic inferences are cancellable, especially if they are considered as potential implicatures. Some authors (like Capone 2003, 2006, 2009 or Burton-Roberts 2005) argue that explicatures are not cancellable, if they are based on strong intentionality. Potential implicatures involve no strong intentionality and thus, at least in this case, we could say without hesitation that they are cancellable inferences. To explain things crudely, cancellability is important in all forms of interaction where the speaker does not want to threaten the face of the recipient, while lack of cancellability correlates with strong intentionality and especially with the need to liberate a text from possible contradictions or logical absurdities, which is what happens in explicatures, generally. It would be counterintuitive to argue that implicatures are always cancellable or are always uncancellable. In general, potential implicatures are cancellable. In practice, in many cases particularized implicatures are not cancellable. (They are ‘entrenched’ to use a term by Jaszczolt (2016)).

The issue of indirect reports benefits from our pragmatic considerations because indirect reports can be studied with reference to actual contexts of usage but also with reference to the default context, where principles of language use guide interpretation and can be deemed to be responsible for the social praxis involved in generating (producing) and understanding indirect reports. Conceding that there is a social praxis to which indirect reports conform is tantamount to saying that indirect reports are ‘manufactured’, as they are not ‘natural’ products emerging from a bio-program. Even if we admitted that principles of language use reflecting innate mechanisms govern the use of indirect reports, speakers would nonetheless have to be confronted with a practice and learn what is licit and what is not from it, although innate mechanisms would help them considerably and provide necessary guide. The praxis is needed to reinforce the application of innate principles of language use and to ban products which are not well-manufactured (illegitimate indirect reports).

The reason why I have chosen to discuss indirect reports is that this issue represents a way to study the interconnection between linguistic activities and social practices. The emphasis here is not on sentences that (merely) have a representational power but on utterances embedded in social practices (in real situations). Indirect reports do not only involve assertions but also speech acts other than assertions (as we shall see, the norms governing the reports of performative utterances may be somewhat different from those holding for assertions); thus they require an emphasis on social action as implemented through linguistic mechanisms. Indirect reports are also motivated by the speakers’ perlocutionary goals and these are best investigated through reference to the relationship between an indirect report and the action (plan) in which it is embedded. Without much argument, I assume that indirect reports necessitate an argumentative link, which is often hidden (that is, not available from an observational point of view, unless one bothers to understand complex relation-

ships and units beyond the level of the sentence or even of the utterance). Without the intention of making this argumentative link explicit (explaining the reasons for the indirect report), it remains a mystery why the report was issued and why it was formulated in the way it was (given that it was possible to formulate it in different ways, though certain other ways were not licit). If there is a distance between the locutionary act of the original speaker and the form of the indirect report,² this distance (or difference or gap) must be imputed to the nature of the perlocutionary intent of the indirect report. So, on the one hand, the indirect report requires us to understand the nature of the perlocutionary intent; on the other hand, a reflection on the perlocutionary intent gives us a measure of the difference between the original utterance and the indirect report. Needless to say, the original utterance is not available to the hearer (the addressee of the report), but since his/her aim is to reconstruct it and this is possible only after distinguishing the reporter's from the original speaker's voice, the addressee has to reason on the basis of what she hears and on the basis of contextual clues. If she understands the point of the report, she can perhaps identify the possible transformations of meaning effected by the speaker (the indirect reporter). She can wonder, 'Was this NP what the original speaker used, or did he in fact use other possible NPs? Which are the alternatives? Are there alternatives capable of rendering the message more acceptable or of rendering the original speaker less culpable?' All the armory of inferential mechanisms has to be deployed in attributing a voice to the original speaker. Part of the armory comes from pragmatics and principles of language use. We may reason that the default purpose of an indirect report is to report what a speaker said and not what the indirect reporter thought of what the speaker said (see Chaps. 2 and 13 in this book). It may be reasonable to expect that (UNLESS there are detectable perlocutionary effects leading in a different direction), the reporting speaker will use words maximally reflecting the point of view of the reported speaker. If the perlocutionary effects and the other visible contextual clues allow the addressee to detect a gap between what the original speaker said and what the reporter said (in reporting an utterance), then the addressee will note a divergence between the standard practice of reporting (likely to follow the social path of interaction) and the individual path of interpretation (which follows the individual inclinations and motivations of the speaker). The indirect reporter will be found to be culpable because he has diverged from a practice sedimented through the convergence of the general purpose of the activity (or language game of reporting indirectly) and its being considered as having good effects (thus being ratified as acceptable or reasonable by a community of speakers) (see Pandolfo 2013).

We often find it convenient to report what some speaker said on a certain occasion and in a given context of utterance, including what was said prior to the utterance, some background knowledge concerning the speaker (and the interlocutor), as well as the objects visible in the context of the conversation. We do not report an utterance to waste time, but in order to pursue some purpose, such as providing informa-

²Wettstein (2016), following Quine, uses the term 'deviation'.

tion we deem of use to the addressee, to be extracted from what was said, the reported speaker being considered an informant, someone who knows something the hearer of the report ignores or is at least believed to ignore. We may think that the report is beneficial to the hearer in that the reported speaker provided information the hearer of the report might use (to her advantage). Alternatively, we may think that the hearer of the report should be interested in knowing what the original speaker said because what was said was offensive to the hearer of the report or, otherwise, praised the hearer of the report. We may report insults either by quoting the words used or by paraphrasing the insults in indirect reports which mix-quote some crucial words (though not all the words used) or by abridging the insult in such a way that much of its force is (partially) lost. “He insulted you” could be used either for a very bad insult or for a weak insult; thus, only by comparing the report with the words used can we know whether the reporter aggravated or mitigated the insult. What is (most) interesting, for a theory of pragmatics, is that both indirect reports (including those of the mixed type) and abridgments are interpretative acts, whereas direct reports may not involve interpretation or may involve (by comparison with indirect reports) a weaker degree of interpretation.³

Depending on the purpose of the report, we can either summarize or expand the content of what was said in the original utterance (Uo). Both types of praxis may hide the purpose of adapting the words to the purpose of the indirect report. Expansions are very rarely exegetical, but, in the most innocent cases, they may involve a genuine desire to help hearers understand what is being talked about, that is to say have access to the referents of the discourse, by using modes of presentation which are more informative or helpful to the hearer. In another innocent case, a speaker may want to make sure that the report is accessible to the hearer and, thus, may transform the words used (not only NPs but predicates and adverbs as well) by replacing the text with a less obscure one. There are, however, transformations that are far from innocent, as summarizing involves getting rid of problematic utterances (at least sometimes) and expanding seems to add elements the original speaker (So) did not pronounce but were, so to say, extracted from what she said in virtue of rational inference (see Chap. 14). We may reasonably assume that in some cases, as in interpreting the law, expansions of this type are innocent (or anyway conform to the norm), whereas, in reporting ordinary conversation, expanding by adding elements (propositions) resulting from inference immediately reveals that the indirect report is oriented towards a purpose (whether the purpose is benign or not remains to be decided).

It is not clear which is the most dangerous practice in indirect reporting (at least potentially), whether summarizing or expanding. It may appear that expansions are

³The principal advantage of abridgments is that they do not display the words used, but work as short summaries. This tactics can prevent the indirect reporter from sounding too offensive, as reporting the words verbatim may reproduce the offence. The summary, instead, is an indirect report not only in so far as it reports something without quoting an utterance (by briefly characterizing it in a narrative way) but also in so far as it removes the offensive words: it is indirect also in the sense that it works like a mitigator of the offence.

less innocent, simply because it is immediately evident that elements are added which were not (there) in the text of the reported utterance. However, since it is the speaker's intentions that matter in the praxis of indirect reports, a degree of interpretation is always (or almost always) required. What is suspicious though, is that, sometimes, interpreted constituents do not correspond to elements already there in the text. In such cases, interpretation serves to expand the text by adding things. In exegesis, this may be tolerated (and is in fact encouraged), but in reporting daily conversation, we may have reasons to be suspicious when interpolations are added. Suppose we see John with an angry, red face, saying 'You are insulting me'. Then the reporter may well judge that John has understated his intentions and wanted to say, even though he did not, 'You are badly insulting me'. Could the reporter combine what was said and elements of context to report what was meant, say, by saying 'John felt badly insulted' or 'John angrily said he was being insulted', or 'John said he was badly insulted'? Clearly 'John felt badly insulted' could be understood as 'John said: 'You are badly insulting me'', that is to say as an indirect report in disguise. Although this is not an issue to be pursued here, disguised indirect reports usually correspond to statements of feelings, states of mind, attitudes the speaker (the reporter) could not have access to without the experiencer's giving voice to his/her emotions, feelings, attitudes, etc. (In other words, we may assume that the reporter had access to those emotions or states of mind principally through speech, rather than through inference (say, by looking at the person's facial expression and at what it evinces). 'John said he was being badly insulted' contains an expansion and we have to decide whether the expansion is licit or not. We wonder whether reporting what one wanted to say but did not say is licit as a practice in indirect reporting an utterance. Perhaps the speaker refrained from saying something and she did so with the intention of not aggravating the situation. Thus is not the purpose of expanding the utterance, in this case, in conflict with the speaker's intention? Presumably, the indirect report should cull the speaker's intentions and not the aborted intentions (John was red with anger but refrained from aggravating his utterance). However, it is possible that the reporter noticed some element of the voice (say *INSULTING ME* is pronounced with greater acoustic energy), which he interpreted as replacing a missing constituent such as 'badly'. Given that indirect reports involve an element of interpretation and a reconstruction of the speakers' intentions, I favor the view that such expansions can be licit provided that they are supported by objective elements of the speech situation and by an accurate reconstruction by the reporter.

Consider the utterance type 'John said that Mary is pretty'. We may wonder on what basis the reporter is saying that. Was he in John's vicinity, when he said that? Or is the report hearsay? It is difficult to decide whether the reporter was close in a chain of reporters to John or whether he reports the utterance on the basis of hearsay evidence. Yet, it would not be unreasonable to assume that indirect reports contain an empty slot reserved for evidential grounds, to be filled through free enrichment (see Carston 2002 for the notion of explication and free enrichment). In English or in Italian we do not have ways to signal whether a piece of information is provided on the basis of hearsay evidence or direct knowledge. However, it is clear that when

we hear ‘John said that Mary is in Paris’, we do not get the impression that the reporter is the last person in a chain of informants, but, instead, we get the impression that the reporter was close to John when he said that (or anyway connected with him through some direct information link, as in a telephone call), when he heard John say that. Of course, this is a pragmatic inference, in so far as it is defeasible. One could hear things such as the following: ‘John said that Mary is in Paris, but I was not there when he said that’. This testifies that the inference to the effect that the speaker is a directly related source of information, which surely gets through, is non-monotonic. Of course, it would be unlikely to be part of the semantics of the sentence or of the conventions of use of the utterance. It is not part of the semantics, because there is no constituent in the sentence corresponding to ‘I could hear the utterance myself; I do not have indirect knowledge’. It clearly belongs to pragmatics because the inference does not get through in virtue of certain words.⁴

It may be useful to compare indirect reports to summaries. To some extent, summaries are indirect reports of a certain type. They are not verbatim reports and they are not even close paraphrases of what was said. The speaker (in a summary) takes the freedom to decide which points have to be included and which have to be eliminated.⁵ Furthermore, if some points are eliminated because they are not considered important, other points are subsumed into a more general lexical category (a basic example is ‘There was a car, a scooter and a helicopter’ → ‘There were some vehicles’). One may think that, given the affinity between summaries and indirect reports, a speaker is free to choose his words (which words to use) in an indirect report, eliminating the lexical choices of the original addressee. However, it is never a good idea to replace a delicate word with another word which may appear to be insulting. For example, it is a bad idea to make the following replacement, where a licit lexical choice is replaced by a slurring expression, whose use is condemned as being a form of ‘hate-speech’:

I am waiting for that black guy → I am waiting for that negro
Alessandro said that he was waiting for that negro.

Of course, hearers (and overhearers) may know well that I am not biased against black people and I would never use derogatory words to refer to them. Through background knowledge, such hearers are capable of discriminating between what my reporter said and what I said and they are able to reconstruct, given the indirect report they have heard, that I have said something like ‘I am waiting for that black

⁴ An alternative view might be that these reports need to be contextualized and, in context, it may be clear whether the speaker is a directly related source of information or not. Admittedly, this is an issue where one can hold more than one view.

⁵ Of course, summaries can be used with the purpose of hiding part of the truth. The result of encapsulating some information and of eliminating other pieces of information may be that of ‘partiality’ intended as an unfair treatment of a person through a characterization. Suppose I am asked to write a reference on behalf of Mary, and I confine myself to merely describing her good qualities or (only) her negative qualities. In either case, the result would be disappointing and it might be claimed that my treatment of information concerning Mary was not correct, as there was not the proper balance of good and bad traits.

guy' (or 'I am waiting for that guy', as I am personally not even likely to use the color of the skin to pick up the referent from other possible referents), as this is to be considered insulting or demeaning. However, if the hearers or overhearers do not know me, they will be led by the indirect report into thinking that I am racist and that by proffering my utterance I possibly intended to insult a slice of the population due to a racial prejudice. But I am not that sort of man, thus something has to be introduced (or recognized) as being part of the pragmatic practice to forbid replacements of NPs with NPs which turn out to be insulting (or obscene, etc.) or problematic anyway. This practice is not only confined to the lexicon of slurs, but may include other spheres of life. For example, I remember well, on an occasion of utterance, my scout was going to say something; however, she made an effort to replace the word we would normally use for that action, because in ordinary speech that constitutes a case of homonymy ('scopare' may be either translated as 'sweep the floor' or as 'fuck'). The context contained sufficient clues to disambiguate the item; however, since there was nobody else in the house in addition to me, somehow she was embarrassed to use a word which could be construed as having sexual implications (and could somehow be heard as an invitation) and she hesitated for some seconds, looking for the correct replacement (which to her light was 'spazzare', which is not ambiguous). Would it be correct, in such a case, to report my scout in the following way:

- (1) La signora delle pulizie ha detto che scoperà il pavimento
(lit. the scout said that she would sweep the floor)?

My reply is that, while there is no problem in translating (1) into English, as the verb 'sweep' does not have a sexual import, reporting (1) (in Italian) would not do justice to the lady, who made a considerable effort to replace the word. Even if she did not pronounce that word, her pause, that denoted hesitation, made it evident that she was looking for a different word and when she found it, she would not have liked to have herself reported as if she had used the other option, which she, in fact, avoided. We may conclude that speakers have clear ideas about what they said or did not say and that, often, their approval or disapproval is decisive in determining whether an indirect report is licit (or faithful) or not (see some interesting objections by Wayne Davis p.c. later on in this book). The indirect report has to be faithful to the speaker's meaning, rather than to the locutionary point.

As I have already said, it may be useful to think of an indirect report in terms of a summary. When we summarize a text, we are careful to distinguish between the text we are citing verbatim and the text we are summarizing through our own style. If we are not citing specific words or phrases, the indirect report uses the style of the indirect reporter and it may be useful to distinguish the style of the citations from the style of the non-cited text, which ought to reflect the reporter's perspective to some extent. Could the indirect report aim to ameliorate the style of the text, like a summary? Suppose there are grammatical errors, should they be reported or not? If the reporter keeps them, then she runs the risk of having the mistakes attributed to her – a risk she may not want to incur. Thus, it makes sense to expunge involuntary

errors. In fact, there is no reason for keeping them, since the reporter is summarizing a speech event and not reporting it verbatim. However, there may be mixed-reported segments of the text and the reporter has to choose whether to keep the errors or expunge them (in the quoted text). Normally, unless grammatical errors are relevant to the purpose of the indirect report, they are quickly expunged. Certainly, it never crosses the reporter's mind to inject errors into the text in order to lead the hearer to attribute the errors to the reported speaker. This would not be licit, as that would unnecessarily cast a dark shadow over the reported speaker. If we consider indirect reports as analogous to summaries, we are clearly justified in adding text, in the same way as in a summary we would normally, without hesitating too much, add information which makes the understanding of the text easier. A summary is an act of interpretation and, thus, it makes sense to add information and make the interpretation easier for the writer of the summary, in the hope that the same piece of information will be helpful to the reader too, thus illuminating the text in points which would otherwise be obscure. Since the point of the indirect report is to get across the original speaker's communicative intention, it makes sense to resort to an informational apparatus intended to help the hearer/reader come to a suitable interpretation of the text, one which is possibly in line with that by the indirect reporter. Added information could include information that illuminates certain points of the text, by removing possible ambiguities, but it could also include information aiming to reveal the original speaker's or even the indirect reporter's perlocutionary purpose. An utterance such as 'John said that Mary is in Paris, which you would surely want to know' is a combination of what was said with the revelation of the reporter's perlocutionary point (in proffering the indirect report). We could also have a report like the following 'John said that Mary was in Paris because he wanted to let us know that she often betrays him with another guy'. Here we have the utterance coupled with an explication of the original speaker's perlocutionary purpose. As we can easily see, this is similar to a summary, where we add information to disambiguate or to explicate. In a summary, we usually combine the act of describing with the act of pondering on the text.

Indirect reports are language games – at least they are according to Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. It is true that indirect reports often appear in the form of one utterance long micro-narrations and that language games usually involve a linguistic sequence of utterances; however, these are not structural problems preventing us from using the term 'language game' for an indirect report. What is most important to establish, to demonstrate that the term 'language game' applies well to indirect reports, is that indirect reports follow a praxis – in fact, a social practice. We have already seen that indirect reports are subject to social constraints and that they should not alter what was said in a way that perspectives it (too much) from the angle of the reported speaker while distorting the nature of what was said by the original speaker. The indirect report is surely an act of extracting an original utterance, removed in place and time from the ongoing utterance (and situation of speech) and to situate it into a different context. Surely the reporter may (want to) use the original utterance to support his/her own perspective and the indirect report

is, on occasions, an implicit act of argumentation using the original utterance to defend or support a certain position (thesis). Although the indirect report is certainly an act of fitting (and adapting) an original utterance to a new context (and a new purpose), the original speaker preserves some rights. Although he does not preserve the right of denying that the original utterance can serve to defend the reporter's (implicit or explicit) thesis, he preserves the basic right to assent to or dissent from the transformation which the utterance underwent, on the basis of constraints that come from a societally anchored praxis. If the original speaker thinks that the reported utterance transformed the original utterance too much and in illicit ways, he can object to its being utilized that way. So, although the pragmatic potential and perlocutionary force of the original utterance are no longer under his control, the semantic import of his utterance is and if transformations alter his utterance too much so as to make it too offensive or immoral or reprehensible, he has the right to object to its use. We are now in a position to see that the future perlocutionary effects of an utterance are not predictable, once the utterance is cited or reported. However, in so far as the perlocutionary effects are to some extent connected with the semantic force of the utterance, the original speaker can exercise control over future uses of his utterance and its perlocutionary effects. It is clear that (radically or anyway illegitimately) transforming the utterance can lead to perlocutionary effects which are not only unpredicted, but are also (possibly) objected to by the original speaker.

We have seen that it is useful to consider the analogy between indirectly reporting an utterance and summarizing a story (or an utterance). We may want to return to this important point later on in order to deal with it in greater depth. But now another analogy comes to mind. Indirectly reporting an utterance is similar to translating/interpreting an utterance (from one language to another). The most important difficulties translators encounter consist in cultural differences, reflected in the use of words that are unique and, thus, difficult to explain, let alone translate to users of a different language. For example, it is difficult to explain to British subjects the meaning of the Italian word '*raccomandazione*' which does not coincide with '*recommendation*'. A word which may be used to translate '*raccomandazione*' is '*patronage*' although its syntactic uses are not the same as those of '*raccomandazione*' (to mention some differences, '*raccomandazioni*' can be plural, while '*patronage*' cannot be; '*raccomandazione*' can refer to a particular act while '*patronage*' refers to a practice). Another example attesting to cultural differences is the use of '*patronizing*' in English, which is difficult to translate into Italian. The English want to be independent and secure such independence by warning people who want to interfere too much with their actions and intentions by saying '*You are patronizing*'. This is very difficult to translate into Italian, as people belonging to Italian society, in fact, expect others to volunteer advice. In reporting an utterance from the same language, one does not encounter similar difficulties, as we expect members of the same society to share social practices and cultural values to some extent. However, if one were to report what another said in a different language, difficulties can be experienced. Surely reporting does not amount to translating word for word, as the reporter can feel free to use summaries, but if a culturally loaded word occurs as a

crucial word in the text and can by no means be eliminated, then cultural differences emerge and become an obstacle. In the most obstinate cases, all a reporter/translator can do is to append footnotes, that is explanations of the cultural differences. And now this means that indirect reports have to be expanded so as to voice explanations of certain crucial words.

When we speak, we usually expect our interlocutors to interpret us not as they wish to, but on the basis of the evidence provided by the numerous contextual clues interspersed in the context of utterance (facial expressions such as smiles, frowning, etc.). When we speak, we should bear in mind that our interlocutors are potential ‘indirect reporters’, that is to say they can be situated in circumstances in which they are asked to report what we have said and they comply with the request by providing indirect reports that can be more or less faithful to our utterances. Clearly, when we use non-literal meanings, as in the case of irony, parody, etc., there is the risk of being reported quasi-verbatim through an indirect report. In other words, there is the risk that the indirect report will not incorporate a level of interpretation (that is faithful to the speaker’s *m-intended* interpretation), but will include a level of literal interpretation. The literal interpretation, however, is not offered as such but is offered as interpreted meaning (in other words there are clues indicating that the indirect report is confined to the literal meaning of the original utterance). Thus, the hearer has no way to distinguish between the literal words uttered by the original speaker (and reproduced by the indirect reporter) and the intended meaning. What is even worse, the indirect reporter can pretend that the literal meaning is the intended meaning – in other words, he can **expunge** from the interpretation act all the elements which, in context, allowed the potential hearer to reach the intended interpretation (clues such as facial expression, for examples). The original speaker, in using non-literal meanings, is faced with a situation in which he has been reported as having meant what he literally said. Clearly, pragmatics should intervene at this point in two ways. First, the speaker ought to know and adopt a Principle of Prudence, which will prevent him from using non-literal meanings when there is a serious risk of misinterpretation or (deceitful) re-interpretation. Second, there should be a principle to protect the original speaker from unintended interpretations, given that the clues disseminated in the context should provide objective evidence in favor of one or some other interpretation (of course the problem is that, often, conversations are not video-recorded and, thus, being able to demonstrate that one had a certain interpretation in mind is problematic). This is one of the topics I will discuss in this book – and although I will not devote to it more than one chapter, my impression is that this is one of the most important topics dealt with in the book likely to have many ramifications in due time.

Before proceeding further with the treatment of indirect reports, it might be convenient to dwell for some time on the alleged differences between direct and indirect reports. The reader might think that direct reports are clear-cut cases where what the reporter said coincides with the content of the original speaker’s utterance. If there were clear-cut differences, then we could use direct reports to explain to

what extent indirect reports differ from direct reports. However, it is clear that in direct reports too there may be eliminations and additions (or expansions). As Saka (2005) says, direct quotation need not coincide with verbatim quotation, although surely there are semantic ways to indicate that an utterance is being quoted verbatim (e.g. This is exactly what s/he said). There are obvious transformations occurring in direct reports. To provide a clear example, direct reports may ameliorate the grammatical status of a sentence. The reason for this is that the reporter feels the need to ameliorate the grammar of a sentence because if he did not do so, then the hearer would be uncertain as to whether the bad grammar is due to the reporter or to the reported speaker. But even if the reporting speaker did not care of his self-image, a principle of Charity operates in the language and compels the reporter to offer an image of the original speaker which is acceptable. The only case when the reporter does not alter the grammatical status of a sentence is when he wants to point to such a defect. Suppose an examiner in a competition for a job wants to point to certain defects in the style of an author. Then the best way to point to such defects is by quotation. But, obviously, if such defects are purged in the course of quotation, then the purpose of the quotation is not fulfilled. However, if the purpose of the reporter is not to draw attention to the form but to the content of the message, because such a content is relevant to some perlocutionary purpose, then he had better not focus on small or minor grammatical errors as that would distract the hearer or the reader from the perlocutionary purpose. In direct reports too we may have substitutions of NPs, when such substitutions facilitate the recognition of the referent on the part of the hearer/reader. Or we may have expansions when we want to help the hearer have access to a referent and we do so by adding an appositive phrase which illuminates the referent.

I said that, in indirectly reporting, we may add an element of inference. This is clearly the case when the speaker reports a speech act by another speaker. With assertions, there are no special problems, as the reporter can simply use the verb 'say' which is neutral as to the kind of speech act expressed in the original utterance. In a sense, 'say' is the least committal indirect report and does not reveal anything (or much) about the illocutionary point of the reported speech act. Perhaps the reporter has a theory of what speech act was accomplished but he certainly does not reveal it, if he just makes use of the verb 'say'. Things may be somewhat different if a verb different from 'say' is used in the indirect report. In fact, an utterance such as 'He told me to come to London' is standardly interpreted as 'he ordered me/requested that I come to London'. There is an element of performativity in 'tell' that is missing in indirect reports making use of 'say' (which is neutral concerning illocutionary force, as I previously said). The verb 'ask' is similarly performative and in indirect reports (as well as in direct speech acts) it does not count as reporting a question but as reporting a request (if followed by the infinitive form, as in 'John asked me to leave'). This is probably peculiar to English, as there was once a misunderstanding between one of the authors of a collective book of mine and myself, as I used the verb 'ask' to ask the authors to do something, but it was interpreted as an imperative 'You should do X'. This discussion needs to be deepened at some point, though not here, as my general point is that in reporting a speech act by using

‘tell to’, and ‘ask to’ one is reporting a specific kind of speech act, recognizable through an illocutionary marker. In the case of other speech acts, such as ‘promise’, ‘request’, etc. the use of ‘promise’ in the indirect report need not be a marker of performativity.⁶ The reporter may say ‘John promised to come’ without committing himself to the usage (by John) of the words ‘I promise to come...’. In fact, such reports may well contain an element of inference. Perhaps John said ‘I will come’ and in the context of the speech act, the reporter understood that he was promising to come. These can be treated as interpreted reported speech acts. In reporting, one is also interpreting the words and saying that they counted as doing *x* in that particular context. Suppose John said ‘I will come’ and kissed his golden crucifix meaning ‘I swear I will come’. Then, having observed all this, the reporter may say ‘John swore to come’ and this has to be taken as an act of interpretation and of representation (report) of another speech act. The report both represents the act of saying by John (and its content) and the interpretative act by the reporter. So, these indirect reports turn out to be strongly perspectived.

Another verb used in (or marking) indirect reports is ‘teach to’. Consider ‘Mum taught us how to survive’. ‘Teach’ does not advert us to the presence of a performative, as mum might not have said ‘I want to teach you how to survive’ or ‘I am teaching you how to survive’. Perhaps she did not even intend to teach us anything and she only confined herself to a series of propositions, which amount to a series of pieces of advice, even though not even the word ‘advice’ or ‘advise’ appears (as one can give advice without saying ‘I advise you to...’). Clearly indirect reports prefaced by ‘teach to’ (or ‘taught to...’) refer to indirect reports of action which were interpreted and whose interpretation is encapsulated in the indirect report. Perhaps mum just used the words ‘A man who lives by God’s light is always happy and rich’ and did not say ‘My advice is’ or ‘I am teaching you to...’. However, having interpreted those words in context as a piece of advice or a moral teaching we can report ‘Mum taught us to live by God’s light’. This is clearly an interpreted indirect report of a non-performative utterance; at the same time it is also a summary, as it is not clear what mum’s words were: perhaps she used a sentence; perhaps she made an entire speech on God’s ways of illuminating our behavior. The summary only captures the essential elements of mum’s speech, what is relevant to our current concerns.

This kind of indirect report clearly is an abridgment or a summary (of a general kind) of the words uttered. We only know the general import of the words – this looks like a characterization of mum (we characterize her through what she said) and at the same time it counts as an incitement to behave accordingly. The parallel with stories is illuminating. Although, in the case of one utterance long indirect reports, we do not expect that they should have the complex structure and organization of stories, we expect that something similar should occur at the structural level. In the same way as a story can have an explicit or implicit moral coda, an indirect

⁶In the sense that the use of ‘John promised ...’ in the indirect report does not correspond to the use of a performative expression (like ‘I promise that...’) in the original utterance.

report can have a moral perlocutionary effect. In this case, the report of mum's utterance may count as an incitement to behave accordingly.

In the same way as stories can work as characterizations (see Sacks 1992, vol. 2, p. 242) and can provide space for experiences (of pain or of joy) on the part of the narrator, indirect reports can partly report what the original speaker's attitude to the content of what she said was (at the same time allowing the reporting speaker to give expression to what he felt when the illocutionary act was proffered by the original speaker). The report might be something along these lines:

Mary ironically said that we were very rich;
 Mary cruelly said that we were ignorant.
 Mary happily said that she was willing to help us.

Clearly in these cases we have comments on the part of the reporter a propos of the content of what is said or the inference the reporter made on the basis of what Mary said about Mary's character or an impression which the narrator had in hearing Mary's voice (the hearers can only hear the words Mary said, but not her tone of voice and thus the narrator takes great pains to describe the tone of voice too, as something which is not irrelevant).

We have seen that performative acts need special consideration and that indirect reports of these may involve slight modifications of the general practice, such as, e.g. the introduction of lexical materials expressing the performativity of the speech acts. We wonder whether similar considerations could be held for 'John knows that Mary is in Paris', that is to say reports of knowledge states. Reports of knowledge states are particularly thorny, because there can be no (visible or perceptible) state unless the knower says there is. Although, through inference, I could say 'Mary knows there is a toy on the carpet', there is no guarantee that she has seen the toy, although I have seen it and I expect people in the room to see it. But what if she has not seen it? Then in this case, the statement 'Mary knows there is a toy on the carpet' is clearly false. This shows that attributions of knowledge are special and generally depend on an utterance by the original speaker that could be used as a report of his or her knowledge state. If Mary says 'There is a toy on the carpet' then we can legitimately report 'Mary knows there is a toy on the carpet'. So, now we have the consideration, which does not seem to be too distant from the truth, that 'Mary knows there is a toy on the carpet' has to be treated as if it were an indirect report, although no verb like 'say' appears in the indirect report. We could call them **implicit or disguised indirect reports**. We know that a verb like 'say' must be there in the structure of the indirect report, but we do not see it. The utterance could be explicated in two ways: 'Mary said she knows that there is a toy on the carpet' and 'I know that Mary knows there is a toy on the carpet, because Mary said that'. This may very well be responsible for the fact that in the Italian utterance 'Mario sa che Giovanna è al cinema' (Mario knows that Giovanna is at the cinema) the speaker is prepared to concede that for all Mario knows, Giovanna could not be at the cinema. In other words, knowledge reports in Italian contain an element of uncertainty or doubt which we do not perceive in English (if we are to believe what my many

informants told me). And now we are ready to suspect that the explicature (the slot for the evidential grounds) has been grammaticalized in Italian leading to erosion for verbs of knowledge (see Macagno and Capone, 2016).

The interesting thing about indirect reports is that while usually we express them through the verb ‘say’ (Mary said that she was happy), we could do so by using a verb of knowledge. After all, Timothy Williamson’s (1996) rule of usage (in connection with assertions) encourages us to do so. When Mary utters ‘p’, she is committed to this proposition (‘p’) because, as an obvious consequence of Williamson’s considerations on knowledge and assertion, in a categorical assertion there should be an empty slot for a verb for knowledge. Thus ‘I am at home’ could be paraphrased with ‘I know that I am at home’. I am not too sure that Williamson’s rule of usage is exempt from criticism, because intuitively while there is no harm in imparting real (useful) knowledge through ‘I know that p’, it is a bit strange to preface pieces of knowledge which are not newsworthy with ‘I know that p’. But anyway, if we were to accept Williamson’s considerations, we would have to be confronted with the fact that ‘John knows that p’ is an accurate report of John’s having said ‘p’, given that his saying ‘p’ counted as ‘I know that p’. So now we are accepting the view that ‘John knows that p’ is an indirect report which could describe two different acts: John’s having said ‘I know that p’ and his having said ‘p’. In other words, the indirect report becomes less fine-grained than we think it should be. The important fact which ought to be noted is that, intuitively, there is a difference between ‘John said that p’ and ‘John knows that p’. The difference lies in the fact that in the former case, we are reporting an utterance which is close to the words uttered, whereas in the latter case interpretation of the words is encapsulated in the indirect report. John could have said ‘p’ without being the author of the words – he could have uttered the words in his capacity as animator (in Goffmanian terms). He could have uttered those words ironically, in a joke, under duress, and in general being deprived of the appropriate intention of making a real assertion.⁷ All these cases are covered by ‘said that’,⁸ which in principle ought to be distinguished from ‘asserted that p’ (a scalar mechanism ought to be in force to distinguish the force of ‘say’ from that of ‘assert’). However, in the case of ‘John knows that p’, he did not merely utter the words ‘p’ but committed himself to their truth (to the truth of the proposition expressed by those words).

The considerations I have expressed so far apply *in toto* to belief reports. We might consider utterances such as ‘John believes that Mary is clever’ as indirect reports (interestingly, in principle the utterance could report two things: John’s said: ‘I believe Mary is clever’ or John said ‘Mary is clever’). Despite interpretative ambiguities, the principal problem for pragmatic scholars is to investigate whether the NPs appearing in the belief report also appear (or otherwise do not appear) in

⁷In a subsequent chapter I say more on footing. For the time being, suffice it to say that ‘X said that p’ with x as animator, can only receive the interpretation ‘X said: p’ (recontextualizing things, this interpretation is available).

⁸Grice would have used the convoluted but more appropriate ‘He made as if to say that p’ for such cases. I think one can utter ‘X said that p’ only in a loose way, in such cases.

John's utterance about Mary. Did John think of Mary as Mary or not? What I argue in this volume is that the indirect report is presented from the original speaker's perspective – although in some cases the reporter, faced with a hearer who knows the referents under different guises, may change the names or the descriptions to aid recognition of the referent. What we are interested in is what happens in the standard case. Pragmatics seems to be involved in the practice of showing fidelity to the NPs used by the person whose utterance is reported. In this volume, I justify this position by resorting to pragmatic principles, although I might also merely say that this is the current social practice (involved in this specific language game). In this volume I will claim that null appositives are added, that explain why the reporter is taken to report a belief that uses certain guises (or modes of presentation) and not others. I also argue that these appositions are sentential, that is to say they are appended to NPs but they are appended to sentences.

Given the discussion of belief reports, it is not surprising that the book slides into a discussion of a special case of belief reports: 'de se' belief reports. However, the discussion is extended to other verbs of propositional attitude. The general upshot of my position is that reports of 'de se' attitudes require pragmatic processing, as a first-personal component is injected into the proposition expressed through pragmatics. I then complete the picture by looking at Immunity to Error through Misidentification and claim that this is sensitive to pragmatic aspects of interpretation, as it surely correlates with genuine 'de se' reports of attitudes, and not with impure 'de se' reports.

The last chapter of this volume is devoted to the notorious problem of substitution in simple sentences. This is really a puzzle, according to Jennifer Saul (2007) and one which needs thorough investigation. This puzzle can be entirely dissolved once we consider the possibility of tacit embeddings which function as intensional contexts and thus create opacity to block substitution of co-extensive NPs. Although the idea, presented like this at a superficial level, seems to be easy, its implementation is not, as it involves deep pondering on the nature of pragmatic constraints on free enrichments. I also take into consideration certain objections raised by Saka (abstract for the First International conference in Pragmatics and Philosophy, Palermo May 2016).

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Chapter 2

On the Social Practice of Indirect Reports

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I shall deal with the social practice of indirect speech reports, a topic that has connections with speech act theory and propositional attitudes. I quite agree with Cresswell (2000), mainly a critique of Davidson (1968), that the study of indirect reports needs to incorporate pragmatics, but I shall certainly advocate the view that the practice of indirect reports requires limits to the information that counts as ‘samesaying’ (a term dear to Davidson 1968) and that these can be ascertained by studying societal pragmatics (Mey 2001; Capone 2003b). As Mey says:

Pragmatics admonishes the linguistic scientists that they should take the users of language more seriously, as they, after all, provide the bread and butter of linguistic theorizing (...) (Mey 2001, 289).

If readers expect a mathematical formula to capture the logic of indirect reports, they will be disappointed; following Strawson (1952, 344; cf. Levinson 1983, 175), I am persuaded that “ordinary language has no exact logic” and that the best one can do is to propose that one can master the practice of indirect reports if one is ready to apply a number of constraints. I shall argue that the samesaying relation is to some extent pragmatically determined; the consequence of this is to accept that exchanging different NPs within the same indirect report does not necessarily reverse the truth-value (Cappelen and Lepore 1997a, b). I shall also argue that indirect speech reports are **transformations** of original speech events, subject to severe limitations. I shall study the interactions with the theory of pragmemes, of indexicals and of modes of presentation. I end this chapter suggesting that a key to the understanding of indirect reports is the exploration of analogies with the theory of speech acts and that, on the contrary, analogies with the theory of propositional attitudes may be misleading. As Verschueren says:

pragmatics does not constitute an additional component of a theory of language, but it offers a different perspective (Verschueren 1999, 2).

It is not surprising, therefore, that many otherwise inexplicable phenomena can be explained away by showing that NP substitutions affect the speech act expressed by an utterance.

In this chapter, it is my wish to draw the implications of the theory of **pragmemes**, which I have advanced in other articles (Capone 2005a) following ideas broached by Mey (2001) and to apply them to areas of inquiry which certainly need to be revisited with modern and efficient analytical tools, such as the detailed study of the interplay between speech acts and context. Philosophical approaches to the issue of indirect reports, useful though they are, cannot exhaustively deal with the issue because they are not societally-oriented. Instead, a theory of pragmemes, that is of speech acts in context, has better chances to throw light on the practice of indirect reports (in particular on the reason why, in reporting what someone said, one sometimes needs to discard the literal words used thanks to contextual information). Furthermore, we have reasons to believe that such practices rest on societally-oriented rules prescribing the use of some, rather than other, modes of presentation (of referents) in certain contexts/situations (the term ‘mode of presentation’ has been recently used by Schiffer (1995), who presumably took it from Frege¹ and stands for the guise under which a certain Russellian proposition is apprehended, to use words by Salmon (1986)). Especially public situations seem to involve strict rules about the choice of a mode of presentation. So, I propose to follow Mey (2001) in accepting that speech acts such as indirect reports are sensitive to societal rules prescribing specific transformations. The following considerations throw considerable light on the issue I am about to discuss:

Language users do not decide, on the spur of the moment, which medium to choose in order to get their ideas or feelings across; they use the artificial signs that natural language provides them with, given the affordances of their actual, historical context. The context determines both what one can say and what one cannot: only the pragmatics of the situation can give meaning to one’s words (Mey 2001, 43).

A linguistically-determined mode of presentation (of an individual) is a linguistic expression inducing one to think of a certain referent in a certain way by promoting/publishing certain characteristics. A linguistically-determined mode of presentation is always a **perspectived** description of a referent (the information being included may refer to the speaker’s attitude, to the speaker’s ideological attitude or to the spatial and temporal position (e.g. ‘the former president of the USA’, ‘that man there’)). As Burge (1990) says:

Thoughts are the individual’s perspective on the world. And meanings or senses are, very roughly speaking, a speaker’s way of expressing such a perspective in language. They are what an individual understands and thinks in the use of his words (Burge 1990, 118).

¹ Also see the discussion in Harnish (2000).

2.2 Indirect Reports as Events

Indirect speech reports are (speech) events of some kind that **indirectly** describe other prior events (speech acts). Since they involve both an intention and a movement² (an utterance), I would not hesitate to call them **actions**, following considerations by Habermas (2001, 115), while I am still ready to grant that the issue can be studied from the angle of ‘metarepresentations’ (see the important paper by Wilson 2000). Both types of events are of a linguistic nature, that is to say consist in utterances. In a canonical situation, an indirect speech report is an event e’ that is subsequent to an event (a speech act) which it describes: e.³ e and e’ are related in such a way that, if all goes well, someone who witnesses e’ is thereby informed of what happened in e (at some level of detail and, in particular, at the level of detail required by the situation). e and e’ are related through a practice P, allowing a witness of e’ to be informed of what happened in e.

2.3 Indirect Reports as Language Games

Wittgenstein writes:

Here the term “language *game*” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or a form of life (Wittgenstein 1953, 11).

Wittgenstein continues, making a list of language games, and includes among them the game of ‘reporting an event’. It is a natural extension of Wittgenstein’s ideas to say that making an indirect report is a language game – although we must explain why making an indirect report is a more specific language game than making a report.

If we consider indirect reports *language games* we can perhaps put them in a different light from the one which is usually cast on them by scholars in the philosophy of language. Indirect reports require a reporter, a piece of language behaviour to report, a situation that motivates the reporting (one that includes a goal) and that ends up constraining the form of the report (especially of the NPs in the *that*-clause). The reporter usually does the reporting for the benefit of a hearer (however, it is not difficult to imagine perlocutionary acts such as ‘scaring’ the hearer or putting him off from carrying out an action).⁴ This presupposes asymmetrical knowledge

² A piece of bodily behaviour.

³ It is not unusual to say what one is going to say on a certain occasion. In this case the event reported e’ is subsequent to the reporting.

⁴ Wittgenstein alerts us to the unpredictability of perlocutionary effects by the surprising example of a person who reads aloud to get someone to get asleep.

between the reporter and the hearer. The speaker would not do the reporting if the hearer were informed of the reported speech (but of course there is the marginal chance that an indirect report has the perlocutionary effect of making the hearer notice that a speaker is a liar – in this case the hearer knows the fact reported, but the indirect report is proffered all the same to focus on the issue of the lie). The reporter qualifies himself and the speaker of the event reported as **samesayers** (to use words by Davidson 1968) with respect to the content of the report (the *that*-clause in “He said that P”). ‘Samesayers’ does not mean that the same words are used in the report and in the speech to be reported: it just means that the report and the speech to be reported have some broad content in common. As Burge says:

To use indirect discourse, one must master the practice of *samesaying*. One must be able to use utterances that are relevantly synonymous with the utterances of the original speaker (Burge 1986, 192).

The practice of indirect reports rests on the following rule:

The reporter X will report what was said by Y (Y usually distinct from X, but sometimes coinciding with X) by using a predicate such as ‘say’ that makes reference to a verbal event of some kind (an utterance), by applying it to Y (the participant whose speech is being reported) and by letting the direct object of the predicate ‘say’ express the **content** of the utterance by Y (at some prior time) by way of paraphrase, that is by letting the *that*-clause refer to the same situation or event e that the utterance u reported was actually used (by Y) to refer to, without necessarily using the modes of presentation (of objects and participants) which were actually used by Y in u, and in fact allowing context to play a pervasive role in making reference to objects, activities, and participants thereof. In case doubts arise about interpretation of a constituent of what was said or about authorship, quote that part of the utterance, ensuring that the hearer grasps that what follows ‘that’ (quotation marks excised) is the content of what was said, while the quoted part same-tokens an expression actually used.

The rule above relies on the premise that two expressions are pragmatically equivalent if they express the same content (Jaszczolt 2003) and is reminiscent of Soames’s (1989) position, which has been criticised by Cappelen and Lepore (1997b)). I agree with these authors that mixed indirect reports must be taken into account and that rules for indirect reports need to include a same-tokening relationship (for reasons of simplicity I do not illustrate their formal treatment, which is only informally incorporated in the rule above). Of course this basic rule is incomplete, and I shall attempt to come to better versions of it after considering crucial examples. A first shot at completing the considerations above is to introduce a rule of use, sensitive to the pragmatic

requirement that the reporter be maximally faithful to the words of the agent unless there is a reason to deviate (Soames 1988, 123) (see also analogous considerations for belief reports in Salmon’s work (Salmon 1986), and Saul 1998 for a critique).

A second shot is that contextual considerations (e.g. the formality/informality of the situation) can increase the need for a more fine-grained report or coarse-grained report. In other words, a speaker has to fine-grain an indirect report in order to adjust to the situation of use.

Making an indirect report is a language game that is more specific than making an assertion: in asserting P a speaker merely offers his own voice (unless ironies are involved; see Giora (2003) for an original and important view of ironies); in reporting that P, the speaker offers **two voices**: his voice and that of the speaker in the original speech event. The reporter does not take responsibility for the embedded voice (except in so far as he attributes it to a speaker or another). Reported speech is usually elicited (A: What did John say?) or prompted by the desire to offer H (the hearer) an essential clue to a solution of a problem viz. some piece of information that is contained in (or is a consequence of) the speech reported (I admit I was influenced by Devitt's 1996 pragmatic approach to belief reports,⁵ which I freely extend to indirect reports). Reporting speech is a language game because it involves rules. It is a rule-based activity. Furthermore, the language game of reporting (someone's) speech is sensitive to contextual factors and the context of speech determines whether a report should be more (or less) fine-grained.

The problem as I see it is that reporting speech (in indirect reports) is a language-game of its own that is **severely** constrained by the fact that it displays two voices, the reporter's and the original speaker's, and there is a tension between them; but the interests and the point of view of the reporter in general cannot prevail over those of the original speaker. Furthermore, the specificity of the language game 'reporting (one's) speech' consists in the tension between the two voices and in the fact that none of them prevails over the other. The specificity of the language game 'reporting speech' also consists in the fact that the report partially answers the question "would I accept the report (the way in which the report has been put), were I the original speaker whose speech is being reported?". This (salutary) question serves to eliminate possible distortions of what was said.

Indirect speech reports represent what Bakhtin calls "discourse of the third type", that is discourse which does not just express the speaker's voice or that of a third person, but multiple voices (Robinson 2003, 107):

⁵ Here the term 'pragmatic' is used as derived from 'Pragmatism', and qualifies an approach largely resulting from considerations of means/end reasonings.

Direct referentially oriented discourse recognizes only itself and its object, to which it strives to be maximally adequate. (...). The act of imitating someone else's discourse and the presence of various influences from other people's words, while recognizably clear to the historian of literature and to any competent reader, do not enter into the project that discourse has set itself. If they do enter in, that is, if the discourse itself does contain a deliberate reference to someone else's words, then again we would have before us discourse of the third type, and not of the first (Bachtin 1984, 187).⁶

The situation of utterance plays a major role in shaping the obligations of the reporter and the degree of accuracy with which the original speech is reported. Sometimes it determines a more fine-grained report, sometimes a less fine-grained report.

We can extend the rule we came up with somewhat by incorporating the notion of the specificity of the language game we are dealing with:

Paraphrasis Rule⁷

The that-clause embedded in the verb 'say' is a paraphrasis of what Y said that meets the following constraint: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, but would approve of it as a **fair paraphrasis** of her original utterance.

This is somewhat reminiscent of Burge's position (Burge 1986) that:

The point of indirect discourse might be fairly taken to be to introduce and produce a given utterance that gives the content of the original speaker's utterance (Burge 1986, 196).

Now it should be clear why the language game 'indirect report' is more specific than that of 'assertion'. In factual assertions, only the speaker and the hearer are involved; the speaker takes responsibility for what he takes to be the case in the actual world. In the case of indirect reports, we are confronted with a speaker', a hearer and a speaker'' (the original speaker), and both the speaker' and the speaker'' take responsibility for the content of the that-clause in case all goes well, that is to say, in case the indirect report is felicitous. (But one speaker may be more authoritative than the other, which is the *raison d'être* of the indirect report).

There is another aspect to take into account in our argument that indirect reports are specific language games. Matters of form also go into an evaluation of whether

⁶Burge's (1986) more philosophical position that an extra argument needs to be posited for the reporter also seems to point to there being more than one voice in this discourse.

⁷This position is somewhat reminiscent of Seymour's (1994) treatment of indirect reports, in which reference to a translation of the reported sentence is explicitly incorporated in the semantics of in direct reports.

the reporter made a correct report. In fact, as Dummett (2003, 110) says, one may assent to a statement without being prepared himself to make that statement (since it may be objectionable in other ways, e.g. by being insulting).

Thus we also need the Paraphrasis/Form rule for indirect reports:

Paraphrasis/Form Rule

The that-clause embedded in the verb ‘say’ is a paraphrasis of what Y said that meets the following constraints: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer ‘that’ on account of its form/style.

It seems to me that this rule does not contradict Davidson’s and Rumfitt’s (1993, 439) beliefs that appeals to a relation of sameness of content as between utterances that introduce no intensional semantics.

Having made reference to language games, I can now explain with the words of Habermas, why I have chosen the term ‘practice’ as part of the title of this chapter. A person knows how to make an indirect speech report, if she has mastered the rules that govern the language game ‘reporting speech’. In fact,

To understand a game is to have a certain kind of know-how. Understanding means mastering a technique. This ‘mastery’ expresses the spontaneity with which one can apply an acquired rule independently and thus also the creativity of producing new instances that count as examples of following the rule (...). The competence that I acquire in learning the rule of a game or a grammatical rule is a generative capacity. Wittgenstein never tires of explaining why the cognitive ability of understanding a rule also requires a practical skill, namely that of acting according to the rule (Habermas 2001, 54).

The kind of know-how that is required in indirect speech reports is the one that allows the speaker (the reporter) to adapt the form of the that-clause to the situation of utterance in ways that are pre-determined by the very situation of utterance and the rules that it evokes. If we accept Mey’s idea that

Pragmatics studies the use of Language in human communication as determined by the conditions of society (Mey 2001, 6)

we can freely assert that part of the purpose of this chapter is to explore the pragmatics of indirect reports. However, while I certainly attempt to describe the social rules involved in the language-game ‘indirect report’, I agree with Strawson’s reading of Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* to the effect that “the demand for absolute precision in the rules (a fixed meaning) or for absolute finality in their interpretation, their explanation, is senseless” (Strawson 1954, 77).

2.4 The Logic and Structure of Indirect Reports

I want to briefly outline the logic of indirect reports. Indirect speech reports are micro-narrations: in particular, they narrate certain events (deemed to be of interest to the hearer) that occurred at some time prior to the speech report and that amounted to saying something with appropriate intentions (here intended *à la* Habermas 2001, as teleological entities; see also Peirce 1958, 414). Assertive speech acts are canonical events reported in indirect speech reports. But now, in the case of indirect speech reports, there are two speech acts: the original assertion (subsequently reported) and the micro-narration of the original assertion (another assertion). It is reasonable to assume that the original assertion was connected/related to a certain situation (a complex of cognitive states, goals, desires) and had a bearing on the formation of certain decisions on the part of some of the participants to the speech event (in this way, cognitive effects, to use terminology by Sperber and Wilson 1995, are maximal; see also Wilson 2000; Capone 2001). The indirect report, analogously, relates to some (new) situation (a complex of cognitive states, goals, desires, etc.) and since, following Wilson 2000 and Kamp (1990, 70), it leads to an inference concerning the beliefs of the original speaker, it is tantamount to a belief attribution; thus, following Kamp (1990, 30), it ends up having a bearing on the formation of decisions on the part of some of the participants (to the speech event), in the sense that if the hearer is informed of a certain situation that has a bearing on taking a decision, then she will be willing to take it given this piece of information. The way the indirect speech report can bear on a certain decision is to propose what another person said (asserted) as a **source of knowledge**. If the original speaker qualified as a reliable informer, then what he said can be counted on for the formation of appropriate beliefs that have a bearing on the formation of current decisions relating to the current complex of cognitive states, goals, desires. Alternatively, what the original speaker said can be subjected to further inquiry and can be contrasted with conflicting pieces of knowledge. So far, I have presupposed (rather generously) that there is (normally, albeit not always) an inferential transition from what a speaker A says to what she believes. As Wilson says:

Unlike the literature on mind-reading, the Gricean pragmatic literature deals with the specific metacommunicative ability to attribute speaker meanings on the basis of utterances. It might thus be seen as forming a bridge between the literature on mind-reading and the philosophical, literary, and linguistic literature on quotation (...) (Wilson 2000, 412).

The way I see the difference between a factual assertion and an indirect report is that, in addition to presenting only one voice, the factual assertion is merely a response to the interests of the hearer at *t* (the time of utterance); instead, an indirect report embodies a sensitivity to two situations, *s* and *s'*. *s* is the situation in which a factual assertion (in any case the original speech act reported) was uttered in response to the interests of recipients *R*, whereas *s'* is a complex situation taking

into account both s and s' (s' includes the interests of hearers R'). Thus s'' exhibits a sensitivity to both recipients R and R' . It goes without saying that if modes of presentation reflect the interests of the hearers (as well as of the speakers), then an intersection of the interests of R and R' should be taken into account in the choice of mode of presentation (as Sperber 1996 says, communication normally slightly transforms the message). As should now be obvious, the methodological approach to be used in this chapter is to accept that since users and their language are at the core of all things pragmatic, the world of users is the very condition for doing pragmatics (Mey 2001, 29; Haberland and Mey 1977, 1–16).

Let us see what the canonical structure of \underline{e} and \underline{e}' is. Both \underline{e} and \underline{e}' have an agent in their structure, A , someone who proffers an utterance of type U (he is the Agent because he does something **voluntarily**; see Scanlon 2003). An agent, in my view, is someone who acts in a certain way following an intention to behave in that way (Peirce 1958, 414). A basic relation between \underline{e} and \underline{e}' is of the following kind:

$e: A, u \dashrightarrow e': A', u'$

where A is distinct from A' in the normal case (however, sometimes we have reports such as “I said that ...”, in which A and A' are the same person). On methodological grounds, it is good to distinguish \underline{A} from \underline{A}' , because, although the person (responsible for the original speech act and that responsible for the report) may sometimes coincide, the actor is different. In other words, **reporting** and **saying** can be considered different actions, especially when saying amounts to uttering a speech act (having a certain illocutionary effect), while reporting amounts to describing a previous speech act, rather than engaging again in that action. If the actions are different, then it is good to keep the actors distinct, even when the persons coincide; in this way, we may want to bring out the fact that by saying something a person qualifies as a different actor. u and u' are obviously distinct, because u' needs to specify that u occurred in the past ($u < u'$) and, furthermore, needs to specify the agent of \underline{e} , whether it is distinct from or coincides with A' . In \underline{e} one need not specify who the agent is; it is the pragmatic structure of the event to evince who the actor is. In canonical situations, A in \underline{e} coincides with the person who speaks.

The relationship \dashrightarrow resides in a linguistic **practice**. Given \underline{e} , one knows the linguistic practice involved in rendering \underline{e} through \underline{e}' . The practice is acquired by learning the way people usually proceed from \underline{e} to \underline{e}' and return from \underline{e}' to \underline{e} . By acting in the social sphere, we do assimilate and internalize collective regularities that we may otherwise formulate as “rules” (see Robinson 2003, 149). A practice is a routine way of doing things that is regulated by **social conventions** of an **arbitrary** kind. Suppose you want to ask 100 people to report what happened in a film and you happen to notice discrepancies between the way in which distinct social groups tend to relate things and you furthermore notice that the differences are systematic: then you can guess that different (social) practices are at work in the way narrations are structured and organized. The fact that a different society organizes

narrations in a different way is evidence of the fact that the practices involved are of an arbitrary nature (albeit they may reflect the mentality of a social group).

2.5 Indirect Reports as Transformations

Indirect reports are **micro-narrations**, so they are narrations of some kind, and are subject to the practices involved in narrations. These practices may be different as far as the treatment of reference is concerned. In this paper, we follow Barwise & Perry (1981) and accept that in “b said that Φ ”, Φ itself cannot serve as b’s actual utterance (a notion that is explicated at length in Rumfitt’s 1993 paper, where he proposes the idea of a ‘propositional act’, a type whose tokens are individual utterances; see Rumfitt 1993, 448). Presumably, in the transition from \underline{e} to \underline{e}' , NPs could either be (rigorously) kept the same or they may be transformed (depending on the interests and the knowledge of the recipient of the indirect report) – such a transformation typically involves the choice of a different NP that serves to refer to the same object via a different mode of presentation (the one embodied by the NP) – to use words by Seymour (1992), the same meaning is presented via a different mode of presentation (Seymour 1992, 184). It is a practice that enables us to know how we should behave and whether the transformation from \underline{e} to \underline{e}' should leave a certain amount of information unaltered or not.

What is clear to me is that the tighter the relationship between \underline{e} and \underline{e}' , the easier it is to go from \underline{e}' to \underline{e} . If we allow certain pieces of information to be lost in the transition from \underline{e} to \underline{e}' , then it is natural that we are uneasy about going from \underline{e}' to \underline{e} , in that we can merely expect \underline{e} and \underline{e}' to share some basic rough structure. Suppose that in some situations, perhaps to allow the recipient to identify a referent which otherwise he would not be able to identify (Soames’s 1988 “reason to deviate”), we are allowed (or even forced) to change referential information concerning NPs in a crucial way, by merely allowing the references to be recovered, without having respect for the mode of presentation of the reference. This ensures that the transition from \underline{e} to \underline{e}' is such that, being confronted with \underline{e}' alone, we cannot move back to the structure of \underline{e} without expecting substantial changes in the mode of presentation of the reference, that is to say in the lexical structure of an NP.

Given that, on some occasions, we change mode of presentation (to favour identification of the referent on the part of the hearer), while in others we do not, it is not clear to me that, in general, given \underline{e}' , we can return to the original modes of presentation occurring in \underline{e} , unless we know, from contextual knowledge of the situation that affected the structuring and saying of the speech report, that respect for the original modes of presentation is required by the situation at hand. Formal situations that involve strict rules compelling the reporter to keep NPs unaltered are those, which, in a sense, make the interpretation work easier to the hearer (the hearer is not in doubt as to whether she should attribute a certain mode of presentation to the reporter or to the original speaker whose speech is reported).

There is an interesting case by Barwise & Perry 1981 clearly showing how it is possible to reconstruct, given specifications of the original context of utterance, the original mode of presentation of a referent used by a speaker. Consider the utterance “Bill jumped out of the way because he heard Mary say that he was in danger”. As Barwise & Perry say, this explanation makes sense only if Mary said that Bill was in danger in a way that conveyed to him a sense of danger. Thus, using pragmatic reasoning, we reconstruct the expression she must have used: an utterance such as “You’re in danger”. We exclude that she uttered something like “He is in danger”, because this expression does not convey any sense of urgency or danger.

I think this is a very good first shot at the theory of pragmemes I am after in this paper.

2.6 On the Use of Perspectived NPs

Suppose that our practices allow us latitude in the use of distinct modes of presentation in association with the same reference. An interesting question is: how wide is this latitude? Suppose that, in proffering an indirect speech report, we can indifferently choose between distinct modes of presentation of the (same) reference. Could we not, in this way, make use of **strongly perspectived** NPs, thus implying that the perspective taken is that of the original utterer (the agent of the original speech act reported)?⁸ The crucial question is, if a strongly perspectived NP is used (within the context of an indirect speech report), is there a convention that enables us to attribute the perspective in question to the reporter or, otherwise, to the agent of the original speech act reported? The question is not easy, and points towards the idea that some constraints are involved severely limiting our ability to use NPs to refer to individuals, allowing neutral NPs whose aim is just to guide the recipient to the recovery of the referent (taking into account what he knows), but (drastically) disallowing perspectived NPs, since in such cases one tends to attribute the perspective indicated by the NP to the original actor (pragmatic principles, according to Soames 1988, would attribute perspectived NPs to the original utterer). This issue must be taken up at a later point, and deserves a lengthy and critical discussion. For the time being, we can be certain that **at least** certain transformations must be barred from an indirect speech report, namely those transformations taking input from an ordinary NP and giving as output an NP containing an epithet (e.g. John: He arrived safe in Paris --- → Mary: John said that that bastard arrived safe in Paris). Transformations of this kind distort the nature of the thought reported in a drastic way, since they strongly imply that the original speaker is responsible for the epithet while, in fact, the reporter is responsible.

⁸I used the term ‘strongly perspectived NPs’ because, following Barwise & Perry, we have seen (1981) that weakly perspectived NPs are in order in the that-clause of indirect reports or attitude reports in order to represent the speaker’s perspective.

Notice that, instead, a proper name can be replaced by a (bare) pronominal, because the pronominal, having no (or little) descriptive content, has a **neutral** way of conveying reference. Obviously, in the transformation Proper Name \rightarrow Pronominal some level of specificity is lost and a shift occurs from a mode of presentation that is not tied to the situation of utterance to one that is typically indexical. Yet, the loss of information is minimal, unless the mode of presentation plays a role in the truth-conditions of the statement. Consider the statement: “Mary was called so, because ‘Mary’ is a beautiful name”. In this case, shifting in the subject position of the main clause from a proper name to a pronominal involves preventing the anaphor ‘so’ from playing its semantic role (note that the anaphor ‘so’ reaches back to the form of the NP, not to its referent).

From the beginning, it is becoming clear that an issue of **illocutionary force** is what prevents the mode of presentation to be drastically changed in issuing an indirect speech report. In fact, the shift from an NP to another NP containing an epithet correlates with the shift from the illocutionary force ‘assertion’ to the illocutionary force ‘insult’. The case of epithets is perhaps the only one in which an NP can radically transform the illocutionary force of an utterance.

2.7 Saying as a Locutionary or Illocutionary Act

We should now explore fully the framework of event analysis, in order to give an account of the $e \dashrightarrow e'$ relationship.

The event **e** involves an actor, a person who utters a certain sentence *u*. The event is an action if the actor *A* takes full responsibility for her intention to utter *u*. For example, if John is forced to say “The President is an idiot” under a threat (a person points a gun to his head), the speech event hardly qualifies as an action. It is at most something that happened to John, an event surely, but not an action, since the bodily movement (the utterance of the appropriate sequence of words) is dissociated from an intention; it does not spring from an intention on the part of the person who undergoes the movement. An action is a **causal pressure** on the part of an **intention** on a bodily movement (an event of some kind).

Suppose we discard the possibility that John uttered something under duress (e.g. a threat). In saying *u*, he takes responsibility either for the saying of what he says or for what he says. Suppose John is a teacher. Then he contrives many examples aimed at teaching students grammar rules. The students will consider John responsible for the examples, for choosing them, for issuing some discourse of some kind. It was his intention to say those things. Yet, surely, they will not take John as displaying a positive attitude to the content of what he says. He need not believe that Napoleon was a liar, when he says that in an appropriate context (e.g. with the aim of illustrating a grammar rule).

In some other situations, John takes responsibility both for the saying of what he says and for what he says. By saying *P*, he displays a positive attitude to *P* (he

assents to P or is ready to assent to it). So, now it is time to conclude that in those cases in which a belief is not involved, the locutionary meaning of ‘say’ prevails; in the cases in which beliefs are involved, the illocutionary meaning of ‘say’ prevails (asserting that P, declaring that P, swearing that P, etc.). We shall distinguish between the two by the following symbols: **sayL**, **sayILL**.

2.8 Purpose and Level of Details

It is of fundamental importance, before proceeding further with technical details, to be clear about the purpose of indirect speech reports. The **canonical aim** of an indirect speech report is to inform the hearer or addressee of the structure of a certain event (someone said that P) at a certain level of detail. Roughly speaking, we may have more than one (basic) level of details. The basic level is reporting the original speech event in all details without neglecting even a small detail. Everything said in **e** is repeated in **e'**. This is the situation corresponding to the use of the colon followed by inverted commas and direct speech:

(1) John said “I am happy with you!”.

In a sense, a sentence such as the following:

(2) John said that he was happy with you,

apart from some grammatically required adjustments, covers the same level of detail (in fact, according to David Brown 1998, sentences of this type lend limited support to Russellianism; see also Rumfitt 1993, 451). Yet, the problem with (2) is that the sentence, in itself, does not say what level of details is covered. One needs to resort to contextual knowledge to ascertain that. For example, in the following exchange, it is surely clearer than in (2) that the indirect speech report exhibits the highest order of detail.

(3)

A: You must tell me exactly what he said.

B: He said that he was happy with you.

The level of detail need not be so precise, as when one is faced with a hearer who (one believes) needs information, but not all information about what was said. If the cognitive need of a hearer is satisfied by a smaller level of details, then it is superfluous to include all details about what was proffered in the speech event in question. In other words, if the transformation of an NP by means of a different mode of presentation does not **distort** the things the original utterer said (the message or the proposition expressed) and it can be predicted that the transformation concerning that NP can make the interpretation process easier to the addressee, then the transformation will be allowed. Essentially, it is the situation of utterance, its formality, the goals associated with it, the rules that the situation of utterance makes relevant to understanding and producing speech, that determine (in advance of speech) the

level of details required in reporting another person's speech (see also Fairclough 1992, 71). As Mey says, in order to understand how speech acts work (and I consider indirect reports speech acts, of course), we must

invoke the *adaptability of language*, by which individual members of society rely on language as their principal tool to adapt to the ever-changing conditions surrounding them and, in doing so, generate meaning, as Vershueren calls it (1999, 147) (Mey 2001, 215).

If all this is true, then the purpose of an indirect speech report is essential in determining whether some level of details is enough (appropriate to the situation) or whether something is missing in the report. We are now moving towards a theory of **pragmemes**, because the context may determine what level of detail is required in the indirect speech report. It is the context that will induce a speaker to 'fine-grain' an indirect report (to use terminology by Cappelen and Lepore 1997a, b). In terms of interpretation, this means that the speech act in context determines how much the hearer must read in an utterance and whether he must enrich it further.

2.9 Logical Form and Context

Would it not be a good idea to specify the level of details actually used at logical form, in indirect reports? (The idea of enriching logical forms by incorporating implicit constituents is certainly inspired by Schiffer 1995). Let me spell out this proposal in some detail. Consider (4):

(4) John said you were in Paris.

Out of the blue it is not possible to be sure about the level of details adopted. For example, the references of the NPs 'You' and 'Paris' in the original speech act could have been furnished via different modes of presentation (say, respectively, "The president of the United States", "The Capital of France"). How can we be sure whether the modes of presentation "you" and "Paris" were actually used in the original speech act? Unless the context makes that clear, we cannot know what the level of details of the indirect report is.⁹ However, regardless of the context, we know that a level of detail variable is involved, and that is crucial in the interpretation and in the transition from *e'* to *e* (which, I believe is the crucial purpose of any indirect report). So, the logical form of (4), must be something like (5):

(5) I am reporting a speech act originally proffered by John with level of details x (LD x) by the following sentence: You were in Paris.

To disambiguate (5), consider the following paraphrase:

⁹Richard (2013) would say that pragmatics provides a function from the proposition/sentence uttered by the reporter and the sentence used in speech by the original speaker.

(5) I am using level of details x (LD x) in reporting a speech act originally proffered by John by the following sentence: You were in Paris.

Now that we have a **variable** at logical form, we can specify how the context can interact with it to make the understanding of the speech report more detailed. Thus if (4) is a reply to (6)

(6) Can you tell me what John exactly said?

we may be pretty sure that ‘you’ and ‘Paris’ were involved in the original speech act or that, in any case, they were not replaced by perspectived NPs, such as ‘The President of the United States’ or ‘The Capital of France’.

2.10 Restrictions on Transformations

Suppose that a certain referent, say A , appears in both the original speech act and in the reported (indirect) speech act. Suppose that in the original speech act, A is presented through a mode of presentation M , whereas in the indirect reported speech act, it is presented through a mode of presentation M' and also suppose that M and M' happen to be distinct. Surely, the context has to determine the level of detail associated with the mode of presentation and whether a more **fine-grained** linguistic expression is to be preferred to a more **coarse-grained** expression. Yet, the latitude of the choice can be restricted *a priori*. Consider the following example from Higginbotham’s lecture notes (2004/2005):

(7) Galileo said that the earth moves.

(8) Galileo said that the planet in which Arnold Swarzenegger is a governor moves.

Higginbotham says that (8) is “ridiculous” (even if it is obtained by substituting a coreferential expression for ‘the earth’). He does not explain, though, why he considers examples such as (8) (obtained through substitution of identicals from (7)) ridiculous – presumably his explanation is that it was unlikely for Galileo to have any thoughts about Swarzenegger and, thus, using a mode of presentation making reference to such thoughts is outlandish. However, the explanation cannot be that verbs such as ‘said’ (to be assimilated to verbs of propositional attitude) block Leibniz’s Law, because indirect speech reports that are not fine-grained do involve some latitude in the choice of mode of presentation for a referent presented via a different mode of presentation in the original speech act. There is no harm (and I hope that you will agree) in reporting (9) as (10):

(9) John (to his wife): your mum is dying;

(10) John said that his mother-in-law was dying.

The shift from (9) to (10) is required, since the hearer is not identical with the reference of ‘your mum’. Direct speech involves a perspectived orientation and the

choice of lexemes that contribute to such an orientation. It would have been extravagant of John to say to his wife (11)

(11) My mother-in-law is dying.

The reason for this is that if a language allows a speaker S to choose M or M' to refer to x, then he has to choose the mode of presentation that signals a closer relationship with the hearer (either to make the utterance more informative or to satisfy some social rule of etiquette). A rule of use, pertaining to **direct speech**, like the following seems to be reasonable:

Rule of Preference in the Use of Modes of Presentation (in Direct Speech).

Use perspectived NPs that signal the closest possible relationship between you and your addressee.

In the transition from (9) to (10), since the hearer and the speaker are not the same persons as in the original speech act, the constraint just elucidated is no longer operative. By ranking <X's mum, Y's mother-in-law>, in case the speaker and the hearer are not related to X's mum and to Y's mother-in-law, it is not clear that one is to be preferred to the other because it implies a closer relationship to the hearer.

Let us now switch examples. Let us consider (12), (13), (14):

(12) John: Mrs Robinson is dead.

(13) Mary (speaking to Fred, who is Mrs Robinson's son): John said that Mrs Robinson is dead.

(14) Mary (speaking to Fred, who is Mrs Robinson's son): John said that your mother is dead.

(13), in connection with the situation in question, is outlandish, whereas (14) is appropriate. Why is (14) appropriate? It appears that there is a rule pertaining to indirect speech operative to the effect that:

If a speaker is addressing a hearer in an **indirect speech report** and happens to talk about a referent that is related to the hearer in some way (a close relationship), and the speaker is aware of the existing relation, then s/he ought to choose a mode of presentation that points to that relationship.

We clearly see that there are constraints on what we can say when we shift from direct to indirect speech, even though we can present the same reference via different modes of presentation, in case the constraints cited above are not operative.

Now, let us return to (7) and (8), repeated here as (15) and (16):

(15) Galileo said that the earth moves.

(16) Galileo said that the planet in which Arnold Swarzenegger is a governor moves.

There is a reason why we are prevented from shifting freely from (15) to (16), a reason that does not consist in the blocking of Leibniz's law (a statement will result

in a coextensive statement if an NP is replaced with a coextensive NP; see also Jaszczolt 1999) in connection with verbs of propositional attitudes.¹⁰ Suppose we have some latitude in freely shifting from one mode of presentation to another in paraphrasing a sentence (subject to the constraints formalized above), thus making the application of Leibniz's law tolerable. Although we have some freedom in choosing modes of presentation of the same referent, we are barred from choosing a mode of presentation which, once inserted in the proposition said, would amount to accepting that the original speaker said something implausible. Surely Galileo could not have said that the planet in which Arnold Swarzenegger is a governor moves, because Arnold Swarzenegger was not living at Galileo's time.

In other words, if the use of a mode of presentation leads to (our) accepting that an absurd proposition was said by the original speech act producer (in other words, if it puts an absurd proposition in the mouth of an original speaker), unless we actually want to say that the original speaker said something absurd, we should choose a different mode of presentation and, in particular, one that is closer to the one actually used by the original speaker. Now it is clear that if we can rank modes of presentation in terms of closeness to the original mode of presentation used, we have to agree that the greater the distance between the mode of presentation actually used and the one adopted in the paraphrase (or in the indirect speech report), the greater is the danger that we attribute an absurd or implausible proposition to the original speaker. In other words, the greater the risk we incur of putting something which the original speaker did not intend into his mouth. We are not completely sure that the original speaker would approve of the indirect report or agree it is a fair one.

There is another way of dealing with Higginbotham's example. We may think of the context of utterance as a structure imposing severe constraints on the use(s) of modes of presentations of the referents involved in the content of the speech report (roughly what follows the *that*-clause). If it is one of the presuppositions of the context that the original speaker (whose speech is being reported) was not acquainted with referents *x*, *y*, *z* via the modes of presentation *M*, *M'*, *M''*, then *M*, *M'*, and *M''* must not be used (must: not feature, to use logical notation by Timothy Williamson indicating scope relations) as modes of presentation in the *that*-clause of the indirect report, because their being so used will falsely suggest that the original speaker was acquainted with the referents in question through these modes of presentation.

But this constraint may be considered too strict. This constraint would always bar us from effecting a transition from *e* to *e'* by using different modes of presentation of the referents in the content of a speech report and, in particular, from using a mode of presentation for *x*, with which the hearer is (more) familiar (in case the original assertion used, instead, a distinct mode of presentation with which the hearer is not familiar and likely to prevent him/her from benefiting from understanding and utilizing the knowledge contributed by the indirect speech report). So, this constraint should be in force only if the context makes it clear that the level of detail involved in the presentation of the *that*-clause (in the direct report) is maxi-

¹⁰ In fact, some (e.g. Jaszczolt, p.c.) argue that verbs of saying or 'verba dicendi' are not verbs of propositional attitude.

mal. I assume that a situation requiring maximal specification of level of details is the **court**, in which a witness has to report what she has heard with great accuracy (see Capone 2001 for situated speech acts). Since, in court proceedings, the identities of individuals are important for the determination of responsibility, it is necessary that witnesses should tell what was said (by a person whose behaviour is critically relevant to the assessment of the truth in the proceedings at stake) with utmost accuracy. So, suppose that a witness can potentially choose between the modes of presentation ‘President Clinton’ and ‘The man who was wearing a brown coat’ and that the court proceedings have the aim of determining Clinton’s responsibility in a certain course of action. It then goes without saying that a maximal level of details is required in the report and that ‘Clinton’ will be chosen if the original speech act being reported is about Clinton, even if other possible modes of presentation are available instead.

Now, if all this is true, Higginbotham’s example must be treated in terms of the initial hypothesis I advanced, not of the second hypothesis, because we are not in a context necessitating great accuracy in the choice of modes of presentation but nevertheless there is something wrong with that usage.

There are many examples, similar to Higginbotham’s case, that need to be explained away. In fact, while in a few cases replacement of an NP with another co-referring one is precluded, in general, unless problems arise, such substitutions are possible in indirect reports, especially when they aid **understanding on the part of the hearer**. So the real problem, for the semanticist, is not so much to say that substitutions are not possible in indirect reports, but to specify those cases in which substitutions are blocked, explaining why they are blocked.

One such case is the following. Suppose John utters: “A fortnight is a two week period”. Assuming that in transformations from direct to indirect speech (NP) substitutions are licit, one could then report the following: “John said that a fortnight is a fortnight”. This is a tautology which did not appear in the original speech act. An easy way out of this problem is to say that if no **tautology** appeared in the original speech act, it must not appear in the reported speech act, because it will give the hearer the impression that it was also present in the original speech act (which is not the case).

But this is only an easy way out. The real problem is whether “John said that a fortnight is a fortnight” does capture the original speech act. I do not think it does. The original speech act, in fact, is motivated by the goal of **explaining** one word by making recourse to an easier word. The reported speech act, instead, does not explain anything, because it merely establishes an identity between a word and itself. Since the illocutionary force of the original speech act (**explanation**) is lost due to a transformation that amounts to replacing a term with a co-referential one, it is fair to say that substitutions of this kind are not legitimate in the transition from direct speech to indirect speech reports. This presumably follows from a general semantic principle, worked out by Aston:

A meaning of a sentence fits it to play a distinctive role in communication just because that meaning consists in the sentence's being usable to perform illocutionary acts of a certain type (Aston 2000, 282).

We are now in a position to explain what is odd with substitutions of terms having the same sense within indirect reports. Platts (1997) is puzzled by the fact that, contrary to what might be expected given the acceptance of Frege's explanation of failure of substitution in intensional contexts (the view that in intensional contexts NPs refer to their senses), in indirect reports one obtains strange results by substituting an NP with a distinct one which has the same sense (so, not only coreference, but sense identity are at stake here). For example, see what happens when we replace 'oculist' with 'eye-doctor' in the sentence: "John said that an oculist is an eye-doctor". The result is the sentence "John said that an eye-doctor is an eye-doctor", which may be rejected as false (or pretty inaccurate) by John, since his original speech act did not contain a **repetition** unlike the sentence resulting from the substitution. A way out of the puzzle for Platts is to deny that 'oculist' and 'eye-doctor' have the same sense (but this would amount to denying that the words are synonymous). Another way out of the puzzle is to say, as I have done for the previous example, that substitutions of co-referring or synonymous expressions are prohibited when they severely distort the nature of a speech act originally proffered by the speaker. In the case we are discussing, the original speech act is an **explanation**, in which a more difficult word is explained via a less difficult one. If we replace the more difficult word with a synonymous less difficult one, we lose the pragmatic force of the utterance, which was meant to be an explanation. As Asher and Lascarides (2003) argue, rhetorical relations play a fundamental role in utterance interpretation, especially in the calculation of meaning. They also argue that rhetorical relations are nothing but speech acts. This claim seems to be warranted by the special relationship between rhetoric and indirect speech reports.

Another example, due to Lepore and Loewer (1990), is equally puzzling: "Galileo said that the third planet from the sun moves" (a transformation of: Galileo said: "The earth moves"). The problem, as I see it, is that Lepore & Loewer's example casts doubt on the practice of replacing a word with a co-referential one, when the latter is equipped with attributive meaning, in addition to referential import. Although the authors in question do not really spell out the nature of the problem, the problem here is that the substitution in question will impute to Galileo having said that whatever is the third planet from the sun moves. Galileo will be thought to have said that the earth moves, only as a consequence of the fact that the third planet from the sun happens to be the earth. But if someone had had sufficient expertise, power and technology, he could have interchanged the earth with Jupiter, and Galileo's utterance would have then meant something completely different, in virtue of its attributive meaning. I assume that the consequence of this discussion is that replacing a word that refers to an entity *x* as a consequence of its attributive meaning *y* with a coreferential NP that establishes a direct link with referent *x*, even if such link is not a consequence of the word's having the same attributive meaning

y, is not licit, because the original speaker only intended to refer to x through a logical consequence of what he said and not directly.

It is good at this point to dwell on the interaction between indirect speech reports and indexicals. Among modes of presentation, the indexical has a special status. When a person says “I”, she is presenting herself not only as the person who is speaking, but also as the experiencer of a special state of perception: “I” is a mode of presentation that presents the subject of a special type of experience: a person who has privileged access (direct access) to one’s thoughts and being (see also Zeevat 1997, 163). There is a substantial difference between saying:

(17) I am happy;

(18) Alessandro is happy.

(17), through the mode of presentation “I”, makes it clear that the state of perception “happy” (attributed to the subject) is directly experienced by the person who speaks or thinks; (18), instead, attributes a state to a subject by implying that such an attribution is based on an external mode of inference:

e.g.

Alessandro is dancing at a party;

Alessandro dances only when he is happy

∴

Alessandro is happy.

It would be misleading to utter the third person statement (18) in case the person who speaks (or thinks) is speaking of himself, as (18) implies that the attribution is based on an external mode of inference, whereas an internal mode of inference (direct perception) is implied in first person attributions.

Levinson (2004) notices that in many cases it will not do to replace the indexical pronominal “I” with third person paraphrases (e.g. Stephen Levinson). The contexts he has in mind are mainly constituted by identity statements such as:

(19) I am Stephen Levinson.

It is obvious that, by replacing the indexical pronominal “I” with a third person paraphrase, one obtains a (relatively) uninformative sentence:

(20) Stephen Levinson is Stephen Levinson.

While Levinson’s point is to show that the indexical mode of presentation has a special status, this example throws light on the mechanism of indirect speech reports. In fact, it goes without saying that it will not do to report the utterance (21) by saying:

(21) He said that Stephen Levinson is Stephen Levinson.

In fact, as I previously said, the indirect report should also inform the hearer of the type of speech act the original speaker made, in saying what he said. (21) is not a

good indirect report because, by replacing the indexical mode of presentation with a third person paraphrase, the speaker has managed to obscure the original relationship between the indexical mode of presentation and the speech act actually made: the speaker was **introducing himself** by an identity statement. In introductions, the indexical mode of presentation is crucial, because it renders the identity statement informative. By replacing the indexical mode of presentation with a third person paraphrase, the identity statement is ‘ipso facto’ made uninformative as in (22):

(22) Stephen Levinson is Stephen Levinson.

While this is still an identity statement, it is not an introductory speech act (which has its own rules, being one of the basic language games). The introductory speech act needs to establish an identity between the indexical mode of presentation and another mode of presentation. This is the change it has to bring about in the existing state of affairs, to put it with Mey’s (1993, 111) words. The consideration that pragmatic equivalence (or the lack of it) explains why substitution of an NP is sometimes not licit certainly follows from Jaszczolt’s (2003) remark that equivalence of meaning is not just of the semantic type, but also of the pragmatic type (sometimes, according to Jaszczolt two completely different sentences are pragmatically equivalent; her examples are based on contrasts between languages).

So a plausible generalization for indirect speech reports is that:

a mode of presentation cannot be replaced with a third person paraphrase if such a change will inevitably obscure the kind of speech act made in uttering the original sentence.

My considerations tie in very closely with what Habermas (2001, 60), following Husserl, says about the recognition of dialogue roles through the use of pronouns. As Habermas claims, especially the first person pronoun is used as part of the canonical form of speech acts (e.g. I promise I will come).

As even Husserl realized, reciprocal reflexivity of expectation, in which identical meanings are constituted, requires that each subject can identify and have an expectation simultaneously from her own position and from that of the other. This requires, in turn, the simultaneous perception of dialogue roles that are incompatible (...) (Habermas 2001, 60).

The text above clarifies that the first person pronoun, rather than the third person pronoun, indicates a dialogic role and presupposes the role of another participant to whom the action is addressed (on whom the action has repercussions). Speech acts critically require the dialogic roles ‘I’ and ‘You’.

2.11 Indirect Reports and Pragmemes

In this section, I apply Rumfitt's consideration that:

Whether one utterance reports (i.e. R-relates to) another can depend (...) on contextual features of both the reporting utterance and the utterance being reported (Rumfitt 1993, 446).

I also make the most of Cappelen & Lepore's (1997b) persuasion that the R-relation between an original utterance and a reported utterance is one that makes use of the Gricean notion of speaker's meaning.

Let us consider the following speech act in a school situation (the example is drawn from Capone 2005a):

(23): Rossi, vieni.
(Rossi, come!)

The person uttering (23) is the teacher (addressing her student Rossi) and the language spoken is Italian. Unless one drastically changes the form of the utterance, the literal translation of the utterance into English cannot serve to fully specify the speech act proffered by the teacher. In fact, the teacher is not asking her student Rossi to go to an area of close contact (as the words literally say), but is testing him (proposing to ask him some questions as a way of testing his knowledge). Although, even in Italian, the utterance receives a literal meaning, this is not what is accessed, when one tries to figure out what the teacher says. In old days, the utterance counted as an injunction to Rossi to go to an area of close contact (this was the case when I was a high-school student), but now the utterance "Vieni" within the context of the school is 'immediately' associated with the speech act 'Testing'.

Suppose you have to report what the teacher said by an English translation. Surely (24) would not do.

(24) The teacher asked Rossi to go to her.

Instead, (25) is a better indirect speech report:

(25) The teacher asked Rossi whether he was ready to answer some questions.

So, it appears that reporting a speech act involves conjoining what was said with the context in which it was said, to see whether drastic transformations accrue to the utterance due to the powerful effects of the context. In other words, the indirect speech report must in some way take into account the contextual features that play a role in meaning transformations. It is in the indirect speech report that the illocutionary act and literal meaning must match (while this is not so in the direct speech act). It is not only referential problems resolved through contextual knowledge that, as Cresswell (2000) argued, made the notion of same-saying a pragmatic one. Surely identity in the speech act made enters into the notion of same-saying.

2.12 Indirect Reports and Institutional Contexts

In this chapter, I have argued that NP substitution is possible in indirect speech reports (obviously, I am talking of NPs within the *that*-clause), subject to some constraints. Two severe constraints are that the modification of the NP should **not** result (should: not result, to use logical terminology by T. Williamson) in a drastic modification of the perspective of the (original utterer) and of the speech act made in uttering his words. Now, following considerations in Capone (2003b, 2005b), I want to look at a highly structured situation, to see what changes, if any, are allowed in the indirect speech report in question.

Suppose we are dealing with a University Faculty and talk related to the work that occurs there. Professor Woodhouse is both the head of the department of Italian and the President of the Italian Association in Oxford. The Italian association usually deals with social events (films, parties, etc.), whereas the department of Italian deals with academic activities. The two duties are related, but distinct. Now, the secretary says (to a student):

- (26) Professor Woodhouse rejected your admission, on the grounds that your competence in spoken Italian is not good enough.

A friend of this student (let us call her 'Mary'), who was present during this conversation, later reported what she had overheard to another person, Fred. Suppose she says:

- (27) The secretary said that President of the Italian Society rejected Mary's admission, on the grounds that her competence in spoken Italian is not good enough.

It can be argued that this report will **not** do. First of all, it will not do because it will lead to misunderstandings. Someone who hears (27), may be induced to think that Mary was not admitted to the Italian Society (rather than to attending the graduate course in the Italian Department). Second, it will not do because it may lead someone to think that John Woodhouse is acting within the Italian department with the role of President of the Italian Society. The problem with (27) is that a person's role has a relevance to what he does (in that role) and, thus, the mentioning of a certain role may serve to explain what he does, while the mentioning of another role (which he jointly has) may serve to throw a shadow on the understanding of what he does (as Austin 1962 says, certain speech acts come into effect only if the appropriate officers/persons utter the right words). So another rule (provisional though it may be) for the making of indirect speech reports is that:

When an NP has a crucial explanatory value in the understanding of why an action occurred (in Austin's sense that a certain speech act is felicitous only if the right participants are involved in it), then do not replace that NP within the *that*-clause of an indirect speech report with another NP that refers to a different role of the person talked of.

I believe that if we bothered to sift a number of cases, we would find various examples of how the context can block the substitution of an NP in an indirect report. I was, in fact, struck by an example of contextual variation pointed out by Saul (1998) in her pragmatic discussion of belief reports. She discusses the case of Glenda who knows Bob Dylan under the guise “Robert Zimmerman”:

More generally, we need to account for the fact that the same attitude-reporting sentence (containing no indexicals), uttered in different contexts, can seem to take on different truth-conditions. Suppose now that Glenda is participating in a marketing poll which asks for her opinion of various singers’ voices. One of the names of the list is ‘Bob Dylan’. I’m asked to predict her responses. It would be unacceptable for me to reply with ‘Glenda believes that Bob Dylan has a beautiful voice’, even though that very sentence (...) seemed true in our previous context (Saul 1998, 366).

Mutatis mutandis, we can contrive a similar example for indirect reports. Suppose we have a marketing-poll, and John is asked what will Mary say in response to the question “Which singer do you like most?”. Suppose we presuppose John knows that Mary knows Bob Dylan (only) under the guise or mode of presentation “Robert Zimmerman”. Then, in case we are ready to answer that she will say she likes Robert Zimmerman most, are we also ready to say that she will say that she likes Bob Dylan most (in other words will the two statements have the same truth-conditions?) I do not think we are. The context constrains our answers and seems to require that our answer will report almost literally what Mary will say.

2.13 Choice of Mode of Presentation and the Hearer

It may be thought that the choice of a certain lexeme (instead of a competitor) in an indirect speech report is not a matter of having respect for what the original speaker actually said, but a matter of ensuring that the hearer be able to identify the referent. If the purpose of an indirect speech report is to inform a hearer H of what a speaker S said in a prior speech act, so that H can utilize the knowledge imparted by what S said (assuming that what he said transmitted S’s knowledge), then it goes without saying that it would be best to choose an NP (or mode of presentation) recognizable by the hearer (otherwise the purpose of the indirect speech act will not be fulfilled). Habermas is quite right in saying that

By describing behaviour as an intentional action, we take the perspective of the actor himself; but this agent’s point of view signifies a two-tiered intentional relation to something in the world, namely the relation to the cognitive representation of reality that is valid for the agent and to the subjective attitude that the agent takes towards this representation of reality (Habermas 2001, 113).

The fact that indirect reports can use different modes of presentation from those used in the original speech acts, shows that Habermas' two levels of intentionality are at work in indirect reports¹¹: the Russellian proposition of the that-clause (the cognitive representation of reality Habermas alludes to) and the intention to use a mode of presentation that is more familiar to the hearer so that the hearer can utilize the knowledge imparted with the that-clause to carry out whatever action he deems necessary. The subjective attitude Habermas speaks of is the intention to act in a certain way (propositional attitudes such as desiring to act in a certain way).

From what we have seen, indirect reports, are often associated with perlocutionary purposes; thus, it is correct to say that "minds are partial causes of events in the world and in other minds" (Zeevat 1997, 156).

I find it uncontroversial that when the indirect report is issued with the purpose of letting a hearer utilize what an original speaker said so that the hearer of the speech report can be informed of a situation *s*, then an NP that can guide the hearer towards identifying the referent must be chosen. However, there are constraints on such a choice. The NP chosen **must not** distort what the original speaker said to the extent that, faced with the indirect speech report, the original speaker is likely to say that he does not recognize his intention in that report.

2.14 Indirect Reports and Expressives

As an authoritative linguist has said, we can sometimes be faced with a text or an utterance "whose ambiguous linguistic form makes it 'double-voiced'..." with an ambivalence of voice" (Fairclough 1992, 108). The practice of indirect reports involves being able to separate what is attributable to the original sayer and what is attributable to the current speaker, even if both things appear in the that-clause. So a good rule is the following:

Do not take everything that appears in the that-clause of the indirect report as belonging to the voice of the original speaker whose speech act is being reported.

A complementary rule is the following:

Separate the elements of the that-clause that contribute to the voice of the original speaker from those that contribute to the voice of the reporter by exploiting contextual clues – assuming that these are sufficient for the purpose of separating the two voices.

¹¹ It is clear from the discussion that Habermas aims to reconcile Brentano's notion of intentionality (thoughts are intentional in that they are directed towards objects and contents) with a teleological notion of intentionality.

An important example illustrating the role contextual clues play in separating the two voices is the following drawn from Potts's (2005) important discussion of conventional implicatures and, in particular, of expressive acts (the author takes expressive acts to be a special class of adjectives that can never contribute to the at-issue content):

- (28) Edna is at her friend Chuck's house. Chuck tells her that he thinks all his red vases are ugly. He approves only of his blue ones. He tells Edna that she can take one of his red vases. Edna thinks the red vases are lovely, selects one and returns home to tell her housemate:

'Chuck said I could have one of his lovely vases!' (Potts 2005, 18).

Pott says:

We easily recognize that Edna is contributing the adjective (lovely); the utterance expresses two propositions: (i) that Chuck said Edna could have one of his vases; (ii) Edna thinks Chuck's vases are lovely (Potts 2005, 18).

I am not sure that Potts is completely right about what he says. Surely Edna's housemate need not understand that 'lovely' refers to Edna's and not to Chuck's voice in the absence of appropriate information. In fact, he can avail of no contextual clues to separate Edna's from Chuck's voice in the that-clause attributed to Chuck. Perhaps he can do so only after Edna narrates the whole story, as we have it above. Instead, Edna and the readers, who have access to the whole story, are able to separate Edna's from Chuck's voice. An obvious way to do so is to avoid attributing Chuck elements of the that-clause in case it is clear from the context that they do not reflect (they contradict) Chuck's opinion. In this case, context is used to filter out from the that-clause elements (of meaning) that do not reflect the opinion of the original utterer. Without full contextual knowledge, it is impossible to separate the original speaker's from the reporter's voice (some underdetermination of meaning will result).

Now, all I have said so far belongs to the practice of indirect reports – in fact, there are no linguistic rules that tell us how to separate the reporter and the original speaker's voice from the that-clause (embedded in a verb of saying). We need to depend heavily on the context.

If adjectives present such a problem, what about adverbs? Consider a sentence such as (29)

- (29) John said he frankly wanted to leave.

Is the adverb 'frankly' to be attributed to John or to the reporter? I would not hesitate to say that these adverbs do not pose a serious problem, as they modify the speech act of the original speaker, not of the reporter.

There is in Potts' book a stimulating discussion of conventional implicatures in connection with the connective 'but'. It appears that Potts, following Bach (1999a) denies that the inference associated with 'but' (the suggested contrast) is a conven-

tional implicature. In fact, he opts for the view that it is part of what is said. An interesting, but certainly not well-exploited example, is the following:

(30) Mary said that Sak is huge *but* that he is agile.

Potts and Bach opt for the view that the contrast implicated by ‘but’ is part of what is said (by Mary) because of the following data:

(31) Mary believes that being huge is a good indicator of agility. # Mary said that Shaq is huge *but* that she is agile.

The first sentence creates a context in which Mary denies the secondary content generated by ‘but’ in the second sentence. If the contribution of ‘but’ were a CI, we would have no inconsistency.

2.15 Final Remarks

This chapter has advanced the theory of indirect reports, by the notion of linguistic practices (certainly a societal notion) and by the formulation of a number of rules that are central to these practices. Yet, it would be good if we could find out some general rationale for the fact that sometimes co-referential expressions are inter-substitutable in that-clauses (of indirect reports), while sometimes they are not. A good filter is to be found in speech act theory. If we agree (as I assume we ought to do) that saying is not just a locutionary, but also an illocutionary act, then transformations of what a speaker originally said can be tolerated **provided that** the illocutionary act originally made is preserved in the final indirect speech report. Anything that transforms the speech act originally made will not be put up with. This is the way the filter works. Now we can understand why an NP cannot be replaced with an NP that contains an epithet (e.g. “That bastard”), since, by so doing, the assertion will ‘ipso facto’ be transformed into an **insult**, which is a different speech act from an assertion. The same thing applies to introductions. You cannot replace “I” with “Alessandro Capone” in an introduction, because the purpose of the introduction will be lost (“Alessandro Capone is Alessandro Capone” is not an introduction). It is of interest whether the analogies with propositional attitudes are more or less important in explaining the failure of substitutivity. If analogies with propositional attitudes were more fundamental than analogies with speech act theory, then we would expect the failure of substitutivity to be a pretty general phenomenon in indirect speech reports, while it is not. It is crucial to notice that the sentences (32) and (33) are different in important respects:

(32) He said that Mary is pretty;

(33) He believed that Mary is pretty.

Substitution of a different NP in place of ‘Mary’ in (33) results in a (possible) falsehood because of the mental attitude to the proposition “...is pretty”. Substitution of a different NP in place of ‘Mary’ in (32) results in a (possible) falsehood due to the

external appearances and effects of the (original) speech act. That has nothing to do with the mental attitude of the (original) speaker, but has more to do with the fact that speech acts are **public** events in which the form of what is said may have consequences on the illocutionary and perlocutionary effects achieved. In fact, the form of an NP in an assertion may be consequential on the illocutionary purpose. This is evident when one considers transformations such as:

(34) This gentleman is waiting;

(35) This bastard is waiting.

Only (34) is appropriate to the institutional situation “Potential customer waiting in a shop” and to the goal “selling goods”. (35) will clearly not do in this setting and will conflict with the illocutionary goal “selling goods”. The correlation of form (the problem of mode of presentation) with illocutionary goal is quite solid and tends to show that failures of substitution in indirect reports are due to this correlation.

I am persuaded that despite Davidson’s (1968) claim that the study of indirect reports and belief reports are intertwined, in fact the two studies are grounded on different principles, the study of speech acts and the study of people’s mental life.

To prove that what I say is not without significance, I propose that failures of substitutivity in indirect reports and belief reports are to be explained in a different way.

Suppose I say that “Tom said that the oldest bachelor in England is rich” (the example is due to Platts (1997, 115) and that it happens that the oldest bachelor in England is also the richest bachelor. Substitution of the co-referring expression here will not do (it will not keep the truth values the same), not because I think that Tom would not have assented to the proposition that the richest bachelor in England is rich, but because, in virtue of what he said, he only committed himself to the proposition that the oldest bachelor in England is rich. The problem of whether Tom would have assented to the proposition that the oldest bachelor in England is rich does not arise at all, because it must be granted that something (a proposition) can be said without having any appropriate beliefs about it (this is not to say that in all cases we dissociate what we say from what we believe). There are cases in which a person says something in rehearsing a poem or a play, or in which one is saying something because some other person forces her to do so. As you know very well, SayLoc must be distinguished from SayIII. Only the latter is coupled with appropriate beliefs and is assertoric in nature. I argue that due to the fact that, in the absence of contextual clues, it is simply impossible to distinguish between SayLoc and SayIII, the question of belief cannot be relevant to substitution.

2.16 Conclusion

There is no doubt the theory of indirect speech reports has much to benefit from the theory of pragmemes and of speech acts in institutional contexts. The theory of indirect speech reports will be advanced considerably if we place this issue, which

surely pertains to the philosophy of language, in a societal perspective. It is very instructive to investigate the societal rules having a bearing on the transformations involved in the transition from direct speech to indirect speech reports, in particular, those pertaining to modes of presentation. The use of some, rather than some other, mode of presentation is a matter of being situated in a certain institutional context. It follows that contextual information severely limits transformations pertaining to modes of presentation.

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Chapter 3

On the (Complicated) Relationship Between Direct and Indirect Reports

In this chapter, I discuss subtle differences between direct and indirect reports, to conclude that they are mainly a matter of degree, although there are non-negligible syntactic differences, as direct reports admit interjections, while indirect reports, allegedly, do not (I provide a sketch of an explanation why interjections, if they were uttered in indirect reports, could not count as quoted segments of mixed indirect reports). I discuss the issue of opacity and I claim that in direct reports, especially those of the strict type, opacity is a result of interpreting the report verbatim; opacity is a pragmatic phenomenon in indirect reports. I discuss transformations like eliminations and expansions. I discuss differences on the basis of the interpretation of pronominals, and the possibility of using the report as a summary. I also discuss implicit indirect reports.

3.1 Introduction

The issue of (direct and indirect) reports is magisterially summed up in Keith Allan (2016b):

Essentially a report is X's re-presentation to Y of what Z said. Because X is not identical with Z, what Z said is necessarily transmuted by X. X may use a different medium (e.g. written in place of spoken); X will have a different voice; and X will re-present what Z said, more often than not, using different lexis and grammar, even when attempting a verbatim quote. X may have misheard or misinterpreted Z's utterance: she may add an affective gloss. All of these distinguish X's report ρ from Z's utterance v in both form and content, which renders every report "indirect" to some extent; there are different degrees of indirectness, but a truly indirect report utilises pragmatic enrichment, e.g. when Z's utterance *It's never stopped raining since we arrived* is reported

as *Z complained about the terrible weather there* or *I won easily* is reported as a boast, mistake, or lie.

Although for Allan there is not a clear-cut distinction between direct and indirect reports, he assumes that if there is something to distinguish them, it is the indirect reports' reliance on explicatures (explicatures do not appear or, it is best to say, are not explicated in direct reports). In this paper, we shall discuss a number of related issues on the basis of this presupposition – although at some point we discuss a(n allegedly) grammatical difference between direct and indirect reports, one which is not accepted by Allan (p.c.) and which my other considerations also lead me to be suspicious of, even if I accept that it must be taken into serious consideration.

The issue of indirect reports is fairly complicated; one of the basic assumptions presupposed (or assumed) by most scholars working on indirect reports is that they are different (in many respects, even if in the end the difference could only be a matter of degree) from direct reports¹. A way to characterize this difference is to say that its main ingredient is accuracy or the lack of it (greater or less granularity, in the terminology of Holt 2016). Indirect reports seem to allow the speaker (and prepare the hearer for) a lower degree of accuracy than direct reports. Direct reports, we may assume, but this is a fiction to be dispelled in the course of this chapter, report *verbatim* what a speaker said. They more or less report the same things as indirect reports, but they are required in different contexts. Direct reports seem to prevent the reporter from altering the content of the report – interpolations are banned, or so it might appear *prima facie* (however, we should soon insist on the difference between strict and loose direct reports). But there are many ways to alter the content of a direct report without giving rise to criticism. Suppose Speaker A said 'p' and then 'q'. The direct reporter may make an innocent change, by inverting the order of the utterances. He could report: A said q; p. This is a *prima facie* change but it shows how easily we can inject our voice even into a direct report. As Grice was well aware, the report may be misleading, because it conveys different conversational implicatures (in Capone 2008, I actually thought that some of these inferences were properly called 'explicatures'). A probably has a reason to say p before q. Perhaps the reason is that q explains p or elaborates on p. If the order is changed, the perlocutionary effects are different (Allan 2016b writes of 'rearrangements'). Now, although this case can be clearly deepened further, all I need it for is to show that small differences in the message reported may account for big differences in

¹With some exceptions, such as Saka (2005) and Keith Allan (p.c.), who reiterates what he expressed in Allan 2016a and Allan 2016b. Allan has not been able to find any significant difference between direct and indirect reports. He also thinks that indirect reports could admit interjections as parts of mixed-quoted segments. Also see Coulmas (1986, 5), who says "What appears to be simply the alternative to direct discourse is thus a complex assembly of ways of reporting another's speech or certain aspects thereof (...) that make indirect speech a versatile mode of speech reporting ranging from faithfully adapting the linguistic form of the reported utterance to the deictic centre of the report situation to a summarizing paraphrase of an utterance irrespective of its linguistic form".

interpretation. So, it is possible for the speaker to add some interpolations in direct reports too, although we expect that they should be more substantial in indirect reports. In indirect reports, the speaker may change the words to some extent and thus one of the tasks of the hearer (of an indirect report) is to reconstruct what was actually said on the basis of what was reported (eliminating possible transformations that altered the content too much). So the reporter's problem is obviously the reverse of the hearer's problem. The reporter needs to move from the words uttered to an indirect report more or less summarizing the content of those words (an author who explicitly uses the term 'summary' or 'gloss' for indirect reports exhibiting less granularity is Holt (2016)); the hearer has to move from the words of the indirect report to the words of the reported speaker, often having to infer that (some of) these words belong to the reporting speaker and not to the reported speaker or vice-versa that these words belong to the reported speaker and not to the reporting speaker. Although *prima facie* indirect reports might appear simple, in fact they are rather complicated language games (see Capone 2013a for the view that indirect reports are language games), where both the speaker and the hearer have to adhere to a social praxis, consisting in a number of constraints (some of which were spelled out in a previous chapter, while others will be spelled out later on in this book – see the chapter on non-literal meanings and indirect reporting). In this chapter, we try to understand why direct and indirect reports are different language games, even if apparently the rules for the two practices are not completely different. Intuitively, it is the context embedding the activity to shape the structure of the activity. So we hope to be able to deepen the differences between the two practices by focusing on the contexts and the purposes which accompany and motivate them. (The purpose to which an indirect report is put allows us to infer the direction of the changes made by the reporter).

3.2 Opacity

Let us start the comparison between direct and indirect reports by examining the notion of opacity. Opacity is a characteristic of verbatim direct reports, which may be somehow extended to indirect reports and to belief reports which, as we shall see, are a variety of indirect reports. (The Davidsonian approach to opacity in indirect reports was to see it as a consequence of considering the indirect report a direct report in disguise; Davidson (1968) certainly has the merit of pointing out the connections between direct and indirect reports and of pointing to the phenomenon of voicing in indirect reports, although he never explicitly wrote about the polyphonic dimension of indirect reports).

Consider the following direct report:

- (1) Mary said 'You are an idiot'

The speaker of (1) uses some modes of presentation like 'You' and 'idiot' and if one replaces those words, the result may be unsatisfactory, for various reasons. The

corresponding indirect report ‘Mary said that John is a handicapped person’ is unsatisfactory, first of all because the report now uses the proper name ‘John’ instead of the mode of presentation ‘you’ (the second person pronoun ‘you’ has no implication that the speaker knows the addressee by name, as in ‘Can you move your car a bit’ said to a stranger clearly shows that ‘you’ does not imply knowledge of the addressee’s name)². It is also unsatisfactory because the speaker meant to insult John, rather than describe or characterize him, whereas the replacement of ‘idiot’ (which is normally used to insult) with ‘handicapped person’ seems to involve a transition from an insult to a description or characterization (and the transformation is clearly more evident when the insult is paraphrased through an indirect report, as now we are no longer in a position to know whether Mary is speaking face to face to John, in which case ‘idiot’ is more insulting’, or whether she is speaking of John with a friend. We immediately see that an indirect report is less fine-grained than a direct report (Mary said to John: ‘You are an idiot’) and it involves indirection not only in so far as it does not quote a verbatim utterance but because it invariably involves a less fine-grained picture of the situation and the loss of detail has the effect of mitigating the import of the words. Of course another tactic is available to the indirect reporter: she could provide a less fine-grained report by focusing on the offence, as in ‘Mary offended John’ or ‘Mary insulted John’. Such tactics focus on the speech act uttered, rather than on the words, and seem to encapsulate interpretation of the words. Mary might have said: ‘you are an idiot’ smiling (as a joke) in which case it would not be correct to report the utterance as if it counted as an insult. In Oxford I overheard various times young students saying to one another ‘You bastard’ (the utterance got my attention because you would never say that in Italian unless you want to be punched). How could one report such utterances? ‘X said that the bastard VPs’ is clearly not an adequate indirect report and certainly ‘bastard’ could not be heard as a quoted segment, because there is no way to distinguish between a serious and non-serious use, once the segment is quoted (unless a bit of the original context is provided, a possibility which ought not to be excluded). A segment of speech may be mixed-quoted (or mixed-reported) only when it is possible to recognize whether it was uttered with a serious or non-serious intention. If such a recognition is not possible, given the clues available, then the quotation will lead to obscurity and a violation of a Gricean maxim (perspicuity: in this case, avoid unwanted ambiguities).

But opacity is strictly the consequence of a view of ‘said’ which amounts to interpreting ‘said’ as ‘exactly said’. So opacity needs to be qualified as being the result of interpretation of the verb ‘say’, as surely there can be no opacity if we know that the report, despite the fact that it is direct, is not exactly a verbatim report. The report can fail to be a verbatim report either because we inject something into the utterance or because we eliminate some constituent of it.

² Although unsatisfactory, the transformation in an indirect report has the advantage of helping the hearers identify the referent, while the pronoun ‘you’ clearly is not of much help, given that anyone at all could be addressed by the second person pronominal ‘you’.

Indirect reports and belief reports (a sub-case of indirect reports) seem to behave differently with respect to opacity. Opacity here is more the result of the application of pragmatic principles than the application of semantics, although the basic principles are semantic. The idea is that if a report does not contain a word actually used in mental or actual speech by the subject (the original speaker), he would object to its being used in the report. Suppose John believes that Mary is at the cinema and I report ‘John believes that the Queen is at the cinema’ and there is no evidence that John knows that Mary is the Queen, then I have clearly not reported something he believes but a proposition which happens to be coextensive with the proposition he believes. John may not assent to the report of his belief that the Queen is at the cinema. In other words, substitutions in both belief reports and in indirect reports in general cannot be made, without creating a problem, as the reported speaker may not approve the report. However, according to some authors (see Soames 1988, 1989), this is not due to semantics, but to pragmatics. In other words, although the practice of substituting a coextensive NP in a belief report or indirect report in general is not deviant from a semantic point of view, it is not acceptable due to pragmatics, given that the reporter implicates, by using a certain sentence, that the original speaker or the subject of the belief believes the proposition under the mode of presentation voiced by the sentence used, given that he could have used different modes of presentation, but did not use them. In direct reports (especially verbatim ones) it is clearly semantics that is involved in opacity, as the quotation marks usually are taken to indicate that the words in quotation marks were uttered verbatim (without modification or without much modification). This is semantic opacity – but notice that this view is correct or close to correct only if we accept that quotation marks are conventional semantic indicators that the sentence or words they bracket are verbatim reports. As I said, this view is not devoid of problems, because we notice that there is some latitude in the semantics of ‘say’, as sometimes it means ‘say more or less’, some other times it means ‘say exactly’. Even ‘say’ is a context-sensitive expression and we should decide whether we have two verbs ‘say1’ and ‘say2’ or whether we have only ‘say’, which can be weakened or reinforced (another problem is to establish whether the weaker or the stronger meaning is associated with the semantics of ‘say’, while the other meaning can be obtained (for free) by subtracting or adding features in a context of utterance). This would be a case in which pragmatics is allied with parsimony (see Jaszczolt 1999), given that on the basis of the same lexical entry, two meanings (or shadows of meaning) are constructed.

3.3 Transformations in Direct and Indirect Reports

In this section, I shall argue that both direct and indirect reports can undergo drastic transformations (in the sense that in reporting the original utterance some element of the utterance is lost and some element accrues to it; in other words, a report is sometimes less fine-grained, some other times more fine-grained). If this thesis proves correct, then we should seek the difference between direct and indirect

reports elsewhere – or we have to say that the difference is one of degree and not of substance.

First of all, we need to be aware that in some cases (rare though they are) a direct report sounds very much like an indirect report. It may even be a consequence of conventions that such direct reports are interpreted as indirect reports, that is to say they are not to be taken verbatim, although ‘prima facie’ they look like direct reports. An example that comes to mind is: He said Good Bye (it is interesting that the Italian translation means more than the report of a greeting, and often implies the sudden interruption of an interaction due to a disagreement (or an argument)).³ With this example, there is no implication that ‘Good Bye’ is all that the speaker said, but this is a narrative way of saying (a summary, in other words) that the interaction came to a halt. In English, ‘He said Goodbye’ can also mean that there is a ceremony in which some people give their last greeting to a deceased. In this case it is not a Goodbye utterance but it may be a sequence of utterances by the same speaker or a sequence of utterances by (possibly) different speakers (They said Goodbye). Furthermore, such an idiom places emphasis on the speech act rather than on the words, it works like a summary, even if it appears that it is quoted speech. Here there is an element of convention. However, in some cases it is not convention but context that will allow us to detect an indirect report on hearing a direct report. Consider the following:

- (2) Mum said: Mary must have a bath (said to a five years old daughter)⁴

³ Another example similar to ‘He said Goodbye’, is the Italian utterance ‘Gli ho detto vaffanculo’ (I said to him Go to hell), which although it looks like a direct report (apparently quoting the words said) need not be a direct report, as the hearer imagines that the speaker may have proffered different words (a longer utterance, possibly). This looks like a summary. Another way of summing up the situation would be: ‘L’ho mandato affanculo’. Although this does not make reference to any words or utterances, it sums up the situation when we make clear to someone else that we no longer want to have intercourse with them. This is clearly a summary of what was said and of the (perlocutionary) effects of what was said.

⁴ When I re-read this part of the chapter, I realized there is an ambiguity (if no colon is inserted), as one does not know whether a direct or an indirect report is issued. Davidson was probably right in his intuition that opacity in indirect reports comes from a structure like: Mum said that: Mary must have a bath. I assume that, in oral speech, there are ways to distinguish between the direct report structure and the indirect report structure, as with quotation there must be a pause. We wonder whether the pause is a pronominal in disguise (an implicit pronominal like ‘that’) followed by a colon. This issue cannot be settled here, but surely there is something in the Davidsonian intuition and what matters most is that some pragmatics is needed to resolve the ambiguity indirect report/direct report in some cases, even if, unless we interpret quotation as strict or pure (involving quotation marks and an expression which is literally quoted), there would be no need to resolve such an ambiguity, because there would be trivial differences between direct and indirect reports. As far as I know the only obstacles that stand in the way of a conflation between direct and indirect reports is (a) that sometimes quotation must be interpreted as strict quotation (Mary said exactly that:...) and that direct quotation, but not indirect quotation, does admit the insertion of discourse markers; but, of course, this obstacle can be overcome if one admits mixed quotation in indirect reports: He said that oh yes he was happy to accept the professorship. At least in spoken utterances, scholars have envisaged the possibility of mixed quotation in indirect reports (or mixed indirect reports), and thus a small step forward would possibly be to admit that discourse markers and interjections

Here the father is dramatizing the mother's words to have a greater impact on the daughter but there is no reason to expect that this is a verbatim quote; perhaps the mother said 'Do not forget Mary's bath'. Here there may be an element of convention too, as the father does not expect his daughter to take him literally (it may be a consequence of adult-child interaction that different conventions are used, with quotations used as indirect reports).

It might be of interest to collect examples involving this kind of transformation, but this is not the main point of the section. The main point of the section is that the border between direct and indirect reports has been corroded.

Now we shall be concerned with the transformations we can notice in direct reports. Surely we do not expect direct reports to be exhaustive. Even if an utterance were to be taken as a verbatim report, there is no implication that this is all that was said, but only that what is reported is relevant to the conversational needs at hand. By reporting an utterance, the speaker hopes to provide the addressee with useful information. There is no need to report parts of the utterance which are not of use to the addressee and, thus, no implication that what was reported was everything that was said⁵. Perhaps it was only a selection of what was said. Of course, if the speaker made a selection of utterances to report, it is possible that he decided not to report something which could be of relevance to the addressee, but which was not congruent with the speaker's purpose. Thus there is no point in assuming that the speaker made no manipulation of the utterances he reported.

3.4 Elimination

A reason why 'elimination' seems to us to be an essential transformation is that we cannot possibly report everything that a speaker said and, thus, we have to make a selection or possibly select only an utterance out of many that she proffered (originally, elimination was discussed by Wieland (2013)⁶ in a very interesting paper on indirect reports (though she did not say anything on direct reports) and taken up and critically discussed by Capone (2013a, b). Relevance may be an element in our choice – as we discard utterances that are not relevant to our purpose.

can appear in indirect reports too (He said that, Oh làlà, he was finally in love). (Of course a non-negligible problem is to attribute the interjection to a speaker or to another, given that the indirect report conflates the reporter and the reported speakers' voices). This problem will be discussed later and I will say that considerations on explicatures can explain why interjections seem not to appear in indirect reports (or are considered illicit there).

⁵I distinctly remember deleting those parts which I deemed to be irrelevant from my academic quotations (using (...) to mark the deletion transformation). Of course, in the written mode of communication one can signal slots, where the inverse transformation can be effected, but in the oral mode of communication it is not possible to insert such empty slots and thus the hearer is not encouraged to reconstruct the deleted part.

⁶I now realize that many of the considerations in Wieland (2013) in fact were anticipated by Cappelen and Lepore (1997).

Elimination is an important transformation, although we *qua* hearers are not able to see the boundaries of the utterance and imagine what was adjacent to it. However, the reported speaker can sometimes complain ‘But this is not everything I said’ or ‘this is only part of what I said’, with the implication that the reporter deleted materials likely to be useful in establishing whether the reported speaker was guilty of something (in case the report is used as part of an accusation). I do not easily forget the event in which, in the course of a meeting of the college council, the Dean⁷ said, as a way of making an example, “Suppose I say that Professor Buccheri is an idiot”. As you can very well imagine, the Professor in question complained violently although the word ‘idiot’ was only used as part of a supposition. The truth is that careful though you might be to bracket (or frame, to use a Goffmanian expression) an epithet as part of a quotation, attributing an epithet to someone is insulting (or so it is perceived). So, I quite agree that Professor Buccheri had reasons to complain, but what followed the complaint was not quite correct. In fact, in order to express this complaint formally, the professor in question needed the minutes of the meeting but such a report happened to be very partial, both in the sense that it only partially reported the Dean’s words and in the sense that it was written in favor of Professor Buccheri. After the Dean asked us all to read and approve the report (or withdraw approval), it was clear that much of what had happened had disappeared and that the only event on which the minutes focused was the utterance mentioning Buccheri’s name. In this way, the Dean appeared to be a very crazy person who wanted to insult the Professor – it was not any longer evident that Buccheri’s name appeared in the course of making the example and that the utterance was a temporary hitch (a momentary impasse), an unintended offence. (The Dean showed that she was not sensitive to some social constraints which should have prevented her from associating the name of someone who was present at the meeting with the epithet ‘idiot’ even if as part of an example). So, from this discussion we can evince that ELIMINATION is a powerful rhetorical strategy always bearing a perlocutionary function.

Another type of elimination is what can be called ELIMINATION UNDER ENTAILMENT (see Wieland 2013 for discussion of this transformation in connection with indirect reports and Capone 2013a for criticism)⁸. This too looks like a simple and innocent sort of elimination, although we had better ask, why should the speaker want to eliminate a constituent? Elimination under entailment is the practice of eliminating some constituent likely to be deemed superfluous or redundant or irrelevant to the purpose of the citation. Suppose Mary says: John, who has always spoken in defense of freedom, yesterday attacked freedom of speech, saying that nowadays people can say all sorts of offensive things. Now it is clear that the previous utterance entails → John yesterday attacked freedom of speech, saying that

⁷I changed the situation, the participants and many details, so that the people in question could not recognize themselves. The event actually happened long time ago and in a completely different place.

⁸Again, see Cappelen and Lepore (1997), which is where the discussion originates from.

nowadays people can say all sorts of offensive things. Under entailment we could make one further deletion, given that the utterance thus obtained entails \rightarrow John yesterday attacked freedom of speech. And now we could also make one further deletion, since the utterance now obtained entails the following \rightarrow John attacked freedom of speech. It is clear that all these deletions may be oriented towards a purpose, which may lie not in brevity, but in some possibly opaque and to some extent unpredictable perlocutionary purpose. By deleting ‘yesterday’ the speaker may give the impression that this attitude is not limited to a short period of John’s life and by deleting ‘saying that nowadays people can say all sorts of things’, the speaker may eliminate a reason for John’s position; thus, John may look a more dogmatic person than he is or his remark may have greater generality, since having deleted this constituent, John may be taken to be opposed to freedom of speech for the wrong kind of reason (for all we know he may want to prevent anyone from speaking, even those who say things that are right; instead, all John wants is to prevent fools from speaking). By deleting the constituent ‘who has always spoken in defense of freedom’, the speaker is characterizing John as someone who has always held the position that freedom of speech should be attacked, when instead the speaker explicitly says that this attitude is a fairly recent one and that he used to think otherwise. Furthermore, the speaker is now deliberately avoiding giving the impression (furnished by the original utterance) that there is a contrast between what John used to think in the past and the position he now accepts (with the implication that there was a point at which he changed his mind). So now it should be clear to the speaker that the perlocutionary effects of the report orient the possible transformations and eliminations from a verbatim report.

That verbatim reports do not exist or are very rare is something that emerges from the literature on quotation and on indirect reports. Saka (2005), for example, says that quotation is rarely verbatim and Keith Allan (Forthcoming) says that reports (whether direct or indirect) at least may involve a reshuffling or reordering of the events reported.

3.5 Expansions

Intuitively, indirect reports are more susceptible of being expanded. It may be possible to add materials in an indirect report, without drastically altering the content of the original utterance. Indirect reports often reveal the reporter’s interpretation work. He wants to make sense of an utterance, not just report it. Thus we expect that he may reveal the explicatures and the implicatures of the original utterance, in a way that the original utterance did not (see Allan 2016a for the basic idea that indirect reports may semanticize pragmatic aspects of the original utterance). The indirect reporter may furthermore be sensitive to possible contradictions in the original utterance and eliminate them by offering an interpretation that reconciles the readings of the various sentences in the utterance (thus she will work on the assumption that the original speaker is rational and could not have said things that contradict

each other; therefore alternative interpretations have to be sought beyond the literal meaning of the sentences) (Dascal 2003). The reporter may also report qualities of the utterance such as the voice (he said that in a soft voice; or, he said that shouting; he shouted that ...). And finally he may intercept sincerity or falsity (he was not sincere when he said that; I could see it in his eyes; when I looked at him, he diverted his eyes). The speaker can also intercept sarcasm or metaphoric meaning (thus an indirect report may also be indirect in the sense that it will typically go beyond the literal meaning to capture metaphoric meanings⁹). Appositions can be added to clarify the referent of an NP (in addition to the possibility of replacing an NP with a coextensive one). Appositions can also be added at the sentential level to clarify the meaning of an utterance (He said that p, by which he meant that q). What is most interesting is that the reporter can also draw inferences of a non-linguistic type, especially of the deductive type. In other words, the reported speaker could focus on the consequences of what the original speaker said; by drawing the obvious consequences of what the speaker said, he may say something that praises or criticizes the speaker (in case the obvious consequences were negative and did not occur to the original speaker).

3.6 Interjections in Indirect Reports

It appears that in English indirect reports do not admit interjections or discourse markers (Mayes 1990; Hassler 2002; Wilkins 1995; Holt 2016). Our expectation is that direct reports should admit interjections and discourse markers. If this is true, then we expect there to be a distinction between direct and indirect reports (what we have said so far, if anything, militates in favor of a conflation of direct and indirect reports). The distinction, however, is not neat. In fact there is the theoretical possibility of having mixed reports in English and in other languages; thus, if anything, we would expect indirect reports to admit interjections and other discourse markers even if it should be understood that, when they appear, they are enveloped in quotation marks. The fact that interjections in indirect reports are not attested need not amount to saying that they are ungrammatical; they could be dispreferred for a pragmatic reason (a plausible one could be that it is difficult to establish whether the interjection belongs to the original speaker or to the reporting speaker). The literature is silent on the possibility of interpreting interjections in indirect reports as mixed quotations, and thus I take this to be a controversial point, but not a completely outlandish position. What is less controversial is the fact that free indirect reports can contain interjections, expressives and discourse markers (see Blakemore

⁹The social practice of indirect reporting presumably involves constraints such as the following:

Do not (indirectly) report the literal meaning of an utterance if you know that the utterance had a non-literal meaning (according to the speaker's intentions) unless you know that the hearer has clues allowing her to reconstruct the intended meaning.

2013 for serious work on this).¹⁰ This could be taken as evidence that there should be the theoretical possibility of having mixed indirect reports admitting interjections. After all, free indirect reports involve explicatures specifying the ‘He said that’ or ‘He thought that’ constituent and once the complete explicature is reconstructed, we return to the problematic utterance ‘John said that oh he was very surprised’. At this point we have two options: (a) say that indirect reports too admit interjections, although there is clearly the preference for expressing interjections in explicit direct reports, which explains why such reports of the mixed type are not normally attested (contrary to ordinary mixed reports); (b) say that there is a difference between the explicature and the explicated utterance and that what is illicit at the level of the explicit utterance is licit at the level of the explicature (thus free indirect reports (with interjections) which are reconstructed on the basis of an explicature are licit (the case of free indirect reports), while ordinary (explicit) indirect reports with interjections are not licit). The reason for this is that (or should be that) although the explicature provides lexical materials ordered in a syntactic fashion, the syntax reconstructed is invisible to grammatical processes. Thus the reconstructed semantico/syntactic constituents are visible from a semantic point of view but are invisible to grammatical constraints (one of these is that interjections cannot be inserted in indirect reports). And now if this option is adopted (but it is not yet clear what (all) the consequences of adopting this option can be), we can explain why mixed indirect reports containing interjections are not possible. After all, even mixed indirect reports rely on explicatures. Consider the following example:

(3) John said that ‘that bastard’ does not deserve our trust

By using the mixed quotation, the speaker is distancing herself from the expressed proposition (a modal effect is being somehow conveyed, like lowering the speaker’s commitment to the expressed proposition). In order to achieve this, we need some kind of pragmatic/syntactic reconstruction:

John said that the person whom he referred to by the words ‘that bastard’ does not deserve our trust.

The explicature involves addition of a syntactic structure. Now consider again:

(4) John said that oh he was so surprised

This can have the following explicature:

John said that he was so surprised, which he expressed by using the interjection ‘Oh’

But this is clearly uninterpretable: as far as we know John could have produced the ungrammatical ‘I am oh so surprised’ or ‘I am so surprised, oh’. Given the

¹⁰ An example could be the following:

Mary thought she was happy. Oh làlà, the love of her life had arrived.

impossibility of assigning a single interpretation to the explicature, this is avoided normally.

I should conclude this section on interjections on a positive note. For those who believe that the difference between direct and indirect reports is only a matter of degree, interjections should not count as an obstacle (to conflation) because one could hold the same position as the one expressed by Keith Allan in an important personal communication:

I should have added that if you can't indirectly report an interjection (which you can), then you can't indirectly report a speech defect, a cough, laughter, etc. etc. either. Of course it is possible to report all of these along with comments on the way the speaker looks.

There is something of considerable theoretical importance in these considerations. Once we accept the theoretical possibility of quoting fragments of speech or the possibility that fragments of the *that*-clauses of indirect reports can be interpreted this way, then one has to think hard to explain why some types of constituents can occur while others cannot. It is possible that it is not grammaticality in itself that is involved in the fact that interjections appear to be banned in indirect reports, but that some considerations concerning ambiguity and the difficulty in attributing the interjection to the reporter or to the reported speaker prevail. But should not one say that the same considerations that are applicable to interjections should be applicable to other quoted expressions? Without explicit quotation marks, how can we distinguish between the reporting speaker's and the reported person's voice? This is clearly a matter of pragmatics, and while the possibility of interpretative ambiguity looms large, there is always the theoretical possibility of distinguishing between voices. In another paper (Capone 2010b), I argued at length that we need something (some constraint on interpretation or some principle specific to indirect reports) which allows us to segregate the reported speaker's from the reporting speaker's voice. This is what I called the

3.7 Paraphrasis/Form Principle

The *that*-clause embedded in the verb 'say' is a paraphrasis of what Y said, and meets the following constraints:

Should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer 'that' on account of its form/style.

In a different paper (Capone 2016) and chapter of this book, I specifically discuss a number of objections leveled by Wayne Davis (in personal communication) to my principle. Since there are ways to surmount those objections, I need not mention them here. However, I need to stress that the Paraphrase/Form principle clearly has some work to do in the case of interjections and it easily attributes them to the reported speaker (and not to the reporting speaker) by default.

There are residual problems for a view that allows interjections as quotations in that-clauses of indirect reports. How can we explain the fact that the following report seems to be out?

(5) John said that But he was relieved that he no longer had to work even with the interpretation:

John said that “But” he was relieved that he no longer had to work¹¹.

There may be grammatical reasons, rather than semantic ones for this, given that both ‘that’ and ‘but’ serve to connect sentences and we may assume that only a connector at a time is allowed to link two sentences, not to mention the fact that ‘that’ is a connective associated with subordination while ‘but’ is a connective associated with coordination. Someone with a pragmatic mind might reply that, after all, ‘But’ can also be considered a discourse marker (see Schiffrin 1987) and under such an interpretation it is not a connective. Yet, one might easily reply that even if ‘But’ can be used as a discourse marker, this function does not erase its function as connective (as it is able to connect two sentences by distinct speakers), which shows why it cannot be compatible with ‘that’. At this point scholars like Allan might accept this explanation but still claim that it is only a grammatical explanation certainly not extendable to all interjections, as we can find other interjections that do not have the status of sentential connectives (even if they are discourse markers). Thus Allan could be forced to accept that in some cases interjections or discourse markers are not allowed in that-clauses of indirect reports, but that this is not the general case, as in the general case it is possible to hear the interjections as merely quoted segments of the (mixed) indirect report. For the time being we might be happy with this explanation, which certainly has the merit of not making a difference (from a syntactico/semantic point of view) between indirect reports and free indirect reports. Alternatively, one might disagree with Allan and insist that there is a difference between indirect reports and direct reports and that in indirect reports the main problem with interjections is that (a) it is not clear whether they should be assigned to the reporter or to the original utterance; (b) even if we assign an explicature that encapsulates the quoted item, such an implicature cannot formally capture the position of the interjection in the corresponding direct report and therefore indeterminacy results, which of course would defeat the purpose of the explicature. This section, we are afraid, does not end with firm conclusions.

¹¹ I was surprised to read that Alessandra Giorgi (p.c.) finds that under the appropriate intonation (5) could be found acceptable. I must register her different opinion.

3.8 Pronominals

Direct and indirect reports show a different behavior in connection with pronominals. As is pretty obvious, pronominals require a context capable of determining their interpretation (the pronominal is saturated in context). But pronominals within quotations clearly need to be saturated by the context of the original utterance, whereas pronominals of indirect reports need to be saturated by the context of the report (see Holt 2016). Consider the following example:

- (6) John said that he (pointing to Fred) is so clever.

Clearly the hearer of the report need not search the context of the original utterance in order to assign a referent to ‘he’ (and even if he wanted to, he could not do this, as only the reporter knows, if he remembers well, the context of the original utterance and although the reporter could furnish part of the context (in a narration prior to the indirect report¹²), one usually does not expect him to do so. Of course he could do so, but then how would the hearer decide whether the referent comes from the context of the original utterance or from that of the narration? This is something of a puzzle, one that clearly cannot be resolved on every occasion of utterance. I suggest that the hearer knows in advance whether the referent should come from the context of the report or from the context of the original utterance. Let us for a minute suppose that the truth is that the hearer expects the referent to come from the context of the report, for some reason. A plausible reason might be that the reporter has summed up, as part of the indirect report (or as a preliminary to the indirect report) the context (or part of it) of the original utterance. However, if the narrator has not provided a narration that sets up the context of the original utterance, there is nothing to search for there (the context of the indirect report). Another reason might be that the reporter is accompanying the utterance (of the report) with some gestures (in correspondence with the pronominals), thus indicating that the context of utterance, and NOT some other context, will provide the referents and in particular certain objects demonstrated (by movements of the eyes or of some finger through the gesture of pointing). Another possibility is that pronominals are used anaphorically to refer back to previous NPs – in which case there is no question of searching the context of the original utterance, as the report itself may promote some NP as the antecedent of the anaphor. In this case, pragmatic principles of anaphora suffice (see Huang 1994, 2014). Now let us move back to pronominals in direct reports. Clearly a verbatim report may be indifferent to the issue whether the hearer of the report will recover the referent. The hearer may simply hold the pronominal in his mind until he finds the referent (notice that this way of thinking supports a minimalist semantic view of what is said). Of course, within quotation, there can be anaphoric relations and thus what has been said before may become a context for the pronominal used. However, notice that especially in the written mode of

¹² See Holt (2016) for indirect reports that precede direct reports (to provide circumstantial information). Something similar could happen with indirect reports.

communication, one can use brackets to specify in them the referent of a quoted item. I suppose that nothing prevents the speaker from doing the same in oral communication and add some interpolations clarifying/specifying the referent. However, I suppose that the speaker should qualify the message in such a way that his voice is heard as distinct from that of the reported person.

3.9 Summaries

Another non-negligible difference between direct and indirect reports is that indirect reports sometimes work like summaries. Consider the following examples:

- (7) He told me to go to New York
- (8) He promised to come with me

These indirect reports are more like summaries and they identify the speech act proffered in the original utterance. They do not only describe the words, but they describe the illocutionary point. This is clearly not possible with direct reports, unless one replaces the verb ‘say’ with a description of the speech act, as in the following cases:

- (9) He made the request: ‘Go to New York now and interview M. Johnson’.
- (10) He promised: ‘I will certainly come with you’

These are cases where narration and direct speech coexist, although, I should say, they are bit strained – they are not impossibilities but surely not standard ways of reporting things.

3.10 Voice

Indirect reports are cases of polyphonic language games – very often the hearer is assigned responsibility for deciding which portion of an utterance belongs to which voice. The problem of distinguishing voices besets (or characterizes) indirect reports and makes them more interesting. The task of establishing whether a segment of the indirect report is in fact a quotation is a non-trivial one and is often illuminated by pragmatics. Of course, sometimes we are able to recognize a certain speaker’s voice in an indirect report; we may say that this is not the reporter’s voice, as she never uses such a language; or, more specifically, we can say: ‘I recognize John’s voice; this is the way he speaks’ (meaning, this is the style he uses). However, there may be ways to differentiate voices, in the oral language (the problem does not arise in the written mode of communication because here the writer can use quotation marks, which obviously set the quoted text apart from the indirectly reported text). My idea is that quotation, in oral language, correlates with an intonational pattern that is specific to quotation or, in any case, sufficiently different from the one

used in the indirect report in general: even subtle differences in voice can signal a distinction. What is sufficient is that there should be a contrast, even in quality of the voice (softer; less soft, for example). (See Wharton 2009; in this case, iconicity is presumably responsible for the segmentation of voices: if the speaker uses qualitatively distinct voices, then she can be taken to point to what in reality are indeed distinct voices).

Direct reports, despite the various transformations they can undergo, are not polyphonic or are not polyphonic to the same extent as indirect reports – they do not hide slots for different voices (although a speaker in directly reporting may resort to sentential apposition, to make comments (John said ‘I am completely honest’, which is obviously false)). There may be complications for direct reports: they admit interjections, but then should the interjections always be attributed to the quoted speaker or could they also – at least sometimes – be attributed to the reporter’s voice? Consider the following:

(11) John said I am completely ah ah honest.

I deliberately avoided punctuation because I want you to consider this, at least for a moment, as a spoken utterance. While, due to quotation marks, interpretation is easy in the case of the written utterance, things are more complicated in the case of the oral utterance. We need to segment discourse – and we want to know whether ‘ah ah ah’ (a brief laughter) belongs to the reported speaker or to the reporter. Here one might assume that the laughter cannot belong to the reported speaker, because it runs the risk of undermining his credibility. Thus, it can be taken as a comment by the reporter, who, for a minute, is not only a reporter, but someone making comments or assessments. The laughter plays the same role of a sentential apposition: ‘which is not true, of course’.

3.11 Future Topics

The considerations I have provided so far on the relationship between direct and indirect reports are necessarily provisional. We have more or less built a platform from which we can study the issue. Something which the chapter does not do – as it is objectively difficult to do – is to examine the relationship between direct reports and the original utterances they report or between indirect reports and the original utterances, to see the transformations and rhetorical effects that go hand in hand with manufacturing a direct or indirect report. It is impossible or almost impossible to do all this with spoken conversation, but this should be possible in connection with citations and indirect reports in academic texts. But this is a topic for the future. Another topic for the future is to study the interpretation of utterances adjacent to segments of speech clearly labeled as indirect reports by a verb of saying (and a that-clause), to be considered implicit indirect reports. Holt (2016) has examined some such cases and has pointed out an ambiguity, as they could easily be seen as reporting contextual and circumstantial information which is to be used in the

interpretation of an indirect report. A sketch of how we should proceed with these cases is to consider them possibly free indirect reports. Since free indirect reports should be supported by contextual information allowing the insertion of a 'X said that' constituent in terms of free enrichment, it is easy to see how such interpretations can be aborted in case contextual factors militate in favor of a circumstantial reading of the report. But as I said, this is a topic for the future, although it clearly involves the consideration of pragmatic inferences in determining whether an utterance is to count as a (free) indirect report or not.

Another topic to investigate in the future is implicit indirect reports, like the following:

- (12) Allan has not been able to find any significant difference between direct and indirect reports. He also thinks that indirect reports could admit interjections as parts of mixed-quoted segments.

Contextual clues lead us to consider 'Allan has not been able to find any significant difference between direct and indirect reports' an indirect report. We might reason like this: how do we know that Allan has not been able to find any significant difference? Presumably we know this because he said that in a paper or a book; thus the speaker is implicitly categorized as a reporter and, in particular, as an indirect reporter. We can reason in a similar way with 'He also thinks that...'. How do we know that he thinks that...? Presumably because he said that in a book or a paper, thus the speaker is telling us that he said that and is implicitly qualifying himself as a reporter. Analogous considerations apply to an example by Holt (2016) ('apparently she doesn't like them'). Holt seems to contrast an expression like 'apparently she doesn't like them' with an expression like 'she said she doesn't like them'. She comes close to implicit indirect reports, in this example, although she does not care to draw some obvious consequences. Of course, a reader might now object: how do you distinguish between free indirect reports and implicit indirect reports? The question is an important one. An answer might be that, after all, we may not want to distinguish them. Another answer is that it appears that in free indirect reports the freely indirect report follows an utterance which explicitly uses the verb 'say' or 'think'. Implicit indirect reports need no such verbs. In any case, it ought to be said that both implicit indirect reports and free indirect reports need pragmatic interpretation and, in particular, an explicature.

3.12 Conclusion

There are still controversial points which this paper has not been able to resolve. The considerations by Allan and by Giorgi seem to prove that indirect reports can admit interjections and discourse markers – in this respect they are similar to direct reports. But if they are similar to direct reports, what does the difference between direct and indirect reports boil down to? And is this difference so crucial, after all? Could we not just ignore it? But now there are other questions. Suppose that, for a

minute, we completely conflate direct and indirect reports. Does then claiming that there are mixed indirect reports make any sense? It is more reasonable and more interesting to discuss the phenomenon of mixed indirect reports on the assumption that there are pure quotations (or pure direct reports), unless charges of circularity are raised. The considerations by Giorgi that with certain intonational contours discourse markers like BUT can be inserted in that-clauses of indirect reports does not amount to accepting that there is no significant difference between direct and indirect reports, because she assumes that insertion of BUT with the wrong type of intonation into that-clauses of indirect reports is nevertheless banned. Thus the difference between direct and indirect reports is vindicated – and this is enough to avoid the charge of circularity in the treatment of mixed indirect reports.

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Chapter 4

Indirect Reports as Language Games

En outre, comme tout autre terme predicative, 'jeu de langage' n'acquiert un sens qu'à travers ses applications, c'est-à-dire, dans le jeux qu'on joue avec lui. (Dascal et al. 1996, 1371).

In this chapter I deal with indirect reports in terms of language games. I try to make connections between the theory of language games and the theory of indirect reports, in the light of the issue of clues and cues. Since indirect reporting is a social praxis, it is not surprising that it should be regimented by conventions of use. We hope to throw light on the nature of such conventions by using the notion of language game by Wittgenstein, which requires an essentially dialogic view of language. In language as dialogue, indirect reporting plays an important role, because, as we shall see in a subsequent chapter, an indirect report is a dialogic notion (the notion of footing is relevant to coming to a fuller understanding of this concept). By this chapter we are opening up a road conducive to a more dialogic view of indirect reporting. For the time being, suffice it to say that, for its understanding, an indirect report requires resorting to cues and clues that are visible in the context of the indirect reporting, while cues and clues of the original context are not available to the current participants. This explains why presuppositions (in that-clauses of indirect reports) have to be read with reference to the context of indirect reporting and not of the original speech act reported.

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I shall investigate the issue of indirect reports within the framework of societal pragmatics (Mey 2001) or socio-pragmatics (Dascal 2003). Indirect reports are language games based on rigidly enforced norms or principles; like language games, they are practices that need to be learned by engaging in the very practices and in environments where there are people ready to enforce norms. This is clearly a chapter of socio-pragmatics, as we assume that people, by being exposed to a sufficient number of interactions, form hypotheses about the use of linguistic expressions and then test them in real conversations by seeing the reactions of the co-conversationalists, which normally reinforce or otherwise negatively sanction

the hypotheses. This view presupposes a picture of language use in which actors are not merely agents but are also observers and are trained in particular language games by playing such games, receiving correction and feedback (in addition to examples) from other actors. This is a kind of activity that does not emerge spontaneously merely in virtue of innate universal principles but needs embedding and practice in a socially attentive and interactive environment.

Indirect reports are based on an interplay of voices. The voice of the reporter must allow hearers to ‘reconstruct’ the voice of the reported speaker. Ideally, it must be possible to separate the reporter’s voice from that of the reported speaker. When we analyze the language game of indirect reporting, we ideally need to establish which parts belong to the primary voice (the reported speaker’s voice) and which parts belong to the reporter’s voice. If we have ways to recognize separate styles, separate grammars, etc. then the process of separating voices will be easier. However, we should expect that the reporter will do what he can to make it easy for us to distinguish the two (or more) voices. In other words, UNLESS there are clues leading the hearer to recognize separate voices, the reporter should do his/her best to represent the reported speaker’s voice without interpolations (This polyphonic approach is indebted to ideas by Bakhtin 1984, 1986). In a subsequent section and then in subsequent chapters we shall see that this hypothesis has important work to do in the issue of how slurs have to be reported. If a slur is reported, who is responsible for the slur: the original speaker or the indirect reporter? Contrary to what we find in the literature, my prediction is that the original speaker is responsible to a greater extent (More on this later, in a subsequent chapter on slurring and indirect reporting). The reason for this is that the main business of the practice of indirect reporting is to offer the original speaker’s perspective. The interest in what the reporter says is only a function of the interest in what the original speaker said.

The literature on indirect reports lives on the heritage of Davidson (1968) and his critics. In fact, Davidson’s paper is much indebted to Quine, who, according to Wettstein (2016), was the first to come close to the notion of footing for indirect reporting, a notion on which we will capitalize in the next chapter. In this chapter, I will not directly address the issue of whether the semantics proposed by Davidson is correct or not. Despite my neutrality, I claim that Davidson’s treatment gives us numerous clues on how to deal with the practice of indirect reporting. Consider the famous report:

- (1) Galileo said that the earth moves.

Davidson’s proposal is to treat (1) as if it meant:

Galileo uttered a sentence that meant in his mouth what ‘The earth moves’ means now in mine.

I know well that this is only part of Davidson’s picture; however, this is the part which can be exploited in the discussion of the phenomenon of ‘voicing’ which this chapter is about. Davidson’s treatment makes it clear that there are two voices (the reference to the mouth is clearly a reference to the mouth proffering the speech or

the utterance). Of course, Davidson is interested in the equivalence between the speech proffered by the reported speaker and the speech proffered by the reporter, an equivalence based on intended meaning, not only on sentential meaning (a pragmatic equivalence is required, actually). We are not dealing with sentential meanings, because Davidson makes an explicit reference to a proffered sentence, that is to say an utterance.

So we have a solid platform from which to start working. In the following sections I shall discuss the phenomenon of voicing and the problem of how to separate voices. Intuitively, the different voices of an indirect report can be distinguished either through the presence of contextual clues or through the general application of pragmatic principles or both. We predict that contextual clues can guide interpretation sometimes overriding pragmatic principles – contradicting their predictions on some occasions (hence we need a pragmatic theory that is sufficiently flexible). Here we shall make use of the idea that principles of language use guide interpretation in abstract, but do not completely determine it. A rich context is often influential in accepting or otherwise rejecting the guidance offered by pragmatic principles. This kind of theory clearly has the virtue of flexibility, but we should not think of this flexibility as a potential way of making the theory unfalsifiable, as, ideally, we want a theory that can be controlled by the data and that can explain the data and be explained by them. In a sense, this theory (as I conceive it) is designed in such a way that it takes its lead from a certain central idea, namely that an indirect report is about what the original speaker said and not about what the reporter said. In a theory in which a central idea plays such a crucial and strong role, all we require of the data is that they be compatible with the theory.

4.2 The Transformation Problem

It would be naïve to believe that an indirect reporter has a duty to report what was said verbatim. If she had such a duty, then we would not be able to make any difference between indirect and direct reports. Instead, we all have a firm grasp of the difference between:

- (2) She said: I am happy;
- (3) She said she was happy.

The difference is not only one based on transformations of deictic elements (e.g. 'I' → she; present tense → past tense; first person morphology → third person morphology), but one based on a greater number of transformations. For example it is normally licit to make an indirect report by summing up what a speaker said, rather than reporting all the elements he uttered. (See also Cappelen and Lepore 1997; Wieland 2013). It is possible to omit adverbs, adjectives, modifiers, in a sentence, without distorting it, if the purpose served by the indirect report is fulfilled by the omission of certain words. Of course, if the omission of a certain word results in an utterance somehow distorting the reported speaker's message, then the omission

should not be tolerated. There are small transformations of a message that serve to modify the message considerably. Consider what was done by the blacksmith who created the inscription ‘Arbeit macht frei’ over the Auschwitz main gate. By creating a letter which was upside down, he managed to express his own negative attitude to the message he was reporting by his manual work.¹ The change of a letter in the message seems to stress the awareness that he was used to report a message (actually, he was forced to do so) and his moral reluctance to be so used. In other words, he was distinguishing his voice from those of the Nazi – in a way he was a polyphonic ‘animator’ in the sense of Goffman.

Transformations of the original message of indirect reporting include expansion of the original message, like the following case. Prisoners in Auschwitz ridiculed the German cynicism of the slogan by saying *Arbeit Macht Frei durch den Schornstein*. They were clearly reporting a message by expanding it so as to recuperate its (real) intended message. The general point of transformations concerning indirect reports is to make explicit otherwise implicit components of the message. It is licit in general to render explicit what relevance theorists call the ‘explicatures’ of an utterance. In neutral cases, reports that expand the message so as to include explicatures need not express a critical attitude to the message, as was the case in the ‘Arbeit macht frei’ report.

It is less clear that one can expand the message by including elements obtained through logical inference:

The Nazi used the slogan ‘Arbeit macht frei’ in order to indulge in a morbid exaltation of their crimes.

This may not belong to ordinary practice of indirect reporting, but it is clear that this is a practice in which all historians indulge.

Instead, a transformation which belongs to daily practice is the following. One can report an utterance proffered in a different language by someone who only spoke that language, through the reporter’s language. So, suppose I report that Caesar said that he came, he saw and he won; it will be implicit that the words used by Caesar were words of Latin, and not of English; therefore, my report only relates the content of what he said, and does not report it verbatim. The report involves a translation. But then, one may say, translation allows all sorts of transformations, as one clearly sees if one for example reads the many translations of Thomas Gray’s ‘Elegy written in a country churchyard’. Translation may involve greater levels of literality or departures from the literal meaning in the attempt to capture the authorial intentions. No surprise then if Gray’s words

‘Some pious drops the closing eye requires’

¹ At Auschwitz, the sign was made in 1940 by Polish political prisoners headed by Jan Liwacz (camp number 1010). The upper bowl in the “B” in “ARBEIT” is wider than the lower bowl, appearing to some as upside-down. Allegedly it was made on purpose by political prisoners to make a signal about what was actually happening behind the gates of Auschwitz.

were translated by a translator as meaning that the closing eye requires some pious verses inscribed on the grave. Translations may depart from literal meaning in the attempt to capture the authorial intentions. In the same way, indirect reporting may depart from literal translations in the attempt to provide the authorial intentions. The most drastic departures from literal meanings are seen in the cases when the indirect report is confronted with an utterance whose words were not used with a literal meaning, as in the case of metaphors. To construct indirect reports based on literal meanings in these cases would end up providing unfaithful and infelicitous indirect reports. To use a term by Jaszczolt (2005), the reporter aims at ‘pragmatic equivalence’, not at semantic equivalence. This is perhaps implicit in the treatment of indirect reporting by Donald Davidson. As we will see in a subsequent chapter, the practice of literally reporting what one said is compatible with the intention of projecting a misinterpretation (often of the deliberate kind) of the utterance in question. While surely it may be legitimate to report an ambiguous utterance (an utterance whose ambiguity cannot be easily resolved), one must take special care in conveying that one is doing so because of the interpretation difficulties which are offered to the hearer for scrutiny. In this way, the burden of explaining why the utterance is being reported quasi verbatim is placed on the context, surely an indication that there is something amiss or abnormal in this deviation from the ordinary social praxis.

4.3 Indirect Reports and Language Games

In my previous work on indirect reports I have focused on reports as language games (Capone 2010a, 2012). Now, while there may be differences between Goffman’s terminology as used in the previous section and the terminology of language games, it is also clear that there is substantial overlap. Goffman presumably saw the continuum of social practices as segmented (or ‘framed’). Each segment was to be recognizable as there had to be boundaries between outside and inside activities. An example of Goffmanian analysis that is well known is the lecture. The lecture is a bounded activity with its own rules. Participants know well and in advance how to behave in this segmented area, they know that there is little space for interruptions, they know that lectures have a forthcoming segment reserved for questions and answers (by the lecturer). Clearly, the lecture is also a language game, because it is structured, it has rules, it is part of societal activities, it is sufficiently differentiated from other language games. So, substantially, Goffman’s theory of frames and forms of talk must coincide in broad lines with a theory of language games – or at least it must be possible to explore interconnections and overlapping territory.

But why should we want to deal with indirect reports – activities confined to small segments of interaction – in terms of language games, which are usually activities that unfold for some time and occur at some place which is substantially involved in the language game and even serves to characterize it (for example, court procedures)? My answer is that even if indirect reports are not normally really

extended in time as language activities, they involve embeddings such as those described in the Introduction, and which we may illustrate schematically as in the following:

Indirect report C (indirect reporter)
Original speaker C (original speaker)
Addressee C (addressee).

Although the language game is temporally limited, if we consider the dimension of the linguistic activity that unfolds in a temporal succession, the temporal embeddings obtained by reconstructing the original speaker's situation are potentially manifold and complex. Complexity is introduced when we see connection with other language games such as the following.

Consider a child game, which almost everyone practiced in childhood or adolescence:

There are, say, 20 boys (or girls) in a room. Each whispers what was whispered into his hear previously to the next person in the line (or circle). The aim of the game is to show that, although, ideally, the initial and the last utterance have to be the same, the initial utterance is so transformed that the last utterance can hardly bear any meaningful relation to it.

This might be a game pointing to a practice that is quite standard in society and is based on reliable methods for transmitting and preserving information during the transmission process. The previous game dramatically illustrates the problems inherent in the game 'reporting information' or 'reporting an utterance'. In indirect reporting – with which the previous language game clearly has affinities – it is important to preserve the information expressed by the original utterance and to avoid distortions of the message or of the form of the message – whether deliberate or involuntary. Both kinds of distortions ultimately transform the message to such an extent that it is made either useless or, on the contrary, too powerful, as it has effects which are not justified by the original utterance or by a fair paraphrase of it through an acceptable report. The real problem for the reporter is to master a practice which has, as its most welcome result, the effect of making reports of utterances that are acceptable not only to the reporter but also to the original speaker. A way of guaranteeing this is that the perlocutionary effects which are not intended by the original speaker should be filtered out and one way of doing this is to make a report which is faithful to the intentions of the original speaker.

Consider another game such as the dumb-show.

A dumb-show was one of our favorite games in childhood. We practiced it, I presume, as a form of preparation in view of more serious or important societal language games. In a dumb-show you must depict information by avoiding words. You usually use gestures, even if you can point to words which happen to be written on

a blackboard or on a poster. Now, since depicting occurs so heavily in direct reporting and, also in indirect reports, especially those of the mixed type, this is clearly a case in which we consider 'depicting' an important part of language games, a component shared by different language games. While quotation has clear affinities with a dumb-show as it maximizes the pictorial elements (as noted in one of the chapters on slurs in this book), this is also an important dimension of indirect reporting as, especially at crucial points, where interpretation may lead to distortion of the message, the hearer of the report is guided by principles of language use in interpreting certain words as pictorial, that is resembling or mirroring very closely the words of the original speaker. Especially slurring words or foul language, as it occurs in indirect reports, is seen as being under the responsibility of the original speaker, because surely the reporter would be blameworthy if he replaced words that are not slurring in their import or are perfectly normal with slurs or foul language. Although the pictorial dimension is only a characteristic of reports in crucially delicate positions, this is one of the features which indirect reporting shares with the practice of quotation.

Another language game which is crucial for the understanding of indirect reports is a theatrical performance. In a theatrical performance we usually pretend that we are not using language in a serious way. An actor does not talk for herself, but on behalf of a character. This is more or less what happens in direct reports, but also what happens in indirect reports, if we consider them polyphonic activities (see also the problematic case of mixed quotation in indirect reports). The indirect reporter is like an actor in an important respect. The actor is not someone who passively reproduces someone else's speech (normally the text handed over to him by the author of the work), but is someone who, in reproducing the speech, has to interpret it. Very often the actor has to simulate the state of mind of the character he is impersonating – this of course presupposes interpretation of meaning, but also involves an expressive dimension. The indirect reporter, by analogy, is someone who has to interpret the words of the text he is reporting in order to make a report that is faithful to the authorial intentions. Often, though not always, the reporter may also give some thought to the expressive dimension and try to run a simulation of how the original speaker would have formulated the report. In fact, he may decide to emphasize some words and deliver them with greater acoustic energy if he thinks the original speaker would have done the same.

Another case of language game that is deeply rooted in society is testimony in court. Here it might be important to be able to report what another person said on a certain occasion. This may well be an extreme case, where there is little freedom for transformations and where one needs to separate one's voice from that of the original speaker by formal markings. This practice diverges from the daily practice, to a great extent. Here a reporter may be asked by the prosecutor to reflect on the words used, to make an effort to separate her own voice from that of the original speaker. This practice may well involve a meta-representational component, as one is interested in the meanings as well, in the connotations as well as in the denotations. The

reporter may well be turned into an analyst of her own speech. (Do you exactly mean that ...?). This is clearly a case where reporting is considered a meta-linguistic activity. However, it is not to be excluded that all speakers, when they report an utterance, should reflect on alternative ways of reporting it and, especially, on the issue of whether the utterance reported is faithful to the original speaker's. They should reflect that the original speaker is held accountable for what he said and, thus, their indirect report is a way of making him accountable for the message reported. They should also be aware of the effects that will come to them if the hearer realizes that the message was transformed and distorted on purpose (that is to say deliberately) and out of a motivation that throws him in a negative light. Thus, generally speaking, it is not only the original speakers who can be held accountable for what they said, but the reporter too has a degree of responsibility and is aware that society has a way of intercepting falsehoods, lies or even astute distortions of a message.

Summing up, although it is true that indirect reports are small segments of talk or small strips of social behavior, they nevertheless have many features in common with other strips of behavior which we are less reluctant to call 'language games'. This may be enough to see that the connection between language games and indirect reports is well justified.

In Capone (2012) I specifically discussed indirect reports as language games, in the light of considerations by Dascal et al. (1996) on language games. Here I cannot expand that discussion, but I confine myself to extrapolating the most important points. Dascal et al. consider polyphony a specific language game – now, while surely indirect reports are interesting also for other features, such as representational ones, it is clear that polyphony is a language game that is embedded in the practice of indirect reporting. The game also consists in the way clues and cues are utilized to separate the voices of the participants. This game is similar to what happens in the great works of art such as *Ulysses* by James Joyce or *The Divine Comedy* by Dante Alighieri. These authors intersperse their texts with numerous quotations from other works of art, without explicitly marking the quoted segments, engaging in a clever game with their readers who have to show that they are up to the task set up by the author and must intercept (if possible at all) the quoted segments and their original authors and then understand what the quotations are used for, that is to say they must also intercept the comment which the quotation specifically offers on the text that contains it. Quotations are not autonomous texts but are often interpretative keys (or contextual clues, to use Dascal's terms). It is of some interest that in indirect reports we need contextual clues in order to intercept the quoted segments of the text. But, at the same time, by analogy with the functioning of quotations in literary texts, the quoted segments may themselves offer interpretative keys (that is contextual clues). Especially segments that are recognized as belonging not to the original speaker but to the reporter may manage to inject the reporter's voice as a powerful commentary on what was said.

Dascal et al. consider that the notion of language game by Wittgenstein involves a shift from phenomenalism to physicalism, language games being primarily

intended to create social reality. Can the language game of indirect reporting be so intended? If we follow Tannen (1989), indirect reports can, indeed, be considered actions serving to construct social reality. An indirect report can have effects on deliberation or on action, in that it can present a piece of information that can be integrated into the argumentative structure of practical reasonings. Seen in this light, an indirect report can become a ‘form of life’ (Wittgenstein 1953).

Another feature of language games, according to Dascal et al., is that they are cooperative. Can this be a characteristic of indirect reports (such as language games)? My reply in Capone 2012 was that the recognition of the role of the Hearer (or addressee) in the amount of transformations required in the practice of indirect reporting amounts to a recognition of the cooperative nature of indirect reports. Indirect reports, like other language games, involve an altruistic stance towards the addressee, which is instantiated in important linguistic choices that can be seen as transformations.

4.4 Applying Considerations by Dascal et al. To Indirect Reports as Language Games

In this section, I will mainly discuss ideas pertaining to language games as filtered through Dascal et al.’s (1996) discussion of Wittgenstein’s language games. I quite agree with Dascal et al. that it is not easy to provide a definition of language game, and that it is best to provide examples of language games so that the notion of language game can be illustrated through exemplification. Although Wittgenstein includes indirect reports in his list of language games, to my knowledge this type of exemplification has not been properly investigated in the literature, apart from the discussion in Capone (2010a). However, Dascal et al. illustrate a kind of language game called ‘presenting multiple voices’ through their paper in which they present possibly dissonant voices without wanting to harmonize them. This is similar to the language game ‘Indirect reporting’ since many of the norms governing indirect reporting make reference to the language game ‘presenting multiple voices’. Is it impossible that a language game is embedded in another language game? If it is not (as I believe), then the language game ‘presenting multiple voices’ should be embedded in the language game indirect reporting. Dascal et al. by discussing Wittgenstein’s notion of language game stress the shift (in Wittgenstein’s thought) from phenomenalism to physicalism, in the sense that language is no longer conceived of as a means of representing reality but as a means of creating (social) reality. I quite agree with the authors on the importance of emphasizing this shift. But what consequences does this shift (or the grasp of this shift) have on the understanding of indirect reports as language games? We said that language games aim at creating social reality, but indirect reports seem to be anchored to the representational dimension of language. Language in such cases is used to represent occasions of language use (or events which can be called ‘utterances’). So what is the point of considering indirect reports language games if we are reluctant to stress the connection with action and favor the connection with representation? My idea that a

language game such as indirect reporting embeds another language game may suffice to rescue the language game from the attack we have (hypothetically) leveled to the concept – after all, if the purpose of the language game is to make sense of the transformations of reality on the part of the reporter (and to separate one voice from another), then it is reasonable to make use of this new notion in order to account for the fact that reporting is a sort of **action** in that it transforms events in the light of the needs of hearers in the context of the reporting event. However, we do not want to confine ourselves to a derivative justification of the use of the notion of language game. If we want to see how the language game fits a conception of language in which language is used to act, we must consider narrations (as indirect reports are micro-narrations, after all) as actions. Furthermore, if we follow Tannen (1989), the language game of indirect reporting is aimed at ‘constructing’ social reality. Like actions, indirect reports can transform reality. Like actions, they can have a number of consequences. An indirect report may be part of an argumentative structure, whose aim is to justify a certain kind of action or deliberation. Thus an indirect report (of someone’s words) can be seen as a motivation to act, to deliberate, etc. Seen in this light, an indirect report can become a ‘form of life’ (Wittgenstein 1953; Carapezza and Biancini 2013).

Another feature of language games, according to Dascal et al. is the fact that they are cooperative games. They cannot be played unless the actors cooperate in an action in which they play different roles. In what ways can this feature help us grasp the particularities of the language game ‘indirect reporting’? I propose that we conceive of an indirect report as a game involving at least three actors: the original speaker, the reporting speaker and the hearer. The hearer plays an active role in indirect reports because, many times, transformations of NPs are effected in order to favor understanding on the part of the hearer. Suppose the original speech act was about John Campbell, that the reporter knows John Campbell under the modes of presentation ‘John Campbell’ and ‘The owner of the bar round the corner’ and that the hearer knows John Campbell only under the guise ‘The owner of the bar round the corner’. In circumstances like these, it is obvious that the reporting speaker must (or finds it convenient to) transform the original NP (John Campbell) into the NP with which the hearer is familiar (The owner of the bar round the corner), if understanding has to be achieved. The transition from an NP to a pragmatically equivalent one is dictated by the communicative function of the indirect report. (Also see Devitt 1996 and Wettstein 2016 for a similar argument applied to belief reports). What would be the point of issuing a report which, though faithful to the original speaker’s voice, could not be grasped and, hence, utilized by the hearer? In these circumstances, the reporter has to adapt to the hearer (This process could be called ‘adaptation’).² The NP ‘The owner of the bar round the corner’ will express the perspective of the hearer. We could then say that the hearer plays a role in the language game – it modifies or orients the language game, has an effect over the choice of words. The recipient, in so far as she figures in the language game though a

²Edda Weigand (2009) says that understanding is achieved retrospectively, by checking through a reactive move. However we are also interested in understanding that is created (or favored or facilitated) prospectively, although the possibility of checking it out through a reaction move remains available.

choice of words to be regarded as potentially made by her, is one of the participants who **cooperates** in the language game. She does not speak, but her mere presence serves to perspective the game. She is present as a voice and, therefore, it is as if she spoke in the language game. In a sense, the reporter partially ventriloquizes the hearer. Hence, the cooperative dimension of indirect reports.

4.5 Capone 2010a and Indirect Reports as Language Games

In a previous chapter as well as in Capone (2010a), I advanced a number of ideas on how to capture constraints on replacements of coreferential NPs in the context of direct reporting (and, in particular, in the complement that-clause). The explanation may be parallel, but not identical with the one I gave on the issue of belief reports in Capone (2008a). Such an explanation rests on the idea that replacements of coreferential NPs should not (drastically) alter the speech act which the indirect report aims to report (or describe) and that the original speaker would like to see herself reported in a way that does not attribute her offenses, impoliteness, rudeness, obscenity, and also slurring. In other words, reporting must be done in a way that the voice of the reporter can be separated from the voice of the reported speaker or, if this separation is not possible, in such a way that the original speaker's voice is prevalent. Why should the reported speaker's and NOT the reporting speaker's voice be prevalent? I assume that it is a matter of relevance. Since we are dealing with the verb 'say', we are happy to primarily express the original speaker's voice and then the reporting speaker's voice, but only if this is possible. I now succinctly sum up the main points of Capone (2010a), also expressed in a previous chapter on the social practice of indirect reporting.

The practice of indirect reports rests on the following principles:

Paraphrasis Principle³

The that-clause embedded in the verb 'say' is a paraphrasis of what Y said that meets the following constraint: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, but would approve of it as a **fair paraphrasis** of her original utterance.

Paraphrasis/Form Principle

The that-clause embedded in the verb 'say' is a paraphrasis of what Y said, and meets the following constraints: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer 'that' on account of its form/style.

³This position is somewhat reminiscent of Seymour's (1994) treatment in which reference to a translation of the reported sentence is explicitly incorporated in the semantics of indirect reports.

4.6 Slurs and Taboo Words

An interesting phenomenon was noted by Lepore and Anderson (2013). When we report or quote uses of slurs or taboo words, the offense is assigned to the reporter (or the person quoting) rather than to the original speaker. The words that count as slurs are words offending vast categories of people, such as black people, homosexuals, Jews, etc. So, no matter how you may want to distance yourself from the use of the word ‘negro’ in reporting such a use, you are also liable to be blamed for the use. You cannot easily and without some sort of censure say things such as:

- (4) John said that that negro is my boss.

Lepore and Anderson are adamant that there is something offensive in reporting a slurring word. This is not to say that there are no contexts where the offense is mitigated or nullified (e.g. the academic context in which one discusses a phenomenon scientifically and goes to great pains to show that one deplores such uses). However, in ordinary contexts reporting slurs or taboo words is not convenient.

Lepore and Anderson say it is not semantics (either in the form of conventional implicatures or of presuppositions) which prevents us from reporting slurs easily, but a rule of use. We must know what uses are licit or not and thus, to master the practice of the language game ‘reporting speech’, we must know what uses are licit or prohibited. The rules and uses in question are not semantic, but are **societal**. We must know what practices society allows and what practices it bans. Thus using (or not using a word) is ultimately a matter of knowing societal, rather than linguistic uses.

If the considerations by Lepore and Anderson were completely accepted in their current form, this would have severe implications concerning my stance to the principles involved in the language game ‘reporting speech’. In fact, in my 2010 paper on indirect reports (Capone 2010a), I claimed that whenever strong contextual clues allowing us to distinguish voices within the same speech act are missing, considerations of processing efforts militate against having two voices in the same report. The interpretation that is most relevant is the one that attributes the voice expressed in the that-clause of the report to the original speaker, since, ultimately, the aim of reporting is to say what an original speaker said. Having two voices involves greater processing efforts which are justified if the ultimate effect of the utterance is to let the hearer know how to separate the reporter’s voice from the reported speaker’s one – that is to say if numerous contextual clues are present and allow separation of voices.

So if Lepore and Anderson are correct that the slurring words are to be attributed to the reporter, rather than to the reported speaker, my principles would have to be abandoned. However, I opted for a weaker version of Lepore and Anderson’s theory, according to which both the reported speaker and the reporting speaker are perceived as slurring. My own theory actually predicts that the greater offence is attributed to the reported speaker. I shall return to this in a subsequent chapter. For the time being suffice it to say that in this language game there are two actors that

are differentially involved. Presumably, the original speaker uttered the slur and is mainly responsible for it. The reporter may report the slur because he intends to criticize the original speaker and a language must give him/her expressive opportunities such as being able to report the slur verbatim or quasi-verbatim, because if the slur were replaced by a different (neutral) word (a substitute), the hearer would not be able to understand in a detailed way what exactly happened.

In this section we have tacitly made reference to a combination of two language games, reporting and slurring. I am claiming that the actors of these language games are distinct. The reporting is done by the reporter while the slurring is done by the original speaker. There is obviously the theoretical possibility that the slurring is done by the reporter and by the original speaker, at the same time. There is, in addition, the logical possibility that the slurring is only done by the original speaker but not by the reporter and, finally, the possibility that the slurring is done by the reporter but not by the original speaker. Especially given this logical space and these combinatorial possibilities, it is of importance to consider that part of the language game 'indirect reporting' consists in 'separating voices'. The question 'Who is doing the slurring?' is a question that is addressed in dealing with the language game 'separating voices'. There is a tentative answer to this question which is of theoretical orientation. This answer must be one that pertains to the issue of language games. If you are engaged in a language game, make sure that you are playing one game and not another. Or, to put things in more intelligible terms, play only a game at a time or, do not play two games at the same time, or, which amounts to the same thing, do not use the rules for a language game by applying it to another language game. If a speaker were at the same time reporting and slurring, he would be engaged in two different (possibly conflicting) language games at the same time. Furthermore, the reporter knows well that he would be involved in an ambiguous discourse, as the hearer would find no easy ways to see if the language game of slurring is done by the original speaker or by the reporter. The reporter's language game of slurring may be compatible both with the original speaker's language game of slurring or with the absence of it. The speaker knows well that he has to avoid ambiguity – or in any case engaging in behavior that cannot be interpreted or interpreted smoothly by the hearer. So, it seems to me that the generalization that a speaker should be engaged at most in one language game at a time is not unreasonable. We can imagine that a number of objections could be leveled to it, but I also imagine that the theoretical reasons for resisting them and defusing them would be pretty strong. The main theoretical reason for saying that one cannot engage in two language games at the same time is that this amounts to mixing the rules. If a speaker indirectly reports an utterance which does not contain a slurring expression and at the same time engages in the language game slurring (by embedding the slurring in the indirect reporting), there is no way to keep the rules separate, as one language game would consist in presenting the original utterance as uncontaminated by the slur, while the other language game has to contain the slur and, furthermore, in a position in which the slur could easily be attributed to the original speaker – thus it would no longer be clear who is slurring and who is not. This digression seems to me to be of some use, because in a subsequent chapter I am going to discuss slurs specifically and I

am going to say exactly what I said here but from a different point of view. That is to say the same considerations seem to flow from Gricean considerations about voice attribution and from Searlian considerations about the necessity of being able to report and condemn slurs. However, the emphasis on language games in this chapter shows that we can prove the same notion merely by making recourse to the theory of language games and the rationality of language games. Thus, what I have said now should be seen as a way of supporting what I will say in the following chapters that are specifically about slurs. Could there be any objections to the view that separate language games have to be played at separate times? From a logical point of view, we could admit that though in practice games are conventionally separated through different rules (thus I do not find it easy to imagine that two teams can play basket and soccer at the same time), in some cases at least (especially when language is concerned) it might be possible to play two language games at the same time. For example, I may be joking but at the same time be serious about certain consequences that follow from my joking (I may want to make a serious point by joking about something). However, I imagine that for two language games to be played at the same time, they must at least be compatible and if, *a priori*, we can establish that there can be no compatibility between the two language games (as they may entail different attitudes or conflicting purposes), then we should come to the conclusion that in practice one cannot play those two language games at the same time. Now this seems to me to be a theoretical conclusion of some worth which lends considerable support to my view about slurs and seems to contradict decisively what is said, instead, by Lepore and Anderson. For Lepore and Anderson, normally both the original speaker and the indirect reporter are responsible for the slur. But this goes against our intuition that the logical space must be occupied and there are other possibilities, namely that the original speaker is not slurring while the reporter is and that the reporter is slurring while the original speaker is not.

There are three possible objections to my idea that it is not possible to play two language games at the same time. Consider someone who asks you a question, but in fact it would be best to consider this an assertion (this case is discussed by Goffman in his work *Forms of Talk*). Could not we say that two language games are produced at the same time? Or consider the teacher who asks questions during an exam. Are not these questions, at the same time, ways of examining students (that is to say a completely different language game)? Although these cases look thorny, Goffman himself would tell us that the primary point of the former language game is asserting and of the latter is examining – we should not do too much of the apparent form of the language game but we should look at its core. So, these examples do not look particularly problematic. Another problematic case might be the following. A speaker speaks and narrates an event. However, a secret agent has to listen and count his words; every ten words, he picks up a word and he forms a secret sentence by combining all the words picked up by this method. Here we have two language games played at the same time. However, it should be clear that now the group of participants is segmented and that only a small fraction of the participants are busy in the language game of deciphering a secret message. In any case, this is not something that is normally done in ordinary conversation and here (in this book) we are,

instead, busy describing ordinary practices and not the language game of deciphering. In any case, this situation is ruled out by assuming that in interpreting indirect reports, we need to consider a homogeneous set of participants and that no segmentation should be admitted. The last case to be considered, provided by Marco Carapezza (p.c.) is of Goffmanian flavor. I may talk with my students but my message may well be intended for my overhearers (those who are in the vicinity of my lecture room). Here I am playing two language games at the same time, with the same words. (However, as in the previous example, the segmentation of the participation framework is of some importance as this example is exploited by Goffman to explain the differences in participation status with respect to hearers and to segment the logical space between hearers and overhearers. In our cases of slurring in indirect reporting there is no evidence that the logical space should be segmented in this way in connection with participation status).

4.7 Default Interpretations and Modularity of Mind

In Capone (2010b), I explored the idea that explicatures are the result of modular processes. In particular, I argued that the view by Kasher (1991) according to which only the pragmatic processes involved in understanding speech acts are modular needs to be reassessed. Kasher believes that cancelability (which is one of the characteristics of conversational implicatures) is an obstacle to seeing the interpretative processes involved in pragmatic inferences as modular. In fact, modular processes must be both mandatory and encapsulated. However, the fact that inferences can be aborted when we have access to a body of knowledge, shows that implicatures are not mandatory and, furthermore, require interaction with vast archives; hence they cannot be encapsulated. However, in Capone (2009) I argued that explicatures are not cancellable and this seems to be in conflict with Kasher's (1991) ideas. Furthermore, in Capone (2010c), I argued that the processes involved in calculating explicatures are encapsulated (often requiring 'modules on the fly' to search information). In Capone, I argued that pragmatic processes involved in conversational implicatures can be of two types – modular or non-modular. Following ideas by Cummings (2009) I accepted that at least some cases of conversational implicatures involve the interplay of vast archives of information. However, modular pragmatic processes usually provide the propositional forms which are **then** utilized in non-modular processes. Now, this means that default inferences usually arise due to modular processes – these can become the final messages or otherwise be aborted or integrated by information accessed through vast archives (encyclopedic knowledge). The integration of propositional forms obtained by default inferences through access to vast archives is itself constrained by the Principle of Relevance. Thus, we will require that contextual effects and processing efforts are to be kept in balance while the integration of default propositional forms takes place.

Now, returning to the issue of indirect reports, what are the consequences of this modular approach? One of the consequences is that we consider the default inter-

pretation of an indirect report one in which the voice of the original speaker (the reported speaker) is presented UNLESS there are ways of distinguishing voices (there can be at least two voices, but even more than two voices if we consider that reports may come as the result of chained indirect reports) and of assigning voices to the respective participants. In Capone (2010a) I claimed that processing efforts are involved in selecting the voice of the original reporter. Surely, it must be admitted that a report in which there are two inseparable voices is one that requires greater processing efforts (as one cannot easily settle the question ‘Whose voice is this or that one?’). I admit that this way of resolving the problem is partial and not definitive. One must not only show that processing efforts play a role in deciding whether one or rather two voices, are present in the micro-narration of the indirect report, but ideally one should be able to demonstrate that we have a pragmatic explanation of why the original speaker, rather than the reporting speaker, is selected as the voice that counts. And here the problem must be framed in terms of contextual effects, rather than in terms of processing efforts, since if the original speaker’s voice prevails, then we have additional information on the perspective of the original speaker – and now we remind readers that indirect reports are micro-narrations about the original speakers, about events in which the original speaker and not the reporting speakers were involved. Thus, if the modes of presentation of NPs used in indirect reports are those used by the original speakers, we have additional information on their point of view, on their language, of their mental processes, and also on the context of utterance. These make contextual effects larger, following Sperber and Wilson (1986).

4.8 Dascal and Weizman (1987) on Clues and Cues

Dascal and Weizman (1987, republished in Dascal 2003) is a superb discussion of the issue of clues and cues, which I want to put to use in the understanding of the logic of indirect reporting. Dascal and Weizman, following a tradition going back to Searle (1979), notice that understanding a speech act is often a matter of filling the gaps left there by the speaker by using pieces of information available in the context (whether intended as the specific situation of utterance or background and cultural information having a bearing on the utterance). Since texts may often depart from literal meanings in substantial ways, requiring not only filling of deictic elements but also drastic revision of the literal meaning, Dascal and Weizman are ready to admit that two types of instructions are needed to make sense of texts. These are called contextual ‘clues’ and ‘cues’. These are differentiated in a functional way. Cues allow readers or hearers to notice drastic departures from literality (e, g Is a lexeme used metaphorically? Is the speaker conveying irony? etc.) allowing contextual clues to provide specific solutions to the general problem addressed by cues. So, the questions introduced by cues are normally yes-no questions. The questions introduced by clues are more open, involving a search for items capable of filling lacunae in a text. As Dascal and Weizman cogently say, a cue problem soon turns

into a clue problem. This interplay of cues and clues is at the basis of understanding a text. A practical method worked out by Dascal and Weizman to distinguish cues is to ask informants to transform a text. The elements radically transformed in paraphrase signal a cue problem. This is clearly relevant to understanding the logic of indirect reports, since paraphrase is involved in reports and indirect reporting is perceived as deviant in some ways if the utterance is reported literally without taking into account the cues and clues leading to meaning augmentations and legitimating departures from literal meanings. Indirect reporting is ultimately a way of checking whether the interplay of cues and clues has led to plausible meaning augmentations, because if it has not, then the report is not legitimate. I propose that indirect reporting is closely connected to the issue of cues and clues as presented by Dascal and Weizman. There is another point of intersection between Dascal and Weizman's considerations on cues and clues and the logic of indirect reports. Dascal and Weizman discuss in detail various types of clues and distinguishes between:

- Clues related to extra-linguistic specific context;
- Clues related to meta-linguistic specific context;
- Clues relating to extra-linguistic shallow context: general assumptions about the features of a given set of situations;
- Clues relating to extra-linguistic background knowledge: general knowledge about the world;
- Clues relating to meta-linguistic background knowledge: general knowledge about the functioning of verbal communication.

Clues related to meta-linguistic specific context play an important role in indirect reports. In fact, we have often said that understanding a report fully is a matter of separating the original speaker's voice from the reporter's. Thus a clue telling you that a certain word is part of the linguistic repertoire of a certain person (suppose that word is idiosyncratic to that person) will also allow you to separate the original speaker's voice from the reporter's voice. But first of all, the idiosyncratic word may constitute a cue allowing you to notice that there is an interpretation problem relating to indirectness. Then the cue problem will turn into a clue problem and the cue/clues will allow you to sift the original speaker's voice from the reporting speaker's voice. Now the question arises whether the interpretation process pertaining to separating voices in indirect reports can be included in the more general rubric 'noticing a discrepancy between what the speaker literally says and what the speaker's meaning is'. My answer is positive. Although, in this case, the cue does not allow you to detect a drastic departure from literal to intended meaning, it will allow you to establish a more accurate structure in the report and to fill the lacunae thanks to contextual clues. So, in a sense, the interpretation problem posed by indirect reports is a sub-case of the more general case discussed by Dascal and Weizman. There are further parallels between the discussion in Dascal and Weizman (1987) and the case of indirect reports. Consider the example discussed:

father of fathers of.

This expression is used to express the concept: the original cause of. According to Dascal and Weizman, the departure from literal meaning must be detected through a cue of indirectness:

A cue for indirectness is to be found, if the reader employs her meta-linguistic shallow knowledge and, via the specific meta-linguistic acquaintance with Biblical style (to which the literal Hebrew expression belongs), notices an unexpected register shift. (Dascal and Weizman 1987, republished in Dascal 2003, 189). (Also see Weizman and Dascal 1991 on extralinguistic shallow knowledge enhancing associations with the notion of ‘fighting family’).

Now, following these ideas by Dascal and Weizman, I propose that meta-linguistic specific context provides cues and clues allowing hearers to separate voices in an indirect report. There are many ways in which a reporter can allow hearers to recognize voices: they can imitate the voice quality, they may use items of vocabulary idiosyncratic to a certain speaker (including the reporter), they can use stylistic features that are recognizable as belonging to a certain well-known author, etc. (See also Recanati 2001). We should add that interpretative problems increase in complexity if the reported speaker in turn embeds somebody else’s voice in his own voice (see cases of mixed quotation).

The ideas by Dascal and Weizman were taken up by Hirsch (2011), who applied them to humor. Typical cues for humor are discussed by Hirsch: script opposition (the violation of expectations), framing (jokes appear to have repeatable structure, usually a single scene terminating with a punch-line), word play and nonsense. For the sake of space I cannot go into this, but needless to say these ideas are very useful when it comes to identifying discrepancies between literal and intended meaning in indirect reports. Some parts of an indirect report can be humorous and it may be important in such cases to distinguish between the original speaker’s voice and the reporter’s. Who is being humorous? Although, I will not specifically discuss humor and indirect reports in this chapter, I mention this possibility as part of the general task we are confronted with of separating and specifying the voices expressed in an indirect report. Obviously, we need cues and clues to separate such voices. In another chapter, I discuss the problems involved in reporting non-serious speech, which may well require specific maxims, to constrain what the speaker can prudently say and hearer’s maxims to constrain how a speaker using non-serious speech has to be reported.

4.8.1 Applications of Cues and Clues

In this section I will apply the notion of cues and clues to three important cases of indirect reports. Needless to say, I will keep the discussion short, but I imagine that a number of other cases need to be discussed or taken into account. A case that is of great theoretical importance is an indirect report with implicit **translation**. Surely,

by now we have arrived at the plausible tenet that paraphrasis is involved in indirect reports. Paraphrasis may involve shortening (summing up) or even expanding the report (as clarifications, justifications, or other causal explanations). What makes an indirect report legitimate is the extent to which we are ready to re-express the original voice without distortions of the message or of the form of the message. In case of reports with (implicit) translation it is implicit that the paraphrasis was reached through a translation (the question ‘whose translation?’ is not to be easily dismissed). Consider the report:

(5) Putin said that any American attempt to increase the nuclear arsenal will be considered as a threat to the talks on disarmament.

Now it is clear enough that (5) is a paraphrasis of what Putin said – and this may well consist of an abridgment and of a translation. The translation is obviously one from Russian into English. So we may well accept that Putin’s words were very different from the ones used in the indirect report. It is true that a polyphonic reporter may well utter the sentence (5) by using a recognizable Russian accent and may even try to imitate the specific quality of the voice of the Russian leader. However, there may be strong cues telling us that there is a divergence between the words used by the reporter and those used by Putin and clues leading the hearer to guess that Putin spoke Russian when he uttered the message (Suppose Putin prefers to speak Russian rather than English, which he may know well, due to patriotic reasons). In this case, the following types of clues may be relevant:

Clues relating to extra-linguistic shallow context: general assumptions about the features of a given set of situations;

Clues relating to extra-linguistic background knowledge: general knowledge about the world.

In particular, the clues guiding our interpretation are knowledge of the general fact that Russians normally speak Russian and that the Russian political leader due to patriotism may want to speak Russian when addressing foreign policy (perhaps even before foreign journalists).

The second type of example pertains to non-literal uses. Consider ironic uses. John and Mary are in the library, studying. It is almost time to leave the library and go to dinner. John says: ‘Are y ou staying here?’ and Mary replies:

(6) Yes, I will stay here all night long.

Now, we want to ask whether Fred, who was near them and overheard the conversation could legitimately report:

(7) Mary said that she will stay in the library all night long.

In a sense, it may not be legitimate to report Mary’s speaker meaning by a report of a literal utterance, if what is required of the reporter is Mary speaker’s meaning. So,

whether or not an indirect report of an utterance is legitimate if it only reports the literal meaning of the sentence uttered very much depends on the requirements of the context. If the report was elicited by someone in need of the speaker's meaning, it would be illegitimate to report the literal meaning. A general constraint should be in force in communicative exchanges:

In reporting the words used, give the Hearer some clues concerning the language game in which those words figured.

In general, there should be constraints preventing reporters from merely reporting literal meanings of sentences. These constraints come from general Gricean principles or Relevance Theory considerations (the Communicative principle of Relevance): one should avoid ambiguities and NOT put the hearer to undue and unnecessary processing efforts. They also specifically come from accepting the Paraphrasis Principle which I discussed in Capone (2010a) and reported here in a previous section.⁴ One should notice that there is a tension between the Paraphrasis/Form Principle and my claim that it is not standardly legitimate to report literal meanings, when ironic messages are at stake. So how can we resolve this tension? The tension amounts to this: a level of literality is needed to prevent distortions and attributions of slurs, foul language, sexist language, taboo words, offensive language in general to the original speaker, when, in fact, these should be attributed to the reporter; a level of literality cannot be tolerated when the speaker's meaning diverges from the literal meaning in a drastic way as in ironies. Yet, the tension disintegrates if we consider that both in cases of NPs and of whole utterances speaker meaning is involved. No one prevents me from using the NP the original speaker used in his speech by using it both literally and as being speaker-intended. In other words, in some cases literal meanings are also speaker-intended. Thus, whether we report what the speaker said by using parts of what he literally said (and speaker-meant) or we have to drastically alter what he said to capture the speaker's meaning, we ultimately report the speaker's meaning.

Another issue I want to tackle in connection to reporting literal meanings is whether one really cannot find ways to report literal meanings and do so in a way that is considered acceptable at least in some circumstances. We have said that the reason why we intend to interpret indirect reports as reports of speaker's meaning is that doing otherwise generates ambiguities that cannot be easily resolved. And one is under the constraint to avoid ambiguities and to put the hearer to as little processing effort as possible. However, if processing efforts are balanced by rich cognitive effects, then it may be acceptable to report literal meanings. So even if we admit that this is not the general practice of reporting, in some cases where knowing what the

⁴ Another constraint might be that since speaking non-seriously is a language game, the indirect report should give some clues as to what language game was played by the original speaker (in other words it is not enough to report his literal meanings) and not delete all clues that allow one to reconstruct what language game the speaker was playing. Deletion of clues allowing the Hearer to reconstruct the language game played may be considered a serious sin.

speaker literally meant is of importance to the hearer, the consideration of processing costs is put aside in view of the richer cognitive effects. Suppose that something important and crucial hinges on what Mary literally said and this is made clear in the reporting context. Suppose further that there are rich cues and clues allowing us to assess that the reported statement is a literal and faithful reproduction of the original speaker's words. Then we have the opposite process of what was described by Dascal and Weizman. In the original context cues and clues allow us to detect an interpretation problem and to construct the speaker's meaning. In the reporting context, there are rich cues and clues allowing us to detect an interpretation problem (in particular that the general practice of interpreting indirect reports is not applicable) and assign the words of the report a literal meaning status. What is clear is that in some contexts, this is possible and it is possible due to the existence of rich cues and clues.

The last case I want to discuss, in connection with cues and clues is an example considered by Tannen (1989). This example is interesting because it corroborates what we have said so far, that is that reported speech is often a transformation of the original words, which requires cues and clues for interpretation. Like me, Tannen proposes that intended meanings, considered as 'constructed', should be at stake in indirect reports, and that interpretative problems arise when the recipient fails to reconstruct an utterance's intended meaning.

The example is the following. Two sisters talk on the phone (let us call them A and B). A reports what their mother said about B: she criticized B for not returning home. Instead, she apparently did not criticize A for not returning home from college. B notices the illogicality of this situation, as A who is a college should be under a greater obligation to return home during holidays. B resents her mother's criticism, and apparently seems to take what her mother says literally. However, Tannen proposes that, for tact reasons, the mother avoids criticizing A directly but conveys to her her disappointment over A's conduct by criticizing B, expecting A to reason that if her mother has reasons for criticizing B, then she also has reasons for criticizing A. (We are clearly confronted with a case in which reflective inferences are involved (which according to Cummings (2009) require the deployment of general cognitive abilities (central processes, in particular)). Reflective inferences are obviously at risk, as there is no guarantee that the speaker's meaning will be certainly recovered, given that different hearers' inferential processes may follow different routes, giving differential weight to some crucial elements that are supposed to trigger the inferences). Apparently, neither A nor B grasp their mother's intended speech act and, thus, in reporting it, A concentrates on the literal meaning. Yet, there are cues and clues sufficient for signaling an interpretative problem and for solving it by assigning a specific interpretation of the speaker's intentions. The question which we may address now is whether these cues and clues are preserved by the telephone conversation between the two sisters. We have a situation s, where there is a telephone conversation between the mother and daughter A and situation s1, in which there is a telephone conversation between sister A and B. It is certainly possible, that certain cues such as quality of voice were missed when the first conversa-

tion was reported to B. So it is possible that when the mother told A that it was ok for her if she did not return home, her voice was colored in a certain way and such a quality could constitute a cue. It is possible however, that this cue was missed in the reporting of the conversation. The cue and cues constituted by the criticism of the other sister for a conduct which was similar to the conduct by the other sister who was not actually criticized do not disappear. The problem, however, is that sister B is not able to perceive such cues, is not able to reason on the discrepancy between the mother's reasons for criticizing her conduct and her reasons for approving a similar conduct by her sister. The reason is that in the first conversation (mother/daughter 1), the mother is speaking, if not face-to-face, at least voice-to-voice and, thus, it is more difficult for her to express a direct criticism. She, therefore, resorts to the inferential route and criticizes her addressee's sister (her other daughter) in the hope that she will be able to infer that the same type of action should (also) trigger a negative reaction on the part of her mother, regardless of who the specific daughter is. Basic rationality principles could be easily conducive to a reasoning about what the mother's intended meaning is. So why is it that the two sisters were not aware of the intended meaning? Why is it that the indirect report only takes into account literal meanings? Tannen says that in American English indirect reports are taken as reporting literal meanings. But this is to be excluded by what I argued before in this same section. Tannen is ambivalent on this; on the one hand, she takes American speakers to orient to literal meanings in indirect reports; on the other hand she says that

I am claiming that when a speaker represents an utterance as the words of another what results is by no means describable as "reported speech". Rather it is constructed dialogue. And the construction of the dialogue represents an active, creative, transforming move which expresses the relationship not between the quoted party and the topic of talk but rather the quoting party and the audience to whom the quotation is delivered (Tannen 1989, 11).

But we have already seen that a picture of indirect reporting which does not consider transformations, voicing, cues and clues is deeply flawed. Thus, I take Tannen to express reservations for a notion of indirect reporting which is close to verbatim reports, but not to the notion of indirect reporting which we have defended in this chapter. The idea that **construction** is involved is also a familiar one for us, since we have already accepted that explicatures must be part of indirect reports, that an implicit reference to translation is sometimes made, that the reported words can be summed up or even articulated in a more precise and elaborate manner. Construction also involves constructing a framework for separating voices. It also finally involves assigning an illocutionary intention to a speech act. Cues and clues, in the sense of Dascal and Weizman (1987), feature prominently in this picture of how indirect reports are constructed and deconstructed. The construction work involves taking into account a number of contextual elements which first of all tell you how something has to be taken and then allow you to assign specific content or voices to the indirect report.

4.9 Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that indirect reports often involve transformations of the message uttered in the reported utterance. There is a limit to the quality and number of transformations applicable, and this limit can be found in norms regulating the language game ‘indirect reporting’. I argued that indirect reporting is a societal practice involving societal pragmatics considerations along the lines of Dascal and Weizman (1987) and Mey (2001). Societal pragmatics must be allied with cognitive pragmatics, since the norms implicit in the practice of indirect reporting can often be deduced by cognitive principles like, for instance, the Cognitive Principle of Relevance. Since a theory of how indirect reporting works in conversation is also a theory of communicative practice, it follows that the Communicative principle of Relevance is also at work. This chapter leaves some matters unsettled, though. It would be useful to consider the interaction between indirect reports and the theory of quotation. I leave this matter for the another occasion.

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Chapter 5

Indirect Reporting and Footing

in Footing Goffman provides a powerful model for systematically analyzing the complex theatre of different kinds of entities that can co-exist within a single strip of reported speech. The analytic framework he develops sheds important light on the cognitive complexity of speakers in conversation, who are creating a richly inhabited and textured world through their talk (Goodwin 2007).

5.1 Introduction¹

In this paper I shall deal with indirect reporting as part of pragmatic competence. In particular, I will show that pragmatic competence certainly includes the notion of footing, first of all because discussion of the pragmatic competence involved in indirect reporting certainly requires analysis of the notion of footing; second, because there can be no pragmatic competence, without the notion of footing, as part of our pragmatic competence is to know how to segment discourse and how to recognize transition points between structurally different types of discourse in which the speaker takes a different stance to herself or the persona she speaks for (sometimes signaling that she does not speak for herself but for a different persona, as happens in the case of acting at the theatre). I take pragmatic competence to be knowledge of the conditions of appropriate use, following a venerable tradition dating back to Hymes (1974) and Gumperz (1982) and culminating with Kecskes (2014, 62).

Goffman (1981) wrote a magisterial paper/chapter on Footing, which was to be cited numerous times by the literature on conversation analysis and pragmatics. The topic is clearly of interest in itself, but the hope is that it can be specifically used to clarify the issue of indirect reports by exploring extremely interesting ramifications

¹I realize that Wettstein (2016) hints at the importance of footing in indirect reports by quoting Quine on the dramatic character of indirect reports. Here, however, we will be explicit and systematic in opening up a file on footing and indirect reporting and we will provide a number of theoretically important considerations, the most important of which touch on the issue of presuppositions. I understand this issue cannot be deepened exhaustively here, but it is good that we should start giving some thought to this.

deriving from a perspective in which language structures are not isolated from the context and the social life of their speakers. In this paper, I suggest that if we follow Volosinov's insight that reported speech constitutes a crucial site for recovering the intrinsic dialogic organization of language (Volosinov 1973), we shall find out that at least the answers to the following questions can benefit from an analysis in terms of footing:

Can an indirect report be issued if the original speaker is only the animator of the utterance?

Who is responsible when a slur occurs in the *that*-clause of an indirect report?

Who is responsible for non-restrictive relative clauses of *that*-clauses of indirect reports?

Who is responsible for presuppositional triggers in *that*-clauses of indirect reports?

What happens when the *that*-clause of an indirect report is ungrammatical? How is this to be interpreted?

Are there legitimate or illegitimate ways of reporting ironic utterances?

The notion of footing provides interesting answers to these not uninteresting questions. Such answers presuppose the idea that semantics and pragmatics work in tandem (as originally proposed by Levinson (1983) and that much of the hearer's interpretative work depends on his mastery of language use and its tacit principles (Mey 2001; Levinson 2000; Carston 2002; Huang 2015, 7–8, Kecskes 2014; Allan 2016).

5.2 The Practice of Indirect Reporting

Reporting an utterance in a (relatively) indirect manner is a linguistic activity very similar to a micro-narration (or a mini-story) in which a dramatic action (or to use more familiar jargon) a dialogic action is extrapolated from its context and re-used for some purpose (and presumably the purpose of extracting and re-using this piece of interaction plays a role in determining the transformations which affect the original utterance and result in differences between the locutionary force of the original act and the locutionary shape of the final product to be called 'indirect report').² Reporting in an indirect mode amounts to taking an original material and

²Norrick (2016) addresses the issue whether indirect reports can constitute stories (or stories can be in the form of indirect reports). However he sees the relationship between stories and indirect reports only contingent. Granting that he may be right, it remains to be seen if there are advantages to glean by comparing the structure of stories with that of indirect reports. An important similarity which I am able to see is that both are oriented towards some conclusion, which is derived by add-

manufacturing a final product, aimed at informing H of a certain course of action or fact *p* through the knowledge transmitted by an utterance (by an original speaker) for the (future) use of the conversationalists (or anyway, participants). The direction of the changes is predictable if we know the final beneficiaries of the indirect report, the purpose to which the report is put, and general responsibilities incurred by the reporter. The act of reporting can be equated to, with some limits to be specified, to narrativizing a conversational event. We have a conversational event to start with, from which we only take an arbitrary slice (there is no rule saying that the reporter should narrate the whole sequence uttered by the original speaker but of course there are general pragmatic constraints militating against drastic cuts that deprive the original speaker's words of their original meaning³) and this slice is used in a different conversational event – a mini-narration which (normally) does not follow the systemic constraints on stories (asking for an extended turn and asking the other participants to refrain from speaking during the process of the narration), but is structurally similar to stories, anyway. The mini-story is also indirect in the style/language used and, as far as possible, it avoids offending or damaging the face of the recipient. So, there are two meanings of 'indirectness' to be considered: (a) extrapolating a text from an original context; (b) changing the words⁴ somewhat as a function of the addressee's (and auditors') feelings and face considerations (obviously, I am now referring to the addressee of the report).⁵ We end up – even at a cursory glance – with a structure of indirect reports which admits two speakers (the original speaker and the reporter, also following Goodwin 2007⁶) and two addressees (the reporter who presumably heard the original utterance and the reporter's intended beneficiary (his addressee when he narrates the original utterance)). The original speaker may be animator/author/principal in the sense of Goffman (1981), the reporter is not principal but he is certainly animator and perhaps even author (being responsible for the indirectness at the level of politeness, being aware that his addressee has feelings and a face which ought not to be threatened). The reporter may be an intended addressee or a non-ratified participant (someone who casually overheard the conversation). The reporter's (intended) addressee is a non-ratified participant in that the original utterance was not intended to be addressed to her. She is very much like in the position of an overhearer, with the difference that she never did something illicit and never had to pretend that s/he was not listening (as, in fact,

ing appropriate premises to the indirect report or which is to be taken as the moral upshot of the story.

³Or radically alter the speaker's meaning.

⁴Reading Leech (2014, 314), I should note that the issue of indirect reports is not confined to indirectly reporting an assertion but also requires considerations on how to indirectly report a speech act other than assertions. I wrote more on this in Capone (2016b).

⁵See Leech 2014 and Haugh (2015).

⁶It is interesting that Goodwin (2007) criticizes Goffman's notion of footing because (apparently) it does not allow the dialogic construction of a single turn. Here we adopt Goodwin's idea that a single turn can be constructed collaboratively by two speakers even for the (apparently) simple case of an indirect report where apparently we have a single speaker even if, in fact, at a deeper analysis there are two.

s/he was not listening). This structural schema immediately adverts us to the position that the issue of footing is relevant to the issue of indirect reporting. In general, I will be using ‘indirect reporting’ and ‘indirect report’ interchangeably, although intuitively there is a difference, as in indirect reporting the focus is on the process, whereas in indirect reports the focus is on the product and the content. Readers will need to contextualize to obtain the intended meaning.

5.3 On Footing

Goffman is interested in the pragmatics of utterance, specifically in connection with the roles played by the speaker when she speaks (I don’t deny it would be useful to have such a laminated structure for the hearer as well; there are steps in this direction in Goffman’s paper as well and some other authors have also investigated in this direction (e.g. Bell 1984)). By footing, Goffman generally refers to the relationship between a speaker and the roles she assumes in uttering the discourse or the relationship between a speaker and the structure of the discourse (including its functional segmentation).⁷ Although one needs reflection to consider that these two aspects are related, for Goffman it is clear that both are involved in footing.⁸ Consider an actor on the stage. The discourse is clearly segmented in such a way that this person, prior to the experience on the stage, speaks in her capacity as an ordinary speaker speaking for herself, while during the experience of the play, which is segmented through formal boundaries from previous and subsequent (functionally differentiated) experiences, she will normally speak for someone else (the persona for which she is acting). Formal boundaries that segment the discourse at the same time reveal that a new footing occurs and that the speaker is no longer speaking for herself, but for another persona.

These shifts of footing occur quite often, as happens when we read a poem (the poem is clearly not our own, but we are only lending our voice to the author), when a politician delivers her speech before a large audience, although she is mainly responsible for what she says, it is not impossible that portions of the text have been written by authors different from her (her team consisting of communication experts). Literary authors (e.g. James Joyce, or Dante Alighieri) often use citations, at points in which they count on expert readers to decide that the text does not belong to them (ordinary readers are not expected to see these subtleties). Citation marks may be left unexpressed in literary citations because the (beauty of the) game consists in recognizing that at this (or that) point it is no longer the writer’s voice that speaks but a different voice – the text becomes stratified or laminated. Citations

⁷ Goodwin (2007) writes that Goffman’s speaker, a laminated structure encompassing quite different kinds of entities which co-exist within the scope of a single utterance, is endowed with considerable cognitive complexity.

⁸ Neal Norrick (p. c.) was kind enough to clarify that actors on the stage convey shifts in footing by moving their feet, thus signalling boundaries between a segment and another of the interaction.

in academic texts are often revealed by quotation marks – here one cannot possibly play the ambiguous game of letting readers guess that the text belongs to someone else, because the author does not want to run the risk of being considered a plagiarist. In spoken discourse, quotations may not be marked formally – albeit one may use the complementary channel to mark something as not being one's own. A quotation need not coincide with a full sentence, but even an arbitrarily short segment of the sentence (usually the smallest level is the word) can be cited as part of an indirect report (this is the case of mixed indirect reports, surely an important one, but one which we are NOT specifically concerned with here).⁹

What is it that marks a shift of footing? Can tone of voice be crucial? I suppose it is, as actors normally have voices that can be typically recognized as being theatrical and even ordinary speakers are capable of imitating actors, especially when they reproduce segments which are not their own (as happens in cases of ironies, which linguists have been justified in calling 'echoic' (see Spenber and Wilson 1986; see Wilson 2006)).¹⁰ But, as I said before, Goffman counted on formal boundaries coinciding with words/utterances to play a crucial role in the organization of discourse (suppose a doctor wants to differentiate informal conversation from the sequence that pursues the official purpose of the interaction; she has ways to mark boundaries shifting from dialect to the standard language or by using the multifunctional marker 'Ok'¹¹; she may even use an instrument like a pressure tester to segment the various phases of the discourse).

It is of some interest that the discussion of the notion of footing, in Goffman's paper, in connection with the Hearer, is not as deep as we might have expected. We also have a laminated structure, in which hearers are classified on the basis of the notion of 'ratified participant' and we have a tripartite structure in which we can distinguish the roles of addressees, auditors and overhearers. This is more or less the same type of analysis we find in Bell (1984), with the difference that this author exploits it to show how the style of the speaker can change as a function of the hearers' roles she takes into account. Audience design can play some role in the philosophy of language, as noted in Devitt's (1996) considerations about belief reports and indirect reports. Another area to which audience design can be applied is deixis, as, obviously, in mass communication such as radio talk, referents that are visible to addressees and official auditors (within the program) are not visible by the audience at home, and thus the speaker must take this into account when packing a referent with an NP. Deictic items, obviously, constitute a problem and the speaker must be able to consider the auditors at home in order to avoid transmitting messages which otherwise would be inert (given that reference and referential presuppositions, as Strawson pointed out in his discussion with Russell, are the *sine qua non* of the communication process).

⁹ See Cappelen and Lepore (2005a).

¹⁰ See Camp (2012) for intonational cues, such as stress, pitch, slow rate, nasalization (also Rockwell 2000; Attardo et al. 2003).

¹¹ See Schiffrin (1988) for the multifunctionality of discourse markers such as 'Ok'.

The final shape of the indirect report is strongly determined by considerations about the hearer. The hearer will find the information contained in the indirect report useful only if she is able to recognize the referents of the NPs (the constituents having nominal function) used (as a predication act presupposes a referent of which it is predicated; if there is no referent available, as Strawson points out, communication cannot proceed further (see also Huang 2015, 98–99). Thus, in manufacturing an indirect report the speaker may consider whether he can retain the NPs used in the original utterance or not. If she predicts that those NPs will not be easily recognized by the hearer, she will replace them with coextensive but more informative ones (see Devitt 1996; Capone 2008) with respect to the real addressee (keeping the reference the same). If she is given evidence by the Hearer's actual behavior that those NPs do not switch any light on in the hearer's mind, being obscure, she will replace them with more informative ones. The move will amount to changing an NP not because it is not correct from a grammatical point of view, but because it is not useful in fixing reference. This predictive/reactive behavior is a consequence of the general principle according to which (following Dascal's (2003) important insight) the speaker has a duty to make herself understood, which involves predicting the hearer's responses or being sensitive to online feedback signals (monitoring the hearer's facial expression – the complementary channel, in the sense of Goffman) and linguistic responses. Part of this duty involves reacting to the hearer's behavior after (or even during) the monitoring phase and adjusting one's speech.

The considerations by Devitt (1996), which clearly come from philosophy of language, could be formalized a little by using Goffman's notion of footing and then Bell's notion of audience design, which is closely connected with Goffman's analysis. Bell (1984) in an influential article has written about audience design – that is to say the analysis of Hearers as categorized in terms of the notion of footing: the addressee, the auditors, the overhearers. The addressee is clearly the person addressed by the speaker (pronouns or proper names can be used in addressing her), the auditors are more passive but ratified participants, overhearers are not ratified participants (even if in some cases the speaker can decide to speak to them, even if indirectly). A person who speaks normally wants to be understood by her addressees and by her auditors, but does not care much if the overhearers understand her or not. Thus, she accommodates (to use and adapt a term from sociolinguistics) to the addressees and the auditors but does not care to take the needs of the overhearers into consideration (at one point, she may even decide to use a more sophisticated, latinate lexicon to deliberately exclude them from the communication process). As Bell (1984) says, the relationship is normally inverted in mass communication, as the speaker (say a politician) may be interested more in delivering a message to a television audience than say to the addressee (e.g. an interviewer or another participant in the tv program) and she would care even for overhearers – those who are not the intended tv audience but happen to be nearby (those who read about the tv program in the news, for example). Thus the choice of NPs in indirect reporting in a tv program may largely depend on the knowledge which the speaker has of the auditors and the overhearers. If she wants to reach all, she needs to speak the language of the population, that is assume that the ideal audience coincides with the

least knowledgeable one. It is of some theoretical interest that we have found a connection between the philosophy of language (Devitt 1996) and sociolinguistics (Bell 1984).

5.4 Applying the Notion of Footing to Indirect Reports

One of the most immediate consequences of applying Goffman's notion of footing to indirect reports is that we would never say 'John said that p' if, in fact, he was only reading 'p' aloud, or if he was reciting a poem or if he was acting in a play or if he merely reproduced a certain politician's accent. Similar considerations will induce us to refrain from saying 'Someone said that p' if we read a sentence on a blackboard in a classroom – perhaps this was only a grammatical example. There is an anonymous voice behind the sentence, but we are not even able to make progress in the inquiry whether someone was responsible for the sentence, as we don't know who wrote it and why s/he wrote it (let alone whom s/he wrote it for). As far as we know, this might only be a linguistic example (a linguistic orphan in the sense of Goffman 1981), a sentence in short, and not an utterance. Thus we are not authorized to say 'Someone said that p'. We may perhaps say 'Someone wrote "p"' but not 'Someone wrote that p'. The use of 'that' (the complemetizer) usually indicates that the sentence following it has a content, being able to refer to extra-linguistic entities. But sentences like 'Maria has a baby' uttered as part of a grammatical exemplification act never manage to reach the real world of reference, as a linguistics professor can utter them without having a referent in mind when saying 'Maria' and the hearer likewise does not have a referent in mind when she interprets them (the semiotic potential of the situation seems to be enough to deprive Proper Names of their referents¹²). The word 'content', as I see it, involves a link between an utterance and the world (but of course it could be used in a different way and, in fact the literature makes disparate uses of the word 'content'). What is our footing to a sentence like 'Maria is stupid' written on a blackboard? Since we do not know the purpose for which the sentence was written, we are not able to say whether it was only a linguistic example (just a sentence) or whether it was an utterance with an animator/author/principal. Indirect reports with explicit that-clauses always involve an animator/author/principal. (This is what mainly distinguishes them from pure quotations).

¹² This is more or less what happens when we read works of fiction (where names are normally empty), with the difference that at least there we open files for proper names, whereas in linguistic examples we need not even do that.

5.5 Indirect Reports as Spoken by Two Speakers

what is expressed in the forms employed for reporting speech is an active relation of one message to another (Volosinov 1973, 116).

A more serious problem, when the issue of footing is considered, is the following. Given that in an indirect report there are two speakers, how should we use the category animator/author/principal with respect to these two speakers? We are *a priori*, in a position to say that the reported speaker should at least be a principal (as well as author and animator) with respect to the content of her utterance. A that-clause at least involves a principal (as reported speaker), as we have already seen. But now what is the footing of the reporting speaker? We have previously hinted that the reporting speaker is manufacturing the indirect report, thus it follows that she can be considered (to some extent) the author or as one of the authors (as a second author, one who is re-writing or authoring again something already authored for her by the reported speaker). But is she Principal? A natural answer would be ‘She is and she isn’t’. She takes responsibility up to a point and the demarcation point is now signaled by the word ‘that’, as anything that precedes ‘that’ is taken to be under the responsibility of the reporter, while anything that follows ‘that’ seems to be under the responsibility of the reported speaker. However, certain elements of the that-clause may also be under the responsibility of the reporter (as Holt 2016 says, in indirect reports the reporter comes to the fore). If slurs are used, then is the slur to be attributed to the reported speaker or to the reporter?¹³ (Unlike Anderson and Lepore 2013), my answer is that the reported speaker is responsible, but surely the reporting speaker at least has the responsibility of failing to substitute a word which may be regarded as offensive and denigrative (capable of doing harm) with a neutral one, although such a responsibility is alleviated in part in contexts in which it is clear that the purpose of the utterance is to condemn the racist attitude expressed by the use of the slur (thus the slur can be seen as being used by the reported speaker and being only quoted by the reporting speaker). Responses to my previous papers indicate that one cannot achieve a universal consensus on this, but it should be conceded that there can be an ambiguous footing for slurring words in that-clauses of an indirect report and we may oscillate between different positions. Sometimes we consider the slur as being under the responsibility of the reported speaker, sometimes under the responsibility of the reporting speaker, a lot depending on whether we know (for example) that the reported speaker is racist but the reporting speaker isn’t or vice versa. In Capone (2013a)), I argued that general principles of communication may be involved in deciding that the reported speaker is more responsible than the reporting speaker, but since general (defaultive) implicatures can be superseded by contextual considerations, I have no objection to the possibility that an ambiguous footing may be adopted to the slurring words in that-clauses of indirect

¹³ Haugh talks about places in which there is ambiguity concerning who is really responsible for a message (Haugh 2015, 35).

reports (one of the things which is absolutely clear, however, and cannot be doubted is that the hearer cannot be deemed responsible for the use/mention of the slurring word in case she immediately objects to it – if she does not object to it, she connives with the speaker as she tacitly accepts the presuppositions of the utterance (see Levinson 1983; Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990; Stalnaker 1999 on this)). (We are back to the idea put forward by Goodwin (2007) that the speaker and recipient can co-author and be responsible for a certain segment of discourse). We have found out, in passing, that hearers do not play a passive role, although unless they do not say something to question presuppositions they are taken by the literature (e.g. Stalnaker) as conniving with the linguistic presuppositions, and they may even be recruited for the purpose of sharing a propositional attitude with the speaker. It is of some interest that if the reporter may adopt a footing as author rather than as principal (e.g. with respect to some slurring embedded component) with respect to the embedded utterance that happens to express a slur, the hearer's footing should in principle be even more ambivalent – or so we would expect. However, paradoxically, while the speaker in reporting a slur may be partially dispensed with responsibility (except for the general responsibility incurred in not having avoided the slurring expression altogether) as pragmatic principles may well assign responsibility for the slurring expression to the original speaker (absent strong contextual clues militating in the opposite direction), the hearer, failing to be a reporter, may be exposed to the presuppositions of the slurring expression which extend from the context of the original utterance to the context of the report given that a racist discourse is being issued in the first instance and also given that the reporter has not done anything (so far) to dissociate himself from those presuppositions. Thus, the hearer must dissociate himself explicitly from those presuppositions if she does not want to incur the footing of principal (with respect to the slurring segment) and share responsibility for the slur.

There are several considerations against a neat differentiation between pre-that and after-that portions of an indirect report as far as the idea of footing is concerned. In fact, several parenthetical comments can be embedded (on the part of the reporting speaker) in the after-that portion of an indirect report. Relatives and appositions can do a great job in re-injecting the reporting speaker's voice (and responsibility) into segments of that-clauses (even if it is important that such segments should be syntactically differentiated from the main that-clause). Syntactic boundaries like relative pronouns (in non-restrictive relative clauses) may announce that the voice (and footing) shifts, from the reported speaker to the reporter. The reporter is even allowed to add moral codas, like 'which is not fair', at the end of an indirect report and, again, these mark a shift of footing from the content for which the reported speaker is responsible to the content for which (only) the reporting speaker is. Another and more subtle way of injecting one's voice into the that-clause of an indirect report is to add some implicit commentary, more or less like what is discussed in Goodwin (2007), in the form of laugh tokens (laugh tokens formulate somebody else's talk as something to be laughed at).

Even inside that-clauses the chances for polyphony are not limited or scarce (Goodwin 2007 writes about the "dialogic interplay of different voices within

reported speech”). Although the reporting speaker is not, in general, responsible for the content of the *that*-clause, she may be responsible as *author* for the structure and the lexicon used. The linguistic game may be to differentiate portions of the text for which the reporter is responsible from those for which the reporting speaker is responsible. In my previous publications (e.g. Capone 2010 but also Capone 2016a), I defended the view that at controversial points (but in general not for every word used), when doubt arises, we use general principles to assign responsibility for the words used (responsibility as author) to the reported speaker. However, contextual considerations may supersede that defaultive interpretation. If we know both John and Fred and know their stylistic preferences, it is not difficult to distinguish between their voices (and authorship). We know that John would use but Fred would never use the word *x*. Thus, for many of the words used in the *that*-clause of an indirect report we can know whether the author was John or Fred. These are heavily context-dependent considerations; however we should not bar them from counting. We should, in general, keep the balance between an abstract general (pragmatic) approach and a more concrete, context-dependent (pragmatic) approach. We may also use intonation to detach ourselves from a word, by using a theatrical countenance. For the duration of a word or two our voice becomes theatrical, which means we are not using our words, but someone else’s. We may explore similar possibilities and each of them will add some interest to our picture.

5.6 Cuts in the Original Utterance

One point in which it is clear that the reporter, and not the reported speaker, is the author is when cuts in the segments of the discourse are effected. Now this is similar, as I said, to a micro-narration, where we don’t keep all elements, but only some of them. The cuts, however, should not be arbitrary or due to my desire to highlight this but not that other feature. The *macrostructure* of the discourse (van Dijk 1980) must be preserved in cutting things and if the cuts amount to transforming, altering and mis-representing the macro-structure of the discourse, they should be avoided.¹⁴ One of the points which indirect reports have in common with narrations is that they are (rhetorically) oriented. Narrations are, naturally, part of arguments where the moral conclusion can be expressed or, otherwise, elided (left to be reconstructed by the hearer). Indirect reports too may be parts of argumentation moves and they often have an unexpressed moral conclusion – in other words they have an orientation. What is said is reported because it can favor some course of action *x* rather than *y*. Now, eliminating information (by formal cuts, see Cappelen and Lepore 1997;

¹⁴ Neal Norrick in a p.c. considers that most the time we feel that we have been misquoted in that authors using our citations are altering the message. I agree that these things happen all the time, but there are three questions to ask: (a) should they happen? (b) to what extent should we tolerate them? (c) is it not this happening as a result of having to re-interpret the citation in a different context that the meaning changes at least partially?

Wieland 2013) from a *that*-clause of an indirect report (as well as sometimes changing the NPs used) may serve a rhetorical function. But there is a limit to what can be done, as the original speaker can be seen as having the right to approve the content of the *that*-clause indirectly reported (or withdraw approval). If this approval is withdrawn legitimately, then there is something wrong in the praxis of making cuts, as the cuts have been instrumental in choosing an orientation rather than another while sacrificing impartiality and objectivity. Anyway, a reporter who makes cuts adopts the footing as author as he decides which part of the text is more relevant and seems to adapt the indirect report to the purpose of the discourse. In so far as the reporter aims at perlocutionary effects (which are notoriously connected with intentions) he is also projecting himself as principal. He is at least principal with respect to the perlocutionary effects. He is thus using the content of the reported utterance with an aim of his own and he is integrating the content of the report in a new context where it can acquire new meanings and perlocutionary effects. He is not principal but in a sense he is, because he intends at least the indirect report to fit the new context and to produce further meanings and effects in that context.

5.7 Presuppositional Triggers and Indirect Reports

Another important possibility to be investigated in this chapter is whether presuppositions of clauses embedded in indirect reports are under the authority of the reported speaker or the reporting speaker. Presuppositions, normally, have a lexical trigger (but it can also be a grammatical construction, such as cleft-clauses (see Atlas and Levinson 1981; Levinson 1983; Huang 2015, 88, on constructional triggers). I have written extensively on presuppositions and indirect reports in some work with Fabrizio Macagno (Macagno and Capone 2016) – but there the focus was on whether presuppositions can be conversationally be implicated (in general). Here the interest and the focus is on whether the trigger in itself can be seen as responsible for the presupposition and whether this responsibility is something that belongs to the reported speaker or the reporting speaker. In fact, we know that the reporting speaker can be the author of the text (or of part of the text) in the *that*-clause. Thus if there are segments of the *that*-clause for which she is responsible, as author, she should also be responsible for the presuppositions triggered by those items. And is it impossible that the reporting speaker transformed the text in such a way that she used presuppositional triggers in a *that*-clause of an indirect report, while the text used by the reported speaker did not make use of such triggers? Clearly, this is not an impossibility. We may have an indirect report of the following type:

- (1) John said that it was Mary who stole the mobile phone

Of course nothing in the grammatical competence that governs indirect reports guarantees that ‘It was Mary who stole the mobile phone’ is the sentence actually uttered by John. Perhaps John said ‘Mary stole the mobile phone and the tv set’ without focus on MARY. The use of the cleft construction in the indirect report

seems to presuppose a context in which ‘Mary stole the mobile phone’ is an alternative to ‘Fred stole the mobile phone’. However, if there is no semantic rule saying that the presupposition in the *that*-clause must be mapped to a lexical trigger in the original utterance, the expectation that there should be a mapping between presupposition and one of the contexts available.

I take the problems generated by this case very seriously. I suppose that an utterance of ‘John said that it was Mary who stole the mobile phone’ could well be a reply to the following question: ‘Who stole the mobile phone, Fred or Mary?’. In this case, the previous (eliciting) question poses the issue that someone stole the telephone and also states the domain of alternatives presupposed by the answer ‘John said that it was Mary who stole the mobile phone’. Since the speaker’s presupposition is satisfied in this context, we cannot say that the presupposing utterance is infelicitous. However, if the speaker were, at this point, asked what John literally said, she might well provide a statement that contains no presupposing construction (specifically no cleft sentence). She could reply: John said that Mary stole the telephone and Fred the tv set. In fact, the indirect report is made to use a previous utterance to reply to the previous question whether it was Mary or Fred that stole the telephone. The utterance is now reported in such a way that it interacts with the structure of the question, which elicits a reply and presupposes a set of alternatives. Thus, the indirect report, in being a reply, has to adapt to the structure of the question and can be seen as transforming the original utterance using information extracted from it in order to answer the question.

One more example can clarify things, to show that there is something to be explored in connection with this issue. Consider:

(2) Mary said that the Queen of England returned from France.

Given the reporting practices so far discussed in the existing literature on indirect reports, this could well come from:

(3) Mary said: Elisabeth returned from France

in a context in which Mary does not know that Elisabeth is the Queen of England.

There is quasi-universal agreement in the literature (Richard 2013; Soames 2015; Salmon 2007; Brown and Saul 2002, etc.) that opacity need not be preserved in shifting from a statement to an indirect report of that statement, given that the Russellian content (the singular proposition) is more important. Opacity effects are normally due to communicative (pragmatic) effects (Salmon (2007), Brown and Saul 2002; Capone 2008). If these considerations are accepted, it follows deductively that there is no principled semantic reason for saying that NPs or constructions triggering presuppositions in *that*-clauses of indirect reports should be mapped to statements by the original speaker which contained those presuppositional triggers. If this works for the Queen of England example, it should also work for presuppositions of cleft constructions and other similarly presupposing con-

structions. But now the moral of this is that one need not take the original speaker as the author of the segments of the *that*-clause which trigger presuppositions, although we work with a social praxis inducing us to see the author of the presuppositional trigger present in the *that*-clause of the indirect reporter as coincident with the author of the original utterance. Presumably, this is a defaultive interpretation to be explained pragmatically by saying that this is part of a praxis and that this praxis is probably determined by the general principle that the author of the *that*-clause should depart as little as possible from the form of the original utterance, unless she has a compelling reason to depart from it. This may well follow from Gricean principles or from Relevance-theoretical considerations¹⁵ (it is not important for the issue of footing to focus on one or the other) or simply from rationality considerations (I have written about this in Capone [Forthcoming-a](#)). Thus, although there is this expectation, the possibility that a non-defaultive interpretation obtains occurs in special contexts.

Another case worth considering is the following. Consider:

- (4) John said that Mary, who is Princess of Wales, is now in Paris for two months.

We will remember that non-restrictive relative clauses, according to Levinson (1983) (but also see Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990)) normally are presuppositional triggers, that is to say they seem to trigger presuppositions. However, now one should ask: which speaker's presupposition? Here we clearly have two speakers (given the dialogic structure of the indirect report) and it seems to me that the presupposition is triggered relative to the reporting speaker, but not relative to the reported speaker (in other words the reported speaker may have never uttered the non-restrictive relative clause in the original utterance). This surprising behavior of presuppositions is somehow at odds with our expectation that in problematic cases where it is not clear whether we have the indirect reporter's voice or the indirectly reported speaker's voice, pragmatic principles say that the reported speaker's voice prevails as the purpose of the report is mainly to report what the reported speaker originally said. However, default interpretations can clearly be overridden by contextual considerations or anyway by the cogency of certain theoretical difficulties. As we know well, a presupposition needs to be satisfied by the context (Stalnaker 1973; Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990) or must at least be compatible with the context of utterance (Levinson 1983). But which context of utterance should satisfy it? The reporting speaker's utterance or the reported speaker's utterance? This is similar to a problem encountered in dealing with indirect reports/belief reports (see Mark Richard 2013), in that deictic elements should be interpreted in connection with the context of the reporter's utterance, as contextual clues belonging to the reported speaker's utterance may have been missed or nobody managed to narrate them (as such a narration would clearly be quite time-consuming) (see also Gutierrez-Rexach 2016, 554). Thus there are, in general, serious problems in having access to the context of the original utterance. In the same way in

¹⁵ See Capone (2008), Capone (2010).

which pronominals are normally interpreted with reference to the context of the reporter's utterance (in the case of pronominals there does not seem to be a different option, according to Richard 2013), presuppositions too must be satisfied by the context of the reporter's utterance, for one thing, the context of the original utterance is unavailable or at least not easily available. Thus, issues of processing costs (see Sperber and Wilson 1986, Carston 2002; Wilson and Sperber 2012) ensure that presuppositions of triggers present in that-clauses of indirect reports must be satisfied (or compatible with, if we follow Levinson's 1983 story) by the reporter's context. At least, we have somehow resolved a deeply disturbing problem.

5.8 Syntax and Indirect Reporting

Are there other segments of that-clauses in indirect reports which can be analysed in connection with the topic of footing? The syntax of a that-clause may be a matter of footing-based analysis. What happens when there is a grammatical error in the that-clause of an indirect report? Who should be the author of the error? I suppose that, generally speaking, the grammar of the clause is under the responsibility of the reporter. The reporter can edit the speech (Lehrer 1989), can clean it and render it grammatical. If a journalist, who is supposed to know grammar well, decides to keep ungrammatical elements of the discourse (elements not to be imputed to a fleeting, momentary distraction, such as, for example, a missing comma or a missing round bracket), should we suppose that she is responsible or author of the error or is the reported speaker responsible, instead? Contextual considerations here may lead us to prefer the solution that the reported speaker and not the journalist is responsible because we know and everyone else knows that journalists know grammar. But we may also have the opposite case. Professor Higgins is a well-known grammarian and Jones is a poor journalist, who sometimes makes errors. Presumably in this case contextual considerations will be conducive to the opposite conclusion because we could admit that professor Higgins could make mistakes of this kind only if he were drunk or unwell. Here as well, the question of authorship is determined by general pragmatic considerations, because attributing author's status with respect to the error to the original speaker should be seen the general case, given that the speaker, due to general pragmatic principles, should depart as little as she can from the form of the original utterance (see my 2010 paper for the *Journal of Pragmatics*). As I said in Capone (2010),

Paraphrase/Form Principle

The that-clause embedded in the verb 'say' is a paraphrase of what Y said, and meets the following constraints:

Should Y hear what X said Y had said, Y would not take issue with it as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrase of the original utterance. Furthermore, Y would not object to the vocal expression of the assertion, based

on the words following the complementizer ‘that’ on account of its form/style. (Capone 2010, 382).

This formulation of the Principle may not be the final story, as Wayne Davis (p.c.) raised several reasonable objections to it, all of which, however, I thought could be overcome, as I said in Capone (2016a). Detailed discussion of such objections would lead us too much away from the discussion of footing.

5.9 Ironies and Footing

My final considerations on footing and indirect reports concern ironies, which according to Carston (2002, 15) are textbook cases in which what is meant by the speaker is not part of what her linguistic string means¹⁶ (the reverse is also true, that is, the literal meaning is not part of the intended meaning). If the consideration that indirect reports normally report the implicatures and explicatures of an utterance (Allan 2016) is accepted, it logically follows from this that there would be something wrong in reporting an ironic utterance by simply re-presenting (a term used by Allan 2016) its literal meaning.

Ironic utterances, according to Goffman (1981), involve a shift of footing, as the speaker offers some cues (typically the tone of voice becoming theatrical or echoic¹⁷; also see Dascal 2003 on cues and clues) that he is ventroquiling a different person (he is speaking for a different person in the sense that his literal words have been authored by a different person who is the principal) and is expressing a sense of detachment from those words (the segment cited).¹⁸ Goffman’s perspective is compatible with Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) perspective on irony (see also other authors on irony, such as Colston (2000), Giora (1995), Gibbs et al. 1995; Wilson 2006 among others), even if it is not clear to me how compatible it is with the pre-tense approaches to irony (Recanati 2004). Is it legitimate to report an utterance that contains ironic interpretations by using its literal meaning?¹⁹ It is clear that, by

¹⁶ Also see Camp (2012).

¹⁷ Following Wilson (2006), I accept that normally ironic utterances are echoic, but there are exceptions as they may largely depend on actions (as when I say ‘Thanks for opening the door’ (nobody let alone the addressee opened the door). See Kumon-Nakamura et al. (1995).

¹⁸ One of the rules which is obviously flouted in ironical assertions is the knowledge rule (see Montminy 2013).

¹⁹ Camp (2012) has introduced the idea that indirect reports can be used as a test as to whether an utterance is ironic, as she thinks that an indirect report may have semantic ways to report an ironic utterance by inheriting the sarcastic intonation (however, this intonation, in Camp’s examples, is limited to a lexeme or anyway a portion of the that-clause of the indirect report). I suppose this is true at least of English, but what we are considering here is not whether there are strategies for quoting ironic utterances but a general theoretical stance on indirect reporting. Camp’s cases, in fact, seem to me to be cases of mixed quotations and, thus, they are more relevant to the issue of quotation than to the issue of indirect reporting. Anyway, Camp’s semantic possibilities do not rule

doing so, one supersedes the speaker's meaning altogether and pretends to report the speaker's meaning rather than the literal meaning. This is certainly snide (and it is not the ordinary practice, as there are norms against doing so) because the final hearer ignores the contextual considerations which promoted a legitimate interpretation of the irony in the original utterance. Cues and clues are erased on purpose in that no mention is made of them and they are considered unimportant, nor is the hearer informed of such voluntary deletions. Now, this cannot be the standard practice of reporting as this is mainly naturally aimed at capturing the original speaker's intention (see also Wieland 2010²⁰) (despite various detours that only concern issues of authorship). These deletions are culpable because they hide the intent of transforming what the speaker said by deliberately altering it. Thus, it follows that one should

NOT report what a speaker said by reporting the literal utterance if the hearer cannot perceive the cues and clues which the original speaker disseminated (see Dascal 2003) and intended to be used as key to the intended interpretation (see also Capone Forthcoming-b).

(As I said in a previous chapter, there are exceptions to this especially when one is faced with a genuinely and irreducibly ambiguous utterance and one is not able to settle on any given meaning as the possibly intended one – thus reporting the ambiguous utterance is one way of allowing the hearer to take a decision herself concerning the interpretation of the ambiguous utterance).

Now, in the terms of Goffman, an ironic utterance is one in which the speaker is distancing herself from the one who actually proffered or thought the utterance. Thus, she speaks as *animator* and the hearer has the task of reconstructing the real

out that we should address the general issue of what happens when we decide to indirectly report a sarcastic utterance by using its literal words. (However, I suppose that this would be a problem of the semantic type for the semanticists who, according to Camp (2012), should be taken to be committed to the view that there is a sarcasm operator (SARC OP) operating at logical form (Camp, however, specifies that some semanticists like King and Stanley 2005 actually endorse the position that ironical utterances are literally false, which triggers pragmatic interpretation). Considerations from the point of view of semanticists can be of some interest, but they need not be applicable, for example, to written texts (plays, articles, etc.) and, thus, may not be general enough to cover the whole story about ironies.

²⁰ I am somehow taking sides with Wieland (2010) in the important discussion of indirect reports as tests to establish whether what is said should just include semantics or otherwise pragmatics (pragmatic intrusion) (against Cappelen and Lepore 2005b; see also Montminy 2006). Of course Cappelen and Lepore could always reply that indirect reports can be used as tests only in the limited cases in which an utterance is used seriously as they say nothing about non-serious cases. I want my considerations on indirect reporting to be considered independently from the certainly important issue whether what is said should only include semantics and limited pragmatic intrusion (e.g. referents of pronominals and NPs), because on the one hand I recognize that literal meanings play an important role, on the other hand I have to concede that non-literal meanings count too.

utterance she intends. Thus, there are two utterances to be considered²¹ (again notice the laminated structure of the utterance in terms of Goffman's footing (Goffman 1981; Goodwin 2007)). Instead, when contextual cues and clues are deleted, the hearer can only perceive one utterance and is certainly not able to segment the discourse to see that in one of its segments the speaker is only speaking qua *animator* and, instead, there is another utterance to be construed through pragmatic principles. The problem is one of footing. Thus, in such snide cases, the literal words are being re-used but the **footing is not properly translated** (or reported). The report is faulty because the original footing can no longer be recognized and segmentation of the discourse in the search for units of interpretation cannot succeed.

My stance to reporting ironies in a sense follows deductively from accepting the following:

Paraphrase/Form Principle

The that-clause embedded in the verb 'say' is a paraphrase of what Y said, and meets the following constraints:

Should Y hear what X said Y had said, Y would not take issue with it as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrase of the original utterance. Furthermore, Y would not object to the vocal expression of the assertion, based on the words following the complementizer 'that' on account of its form/style. (Capone 2010, 382).²²

An ironic speaker would never approve of a literal reporting of what he said, thus confirming what Davis say in the following excerpt:

The role of the speaker's own testimony in establishing what he implicated has, to my knowledge, been almost completely ignored. This is especially remarkable because implicature is stipulated to be a form of speaker meaning or implication, which is widely and correctly taken to depend on the speaker's intentions, traditionally thought to be known primarily through introspection and first-person reports. (Davis 1998, 130).

However, there are surely more complicated cases, as those brought by Camp (2012) to our attention:

(5) As I reached the bank at closing time, the bank clerk helpfully shut the door in my face.

Cases like these are taken by Camp to provide counterevidence to the expressivist view (or the echoic view) because at least part of the utterance is serious, whereas a segment of it, is not ('helpfully').

As Camp recognizes, a move available to expressivists is to say that there are two utterances. Thus this objection is not difficult to deal with, although, when one

²¹ This is clearly different from the Quintilian view (Camp 2012) that irony involves an utterance that is interpreted in the opposite way. That view completely ignores the issue of footing.

²² This is very much in line with Eros Corazza's (2004, 262) considerations.

deeply thinks of it, then for every ironic utterance there are segments of it which cannot be taken ironically, mainly the referential slots for NPs or Proper Names. Should we have two utterances in these cases as well? Goffman's notion of footing easily answers this question as in any case two utterances are involved in ironic utterances.

What is of interest to us is that, in reporting such ironic utterances, a move is available to the indirect reporter, as noted by Wieland (2013): deletion. The reporter can delete the ironic segment and produce an utterance part which is serious, although she may freely add a relative clause commenting on the ironic part:

(6) John said that, at closing time, the bank clerk shut the door in his face, which was not very kind.

The parenthetical comment is clearly a paraphrase of the ironic segment.

So, we clearly see that the notion of footing has some work to do in reports of non-serious utterances. This is a complex topic deserving to be discussed in a different chapter.

5.10 Conclusion

Summing up, so far we have seen that the notion of footing interacts with our general knowledge of how to transform an utterance into an indirect report (it is difficult or impossible to do this with utterances proffered by actors, people who recite poems, etc. because they do not have the appropriate footing, which at least requires a coincidence of animator/author/principal). We have also seen that the question of authorship is pressing in indirect reports and that segments of them present the reporter as Author/Principal (e.g. non-restrictive relative clauses and constructional triggers of presuppositions, in general). We have seen that the syntax of that-clauses of indirect reports is a problematic issue (who is the author of a syntactic mistake in the that-clause of an indirect report?). We have also seen that, if there are illicit deletions (Wieland 2013), the reporter should be seen as the culprit.

We have reached a point where we can conclude that, as far as footing is concerned, the structure of an indirect report is as important as its content. There should be a nexus between footing and content because content cannot be of any value if we do not discern the footing-based structure of discourse. I hope that this is the first step towards a more exhaustive understanding of indirect reports. Understandably, there are other directions which the literature might take but, unless the notion of footing is examined closely in all its ramifications, we cannot make real progress in the understanding of this interesting issue.

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Chapter 6

Reporting Non-serious Speech

*In many cases in which an agent asserts a proposition by assertively uttering s in a context c , one can report that assertion by assertively uttering **A said/asserted that s** in a related context c' . Let us suppose we have a case of this sort in which the agent asserted both the proposition p that is the semantic content of s with respect to c and some stronger proposition q as well. Let us suppose further that the semantic content of s in the original context c is the same as the semantic content of s in the reporting context c' . Then it would seem that the reporter's usage of **that s** in c' might be taken as designating p or as designating q . In other words, a person assertively uttering the attitude ascription might use the **that**-clause either to pick out the semantic content of s in the reporting context, or to pick out a different proposition q . Depending on which of these is selected, the reporter will be taken as claiming either that the agent asserted p or that the agent asserted q . (Soames 2002, 134).*

6.1 Introduction

This chapter is an attempt to reconcile sociopragmatics à la Mey (2001) with more philosophical approaches to indirect reports. The result is hybrid, but not one to be ashamed of. Indirect reporting is the testing bed for a socio-pragmatic theory and I will show that socio-pragmatics has something to say about constraints on reporting what one said.¹ In this chapter, I capitalize on advances made in the theory of indirect reports in a very fruitful paper by Norrick (2016).

In this chapter, I am mainly interested in seeing how the humor and wit by Luciana Littizzetto (or actor Benigni) could be applicable in a class situation. Luciana Littizzetto acted in a film in which she represented a school teacher who had an extremely good relationship with her students, over whom she had control through her irony. I tried to see what difficulties imitating Luciana Littizzetto's style in a real school would create.

¹ This is not to say that by investigating the problem of the socio-pragmatics of indirect reports we cannot say or we should give up the aim to say something general about the nature of communication and about the idea that rationality can have a strong impact on and at least partially determine or shape communicative practices.

Indirect reporting is a linguistic activity whose aim is to paraphrase what (typically) another person or (more rarely) the indirect reporter said on an occasion (usually, normally) prior to the speech report – that is to say an utterance reflecting the content of the original utterance,² although it is not as fine-grained as the original utterance (sometimes the paraphrase can be compressed into a **summary**). Reporting what another person said normally has a purpose, which is to inform the Hearer of a proposition *p* having some bearing on the future conduct or behavior of H or to criticize what the original speaker said (on account of its content or form). The speaker may use an utterance by a different person in the hope that the original speaker will be considered an authority and thus the hearer will accept the proposition associated with that utterance more easily (Kertész and Rákosi 2015). The report may occasionally be used as part of an argumentation and the proposition in the indirect report may support other propositions. The argumentative function of indirect reports is non-negligible and deserves being studied.

As I have said on a number of occasions, the relationship between direct and indirect reports is quite complicated (see Capone 2015a), as the boundary between the two practices has been considerably corroded. Indirect reports allow the expression of multiple voices (the original speaker's and the reporting speaker's) and sometimes the words of the original speaker are cited (clues may be mobilized to point to such words as coming directly from quoted speech). Indirect reports, though monologic turns similar to stories or mini-narrations, exemplify Cooren's insight that "many different types of actants populate the dialogic scene" (Cooren 2008, 24). The Hearer's (Herculean) task is to separate the reporter's voice from the original speaker's voice – pragmatic principles can be resorted to for this purpose, but there can also be more tangible clues in the context.

One of the problematic properties of indirect reports is that they summarize what was said transforming it to such an extent that sometimes the original speaker no longer recognizes his own words (and may end up objecting to the paraphrase). Furthermore, in summarizing things, she may end up deleting parts of the context of the original utterance.³ This is an aspect we will take into due consideration in this chapter, as the problem discussed is what happens when one reports non-serious speech in a literal way, giving the impression that it was seriously intended. If non-serious speech is a transformation of serious speech, surely reporting non-serious

²When one says that the report should somehow reflect the original utterance, one is implicitly admitting that the report must be a function of the original utterance and that there should be something quite general to be called the 'praxis of indirect reporting' allowing us to compute two related but not necessarily identical functions allowing us to move from the original utterance to the report and from the report to the original utterance. Specularity consists in the fact that, regardless of the distortion and deviation we allow into the system, the social practice will determine that the function of indirect reporting is mainly to let knowledge flow from one mind to another through the intermediary of the indirect reporter while at the same time providing a sketch of what the original speaker's mind had to be like at the time he proffered the utterance.

³This looks like a case in which a speaker loses control over what he says. In a sense it is true, as Cooren 2008 says that "communicating always consists of producing texts that function like machines, that is, that always operate without being totally controlled by their producers" (p. 25); however, speakers try to regain control over what they say by the mobilization of clues or by the mobilization of pragmatic principles.

speech in a literal way is a further transformation that goes into the opposite direction. The efforts made by the Hearer of the original speaker is thereby annulled by the efforts made by the reporter in deleting previous transformations as well as clues alerting the Hearer to those transformations (aspects of intonation or facial expression (see Wharton 2009)).⁴

6.1.1 *On the Dialogic Structure of Indirect Reports*

In a sense, we may be inclined to consider indirect reports narrations or mini-narrations. To avoid direct speech, the reporter surely has to compress his understanding of what happened (the story); he may even use a summary, finding that too many details would distract the hearer from the fulfillment of the real purpose of (uttering) the indirect report. The degree to which details are eliminated is a function of the purpose of the indirect report – anything that is not relevant to this purpose can be eliminated, because it would be distracting.

There are two dialogic dimensions to take into account in a typical indirect report or a typical event of indirect reporting: the dialogue between **S₀** and **S_r** (the original speaker and the reporter) and the dialogue between **S_r** and H (H could also be called H/S3, since he may in turn reply to the report (ask for clarifications, asking what the purpose of the report is, reacting to the content of the that-clause (“But this is not true/cannot be true because...”). Indirectly, there is also a dialogue going on, between **S₀** and H/S3, the mediator of which is **S_r**. (See Levinson 1988 for this type of footing). When the indirect reporter is also a messenger, the dialogue is intended (intentional). Although it is not a canonical dialogic situation, nevertheless there is a dialogue going on between **S₀** and H/S3 because unlike in the ordinary case of indirect reports, the **S₀** intends U to be utilized by H/S3, who is the intended recipient of U. In some cases, a reaction (reply) is also expected, and this can occur (and typically occurs again) through the messenger. The indirect reporter can merely be a reporter (someone who took the initiative to report the event of the utterance by **S₀** (despite **S₀**’s having no interest in being reported to H/S3) or a messenger. In case he merely happens to report something (without being caused to report U by **S₀** through some further utterance to the effect that U be reported), the dialogue is

⁴In order to explain what is going on here, it may be useful to use an example. Suppose that the original utterance is proffered in a context C. Context C contains elements X, X1, X2, X3, Xn, all relevant to the interpretation of utterance U. Somehow, we can represent X, X1, X2, X3, Xn as elements contained in a certain envelope. However, when the reporter passes the message U from S to H, he closes and seals the envelope containing the elements of the context determining (or enriching) the interpretation of U. The reporter passes another envelope containing U to the hearer, but he does not pass him or her the envelope containing the elements of the context. Thus, U cannot any longer be inspected by letting X, X1, X2, X3, Xn interact with U. All we have is U. If U is presented as if it only consists of a literal proposition, all the hearers have available is the literal proposition (and nothing else). They cannot have access to the envelope containing X, X1, X2, X3, Xn because the reporter has concealed that envelope. However, it is not to be excluded that in the future they might accuse the reporter of concealing important information which would have enriched and modified the (bare) proposition P communicated.

imperfect: H/S3 happens to know what **S₀** said, without **S₀**'s having had the intention to provide an initiation move (with respect to H/S3). There are similarities and differences between this situation and that in which H is an **overhearer**. The overhearer wants to know what **S₀** said – instead H/S3 may have no interest in knowing what **S₀** said. He may be told what **S₀** said, without being asked whether he would like to hear (but he may, of course, be asked for permission to report the utterance (“Do you want to know what **S₀** said?”)). The overhearer, furthermore, may react to what the other person says, although formally he has no permission to react (he may ask for permission or volunteer an utterance). The Hearer/S3 may react, but his reaction is normally only addressed to **S_r** – unless he asks **S_r** to act as an intermediary (messenger) and report his response to the utterance.

So far, we have concentrated on structural aspects which come to our help in exploring the issue of indirect reports in depth. However, we should clarify that reports may be of two types: solicited and unsolicited indirect reports. Solicited indirect reports add further structure to the event of reporting an utterance, because, this time, this will have to be seen not as an initiative action but as a reaction. (For this terminology, see Weigand 2009). Someone solicited the indirect report and the reporter complied with the request by providing the indirect report. This is what usually happened during Fascism, when spies were enrolled for the purpose of spying on Jews, politicians of the opposition, etc. This could also be done by the police these days or by people in positions of power who play a role in an organization and need to check that everything works well, including what people say about them or others. Now, this is important, because if someone comes to you and tells you ‘This is what X said: ...’, the utterance could be qualified as a reactive or as an initiative utterance. If reactive, then it is implicit that the reporter is saying something that was requested by the person in power. She would not report the utterance if nothing was wrong with it, but she would, if the utterance were to do the work of an accusation. Analogously, if someone comes to you and, out of the blue, reports someone else's utterance, there are chances that there is something amiss in the reported utterance (as nobody would dream of reporting an utterance if there was nothing amiss in it), and thus the report has to do the work of a criticism, or, alternatively, the reporter thinks that the utterance (especially the that-clause embedded in the verb of saying) will be informative to the Hearer (who becomes the beneficiary of the information). In either case, the reporter thinks the Hearer wants to know what was said (in the that-clause) and that the hearer will find the information in the that-clause useful (for some future action, to be planned). In either case, the reported person will be subject to evaluation: a) in the case in which he said something that hurt H, he is to be blamed; b) in the case in which he said something that benefited H, he is to be praised. In either case, the reporter has to be praised (or is motivated by the hope of praise), because he says something that is of interest to H.

6.1.2 *Non-serious Speech as a Transformation*

We normally expect people to speak seriously (You are lazy! I mean it seriously). This is the default interpretation of utterances: we do not stop and ask for each of the utterances we hear “Is the speaker speaking seriously (or not)?” (Dascal 2003; Capone 2011). This would make our life terribly difficult. So we get along with Dascal that the normal interpretation is that the speaker is speaking seriously.⁵ However, if there are cues concerning the discrepancy between what the words literally say and what the speaker’s intentions are, we may bother to look for further clues to the effect that there is a transformation. As Goffman would say, a transformation (in this case) is essentially one of footing. While the default expectation is that a speaker (in an ordinary every day speech situation) is a) the Principal; b) the author; c) the animator, in case there is a transformation and the footing is shifted, the speaker can be the animator and author (without being the Principal) of the words. He is the animator because he makes as if to say some words that *prima facie* belong to him (Grice 1989) (in other words he voices a message that does not come from him) and he is the author because nobody else is there to produce those words, to manufacture the utterance, because the style is his after all!⁶ Thus he is merely the soundbox (and author), while he distances himself from the person who utters the literal message. So now we have the speaker as a person with his own attitudes and another fictional person with attitudes different from the speaker’s. A teacher, who clearly wants to teach his students that no people should be discriminated against, treated as objects or treated as sub-humans, may dramatize the mentality of the nazi or of the neo-nazi by saying non-seriously ‘Ok why don’t we get rid of homosexuals and send them to gas-chambers’⁷ (at a point in which he has already

⁵ We normally presuppose that we are responsible for the things we say not only in the sense that we are ready to provide justification for what we say, but also in the sense that we exclude that there are voices (belonging to someone else) being inserted into our minds. Although my readers may find this digression funny and peculiar, it is not unusual to find people who have been indoctrinated by their parents, by their teachers or by society in general. Although nobody really questions the fact that the things people say might come from themselves (and claim that they might come from someone else), it is not extraordinary that people should act and say things according to a script because they know this is what is normal to do, what society wants or expects us to do. This is why it is really of importance to train the individual not only to accept the things he accepts but to look for and find alternatives to the things he accepts, in order to be able to compare the things he accepts with the things he might accept (even though he does not accept them at the moment); only in this way, does the individual really show himself to speak for himself, rather than for generic others who somehow managed to get implanted into his mind.

⁶ However, there is the possibility of implicit quotation, in which case part of the utterance could belong to author 1 (the speaker) and part of the utterance (the quoted utterance) could belong to Author 2 (the quoted author). (See Holt 2015 for the notion of implicit quotation).

⁷ This can be considered echoic, following suggestions by Relevance Theorists. One cannot deny that Italian culture (especially films or ordinary parlance) has bombarded Italians with the idea that homosexuals are despicable. It is difficult to count the victims of this culture – one need not send people to a concentration camp to eliminate them. One can simply instigate them to commit suicide. God knows how many young people have been the victims of this (self-perpetuating) culture.

explained what the Nazi's plan was). Clearly there must be abundant clues to dramatize the message in this way. Hearers have to understand that the speaker is ironic,⁸ that he is distancing himself from the mentality his utterance voices, and also that he is condemning such a mentality. Irony can be a way of (con)damning (to use a term by Davis 1998). But there must be clues that he is speaking non-seriously. His face must express contempt for the utterance and thus intentions have to speak through the face or gestures, rather than through the words (There must be a way to express that he is merely acting, and that can be done by making gestures much more prominent than would otherwise be, e.g. by looking upward rather than looking at the students (by which action the speaker is looking in a way that contrasts with face-to-face interaction, isolating the episode from the flow of daily interaction with the students (speaking as an actor does, in other words⁹)). By dramatizing the

In any case, the parlance of ordinary Italians is full of utterances expressing the idea that homosexuals would better die. This is what this hypothetical teacher is echoing. (On the one hand, the government officially condemns homophobia, on the other hand they do not do anything to prohibit slurs in films in which humor is achieved too cheaply).

⁸The purpose of irony may well be to condemn a certain view. Although the view is apparently voiced (though not asserted, to follow Davis 2016), the speaker makes clear that this cannot be his voice (he may even change the quality of his voice dramatically to point this out). Irony clearly puts the hearer to excessive processing efforts and it is this unnecessary dose of processing efforts to determine the condemnation of the view just voiced. By being ironic, the speaker is not expressing his views on the matter, but is forcing the hearers to form their own view and express their own condemnation of the view thus expressed. The ironic speaker somehow forces the hearers to adopt an active attitude, to be complicit in the condemnation of a certain view by co-authoring the act of condemnation. Recourse to implicit levels of meaning is, thus, to be seen as forcing the hearers to take responsibility in the production of the utterance that replaced the one actually proffered, in endorsing its condemnation of a certain view. Although the ironic speaker may predict that some of his hearers may refuse to participate in the act of condemnation (of a homophobic attitude), he proffers an utterance that is quite strong and involves consequences that are so serious that even a homophobic hearer may refuse to accept them. The speaker is confident that the irony is likely to lead them to reflect on how easy it is to adopt certain general attitudes of hatred and how easy it is to be responsible for repulsive actions. The speaker is implicitly arguing (there may be a tacit argument going on) that an act like sending homosexual to gas chambers is a consequence (and a natural one) of being homophobic. Since he anticipates that even the most homophobic hearers may not be inclined to accept the extreme consequences (sending homosexuals to gas chambers), he hopes that they will dissociate from the homophobic attitudes which are taken to naturally lead to them. Thus, the ironic teacher hopes that the hearers will dissociate from the consequences of the homophobic attitudes in the hope that they will consequently dissociate themselves from the premises which lead to the extreme consequences.

⁹It is of interest to me that Cooren (2008, 28) points to the notion of **incarnation** in an example in which a person expresses frustration through sighs, specific intonation, facial expression, etc. Here, instead, (in the teacher's discourse) the actant being incarnated is homophobia, which is dramatized and ventriloquized. The action of looking upward – that is to say avoiding eye-contact with the students – is a good way of incarnating Homophobia, which involves feeling superior and also involves treating some people as sub-humans. When we commit our worst actions we are not capable of looking into the eyes of the people we damage – thus looking upward is the best way of incarnating Homophobia. On the one hand, it can be considered as a marker of acting (fictional acting), on the other hand it can be considered as a marker of depersonalization – someone who makes something ignoble in a sense is acting (in a fictional way) because he is situating himself in

utterance, the teacher may want to let his students know how easy it is to make such judgments, that each of them, immersed in a culture similar to the Nazi one, would tend to behave in a way that conforms to the general mentality of the times. In a sense, the teacher is in the position of the ventriloquist, as he ventriloquizes another voice (an imaginary character having the characteristic of homophobia) but he is also ventriloquizing an actant like homophobia itself (to use a notion expressed in Cooren 2008).

Reporting such utterances may be problematic. Everyone knows the teacher is not homophobic, he is non-homophobic, and has probably made clear in some other part of the lecture that this is a lecture whose purpose is to defeat homophobia. Surely the students also have available in memory past lectures by the same teacher in which he expressed non-homophobic views and championed those views. Thus, a rational reconstruction of the episode at hand would be to reconcile the past views with the current ones. To preserve a veneer of rationality, students have to interpret the teacher's utterances as ironic and, also, as condemning homophobia. (This is what Kant would call 'transcendental unity of the ego'; also see the chapter on impure 'de se' thoughts).¹⁰ The students must have the competence to understand that the teacher is dramatizing an utterance in order to damn that utterance and the mentality which it represents (to use words by Davis 1998).

Although the students could pretend that the teacher was offending homosexuals, etc., in a fair analysis of the speech event, a number of clues have to be considered. But, of course, the problem is whether these clues can be reconstructed after some time and whether the students can be honest about such a reconstruction. If they pretend that the teacher was speaking seriously, they can also lie if pressed to furnish further details. What strikes me is that it is unlikely that the students would spontaneously provide the clues which militated in favor of a certain interpretation

a position which is de-humanized. He is acting in the sense that he is not being himself, but he is obeying voices which are not his own (like Nazi officials who obeyed orders in sending Jews to the gas chambers and thus abandoned their real 'selves' in fear of losing their 'selves').

¹⁰ In other words, in assessing the propositions presented by the speaker, the hearers cannot confine themselves to the *hic and nunc* of the conversation, but must open up files they held in memory and compare the things said now with the things said previously (in the teacher's past), to reconstruct the textual self. Reconstruction of this textual self may very well involve the elimination of contradictions, but this process of contradiction elimination is not usually done by deleting the things said in the past, although this could very well be done. In general, it is the past that is prioritized, as the speaker is able to construct a textual self that is coherent and extends in time (and is not confined to a single episode; thus, the single episode is probably not sufficient in itself to add to the picture so far constructed of the textual self). Why is it that the past, rather than the present, is prioritized? Is this something that flows from cognitive principles or is it flowing in any case from generalizations about communicative practice? One could very well admit that the present is more important than the past, in the sense that one has the right to change one's mind. So why is it that the past textual self and not the present one is chosen? (Of course, a superficial explanation is that while the past textual self is held in memory through assertions that are somehow categorized as 'serious', the present textual self is still under interpretation and it is not impossible that if the interpretation is an ironic one, the hearer may simply suspend his judgment). Hearers may very well take the textual self as one which was projected throughout a number of years and thus has had the opportunity to become sedimented and consolidated.

when the utterance was proffered, and thus they would have to be asked (say by the headmistress) whether certain clues were available:

What kind of facial expression did the teacher have?

What was his voice like?

Did the teacher make use of unusual gestures qualifying him as acting?

Was there a clash between propositions expressed in previous lectures and the current one (cue in the sense of Dascal 2003).

Was the speaker smiling or frowning?

So now it is clear that indirect reporting is not only a question of reporting words, but of reporting interpretation, and it involves the practice of inferring intentional meaning. While speaking non-seriously (in the teacher's case) involves a change of footing, (indirect) reporting involves reporting this change of footing and a summary of the transformations and the clues available. It occurs to me that, contrary to our habit of taking for granted that for every utterance there can be direct and indirect reports (and the reporter can choose which one to use), in this case (the teacher's utterance) direct reporting would be misleading unless accompanied by further narration (he did the following while uttering the words "...":...). And, if I am correct, this probably means that **only** indirect reporting can report what happened in the situation just described with considerable fidelity to the speaker's intentions.¹¹ To provide a further example, if there are two participants, A, B, A makes a request and B does not respond (a silence ensues), we could easily describe the situation as 'B said nothing' or 'B did not reply anything', but this would amount to a direct report disguised as an indirect report. A satisfactory indirect report would have to provide an interpretation of the silence. As Kurzon (2007) says, this silence could be interpreted differently, but one gets a specific interpretation in the specific context (B did not want to comply with the request, in an Anglo-American setting) and it would be fair to indirectly report what happened (that is to say the silence) through a paraphrase of the intended message.

6.1.3 *Reporting Non-serious Speech*

In this chapter, I examine the case of reporting non-serious speech concentrating on the implicit norms regulating such reports.

¹¹ A quantity implicature may be involved here. Given that, according to Levinson, what is not said is not said, if one reports an utterance U literally, it can be inferred that the speaker only said what is literally reported and nothing else. Thus, it must be excluded that further enrichments were made or were to be made in context.

Intuitively, the problem I am examining in this paper amounts to the following: Speakers use clues to project a certain non-serious meaning and expect hearers to use clues to understand the non-serious use of the utterance. They also expect to be reported by a non-literal statement. If they are so reported, they expect the reporter not to mention the literal words proffered, but will expect her/him to use a paraphrase of the words proffered that is not too distant from those words (or their content). Ideally, they would also expect the hearer of the indirect report to come to know that the words of the reporter are different from the words vocalized by the reported speaker. In other words, they would expect the reporter to furnish some clues as to what was said or as to how it was said.

I suppose that non-serious speech is a testing bed for indirect reporting. Serious speech, if it were not for NPs, which are particularly problematic, would not pose particularly serious problems for the activity of indirect reporting. However, non-serious speech is problematic because it requires clues for interpretation and such clues are not normally reported as such, although some of them could be reported, presumably ('He said that p, but he laughed in saying that' (these can be called 'annotative' aspects)). In this chapter, I shall propose that someone who has mastered the praxis of the language game of indirectly reporting speech is aware of the tricks involved in reporting speech in a quasi-verbatim way and knows that, unless the Hearer has clues available to decouple the words uttered from the intentions of the original speaker, literal indirect reports are highly misleading, as they are interpretatively ambiguous between a literal and non-literal interpretation (of the that-clause) and the hearer is not in a position to know which interpretation is intended. Presumably, the default interpretation of indirect reports is non-literal – and this helps the Hearer understand what the speaker's meaning of the original utterance is, as it avoids the proliferation of interpretations. Intuitively the social practice of indirect reporting involves constraints such as the following:

Non-serious Speech Injunction:

Do not (indirectly) report the literal meaning of an utterance if you know that the utterance had a non-literal meaning (according to the speaker's intentions) unless you know that the hearer has clues allowing her to reconstruct the intended meaning.

Instead, report what you take to be the original speaker's 'speaker' meaning by a paraphrase of what the original speaker said, which is not too distant from what the original speaker said.

Paraphrase the speaker's meaning by a locution which is understandable for the Hearer.

If possible, inject clues indicating that what is being reported is (only) a legitimate paraphrase of the original speaker's utterance which discards the literal words or does not use the original words (either because the original words cannot be remembered any longer or because it would be misleading to utter them).

We can arrive at the injunctions above in a number of ways. We probably arrive at them by generalizations on the practice of indirect reporting. We observe what is done and then conclude what must be done. Another, less direct way, is by elimination. Suppose we have the following injunction:

Unless required otherwise, always indirectly report what someone (or someone else) said by proffering what he literally said. In order to achieve maximal literality, report the words uttered verbatim or quasi verbatim after insertion of a complementizer such as 'that'.

An immediate consequence of accepting such a hypothetical injunction is that the hearer should always have to be in a position to distinguish whether the speaker spoke literally or, as often happens, non-literally. In other words, the indirect reporter has to be a quasi-direct reporter and, furthermore, has to transmit not only the words perceived but also the task of making sense of those words. This means that the reporter will most faithfully report the words, but will take no position as to matters of interpretation, but will instead pass on the interpretation problem to the hearer. Given that, very often, the hearer does not share the epistemic position of the speaker (the reporter) in that he has no access to the context of the original utterance, the speaker in addition to the task of coming to an interpretation, has to transmit the context, or at least part of it, so as to allow the interpretation work to be carried out independently. In a way, this amounts to behaving like one who pretends that he has not come to a plausible interpretation of the statement reported, while in fact, he has already come to a plausible and reasonable interpretation. Furthermore, given that, in fact, the reporter – despite his pretending that he has not interpreted the utterance – has indeed interpreted it, there is at this point the possibility that the speaker and the hearer will come to a different paraphrase. It is true that in certain (admittedly rare) cases, the contextual clues determining possible interpretation can be reported, but these clues may well interact with the world knowledge possessed by the speaker (the reporter) and the hearer. Differential world knowledge may lead to different increments in meaning on the part of the speaker and the hearer. Thus, it is quite possible for the speaker and the hearer to come to different interpretations of the indirect report. If we accept a principle for good reporting such as the Non-serious Speech injunction, at least we are spared the embarrassing case that the reporter and the hearer will be confronted with differential knowledge by reporting and by hearing the indirect report. Ideally, admitting that the indirect report actually reports a paraphrase is good, because at least the paraphrase by the reporter and what the hearer understands given the report are likely to be the same. This view of indirect reporting consists in making it clear that the reporter and the hearer, at the end of the report, are in the same epistemic situation. By abandoning the Non-serious Speech Injunction, there is no way of guaranteeing that indirect reporting is a way of contributing to shared knowledge, of adding presuppositions to the common ground, and of diminishing the possible asymmetry in epistemic terms between the reporter and the hearer. Intuitively, the purpose of an indirect report is to diminish the gap in knowledge (or the asymmetry in knowledge) between the speaker and the hearer. But by introducing a norm telling us to directly report everything we

hear, we, in fact, undermine the general purpose and utility of indirect reporting. Thus, we have proven that by the elimination of the Non-Serious Speech Injunction, we have arrived at a norm that undermines the function of indirect reporting. Given that we would still like to claim that indirect reporting is a way of creating a balance between the information possessed by the reporter and that possessed by the hearer and to fill the gap between them, we claim that the Non-Serious Speech Injunction should be accepted, for the time being.

Given the social practice of indirect reporting, a speaker (any original speaker) knows¹² that she is likely to be reported and that her words can be reported either literally or non-literally (that is, through paraphrase). If the speaker is speaking seriously, the indirect report cannot drastically alter what he said, unless it is not faithful. If the speaker speaks in a non-serious way, he knows that his words will be reported either literally or non-literally, that is to say through paraphrase. If they are reported literally, there is a problem, because the report is not necessarily faithful to the speaker's meaning. Strictly speaking, the reporter does not report a falsehood (but the reported speaker may legitimately claim that a falsehood was reported, which lends credibility to the idea that non-serious speech must be part of the explicature of an utterance), but may be misleading in crucial ways, because she may give the impression that the reported speaker is speaking seriously, while she is not. If her words are reported through paraphrase, there may be a problem, because this may not be the right paraphrase. The reporter may have captured or may have missed (or transformed) the speaker's intentions.

Now, consider again the Injunction:

In an indirect report, do not (indirectly) report the literal meaning of an utterance if you know that the utterance had a non-literal meaning (according to the speaker's intentions) unless you know that the hearer has clues allowing her to reconstruct the intended meaning.

¹² Although I say that a speaker knows that she can be reported either literally or non-literally, what I really mean is that she should know that this might happen. And she should know not this because she is inclined to detect fraud or attempts at misrepresenting her speech, but because our reflections and considerations as brought out in this chapter should alert any speaker to the fact that she faces this problem (or danger), that there is the possibility of being intentionally misrepresented. It is true that a speaker may well follow a principle of positive thinking and be optimistic about the possibility of finding other members of the community who take an interest in protecting her, but being exposed to experience involves being confronted with cases of manipulation of the information and it is, therefore, likely that a potential speaker will develop strategies aimed at protecting her textual self. Protecting one's textual self involves knowing that there may be conflicts of interest between the speaker and the hearers and that, if such conflicts prevail, there is no guarantee that the hearers (in practice) will be honest and will not manipulate the information transmitted in reporting her (although there certainly are norms likely to protect her textual self, or at least there should be).

This injunction, intuitively, it seems to me, makes opposite predictions with respect to the Paraphrase/Form Principle (and especially its consequences), which I previously embraced (In Capone 2010a, b, c, 2013a):

Paraphrasis/Form Principle

The that-clause embedded in the verb ‘say’ is a paraphrasis of what Y said, and meets the following constraints:

Should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer ‘that’ on account of its form/style. (Capone 2013a, p. 174)

6.1.3.1 Consequences of the Paraphrasis/Form Principle

Take the NPs present in the that-clause of reported utterance as if they were uttered by the original speaker. In other words, take the reporter to be faithful to the words of the original speaker.

This apparently efficient principle was discussed in Capone (2015a, b), where I examined the problems posed by slurring expressions (in the light of objections expressed by Wayne Davis (p.c)). Now, it seems clear to me that the Paraphrasis/Form Principle and its consequences, elaborated on as an answer to the notorious problems of NP substitutions, make predictions potentially antithetical to those made by the Non-serious Speech Injunction. An injunction says that the that-clause of the indirect report is only a paraphrase of what the original speaker said (a paraphrase which goes beyond the literal words uttered), the other says that although the that-clause of an indirect report is a paraphrase, at special loci, such as NPs, the original modes of presentations used by the original speaker are reported (an explicature is responsible for this, as I claimed in Capone (2010a, b, c)). Hence a Principle says that the level of literal meanings has to be abandoned, the other says that even in paraphrase literal meanings survive at certain crucial points. I predict it will not be easy to make the predictions compatible. Intuitively, we may either have to resort to the flexibility of a pragmatic theory, by ordering the two principles, or we may have to say that non-serious speech is a specific language game with its own rules (or principles). We need to be able to master the social practice (or praxis) of the language game speaking non-seriously and we have to make sure that, in translating, the language game is preserved (while collateral information may be given about the language game in question, through sentential adjuncts (‘Smiling, he said that he was going away from home’) or through coordination (‘He said that he was going to leave home, but he smiled’)). I cannot say in advance which step has to be taken, although I am fascinated by the idea that a pragmatic theory must have some flexibility. Inevitably, if this tack is taken, we need to say that the two practices (or

principles) are ordered, but then we need to explain why they are ordered (and give a rationale for this order and for why a reverse order is not expected). Furthermore, we need to see how the two principles relate to some unifying principle. (Ideally, we would also have to explain how two apparently opposite principles emanate from the same underlying principle). So, the enterprise is not easy, but we may be helped by analytically considering the problem and splitting it into smaller problems.

Let us consider the two Principles as interacting (at some stage):

6.1.3.2 Principle A

Paraphrasis/Form Principle

The *that*-clause embedded in the verb ‘say’ is a paraphrasis of what Y said, and meets the following constraints:

Should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer ‘that’ on account of its form/style. (Capone 2013a, p. 174).

6.1.3.3 Principle B

Non-serious Speech Injunction:

Do not (indirectly) report the literal meaning of an utterance if you know that the utterance had a non-literal meaning (according to the speaker’s intentions) unless you know that the hearer has clues allowing her to reconstruct the intended meaning.

Principle A says that indirect reports should provide a fair paraphrase of what was said and, in particular, should not change delicate words. In particular, NPs within the *that*-clause are delicate positions (but also Vs in VPs, to tell the whole truth). Principle A basically says that the NP used in the report should not be too distant from the NP used by the original speaker. Maximal fidelity would involve coincidence between the NP used by the original speaker and the one used by the reporter (unless there is a reason to choose a different NP, that is a reason to deviate from the practice). Principle A can be interpreted in a way that the reporter should have great respect for literal meanings. Principle B says that in cases of non-serious speech, the reporter should NOT report literal meanings (in case they clash with the non-literal interpretations).

Should we say that principle A is valid only for serious speech and Principle B only for non-serious speech? Saying this is not necessary, since Principle B applies to

non-serious speech. Thus a division of labor is created by the way principle B is formulated. Principle A claims respect for literal meanings just in case literal meanings coincide with speaker's meanings (See Dascal 2003 on the possible coincidence of literal meanings and speaker's meanings). This is something obvious, although perhaps we should make this explicit at this point. So, now we see that the two Principles can coexist side by side without many complications.

6.1.4 *Pre-pragmatics*

Gricean pragmatics ordinarily deals with conversational implicatures, that is to say with messages implicated on the basis of the meanings of the linguistic expressions used, where by 'meanings' we intend the meanings emanating from the semantics of linguistic expressions. This picture is not sufficient, because, as Grice was well aware, pre-pragmatics was involved in establishing the referents of pronominals or other NPs and in resolving semantic or otherwise interpretative ambiguities. Since Grice (1989), Relevance Theorists (Carston 2002; Sperber and Wilson 1986) have been happy to note that the (semantic) logical form associated with a linguistic expression is normally reduced to the bone, it is too schematic to be able to count as the full proposition expressed by a linguistic expression. At this point explicatures come into the picture to elucidate what has been said, that is to say the proposition uttered: here we have a large variety of explicatures, such as settling on the attributive/referential interpretation (another case of interpretation of NPs), resolution of ellipsis, assignment of quantifiers to a domain of quantification, resolution of interpretative ambiguities in conjunctions, assignment of modes of presentations to NPs or propositions in belief reports and indirect reports, etc. The most important case of explicature is the assignment of a serious intention to the speaker who uttered the sentence. We have to decide case by case whether, in uttering S (or u (S)), the speaker was speaking seriously or not – he was joking for example. If he was speaking seriously, then one (the hearer, for example) could say whether the utterance he made was true or false. If the speaker did not speak seriously, the question of truth or falsehood does not arise. One cannot straightforwardly say 'That is false'. Clearly, speaking in a non-serious way is a different language game. I can say 'You are very clever', meaning 'You are fundamentally stupid'. But even if an interpretation is assigned to the utterance, one would hesitate before saying 'That is true'. What is true, the literal meaning or the intended meaning? The pronominal 'That' will give rise to an interpretative ambiguity, as the literal meaning interpretation is obviously false, while the intended meaning interpretation is clearly true, but it is one which the speaker could easily deny. So we are faced with a language game that is completely different from the one we are confronted with in serious assertions.

There is probably a hierarchy of interpretations, and I would like to claim that Hearers go for a serious interpretation by default, although they are attentive to the presence of cues (Dascal 2003) leading the interpretation process in a different direction, while clues will allow the hearer to form a plausible hypothesis about the

details of the speaker's intentions. So, unlike generalized implicatures/explicatures, explicatures determining the seriousness of the speaker's intentions are not unreflective, but, on the contrary, rely on the hearer's analysis of the text, of the cues available, and of the context in which the interaction is embedded (for example, details such as a smile on the speaker's face are of some relevance to the interpretation process) (see Davis 1998; Cummings 2009). If a speaker smiles when she speaks, then there is a cue as to how her speech is to be taken, which may be combined with other available clues to furnish an interpretation.

6.1.5 *Clues and Non-serious Utterances*

Non-serious speech is a language game (Wittgenstein 1952), with its own rules. The person who speaks in a sense dissociates herself from the words uttered. Following Goffman 1981, the speaker could be author, principal, and animator. The principal is the person responsible for the words uttered; the author may or may not coincide with the principal, because the principal may have been assisted by someone else in formulating his/her speech. In the case of non-serious utterances, the speaker utters some words, but is only an animator; the words do not belong to him, but to someone else who uttered them at a different time or who is likely to utter those words. Thus the speaker has to find a way to signal that he is dissociating himself from the words he utters in his capacity as animator. A typical way of distancing oneself from the words uttered is by smiling in such a way that the hearers can recognize that the speaker intends them to recognize that he is smiling on purpose (see Wharton 2009). Other cues signaling the dissociation may be the fact that it is highly unlikely that the speaker may utter those words, as they conflict with statements the speaker uttered before in his life (cues, in the sense of Weizman and Dascal 1991). Another cue is that the words point to beliefs which in general are hard to accept. But now, if the speaker voices a message by uttering literal words that do not convey the real message he wants to get across, what is his real message? The Hearer must rely on context (contextual clues) to arrive at a plausible intended interpretation. So we have U1, which is the utterance actually proffered by the speaker and U2, which differs markedly from U1. In this section I compare a hypothetical utterance by Benigni with the situation already discussed in which a teacher in school ironically proffers an utterance which is reprehensible at the literal level. Consider a hypothetical utterance by famous actor Benigni, who is well known for uttering non-serious sentences. Suppose he says 'Ok let us send all homosexuals to Auschwitz'. How is the utterance to be taken? Surely we know pretty well that Benigni is left-winged and would never utter such a sentence, himself. However, we may take him to voice the opinion of many right-winged persons, whose hatred for homosexuals may be so intense that they may want to eliminate them or get rid of them or segregate them (For many years Berlusconi and his right-winged allies represented a position close to this). So his aim in uttering the sentence (in a non-serious way) is to let us reflect on the fact that there are people who, in fact, would utter the sentence

in a serious way or would say things that are similar enough; he would let us understand that he condemns such people (and such opinions); he would let us understand that we need to dissociate ourselves from such people and behave differently from them. Now we can fully grasp how rich pragmatics is, because with one utterance he will do at least three things, including aiming at a perlocutionary effect. The perlocutionary effect (if there is a single one) may be described as ‘changing people’s mentality’ and is entirely obtained through non-conventional means much in the way predicted, for the majority of utterances.¹³ The extra difficulty presented by non-serious messages is that the illocutionary purpose must be deduced not on the basis of the words uttered but *DESPITE* the words uttered.

Reporting such utterances in indirect report is not easy. Since Benigni always speaks humorously it is unlikely that someone will interpret him literally and will construe a literal indirect report on the basis of the words he uttered. However, suppose a teacher in the course of a class wants to use a technique similar to Benigni (as in our previous example); will there be the risk that some student will report him literally? Surely the principle of Prudence is available to the teacher, as he may realize that someone in the class (with bad feelings against him) could use the utterance against him. However, if the majority of students has perceived his intention to use the utterance in a non-serious way, because he has distanced himself from the utterance by sufficient cues and clues, there should not be a problem (or so we hope).

How does Benigni’s situation compare with the situation of the teacher who runs the risk of being misreported by his students? The language games are obviously different. In the case of Benigni, everybody knows he is an actor and that he is acting. In saying what he says, Benigni is being categorized as acting, and *NOT* through inference. There is no need for a reflective inference (a convention of use may be enough in this case): Benigni is a comical actor and everything he says is interpreted within the frame of a) an event of acting; b) an event of comical acting. Instead, the teacher has to modify the frame. He has to change the frame in which he speaks (teaching) and transform it (at least temporarily) into another frame (provisionally acting). (He may invoke the frame of a famous actor, Luciana Littizzetto, who impersonates a very good school teacher and constantly uses irony to have control over her student’s actions). The teacher has to disseminate abundant clues so that the students

¹³ One thing which is of importance, which I neglected to say, is that in addition to the messages projected by the ironic utterance (and its functions), the ironic segment projects some strong presuppositions. The speaker says this, albeit ironically, because he is firmly persuaded that there are people who would say things like this. If nobody really said things like this, using an ironic utterance of this type would be terribly uneconomical because it would put the hearer to heavy processing efforts with no purpose. Although I admit this is not the standard way of discussing and explaining presuppositions, Macagno and I (2016) have written a paper in which we dwelled on the interaction between presupposition and implicature (or explicature). I do not want to say that such considerations are conclusive, but our example here seems to be a demonstration that we are on the right path. Presuppositions are clearly things which are at issue in this kind of discourse and the aim of the utterance is to exorcise them in one way or the other. On the one hand the utterance invokes presuppositions, on the other hand its aim is to reverse them.

will know that the frame has changed. However, the teacher has to be so clever as to insert a different frame (acting) into a previous frame (teaching) and the result must be one according to which the students know that the teacher is acting because he wants to teach them something by acting.

6.1.6 The Principle of Prudence

Since there is the possibility that hearers, however attentive and competent, either will not notice that the speaker was not speaking seriously or will pretend they did not realize that she was speaking seriously, a speaker is always in danger of being reported (directly and indirectly) in an unfaithful way. A strategy the reporters may use to furnish an unfaithful report that looks like a faithful one is to delete all cues and clues that were conducive to the non-serious interpretation. This transformation, to be called **DELIBERATE DELETION**, is not different from what happens when a detective goes to the scene of the crime and tinkers with the evidence available, deleting finger prints or removing a blood-stained handkerchief or removing (or modifying) a weapon. Those clues were clearly of importance for establishing the truth, but their deliberate removal creates havoc, as now the other detectives will be deliberately misled and will be driven towards different directions. Obviously, cancelling the evidence available on the crime scene is not licit; so why should the same action be done with indirect reports? The parallel points to the fact that when, in reporting, clues are eliminated with the intention of deliberately misleading the hearer, there is an evil intention on the part of the reporter. (And there is something inappropriate about this). The reporter knows well that the original words were uttered with a non-serious intention, that the cues and clues available militated in favor of a non-serious intention, thus when he deletes the clues, he knows in the first place that those clues are important and wants to mislead the Hearer who will be led to consider only the literal words, as if the literal words were all that was there to be looked at.

Now, a non-serious speaker knows that all this might happen and that he may be misquoted by being literally quoted and, thus, might take steps to indicate that he is non-serious (look, I am joking). Alternatively, he has to abide by a principle of Prudence:

6.1.6.1 Principle of Prudence

In case you do not know whether the Hearer is unable to distinguish your intentions or you do not know whether the Hearer will deliberately use transformations to delete all cues and clues available in the context (that were utilized by the speaker), thus being ready to report an utterance verbatim, although it was not intended to be available for verbatim report, AVOID speaking non-seriously.

Now it strikes me that interpretatively ambiguous utterances and non-serious utterances alike need a protection clause of this type. This is not surprising because non-serious utterances are specific cases of interpretative ambiguities. There was a period in Italy's history in which Berlusconi said that the opposition was disseminating hatred among ordinary people by incitements to violence. According to Berlusconi, a sentence such as 'Dobbiamo liberarci di Berlusconi' (We have to get rid of Berlusconi) could be considered as incitement to violence, because one of its interpretations (admittedly the pejorative¹⁴ interpretation) "could be" 'Let us get rid of Berlusconi by eliminating him physically'. Now, it is not clear to me how much truth there is in these claims, which amount to transforming all metaphorical expressions into pejorative interpretations through some kind of paranoid logic. However, there is some truth, as Berlusconi was the victim of a physical assault by a person with mental disorders. Thus, in a sense it is true that dissemination of hatred through metaphors can be conducive to violence (we could call this phenomenon 'instigation to political violence through metaphors'). Now if there is a grain of truth in all this, it is clear that those who speak should be aware of their responsibility and that they can be interpreted as threatening a given person by metaphorical extension. Thus they should abide by the Principle of Prudence and avoid uttering expressions interpretable in a pejorative way.

The Principle of Prudence may be a consequence of a more general principle: Avoid ambiguities. If an utterance is ambiguous, we put the Hearer to undue processing efforts. The hearer may well analyze all clues available and come to a satisfactory interpretation of the utterance. However, not all utterances are ambiguous to the same extent as 'John went to the bank' where all the hearer needs to ask (and reply to) is: which bank? The financial institution or the river bank? Some utterances pose difficult interpretative ambiguities not to be resolved through answers to a wh-question. Furthermore, the cases we have discussed are difficult not because an interpretative ambiguity is at stake but because a judgment on the speaker crucially depends on the interpretation of the utterance. If a certain interpretation is accessed, one can be lenient to the speaker; otherwise the speaker can be accused of disseminating racial hatred. So the Principle of Prudence is not simply a sub-case of a more general case (Avoid ambiguities), because much more is at stake in indirectly reporting what was said in the case of non-serious speech. Here prudence is not something that comes from outside (say from a social constraint, following Kurzon 2007), but something that comes from inside. The speaker considers the consequences of what he is about to say, and arrives at the conclusion that it is not worthwhile incurring such severe consequences just for the sake of freedom of speech or of the pleasure of carrying out his mission. The Principle of Prudence weighs the negative consequences of what the speaker says (and of the way he is going to be reported) against the positive consequences of what he says (countering racial hatred). The speaker may well opt for self-preservation since the positive consequences do not outweigh the negative consequences. (On the contrary, by keeping to the safe side, the teacher may well proceed in his positive mission).

¹⁴Or paranoid.

6.1.7 *A Real Case*

Below, I report a real case as illustration of the difficulties arising from cases of reports of non-serious speech. Teacher A. is confronted with an anomalous situation. Out of the blue, in the course of ordinary activities such as writing a written summary of a text by Jane Austen, a student starts narrating a story about his desk-mate, who was on a school trip with him and (presumably) shared the same room (in the hotel). He says that his desk-mate was alone with a girl in the room for several hours but did not have an erection (the language used was rather vulgar, in fact). Presumably – although this was never said – his desk-mate was naked in the room (the girl too probably)¹⁵ and the person telling the funny story had access to the room (as he came back and forth). To start with, the teacher was incredulous, but then he realized that a vulgar story had been told. He sarcastically said (smiling) ‘This class looks like a pornography laboratory’. There was no reaction on the part of the class. The speaker’s intention was non-serious. He did not literally say that the class was a laboratory of pornography – there was clearly some exaggeration in the statement and he also marked his statement by smiling, categorizing it as a non-serious statement. The class was shocked by the fact that the teacher thought it necessary to write a report on the class journal of what the student had done. In reaction to his action, the student persuaded the class to complain with the headmistress about the “offensive” statement on the part of the teacher.

There is something snide in what the students did. They reported the speaker as having offended them, that is they pretended that they understood that he teacher was speaking in a serious way – when, in fact, he was speaking non-seriously, his intention only being to utter a mild rebuke for the action and (hyperbolically) using an utterance in a non-literal way. The transformation done by the students was obviously illicit: they reported a non-serious intention as if it was a serious intention. They eliminated markers such as the teacher’s smiling or the teacher’s tone of voice. They discarded all contextual signals to the effect that the teacher had gone for a hyperbolic statement. The class – as a whole – had not indulged in creating pornography. The action the statement was a reaction to was not an act of making pornography. The statement, thus, was obviously false. It only related indirectly to the offensive act and it sounded like a (mild) rebuke uttered through a non-serious speech act (detectable through clues such as the teacher’s smiling while he said that). By exaggerating, the speaker was signaling that his intention was not serious. Nevertheless he drew attention to the offensive act. There is another problem in the transformation effected by the class. The domain of quantification at the literal level is the class. However, at a non-literal level it is the sub-set of the class (the person who uttered the offensive speech act).

The report in question is illicit because it is based on a deliberate transformation of the speech act by a suppression of its cues (discrepancy between what is the case

¹⁵ We infer this through inference.

and the report) and the clues (teacher's smile; tone of voice; relation between the teacher's assertion and the action it is a reaction to).

In the interpretation of the teacher's speech act, an important clue is the relation (or pertinence) between the teacher's action and the speech act it was a reaction to. The speech act by the teacher has to be seen as a reaction to the speech act by the student – thus it cannot be considered a rebuke to the whole class (it could not be intended seriously as a rebuke to the class; hence the teacher could not have wanted to offend the whole class). Another important clue to the right interpretation is the transformation **generalization** often adopted in school situations. Generalization is a transformation according to which an offense to an individual is an offense to the community to whom the individual belongs and an offense to the community to whom the individual belongs is an offense to the individual. By extension, generalization is a transformation according to which an offense by an individual is an offense by the community to whom the individual belongs. Thus, according to such transformations, an insult to Italians would be an insult to me and insult to me could be seen as an insult to Italians (as I belong to the class of Italians). Analogously, if I steal a book that can be taken as an offence not by an Italian but by Italians. If generalization works, then the teacher's utterance 'This class is a laboratory of pornography' has to be considered a generalization – the teacher obviously refers to the individual who has made the offence rather than to the class but implies that the class is involved in the offence (because it is the place where the offence occurred or because it has been affected somehow by the offence). He may furthermore mean that the class is complicit because in failing to object to the act they accepted its presuppositions, namely that it is licit or should be licit to produce obscene remarks in a classroom setting.

So, it is clear at this point that in reporting the utterance, the class is not taking into account the transformation of the type GENERALIZATION.

So what should we make of this story? The point is that the teacher uttered something to be intended as a joke (which nevertheless had to have the perlocutionary effect of making the culprit reflect on what he had done) but was transformed, in indirect reporting, into a serious utterance by deletion of cues and clues and by the suppression of the reflective inferences needed in working out that the utterance could not have been produced with a serious intention. Of course, the suppression of the reflective inferences was not explicit, but it nevertheless occurred because by reporting the utterance as if it was a serious one, they implicitly denied that such reflective inferences could be calculated.

Given that a joke can be transformed into something which is not a joke, indirect reporting presents some dangers to the reported person, because he runs the risk of seeing the cues and clues related to his utterance cancelled completely (in so far as they are not reported). The context of the utterance could also be deleted – thus if the utterance were reported verbatim out of the blue, the teacher would run the risk of being considered mad by the headmistress. Reporting jokes by deleting the context is a serious **sin** (we could call it the **sin of deletion** of clues – because, once it

is decontextualized, the action is deprived of any purpose. There is nothing more efficient than presenting someone as a mad person through an indirect report the context of which was suppressed.

But how could the teacher defend his case?

The teacher could clearly ask the students (each student) to report the words verbatim. He could clearly ask the students to provide the context antecedent to the teacher's original utterance. He could ask the students to confirm or deny that some cues were available. He could ask the students whether they noticed certain clues (e.g. the fact that he was smiling, that he had a certain tone of voice, etc.). He could ask if the students were aware of the fact that there was no relation between their general conduct and the teacher's remark and of the fact that there was a connection between the teacher's remark and the conduct by one of the students. The teacher could finally make the students admit that the remark was intended only for the student who had created a problem and not for the rest of the class.

The teacher however, has no certainty that he can prove his case. Therefore, he knows that in the future he should abide by the Principle of Prudence. One should not utter a non-serious utterance if one does not want to run the risk of being reported through a literal (verbatim) report (of what one said).

Now we need to go back to my initial considerations about the dialogic structure of indirect reports. Suppose that the students go to the headmistress to report what the teacher said (about homosexuals and gas chambers). This is not a reactive move, but an initiative move, because the Headmistress did not solicit the report (she never dreamed of telling her students to spy on her teachers). Since indirect reports of the initiative type can be divided into two categories (accusations; provision of useful information orienting H's future action (information beneficial to H)), the headmistress has to decide how the indirect report is to be used. The information provided (in the that-clause of the indirect report) is obviously not beneficial to her (personally; or even to her qua headmistress, because it only means trouble and perhaps having to think of sanctions). Thus, the alternative interpretation is that it is an accusation. Now, given that it is an accusation, she knows that in principle she has to defend her teacher (as well as protect her students), and thus the minimum she should find out is whether the utterance was uttered seriously or as a joke, and if it was a joke, she should find out whether it had a function in the context of the lecture (irrelevance would be a fault, in itself, since the teacher ran a risk (of being misunderstood) for nothing); worse, if the joke was not related to a didactic purpose, it would reveal the teacher's madness. But now, given the initiative function of the indirect report, and given that it was intended as an accusation, it requires a reactive move, one by the headmistress and one by the teacher in question (who has to defend himself). The dialogic structure of indirect reports is of interest, because the report must have a function and its function may reveal its weaknesses. The Headmistress may find out that the students reported the utterance literally despite there being plenty of evidence that it was not to be intended literally. Given that it

works as an accusation, the Headmistress has a duty to find out whether it was intended literally or not. Thus, we have intercepted yet another Principle related to the practice of indirect reporting:

The Hearer's Duty

The hearer of an indirect report has the duty to ascertain whether the reported utterance was intended to be literal or whether it was said as a joke (or as part of a joke). Furthermore she has duty to understand whether the reporter is transforming the utterance (reported) by deliberate deletions of the transformations (cues and clues), given that the report has been provided as part of an accusation.

6.1.8 Differences Between Non-serious Speech and Speech Acts in Context

One might say, "After all, non-serious speech is not very unlike speech acts in context". Here too literal meaning is not what has to be reported. The cases look pretty similar, but the similarity ends when it comes to reporting them. And we immediately see that there is a difference in the way speech acts in general and jokes or sarcastic remarks (in particular) are reported (or are to be reported). When you report a speech act, you can choose between a literal or non-literal report. The literal report places the inferential onus on the Hearer. The Hearer has to embed the speech act into the original context (or what can be reconstructed out of the original context, after the report) in order to extract a non-literal meaning. Of course, in order to search the context (or reconstruct the context), he must have some cue or clues to the effect that a non-literal meaning is intended. However, the search for the context can start as a default, because we all know that utterances acquire meaning augmentations in context. Anyway, reporting a speech act as a literal speech act does not do much harm. Consider the examiner at a University exam. We can report him this way:

He asked a difficult question.

Of course, in the context of the exam, the question is never a genuine question but is a questioning, that is an act of examining a student. But we are not completely distorting the speech act when we report it by saying 'He asked a difficult question' as asking a question in this context means examining a student; everyone knows that. Thus we can go on reporting the speech act as asking a question.

When we report an ironic, a sarcastic utterance or a joke, by reporting the literal words, we deliberately mislead the Hearer into thinking that what was done was only describable in the way we have described it. In other words, we mislead the Hearer into believing that the speaker just said what he said and did not do more or mean more. The reason why we do this is that we manage to cancel cues and clues.

6.2 Conclusion

In this chapter I have focused on the liabilities we incur when we speak non-seriously as in jokes because we run the risk of being reported and we also run the risk of being reported literally, that is to say through a deliberate cancellation of the clues we exploited to get it home to the hearer that we were making a joke or were being sarcastic, etc. Jokes can be used by teachers as pedagogical devices, to draw the students' attention to the consequences of an action (in the paper we concentrated on dissemination of awareness of racial hatred). While non-serious speech can be a way of dramatizing and showing the negative effects of homophobia, the teacher runs the risk of being reported as having said something homophobic – in other words he can be reported through a direct report that eliminates all clues indicating the transformation (and change of footing). I therefore proposed a Principle of Prudence. Whether the teacher (or anyway the person uttering non-serious speech) should opt for the Principle of Prudence depends on the situation. We made a distinction between the liabilities (hypothetically) incurred by actor Benigni when he uses the same didactic method in order to defeat homophobia and the liabilities incurred by a teacher at school. Benigni, qua actor, speaks within a certain frame, which is given. The teacher, instead, has to create his own frame (acting) and such a frame should coexist with the given frame (teaching). Thus the language game is much more complicated in the teacher's case.

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Chapter 7

Indirect Reports and Slurring

According to Vološinov (1971), there is a tension between two indirect discourse practices; one in which the reported message's integrity is preserved and the boundaries between the main message and the embedded reported message are formally marked and one in which such boundaries are dissolved as the reporting context allows the reporting speaker to intrude to a greater extent and transform the message by stylistic interpolations. This tension is clearly resolved, in the context of this chapter on indirect reports, through the recognition of pragmatic principles assigning default interpretations (according to which the boundaries between the reporting message and the reported message are clearly visible and the reported speaker's voice prevails at least within the embedded message), while allowing context to create priorities sometimes overriding the default interpretations and making the otherwise costly violations of pragmatic principles worthwhile by facilitating the information flow and subordinating it to the exigencies of the embedding context.

7.1 Introduction

The practice of indirect reporting involves a mixture of serious and non-serious use, as, on the one hand, this practice involves transformations in the sense of Goffman (1974),¹ on the other hand it involves using language in the context of a serious activity, such as describing what another person said. The practice of indirect reporting is sensitive to contextual information and, thus, it goes without saying that the richer the cues and clues allowing speakers to interpret transformations, the more complex are the transformations involved in the indirect reports. And the more complex the transformations are, the greater the need for a decoupling principle along the lines of Clark and Gerrig (1990):

¹For example, shifts from serious to non-serious or depictive uses.

Speakers intend their addressees to recognize different aspects of their quotations as depictive, supportive, and annotative.

Mutatis mutandis, we can apply the Decoupling Principle to indirect reports:

Speakers intend their addressees to recognize different voices belonging to the indirect report and, in particular, to separate voices attributing them to the original source, the current speaker (the indirect reporter) or some other person involved in context. They also intend addressees to recognize supportive and annotative aspects.

To make the considerations above less cryptic, I note that *supportive* aspects in one way or the other allow the speaker to make the indirect report. For example, the reporter may use English to report a Latin utterance. This use of English is clearly supportive and NOT depictive (of course, hearers have pragmatic ways to decouple such aspects). *Annotative* aspects are those which are noted, without serving a principal purpose in the practice of reporting (for example I can note that the original speaker was giggling while using a certain word). Annotative aspects provide clues for the interpretation of the speech act.

By using Clark and Gerrig's terminology, I have already considerably departed from the standard practice of considering indirect and direct reports neatly differentiated. Clark and Gerrig themselves consider the two practices as neatly separated, because quotation prevalently makes use of depictive aspects of language use while indirect reports make use of descriptions. Presumably, using Clark and Gerrig's terminology, there are other reasons for keeping the two practices distinct. Clark and Gerrig (p. 771) note that quotation involves both serious and non-serious language use. It involves serious language use in that the quoted item is syntactically an NP; it involves non-serious language use in that the quoted item is syntactically a sentence (S) and, thus, depictive elements prevail. Presumably, by Clark and Gerrig's standards, indirect reports should only involve serious uses of language, since only NPs are involved here, rather than sentences intended in their depictive sense. However, we all know that indirect reporting is very often a **polyphonic** practice where the hearer's main task is to separate voices attributing them to different actors. Even if we accept Clark and Gerrig's terminology, it is universally recognized that there are what are often called 'mixed quotations', that is to say cases of indirect reports where some segments are quoted. Mixed quotations are considered relatively rare cases – while the point of my discussion is that they should be considered as prototypical cases of indirect reports and that indirect reports in general should be modeled after mixed quotations (see Capone 2010a).

I have already said that indirect reports are interpreted in context. However, here the term 'context' is ambiguous, because, strictly speaking, at least two types of context should be relevant to the interpretation of indirect reports: the context of utterance (of the original speaker) and the context of utterance (of the indirect reporter). There is often an interesting interplay between the two. We should note

from the beginning that chronological considerations are important in ranking the two contexts and that the context of utterance (of the reporting speaker) is the departure point from which interpretation starts; therefore, it is often useful to bear in mind what the purpose of the indirect report is or might be.

When we deal with the purpose of an indirect report, we are implicitly discussing the theory of knowledge. This is the point where a theory of knowledge and a theory of communication intersect, since knowledge often is and must be transmitted and its transmission can be effected only by means of speech acts. Indirect reports are cases in which you transmit knowledge of what another person said and what another person said is the only way or one of the ways in which you can gain knowledge about a certain situation or event *s*. The situation is clearly different from that of perception, where the only mediating elements are the perception system and certain *a priori* principles of knowledge. In indirect reports, the situation *s* is transformed two times: once by the original speaker and then by the reporting speaker. So, the task of the hearer is clearly inferential; how to delete possible transformations and how to get (back) to *s* without the interference of possible transformations. This is clearly a task requiring pragmatics. If the hearer of the indirect report is interested in the indirect report mainly because it allows her to have access to *s*, the reporting speaker knows this and may very well take this into account in her treatment of the information concerning the original utterance. So we may grant that at least part of the transformations may be shaped by the desire to meet H's interests in getting to know *s*. Other transformations may be independent of H's interests H or may conflict with them. Just to mention a case, consider the reporter who said: 'John said that the bus for Oxford is on the left when you get out of the airport'. In this interpretation process, it is crucial that the perspective be the same. And that must be: passenger getting out of the airport. If the perspective adopted in the indirect report was different from the one adopted in the original utterance, confusion would ensue. Thus, we exclude that the perspective could be: relatives waiting for the passenger out of the airport. If, for some reason, the indirect reporter transformed the utterance without taking into consideration the hearer's interests, an uninterpretable utterance would result (or to be more precise an utterance providing misleading information would result). As an upshot of this, the purpose of the indirect report must prominently feature among the factors to take into account in the interpretation as well as in the production of indirect reports. Let us, provisionally, consider the basic structural elements that go into an indirect report.

Context 1 (original speaker)

Context 2 (reporting speaker)

Context 3 (addressee)

Decoupling Principle

Separate the original speaker's from the reported speaker's voice. Establish which portions of the text have a directly pictorial function.

Separate those parts which have a supportive or an annotative function.

In doing so, take into account the following.

Purpose 1 (original speaker)

Purpose 2 (reporting speaker)

Purpose 3 (addressee).

Point of view 1 (Original speaker)

Point of view 2 (reporting speaker)

Point of view 3 (addressee).

Now that the structural components of the practice of indirect reports are in place, we can expect that a theory of indirect reports could be objectively built on this basis.

7.1.1 Davidson on Indirect Reports

In this chapter, I am not after the logical form of indirect reports. I am mainly after a pragmatic treatment based on the notion of the language game. However, I will briefly mention Donald Davidson's treatment of the logical form of indirect reports because it is the treatment that best accords with my view of indirect reports as language games. According to Davidson a sentence such as:

(1) John said that Mary is in Paris

is to be accounted for, truth-conditionally, by the following logical form:

John said that. Mary is in Paris.

In other words, Davidson asks us to consider a proposal according to which the complementizer 'that' disappears from logical form, being replaced by the pronominal 'that'. A propos of this, Davidson briefly mentions historical considerations on the development of the complementizer 'that' from the pronominal 'that'. Now, I am aware that there is a strand of research that builds on Davidson's proposal (sometimes aiming to ameliorate it, sometimes aiming to destroy it; see Rumfitt 1993). But as in this chapter I am mainly interested in the language game 'indirect report' and in the pragmatics of indirect reporting, I will skip such discussions. I will nevertheless rehearse considerations by Davidson, which are now very popular in philosophy:

We tried to bring the flavor of the analysis to which we have returned by rewording our favorite sentence as "Galileo uttered a sentence that meant in his mouth what 'The earth moves' means now in mine". We should not think ill of this verbose version of "Galileo said that the earth moves" because of apparent reference to a meaning ("What the earth moves means"), this expression is not treated as a singular term in the theory. We are indeed asked to make sense of the a judgment of synonymy between utterances, but not as foundations of a theory

of Language, merely as an unanalyzed part of the content of the familiar idiom of indirect discourse. The idea that underlies our awkward paraphrase is that of samesaying: when I say that Galileo said that the earth moves, I represent Galileo and myself as samesayers. (Davidson 1968, 140).

Now, extrapolating what seems to me to be the most interesting part of this excerpt, I would like to emphasize that for Davidson it was clear that *oratio obliqua* is a discourse involving multiple voices. The mouths uttering the words belong to different persons. The sentences actually uttered, as far as Davidson is aware, may very well be different provided that the two utterances are semantically equivalent, that is to say their imports are truth-conditionally equivalent. There are two voices, two points of view involved, and an indirect report is, obviously, a transformation of the original utterance. Baldwin (1982, 273) claims that a defect standardly attributed to Davidson's formulation of the theory is that it seems to imply that there is one more utterance besides the utterance 'The earth moves'. This, which from a philosophical point of view, counts as a defect (to be remedied anyway, if we follow the discussion in Baldwin), is not necessarily a defect from a linguistic point of view as it makes us see that the case of indirect reports (and its logic) depends on the tension between the reported speaker's and the reporter's voice. It is no surprise that there may be two utterances, whose content is fundamentally the same, although parts of it, those parts which do not count for the provision of an extensional semantic theory of indirect reports, need not be the same.

The considerations by Davidson on p. 143 are not equally famous, but in my opinion they lead to a view of indirect reports as language games, in the study of which pragmatics is prevalently or at least substantially involved:

We would do better, in coping with this subject, to talk of inscriptions and utterances and speech acts, and avoid reference to sentences. For what an utterance of "Galileo said that" does is announce a further utterance. Like any utterance, this first may be serious or silly, assertive or playful, but if it is true, it must be followed by an utterance synonymous with some other. The second utterance, the introduced act, may also be true or false, done in the mode of assertion or play. But if it is as announced, it must serve at least the purpose of conveying the content of what someone said. (Davidson 1968, 143).

At this point we notice that Davidson has touched on a deep issue – the content of indirect reports may be determined pragmatically. So, it is possible that the utterance *x* following "Galileo said that" may be synonymous with an utterance which is not truth-conditionally equivalent to *x*, but can be made pragmatically equivalent to *x*, say through pragmatic intrusion. (In other words, we should consider the explicatures as truth-conditionally equivalent). In general, the excerpt above raised the important question that the purpose and the speech act communicated by the indirect report may be prominent when we try to establish whether the reporting utterance and the original utterance match in content. However, I briefly discussed this notion in Capone (2010a). For the sake of this chapter, it is important to point out

that Davidson thinks we must separate truth-conditional from pragmatic content. Even if Davidson does not move towards a radical pragmatic view of indirect reports, it is clear that the notion of pragmatic equivalence is what is at stake when we say that the original utterance and the reporting utterance match in content. Suppose, for example, that the original utterance is:

(2) Mario is really brave

and the reporter, whether accurately or not, transforms (2) by uttering (3) (with a view that (3) and (2) match in content).

(3) John said that Mario is a lion.

Should we say that the indirect report matches in content the original utterance? For some purposes, we may be persuaded to answer positively. However, we shall answer negatively for the purpose of locutionary force (the literal truth-conditional meaning). But then in most if not in all cases, we should say that there is not a match between an original utterance and the corresponding indirect report. And this clearly is not the case. The pragmatic strand of Davidson's considerations was not continued. I hope that this chapter moves towards a better understanding of the logic of language games such as indirect reporting.

In ending this section, I want to remind readers that the initial Davidsonian formulation of indirect discourse was criticized because it was immune to intentionality (Baldwin 1982, 272) and was thus later replaced by a better analysis which was completely extensional (Baldwin 1982, 273):

Galileo said x iff $(\exists y)$ (Galileo uttered y and Same in content (x, y)).

7.1.2 Capone (2010a) and Indirect Reports

In Capone (2010a) I advanced a number of ideas on how to capture constraints on replacements of co-referential NPs in the context of indirect reporting (and, in particular, in the complement that-clause). The explanation may be parallel, but not identical with the one I gave on the issue of belief reports in Capone (2008). Such an explanation rests on the idea that replacements of co-referential NPs should not alter the speech act which the indirect report aims to report (or describe) and that the original speaker would like to see herself reported in a way that does not attribute her offenses, impoliteness, rudeness, obscenity, and also slurring. In other words, reporting must be done in a such a way that the voice of the reporter can be separated from the voice of the reported speaker or, if this separation is not possible, in such a way that the original speaker's voice is prevalent. Why should the reported speaker's and NOT the reporting speaker's voice be prevalent? I assume that it is a matter of relevance. Since we are dealing with the verb 'say', we are happy to primarily express the original speaker's voice and then the reporting speaker's voice,

but only if this is possible. I now succinctly sum up the main points of Capone (2010a).

The practice of indirect reports rests on the following principles:

Paraphrasis Principle²

The that-clause embedded in the verb ‘say’ is a paraphrasis of what Y said that meets the following constraint: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, but would approve of it as a **fair paraphrasis** of her original utterance.

Paraphrasis/Form Principle

The that-clause embedded in the verb ‘say’ is a paraphrasis of what Y said, and meets the following constraints: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer ‘that’ on account of its form/style.

In Capone (2010a), I also discussed possible objections to the Paraphrasis/Form principle. Since this discussion will be amplified in the present chapter, I present some of the original discussion in this section.

Depending on the context, I needn’t be beholden to the original speaker’s ‘approval’ of my paraphrasis as fair, nor need I avoid manners of speech which the original speaker would shy away from. In such contexts, if John said of a person x that he will be coming to the party, my report to that effect is true whether I refer to person x politely, as John would approve of, or impolitely, as (let us imagine) my hearer would approve of. John may, upon hearing my report, demur: “Well, I don’t know why you’d call x a jerk but, yes, I did say he was coming to the party”. The Paraphrasis Principle and the author’s other remarks are intended to rule out contexts of indirect reporting that seem to allow this type of license with the original speaker’s words.

As I said in Capone (2010a), I am quite open to the possibility that in suitable contexts one should be able to replace an NP with a coreferential expression in the that-clause of an indirect report. However, I stick to the proposal that, in the absence of abundant contextual clues and cues allowing us to separate the original speaker’s voice from the reporter’s, the default interpretation of the utterance conforms to the paraphrasis rules stated above.

²This position is somewhat reminiscent of Seymour’s (1994) treatment of indirect reports, in which reference to a translation of the reported sentence is explicitly incorporated in the semantics of indirect reports.

7.1.3 *Some Considerations on Wieland on Indirect Reports*

Wieland (2013) considers that most theories on indirect reports conclude that the practice of indirect reporting must be studied essentially from a pragmatic point of view. However, Wieland refuses to accept that one cannot say something systematic and of general import about the practice of indirect reporting. She is adamant in considering the case of indirect reporting distinct from the case of quotation and the case of belief reports. If such propositions are accepted, it goes without saying that indirect reports allow a certain amount of substitution (of NPs having identical referents) and, thus, it is not to be taken for granted that they provide contexts for opacity. Since they are not expressions of belief, the attitude of the original speaker need not interfere with substitution of NPs having identical reference. Now, I do not want to dispute these propositions, as there is obviously some truth in them. But it is possible that the inferential step from these propositions to the lack of opacity exhibited (according to Wieland) by indirect reports is not necessary or needed; in other words, it may distract us from making obvious connections between a theory of quotation and a theory of indirect reports. And the most obvious link between the two theories is that in both cases we need to establish which voices belong to the various segments making up the utterance. At least in some cases, indirect reporting (as made clear by Cappelen and Lepore 2005b) involves mixed quotation, at least in some cases. So the only way to make the two issues separate is to insist on quotation as being characterized strictly by opacity and indirect reports as not being characterized by opacity (or in being characterized less strictly by it). However, if we grant that indirect reports can contain quoted segments, it is less clear that opacity and lack of opacity can be used to distinguish the two cases. In my article on quotation (Capone 2013) I insisted that inverted commas need not always be used to signal the quotative function, as they are often absent in the oral language. Rather we need pragmatic ways of marking a segment as quoted. But if this is the case, then it goes without saying that implicitly many segments of indirect reports can be marked as quoted, at least through some pragmatic means. These differences of opinion between Wieland and myself do not prevent me from seeing the importance of her other considerations on indirect reports.³ And it is on these crucial considerations – which I should say are both important and controversial – that I want to concentrate now.

Somehow departing from my considerations in Capone (2009), Wieland argues that in some contexts, when the reporting speaker has a purpose which serves to advance the communication process – rather than impeding it through the use of an

³Davidson, with his formidable method proved that, indeed, indirect reports are contexts for opacity and, in a sense, the considerations about the opacity of belief reports should be considered consequential on the considerations on indirect (and direct) reports, as noted by Wettstein (2016). This chapter on slurs is particularly important for the purpose of vindicating Davidson's assertions, as indirect reports containing slurs in the that-clause are particularly problematic. This is a case in which a reporting speaker would not replace (in the sense that he is prohibited) a non-slurring expression with a slur or a slur with its neutral counterpart.

NP whose semantic import is not known to the hearer – it is licit to inter-substitute co-referential terms.⁴ Consider this co-referential substitution:

(4)

A: My favourite *tapa* is *patatas bravas*.

B: A said that her favorite *tapa* is the third item on your menu.

Wieland says:

In this case, the term ‘*patatas bravas*’ is substituted with a definite description with a value that can only be determined in the reporting context. It would be implausible to suggest that the original speaker meant anything like ‘the third item on your menu’ in the original context of utterance. Nevertheless, ordinary reporting practices take advantage of this sort of inter-substitution (Wieland 2013).

I agree that in reporting the original utterance by transforming an NP in this way allowing the hearer to get to the referent in a quicker way, a speaker has a practical purpose. This practical purpose does not completely transform the original utterance, in ways that might give rise to complaints by the original speaker. Furthermore, this is clearly a case in which the NP used to transform the original NP is quite neutral; and most importantly, by using it, a hearer can have access to the thought entertained by the original speaker (in saying whatever he said), as the NP which was used as a replacement will eventually, albeit not immediately now during the indirect report, but once the report has been heard in its entirety, allow the hearer to reconstruct the item that is momentarily missing. I propose to use a technical term for items such as ‘the third item on the menu’ – these are sort of pro-forms, but unlike pronominals, which point to objects, they are **quotative pro-forms**, as they point to locutionary segments of the talk. (Obviously they refer to types, rather than tokens).

Clearly, the discussion would have taken a different direction if we had treated the case of replacing a non-slurring expression with a slur. Such cases are clearly more complicated, as even Wieland would have to admit. This is the reason why I take that a chapter on slurs and indirect reports of slurring utterances is of crucial importance for a theory of indirect reporting.

There are other interesting transformations which Wieland draws our attention to. Consider the following, from her paper:

(5)

A: I went to the taco stand and bought a soda.

B: A said that she went to the taco stand.

⁴Of course, Devitt (1996) has made this claim long before Wieland.

B's utterance is clearly obtained by conjunction elimination.⁵ Apparently, this is the case of an innocuous, even innocent transformation. However, there are doubts that this transformation can be effected without consequences when conjunction is involved in an explicature, as in the famous examples by Carston (2002). So, suppose that Churchill said (6)

(6) The Germans raided London and we fought them back

or

(7) The Germans raided London but we fought them back.

There may be explicatures or conventional implicatures attached to a certain conjunction (and as a consequence, we fought them back). Thus eliminating a conjunct from an indirect report, in such cases, gives us the impression that part of the original meaning is lost. So if (7) is reported as (8)

(8) Churchill said that we fought the Germans back

we have partially reported the utterance. It is a partial report. Could a partial report be felicitous? There are contexts in which it might and contexts in which it might not be felicitous. So, it is not straightforward that conjunction elimination is an operation that can always be used felicitously in indirect reporting.

Consider now modifier elimination. It might be thought that modifier elimination is an innocuous logical operation in indirect reports, simply because it is supported by logical/semantical entailments:

If NP [VP ADVB V NP], then it must be the case that NP [VP V NP].

So, if I met a beautiful woman at the party, it must be the case that I met a woman at the party.⁶ And if John says:

(9) I met a beautiful woman at the party

it could be claimed that one could felicitously report;

(9) John said that he met a woman at the party.

But now suppose that, on a different occasion, John said of the same woman, unaware that she was that woman:

(10) That woman is horrible.

Now we could conjoin (9) with (10), since after all John was talking about the same woman and obtain:

(11) John said he met a woman, who was horrible, at the party.

⁵It is fair to say that this discussion was broached by Cappelen and Lepore (1997).

⁶This clearly does not work with privative adjectives as in 'I bought a toy gun'.

So the problem I see in modifier elimination is that it will allow us to conjoin a report of what John said on some occasion with a report of what he said on another occasion which contradicted what he said before. The contradiction passes unnoticed, if we simply support the view that modifier elimination is a feasible operation in indirect reporting.⁷

I should notice that Wieland adds a little later that “Some *modifier eliminations* and *modifier introductions* alter the original utterance in a pragmatically infelicitous way and some do not. These are governed by pragmatic constraints on relevance and not semantic rules”. I quite agree with these considerations, even if I would take side with a more general position in which partial indirect reports are always less informative than exhaustive indirect reports and thus they require a context that justifies the extra cognitive effort required in the logical operation of reporting (since reducing involves an extra logical operation). This may well be in line with the general position by Sperber and Wilson (1986) according to which Relevance is a balance of positive rewards (effects) and cognitive efforts.

Another important consideration by Wieland is that the logical operation **inference** can be incorporated into indirect reports. She felicitously calls this case: inferential indirect report. An example of this practice might be the following (always from Wieland 2013):

(12) A: I didn’t fail any students.

B: Professor A said Maryanne passed her exam.⁸

Wieland says: “Just as long as B knows that Maryanne is one of A’s students, then B can felicitously report A’s utterance in this way. The fact that the intersubstitutability of co-referential terms and paraphrase on the basis of inference are not only possible but commonplace suggests that an indirect report does not function to replicate the original utterance, and it does not even function to convey content that is identical to the original utterance, but rather its pragmatic function is to convey whatever is relevant about the original utterance to the reporter and audience given new facts about the reporting context”. Now there is something weird about this case. Suppose Professor B is universally known as passing only very good students (he fails those who are passable for other professors). Then, given what is known about Professor B’s beliefs, it could be claimed that Professor B said that Maryanne was a very good student. Then suppose it is well known that professor B believes that all his good students will become University Professors. Then it will be held that Professor B said that Maryanne will become a University Professor. But it is not

⁷ Another example that goes against Wieland is the following. A rather misogynous man may commit himself to the belief ‘I love beautiful women’; however, he may not take himself to be represented correctly by the sentence ‘I love women’ (given that he may have many prejudices against women).

⁸ Davis (2005) would say that the proposition in the that-clause of the indirect report need not coincide with the proposition in (12) because they have different constituent structure.

clear that Professor B said all these things. Now, while in my own examples, the problem might derive from identifying the words said with the beliefs normally associated with those words, in Wieland's case the problem is even worse, because professor B is said to have said something without even believing it, as he never had any beliefs about Maryanne (suppose the examination was carried out on papers marked by a code, to make them anonymous).⁹ There might be interminable discussions on points such as these – and it is good that these discussions should be undertaken. My intuition is that we are at a point in which it is not easy to distinguish between legitimate cases of indirect reports and cases that are parasitic on them. It is possible that the case at hand might be considered a loose usage. But even if it is a loose usage, it is still an indirect report, and thus Wieland does well to point out that inference may play an element in reporting. (Given that it may play a role in establishing the truth of a report, I propose that we give great consideration to Wieland's case).

The case just discussed reminds me of cases in which pragmatic inferential augmentations are banned by Douven's (2010) the Pragmatics of belief and, in particular, by his Epistemic Hygienics.

Douven proposes that when we store a belief (in the form of an assertion or a sentence or a thought), we avoid storing it together with inferential augmentations which may lead us later to remember something which was not the case. This is called Epistemic Hygienics. A vivid example coming from that paper is the reference to Gettier's problem. Suppose I know that *p*. Then, even if I can infer '*p* or *q*' from '*p*', it will not do to store in memory '*p* or *q*' if that is going to create trouble later, leading me to believe something that is false or unjustified. We may remember that what creates havoc in Gettier's problem is the shift from '*p*' to '*p* or *q*'. Keeping in memory '*p* or *q*' when one believes '*p*' creates trouble, as that may lead to an apparently justified belief which happens to be true.

The **Epistemic Hygienics Principle**, which will avoid us many problems, in the future is the following:

Epistemic Hygienics (EH): Do not accept sentences that could mislead your future selves.

Some interesting examples by Douven are the following:

- (13) Peggy's car is blue;
- (14) Peggy's car is bluish.

⁹If belief reports and, consequently, indirect reports are thought to be structured (in that they are reports of structured propositions), it would be important to give some thought to structure before saying that two utterances are pragmatically equivalent. The minimum that should be said, to predicate equivalence, is that two propositions should have the same structure.

It is clear that if Peggy's car is blue, it is also bluish (blue being a stronger gradation of bluish). However, if one commits 'Peggy's car is bluish' to memory when one believes that it is blue, one will remember a piece of information likely to mislead one's future self. Igor Douven compares memorizing or committing to memory with writing notes (e.g. Turn off the gas) which will be of use to our future selves. If memories are like notes, we should avoid writing notes that mislead our future selves.

Igor Douven's paper is of great importance to epistemology but also to pragmatics. He shows that pragmatics and epistemology are intimately connected. While Igor Douven's story can be interpreted in the light of more general principles of cognition (obviously, a memory that is misleading is a case in which a believed assumption is more costly than beneficial in terms of cognitive effects; positive cognitive effects being those which put you in touch with reality, not those which drive you away from it), I cannot do this in this chapter.

Now, to return to Wieland's case, how can we deal with it in terms of the pragmatics of belief by Douven? If we accept:

Epistemic Hygienics (EH): Do not accept sentences that could mislead your future selves,

it is clear that creating indirect reports by resorting to inferential steps that can mislead our future selves is illicit.

So, if on the basis of the first half of (12), I make the indirect report (in the second half of (12), in the future, I will be entitled to expect that, on meeting Maryanne, Professor A will recognize her and say 'Hello' to her. But this may never happen, if he passed her only by marking an anonymous paper. Nor should we expect that, being really impressed by her paper, on seeing a paper by Maryanne in the *Journal of Philosophy*, he will be able to connect this paper to his past positive experience (commenting "Oh, this is another paper by Maryanne). But all this makes sense, if we are aware that there is something snide in the practice allowing us to go from the first step of (12) to its second step.

The last case discussed by Wieland that is of considerable interest (presumably based on cases I myself pointed out in Capone (2010a), as kindly noted by Wieland) is whether we should consider the literal or the metaphorical/indirect/ironic level as the basic level of content of an indirect report. Wieland seems to opt for the view that the content of an indirect report should be constituted by interpreted and not by literal segments of speech. Thus an utterance of (15)

(15) Mary is a lioness

should be reported as:

(16) John said that Mary is brave.

However, I notice that it is not cases of metaphors that are particularly thorny, because here by reporting the literal level of meaning, one allows the hearer nevertheless to compute the indirect or not literal level of meaning. The most problematic cases are those of irony, because the context of the original utterance is missing (or may be missing) and thus the hearer cannot move from the literal to the ironic (or echoic) meaning. Thus the transition from (17) to (18) is not easy:

(17) The talk was very good.

(18) He said that the talk was really bad and he didn't like it much.

It appears that Wieland is uncontroversially moving towards a view of indirect reports in which the content of the indirect report is only the intended meaning, rather than the literal meaning of the original utterance. Now, if such a view is accepted, indirect reports could NOT be used, as Cappelen and Lepore (2005a) do, as tests for literal meaning or minimal semantics. My impression is that in context we must settle whether an indirect report is a literal or a non-literal report. There is evidence in favor of both views. Given the fact that it is possible to use direct quotation, when we want to mention the words used, the use of an indirect report for the same purpose would ultimately obtain the same effects of a quotation, but with great processing efforts (as one will ultimately compare the quotative construction with the indirect report). However, given that indirect reports are often mixed with quotative segments and given that quotation is (as I claimed in Capone 2013) a radically pragmatic operation, it is possible in theory that an indirect report might overlap with a quotative structure (see also Burton-Roberts 2006) – which is what happens in the most thorny examples by Cappelen and Lepore. I will stop the discussion here, as I do not want it to slide into a discussion of Semantic Minimalism. In this chapter, I am mainly interested in the polyphonic structure of indirect reports and it is this aim I have in mind throughout. The overlap between quotation and indirect reports amply attests to this polyphonic structure.

7.1.4 *Indirect Reports and Quotation*

While scholars are generally adamant that there is a clear-cut distinction between quotation and indirect reports, this chapter is, in fact, blurring these two practices. And the result of blurring the two practices fits in with the idea that opacity is a phenomenon to be found both in quotations and in indirect reports. In fact, the Davidsonian treatment of indirect reports also involved the blurring of quotation and indirect reports, as the complementizer 'that' for Davidson was a demonstrative pronominal and the thing which followed the demonstrative pronominal could be easily assimilated to a quotation (which explained where the opacity came from) (See Baldwin's 1982 important considerations agreeing with this¹⁰). Current schol-

¹⁰Baldwin (1982, 273) writes: "Davidson argues against such quotational theories and thereby implies that his paratactic theory is not a quotational one. But he treats quotation as abbreviated

ars try to keep apart indirect reports and quotation – and perhaps their practice is correct up to a point. However, doing so in a rigid manner would prevent us from understanding where opacity comes from in such cases. Even if one granted that indirect reports are not always opaque, one surely must concede that they are preponderantly opaque. And even if they were only sometimes opaque, we would still have the trouble of explaining where the opacity comes from. And of course, the opacity of indirect reports comes from the fact that quotation and indirect reports are similar to some extent, as invariably proven by the practice of mixed quotation (in indirect reports). I prefer to believe that mixed quotation is not just a quirk, something that occurs sometimes, but is something that occurs frequently, since I have accepted (Capone 2013) that quotation both in the oral and in the written language can dispense with quotation marks and can resort to pragmatic marking. Given that any segment of an indirect discourse could be marked pragmatically as being mixed quoted, it is clear that the analogies between quotation and indirect reports are quite striking.

But now I want to pursue this line of reasoning further. Consider taboo words, usually relating to sexual organs, etc. Scholars have insisted that, despite the fact that a speaker normally takes great pains to distance herself from the use of a taboo word, thanks to quotation, she cannot really manage to do so, and for some strange reason, still to be explained adequately, the taboo word is assigned to her voice as well. So, consider the following example:

(19) Mary said that ‘....T.....’.

(Where T stands for a taboo word inserted within a sentential frame). Regardless of the framing device of quotation, the responsibility for the taboo word is equally assigned to Mary and the (indirect) reporter. Now, we would expect the matter to be different in indirect reports. Given that ‘that’ is not a demonstrative pronominal (as the Davidsonian analysis has it), but only a complementizer, the *that*-clause should come from the perspective of the indirect reporter. Thus, if there was a real difference between direct quotation and indirect reports, we could expect that only the reporter would be responsible for the taboo word in the following utterance type:

(20) Mary said thatT....

But this expectation is not born out. We equally attribute the T word to the reporter and to the original speaker. And we possibly attribute the gaffe to the original speaker to a greater extent than to the reporter. So things stand exactly in the same way, as far as obscenities and other taboo words are concerned. Given that we are willing to provide similar analyses of indirect and direct reports in these cases, it is clear that neither quotation marks nor the complementizer can prevent responsibility from being assigned to the reporter. The two different functions of the

spelling out, and if, more sensibly, one treats quotation marks as a demonstrative device, and one treats the symbols within the quotation marks as a display of that which is referred to by the demonstrative, then the difference between paratactic and quotational theories becomes one largely of notation”.

complementizer and of quotation marks would lead one to expect that quotation marks could be more protective for the reporter, but this is not the case. The presence of the complementizer in indirect reports would lead one to expect that the complementizer could be more **protective** for the original speaker, but this is not the case. And why not? The truth is that if quotation and concealed mixed quotation in indirect reports are triggered and interpreted pragmatically, then we have a pragmatic machinery capable of explaining why the responsibility of a certain segment of talk is assigned to the original speaker, or both to the original speaker and the reporter. It should also explain why the responsibility of the reporter, in the case of obscenities, is smaller than that of the original speaker, still being conspicuous.

At this point, we can go exploit the machinery of indirect reports for direct quotations as well.

Paraphrase Principle¹¹

The that-clause embedded in the verb ‘say’ is a paraphrase of what Y said meeting the following constraint: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, but would approve of it as a **fair paraphrase** of her original utterance.

Paraphrase/Form Principle

The that-clause embedded in the verb ‘say’ is a paraphrase of what Y said, and meets the following constraints: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrase of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer ‘that’ on account of its form/style.

According to these two principles, one can explain why the responsibility for the obscenity is assigned to the original speaker both in the case of indirect reports and in the case of direct quotation. Of course the case of indirect reports flows easily and directly from the principles above. In the case of quotation, we need a D-tour. It is pragmatics that assigns the obscenity to the original speaker, by marking a segment as quoted, since the point of the quotation is to assign her those words. It follows that if the pragmatics of quotation is ok, the original speaker would approve of the utterance that is being attributed to her.

Now, why is it that the reporter (both the direct and the indirect reporter) is guilty of obscenity? Why is it that the quotation marks do not protect her? And the answer is obvious. The reporter could have avoided reporting the locution and could have found ways of expressing the content in such a way that the very content as well the obscenity could be perceived, without **depicting** the obscenity but by describing it. In this way, she would have dissociated herself (her voice) from the voicing of the

¹¹ This position is somewhat reminiscent of Seymour’s (1994) treatment of indirect reports, in which reference to a translation of the reported sentence is explicitly incorporated in the semantics of indirect reports.

obscurity. Now, in the indirect report, the original speaker is guilty of the obscenity to a greater extent because a segment of the indirect report is being mixed-quoted through the pragmatic machinery. Nevertheless, the reporter is responsible for the obscenity – even if to a smaller extent – because she could have reported the content by describing the obscenity rather than by depicting it. Since she preferred depicting to describing, he must be deemed guilty of not sparing the hearer the embarrassment of hearing the obscenity.

7.1.4.1 Seymour (1994) on Indirect Discourse and Quotation

My approach to indirect reports is reminiscent of ideas expressed by Seymour (1994), which is a unique and, in my view, important paper on the close connections between indirect reports and quotation. However, my views, diverge from Seymour's in at least an important respect. My analysis of 'quotation' does not involve/presuppose a view based on names and is clearly based on a more developed view of quotation, say the one based on Recanati (2010) and the one I developed in Capone (2013), radical in claiming that only pragmatics is involved in deciding what the thing quoted is (a lexeme, a phonetic form, a written form, something somebody said, etc.). The other important difference is that I do not attach special importance to the ambiguity (whether semantic or interpretative, but I assume it makes sense to claim it is interpretative) between a sense of 'X said that' involved in indirect reporting the content of what another person said and another sense which amounts to a special interpretation of quotation: in reporting 'X said that p', one is basically saying that there is a proposition p, such that X said 'p' and the content of 'p' is given (translated) by the sentence uttered by X. Seymour is ambivalent between quotation proper and a domesticated view of quotation in which the quoted sentence describes an act of saying in the direct sense, but translates it according to the conceptual scheme of the reporter's translational manual. Now, if I am correct, Seymour allows a mixture of elements reflecting the quoted person's voice and elements reflecting the reporter's conceptual translation manual. So, if my understanding of Seymour is correct, when the (English) reporter reports 'She said that Mary went to Rome', it is possible that the original speaker used 'Maria' and 'Roma' in her utterance, but these are translated as 'Mary' and 'Rome'. The basic structure and content of the quoted item is the same, but certain interpolations were made. The great merit of Seymour's analysis lies in making us see that indirect reports are (normally) a blend of quotation and pure indirect reports. Pure indirect reports only represent a schematic summary made by the reporter of what the reported speaker said. The blended report couples this summary with a quotation structure, or couples a quotation structure with a use of the same sentence as if it was not quoted. In my view pure indirect reports do not exist or represent an abstract ideal, while the quotative approach to indirect reports is what can be fully accepted, provided that we agree that speakers and hearers rely on a pragmatic machinery allowing them to distinguish voices in the indirect report. So, does Seymour definitely abandon the Davidsonian analysis? Clearly he does not, since he blends a sentential approach with a paraphrase

approach, and, furthermore, he accepts that indirect reports rest on a semantic theory based on the concept of truth, of systematicity and recursiveness. The fact that Seymour's view (as well as mine) is a blend of the paraphrase and sentential theories does not prevent the theory from being based on truth, since both paraphrase and quotation are structures that can be evaluated truth-conditionally. The theory is clearly systematic, being based on an abstract linguistic system that works through compositionality; and it is recursive, since it is possible to apply the same semantic rules recursively (John said that Mary said that Robert said that....).

7.1.5 *Douven's Point of View*

Reacting to Capone (2013), Douven (personal communication) writes the following:

I was wondering whether the paraphrase principles do not give too much weight to the speaker's approval. Couldn't a speaker have ulterior motives for disapproving some paraphrase, even if an impartial third party would approve of it? Perhaps the speaker regrets what he or she said. Or the speaker has a false memory about what he/she said and is perfectly honest (though mistaken, as seen from an impartial standpoint) in disagreeing with the paraphrase.

I was also wondering whether it would be worth trying to adopt instead of the paraphrase principles a principle like the following, which would connect to the current debate about contextualism in epistemology: 'S said that p' is true iff by an assertion of that sentence the hearer comes to know what S said. As various epistemologists have argued, the standards for knowledge may vary with context. In some contexts, not much evidence is needed to gain knowledge; in other contexts, a lot of evidence is needed; and of course there are all sorts of intermediate cases. This might explain why in some contexts we think a loose paraphrase of what someone said is OK, while in others we feel that the speaker should stay very close to the original speaker's wording.

Considering the first part of Douven's comments, one would need to revise the paraphrase principle and add that the approval should come not only from the original speaker but also from an objective and impartial third party. This would eliminate the extreme cases in which disapproval comes because the speaker regrets having said what she said or because she has a false memory of what she said. (Also see the next chapter and, in particular, a point in which I specifically answer an interesting objection by Wayne Davis (p.c.).

Considering the second part of Douven's comments, I am sympathetic towards a contextualist view of the matter. Presumably, Douven connects 'X said p' with knowledge of what X said on the part of the hearer. Transforming the issue of

indirect reports into an epistemic issue amounts to bringing in contextualism. According to Contextualists (e.g. De Rose 2009), the truth of a knowledge claim may depend on the amount of evidence required to assess it. In some contexts, we need a greater amount of evidence for the truth of ‘X knows that p’. In other contexts, we need an inferior amount of evidence. In high stake contexts, the evidence needed is greater than the one needed in low stakes contexts. Analogously, in high stake contexts, we could say that the Paraphrase Principle is adhered to more strictly than in low stakes contexts. But this is not the only case in which we need to depart from the Paraphrase Principle somehow. I have already discussed a case in which a speaker may be interested in letting the hearer identify a referent and thus may use a mode of presentation of the reference distinct from the one used or approvable by the original speaker. This situation is not linked to contextualism in a theory of knowledge, as the mode of presentation is different regardless of whether we are in a high stake or a low stake situation. However, presumably Douven would want to say that we are in a low stake situations and this explains why the reporter is inclined to modify the mode of presentation used by the original speaker.

Now there are cogent reasons to be sympathetic to Igor Douven’s treatment, even if a modification of his way of putting things is required. I propose to modify his assertion:

‘S said that p’ is true iff by an assertion of that sentence the hearer comes to know what S said.

The following is preferable, instead:

an assertion of ‘S said that p’ is felicitous iff by an assertion of that sentence the hearer comes to know what S said.

Should the Paraphrase principle be abandoned then? Perhaps a reformulation is needed that links it to high stakes contexts. Alternatively, one could opt for the option that assertions of ‘X said that p’ which depart from the Paraphrase Principle are parasitic or loose uses. This would give greater legitimacy to the Paraphrase Principle while admitting that in some contexts we may depart from it somehow.

7.1.6 *Slurring*

If the considerations already expressed in a previous section on taboo words relating to the sexual sphere are correct, we would expect an analogy to work between taboo words in general and slurring. Slurring – to take up ideas from Anderson and Lepore (2013) amounts to using words that are derogatory and offend vast categories of people (usually minorities) such as Jews, Chinese (in USA), black people, homosexuals, etc. Our problem is not slurring *per se*, but what effects does slurring have on quotation and on indirect reports. Anderson and Lepore mainly deal with

indirect reports – which use plugs such as the verb ‘say’ – but it is clear that indirect reports and quotations work in a parallel way when slurring is embedded in the quotation or indirect report structure. Anderson and Lepore reject the view that slurring persists in indirect reports (in that the reporter is being assigned responsibility for the slurring, rather than the original speaker) because of a conventional implicature (Williamson 2007) or because of a presupposition (see Williamson 2007 for discussion). Presuppositions usually do not escape verbs of saying, called ‘plugs’ because they tend to be blocked by them (also see Levinson 1983). But then slurs behave unlike presuppositions because they can survive embedding in plugs (even if they often survive embedding in negation, if-clauses, etc. like most presuppositions). Of course Anderson and Lepore do not consider a pragmatic view of presupposition (along the lines of Simons 2013), according to which, at least in several cases, presuppositions are projected through conversational implicatures (but then, in this case they are not presuppositions but conversational implicatures). We know how Anderson and Lepore would reply to a possible objection by Simons. If the persistence of the slurring is due to a conversational implicature, first of all we should account for the implicature through a pragmatic story. Second, the implicature would have to be cancellable, at least in some contexts. And yet we see that the implicature can hardly be cancelled, although it may be mitigated to some extent say in scientific contexts in which the writer makes it absolutely clear that her purpose in dealing with the prohibited word is scientific. If only mitigation is obtained through contextual variation, then it is hardly the case of a conversational implicature. The case against conventional implicature is more thorny. As usual, we are interested in cases of plugs, such as:

(21) John said that Mary is obstinate but brave (however I do not personally see any contrast between being obstinate and being brave).

Plugs do not make the conventional implicature disappear completely, as the speaker of (21) presumably accepts that for someone it must be true that there is a contrast between being obstinate and being brave. However, they demote it from the epistemic commitments of the speaker. Thus, Anderson and Lepore are justified in holding that slurring cannot be a matter of conventional implicature. Furthermore, conventional implicatures disappear if we replace a word with another (which has the same truth-conditional import, but lacks the implicature). So we expect slurring to cease if, in discourse, by correction (or self-repair), we explicitly replace a slurring word with one lacking the same connotation. But this is not the case, and no replacement or correction can repair the slurring which was caused by using a slurring word. Consider, in fact, the following:

(22) Look at what that negro is doing – oh, I mean that black gentleman.

A repair like the one in (22) seems to make things worse, because it tends to add an ironic interpretation.¹²

¹² Kennedy (2002, 19) writes about the word ‘negro’: ‘nigger’ is an ugly, evil, irredeemable word. He cites someone considering the word “the nuclear bomb of racial epithets” (p. 61).

Anderson and Lepore discuss at length the word ‘Negro’ – but they do not discuss – not even *en passant* – that in the past the word ‘Negro’ seemed to be acceptable or usable in American English. Consider for instance the ‘I have a dream’ speech by M.L. King. I was myself perplexed by such uses. Would they count as uses involving camaraderie among blacks or are they echoic uses to be wrapped in inverted commas? (It is possible to oscillate between the two views). It is difficult to answer this question in the context of this chapter, as it involves diachronic considerations too. However, if there is at least a context in which the slurring word, wrapped up by quotation marks, does not count as slurring, one could opt for a conversational implicature. So, the only cards on the table are the following: a conversational implicature and a rule of use. The rule of use view has been advocated by Anderson and Lepore. They claim that there is a prohibition against using slurring words. Of course, this prohibition works for the groups outside the potentially slurred groups. So, there is no prohibition for members of the slurred groups against using a slurring word. This could explain why the contextual variation has such powerful transformative effects on the slurring potential of the word ‘negro’ or ‘queer’. The conversational implicature view would no longer be needed – or could count as an alternative view having more or less the same explanatory power. But what would the conversational implicature view amount to? Without going into details, it would have to say that certain words are slurs in ordinary contexts where the speaker speaks for herself (and no direct report or quotative structure is involved), and they are slurs presumably because there is a societal rule against the use of these words. Then it would have to explain, on the basis of this general prohibition, why inverted commas or indirect reports do not rescind the responsibility of the indirect reporter from that of the original speaker who is presumably responsible for slurring. But now the conversational implicature view is parasitic on the rule of use advocated by Anderson and Lepore. So, it would be simpler to hold that the rule of use based on a societal Prohibition works both for the original speaker and the reporter. But if it was a rule of use, how can we explain the fact that quotation marks do not rescind the responsibility of the reporter from that of the original speaker? After all, it is commonly held that quotation involves mentioning (at least in semantic textbooks such as Lyons 1977). If it involves mentioning, why should a rule of use be applicable to the reporter? Clearly indirect reports do not pose a serious threat to Anderson and Lepore because it might be claimed that the complementizer ‘that’ need not work like a demonstrative pronominal and the indirect reporter can be considered as one who uses the words in the that-clause, at least partially. What I have said before about the parallel considerations on quotation and indirect reports discourage us from this pyrrhic victory, so cheaply obtained. I claimed that in indirect reports too the hearer is faced with the thorny task of separating the original speaker’s from the reporter’s voice. Thus, it is not impossible, especially in the presence of appropriate clues, to consider the slurring words of the indirect report as embedded in inverted commas (in this case the original speaker would have to accept responsibility for the slurring). So the problem raised by quotation is not trivial. The rule of use advocated by Anderson and Lepore does not seem to work well, first of all because quotation structures as well as indirect reports

that have a quotative structure do not allow us to pass the theory based on a rule of use (a prohibition). Second, we need to note that contrary to Anderson and Lepore, who claim that indirect reports containing slurring words assign greater responsibility for the slurring to the reporter than to the original speaker,¹³ I claim that, if anything, a pragmatic theory like the one voiced in Capone (2010a) makes it the case that the original speaker has greater responsibility. So, we need a pragmatic machinery like the one expressed in:

Paraphrasis Principle¹⁴

The that-clause embedded in the verb ‘say’ is a paraphrasis of what Y said that meets the following constraint: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, but would approve of it as a **fair paraphrasis** of her original utterance.

Paraphrasis/Form Principle

The that-clause embedded in the verb ‘say’ is a paraphrasis of what Y said, and meets the following constraints: should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer ‘that’ on account of its form/style.

Now, these principles would allow us to assign the original speaker the principal responsibility for the slurring, taking for granted or presupposing Anderson and Lepore’s rule of use (or prohibition). The reporting speaker, given such a use, is guilty of not having used an alternative word or a description, rather than a segment which has depictive properties. Given that she has not avoided the slurring word, when she obviously could do so, she herself becomes responsible for the slurring. But now we have explained why the pragmatic explanation, despite being parasitic on Anderson and Lepore’s rule of use, does more work than the original explanation by Anderson and Lepore. Thus, it could be recommended by Modified Occam’s Razor, because even if Anderson and Lepore’s view appears to be simpler, it cannot explain what the conversational implicature view – which is more complex – does explain.

Objection Why should the reporter have to use some form of substitution of the slurring in question, if, after all, the devices of quoting and of mix-quoting in indirect reports allow her to avoid responsibility, since after all quoting does not amount

¹³ Anderson and Lepore (2013) write that “Indirect reports and other attitudinal inscriptions fail to attribute slurring to whomever they report since the offense of the reporter “screens off”, so to speak, the offense of whoever is being reported. This position is interesting, but needless to say, it would need greater justification.

¹⁴ This position is somewhat reminiscent of Seymour’s (1994) treatment of indirect reports, in which reference to a translation of the reported sentence is explicitly incorporated in the semantics of indirect reports.

to using a certain expression. The reply is simple. It is true that the reporter is not using the slurring in question and, therefore, cannot be accused of having infringed a rule of use (or what Anderson and Lepore call ‘A prohibition’). However, in depicting the slurring, rather than describing it by a suitable transformation and by some descriptive phrase alluding to the slurring character of the original phrase, the reporter is signalling some complicity and is not distancing herself from the trespasser (the original speaker). Since using depictive elements involves taking the shortest route in the description process, when there is an alternative route which by embarking on a transformation involves greater processing efforts (and production efforts), it is clear that the avoidance of greater processing processes is taken as a sign of complicity, while the more costly transformation is taken (or would be taken) as a way of signalling that one is distancing oneself from the offensive segment of talk.

7.2 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have mainly explored the analogies between quotation and indirect reports, and I have maintained that such analogies allow a parallel pragmatic treatment. In the end, I have concentrated on slurring and I have explained **why** both taboo words and slurring words cannot be embedded in quotation structures without losing their anti-social status. It is clear that slurring too involves the task of separating voices and of accepting the polyphonic structure of discourse. Essentially the problem, in our case, is how it comes about that when someone reports a slurring expression, there are, in fact, at least two people – and not just one – doing the slurring. This is a complicated but interesting question, which is a way of testing both the theory of quotation and that of indirect reports, throwing light on parallel problems about polyphony and the way it is supported by conversational implicature.

In the next chapter, I will deepen the considerations on slurs I have broached here.

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Chapter 8

Indirectly Reporting and Translating Slurring Utterances

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I am going to examine the intricate connection between indirectly reporting and translating utterances, to move forward with the application of this connection to slurring. Since I (more or less) consider slurring a derogatory speech act (albeit a secondary speech act, one that cannot be carried out unless one performs another speech act, like, e.g. asserting), the question I examine reduces to how one can indirectly report or translate the speech act of slurring. I will pay attention to the idea that slurring is a derogatory speech act (and possibly one in a series of speech acts aimed at maintaining the status quo, that is the social distinction between social categories (e.g. blacks vs. whites)). This idea of slurring as a derogatory speech act is similar to the idea by Croom (2008, 2011, 2013a, b, 2014) (and other scholars such as Saka (1998) and Potts (2007)) that slurring contains both an ideational component and an expressive one. However, the expressive dimension is more regulated than one may have thought, so much so that I venture the idea of a speech act (with an appropriate distinction between the micro speech act of slurring and the macro speech act of dominating by a series of micro speech acts) (see van Dijk 1980 on macrostructures).

In this chapter, I am going to assume, rather than arguing in detail, that society is stratified and that slurring expressions may reveal this stratification as well as conflictual relationships between dominated and dominating (Waugh et al. 2016). Becoming aware, from a linguistic theoretical point of view of the demeaning force of slurs amounts to recognizing that there are opposite forces in society threatening the *status quo* and establishing a more equalitarian relationship between the oppressors and the oppressed. Interesting phenomena like, e.g. appropriating a slur (e.g. blacks referring to themselves as ‘niggars’) ¹attest that there are forces threatening

¹As Croom (p.c.) says, it would be closer to the truth to say that black interlocutors often call each other ‘nigga’ – or more often ‘my nigga’ as in ‘what’s up my nigga?’ – but do not typically call

the *status quo*. This paper is not going to reveal, but will presuppose, knowledge of a story of oppression in which a social category is oppressed (linguistically as well as socially) by slurring (among other things). The recent events in USA like riots against the brutality of the police towards weaker social categories like (e.g.) Afro-Americans attest that in addition to a linguistic reflection on the means of oppression (like slurring), a growing awareness of the political and social oppression of certain weaker social categories is resulting in mobilization of social events of pondering on and resisting the brutality of the oppressive acts. This is going on in many spheres of life, as homosexuals demand greater rights, Hispanic people demand social recognition, immigrants, in general, demand recognition as human beings, American Indians demand rights which were denied in the past, etc. Since slurring affects many social categories (as recognized e.g. by Croom 2013b), by examining slurring we are going to address the topic of metalinguistic reflection and emancipation of oppressed social categories (see Waugh et al. 2016). This is possibly a topic for critical discourse analysis. However, I will only explore certain linguistic aspects of the phenomenon and, in particular, the connection with the issue of indirect reporting and translating. This chapter is an indirect contribution to the issue of slurring and a direct contribution to the issue of indirect reports. In a sense, the aim of this paper is to expand the theory of indirect reports, by using slurs as a testing bed for the theory.

In particular, I would like to explore the issue of how slurs can be translated and of the difficulties encountered by translators in translating them. Since translating and indirect reporting are interconnected activities, I hope to glean the advantages of applying my previous views of indirect reports to this issue.

8.2 Structure of the Paper

I will examine the interconnection between indirect reporting and translating, arguing that there is some overlap and that the former illuminates the latter (and viceversa). I shall focus on transformations which indirect reporting and translating have in common: addition, elimination, replacement, modification, syntactic adjustments. I shall then consider the translation of American slurs into Italian and consider that translation is not easy, due to the lack of the cultural presuppositions and of a semantic item covering the same semantic area as e.g. ‘Nigger’, I arrive at the idea that modulation may be of help where there is no close counterpart of the slurring expression in the language one uses for the translation. Finally, I consider the issue of translation with respect to the Paraphrase/Form/Style Principle I formulated in Capone (2010). I also consider consequences of the phenomenon of appropriation on translation practices. I offer general considerations on the lack of pragmatic flexibility exhibited by slurring expressions with respect to non-literal uses. I end

themselves this way in isolation or on their own. The non-derogatory use often occurs in these kinds of *dyadic* in-group exchanges.

the chapter with some technical considerations on responsibility for slurs in indirect reporting and the discussion of a serious problem raised by Wayne Davis in p.c.

8.2.1 *Translating and Indirect Reporting*

Before proceeding with the main issue of this chapter, I want to discuss the connection between indirect reporting and translating. The connection is pretty intricate, because, on the one hand, indirect reporting may involve segments that are translated (whether a few words or an entire sentence); on the other hand, translating what one said is a form of indirect reporting, since the translator is faced with difficult choices (should she use a register or another? Should she use a certain syntactic structure or a different one?). It is fair to say that translating may involve adding interpolations which might even include the translator's comments, especially when a word or syntactic structure is ambiguous. In the same way in which the reporter in indirect reporting has some freedom to alter the words of the message, in translating, the translator can change the message somehow, as, after all, translating means not merely translating words literally but capturing the speaker's intentions. If one is faced with a choice of words that are different, one should choose one rather than the other by trying to work out the speaker's intentions (in a rational way). Working out the speaker's intentions is not a matter of guessing those intentions but of using reason to work out the intended message – and this might involve conscious or unconscious processing and inferencing (see Cummings 2009 on non-modular pragmatics). On the one hand, the fact that the speaker is rational and is endowed with a theory of mind module (massive modularity is currently being preferred to classical rigid Fodorian modularity (see Carruthers 2006)), induces us to infer whatever can be inferred thanks to an innate inference system providing default inferences or, in any case, modulating meanings in context by using heuristics such as those presented by Relevance Theorists (in short, the principle of Relevance, whether cognitive or communicative) (see Sperber and Wilson 1986; Carston 2002; Hall 2013).² On the other hand, we might use conscious inference to calculate what the speaker intended to mean. We may consciously ask ourselves, “Why did the speaker behave in this way?”, “Is there a reason why he did or said this?”. We may answer these questions by using reason and by constructing a sort of argument (see Macagno and Walton 2013 on conversational implicature as argument). We may, for instance, want to eliminate certain interpretative options by realizing that they could not be intended because the speaker is too rational to have intended them. We certainly do not want to infer logical impossibilities or absurdities – and thus much of the inferential process is busy finding plausible alternatives to otherwise

²Indeed, this question is rather complicated, as one may have a modularized pragmatic module (acquired by experience and associations) rather than an innate one. It is admittedly very difficult to say what is innate and what is not. Perhaps there are some general predispositions guiding inference, but one cannot say for sure what the optimal level of generality is.

implausible interpretations which could not be rationally intended and which it would be irrational to attribute to a speaker in the attempt to work out what she intended. Often, the context comes to our help in working out what the speaker meant, as the context serves to eliminate certain options or to make others manifest. Dascal and Weizman (1987) are absolutely right in claiming that interpretation should be guided by abundant cues and clues. These cues and clues are like Hans and Gretel's pebbles – they help us find the best route towards the intended interpretation. The cues and clues are the foundations of interpretative acts, as they orient them either by eliminating certain options or by selecting certain alternatives that are more plausible or desirable than others.

8.2.2 Transformations Which Indirect Reporting and Translating Have in Common

In indirect reporting or translating a message, there is a basic requirement, as pointed out by Dascal (2003). The speaker has a duty to make herself understood, which is counterbalanced by the duty to be as faithful as possible to the original message. In practice, this means that an indirect report or a translation should be oriented to the Hearer; however, if there is the risk that the message will be altered, then the speaker has a duty to choose a more literal option. This means that the reporter should make an effort to interpret the original message and make it intelligible to the hearer – by possible transformations, like clarifications of the message, to be appended as appositives, to the indirect report/translation. However, when the reporter has reasons to believe that the message, despite all efforts to achieve clarification, is obscure, she has a duty to go back to a more literal level of meaning – postponing the interpretation act while preserving the original message and making it possible that, in the future, one might go back to the original intention, through richer clues. In such cases of obscure messages, the preservation of literality (and of the clues available) amounts to a postponing of the interpretation act. (However, in some cases, such as e.g. non-serious utterances, reporting an utterance verbatim fails to do justice to and maybe distorts the speaker's intentions – thus for certain language games only indirect reporting is apparently licit).

The basic transformations that apply to indirect reports/translation acts are the following (although I do not claim to exhaust all possibilities) (see Wieland 2013 for a detailed discussion of such transformations and Capone 2013c for a reply).

Addition

The speaker appends some words in the way of apposition, to an NP or to a S, in order to clarify the message and add further identificatory information.

Replacement

Devitt (1996) proposes that one can replace an obscure NP with a coextensive one to allow the Hearer to identify the referent.

Elimination

The speaker eliminates some word (or segments of the message) that are not useful to the hearer. Since the aim of the indirect report is to provide useful information likely to interact with information already possessed by the Hearer, if the reporter deems that a certain segment does not or will not interact with the information already possessed by the Hearer in a fruitful way, he is free to eliminate a certain segment (although the responsibility of elimination rests on him and at any moment he could be pressed to explain why he eliminated a certain segment).

Syntactic Adjustments

Syntactic adjustments are usually ameliorative. Nobody would bother to alter a message by using bad grammar. Of course, it is possible that the reporter himself is not a grammar expert and makes grammar mistakes.

Clarification

The speaker may attempt to make the message more easily comprehensible by adding sentential appositions but also by the omission of hedges, repetition, conjunction, removal of clefts, etc. The reporter can also rearrange the content to aim at greater coherence (see Allan 2016 on clarification).

Saying What Was Not Said (Even If It Was Meant)

Can we think of further transformations? Could we add what the speaker wanted to say but did not say? Could we add text at will? This is a problematic case – on the one hand we should reconstruct the speaker's intentions, on the other hand we should take into account what she said – NOT what she did not say. There may be difficult cases. A mother says to her daughter 'You can go to the party'. However, the father, should circumstances be different could say or report: 'Your mother did not say you can go to the party. Your grandmother died.' This case, difficult and thorny though it is, seems to me to point to the fact that literal meanings are ephemeral and that we should always reconstruct intentions. An utterance such as 'You can go to the party' should be paraphrased 'You can go to the party (unless something serious occurs, in which case you cannot go)'. There is an implicit dimension to these permissions – and reporting literal meanings may not be a good idea in certain circumstances, as in those cases literal meanings are superseded. In general, the indirect reporter has the option of making explicit all the elements of meaning left implicit.

8.2.3 *Translating Slurs*

There is no doubt that for every slurring expression we might find a neutral counterpart (see Croom 2013b), that is to say, a word capable of referring to a category of people in a neutral way (it is a different matter to consider that even a harmless counterpart can be transformed into a demeaning expression if pronounced with derogatory tone, accompanied by a frowning or, alternatively, derisive facial expression (consider in Italian ‘E’ g-a-y’). Neutral counterparts are at risk of losing their neutrality, but they are certainly less damaging than slurring expressions, which, as Saka (1998); Potts (2007) and Croom (2013b) say, are associated with an expressive dimension. To use the terminology I used in a previous section, when a slurring expression is uttered, it is as if it alone was responsible for a speech act of slurring, which is orthogonal to the main speech act (say, assertion, if the utterance has overall assertive force). We may well want to distinguish between a primary and a secondary speech act – the slurring expression is responsible for the secondary speech act.

In American society, the word ‘Nigger’ is one of the worst slurs one can use – one of the most hated and irredeemable words of the American language, according to Kennedy 2002. Its use has been associated with violence – moral and physical violence, since the insulted person may feel authorized to reply and to be offensive in return. The use of this word need not be pejorative, as Kennedy says, as it can be modulated in context. However, rather than saying that the word is ambiguous or that there are different rules of use for the same word, I at most favor the idea of an interpretative ambiguity.³ In particular, if the word is associated with moral abuse, with the potential for derogating, demeaning and insulting, in certain other contexts, it can be used in a positive sense. Describing someone who resisted abuse by white people, a black person might say ‘He is a real nigger’ (Kennedy 2002). In this case, the use of the word is positive, as the word connotes a positive quality. Black people themselves can use ‘nigger’ with a derogatory intention. In some cases, black people among themselves use the word ‘nigger’ not as derogatory but in order to refer to Afro-American people – these are the so called ‘appropriated’ uses, which as Croom (2013b) and Bianchi (2014) say, contain an echoic dimension, also being reminders (Jacobs 2002) that white people will never come to consider Afro-Americans on a par, as reminders that Afro-Americans are at risk of being discriminated or ill-treated.

Recent events in USA, as well as internet posts by eminent philosophers like Jennifer Saul and Jason Stanley, attest to a history of racism (if this was not enough, one could read and be outraged by the very sad stories Kennedy (2002) reports about discriminatory practices in USA and the terrible and devastating consequences for children). Madison T. Schockley (2014) writes:

³I accept Hom’s (2008) view that the semantics of slurring expressions has a potential for doing harm; however, it is the uses to which these expressions are put that determine the ultimate meanings of such expressions.

The presumption of guilt and danger that is at the heart of racial profiling lays heavy upon every black person living in America. It changes our relationship with the world. We are constantly on guard against a charge, a confrontation, a challenge. Racial profiling does long-term damage to the self-image, self-esteem and ego of the African American.

When it comes to translating words such as 'Nigger', Italians have their own dose of problems – as there is no equivalent word packed with racial hatred to the same extent. It is true that in current Italian, in a way parallel to the English language, a distinction is being made between 'nero' and 'negro', 'nero' being more politically correct. However, at least twenty years ago, it was ordinary and licit to use the word 'negro', just to refer to someone of black skin possibly coming from Africa or America. No hatred, contempt or derogation was signaled by the use of 'negro'. As I said, on the spur of the linguistic changes going on in America, now we could differentially use 'negro' and 'nero' – but the word 'negro' never comes to acquire the negative connotations associated with 'nigger', which is utterly derogatory. The reason for this, I would like to claim, is that Italian society is not racist in the same way or to the same extent as American society. There are no stories of violence involving black people – even immigrants. The attitude towards immigrants is benevolent, though of course immigrants are more likely to be exploited.

As I said, if Italians are racist, they are so in a different way. The use of words like 'nigger' presupposes an attitude to the person derogated which involves considering it as being sub-human. Italians would still treat black people as human beings, even if their conscience is blind to the issue whether it is licit to exploit them. Italians surely think there are different social classes and that the higher classes deserve greater respect. However, they would not show disrespect towards immigrants, but would reserve differential forms of behavior such as using 'tu' instead of 'Lei' in addressing an immigrant (see *tu/vous* languages, Brown and Levinson 1978) and also using differential syntax, simplified syntax without morphology being reserved to the immigrants either because they think they would find it easier to understand this way or just to mark the immigrant status of the people in question. (There are exceptions, like the Lega spokesman Calderoli, who defined the Italian black minister on equal opportunities an 'orango tango' – but xenophobes of course are everywhere).

To my knowledge, there are no slurs for black people in Italian, although there are slurs for immigrants in general (regardless of the nationality they come from), such as 'vocupra' (do-you-want-to-buy-it). Of course I am not arguing that Italians do not have any slurs – of course they have. 'Terrone' was a slur reserved to farmers from the South. It is interesting that Anglo-american society does not have slurs for people in certain categories of jobs, as any honest job is sacrosanct in Anglo-American society. Interestingly, people from the north of Italy who had to buy oranges, mandarins and wheat from people from the south, found it objectionable that one could earn a living by working in farms.

Another terrifying slur is reserved to homosexuals 'ricchione', 'frocio' – I report these slurs just to make a comparison with 'negro', which, by comparison has no

derogatory force, while the slurs ‘ricchione’ or ‘frocio’ are derogatory, have a potential to offend, and, most of all, are designed to address a category of people with (allegedly) sub-human qualities.

Now, we go back to the issue of how to translate ‘nigger’ given that derogating Afro-Americans is not a practice common to Italians. Should the translator use ‘negro’ (rather than ‘nero’) imposing a distinction between the two words? What is clear is that, by doing so, the translator superimposes a connotation that is surely derivable from the context of the translation and has to rely on contextual clues (possibly added by the translator in the course of the translation) on a word like ‘negro’. It is not surprising, therefore, that the word ‘negro’ in the context of the translation acquires a new pragmatic connotation – one that can be purged if a different context embeds the expression ‘negro’. In other words, in order to translate such words, the translator has to rely on what Recanati (2004) famously called ‘modulation’ – the potential that words have to acquire new extra meanings in context, meanings that depend on use and not on semantics, and which can disappear if the context is different. Such meanings are cancellable in the sense that they are modulated by the contexts, and if the contexts do not support such meanings, these are not promoted but they are inhibited. (So they are cancellable in the sense of being only potential).

The issue of how to translate a slurring expression has been addressed in the literature by Alan Gribben, who translated ‘nigger’ in Mark Twain’s *Huckleberry Finn* as ‘slave’.

http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2011/01/sanitising_huckleberry_finn

Now, surely this is a case of intra-language translation, but one that points to a general problem which translators have to face. Should one remove a slur and replace it with an suitable alternative? What is clear is that, even if Alan Gribben’s intention was laudable, one cannot just sanitize language by eliminating a slurring word (replacing it with an alternative), as the result is one of loss. Surely the novel *Huckleberry Finn* loses its firm condemnation of slavery if the reader is not shown how black people were treated and what they were called. Realism is lost if language is purged of its slurring words.

8.2.4 *Transformations in Translations*

When someone translates a slurring expression, there are potential problems. If the translator hides the slurring expression, by using a common and comparatively neutral alternative, she is not sufficiently faithful to the literal meaning. If the slurring expression is associated with an orthogonal speech act, such a speech act disappears when the slurring expression is purged and replaced by a neutral counterpart. Already in Capone (2010), I noted that replacing a word with another may result in a different speech act – and this is the reason why one cannot always replace a word

with a coextensive expression in the *that*-clause of an indirect report. The same problem noted by myself arises in translation – possibly indicating the close relationship between translating and indirectly reporting. If the translator retains the slurring expression (by using a corresponding expression that has a slurring potential), there are two problems. The original speaker is credited with having said something which may be objectionable in the language and culture of the hearer. And the translator is possibly held complicit, because he could have avoided the slurring expression, but did not do so. There is obviously a tension between the two problems. The translator cannot be both faithful to literal meaning and politically correct. She is confronted with a hard choice.

According to Anderson and Lepore (2013) there is an edict against slurring (against the use of slurs). The indirect reporter should not use the slurring expression because there is a rule of use saying that one should avoid slurs (while using their neutral counterparts, or conventional replacements such as the N-word). According to these authors, if there is a slurring expression in the *that*-clause of the indirect report, the reporter is responsible as well as the reported speaker. (Thus, reporting as quoting is being assimilated to using a slur).

However, accepting such a rule of use in a general way would prevent us from describing, reflecting on, and criticizing the uses of slurring expressions (see Capone 2014).⁴ Furthermore, the aim of an indirect report is to ascribe an utterance to the reported speaker and thus it is natural that if a slurring expression is present in the *that*-clause, the reported speaker should be principally responsible, the reporting speaker's job being only to inform the hearer of what has happened: a slurring event.

Going back to translation, if it is similar to indirect reporting, to some extent, the translator too should be accountable for the slurring expression, according to Anderson and Lepore. But we have already seen that the translator cannot edit the text without cancelling an important speech act. However, the translator is often in a position that is different from that of an indirect reporter. The indirect reporter often has the aim of reporting the original utterance (however indirectly) to draw attention to what the original speaker said and did, in saying it. The indirect reporter's aim may even be that of criticizing the speaker for what he said (conscious that uttering a slurring expression was something for which one could be criticized).

The translator, instead, does not usually report what the speaker said in order to criticize it, but in order to create a relationship between the speaker and the intended Hearer. The translator is a cultural mediator and it would be close to the truth to say, following Robinson (2003), that the translator is doing things with words. He knows that being homosexual in Russia is close to a crime, while this is not so in USA, where laws are protective for homosexuals. Thus, in English-Russian translation, the translator might do well to edit the Russian text and hide the possible slurs. In doing so, it is true, part of the speech acts proffered is lost, but the rapport between

⁴Croom argues, "Anderson and Lepore also do not explain why the edict had arisen in the first place. In other words, they presuppose rather than explain why slurs are offensive. Their view is a fist pounding: "Slurs are wrong because we say so!" No deeper or more insightful reasons are given, which is inadequate" (Croom p.c.).

the conversationalists has been protected. Protecting rapport might involve, in this case, editings and the purging of slurring expressions.

Translations may, sometimes, involve additions. We may call these ‘cultural preambles’. Slurring expressions are strongly presuppositional – they presuppose certain cultural assumptions, certain conflictual relationships, a history of hatred, and knowledge of the edicts (societal rules) that ban them. Translating the word ‘Nigger’ with ‘negro’ will not illuminate the Italian hearer as to the history of the word. If such a translation is used, one needs preambles that explain how the word is originally used in USA. Without such preambles, the word is inert and its illocutionary force cannot be understood. In other words, translating might require some explaining. Something similar happens in indirectly reporting what a foreigner said. Italians find it difficult to understand the word ‘patronizing’ – and if one translates such words, one should make sure that an explanation is given as to the Anglo-American attitude towards freedom and interference. So, should one stop the translation/report and explain things? This seems to me to be necessary, although certainly time consuming. We might call it ‘translator’s notes’.

So far, we have tacitly been assuming that the translator often has to edit a text and to purge a slurring expression. But why is it that she makes use of a slurring expression in the first place? (‘Making use’ is the wrong expression, because the translator does not use words, but reports what he heard; at most he mentions certain words). If a translator preserves a slurring expression in the translated speech, she is conscious that the reasons for preserving the expressions were greater than the reasons for editing it. Should the translator be responsible? My answer is that mainly the reported speaker (or the translated speaker) is responsible for the slurring expression. In order to motivate this point of view, we might want to say that everything that should be said for indirect reports should be said for translation, which is a form of indirect reporting – albeit one in which translation does not only apply to a segment but to an entire speech event. In my previous papers on indirect reporting (Capone 2010, 2013c, 2014), I have supported the position that slurring should be attributed to the original speaker because indirect reports have the aim to report what the speaker said. I also said that it would be uneconomical to attribute the slurring both to the original speaker and to the reporter. I furthermore claimed that the Principle of expressibility by Searle (1979) supports the idea that the original speaker is responsible for the slur, because if this was not the case, it would never be possible to attribute a slurring expression to anyone. It is true that one can replace the slur with some descriptive word (e.g. the N-word) which loses its connotations, but this strategy is not available in many cases of slurs (and Croom has shown that slurring words can be a great many).

8.2.5 *Translating Appropriated Slurs*

Now I would like to touch on an issue of theoretical importance. We have seen (see Croom 2013b; Bianchi 2014; Jacobs 2002) that slurs can be appropriated by the categories typically slurred by them (e.g. Afro-Americans have appropriated the word ‘nigger’, after effecting a phonetic modification: *nigga*). These uses of slurs – appropriated though they are – can be indirectly reported or translated. And now the question is, how can you translate or indirectly report an appropriated slur without using (or mentioning) that word, which in the mouth of the indirect reporter sounds much more racist and offensive than in the mouth of the users who have appropriated that word. There are conventions of use. A white man cannot use ‘nigger’ or ‘nigga’ without causing resentment – and making a politically incorrect move. ‘Nigga’ is a word which only Afro-Americans can use (speaking among themselves, without slurring). So, how can one indirectly report such uses? And how can one translate them? Of course one strategy of indirect reporting, when things are not easy, is to resort to mixed quotation (see Cappelen and Lepore 2005). One can indirectly report what another person said, overall, by paraphrase, but one can mix-quote the problematic segment. Things might proceed quite smoothly in the written language, where quotation marks, at least in certain languages, can be used to distinguish paraphrase from direct quotation. But I doubt that things might proceed smoothly in the oral language, even because ‘nigga’ is not neatly differentiated from ‘nigger’ phonetically. Should the (white) translator or the indirect reporter participate in the same convention of use that regulates speech among members of the Afro-American community? Background knowledge might help – if hearers know sufficiently well that the slur was appropriated, then the same principle I used in my 2010 article (Capone 2010) on indirect reports might regulate the attribution of voice. The voice heard inside the indirect report (in connection with the segment ‘nigga’ is the voice of the reported speaker and not that of the reporting speaker. This time, the reporting speaker is not complicit, because the quotation device offered by the Paraphrase/form/Style Principle will attribute the voice to the reported speaker and further background knowledge ensures that we know that the reporting speaker is only complicit in appropriation. In other words, we do not hear the reporting speaker as uttering or mentioning a prohibited word, as this time she is only mentioning a word as used by a community in which such a use is licit (and not prohibited) and is not heard as insulting or demeaning or derogating.

8.2.6 *A Matter of Use*

Elsewhere (in Capone 2009), I have addressed the issue of cancellability of inferences. One of the inferences, which is extensively used, the assignment of commitments (to speakers) helps us discriminate between serious and non-serious uses of linguistic expressions. The matter of what commitments the speaker undertakes is

important. It is usually taken for granted that, unless an intention is fixed pragmatically, one cannot proceed to assess whether a use of a word is serious or not. This issue is addressed in Bach (2001) and Dascal (2003). According to Dascal (2003) we need cues to understand how a certain segment of discourse is to be taken, whether the speaker is being serious or non-serious.

However, despite the pragmatic flexibility of much of everyday discourse, there are moments and contexts in which one cannot pretend to use a certain word non-seriously. This is the case of words associated with sexual activities or sex in general. It is also the case that a slurring expression cannot be easily retracted. I doubt that one can utter a slurring word and then publically retract the intention. For many areas of the lexicon, albeit not for all of them, there are direct routes between the word and the intention – so much so that uttering that word amounts to expressing that intention – and nothing else. This is a limit to what pragmatics can do, although, as we have seen, there are ways to corrode such limits as the case of re-appropriation attests.

8.2.7 *Responsibility for Slurs in Indirect Reports and Pragmatics*

In the following sections I address some problems in connection with responsibility for the slurs in that-clauses in indirect reports, with an eye on a serious problem raised by Wayne Davis.

Anderson and Lepore propose that in indirect reports the reporting speaker, rather than (or more than) the reported speaker, is responsible for the slurring expression appearing in the embedded that-clause. Now, while I accept that in some cases, the reporting speaker can be complicit in uttering the slurring expression, I am inclined to accept that the reported speaker is assigned greater responsibility than the reporting speaker – intuitively because the indirect report is about the reported speaker and NOT the reporting speaker.

I would say that the pragmatic considerations I expressed in Capone (2010, 2012, 2013c) assign responsibility for the slur to the reported speaker, while the responsibility of the reporter consists in not having avoided the slur choosing a more neutral counterpart. However, if a more neutral counterpart had been chosen, how could we know that the original speaker was responsible for slurring? This is a damn complicated question. We may get the idea that the reporting speaker was complicit in the slurring, however his responsibility for the slurring was inferior. And there are contexts in which the responsibility of the reporter has been completely corroded (take the current chapter or a judiciary proceeding).

In my opinion, there should be ways to signal that the reporter is not primarily responsible for the slurring expression (here contextual clues could be mobilized to convey that that reporter's standard vocabulary does not include slurs and, therefore,

by deduction responsibility for the slurring is shifted to the reported speaker. Furthermore, pragmatic default inferences also contribute to assigning responsibility to the reported speaker, as the interpretation that the perspective of the reported speaker is being adopted is more relevant – relevance being the ratio between contextual effects and processing efforts. An interpretation according to which either the reported speaker or the reporting speaker or both could be responsible for the slurring is clearly non-economical with respect to the possibility that one alone was responsible. If the reporting speaker was responsible for the slurring (and not the reported speaker), the reporting speaker could certainly be guilty of lack of clarity and the processing efforts would be greater. However, if the original speaker was responsible for the slurring, the interpretation would be the most relevant one since the perspective of the original speaker is what counts and what the hearer is interested in. The hearer does not want to know what the reporting speaker thinks, but only what the reported speaker thinks.

In Capone (2010, 2013c) I drew the readers' attention to the following:

Paraphrasis/Form Principle

The *that*-clause embedded in the verb 'say' is a paraphrasis of what Y said, and meets the following constraints:

Should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer 'that' on account of its form/style. (Capone 2013c, p. 174)

In Capone (2010) I drew this principle from the principle of Relevance, but this is not at stake here.

Now, the paraphrasis/Form principle clearly predicts that if a speaker did not utter a slurring expression in her utterance, she would not like/accept being reported as having uttered that word. Hence the obligation by the indirect reporter to avoid using that word, as such a usage would cast a sinister shadow on the reported speaker depicting her as racist (when she is not). There is a complication here, because while the reported speaker never uttered the word 'nigro' or 'nigger', she may have wanted to utter it. The indirect reporter knows well that the slur was not uttered, but she also knows that if she had been permitted, the speaker would have willingly uttered it (she was prevented by political circumstances). Perhaps the reported speaker used the word 'black' with derogatory intonation, or perhaps when this word was uttered the speaker's face was illuminated by a sinister grimace. Perhaps the reporting speaker merely guessed at the intention behind the word. So, should we take the reporting speaker who injects 'nigger' into the *that* clause of his report at face value and attribute it to the reported speaker or not? My story predicts that even if the reporting speaker was wrong in his choice of 'nigger', pragmatics says that the reported speaker is represented as being racist.

That these semantic/pragmatic considerations should be taken into account is obvious, if one considers that accepting the alternative account by Anderson and Lepore (2013) commits one to the view that an indirect report of a slurring expression is subject to a double prohibition (both the original speaker and the reported one are prohibited from uttering the slurring expression) and nevertheless the indirect report of a slurring expression gets by. Why is it that it gets by? Because it is important to someone that she know about the slurring utterance in the first place and this can be achieved only through reporting the slurring expression. It appears that the prohibition was evaded twice. Instead, a view that the reporting speaker is simply quoting (admittedly mixed-quoting)⁵ a speaker would ensure that only one person is guilty for the slurring – and this is the desired result, because ideally we would want to make a difference between the original culprit and the reporter who may be non-racist and whose purpose is (possibly) to denounce a racist remark. In Anderson and Lepore's (2013) view accusing someone of slurring is something that can occur in the court (presumably) but not in ordinary conversation. Yet, we have evidence that in ordinary conversations too we utter pronouncements against immoral and illicit conducts.

8.2.8 *Arguments for the View That the Reported Speaker is Responsible for Slurs in That-Clauses of Indirect Reports*

In the remainder of this chapter, I will expatiate on the reasons for believing that the story of indirect reports and slurs should proceed the way I have depicted it. I will advance a number of arguments, examining their consequences.

The first argument is based on expressivity. We must be able to express what we think. Searle says “Whatever can be meant can be said (Searle 1979, 20). In the case of indirect reporting, we must have a way to report an offensive speech event (for the purpose of denouncing it) without committing/repeating the same offence. Clearly, one can resort to euphemistic ways of saying things or one can be indirect and use convoluted sentences that give the hearer an idea of what was done in the offensive utterance. To give you an example, one of our colleagues, who was known by everyone to be crazy, once said in the common room that “Berlusconi ha il pisello piccolo” (Berlusconi has a small dick). I then interpreted this utterance literally, although now it occurs to me that this was probably a way of saying that Berlusconi is not capable of governing the country, if an analogy is followed with another expression which idiomatically means that (Berlusconi non ha le palle (per governare il paese). Perhaps this teacher had transformed the idiomatic form into an unidiomatic form. Whatever the case, I wanted to tell other colleagues what had happened, but I was terribly embarrassed to let the female teachers know. The taboo

⁵Mixed-quoting is the result of the application of pragmatic principles.

associated with this sentence was making its sting felt. However, there was no way to report the utterance without appearing to commit the same offence. But surely, if one had to report the utterance, one had to do so in a way that revealed the words used. Thus, as a consequence of Searle's principle of expressibility, a speaker must be in a position to make an indirect report of something that is obscene relying on the context or pragmatic principles to impute the offensive phrase to the reported speaker. There must be contexts, such as a court, where one must be able to tell the whole truth about what was said.

The second argument exploits a parallel between quotation and indirect reporting. If we accept Anderson and Lepore's view that there is a societal prohibition against uttering a slurring expression, it is clear that this should apply to quotation as well. Thus a sentence such as

Mary said: John is a nigger

should be as infelicitous as the corresponding indirect report 'Mary said that John is a nigger'. Here my opponent may reply that, after all, Anderson and Lepore think of a prohibition against using, rather than against 'mentioning' (in the sense of Lyons 1977) a slurring expression. I quite agree that quotative structures, in general, are associated with opacity and sometimes mention, rather than using, certain expressions. However, even accepting the using/mentioning distinction, it should be said that the distinction does not neatly correlate with the distinction between indirect reporting and quoting. In fact, we have seen that quotation structures can, in context, amount to indirect reporting. Furthermore, as Cappelen and Lepore (2005) themselves note, indirect reports exhibit the phenomenon of mixed quotation. Thus there are segments of indirect reports that are mentioned. We can easily have reports such as John said that 'apple' has five letters. If anything, we would expect quotations to host slurring expressions, while indirect reporting should not. However, in practice there is not much difference between quotation and indirect reporting.

The third argument is based on critical linguistics (on this, see Linda Waugh et al. 2016). If we want to expunge racism, we should be able to denounce it and we should be able to talk about it, rather than being scared of talking about it. Denouncing racism involves describing the kind of speech acts performed by people during their racist practices. It is clear that in doing so, we should be able to report utterances *verbatim* or close to *verbatim*, our moral authority sufficing to exclude that we are complicit in this kind of discourse. We should take position in public and this should be enough to label us as non-racists and to bracket the racist linguistic practices. Indirect reporting is a way of bracketing slurring expressions, which appear as enveloped in inverted commas. Contextual considerations combined with default interpretations should be enough to bracket slurring and racist expressions in general.

8.3 Objections by Wayne Davis

The job is done egregiously by my Paraphrasis/Form Principle, which however was criticized by Wayne Davis in a personal communication. There are two fundamental objections.

Consider the following example:

(4)

Billy: The first black person was elected U.S. president in 2008.

Tommy: Billy said that the first nigger was elected U.S. president in 2008.

Wayne Davis writes:

I would say that Tommy's report is false. But your constraint need not be violated. Billy may not object at all to Tommy's way of reporting what he said and may have been just as happy using 'nigger' in place of what he said. Billy may take it as a fair paraphrasis of what he said. But it is not, so Tommy's report is false. It is also an unacceptable thing to say, whether or not Billy objects to it.

I quite agree that this is a plausible objection. But this is seen from the point of view of a racist speaker. So my prediction makes a difference between racist and non-racist speakers. It works in the case of non-racist speakers but not in the case of racist speakers.

Nevertheless, we could try to revise my Principle:

Should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, in case he were to accept certain norms that are standard or should be standard in society, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer 'that' on account of its form/style. (Capone 2013c, p. 174)

Now, I should say that these contextual injections of clauses could go on in case other objections are raised. I doubt that all such clauses should be made explicit, as principles should have a general validity even if they are in need of being constantly enriched through contextualizations.

Anyway, a better treatment of Wayne Davis' objection could be the following:

An indirect report of an utterance by X cannot be felicitous UNLESS X is inclined to approve if it on account of its content and form/style or some impartial judge is inclined to accept it on account of its content/form/style given what was said by the original speaker.

The case by Davis is ruled out because the reported speaker did not utter a slurring expression and although he would probably have approved of it, either he or the impartial judge would agree that what he said did not include a slurring expression: thus, if the slurring expression occurs in the indirect report, despite the fact that it was not uttered by the original speaker, it must be construed as under the responsibility of the reporting speaker.

The upshot of this is the following: if a slurring expression occurs in the that-clause of an indirect report, assume that the slur is under the responsibility of the original speaker, because if the original speaker had not uttered it, the reporter would not have had the right to report it, given that either the original speaker or the impartial judge would object to its presence in the that-clause of the indirect report.

I take that indirect reports typically display the words used in speech by the original speaker. I believe that it is more natural that the indirect report should express the words used by the reported speaker rather than those of the reporting speaker, because the indirect report is intended to reflect the utterance of the reported speaker.

Wayne Davis objects to this. He says:

This may be true in some cases, but only when the reporter is using the same language as the reported speaker. It is also false in the same-language case when the reported speaker uses a lot of contractions or regionalisms that are inappropriate in the reporter's context or uses misspellings or mispronunciations.

Let us leave aside the different-language case, as here contextual considerations advert the hearers that it is not possible that the same words uttered by the original speaker are used by the indirect reporter. This is a notable exception, but I never claimed that my principle covers all cases. It is predictable that defaults in interpretation can be overridden by contextual considerations. (the case of translation was addressed in a previous chapter).

It is true that, as Davis says, indirect reports can change the words, they can eliminate grammatical errors, misspellings, regionalisms etc. However, intuitively there is a difference between an indirect report that eliminates all such problems and an indirect report that introduces them. In the former case, a speaker should not be entirely unhappy about the reporter's charitable attitude and thus my principle may not be refuted by such a case. In the latter case, errors are being introduced on purpose (or perhaps involuntarily). But certainly, the original speaker should not be happy with the result. Such an attitude is clearly reflected in my Principle. Of course, a third case could be pondered on. A person who is particularly proud of belonging to a certain region, objects to the fact that the indirect reporter eliminated a certain regionalism. But this case too is covered by my Paraphrasis/Form Principle. In fact, the original speaker objects to the change or interpolation by the reporter, as I predicted. Whatever the success of my reply strategy, I would like to say that though I greatly appreciate the merit of Wayne Davis's objection, I resist his objection on

general grounds. Of course I never said or would like to say that all the words used in the indirect report belong to the original speaker. In some cases, it may not be important to decide whether a word was part of the original speaker's speech or was just a synonym used for convenience. The Paraphrasis/Form principle applies only when it is relevant, that is in the case of problematic words. If a word rather than another makes an important difference, in that the indirect report ends up reporting a different speech act (as I said in Capone 2010) or the indirect report ends up being offensive to the audience, then an interpretative problem arises and the interpretative ambiguity I discussed at the beginning of this chapter arises, which needs to be resolved by pragmatic interpretation. So Davis might now be relieved by my conclusion that, like him, I do not think that every word of the original utterance must be in the that-clause of the indirect report.

Consider now a different case. I happened to send a paper to P & C. During the proofs something strange happened. I had no reply to my corrections and no revised proofs were sent to me. The result was that an uncorrected paper was published. Thomas Gray, whom I cited to embellish the paper, became Thomas Grey. Although the Press is now remedying this problem, which really horrified me, I was certainly not happy to have been reported as saying that Thomas Grey and NOT Thomas Gray had written the *Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard*. I certainly object to my having been reported in that way. I understand that these things happen, but the real problem is when indirect reporters are either inaccurate and sloppy or dishonest. So there must be something general in defense of my principle.

8.3.1 *On Translation*

Translation may be a problematic area in the issue of indirect reports. While my form/style principle predicts that forms should be as close as possible to those of the original utterances (and utterers), I have allowed, in some cases, that the principle can and must be surmounted in case heavy contextual clues indicate that the words originally uttered cannot be in the language of the indirect report. In other words, it is possible that the original utterance is in Russian, while the reporting utterance is in English or Italian. I have also made it clear that, even when the context does not make us suspicious that the original utterance was in a language different from the one of the indirect report, we should not expect a coincidence between every word in the reporting utterance and every word in the reported utterance (the original utterance). We expect Relevance to be involved in selecting the lexical items which are under the scope of the Form/Style Principle.

Now suppose that there are some slurring expressions in the that-clause of the indirect report, which as the context may indicate, is expressed in a language non-coincident with that of the reported utterance. What should we make of those slurring expressions? Should we ignore them altogether, assuming that due to the translation we should give up the hope of reconstructing the original speaker's words? While I must agree that, in this case, things are much more complicated, my

intuition is that the words used by the indirect reporter/translator still give us some indication as to the general quality of the words used by the original speaker. The use of a slur in the that-clause of an indirect report, in my opinion, should correspond to a use of a slur in the reported utterance. And this may be imputed to some presumed **Principle of Translation**:

Do not translate an expression occurring in the original utterance (reported) with a word giving the impression that the original speaker was slurring, using foul language, insulting, etc. unless the original speaker was indeed slurring, using foul language, insulting, etc.

In other words, the form/style principle seems to survive despite the complications of translation. The Principle of Translation seems to be necessitated by the Form/Style Principle. In fact, even by translating, one can somehow give the hearer some indication about the original voice. It is not a matter of words, but of style, and thus despite the fact that the words may be different, because they come from a different language, the style seems to be preserved despite translation.

These may not be the final words on the matter, but I take these to be an important step forward.

8.4 Conclusion

The issue of slurs can be tackled from a philosophical point of view – it is just another way to prove that opacity exists and that in indirect reports one cannot (even try) to replace a word with a coextensive one. Slurs appear to be (“largely or for the most part,” in accord with the family resemblance conception of category membership) coextensive with their neutral counterparts – if the considerations by Croom are accepted. Thus, they are one more weapon in the arsenal of the philosopher who argues in favor of opacity (of indirect reports or belief reports). So far, philosophers/linguists have found ways to severely restrict or corrode the idea of opacity. It is claimed that one can replace a word with a coextensive one – say a name with another – without changing the truth-conditions of the report. For example, Devitt (1996) is at great pains to show that we can replace a proper name in a belief report if the coextensive name is more familiar to the hearer. The change does not affect the truth value of the utterance. I have always stuck to the more conservative view (see Higginbotham lectures, Oxford 1994) that opacity exists – and this can be supported by intuitions about slurs (this agrees with Croom 2016, as indeed his family resemblance approach has been attempting to argue this point even further, for D and S are not even strictly speaking co-extensive on his view!). Obviously there is a deep difference between ‘John believes that Afro-Americans are clever’ and ‘John believes that niggers are clever’. John may have the former but not the latter

belief – because he does not believe that Afro-Americans are niggers – that is to say despicable.

Now, concluding I should say that I have tackled an issue that is of importance for societal pragmatics and for society in general – an issue that is too painful. I hope to be forgiven for the detachment I have shown, which is that of the philosopher of language/linguist who merely addresses a linguistico/philosophical issue.

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Chapter 9

Belief Reports and Pragmatic Intrusion (The Case of Null Appositives)

In this chapter, I explore Bach's idea (2000) that null appositives, intended as expanded qua-clauses, can resolve the puzzles of belief reports. These puzzles are crucial in understanding the semantics and pragmatics of belief reports. I propose that Bach's strategy is not only a way of dealing with puzzles, but also an ideal way of dealing with belief reports. I argue that even simple unproblematic cases of belief reports are cases of pragmatic intrusion, involving null appositives, or, to use the words of Bach, 'qua-clauses'. My contribution in this chapter develops ideas broached by Salmon (1986) but is more linguistically-determined. The main difference between my pragmatic approach and the one by Salmon (1986) is that this author uses the notion of conversational implicature, whereas I use the notion of pragmatic intrusion and explicature. From my point of view, statements such as "John believes that Cicero is clever" and "John believes that Tully is clever" are assigned distinct truth-values. In other words, I claim that belief reports in the default case illuminate the hearer on the mental life of the believer, that includes specific modes of presentation of the referents talked about. Furthermore, while in the other pragmatic approaches, it is mysterious how a mode of presentation is assumed to be the main filter of the believer's mental life, here I provide an explanatory account in terms of relevance, cognitive effects, and processing efforts. The most important part of the chapter is devoted to showing that null appositives are required, in the case of belief reports, to explain certain anaphoric effects, which would otherwise be mysterious. My examples show that null appositives are not necessitated at logical form, but only at the level of the explicature, in line with the standard assumptions by Carston and Recanati on pragmatic intrusion. I develop a potentially useful analysis of belief reports by exploiting syntactic and semantic considerations on presuppositional clitics in Romance.

9.1 Introduction

As Mey (2001) says:

Pragmatics admonishes the linguistic scientists that they should take the users of language more seriously, as they, after all, provide the bread and butter of linguistic theorizing (...) (Mey 2001, 289).

It is in the spirit of this view that I write a chapter on belief reports and pragmatic intrusion.¹ In this chapter, I discuss the issue of belief reports and propose to integrate it with the recent idea (mainly proposed by relevance theorists such as Carston 2002 and Sperber and Wilson 2002, but also, in different form, by Bach 1994; Levinson 2000; and Mey 2001) that the proposition expressed by an utterance (in a context C) is ultimately fleshed out (supplied on the basis of a skeletal semantic template, to use words by Carston) by recourse to pragmatics, that constructs missing constituents or expands the bare semantics of a sentence to resolve potential inconsistencies or absurdities. In particular, I propose that belief reports are cases of “intrusive constructions” (to use a term by Levinson 2000, 213), in that the truth-conditions of the whole depend on a pragmatic process of interpretation. In this chapter, I accept Sperber & Wilson’s view that as the gap between sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning widens, it increasingly brings into question a basic assumption of much philosophy of language, that the semantics of sentences provides, in all cases, straightforward, direct access to the structure of human thoughts (Sperber and Wilson 2004).

First of all, I discuss the hidden-indexical theory of belief reports by Schiffer (1995). Then I consider certain problems raised by Schiffer (2000) and Recanati (1993). I argue that these theories can be improved and that pragmatic intrusion can resolve the puzzles raised by the semantics of belief reports (see also Jaszczolt 2005, 126). I offer some plausible views of pragmatic intrusion (mainly Carston’s 1999; Sperber and Wilson’s 2002 views). Then I work out the details of the pragmatic analysis of belief reports. In particular, I offer an alternative to Salmon’s (1986) view that conversational implicatures can explain away apparent cases of substitution failure in belief reports, proposing that a communicative act triggers the expectation that it will be maximally relevant in that it will produce a high level of positive effects worth the hearer’s processing efforts, compatibly with the speaker’s preferences and abilities (Sperber and Wilson 1995; Blakemore 2000). It appears that relevance theory best handles the cases of belief sentences used in thought (rather than in assertions), while Salmon’s treatment, as Green (1998) points out,

¹I was told that the term ‘pragmatic intrusion’ has negative connotations in the context of a theory in which the meanings of sentences are in general underdetermined. I do not take the view that a language, in order to be perfect, must match logical forms and propositions and thus I do not take intrusion as a sign of imperfection. It is true that that better terminology could be used, e.g. pragmatic inserts; but I am persuaded that the use of novel terminology may confuse readers who are used to books like Levinson (2000) or Carston (2002). So, I hope to be allowed to retain the term ‘intrusion’, imperfect though it may be.

makes use of a Gricean explanation in terms of ‘assertions’ in conversational settings. Furthermore, unlike Devitt (1996), I propose that belief reports essentially illuminate the hearer on the cognitive state of the believer. The most important part of the chapter is devoted to showing that the presence of null appositives to NPs (within belief sentences) is required at the level of the explicature of a belief report. I mainly investigate cases of anaphora, control, and ellipsis and I extend the discussion to modal verbs such as ‘ought’ and to reflexive belief.

9.2 The Hidden-Indexical Theory of Belief Reports

Schiffer (1995) presents his hidden-indexical theory of belief reports. According to him, a sentence such as (1)

- (1) A believes that S

expresses a three-place relation $B(x, p, m)$, holding among a believer x , a mode-of-presentation-less proposition p and a mode of presentation m under which x believes p . According to Schiffer (1995),

it is possible for x to believe p under one mode of presentation m while believing not- p under a second mode of presentation m' , and while suspending judgement altogether under a third mode of presentation m'' (Schiffer 1995, 248).

As Schiffer says:

This propositional mode of presentation is determined by modes of presentation of the objects and properties the proposition is about (Schiffer 1995, 249).

Schiffer admits the difficulties inherent in explaining what a mode of presentation (of a proposition) is and suggests that modes of presentations are mental representations that play certain functional roles.

Schiffer writes:

This theory is aptly called the *hidden*-indexical theory because the reference to the mode-of-presentation type is not carried by any expression in the belief ascription. In this sense, it is like the reference to a place at which it is raining which occurs in an utterance of “It’s raining”. And the theory is aptly called the hidden-indexical theory, because the mode-of-presentation type to which reference is made in the utterance of a belief sentence can vary from one utterance of the sentence to another (Schiffer 1995, 250).

Schiffer acknowledges that the reference to a mode of presentation is similar to the reference to a place in an utterance of (8):

- (2) It is raining.

Endless discussions have been made on whether the place is or is not an implicit argument of the verb ‘rain’ in sentences such as (2), but Carston’s view that ‘rain’ is not associated with a location variable seems to be reasonable (being more parsimonious; see also Cappelen and Lepore 2005 on unarticulated constituents). The parallel between sentences such as (2) and sentences such (3)

(3) John believes that Mary is pretty.

induces us to think that the mode of presentation associated with the embedded proposition of (3) is furnished through pragmatics (specifically through pragmatic intrusion and explication). Schiffer’s statement that the mode of presentation type varies from context to context also points to its pragmatic nature.

9.3 A Problem in the Hidden-Indexical Theory

Schiffer (2000) discusses a major problem for the hidden-indexical theory. The hidden-indexical theory entails that believing is a **three-place relation**, $B(x, p, m)$, holding among a believer x , a proposition p , and a mode of presentation \underline{m} under which x believes p . The ordinary-language way of representing this open sentence is evidently ‘ x believes p under (mode of presentation) \underline{m} ’.

(...) and from this it follows that a singular term replacing ‘ m ’ in a true substitution instance of (3) [Ralph believes that Fido is a dog under mode of presentation m] would be the specification of an argument of the three-place relation expressed by the open sentence. (...) The intuitive point is that (3) clearly does not *look like* it contains a three-place verb with the specification of a third argument. Rather, it looks to be on all fours with a sentence like

(4) Louise hit Ralph under the influence of crack.

which is paradigmatically a sentence in which the singular term ‘the influence of crack’ is not the specification of the third argument in an instance of the three-place hitting relation (...) but rather merely part of the adverbial phrase ‘under the influence of crack’ (Schiffer 2000, 19).

Schiffer uses a Chomskyan diagnosis to check that ‘under mode of presentation m ’ is an adverbial, and not an argument of the verb (believe). Consider the sentence (4):

(4) Mary gave the house to her husband.

We know that ‘to her husband’ is an argument of the verb ‘give’ because one can give the answer ‘to her husband’ to the question (5):

(5) To whom did you wonder whether Mary gave the house?

Now, Schiffer thinks that the answer “Under mode of presentation *m*” to the question (6)

(6) Under what mode of presentation did you wonder whether Ralph believes that Fido is a dog?

does not show that ‘under mode mode of presentation *m*’ is an argument of ‘believe’ but shows that it is an adjunct of ‘wonder’. It would, in fact, be an elliptical answer for:

(7) I wonder under mode of presentation *m* whether Ralph believes that Fido is a dog.

Schiffer is aware that some scholars have disputed this syntactic test, yet he still maintains that there is a problem for those holding the hidden-indexical view.

Schiffer hopes to find a way out of this problem by following Recanati’s (1993) proposal. Recanati thinks that ‘believe’ expresses a two-place relation between a believer and a quasi-singular proposition. The quasi singular proposition is something along the following lines:

$\langle\langle m', \text{Fido} \rangle, \langle m'', \text{doghood} \rangle\rangle$

As we can see, the directly-referential singular terms of this quasi-singular proposition are **each** associated with a mode of presentation. However, modes of presentation do not contribute to truth-conditions. Schiffer modifies Recanati’s proposal by introducing the requirement that the modes of presentation *m'* and *m''* be not specific modes of presentation but types of mode of presentation. Thus, where *T* ranges over modes of presentation types:

$B(x, \langle\langle T, \text{Fido} \rangle, \langle T', \text{doghood} \rangle\rangle)$ iff
 $\exists m \exists m' (T m \ \& \ T' m' \ \& \ B(x, \langle\langle m, \text{Fido} \rangle, \langle m', \text{doghood} \rangle\rangle))$.

In other words, the treatment above makes it clear that the modes of presentation associated with ‘Fido’ and ‘doghood’ are not specific modes of presentation, but types of modes of presentation.

According to Schiffer, the treatment above violates Recanati’s availability hypothesis: ordinary speakers ought to have some awareness of referring to such modes of presentation types. He writes:

Yet, I submit, it seems clear that the belief reporter has no such awareness. If asked what she was referring to in her use of ‘Fido’, she would not give any restatement that indicated that she was referring to a mode-of-presentation type (Schiffer 2000, 29).

As Schiffer is aware, this is not just a problem for Recanati’s analysis, but for the hidden-indexical theory as well.

The most crucial problem, though, is the following: where do the modes of presentation come from in an analysis such as:

<<m', Fido>, <m'', doghood>>?

Recanati and Schiffer appear to believe that the modes of presentation are in the that-clause complement of 'believe' independently of the semantics of the verb 'believe'. Yet, we all agree that verbs such as 'believe' or 'know' create opacity, a problem which the hidden-indexical theory was contrived to deal with in the first place. In a sense, they are making it appear that it is the semantics of the that-clause that is responsible for a structure such as

<<m', Fido>, <m'', doghood>>.

Yet, they ought to be aware of examples such as (8)

(8) The judge decided that John Rigotti should die.

It seems reasonable to suppose that the judge's decision applies to the referent of 'John Rigotti' under any mode of presentation whatsoever. Yet, as Williamson (2006) notes, it must be granted that if John Rigotti=The XYZ, then when John Rigotti dies so does the XYZ. But it does not follow that the judge decided that the XYZ should die. This shows that that-clauses, on their own, cannot be held responsible for opacity effects. The opacity comes from the verb e.g. 'decided'. It seems to me that a more fruitful tack is to suggest that modes of presentation or modes of presentation types *are* built up locally within the NPs and VPs or APs contained in a that-clause embedded in a belief verb as **pragmatic increments**. They subsequently interact with semantic aspects of the verb of the main clause to create opacity effects. They also interact locally to incorporate aspects of the NPs, VPs, and APs of the that-clause. In fact, normally opacity effects are explained away on the assumption that the modes of presentation within the that-clause incorporate certain names. The proposal I articulate in this chapter assumes that verbs like 'believe' (attitudinatives, to use a term by Green 1998) are semantically univocal and not ambiguous. It appears to me that by placing the burden of providing modes of presentation on pragmatics, we can abide by Modified Occam's Razor, which advises us not to multiply senses without necessity.

Salmon must be quite right in saying that modes of presentation are part of the pragmatics of belief reports:

(...) there is an established practice of using belief attributions to convey not only the proposition agreed to (which is specified by the belief attribution) but also the way the subject of the attribution takes the proposition in agreeing to it (which is no part of the semantic content of the belief attribution) (Salmon 1990, 233–234).

9.4 Pragmatic Intrusion

Many authors have dealt with the semantics/pragmatics debate, but here I shall mainly capitalize on ideas by Carston (1999) and Wilson and Sperber (2002). The reader will find an overview of other theories in Capone (2006a). It is a pity that I cannot adequately deal with the views of Bach (1994), Levinson (2000) (see my review), Recanati (2004) (see my review) and of Stainton (2004a, b) which are also important.

Carston opposes the view that decoding utterances is merely a matter of coupling logical forms with pragmatic information:

A different view of pragmatic inference was suggested in the previous section, according to which this sort of inferential activity is an automatic response of receivers of (attention pre-empting) ostensive stimuli; it is but a particular instance of our general propensity to interpret human behaviour in terms of the mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions) of the behavior, which, in turn, is to be located within a bigger picture of general relevance-seeking information processing. According to this view, pragmatic inference is fundamental and the employment of a code (linguistic system) as an ostensive stimulus is a useful addition; it would not be reasonable to expect, nor would it be particularly desirable, that the forms supplied by the code should be eternal or even fully propositional (Carston 1999, 106).

No doubt, pragmatic information is useful in constructing fully truth-evaluable propositional forms, but compositional semantics plays a crucial role in the interpretation of sentences/utterances combining lexical with grammatical information. Even if Carston's claims are correct in so far as human communication reserves a large role for pragmatic interpretation in the construction of propositional forms, it is **methodologically** important to stress the role played by linguistic semantics and, in particular, by the lexicon and syntactico/semantic compositionality (Stanley 2005). Carston tempers her view somewhat on p. 114:

The semantics/pragmatics interface is a representational level described as logical form or the linguistic semantic representation; it is standardly not fully propositional but rather a schema for the construction of fully propositional representations. Exactly what this looks like is, of course, an important question and not one that can be answered with any great conviction. A reasonable construal is of a structured string of concepts, configured along the lines of Chomskyan LF, perhaps indicating relative scope of quantifiers and negation, and with open slots marking constituents that must be contextually filled, as in the case of indexicals, quantifier domain, and many other elements (Carston 1991, 114).

Below are some of the examples relevance theorists use in support of the case for pragmatic intrusion:

- (9) The steak is raw;
- (10) Holland is flat;
- (11) Jane is a bulldozer;
- (12) He took off his boots and got into bed;
- (13) Writing an essay will take time;
- (14) Everyone went to the party.

(9) is true even if the steak is not completely raw, but only partially cooked; (10) is true even if Holland's surface is not, strictly speaking, completely flat but is flatter than most other European countries; (11) is obviously false, and thus a metaphoric interpretation must be accessed to consider it true; (12) is true in case the action of taking the boots off precedes the action of going into bed; (13) does not express the trivial proposition that writing an essay takes some time, but that it takes a considerable amount of time (and attention); (14) obviously does not mean that all human beings went to the party, but that all members of a certain domain went to the party; thus the domain of the quantifier must be suitably restricted by means of contextual knowledge.

9.5 Puzzles Arising from Belief Reports

If we abandon the hidden-indexical theory, there is no easy way to handle the puzzles of belief reports. I start to discuss Kripke's puzzle. The author presents the case of Pierre, a French speaker, who says "Londres est jolie", on the basis of what he hears about London, leading us to conclude that he believes that London is pretty. However, one day Pierre moves to London and goes to live in a rather ugly area of the city. He learns English without resorting to translation and is now willing to assent to the sentence "London is not pretty". He is not in a position to equate what he thought of under the name 'Londres' with what he now thinks of under the name 'London' (Kripke 1979, 891–892). Kripke rejects the idea that Pierre has contradictory beliefs; He says that Pierre lacks information, no logical acumen, and thus he is not able to connect his notion of 'Londres' with his notion of 'London'. The notion of 'connection' used here is one of referential identity: coming to know that the thing *x* referred to as 'MoP*' is the same thing *x* referred to by 'MoP**'.

There is another puzzle, which according to Kripke (1979), arises without substitution. Consider the following utterances:

- (15) Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent.
- (16) Peter disbelieves that Paderewski had musical talent.

Peter uses the name 'Paderewski' for what he takes to be two different individuals. Given that Peter does not realize that Paderewski the statesman is Paderewski the pianist, the problem is to explain how both of (15) and (16) can be true. It may

appear that Peter has contradictory beliefs, but this is not the case. Peter is not illogical; he is merely ignorant.

Crimmins and Perry (1989) resolve problems of this kind by noting that the same referent can be associated with two different notions and that failure to connect these notions leads a person to be in two distinct belief states. The most important idea of this chapter is that a belief report is about an **unarticulated constituent**, a propositional constituent that is not linguistically articulated. Context is what leads to the specification of this constituent:

We shall say in such cases that the notions that the belief report is about are *provided* by the utterance and its context (Crimmins and Perry 1989, 975).

9.6 Bach's View of Belief Reports

Let us now return to the issue of belief reports, armed with the notion that pragmatic intrusion furnishes a fully truth-evaluable proposition. Given that it is implausible that the mode of presentation is furnished by the semantics of the belief report, we conclude that it must be supplied by recourse to pragmatics. So we must proceed in the direction of a pragmatic theory of belief reports.

Bach's view of belief reports is rather promising. Bach says:

(...) 'that'-clauses are not content clauses. The specification assumption is false: even though 'that'-clauses express propositions, belief reports do not in general *specify* things that people believe (or disbelieve) – they merely describe or characterize them. A 'that'-clause is not a specifier (much less a proper name, as is sometimes casually suggested) of the thing believed, but merely a descriptor of it. A belief report can be true even if what the believer believes is more specific than the proposition expressed by the 'that'-clause used to characterize what he believes (Bach 2000, 121).

This quotation is important because it stresses the role played by **pragmatic intrusion** in fleshing out the proposition believed on the basis of the surface elements appearing in the 'that'-clause and the context which serves to enrich or expand the proposition.

Let us see how this approach allows us to handle the Paderewski case. Let us recall that the problem arises due to **ignorance**: Peter has two notions of Paderewski, which, as Crimmins & Perry say, he is not able to connect. Peter believes of Paderewski, of whom he knows that he is a musician, that he has musical talent. And he believes of Paderewski, of whom he knows that he is a statesman, that he has no musical talent. Peter is not able to connect the two notions as he is ignorant of the fact that Paderewski the statesman is nothing but Paderewski the musician. Thus, we can say of Peter both (17) and (18):

- (17) Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent;
- (18) Peter disbelieves that Paderewski had musical talent (understood as: Peter believes that Paderewski had no musical talent).

(17) and (18) do not attribute contradictory beliefs to Peter – even if the speaker of (17) and (18) knows that there is a referential identity between the two instances of ‘Paderewski’ – provided that Peter is not able to connect the two notions he has of Paderewski.

Bach explains why (17) and (18) are not contradictory statements by saying that the ‘that’-clauses do not fully specify the propositions believed (by Peter), but simply **characterize** them. To fully specify what Peter believes in the two cases, we need to flesh out the proposition corresponding to the ‘that’-clause, using **appositives** both in (17) and (18), thus obtaining (19) and (20):

- (19) Peter believes that Paderewski, the pianist, had musical talent;
- (20) Peter disbelieves that Paderewski, the statesman, had musical talent.

Bach writes:

This difference could be indicated by using the appositives ‘the pianist’ and ‘the statesman’ after the name ‘Paderewski’. Using one appositive rather than the other would be sufficient in the context to differentiate one belief from the other, although both beliefs are such as to be true only if Paderewski had musical talent (Bach 2000, 126).

Bach’s proposal is a good step forward towards a more accurate theory of belief reports. He proposes to make modes of presentation of the referent ‘Paderewski’ explicit, in line with Salmon’s idea that:

The important thing is that, by definition, they [modes of presentation] are such that if a fully rational believer adopts conflicting attitudes (such as belief and disbelief, or belief and suspension of judgement) toward proposition p and q, then the believer must take p and q in different ways, by means of different modes of acquaintance, in harbouring the conflicting attitudes towards them – even if p and q are in fact the same proposition (Salmon 1990, 230).

Bach’s idea that an appositive qua-clause is supplied by pragmatics in utterances such as (17) and (18) is shared by Bezuidenhout (2000). Like Bach (2000), she too claims that this process of inferential enrichment is the norm, rather than an ‘ad hoc’ way of resolving a puzzle. Bach’s idea that modes of presentation must be made explicit in order to deal with Paderewski-like cases is important. Yet, something else has to be said.

First, (19), (20) are interpretatively ambiguous: on one interpretation the appositive specifies how Peter thinks of Paderewski; on the other, it specifies who the

speaker of the entire sentence has in mind.² The interpretative ambiguity must be resolved by pragmatics, as I argue in a later section, responding to a similar objection to my analysis of belief reports based on pragmatic intrusion and specifically on the provision (or specification) of null appositives. The problem is tackled later on in this chapter.

Second, the fact that Peter has two different notions of Paderewski, as is known in context, does not suffice to make his two beliefs about the two notions of Paderewski's non-contradictory. Suppose, in fact, that at some stage he thought that the two notions of Paderewski could be connected to the same individual (and this realization can be grasped pragmatically by using further appositives). Then, at least for a moment, he must have had contradictory thoughts contemplating the thoughts (19) and (20). So, I think that the 'that' clauses must be specified further and that the inexplicit hidden constituents to be fleshed out must include Paderewski, the pianist, an individual distinct from Paderewski, the statesman.

The most interesting part of the theory is that it is applicable to **all** substitution cases, as well. Thus, in principle it ought to explain why it is that a speaker can say both of:

- (21) Alexander believes that Cicero was a great orator of the past;
- (22) Alexander does not believe that Tullius was a great orator of the past

provided that it is part of contextual knowledge that Alexander does not know that Cicero is also known under the mode of presentation 'Tullius'.

Bach does not go to great length to explain how pragmatic intrusion can account for examples such as (21) and (22). Intuitively, it is clear that what makes the two statements non-contradictory is the fact that Alexander is not able to connect his two notions 'Cicero' and 'Tullius'. Now, pairs of sentences such as (21) and (22) must always be evaluated in context, where contextual knowledge provides linguistic materials that expand the that-clauses further and make it clear that the notions 'Cicero' and 'Tullius' are not linked. The missing constituent is something like (23) or (24):

- (23) (23) the great orator;
- (24) (24) the man I bumped into yesterday at the market place

(Alternatively, the apposition could specify something like "the person I know under the mode of presentation 'Cicero'").

9.7 On Modes of Presentation Again! (Pragmatic Intrusion)

It is now time to explain opacity phenomena and the puzzles associated with belief reports through a theory of pragmatic intrusion in which modes of presentation of propositions are supplied through pragmatics.

²This observation was made by a commentator.

For a minute suppose that one accepts that pragmatics is merely involved in explaining why we find it misleading to report a belief utterance by substituting an NP with a coreferential one, while one accepts that the beliefs reported are essentially the same (thus excluding pragmatic intrusion into the proposition expressed). Now, consider a sentence such as (25):

(25) John believes that Mary Smith is clever.

Suppose that the referent of 'Mary Smith' is x ; then it would be reasonable to assume that if (25) is true, John must believe of x , under the mode of presentation 'Mary Smith', that she is clever. For Salmon, (26) expresses the same proposition as (27):

(25) John believes that she is clever;

(26) John believes that Mary Smith is clever.

He explains the fact that an ordinary speaker surely finds that (26) and (27) are normally taken to have distinct truth-values by resorting to a Gricean pragmatic reasoning. If a speaker attributes the pronominal mode of presentation 'she' to John (in the sense that John believed the proposition that X is clever under the mode of presentation 'She is clever'), it would be misleading to use a more informative sentence such as (27), leading the hearer to attribute the mode of presentation 'Mary Smith' to John. Thus, it is not really reasonable to trust the ordinary speaker's judgements, who cannot distinguish between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional elements of meaning.

Instead, my view is that Salmon's pragmatic view must be refined and recast in terms of Relevance Theory in order to reply to some obvious objections.

Consider a simple sentence such as (28)

(28) John believes that Mary Smith is clever.

(28) has the following logical form:

John believes of x that she is clever.

Pragmatics adds the constituent: under mode of presentation Mo/Mary Smith. Thus, via pragmatic intrusion, we have:

John believes of x , under MoP, that she is clever.

A more elegant representation of this interpretation is certainly the following, adapted from Green (1998):

BEL [John, that Mary Smith is clever, ft (John, 'Mary Smith is clever')]

Where $ft(x, S)$ is a function that takes a person x , a sentence S and a time argument t as arguments and gives as values the way x would take the information content of

sentence S, at t, were it presented to him or her through the very sentence S. (This looks like the theory of Richard (2013) but the details seem to me to be different as the function seems to be one from the proposition expressed by the sentence (of the that-clause) to the mode of presentation expressed by the sentence in the theory of Green (1998)).

I now try to provide an explanation of the interpretation of belief reports on the basis of Sperber & Wilson's relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986). The principle at work in the pragmatic specification of modes of presentation is the following:

Communicative Principle of Relevance According to this principle, every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its optimal relevance. An ostensive stimulus is optimally relevant iff it is (a) relevant enough to be worth the hearer's attention; (b) the most relevant stimulus the speaker could have produced given her abilities and preferences (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 270).

The sentence (28) is optimally relevant if the NP 'Mary Smith' is the mode of presentation (pragmatically) associated with the referent of 'Mary Smith', in other words if it plays some role in the identification of reference for the believer. Given that relevance is a ratio of contextual effects and cognitive efforts, it goes without saying that the use of a proper name in the that-clause of a belief-sentence is maximally relevant if it has maximal positive effects, in other words if it does not just provide a referent but if it is actually used by the believer in identifying the referent in question.

Now we can explain why we have the intuition that (26) and (27) do not have the same truth-conditions, in a more articulated manner, given that we accept that pragmatic intrusion contributes to a fully truth-evaluable proposition (e.g. Carston 1999) and, thus is part of what is **said** (according to Carston's 2002 notion of what is said, not according to Bach's notion of what is said; on the distinction see Burton-Roberts 2005; 2006). Furthermore, in Capone (2006a, 2009) I also argued that pragmatic inferences that contribute to pragmatic intrusion are not cancellable (also see Capone 2009; Burton-Roberts 2005, 2006 in support of this view). If my ideas are correct, the fact that (26) and (27) intuitively correlate with distinct truth-conditions (ordinary speakers would perceive them to have distinct truth-conditions, regardless of how things are from a theoretical point of view) is merely the consequence of our theoretical assumptions about explicatures: explicatures are non-cancellable. (See the chapter on cancellability of explicatures of propositional attitude ascriptions in this volume). My ideas are in line with Sperber & Wilson's view of explicitness outlined in *Relevance* (1986, 182):

Explicitness:

An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit if and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U.

On the analogy of 'implicature', Sperber & Wilson call an explicitly communicated assumption an **explicature**. Logical forms are 'developed' into explicatures by

inferential enrichment. Every explicature, then, is recovered by a combination of decoding and inference.

The picture we have come to is somewhat different from the one adopted in other pragmatic views of propositional attitudes. Salmon (1986) would say that the sentences (26) and (27) are assigned the same truth-conditions, because he essentially leaves pragmatic intrusion out of the picture. To be more precise, he allows pragmatic intrusion up to a point, until the referents of 'she' and 'Mary Smith' are made part of the interpreted logical form, but does not explicitly accept a more radically intrusionistic view, like the one I proposed along the lines of Carston (1999) or Wilson and Sperber (2002), in which the provision of modes of presentation is made part of the proposition uttered. Consider (29) and (30):

- (29) John believes that Hesperus is Hesperus;
- (30) John believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus.

Ordinary speakers appear to attribute distinct truth-conditions to these statements. Salmon explains the oddity in such a judgement by saying that it would be misleading for a speaker who commits herself to (29) to utter (30), since the reference to a mode of presentation (of the reference) is part of the pragmatics of the belief report. Yet, he does not consider the case in which (29) and (30) are not real utterances, but just thoughts, to be attributed to a thinker (in silent utterances). In this case, his pragmatic strategy is not available. Yet, Sperber & Wilson's theory can help explain why (29) and (30) are distinct thoughts by providing each of them with a distinct explicature.

Timothy Williamson (2006) makes an interesting comment. After all, even in thought one can entertain a proposition under the guise of a sentence. Presumably, Williamson thinks that modes of presentation, in thought, are supplied directly by the sentence used to express that thought. But this is not entirely persuasive. Even in thought, we need a mechanism blocking substitution in opaque contexts, so that we shall not say of Mary who thinks that John believes that Hesperus is Hesperus that she thinks that John believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus. As Williamson argues, the sentence used in thought surely can provide a suitable mode of presentation of the reference, but it is no guarantee that substitutions of synonymous expressions is blocked. Instead, this is blocked by mechanisms of interpretations such as those advocated by relevance theorists. A sentence can provide a suitable mode of presentation to a thought, but the principle of relevance ensures that that mode of presentation is the only one under which the proposition is held by the believer or, if this is too strong, that that proposition is not necessarily held under all possible modes of presentation of the reference.

It could be added that surely implicature can occur in the realm of thought as well: I think to myself "Good thing I took the medicine and got better!". I am sure that I take the content of my thought to be some such proposition as 'good thing I took the medicine and, as a result, got better', even though I am not communicating with anyone else.

I quite agree with the above. Pragmatic processes are present even in thought, provided that thought occurs through some linguistic sentences. I take the remarks above as supporting my view that pragmatics is needed to construct propositions

even in thought and, thus, to provide modes of presentation. Presumably, what I was opposing is a view that accepts that it would be misleading for a speaker to utter a belief sentence in case the NP in the embedded *that*-clause is not a mode of presentation under which a referent is thought of by the believer (see also Recanati 1993). Such a view is intrinsically connected with the notion of what goes on in conversation, while we need an account that dispenses with the representation of a real conversation, because belief sentences are employed even in thoughts. Of course it is right that even in thought there are inferences which are the counterparts of the implicatures triggered in actual communication, but here I assume a relevance theory explanation of sentences-in-thought such as “Good thing I took the medicine and got better!”, as this is more in tune with the issue of sentences-in-thought. Gricean explanations are more suitable for actual communication acts.³ In fact, the way Levinson’s (2000) Q- and I-Principle are formulated seems to me to need some notion of actual communication (The Q-principle says that we should not proffer an assertion that is weaker than our knowledge of the world allows, unless asserting a stronger assertion violates the I-Principle. The I-Principle says that we must produce the minimal semantic clues indispensable for achieving our communicative goals (bearing the Q-principle in mind)).

Furthermore, it can be evinced from Green’s (1998) discussion of Salmon’s treatment of belief reports (perhaps one of the clearest expositions of Salmon’s views) that the Gricean explanation of belief reports makes a heavy use of the notion of ‘asserting’, while my relevance theory explanation of the phenomena in question makes allowance for sentences in thought.

Unlike Salmon, I adopt a fully intrusionistic picture in line with Carston (1999) and Wilson and Sperber (2002), and say that the propositions which John is said to believe in (29) and in (30) are distinct, as they include distinct modes of presentation. The pragmatic machinery is responsible for the fleshing out of the propositions believed and the inclusion there of distinct modes of presentation.

It might be worth our while examining more closely the way Relevance Theory can deal with belief reports, in the light of a natural objection arising from accepting Devitt (1996).

Sperber and Wilson (2004) propose the following sub-tasks in the overall comprehension process

- (a) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about explicatures by developing the linguistically-encoded logical form;
- (b) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions (implicated premises);
- (c) Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual implications (implicated conclusions).

So, let us reconstruct the steps required in processing belief reports of the type:

- (31) John believes that Mary is pretty.

³To deal with this issue exhaustively one needs one further paper.

The speaker uttered (31) saying that John believes the proposition that X is pretty. The speaker could have chosen a range MoP1, MoP2, MoPn of modes of presentation to present John's belief (about Mary), but he chose 'Mary' as a mode of presentation of X. The utterance (31) comes with a presumption of optimal relevance, that is with the promise that the actual linguistic choice is determined by the intention of causing maximal contextual effects with minimal processing costs. Now the hearer realizes that the reason why 'Mary' was chosen in the utterance (31) is that the speaker thus hopes to obtain maximal relevance by increasing contextual effects. The interpretation according to which 'Mary' is the mode of presentation under which the belief is held involves maximal positive effects because it serves to differentiate what John believes from what John does not believe, or at least it serves to specify a more fine-grained ascription of belief.⁴

A natural objection is that an utterance of (32)

(32) John believes that Mary Smith is pretty,

can be interpreted without having to assume that 'Mary Smith' is a mode of presentation under which the belief is held. A potential objection, in fact, might come from Devitt (1996), who says that the NP could be used to facilitate recognition of the referent to the hearer of the belief report, in which case it need not play a crucial role in the mental life of the believer (John). Presumably, Devitt's position is in line with Quine (1960, 218):

Commonly the degree of allowable deviation depends on why we are quoting. It is a question of what traits of the quoted speaker's remarks we want to make something of; those are the traits that must be kept straight if our indirect quotation is to count as true. Similar remarks apply to sentences of belief and other propositional attitudes (Quine 1960, 218).

Now, I do not deny that there might be a context in which the hearer H, faced with (32), replies: "Sorry, I do not know Mary Smith", and then the speaker replaces (32) with (33):

(33) John believes that [our department's secretary]0 is pretty.

In this case, given that the context is different and that the hearer understands that the correction has been made to enhance the hearer's comprehension, maximal relevance is achieved if 'our department's secretary' is not the mode of presentation under which the belief is presented (to the believer). In a context in which the focus is on action, maximal positive effects are achieved if one uses descriptions to facilitate the action in question. The **practical** concerns at the heart of Devitt's treatment do not necessarily clash with my view, since Devitt must be aware that his proposal is based on heavy contextual assumptions. Nevertheless, what, I would like to stress is that Devitt's treatment does not do justice to the standard pragmatic interpretation

⁴I was told that the choice of NP may ease the comprehension process (thus reducing processing costs) and that reduced effort may increase overall relevance.

of belief reports. After all, the use in (33) is not perceived to be the normal, ordinary use of belief reports, which is **to throw light on the mental life of believers**. There is one more thing to be added. In the sentence (33), there is an implicit mode of presentation which I marked as 0, which is bound (through pragmatic anaphora) to the NP 'Mary Smith' in (32). This is not to suggest that there is always this implicit mode of presentation in the structure of the explicated thought, yet an array of implicit contextual assumptions may make the interpretation of this 0 as a neutral (and inert) mode of presentation under which the belief is held by the believer.

To consider an example adapted from Devitt (1996), suppose that my cousin, Robert McKay, has recently murdered John Gruff. I know that he is the murderer (furthermore suppose that he always tells me what he does). We happen to read the local newspaper, which has published an interview with an important detective, Sherlock Holmes. The detective provides some details about the state of the investigation and says that he is far from knowing the identity of the murderer. Among the things Sherlock Holmes says is that he believes that the murderer is insane. So both my cousin and I know that Sherlock Holmes is far from knowing the name of the murderer. Yet, I say

(34) Sherlock Holmes believes that the murderer is insane. Thus, Sherlock Holmes believes that [Robert McKay] 0 is insane

where 'Robert McKay' is the mode of presentation adopted to make Sherlock Holmes's belief relevant to H and to induce him to reflect on his mental state and 0 is the mode of presentation under which the belief is originally held by the believer.

That contextual assumptions must be taken into account in pragmatic interpretations is well-known. I do not take these as fatal objections to my relevance-theoretic treatment of belief reports. Green (1998), instead, believes that cases such as the one by Devitt militate against a pragmatic analysis of belief reports, presumably because he would like to align inferences such as the ones arising from belief reports to almost-universal implicatures such as those arising from utterances of "I lost a contact lens". Green argues that the implicature "I lost my contact lens" falls under the scope of negation and of modal embedding (conditionals) and, thus, is an ideal candidate for inclusion in "what is said" by a speaker. Implicatures from belief reports lack the almost-universal feature, presumably because they are defeated in some contexts. Yet, Green undervalues cases of defeasibility such as "I found a contact lens" where the intuitive understanding is that the speaker found somebody else's contact lens. Thus it can be doubted that there are near-universal implicatures in Green's sense. It appears to me that what makes inferences of belief reports eligible to be part of what is said, in addition to being part of the proposition expressed, is the fact that they are not cancellable. I personally find the examples of cancellability by Green (1998) based on Barwise and Perry (1981) and Berg (1988) hard to swallow. Furthermore, the fact that, as Green notes, ordinary speakers' judgements consider utterances of belief reports that express the same proposition but contain distinct modes of presentation as truth-conditionally distinct seems to militate against the view that the inferences of belief reports are implicatures and in favour of the view that they are part of what is said and of (uncancellable) explicatures (I

devote a further chapter on the problem of non-cancellability of explicatures later in this book).

So far, I have argued that pragmatic intrusion is responsible for enriching the logical forms of belief sentences and fleshing out the full truth-evaluable propositions associated with belief reports. The processes I have inquired into are **unreflective**, and largely intuitive, in line with considerations by Wilson (2000, 417). The fact that explicatures are mainly unreflective⁵ can explain why it is that most of us are inclined to think that belief reports are not interchangeable *salva veritate* if an NP is replaced with a coreferential expression.

Devitt's (1996) approach may be seen as an ideal candidate for the treatment of belief reports presumably because it has the merit of reconciling Millian with Fregean theories (Davis 2005). Yet, the approach is unsatisfactory because it does not address semantic and syntactic problems properly. The way Devitt hopes to reconcile both positions is to say that each NP (or AP) within the clause embedded in a belief verb expresses both a referent and a mode of presentation. Yet this apparently conciliatory move does not take into account the syntactic difficulties threatening Schiffer's theory. Surely Devitt would not want to say that each NP (or AP) **semantically** expresses both a referent and a mode of presentation. Even if possibly true, this claim does not explain the opacity problem: the fact that belief contexts block the application of Leibniz's law. Consider Leibniz' Law:

Two things are identical with each other if they are substitutable preserving the truth of the sentence (Jaszczolt 2005, 120).⁶

Arguing in favour of the (semantic) association of every NP with a referent and a mode of presentation would *ipso facto* create a problem in that Leibniz's law would then be inapplicable even in the case of NPs outside the scope of belief-like operators (opacity would be exported outside the scope of belief verbs)⁷; not to mention the fact that not all NPs can be directly associated with referents (what about 'beauty', 'wealth', 'justice'?).

An additional problem is that, in the spirit of his conciliatory proposal, Devitt grants that both transparent and opaque interpretations are licensed by belief reports, following Quine (1960). He grants that a sentence such as (35)

(35) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.

Can receive the two following interpretations:

(36) Ralph believes of Ortcutt that he is a spy;

(37) Ralph believes that (assents to) "Ortcutt is a spy".

⁵ However, I am not saying that they are unreflective in all cases.

⁶ Williamson (2006) correctly argues that a better formulation of Leibniz's law is required. The reader is referred to Asher (2000) and in particular to his identity principle: Suppose that φ is an expression denoting an abstract entity, that φ contains an occurrence of a name α , and that the denotation of α is the same as the denotation of β , then the denotation of $(\varphi) = \text{denotation}(\varphi [\beta/\alpha])$. Something along these lines is required.

⁷ See my last chapter in this book on this problem.

(36) constitutes the transparent construal, whereas (37) constitutes the opaque construal.

A thorny problem for Devitt (and for Quine) is that, everything being equal, a **univocal semantic representation** should be preferred to the ambiguity view, on grounds of parsimony (Modified Occam's Razor; see also the important work by Jaszczolt 1999, who tries to eliminate ambiguities in favour of univocal interpretations). Given his general conciliatory strategy of associating an NP both with a referent and with a mode of presentation, another problem would be that the transparent reading should be obtained by suppressing the mode of presentation the referent is associated with. So, Devitt faces the hard task of explaining where the mode of presentation comes from (semantically) in the opaque construal; in addition, he must explain how the mode of presentation is suppressed in the transparent construal. The move of resorting to the context of utterance is not allowed him, if his strategy is not pragmatic, but merely semantic. His strategy is clearly not pragmatic, given what he says, because he invokes no pragmatic machinery to explain what he assumes. In my opinion, explaining how a mode of presentation within the scope of 'believe' is associated with an NP, in semantic terms, involves syntactically deriving the mode of presentation from the belief verb and claiming that it is an argument of the verb. But this move is not devoid of problems, as Schiffer and Recanati convincingly noticed.

A pragmatic approach avoids the proliferation of senses (the ambiguity problem) and also explains why in some contexts, but not in others, modes of presentation are suppressed. It also explains why the opacity construals are *default*,⁸ achieved by maximizing relevance. The transparent interpretation is simply achieved by preventing a mode of presentation from arising, and thus needs a context in which the suppression of the mode of presentation is mandated by background knowledge. I also want to say that the suppression of a mode of presentation should not be considered a case of defeasibility. Explicatures are derived/constructed through unreflective pragmatic mechanisms promoting the most relevant interpretation, that is to say, the one with the greatest amount of positive cognitive effects. An interpretation reducing the possibility of mistaken action is more relevant than an alternative interpretation (in a context in which there is focus on the action) because it maximises contextual effects. This is why MoPs are prevented from arising in certain cases in which there is a heavy emphasis on the facilitation of action (presumably in Devitt's cases discussed above).

My proposal has much to do with modes of presentation, but in a sense, it ignores a very important fact pointed out by Jaszczolt (1999). An NP embedded in that-clauses in belief reports has the main function of referring to an entity that belongs to the real world. In my approach, this important fact can be reconciled with the fact that the referent is normally associated with a specific mode of presentation. That NPs within that-clauses of belief reports refer to **extra-linguistic entities** is also ensured by inferential pragmatics, since a that-clause providing information about the world, in addition to providing information about the believer's mental life, is

⁸I am not arguing that the inferences in question are the result of default rules, but only that they standardly get through.

more informative, as it **eliminates** a greater amount of states of the world, and is conducive to successful action (on the notion of informativeness, see the important work by Levinson (2000), as well as his papers on anaphora). Thus relevance is increased, as a result of increased contextual effects.

9.8 Further Considerations on Null Appositives

What I have so far proposed is that pragmatic intrusion provides a specific mode of presentation, while I have suggested that there is a constituent present in the structure of the explication having the features of a pronominal or a free variable and is a (pragmatic) empty category, in that it does not receive a phonological representation. This is a **null appositive** (it should be clear, however, that I am not proposing that the variable is present at LF). The possibility of an NP's having an appositive is exemplified by sentences such as (38)

(38) Mary, the President of our union, is clever.

An appositive is surely a modifier, in that it adds further qualifications or restrictions to those expressed by the main NP. The appositive adds a superior node to an NP node, a node with similar features, thus an NP. Of course, it is important to know whether the appositive adds a further constituent to the main proposition expressed by the sentence. My answer is that it does not and simply makes the referring potential of the name it is an appositive to more explicit. Given that, in our belief sentences, the appositive representing a mode of presentation is a null element, we can represent it in this way:

(39) John believes that [NP [NP Mary] [NP 0]] is clever.

The most thorny problem I can see, with this proposal, is that, after all, we would have to generalize it to all NPs. Thus, in (39), the NP 'John' too would have to be associated with a null Mode of Presentation. Is not then opacity created in subject position too? Well, my proposal crucially hinges on the interaction between the empty category 0 and the verb 'believe' which has 0 in its scope. 'John' is outside the scope of 'believe' and thus no interesting interaction, resulting in an opacity effect, obtains. The implicit mode of presentation in the subject position of (39) does not result in opacity effects, because it does not prevent substitution *salva veritate* of the NP 'John'.

Another problem with my proposal could be the following. It may be plausibly argued that a sentence such as (38) is truth-conditionally equivalent to (40):

(40) Mary, who is the President of our union, is clever.

Now, suppose we embed this sentence into a belief sentence, we obtain:

(41) John thinks that Mary, who is the President of our union, is clever.

However, on one interpretation the relative clause just gives more information about Mary without shedding light on how John thinks of her. The objection is a natural one and a very good one too. I pointed out in a previous section that Bach's use of appositive clauses could not be the end of the story and that further pragmatic processing was involved. The objection gives additional reason for assuming that a story in terms of Relevance Theory is needed. This story must explain why an appositive clause is needed and how this appositive clause is assumed to be part of the believer's mode of presentation of the proposition believed. However, one might retort that the problem arises not really from implicit appositives, but from explicit ones, like the ones above, which can be understood '*de re*' (as not being part of the believer's mode of presentation). Cases such as this can be disposed of with a pragmatic treatment in line with Sperber & Wilson's considerations. The implicit appositive clause is interpreted as providing a mode of presentation that serves to specify further the believer's belief state because this interpretation has greater contextual effects than a merely referential interpretation. In other words, considerations analogous to the ones I adopted in resolving Jaszczolt's problem apply here. This problem seems to me of great theoretical importance. I will take it up later (A possible solution is that relative clauses introduce presuppositions that need to be satisfied in the context of utterance and thus establish a more direct connection with the context of utterance than with the mental panorama of the believer; however, I will connect this solution with the logical form of belief reports, which I propose towards the end of this chapter).

The discussion so far has hinged on the assumption that we can have something like null appositives, specifically modes of presentation, in the structure of NPs belonging to that-clauses embedded in verbs of belief. The literature on pragmatic intrusion is characterised by endless discussions on whether we should posit empty constituents in logical forms of sentences such as "It rains". Recanati (2004) is a champion of the view that we should not posit these empty categories at logical form. In the words of Mey (personal communication), I must say that in cases such as the one discussed by Recanati there is not clear-cut evidence in favour of one or another theory. But is there independent evidence for the existence of this null appositive that modifies NPs within the scope of belief verbs? I propose we should set aside the task of assigning null appositives at logical form and remain content with stipulating that such appositives appear in the propositions expressed, that is to say the explicature (so we are following Recanati 2004 and Carston 2002). Crucial and indubitable evidence comes from sentences such as (42):

(42) John believes that Mary Pope went to Paris and that she had fun.

I propose we should analyse (42) as providing evidence for a proposition such as:

(43) John believes that [Mary Pope] ₀ went to Paris and that [she] ₀ had fun.

It is interesting to note that if we allow implicit modes of presentation, we are faced with a double anaphoric pattern, as the indexes show:

(44) John believes that [Mary Pope]_i _{0n} went to Paris and that [she]_i _{0n} had fun.

The subscript *i* represents the reference of ‘Mary Pope’, and this is attributed through coindexation to ‘she’. Instead, *n* is the subscript attributed to 0, the mode of presentation associated with ‘Mary Pope’ (which must be coindexed with the form ‘Mary Pope’), and that is coindexed with the implicit mode of presentation 0 associated with ‘she’. Notice that, unless we establish this (conceptual) anaphoric chain, which is possible only through the existence of null modes of presentation (or null appositives), it would be possible to understand (42) allowing ‘she’ to be intersubstitutable with any NP at all that has the same referent as ‘Mary Pope’, with no regard for the mode of presentation ‘Mary Pope’. But this is not the natural interpretation of the utterance (An upshot of this is that even if we believe that coextensive NPs can sometimes be intersubstituted in that-clauses of belief reports (as Devitt says), intersentential substitutions in anaphoric chains are not licit).

Further evidence comes from control structures:

(45) John believes Mary Pope to be in Paris and [PRO]₀ to be working hard (instead she is having fun with her other boyfriend).

The control structure ensures that the reference of ‘Mary Pope’ is transmitted through anaphora to PRO; however unless we posit that PRO has a null appositive in the explicature, we cannot account for the opacity of the structure, as certainly by replacing PRO with an NP coreferential with ‘Mary Pope’ (but distinct from it) a statement having different truth-conditions is obtained.⁹

A more interesting piece of evidence comes from Italian control structures:

(46) Maria crede di PRO essere intelligente.

(lit. Maria believes PRO to be intelligent)

Maria believes she is intelligent.

Suppose we call Maria ‘Maria’, but she does not know that this is her name; in fact, she does not know that she has a name. Maria thinks of herself under some mode of presentation of the self (a first-person mode of presentation), but this does not include the name ‘Maria’, which, instead, is the mode of presentation we associate with her. This case strongly supports the idea that we must posit a propositional structure such as the following:

(47) Maria crede di [PRO]₀ essere intelligente.

In fact, while PRO in the present case receives its reference through an anaphoric link with Maria, it cannot be associated with the mode of presentation ‘Maria’. We thus need a way of signalling that PRO must be possibly distinct from 0 and that 0 must be possibly distinct from ‘Maria’. 0 is associated with PRO, but not through anaphora, only as a null appositive capable of having the meaning of ‘whatever coincides with the subject of belief’.¹⁰ This is what Lewis (1979) calls an attitude

⁹In this respect, my view is different from Salmon’s.

¹⁰My example is reminiscent of an example by Stanley and Williamson (2001), who actually use a case of amnesia to exemplify *de se* interpretations.

‘de se’. Higginbotham’s (2004) considerations on the “internal” aspect of PRO (in the context of a discussion of ‘de se’ beliefs) are applicable here: what is believed by Maria to be intelligent is the subject of the experience BELIEVING (see also Stanley and Williamson 2001, for an analogous view). The example (47) is reminiscent of Castañeda’s (1966) famous example “The editor of Soul knows that he is a millionaire”. This, according to Castañeda, does not entail that the Editor of Soul knows that the Editor of Soul is a millionaire.

In Capone (2000), I proposed that clitics in **clitic-doubling constructions**¹¹ qualify propositions believed or known in a special way, anchoring them to discourse. While I recognize that more than one view is tenable in connection with the Italian clitic ‘lo’, I now think that a theory along the lines I have just proposed is not untenable (Also see Capone 2013).

Further evidence comes from verbs of propositional attitude like ‘want’, which mandate control structures. Consider (49):

(49) Mary wants Cicero PRO, but not Tullius, to come to her party.

Suppose Mary is not aware that Cicero is Tullius; she would like Cicero to come to the party, but she would like Tullius not to come to her party (say she has always heard nice things about Cicero but bad things about Tullius). If she knew that Cicero is Tullius, she would not let him come (49) ought to be analysed as:

Mary wants Cicero [ti 0 to come to the party] but she does not want Tullius [tii 0 to come to the party].¹²

Unless we posit null appositive modes of presentation associated with ti and tii, the sentence (50) has to be perceived as a contradiction, since ti inherits its reference from ‘Cicero’, tii inherits its reference from ‘Tullius’ (in conjunction with the premise that Cicero=Tullius). However, the sentence is not contradictory because Mary, due to her frame of mind, will not admit Tullius to her party (given the bad things she has heard about him), but she will allow Cicero (given the nice things she has heard about him).¹³ The sentence (50) reminds us of Carston’s famous example (originally from Cohen 1971):

(50) If the king of France dies and France becomes a republic, I shall be happy, but if France becomes a republic and the king of France dies I shall be unhappy.

The sentence (50) has a veneer of contradiction, unless we furnish the explicatures and provide a temporal and causal interpretation for the material in each if-clause. When the underdeterminacy is resolved, we are no longer confronted with a

¹¹ For example,

(48) Giovanni lo sa che Maria è a Parigi
((lit.) John it knows that Mary is in Paris).

¹² I am adopting this analysis from Carnie (2002).

¹³ This case seems to strongly support the idea that explicatures of belief reports are not cancellable.

possibly contradictory sentence/statement (however, see Capone 2006a for a more detailed proposal, in addition to Burton-Roberts 2005). Analogously, by furnishing the explicature of (50) and in particular by coindexing each 0 (implicit mode of presentation) with the NP 0 is an appositive to, we obtain a statement that is no longer contradictory.

My proposal abides by Carston's precept that:

(...) pragmatic processes can supply constituents to what is said solely on communicative grounds, without any linguistic pointer (Carston 2002, 23).

There is an interesting interaction between modality and belief reports, and it might be useful to analyse the modal 'ought'. Obligations are normally imposed by the rules of society on people who act in certain roles. Were they not to act in such roles, they would not contract the relevant obligations. For example, as I am a teacher I ought to lecture almost every morning in my school (but not on Sundays!). The mode of presentation is important, as the obligation is perceived only under a specific mode of presentation, which includes a public role (it follows that I should not lecture on Sundays, when I do not act as a public official). So consider the following example:

(51) John believes he ought to lecture in the morning.

Although some may deny this, I believe that implicit modes of presentation are at play here, explaining that the propositional form includes that John believes that he, qua teacher, ought to lecture in the morning (every working day of his life as a teacher, but certainly not when he retires); in other words, the modal 'ought' selects a **stage** of John's life in which he is a teacher and cannot be extended to periods of time in which he is retired). If such considerations make sense, we can explain why substitution can be blocked in the following case:

(52) John believes that the Prime Minister ought to go to the ceremony of the opening of the judiciary year;

(53) John believes that Berlusconi ought to go to the ceremony of the opening of the judiciary year.

The expression 'the prime minister' in (52) may receive an attributive or a referential interpretation. The attributive interpretation is 'whoever is the Prime Minister'; the referential interpretation is 'Berlusconi'. Suppose we confine ourselves to the attributive interpretation. From this interpretation, it follows that if the Prime Minister ought to go to the ceremony, then Berlusconi has to go. Yet, from (52) it does not follow that (53) is unconditionally true. First, the speaker need not know that Berlusconi happens to be the Prime Minister. Second, (53) follows from (52) **provided that** the speaker knows of the identity in question and on the understanding that 'ought' is confined to the period in which Berlusconi is in charge as Prime Minister. These moral matters ought to have discouraged Devitt (1996), who, instead, uses the attributive/referential interpretative ambiguity to argue that substitution of NPs in belief sentences is licit for communicative purposes.

A further example that can be used to prove that implicit modes of presentation do some work at the propositional level is drawn from Seymour's (1992) paper. Seymour defends a sentential theory of propositional attitudes and essentially believes that a person *X* believes that *S* in case he is in a relation *R* to a certain sentence. If we mention the sentence in order to specify its character, the whole belief sentence reports a belief relation between the agent and a certain linguistic meaning under a mode of presentation that is a certain verbal form. If we mention the subordinate clause in order to specify its content, the agent is then described as being in a relation with the content of the sentence mentioned and, in this case, the sentence no longer behaves as a mode of presentation. Seymour calls the first type of belief **intentional belief** and the second **material belief**. Seymour considers that intentional beliefs (opaque readings) are distinguished by the fact that they are **reflexive**. Material beliefs are distinguished by the fact that they are not reflexive. Thus, if (54) is true, (55) must be true, provided that we consider the opaque reading of (54):

(54) John believes that Mary Simpson went to Paris.

(55) John believes he believes that Mary Simpson went to Paris.

If John is not ready to assent to 'Mary Simpson went to Paris', there is no way to derive the inference (55). Seymour's intuition is most easily explained away by resorting to modes of presentation (given Kripke's reasonable doubts about the equation of believing and assenting to a proposition). Thus the statement or thought (54) must receive an adequate representation as (56):

(56) John believes that [Mary Simpson]_i 0_i went to Paris

where 0 represents the null appositive or mode of presentation, which is coindexed with the form 'Mary Simpson'.

Timothy Williamson (2006) says that we should also consider the case in which John lacks self-knowledge or does not grasp the concept of belief. Presumably this amounts to an objection against my treatment. As a reply, I consider that in some cases the reflexivity of belief (or of knowledge) comes to the philosopher's help in resolving otherwise insuperable problems. Stanley and Williamson's (2001) discussion of opacity in favour of the idea that knowledge-how is a sub-species of knowledge-that is one such case. Of course, if knowledge-that involved opacity while knowledge-how involved a transparent relation to an embedded proposition *p*, there would be serious trouble for Stanley & Williamson who have taken great pains to analyse knowledge-how in terms of a relation between a (cognitive) agent and a proposition (invoking the semantic machinery of embedded questions). In particular, there would be trouble if there was no significant truth-conditional difference between "Hannah knows how to locate Hesperus" and "Hannah knows how to locate Phosphorus". Stanley & Williamson claim that the latter proposition does not seem to follow from the former. But I think that their analysis tacitly assumes that knowledge is a reflexive relation. Only reflexivity can block the intersubstitution of the two names, because despite the fact that Hannah is able to locate that planet there in the sky (on a map of the universe) regardless of its name(s) (and thus in a sense she is able to locate both Hesperus and Phosphorus), she would not say of

herself that she knows she knows how to locate Phosphorus even if she knows she knows how to locate Hesperus. As Seymour would say, it is the reflexive notion of knowledge-how to block substitution.

Independent evidence in favour of the presence of modes of presentation of the referent in that-clauses of belief reports comes from what Stanley (2005) says about ellipsis. Stanley argues that explicatures play a role into certain linguistic processes like anaphora and deixis (this is well known since Chomsky 1972, 33). An example such as (57)

(57) The ham sandwich wants his bill now.

proves that the pragmatic determination of the referent of 'The ham sandwich' (the person who ordered the ham sandwich) must be available for anaphoric coindexation. The examples of ellipsis are even more interesting. Consider (58):

(58) Bill served a ham sandwich, and John did too.

(58) cannot be interpreted as conveying that Bill served a person who ordered a ham sandwich, whereas John served a ham sandwich. The explicature of the first conjunct of (58) must be available for the understanding of the elided constituent too. In other words it must be used in providing an explicature that reconstructs the missing (elided) constituent.

Analogous considerations apply to metaphorical meaning, which is carried over in ellipsis, showing that explicatures play a role in this linguistic process:

(59) John is a pig and Bill is too.

Now, let us apply ellipsis to belief reports. Consider:

(60) John believes that Kent Clark is not Superman and Fred does too.

We said above that ellipsis carries over the explicature of the first sentence to the elided constituent. Thus, it is not licit to interpret (60) as the thought that John believes a non-contradictory thought while Fred believes a contradictory one. In other words, it is not licit to replace 'Kent Clark' with 'Superman' in the elided constituent, as a result of a syntactic constraint due to ellipsis: the explicature of the first sentence must be used in reconstructing the meaning of the elided constituent (we could also use talk of a 'parallel' explicature). What is this explicature? I assume that it consists in the attribution of the mode of presentation 'Kent Clark' to the referent Kent Clark.

Analogous considerations apply to (61) (to use comparatives, which were first taken account of by Carston in her discussion of the semantics/pragmatics debate):

(61) John believes that Kent Clark is better than Superman and Fred does too.

As Carston (2002) and Levinson (2000) noted, the statement 'A is better than B' presupposes that A and B are distinct, otherwise it communicates a patently false thought.

Ellipsis in (61) imposes the constraint that the explicature of the first conjoined sentence should carry over to the elided constituent. In particular, the elided con-

stituent cannot be interpreted as “Fred holds the belief that Kent Clark is better than himself”. What is it that blocks substitution ‘salva veritate’ in the elided constituent? Presumably it is the fact that ‘Kent Clark is associated with the mode of presentation ‘Kent Clark’ in the explicature of the first conjunct and it cannot be associated with the mode of presentation ‘Superman’ in the explicature of the second conjunct. This is best explained away on the assumption that the explicature of the first conjunct is that Kent Clark is associated with the MoP ‘Kent Clark’ in John’s belief and that there is a linguistic constraint due to ellipsis such that the explicature of the first conjunct is carried over to the elided constituent of the second conjunct (These examples too seem to prove that explicatures of belief reports are not cancellable; also see Chap. 14 on superman sentences and substitution failure in simple sentences).

9.9 An Alternative Analysis

So far, I have developed an analysis following Bach’s idea that one should posit null appositives not in the logical form, but at the level of the propositional form. I have also elaborated on the reasons why null appositives are required at the level of the logical form. Yet, as it could be correctly pointed out, I am not exempted from providing a semantic analysis of the propositional form thus obtained through pragmatic expansion. Furthermore, it is possible that the ideas exposed so far may be further expanded so as accommodate a plausible objection on the part of my hypothetical opponent. Presumably a semantic analysis of the propositional development of null appositive clauses looks like this:

John believes that [NP 0 VP]

where 0 is a null appositive (presumably an NP). This is in line with Del Gobbo’s (2003) idea that appositives expand NPs into NPs (through adjunction). If we adopt the idea that a null appositive is nothing but a relative clause, then we have a further expansion of the structure above:

John believes that [NP [CP who [t is NP]] VP]

where t is the trace of the relative pronoun which moves to a node dominated by CP (complementizer phrase) (see Haegeman 1994).

A plausible consequence of this analysis is that the null relative clauses may be taken to provide the speaker’s in addition to the believer’s mode of presentation of the reference. In response to this possible objection, something else must be said about a sentence such as “John believes that Mary went to Paris”.

We can assume that all attitudinatives have a null appositive that has an internal articulation of the type [MoP/SN, MoP/VP], where by MoP we indicate a mode of presentation. We also suppose that this supposition can be held cross-linguistically

(unless there is evidence that a language must be assigned a different structure; for such cases we are open to the hypothesis that languages may vary according to whether they exhibit tacit or otherwise explicit appositive clauses to attitudinatives).

At this point all attitudinatives have the following semantic/syntactic structure:

John believes [[that P] [NPMoP VPMoP]]

It is not surprising that there are appositives to sentences, given that sentential arguments are assimilated to NPs. In any case, De Vries (2002) provides a number of examples of appositives to sentences. Given this semantic structure, relevance theory intervenes to supply appropriate binding between NPMoP and the NP occurring in P.

At this point we can easily explain the intuition that non-restrictive relative clauses actually express a speaker's in addition to a believer's mode of presentation. This can be explained by the fact that processing effort decreases relevance and, thus, to preserve the high relevance of the non-restrictive relative clause, we need the extra assumption that the non-restrictive relative clause expresses the speaker's mode of presentation, in addition to the believer's mode of presentation.

By incorporating qua-clauses not at the level of the uttered sentence, but at the level of the null appositive we have immediately resolved the problem we are tackling.

It may be objected that this alternative analysis places a greater load on the semantics, than on the pragmatics. Yet, we still have to posit appositives to explain the behaviour of clitic-doubling in languages like Italian and to posit null appositives for English is no costly move, given that appositives exist in English and thus the English language must have the semantic and syntactic resources for expressing them.

It may take time to adjudicate between the previous position and the one I express albeit tentatively in this section. It is not clear to me that the null appositive view, as I expressed it, requires positing free variables (of a complex kind) at Logical Form, in the sense of Stanley (2000), in which case pragmatics is assigned the modest role of filling in these variables, of giving them semantic values by saturating them. The picture I have so far provided is compatible with a full pragmatic intrusion story. The syntactic structure of the null appositive to the embedded clause of a belief report is just the structure of a constituent we mentally supply through pragmatics and it is possibly not part of the semantic structure of a belief sentence.

At this point, we have to clear out how we should treat clitic doubling belief-like constructions. Supposedly, they have a structure similar to the constructions where no clitic appears, with the difference that the clitic is already there, and already functions as an apposition to the *that*-clause. However, there is nothing in the grammar that banishes the idea of having cyclic appositives (or reiterated appositives), an appositive being an appositive to another appositive. At this point, we can assign the following structure to clitic doubling constructions such as “Giovanni lo sa che p”:

Giovanni sa [[che S] [[NP lo] [NP/MoP, VP/MoP]]]

This enables the clitic to provide, by semantic implication, a mode of presentation of the whole of S, while [NP/MoP, VP/MoP] supplies a structure which is more articulated and provides modes of presentation variables which can be bound with NPs within the embedded clause. We can think of these variables as present in constituents we assign the sentence through pragmatics. The present analysis assumes, in line with de Vries (2002), that appositives can be stacked in English and in many other languages (an English example is “This man, who came to dinner late, about whom nobody knew anything...”). (See Capone 2013 on the pragmatics of pronominal clitics for a deeper discussion of this issue).

9.10 Loose Ends

We should now turn to a problem noted by Braun (1998). Braun believes that Fregean theories hold the view that speakers routinely think about other people’s mental representations and intend to talk about those mental representations when they utter belief sentences. He thinks that the following case is problematic for Fregean theories. Suppose Gingrich says:

(62) I am a Republican.

Linda hears that and forms a belief about Gingrich. Any of the following is a correct description of Linda’s belief:

(63) Linda believes that Gingrich is a Republican;

(64) Linda believes that you are a republican (addressing Gingrich);

(65) Linda believes that he is a Republican (demonstrating Gingrich).

Braun’s point is to show that, regardless of the mode of presentation Linda makes use of in her (unexpressed) thought, one can use modes of presentation such as ‘Gingrich’ or pronouns whose content is retrieved relative to the context of utterance. Braun concludes that the Fregean emphasis on the mode of presentation of the believer is misguided, as in actual conversation we are in fact more busy identifying reference.

Wayne Davis (2005, 268) provides the following reply to Braun’s argument:

In this case, the fact that ‘Gingrich’, ‘he’ and ‘you’ differ markedly in meaning does not matter at all. But this is clearly a case in which the belief ascriptions are intended transparently. It is on the opaque interpretation that substitutivity fails (Davis 2005, 268).

My answer to Braun is different from Davis’s. A point Braun neglects is that in context we know quite well that Linda thinks of Gingrich as Gingrich and thus it follows that a suitable mode of presentation of the referent could either be the name

‘Gingrich’ (as was done in (63)) or a pronominal, making an **implicit** reference to the mode of presentation ‘Gingrich’. In other words, Braun’s considerations, valuable though they are, do not militate against my approach which posits implicit appositives (in the explicature) to account for implicit modes of presentation.

Davis (2005) has an example that is useful for the discussion of explicatures (once again I notice that I talk of explicatures, while other theorists talk about implicatures). I believe that explicatures are not cancellable (see Capone forthcoming). Consider in detail Davis’s discussion in terms of the implicatures of belief reports:

The metalinguistic implicature will be cancelled when it is evident in the context that the speaker is using a language not known by the subject being described. If I say, ‘Boris Yeltsin believes that the Pacific Ocean is larger than the Atlantic’, I would not imply or be taken to have implied that Yeltsin believes any English sentence to be true. When we ascribe beliefs to a prelinguistic child or animal, we do not implicate that the subject would believe any sentence at all to be true (Davis 2005, 177).

The hearer knows from the very beginning that Yeltsin’s thoughts are described **through translation** and thus immediately accesses the assumption that the proposition embedded in the belief report is not as fine-grained as if the speaker were talking about an English believer (see also Green 1998 on similar cases). Yet, this pragmatic information amounts to an explicature, not to an implicature. On the present view, the following argument (from Williamson 2006) turns out to be valid (with the proviso that we are talking about coarse-grained beliefs and that, following Kripke, we give up the assumption that believing amounts to assenting to a sentence):

Bush believes that it is raining; Yeltsin believes that it is raining; Bush is not Yeltsin; therefore at least two people believe that it is raining.

The reasoning should suffice to prove that the pragmatically supplied constituents of belief reports (in particular appositive clauses specifying modes of presentation) are part of explicatures. It is propositions that are involved in logical deductive inferences, not fragmentary logical forms. For a full discussion of the role played by pragmatic inference in deductive inferences see Levinson (1983). The explicatures in belief reports like the ones in the Bush/Yeltsin case are motivated by the search for the most relevant proposition effects **compatible with the speaker’s abilities and preferences**. The speaker is obviously not capable of translating a belief and of doing justice to the original modes of presentation because the translation would become too laborious and thus relevance would be threatened by undue processing efforts.

The differences between my approach and standard pragmatic approaches (e.g. Salmon’s) can surmount an otherwise insuperable objection by Davis (2005, 278), which I deal with below. One who knows the Superman story (I assume everyone is acquainted with it) must accept the following thoughts:

- (66) Lois knows that 'Superman' refers to Superman;
 (67) Lois knows that 'Clerk Kent' refers to Clark Kent.

But in the Millian theory 'Superman' refers to Clark Kent and 'Clark Kent' refers to Superman.

Thus, if we conjoin the thoughts in (66) and (67) with these referential identities, we obtain the following true statements:

- (68) Lois knows that 'Superman' refers to Clark Kent;
 (69) Lois knows that 'Clark Kent' refers to Superman.

But then how can Lois fail to know that the two names are coreferential?

Davis's reasoning is easily surmounted if one accepts as was proposed earlier, that pragmatic intrusion characterises the proposition expressed. Once the intrusion is fully characterised, the proposition expressed cannot be cancelled. Thus, unless in context it is clear that Lois knows the identity Superman = Kent Clark, it will not do to replace Superman in (67) with Kent Clark, in that this substitution suggests that the mode of presentation of the reference should be changed too, but this is not possible because the explicature is not cancellable.

9.11 Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to connect two issues usually dealt with separately: belief reports and pragmatic intrusion (the semantics/pragmatics debate). I have proposed that advances in the former issue cannot be made without advances in the latter. The semantics of a sentence is often too skeletal to accommodate all the elements of a thought; thus pragmatics must contribute to the expression of implicit constituents. Modes of presentation are usually contributed to a thought through pragmatics. The contribution of this chapter is to explain, through relevance theory, that a belief report opens a window on the mental panorama of a believer and focuses on his way of representing constituents of thought. I also argued that this pragmatic picture is necessitated by linguistic facts, such as anaphora, control, ellipsis, 'de se' beliefs, inferential properties of beliefs, modality, presuppositional clitics, etc.

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Chapter 10

The Semantics and Pragmatics of Attitudes ‘de se’

It is widely accepted that there is a huge gap between the meaning of a sentence and the messages actually conveyed by the uttering of that sentence (Huang 2007).

But why do we need clear, sharply demarcated boundaries at all, when pragmatics is in constant development, so that boundary markers, once placed, will have to be moved all the time? Maybe a ‘pragmatic definition’ of pragmatics could be found that avoids both the Scylla and Charybdis of the above alternative? (Mey 2001, 7).

10.1 Introduction

Since Mill (1872), there is a convergence in pragmatics on the idea that “What a speaker intends to communicate is characteristically far richer than what she directly expresses; in many cases, linguistic meaning radically underdetermines the message conveyed and understood. Speaker S tacitly exploits pragmatic principles to bridge this gap and counts on hearer H to invoke the same principles for the purposes of utterance interpretation” (Horn and Ward 2004). In the spirit of Horn’s programmatic assertion, in this chapter I shall deal with utterances reporting attitudes ‘de se’ and I suggest that pragmatic principles and mechanisms are at play in the recovery of ‘de se’ attitudes, in cases in which grammatical and semantic information does not exclusively determine the ‘de se’ interpretation. The examples I shall consider are cases like ‘John believes he is clever’ or ‘John remembers walking in Oxford’, where a subject has a thought or a memory about himself (the subject of the thought) and these are contrasted with examples like ‘John believes he is clever’ (‘He’ used here to refer to someone other than John, whom the speaker is pointing to), in which the pronominal has a ‘de re’ interpretation. In cases like ‘John remembers walking in Oxford’, following Higginbotham (2003), I assume that PRO (the null subject of the subordinate clause) is associated with a ‘de se’ interpretation.

I shall argue that ‘de se’ attitude attributions are not completely reducible to pragmatic mechanisms that take input from ‘de re’ logical forms. I propose that the pragmatic processes at work in cases where semantics and grammar do not fully

determine the ‘*de se*’ reading consist of free enrichment (John believes *he** is clever). In free enrichments, although there does not seem to be either an overt indexical or a covert slot in the linguistically decoded logical form of the sentence uttered, the logical form nevertheless needs to be conceptually enriched in the explicature (Huang 2007, 191). I cast my view in the relevance-theoretic framework, according to which the human cognitive system works tends to maximise relevance with respect to communication: the principle of relevance is responsible for both the explicit and implicit content of an utterance. However, it should also be said that I was greatly influenced by Levinson’s (2000) ideas about pragmatic intrusion. I propose to add another type of intrusive constructions: sentences expressing attitudes ‘*de se*’.

The article has the following structure. I initially present philosophical theories of ‘*de se*’ attitudes, starting from Castañeda (1966). I then discuss a linguistic treatment of ‘*de se*’ attitudes’ (Higginbotham 2003). In the final sections I discuss pragmatic intrusion and I distinguish cases in which ‘*de se*’ inferences are cancellable and those where they are not. I propose that PRO is associated with ‘*de se*’ beliefs through semantics alone (pragmatics is not involved), but that the internal dimension of PRO is a pragmatic inference. I also propose that Higginbotham’s treatment does not do justice to the fact that ‘*de se*’ beliefs involve a mode of presentation incorporating a mental tokening of ‘I’. This component of meaning is on top of Higginbotham’s semantics for PRO’s first-personal readings. (I modify his semantic elucidations to accommodate this intuition). As Recanati (2007) says “Indeed, the ability to entertain implicit *de se* thoughts is arguably a necessary condition for anyone to evolve the concept EGO” (Recanati 2007, 177). Analogously, I propose that there can be no ‘*de se*’ thought without a mode of presentation that somehow vocalizes the word ‘I’ (albeit in thought) or some transformation of it. My proposal is that the content of this word ‘I’ is mixture of a demonstrative and of a proper name and has to supplement Higginbotham’s treatment of the first-personal reading of PRO.

To be even more schematic, I claim that ‘*de se*’ interpretations associated with the pronominal ‘he’ (the cases for which Castañeda uses the asterisk) are pragmatic and I explain how pragmatics predicts them. I also predict a number of ‘*de re*’ interpretations through pragmatics. The external first-personal dimension of PRO in constructions such as ‘John remembers going to the cinema’ is semantically ‘*de se*’, following Higginbotham (2003).

Hornian, Levinsonian and relevance theories bear on the present analysis in that (1) they assume that there is a gap between the sentential meaning and utterance meaning, as is also attested in the case of ‘*de se*’ intrusive constructions; (2) they provide the principles of the analysis of the pragmatic inferences which in some, but not in all cases, are responsible for ‘*de se*’ interpretations. (3) These theories are compatible with Jaszczolt’s (2005) theory of merger representations, postulated levels in which semantic, pragmatic and socio-cultural information merge to produce propositional forms that are truth-evaluable.

Here I consider the following list of factors for the purpose of my pragmatic analysis:

List of factors in ‘de se’ attitude analysis

Expressions	Verbs	‘de se’ or ‘de re’	Internal	External
PRO	Believe	de se	Semantic	Semantic
He, him	remember	de re	or	or
His	imagine		Pragmatic	Pragmatic
himself	Expect			
He himself	Dream			
	Forget			
	Know...			

In particular, I argue that ‘imagine’, and ‘expect’, ‘dream’, ‘know’ are different from ‘remember’ in terms of the internal dimension.

10.2 Philosophical Perspectives on ‘de se’ Attitudes and Ego-Like Concepts

Although my treatment is a linguistic one, in that it mainly deals with interpretations of utterances and with a systematic exploration of minimal pairs, there is no denying that the topic originated in philosophy. I therefore start this chapter with an orderly presentation of theories of ‘de se’ beliefs and other (propositional) attitudes. The verbs we are going to analyse are ‘believe’, ‘remember’, ‘image’, ‘want’, etc., usually referred to as verbs of propositional attitude. Since ‘de se’ beliefs specifically raise doubts as to whether propositions are involved in the analysis of such verbs, it is best to use the neutral term ‘attitudes’. The theory of ‘de se’ attitudes is clearly a topic within the philosophy of mind; however, here I shall be more narrowly concerned with linguistic implications of philosophical theories. In other words, I shall be mainly preoccupied with matters such as inference and, specifically, linguistic entailment. In this section, it is not possible to review all the articles or books on ‘de se’ beliefs in great detail – and I am sure there are ramifications we have to explore in the future. However, it is possible to follow the ideas on ‘de se’ interpretations triggered by Castañeda’s seminal article which is the basis for my pragmatic interpretation of ‘de se’ attitudes, through the development by Perry who insists on the causal efficacy of having ‘de se’ thoughts. The discussion by Millikan is essential to my claim that ‘de se’ readings involve the use of an indexical like ‘I’ in one’s thought. Harcourt explores the view that ‘I’ could be an implicated component of ‘de se’ readings. This too connects with my idea that ‘de se’ readings involve the concept of ‘I’.

10.2.1 ‘*De se*’ vs. ‘*de re*’ Attitudes

According to Castañeda, there is a difference between (1) and (2)

- (1) The editor of Soul believes that the editor of Soul is a millionaire;
- (2) The editor of Soul believes that he* is a millionaire.

Specifically (1) can be true, without its being the case that (2) is true. Suppose that John has been informed of the fact that the Editor of Soul has inherited a huge sum of money: then he knows that the editor of Soul is a millionaire. However, he has not been informed of a sudden change in the board of Soul and, specifically, he does not know that he himself has been appointed editor of Soul. Then he does not know that he himself is the editor of Soul, albeit he knows that the editor of Soul is a millionaire. Since the pronominal ‘he’ is ambiguous between a ‘*de se*’ and a ‘*de re*’ interpretation, Castañeda uses the asterisk to disambiguate. The asterisk will turn the pronominal into an **essential indexical** (presumably it is these asterisks that are the topic of our pragmatic analysis, a linguistic fact neglected or not brought into focus by the philosopher and his followers).

Perry (1979) develops the considerations by Castañeda, by linking the ‘*de se*’ notion to the theory of action, claiming that the ‘*de se*’ concept is causally active. Perry (1979) holds a line of thought similar to Castañeda’s. His story about the supermarket is an impressive attempt to connect the issue of belief (and, in particular, ‘*de se*’ beliefs) with the theory of action. John Perry is in a supermarket and sees a trail of sugar left by what he thinks is a different shopper. He follows the trail of sugar because he wants to tell the unaware shopper about it, until it dawns upon him that he (himself) is the messy shopper. He stops following the messy shopper when he understands that he himself is the messy shopper. The belief that the messy shopper is leaving a trail of sugar in the supermarket is not causally relevant to taking action, instead the belief that he himself is leaving a trail of sugar will prompt him to do so. Thus, the mode of presentation involved in the belief state is causally involved in determining a certain action, which would not have been caused by a non-first-personal mode of presentation. In principle, the account presented so far is compatible with Castañeda’s considerations.

Perry (2000) differs significantly from Castañeda’s ideas, though. He focuses on the pragmatic nature of the inference involved in a sentence such as (3)

- (3) Privatus believes that he(*) is rich.

According to him, a pragmatic process is responsible for the interpretation of ‘he*’ as an essential indexical (Perry does not bother to explain the details of this process) – in fact, the inference can be cancelled. Suppose that Privatus is acting in a play and that a speaker utters (3) meaning that Privatus believes that the character he is acting out is rich. It follows that Privatus does not believe himself to be rich. Hence the interpretation of ‘he*’ as an essential indexical is not a semantic one (and

it is optional, as indicated by (*)). Since the interpretation is due to a pragmatic process, it can be cancelled (in this case it is cancelled by contextual assumptions).¹

Furthermore, Perry believes that even (4) is only pragmatically 'de se':

- (4) The dean was surprised to find that he believed himself to be overpaid.

This sentence can be uttered in a context in which the dean has complained that professors who publish less than ten articles per year are overpaid. (It simply happens that the dean has published less than ten papers per year, but does not remember that). In this context, it is clear that (4) does not mean that the dean believes himself to be overpaid. Perry reflects on interesting cases of cancellability, thus paving the way for a pragmatic theory of belief reports (the question whether he is simply making use of parasitic or etiolated cases of language use is not important for the time being; I hope to be able to place the pragmatic theory on a more solid footing).

Unlike Perry and others, Millikan (1990) proposes that essential indexicals are different from ordinary deictic expressions. Millikan, unlike Perry, believes that deictic expressions have nothing to do with action. In fact, only in the case in which the deictic expression identifies the first person perspective in action, is action influenced by the deictic expression, but this is a case in which the deictic expression is nothing but a mode of presentation of the ego. The author believes that there is a noteworthy difference between ordinary deictic expressions and the essential indexical. Ordinary deictic expressions have their referents identified through the context of utterance. Instead, an essential indexical is necessarily related to the first person perspective, as the thinking subject directly presents herself to conscience. For Millikan it is reasonable to use a mode of presentation (e.g. @RM) similar to definite descriptions or proper names except for the fact that its use implies the identity $I = @RM$. This mode of presentation is connected with dispositions to act and, in this sense, is causally active.

Harcourt (1999) too believes that essential indexicals have a first-personal interpretation and resorts to a conventional implicature analysis. Harcourt makes use of a Davidsonian theory of propositional attitudes and believes that it is useful to analyse e.g. Mario believes that Joan is in Paris as (5)

- (5) Mario believes that: Joan is in Paris.

The crucial problem for Harcourt is to explain how first-personal modes of presentation interact with the theory of action, while preserving semantic innocence. In fact, changing the example a bit, and using a 'de se' case, the problem is how to relate

- (6) Mario believes that he* is happy
(7) Mario believes that: he is happy

¹ However, it is my considered opinion that the utterance 'Privatus believes that he is rich' is a loose usage whose real meaning is 'Privatus says that he is rich', given that the verb 'say' is neutral concerning propositional attitudes.

in such a way as to preserve semantic innocence. It is interesting that Harcourt discards a move available to him, conversational implicature. If he resorted to this move, he could explain how, despite the fact that (6) can be analysed in terms of purely extensional semantics, a first-personal perspective is conversationally implicated through the usage of a logical form such as (7). Harcourt gives up the implicature hypothesis, because, in his opinion, it is not possible to test the hypothesis due to the ambiguity of the sentence and because, according to interpretationism, (which is the view he accepts), the interpretation of the embedded sentence requires that the first-personal interpretation be a semantic component of the content of the embedded sentence. However, it should be said that all interpretationism requires is that the embedded sentence be semantically interpreted as in the original utterance, (7), pragmatic increments being on top of that. The question of the ambiguity is easily resolved by resorting to Modified Occam's razor, enjoining us not to multiply senses if simpler hypotheses can be considered (see Grice 1989, Jaszczolt 1999; Ariel 2008).

Harcourt believes that the essential indexical implies an original context of use in which the thinking subject presented himself as 'I' (I take he is invoking the notion of conventional implicature) – however, it is difficult to see how this treatment can preserve semantic innocence, given that only the character of the expression 'he*' in (6) can guarantee such an implication. Harcourt's theory, instead, works much better in case he is willing to defend a conversational implicature analysis.

So far we have seen cases where philosophers invoked a special 'de se' concept, said to be causally active. The philosophical treatments of 'de se' attitudes include recent work by Feit (2008) and Stalnaker (2008a). However, for the sake of space, I cannot deal with them.

10.3 A Linguistic Treatment: PRO and 'de se' Attitudes in Higginbotham (2003)

So far, we have only considered philosophical treatments of 'de se' attitudes. At this stage, I propose to discuss Higginbotham's views, because they provide an analysis that makes it particularly clear and vivid that a 'de se' attitude **entails** a 'de re' attitude, that is what we require for our analysis based on informativeness and pragmatic scales or on contextual effects and processing efforts. Higginbotham (2003) considers a range of data such as the following:

- (8) John expects to win
- (9) John expects that he will win;
- (10) John expects that he himself will win.

Higginbotham considers that (9) does not necessarily have a 'de se' interpretation, while (8) and (10) necessarily have a 'de se' interpretation. He also says that

syntactic constructions with PRO (where PRO is anaphoric) are even more first-personal than constructions such as (10). There is an ambiguity about (9) that allows the possibility of a 'de re' interpretation as well (albeit the 'de se' interpretation is preferred, and this fact demands a pragmatic explanation). Higginbotham makes use of Peacock's (1981) important idea of a 'de se' mode of presentation:

Suppose that there is a special mode of presentation 'self' that a thinking subject *x* can use in thinking of himself, but not in thinking of people other than himself, and that others cannot use in thinking of *x*. A 'de se' thought will use an occurrence of [self_{*x*}] indexed to *x*.

The constructions hosting 'de se' modes of presentation include verbs such as 'imagine', 'remember', 'dream', 'pretend', 'know oneself', etc. Higginbotham compares the following sentence types:

- (11) John remembered [his going to the movie];
- (12) John remembered [him going to the movie];
- (13) John remembered [himself going to the movie];
- (14) John remembered [PRO going to the movie].

Unlike the other cases, (13) and (14) report 'de se' thoughts.

Given these facts, Higginbotham shows that the validity of the following deductive argument crucially depends on the presence of PRO; if a pronominal were substituted for PRO, it would become invalid:

Only Churchill gave the speech.
Churchill remembers [PRO giving his speech]; therefore
...
Only Churchill remembers [PRO giving his speech].

If we replace 'Only Churchill remembers giving his speech' with 'Only Churchill remembers his giving his speech', the argument is not valid.

An important linguistic fact noted by Higginbotham is that gerundive complements of 'remember' are associated with particular interpretations, according to which the remembered event is a **perceived** event. Thus, there is a difference between

- (15) I remember giving a lecture at the University of Messina on 3rd November 1988;
- (16) I remember that I gave a lecture at the University of Messina on 3rd November 1988.

I remember the event of the lecture through my **direct experience** of the event, given the semantics of (15); instead, I may merely remember that the event as described in the complement of 'remember' in (16) through someone else's assertion, given the semantic import of (16).

To corroborate the considerations above, Higginbotham uses the example below:

(17) My grandfather died before I was born. I remember that he was called ‘Rufus’. But I do not remember his being called ‘Rufus’.

If ‘remember that’ and ‘remember + gerund’ had the same semantic import (if they contributed in the same way to truth conditions), then (17) would have to be a logical contradiction. But it is not. Hence the two constructions are associated with different truth conditional import. Higginbotham draws our attention to the following minimal pair:

(18) I used to remember that I walked to school in the fifth grade, but I no longer remember it;

(19) I used to remember walking to school in the fifth grade, but I no longer remember it.

Unlike (18), (19) is acceptable for Higginbotham. (18) reminds us of Moore’s paradox (Of course, to see why there is a problem in (18) one needs to stress that ‘remember’ is factive and that the assertion amounts to something like ‘I walked to school in the fifth grade but I no longer remember it’). (19) is acceptable, provided that we enlarge the scenario to include someone who said ‘You used to remember walking to school in the fifth grade’. The speaker of (19) says that he no longer remembers the event in question, while he implicitly attributes responsibility for the truth of his remembering the event in the past to someone else who can report such an event of remembering.

A referee (personal communication) has stated that this example has problems, since it is not acceptable. S/he says that, if the utterance is acceptable, then one tends to read it (in terms of its internal dimension) as a direct experience of someone the memory of which can fade away with time or because of his partial election. I quite agree with the referee that one can have doubts on the grammaticality of (18), and thus, to remedy the problem, I propose to consider it a loose usage (see Burge 2003 on loose uses of ‘remember’). In any case, the possibility ‘I used to remember walking to school in the fifth grade but I no longer remember it well’ is perfectly grammatical. This usage points to the fact that the internal dimension of PRO can be more or less fine-grained, a point that will be of use when I specifically deal with the internal dimension of PRO in terms of pragmatics.

Another point Higginbotham makes is that ‘de se’ constructions seem to involve immunity to error through misidentification (see work by Shoemaker 1968; also see the next chapter and then the next). In other words, a person who says (20)

(20) I remember walking in Oxford

may be wrong on the place of the walking but not on the fact that it is his own walking that he remembers (leaving aside quasi-memories, cases in which someone else’s memories are implanted in a person’s brain).

Let us now see how Higginbotham characterises ‘de se’ attitudes semantically. He does that by making use of theta-roles as well as the Davidsonian’s idea that

verbs have a hidden argument for events in logical form. Basically, Higginbotham's idea is to identify the external argument of the verb of the complement cause with the external argument of the verb of propositional attitude. So the idea is that if I remember walking in Oxford, the agent of the walking is identical with the agent of the remembering. There is no such identification if the construction does not express a 'de se' concept as in 'John remembers that he walked in Oxford'.

Consider the two cases:

- (21) John expects to win;
- (22) John expects that he will win.

Since there is no identification between the external argument of 'win' and the external argument of 'expect' in (22), we will represent (22) as

- (23) (For John = x) $(\exists e)$ expect [$x, e, \wedge (\exists e') \text{ win } (x, e')$].

(The approach considers propositions as sets of possible worlds à la Stalnaker; \wedge signals intensional abstraction over possible worlds).

Instead, (21) will be represented as (24)

- (24) (For John = x) $(\exists e)$ expect [$x, e, \wedge (\exists e') \text{ win } (\sigma(e)), e'$].

(23) represents a Russellian proposition as embedded in the matrix verb; (24) represents a mode of presentation that is first-personal in the sense of Peacock (1981). Since the identification of thematic roles has implications for reference as well, the Russellian proposition of (22) is expressed as a logical implication of (23) (in other words we expect (24) to entail (23)).

According to Higginbotham, in control structures embedded in verbs such as 'remember', PRO also signals an internal dimension. When I say that I remember that I fell downstairs, there is no implication that my memory comes from my experience as the person who undergoes the event of falling downstairs. Someone else may have told me that I fell downstairs. However, if I say that I remember falling downstairs, I imply that I experienced the event and that I was involved in it, say, as patient, the person affected by the very event (we set aside the issue of quasi-memories). This is the internal dimension of the event of remembering – I remember the event from the inside, as the person who was affected by the event. (So if the event caused me pain, I remember it. It is not like remembering the event through the external perception of the event, say in case it was possible to connect my perceptual system to a camera and annul all other perceptions. In case it was possible to annul all my perceptions except for the visual images coming from a connected camera, it would not be true that I remember falling downstairs, but one could report that by saying I remember I fell downstairs (I take up this point in a critical discussion later on).

In order to represent the internal dimension of PRO, Higginbotham represents (25) as (26).

- (25) John remembers falling downstairs;
- (26) For John = x) $(\exists e)$ remember [$x, e, \wedge (\exists e') \text{ fall downstairs } (\sigma(e) \ \& \ \theta(e')), e'$].

In other words, the falling downstairs is remembered as an event undergone by the person who remembers it as a thematic role affected by the event of falling downstairs.

Now consider the case of the mad Heimson who believes to be Hume (Lewis 1979). We wonder whether Heimson and Hume numerically have the same beliefs (that is beliefs with the same anaphoric indices). Consider ‘Heimson believes that he is Hume’ and ‘Hume believes that he is Heimson’ according to Higginbotham.

(27) (For $x = \text{Heimson}$), $((\exists e) \text{ believes } [x, e, \wedge (\exists e') \text{ be identical } (\sigma(e) = \theta(e')), <<\text{Hume}, e']]$

(28) (For $x = \text{Hume}$), $((\exists e) \text{ believes } [x, e, \wedge (\exists e') \text{ be identical } (\sigma(e)) = \theta(e'), \text{Hume}, e']]$

According to such readings, Heimson and Hume do not have numerically the same beliefs (given the identification of the believer and the bearer of the internal perspective, it has to be excluded that Heimson can be both the believer and the bearer of the internal perspective of the person identical with Hume).

10.4 Pragmatic Intrusion into Truth-Conditional Semantics

Although various authors have written about the role played by pragmatic inference in constructing a propositional form (e.g. Bach (1994), Levinson (2000), Recanati (2004), Stainton (1994), Bezuidenhout (1997), Powell (2001)), in this chapter I shall concentrate Relevance Theory’s position on the semantics/pragmatics debate (mainly Carston 2002 and Wilson and Sperber 2002). As Horn points out (2004, 18) “taking the lead from work by Atlas, relevance theorists have argued that the pragmatic reasoning used to compute implicated meaning must also be central in fleshing out underspecified propositions in cases in which the semantic meaning contributed by the linguistic expression itself is insufficient to yield a proper accounting of truth-conditional content”. Carston’s and Sperber & Wilson’s idea of pragmatic contribution to the proposition expressed has something distinctive because, unlike Bach, they believe that pragmatics contributes to what is said and, unlike Levinson (2000), they believe that the inferences developing logical forms into propositional forms are explicatures, not implicatures. Carston’s and Wilson & Sperber’s ideas are similar to Stainton’s and Recanati’s, but they differ as to the details. See Capone (2006, 2009) for a review of intrusionistic perspectives.

In this chapter, I propose to adopt Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986; Carston 2002, etc.) as a background to my treatment of attitudes ‘de se’. However, given that I have already discussed this framework in other papers (e.g. Capone 2008a), I will not say much about it except that it is now widely believed that, in many cases, semantics is radically underdetermined and that pragmatics must supply information necessary to the completion of a logical form. The **Principle of Relevance** guides inferential interpretation since one must bear in mind that an

input is optimally relevant if the contextual effects it provides are greater than the processing costs.

10.5 Beliefs 'de se' and Pragmatic Intrusion

In this section, I consider 'de se' readings of attitude constructions and, in particular, constructions like 'John remembers walking in Oxford', 'John remembers he walked in Oxford', 'John remembers his walking in Oxford', 'John remembers he himself walking in Oxford'. My analysis starts with control structures like 'John remembers walking in Oxford' and then proceeds with the remaining constructions. Control structures in their 'de se' construals are determined through semantics (I assume the truth of a story like Higginbotham's, but I then slightly modify it). The remaining constructions are discussed in terms of pragmatics.

Since this is a rather complex and intricate section, we need sign-posts for readers here, to make sure that the analysis is taken for what it is, and not for what it is not. What I want to show in this section is that in some cases, but not in all cases, it is possible to derive the 'de se' interpretation through pragmatics.

For constructions exhibiting PRO (such as 'John remembered going to the cinema'), I accept Higginbotham's story and claim that the external interpretation of PRO is semantic and first-personal. However, I want to distinguish the concept of first-personal from the concept of using modes of presentation like 'I'. A thought can be first-personal even if, in talk with himself, the speaker uses a mode of presentation like 'You', where by 'You' he means 'I'. I present arguments against the semantic analysis of the external interpretation of PRO, but conclude that these are not correct. PRO is first-personal. In particular, I use an argument by Feit (personal communication) to show that PRO must be first-personal and that Higginbotham's semantic analysis probably needs further tightening up. I also use a circularity problem, to show that Higginbotham's syntactic analysis is, after all, presupposed by my pragmatic analysis.

I argue that the examples where Castañeda used the asterisk are cases where a pronominal, which is not PRO, is assigned a 'de se' interpretation. A pragmatic explanation is reserved for sentences like 'John remembered his going to the movie' – with the difference that here I argue that 'his' is not assigned an asterisk à la Castañeda.

The internal dimension of PRO is a separate question from its external first-personal interpretation. While the implicature analysis has very limited effects on the external dimension of PRO, since I have accepted that PRO is first-personal through semantics, I argue that its internal dimension is conveyed not through semantics, but through implicature (or explicature).

The pragmatic analysis has the following structure:

- (a) Analysis of inferential enrichments amounting to ‘de se’ interpretations;
- (b) Analysis of pronominals used instead of PRO in control structures;
- (c) Analysis of reflexives used in control structures;
- (d) Apparently ‘de se’ uses of pronominals with attributive construals.

In each of this section I will substantiate the claim that ‘de se’ constructions are cases of pragmatic intrusion and that pragmatics serves to resolve interpretative ambiguity and to determine a full proposition.

10.5.1 Mode of Presentations of First-Personal Readings: Semantics or Pragmatics?

Before proceeding with our pragmatic story, it will be important to explain ‘de se’ pragmatic interpretations in greater depth. What kind of representation must be part of the explicature when a ‘de se’ thought is involved? Presumably, when the speaker says

(29) Giovanni crede di essere intelligente (John believes he is clever),

there is an inference to the effect that the speaker has the following mental representation:

“I am clever”.

This is on top of the semantics provided by Higginbotham for controlled clauses of attitude verbs.² In fact, strictly speaking, it would be possible for the semantic interpretations by Higginbotham to be accessible to the believer without his using a mental occurrence of ‘I’. Higginbotham’s story could be true even if the thinking subject thought of himself as the believer of his thought, without ever pronouncing (or using a mental occurrence) of the word ‘I’. However, accepting the considerations by Millikan, it is reasonable to suppose that ‘de se’ readings involve a mode of presentation that somehow incorporates ‘I’. Sentences such as (30)

(30) John thought he was clever.

are ‘de se’ in that they incorporate mental linguistic materials such as ‘I’ when it is clear in context that the evidence for the thought comes from the fact that the believer uttered a statement about his/her belief.

But is there a sharp difference between this additional pragmatic component and Higginbotham’s semantics? It is true that Higginbotham does not explicitly consider utterances of ‘believe’ in connection with PRO, but since in Italian belief-

²One should note that Higginbotham does not extend his analysis of ‘X remembers walking in Oxford’ to beliefs, but the extension is required for languages like Italian, which, unlike English, has control structures embedded by ‘believe’.

constructions obligatorily involve PRO (in the 'de se' interpretation) we must assume an extension of Higginbotham's story. Higginbotham's extended treatment would have to amount to including a use of the 'believer of his/her thought' in a belief attribution (e.g. John believed that the believer of his thought was happy) – strictly speaking it involves usage of temporal variables as in (31)

(31) Giovanni credeva di essere felice (John believed he was happy)
John believed at *t* that the believer of this thought at *t* was happy,³

which presupposes that if John believes at *t* thought *x*, he cannot believe at *t* a thought *y*, *y* distinct from *x* (Can one have two distinct thoughts at the same time? Presumably not).

My own addition to his treatment requires that, on top of Higginbotham's semantics, there will be an inference to the effect that the believer makes use of a mental occurrence of the word 'I' – he says 'I' in his mental sentences (provided that the context is the right one). Now, if the mental occurrence of 'I' were identical with Higginbotham's contrived solution 'The believer of his/her thought at *t*', obviously there would be no reason for having this additional pragmatic component.

A cogent reason for opting for my own treatment is given by Feit (2008, personal communication):

Another reason why I do not think Higginbotham's account can handle 'de se' cases adequately is this. It seems possible that somebody could believe (correctly or mistakenly, it does not matter) that he is not the only thinker of a certain thought, for example he might believe that God is thinking it too. More generally, he might think that he is not the only thinker of any of his thoughts. But, even with this, it seems he could have a 'de se' belief. But on Higginbotham's view – and other similar views – such a belief amounts to "the believer of this thought is F." However, this cannot be what the belief amounts to, since he does not think there is a unique believer, the believer, of his thought. Moreover, if someone else (God perhaps) really is having the same thoughts, then all Higginbotham-style beliefs are false, but he could surely have some true *de se* beliefs nonetheless.

Thus a minimal requirement for making sense of 'de se' attitudes is to say that the mental occurrence of 'I' (say in mentalese, see Feit 2008 on this) must be a demonstrative along the lines of Evans (1982) and Perconti (2008). As Evans says, the demonstrative identification does not go through the recognition of any property.⁴ But is there something the word 'I' can refer to? Evans argues that there is substantive content to our 'I'-ideas. While for philosophers such as Strawson for the

³It might be said that Higginbotham does not particularly discuss this example. Yet, it is natural to think that he must accept this semantic analysis of the Italian example because of his commitments concerning 'John remembers going to the cinema'.

⁴See p. 170–1, Evans (1982) on demonstrative identification based on an information-link between the subject and object as well as on the ability to locate the object relative to egocentric space and to objective space.

judgement that I am in pain to be uttered truthfully there need not be anything corresponding to the identification of something that is in pain (the judgement might as well be expressed by 'There is pain'), for Evans by using 'I' we must identify with an element of the objective order (Also see Grush 2002, for the exegesis of Evans).

Now suppose Higginbotham replies:

All you have shown is that the first-personal interpretation of PRO needs to be grafted to the semantics I proposed, and an obvious way to do this is by placing in the semantics the further constraint that the mode of presentation of the agent of the believing or remembering a certain thought is in the first person. (This move is reminiscent of Harcourt and Millikan)

Presumably, we have to modify Higginbotham's elucidations for an utterance of, say, 'John believes he fell downstairs' in the following way:

(32) For John= x) ($\exists e$) believes [$x, e, \wedge (\exists e')$ fall downstairs ($\sigma(e) \& \theta(e')$ & the mode of presentation of $\sigma(e)$ = 'I', e')].

After all, this is still a completely semantic meaning elucidation.

Summing up, the sentence 'John believes he fell down' needs to be represented as the following:

For John= x) ($\exists e$) believes [$x, e, \wedge (\exists e')$ fall downstairs ($\sigma(e) \& \theta(e')$ & the mode of presentation of $\sigma(e)$ =any pronominal or mode of presentation that is a suitable transformation of 'I' and ultimately reducible to 'I', e')].

As I shall claim later on, a further reason for adhering to a semantic story of PRO and for not wanting to say that PRO conversationally implicates or is associated via an explicature to its first-personal reading is that the explicature triggered by example (31), uses syntactic information, and, in particular, the possibility of expressing the 'de se' reading through PRO. If we say that the 'de se' reading of PRO is conversationally implicated (or alternatively explicated), then we are at a loss when we want to explain the 'de se' reading of (30) through the syntax of e.g. 'Giovanni crede di essere Italiano'. We would have to say that 'de se' concepts are completely pragmatic, but such a story would have no points of contact with the views on the modularity of mind. On the contrary, it is plausible that a theory of mind module is at work in 'de se' readings and that this is the reason why 'de se' interpretations should correlate with a special syntactic construction.

A way of out of the problems for a view that attributes the understanding of an ego-like concept in 'de se' constructions to pragmatics is to say that an explicature is not cancellable and, therefore, that the ego-like concepts of 'de se' constructions are present in the constructions albeit through a pragmatic increment. Higginbotham's original treatment is the basis for the pragmatic scales <de se, de re>, the ego-like concept NOT being needed in such scales. A pragmatic treatment of the ego-like

concepts must be preferred on the grounds of **parsimony** (Modified Occam’s razor), also being the aftermath of Jaszczolt’s idea (Jaszczolt 1999) that referential readings are preferred and default, as well as also being a consequence of the stereotype that when one thinks of oneself one normally uses the first-person pronominal. The path to the claim that ego-like concepts in ‘de se’ constructions are furnished through pragmatics seems to be opened up by considerations of uniqueness. That the ego-like concept is part of the explicature is easily shown by using Feit’s reasoning (personal communication) above, as without such an ego-like concept, Higginbotham-like ‘de se’ beliefs would come out as false. This is a problem analogous to the problems that led Carston to postulate the notion of explicature in the first place. An explicature is a theoretical notion whose aim is to liberate potentially problematic utterances from potential contradictions or falsehoods.

A further reason for opting for the pragmatic explanation of ego-like concepts in ‘de se’ constructions is that the possible repair of Higginbotham’s elucidations along the lines of (32) runs into problems when the context mandates an attributive, rather than referential, interpretation, as in “Any/the believer of this thought would think that the believer of this thought would be lucky in having this thought”.

This thought is clearly ‘de se’ but does not involve an ego-like concept. Presumably this involves the semantic elucidation (32) without the component: “& the mode of presentation of σ (e) = ‘I’”.

10.5.2 *Towards Pragmatics: Castañeda’s Example*

Let us now consider Castañeda’s influential example:

(33) The editor of Soul believes that he* is a millionaire.

Unlike the philosopher’s language, ordinary language has no asterisks. I agree that the preferred interpretation is one according to which the editor of Soul believes that he himself is a millionaire, but this is not a matter of semantics, as there is an alternative reading according to which the interpretation is not ‘de se’ For example, suppose that the editor of Soul believes of the person (himself) he sees in the mirror that he is a millionaire (while, for some reason he does not recognize his familiar face). A sentence such as (34)

(34) The editor of Soul believes that he is a millionaire.

is suited to expressing the speaker’s meaning – however, no ‘de se’ reading is intended in this case (We agree, the example is contrived and is based on philosophical sophistication, however it is not an impossibility). The interpretation in (34) where an asterisk is used to signal pragmatic disambiguation must not be taken for granted, but is the result of cognitive processes at work.

We may also want to explain Perry's example:

(35) The dean was surprised to find that he believed himself to be overpaid.

In a situation in which the dean believes that all professors who publish less than ten papers per year are overpaid (but forgets that he himself has published less than ten papers), a speaker may utter (35). Linguists may have reservations about such an example. They may feel it is contrived or that this is a loose or etiolated language use.⁵ Regardless of whether the use is, strictly speaking, correct or illegitimate, we have to explain such a use as well through a pragmatic theory. While in the case of (34) we must explain why a 'de se' reading accrues to the utterance, in the case of (35) we have to explain why a sentence/utterance typically associated with a 'de se' reading is divested from its ordinary interpretation. Obviously, while the pragmatic process at play in (34) is a case of a standard conversational implicature, the process involved in (35) is a case of a particularized implicature. The implicature overrides the usual semantic interpretation associated with the sentence ('de se' reading) (on the divergence between sentence and speaker's meaning, see Dascal 2003). I assume that the world knowledge against which the utterance of (35) is processed promotes the non-first-personal reading. Given that we assume that the Dean thinks highly of himself and would never say of himself that he thinks he is overpaid, we assume that the interpretation of (35) is not a 'de se' one. The utterance comes to be interpreted as ironic, because, on the one hand, the speaker says that the dean believes that he himself is overpaid, on the other hand we know that the Dean would never think that of himself. The utterance is 'echoic' in that pragmatic interpretation construes it as what the Dean would say of himself if he were to accept what the other people believe of him. The 'de se' reading is a reading expressing what the Dean would think of himself in a possible world in which he conforms to what other people think of him.

Anyway, I should say I am puzzled a bit by Perry's example. I think that what he wants to say requires a different example, such as 'The dean would have been surprised to find out that he believed himself to be overpaid'.

I have reasons to believe that what Perry wanted to prove with this example is that 'de se' readings are in all cases pragmatic and not semantic. Could there be a pragmatic interpretation that is not founded on a semantic concept? In theory it is possible – as Recanati (2004), Carston (2002) and Wilson & Sperber say in their articles and books – that pragmatics furnishes new concepts on the basis of existing ones (a phenomenon called 'modulation'). So *a priori*, we should not discard the possibility that 'de se' readings are only pragmatic interpretations, which make their way into language through grammaticalization (see Ariel 2008). However, it cannot be excluded that what started as pragmatics ended up as semantics or grammar (Levinson 2000). We shall explore possibilities open-minded.

How should a relevance-theoretic treatment of (34) proceed? I assume that the interpretation according to which the speaker attributes a belief 'de se' to the subject

⁵Recanati (2007, 173) also believes that 'himself' is less first-personal than PRO. His example is: "John imagines himself being elected". Presumably (I infer this from the passage in Recanati's text), someone could say this without attributing a 'de se' attitude to John. There is no explanation about why this should be the case, though.

(of the belief) is more informative than the 'de re' interpretation. We can reasonably assume that an interpretation excluding a greater number of states of the world (also see Levinson 2000; Huang 2007) is more informative. It is reasonable to think that on a relevance-theoretic treatment this is true as well. What is to provide information, in fact? To provide information is to provide input to inferential processes, among which there is the strengthening of existing assumptions or the elimination of current assumptions or the creation of cognitive effects that would not derive from existing assumptions alone. A proposition eliminating a greater number of states of the world is, *ipso facto*, more informative than one eliminating a fewer number of states of the world, because it either eliminates existing assumptions or interacts with them in a way that provides a greater number of cognitive effects than the ones deriving from existing assumptions alone. Suppose one knows that all students have arrived, rather than that some students have arrived. Furthermore, suppose one knows that all students who have arrived will receive a present. Then one knows more than if one knows that some students have arrived. If all students consist of A, B, C, D, E, one derives greater cognitive effects from knowledge that all students arrived, since one will be able to say that all of A, B, C, D, E will receive a present. Instead, having only knowledge that some students have arrived, it will not be possible to say which of A, B, C, D, E will receive a present.

Now let us go back to our 'de se' interpretation in (34). We have to ask ourselves which is more informative: the 'de se' or the 'de re' interpretation? Matters of entailment may decide the issue. Consider again Higginbotham's analysis of the 'de se' reading and of the non-de se reading:

(36) (For John = x) $(\exists e) \text{ expect } [x, e, \wedge (\exists e') \text{ win } (\sigma(e)), e']$.

(36) represents the 'de se' reading of 'John expects to win'.

(37) (For John = x) $(\exists e) \text{ expect } [x, e, \wedge (\exists e') \text{ win } (x, e')]$.

Instead, (37) represents the non 'de se' reading (that is, the 'de re' reading) of 'John expects that he will win'. One who is committed to the logical form (36) is committed to (37), but there is no entailment from (37) to (36). This means that the 'de se' reading entails the 'de re' reading. Since 'de se' readings entail 'de re' ones, they are more informative.

We need not go through the entailment (or deduction) step to argue that the 'de se' reading is promoted by pragmatics to default interpretation, though. All we need to prove is that the 'de se' reading has greater cognitive effects than the 'de re' one, processing efforts being the same. To do this, we can think of a philosophical story. Suppose that Mary believes she has to take a tablet at 9 in the morning (the usual tablet she takes daily). Suppose that the tablet has an undesired effect m, which can be eliminated by taking tablet b (the same person who takes tablet a must take tablet b to avoid an unwanted effect m): Then the 'de se' reading of the sentence 'Maria believes she must take the tablet b' has greater cognitive effects, since only in case Maria thinks of herself as herself she is interested in preventing the consequences of taking tablet a. Since the 'de se' reading has greater cognitive effects than the 'de re'

one, which offset the processing costs incurred, it will be promoted by the Principle of Relevance.

10.5.3 De re Interpretations: The Pragmatic Interpretations of Pronominals, as Used Instead of PRO

Let us see what happens if a full pronominal is used instead of PRO. Consider the minimal pair from Higginbotham (2003) again:

- (38) John remembered [his going to the movie];
 (39) John remembered [PRO going to the movie].

Higginbotham says that PRO is associated with a ‘de se’ interpretation, while (38) is not. We ask why it should be the case that ‘John believes he* is clever’ is typically associated with a ‘de se’ reading, while (38) is not. Neo-Griceans (e.g. Huang 2000, 2007; Levinson 2000) can provide an easy explanation. Suppose that

<his, PRO> form a Horn-scale, given that the two forms are from the same semantic field. Since PRO is associated with the ‘de se’ reading, it is more informative than the ‘de re’ reading. Thus PRO ends up entailing ‘his’. Use of ‘his’ at this point will implicate that the ‘de se’ interpretation does not obtain (The only problem for this analysis is the equal lexicalization constraint: should we say that PRO and ‘his’ are equally lexicalized? This is a problematic choice).

Alternatively, one can say that the full pronominal is more marked than PRO and, therefore, triggers an M-implicature to the effect that the interpretation complementary to that of PRO takes place. (Remember, the M-Principle says that the usage of a marked expression instead of an unmarked one will trigger a complementary implicature: the problem here is that, if what Higginbotham says about the first-personal reading is correct, PRO is not coextensive with the full pronominal – as required by the M-Principle (see Levinson 2000; Huang 2007, and references therein).

Both routes are not devoid of problems that need to be addressed somehow.

Now, we want to find a plausible alternative from the viewpoint of relevance theory. Suppose we say that the overt pronominal requires greater processing efforts than ‘PRO’. Then we require additional contextual effects to counterbalance the additional processing efforts. There will be compensatory contextual effects if the interpretation is complementary to that of PRO (or even if it is distinct from that of PRO). Thus, the ‘de re’ interpretation, which is complementary to the ‘de se’ one, gets through.

10.5.4 *The Internal Dimension of PRO: 'Remember' and Other Verbs*

In this section I shall discuss verbs such as 'remember', 'imagine', 'expect', 'dream', 'forget', etc. in terms of the internal dimension of PRO. Since my considerations are sparked by Higginbotham's reflections on the internal dimension of PRO in connection with 'remember', I will start with 'remember', the discussion of which capitalizes on philosophical knowledge.

In particular, I will discuss what, on the basis of ideas by Martin and Deutscher (1966) and Shoemaker (1970), Higginbotham (2003) calls 'remembering from the inside' associating it with control structures ('John remembers falling down the stairs'). Following Norman Malcom (1963), Shoemaker distinguishes between the semantics of 'John remembers that Caesar invaded Britain' (factual memories) and 'John remembers falling down the stairs', the latter sentence being associated with something one remembers happening, as a result of observation or experience.

Shoemaker (1970) only discusses cases like 'John remembers walking in Oxford' and says:

It is a necessary condition of its being true that a person remembers a given past event that he, the same person, should have observed or experienced the event, or known of it in some other direct way, at the time of its occurrence. I shall refer to this as the 'previous awareness condition' for remembering" (p. 269).

He adds that "When a person remembers a past event there is a correspondence between his present cognitive state and some past cognitive and sensory state of his that existed at the time of the event remembered and consisted in his experiencing the event or otherwise being aware of its occurrence (p. 271).

I take that the awareness condition and the correspondence condition for Shoemaker are semantically entailed by a sentence like 'John remembers falling down the stairs' and they more or less correspond to what Higginbotham calls the internal dimension of PRO. Now, while my aim in this section is to argue that the internal dimension of PRO is conversationally implicated by sentences such as 'John remembers falling down the stairs', I need to do justice to the importance of Shoemaker's considerations and suggest that the internal dimension of PRO may be more or less fine-grained and that conversational implicatures may be responsible for the more fine-grained dimension of the internal dimension, while we can assign semantics the task of doing justice to the considerations by Shoemaker, which seem to me to be not implausible. In particular, we can accept that in uttering a sentence such as (40):

(40) John remembers falling down the stairs.

the awareness condition needs to be satisfied and John's memory needs to be caused by a perception of his experience of falling down. Furthermore, the correspondence

condition, whereby there must be a correspondence between the memory and the experience or sensory state that existed at the time of the event, must be satisfied. If John remembers falling down, then there must be an experience to trigger his memory – there is a rough correspondence between the experience and the memory. However, how fine-grained the correspondence ought to be has not been specified by Shoemaker. Is it not possible that only part of the experience has been recalled, thus making it possible that there is a correspondence between the sensory state of the event and the memory, even if we can admit that the fully articulated dimension of the sensory state has been communicated in a more fine-grained way through pragmatics?

It is not unreasonable to propose that the full internal dimension of PRO is communicated via pragmatic intrusion. When we say (41)

(41) John remembers falling downstairs.

we surely mean that the John is remembering the event from the inside, that he was at the same time the perceiver of the event and the participant affected by the event (he did not just see the blood on his face, but he also felt the pain and the event of remembering the pain could occur only through the experience of the pain (his feeling his pain)). However, it is not necessary to place all burden of both first-personal and the internal dimension of PRO on semantics. The burden can be divided between semantics and pragmatics. After all, it is not unnatural to say:

(42) John remembers falling downstairs, but he does in an incomplete way. He does not remember the pain he felt. The memory is to him like a film he is watching.

In this case, notice both the awareness and the correspondence conditions proposed by Shoemaker are satisfied, even if some fine-grained aspects of the internal dimension have been missed.

The statement (42) could be justified, in case John has partial amnesia or has (voluntarily or involuntarily) erased parts of his experience, namely his most painful memories.

We can think of the case in which a memory is so painful that, although the person in question does remember the event (say, an accident), s/he does not want to recall it. By failing to recall its most painful parts, the memory will be partial.

After all, it is not so unreasonable to assume that memories can fade away and that parts of them can be erased. So, the idea that the internal dimension of a memory can be erased (removed) is not so outlandish. Psychologists often say that women who gave birth to a child remove the pain from their memories – this is why they are willing to give birth to a second child, without much thought about it. Furthermore, going back to Higginbotham's example, partially modified:

(43) I used to remember walking to school in the fifth grade, but I no longer remember it very well.

this example can also be understood as saying that the speaker had an exhaustive memory of the event of walking to school in the fifth grade, but now he no longer has it (in that he only has a partial memory left).⁶ Memories can be partial, as parts of memories can be removed. However, in a typical case, the internal dimension of the memory does not disappear. So, if a person says 'I remember falling downstairs' the full internal dimension is communicated as well, but by pragmatics. Through a pragmatic increment, we build up the explicature.

Let us consider how Relevance Theory can deal with similar examples. Consider (44):

(44) I remember falling downstairs.

If one falls downstairs, in the prototypical case, one feels pain. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that in addition to visual memories, the speaker has other types of memories: tactile memories for example (scratches, pain in his bones, etc). It is, therefore, probable that he is remembering the event from the inside. However, it is not implausible that the 'internal dimension' can be (partially) cancelled, probably because the memory can be as painful as the real experience which one is re-experiencing. To put things in the words of Carruthers (2006), when one remembers an event, one rehearses the event in mind, thus evoking motor-sensory schemata that are broadcast to central/conceptual modules and may generate real pain and frustration.

At this point, let us follow Cimatti (2008), in the idea that the subject is constituted through speech and let us make use of the psychotherapy situation as a hypothetical situation. Suppose that the speaker says (44) in the course of a psychotherapy. The patient, who was pushed down the stairs by his mother, removes all sensations of pain. The aim of the therapy is to help the patient relive the situation and recuperate the important parts of the memory he has removed – say what, slightly modifying Higginbotham's terminology, we could call the 'full internal dimension of the memory'. Then this is a case in which the internal dimension of PRO has been partially suppressed and one tries to recuperate it. Thus, at the end of the psychotherapy the same sentence can be uttered with a different meaning including the full internal dimension as well. If the same sentence can be uttered at different moments by the same patient, rehearsing an experience and broadcasting motor/sensory schemata to the central/conceptual systems and broadcasting different schemata at different moments (thus causing different corporeal sensations), this can be taken as proof that the **full** (or fully articulated) internal dimension of PRO is not associated with sentence meaning, but, at most, with utterance meaning, and, in particular, with the speaker's meaning.

The little – not too implausible – story above can show that the full internal dimension of PRO has greater contextual effects. By recuperating the internal dimension of PRO, the speaker can recuperate feelings that have consequences on

⁶The example has the other reading noted by Higginbotham, as well.

parts of his personality. Alternatively, he can recuperate beliefs that, in conjunction with other beliefs, can produce further beliefs.

In fact, see the following deduction:

John remembers falling downstairs.

If John remembers the event (fully) from the inside, he remembers feeling pain.

John remembers the event (fully) from the inside (premise furnished through pragmatics)

If he felt pain, he hated his mother who pushed him.

....

John hated his mother.

Since the premises added by pragmatic inferences (in particular, the internal dimension of the memory) lead to further contextual effects through deduction, it is reasonable to accept that the resulting inferences are motivated by the desire to be relevant, to create abundant cognitive effects with minimal cognitive processes.⁷ As Wilson and Sperber (2004) say:

The most important type of contextual effect is a **CONTEXTUAL IMPLICATION**, a conclusion deducible from input and context together, but from neither input nor context alone. For example, on seeing my train arriving, I might look at my watch, access my knowledge of the train timetable, and derive the contextual implication that my train is late (...) (p. 608).

This topic seems to have intrigued an influential linguist like John Lyons, who notices a difference between

(45) I remembered closing the door

(46) I remembered myself closing the door (these examples are numbered as (3) and (4) in Lyons' paper).

Lyons (1989) writes:

As to the difference between (3) and (4), this is explained, *intuitively* at least, by saying that what is being reported in (3) is the illocutionary agent's reliving in memory – his or her memorial re-experiencing as the agent – of the act of closing the door; and in (4) the quite different mental act of perceiving or witnessing this act, as he or she might perceive (i.e. see, hear, etc.) from the outside as it were, a situation in which he or she was not, or had not been involved as the agent (p. 176).

Now, the real point is the contrast between (45) and (46). If my intuitions are correct, the contrast is not semantic (as Lyons seems to imply) but pragmatic. It is easy to explain the contrast in terms of pragmatics, as the reflexive is more marked than PRO, and thus tends to trigger M-implicatures, if one listens to Levinson (2000) and

⁷On unexpressed premises in enthymemes see Piazza (1995).

Huang (2007). The M-implicature in question is that the perspective from which the action is remembered is complementary to that implied in (45). If (45) was associated by implicature to an internal dimension, (46) is associated by implicature with an external dimension. Explaining this in terms of relevance theory, we can reason on why the more marked lexicalised pronominal is preferred to the null pronominal PRO. Since the more marked item involves greater processing efforts, it needs to be associated with greater contextual effects, such as (I claim) the complementary interpretation to (46), in particular a not-internal dimension (in fact, the external one).

In a paper commenting on Lyons' work, Varela Bravo (1993) attempts to explain the difference between 'I remember closing the door' and 'I remember that I closed the door' through conditions of use, summed up below:

(I Remember) Closing the Door

1. Acknowledgement of the speaker's communicative intention: I/somebody did something;
2. Evaluation of the action as true/false. That is true: You/somebody did it.
3. Acknowledgment of the action from the point of view of the hearer: Yes, you/somebody did it.
4. Positive/negative evaluation in context: You did well/wrongly.

The utterance would interact with the context and would be functional in the conversational exchange.

(I Remember) that I Closed the Door

1. Acknowledgment of the speaker's communicative intention: something happened:
2. Evaluation of the fact as true/false. That is true.
3. Acknowledgement of the fact from the point of view of the hearer: Yes, that happened.
4. Positive/negative evaluation in context: That was fortunate/unfortunate;

The utterance would interact with the context and would be functional in the conversational exchange.

Varela Bravo basically thinks that an utterance of 'I remembered that I closed the door' presents and focuses on a fact, thus in a tag like 'I remembered that I closed the door. Didn't I?' the pro-verb is 'close' and not 'remember'. Instead, 'I remembered closing the door' focuses on an action done and not on a fact, hence in the tag question 'I remembered closing the door. Didn't I?' the pro-verb is NOT 'close' but 'remember'.

Even if he does not use the term 'implicature', Varela Bravo makes it appear that a (distinct) conventional implicature is triggered by use of each construction. It is easy to see that his considerations give independent support to Harcourt (1999), even if it should be clear that Harcourt and Varela Bravo are making different claims. Harcourt is making a claim about the first-personal mode of presentation, while Varela Bravo is making a claim about whether the context of statements such

as ‘John remembers that P’ and ‘John remembers doing X’ restricts the kind of replies that a statement of this type can obtain as a function of the purpose with which the ‘remember’ statement has been made. It is possible that the distinction between a fact being reported and an action being reported is what leads to Higginbotham-like interpretations of PRO (in ‘John remembers walking in Oxford’), as, after all, remembering an action requires being involved in the action as an actor (or agent) who has direct access to the action (and its consequences) through consciousness. Of course, the thing remembered in ‘John remembered falling down the stairs’ need not be an action, but merely an event; even in this case the memory is causally connected to the event and, thus, the experience of the event is somehow involved in the memory.

Before closing this section, I want to consider, ‘imagine’, ‘expect’, ‘dream’ and ‘forget’, albeit briefly. For these verbs, I propose that world knowledge is responsible for the explicated content. In fact, the interpretation of the internal dimension of PRO, and in particular the degree of granularity of this internal perspective, depends on the speaker’s and the hearer’s knowledge of the world. In fact, as pointed out by a number of authors, such as Huang (1991, 1994), Clark & Marshall (1981) and Clark & Carlson (1992), Levinson (2000), Blackwell (2000, 2001), Capone (2000, 2001a, 2003, 2006), implicatures aimed at enriching utterance interpretations are often determined by the presuppositions shared by the speaker and the hearer, that is their ‘common ground’.

If I say ‘I imagine falling down the stairs’ is PRO also associated with an internal dimension? And if I say ‘I expect falling down the stairs (if...)’, is PRO associated with an internal dimension? What necessitated a semantic association between PRO and an internal dimension in the case of ‘remember’ was Shoemaker’s awareness condition. If John remembers falling down the stairs, then he was aware of some experience which caused the memory. ‘Remember’ also involves a correspondence condition: there must be a correspondence between the event remembered and the event experienced. This led me to say that ‘Remember’ is semantically associated with an internal dimension, but I still proposed a partial pragmatic analysis by saying that the full details of the internal dimension or, to use terminology from the theory of propositional attitudes, a fully fine-grained internal dimension was expressed through explicatures.

Now we have to ask the question whether ‘imagine’ and ‘expect’ also involve an awareness condition. If they do not, then the internal dimension of PRO is not a semantic one, but a pragmatically conveyed aspect of communication. ‘Imagining’ or ‘expecting’ seem to be verbs involved in simulating actions or events mentally (to use terminology by Goldman (2006), who explicitly discusses ‘imagining’ in the context of simulation theories of mind-reading).

When John imagines falling down the stairs, he is probably using information about events that happened to someone else in the past. Perhaps he has seen Peter fall down the stairs, and he remembers how Peter felt pain. Thus he may use the information that Peter experienced pain to form a psychological theory about what

it feels like to fall down the stairs and concludes that if one falls down the stairs, one experiences pain. So when John imagines falling down the stairs, he runs a simulation of an experience which he saw happen in the past and he recalls that Peter cried, thus evincing pain, and he also has access to a psychology law: if one falls down, one feels pain. As a result of the simulation taking as input a pretend state 'Suppose I fall down the stairs' and some general beliefs, he arrives at the conclusion that he will feel pain. And this conclusion is what authorises us to conclude that when he imagines falling down the stairs, John also imagines feeling pain. The internal dimension is grafted on top of the semantics by pragmatic reasoning (Of course imagining the pain of an experience has consequences on behaviour, thus RT predicts that the enriched interpretation has greater contextual effects). However, John could have run the simulation in a different way. Suppose he is a scientist and he wants to make generalizations about the physics of falling down the stairs. Then he is not interested in the internal dimension of the experience. John imagines falling down the stairs having an ulterior purpose in mind, that of simulating a physical experience. Thus the internal dimension is completely missing in this simulation. However, unless aspects of the context do not specify that the simulation is being run for scientific purposes, John will be attributed a state of mind that simulates the internal dimension of one who undergoes that experience, hence pain.

Similar considerations are applicable to 'John expects falling down the stairs'. The psychological dimension comes to the fore, when sorrow rather than pain is involved in the internal dimension as in 'John expected being sacked'. If what Carruthers (2006) says about mental rehearsal is accepted, John, in expecting to be sacked, rehearses the state 'being sacked' and thus produces an emotive response to the situation 'being sacked' and this is constitutive of the internal dimension of PRO. But the internal dimension of PRO in the case of 'expect' is the result of running a simulation of the simulation John may run of another person's experience. However, 'expect', can also be used in a simulation run for scientific purposes, in which the focus is on physics rather than on psychology. Admittedly, this is a rare, but not impossible case. Anyway, the internal dimension of expecting something is added only as a result of running a simulation of what it is like to experience the event expected on the part of the person who expects the event, and this is enough to show that the internal dimension of 'expecting' is a pragmatic phenomenon.

Two further verbs ought to be considered: 'dream' and 'forget'. 'Dream' is in all respects like 'remember'. If I dreamed murdering Mary, it is implicit that I remember murdering Mary in a dream – hence all considerations I applied to 'remember' are applicable to the case at hand. In dreams we usually have sensations in addition to visual images, but it is not clear that the internal dimension has something to do with semantics. In fact, there is no awareness condition or correspondence condition attached to dreaming. It is not the case that if I dream murdering Mary, the dreaming was caused by the awareness of murdering Mary or there was a corresponding state of (my) murdering Mary. All this militates against the incorporation of the internal dimension into the semantics. On the contrary, it is reasonable that pragmatics is responsible for the internal dimension. If one dreams murdering Mary,

one typically has experiences of fury, sadistic pleasure, contempt for the victim, etc. But this is only part of a typical scenario – it is not impossible to merely have visual images with no accompanying emotions. It is world knowledge that drives the inference, not the semantics.

Concerning ‘forget’, one can utter sentences like ‘I forgot to close the door’, but sentences like ‘I forgot opening the door’ (meaning I forgot the event: opening the door by myself) are weird in English (if we have to follow some comments I found through google). In Italian this type of sentence is fine, but only with a normative interpretation (‘Mi sono dimenticato di chiudere la porta’ (I forgot closing the door) -> I had to close the door but I forgot to do so). Therefore, even in Italian where it is more certain that this type of sentence is acceptable, the internal dimension of PRO is not involved at all.

However, consider cases of ‘forget’ where no PRO is involved. Consider for example the sentence ‘Mary forgot how she felt during her pregnancy’. Here the speaker may very well include both the internal and external dimension among the parts of the event forgotten (There was an internal dimension to the memory of her pregnancy but Mary forgot all details of it). Analogously, if a speaker says ‘John forgot how one feels during an operation, what is at stake is both the internal and the external dimension. However, if one considers the sentence ‘John forgot how he was snoring after the operation’ on the basis of knowledge that John watched the film of the state after the operation, there is no implication of an internal dimension in connection with the memory described as forgotten. All these variations seem to prove that the full internal dimension of memories, knowledge, forgetting, etc. is communicated through pragmatics. Now, consider constructions with PRO, such as ‘John forgot how to cycle’ or ‘John forgot how to smoke’. There is no internal dimension implication here (We cannot exclude that one can have corporeal sensations or at least a sensation of happiness when one uses a bike, but it does not appear as though the utterance focuses on these). However, if we change the scenario a bit, as in ‘John forgot how to put up with torture’ the internal dimension is implicated conversationally. We can now say that my considerations are not merely tentative, but take into account a range of data (See Huang 2007 and references therein for the treatment of inferences to stereotype based on scenarios – the operation scenario is Huang’s favourite case).

As a last case, I want to consider ‘know’. The constructions ‘know that’ not surprisingly does not exhibit the internal-dimension implication (as there is no PRO here), however the constructions involving ‘knowledge-how’ do exhibit the phenomena noted by Higginbotham (see Stanley and Williamson 2001). Initially, consider constructions involving ‘knowledge-how’ without control, with explicit subjects. The sentence ‘John knew how he felt when he was tortured’ certainly implies an internal dimension; however this is far from certain when the sentence is changed a little as in ‘John knew how he was operated’. Suppose that John was totally anaesthetised during the operation. Then it follows that his ‘knowledge how’ cannot take into account an internal dimension – it is a contextual implicature that he knew how the

operation was carried out by watching the video of the operation (I am appropriating a scenario used by Lyons 1989). In the first sentence there is no PRO, yet the internal dimension implication is present. It must be a pragmatic inference in that case. Now, consider the sentence ‘John knows how one feels after an operation’. Of course the speaker implicates that John knows both the external and the internal dimension of the feeling (Yet there is no PRO here). However, if one changes the verb, saying ‘John knows how one sleeps after an operation’ on the basis of the fact that John watched a video of his state of sleeping, there is no internal dimension at stake (Furthermore, John may know how one sleeps after an operation on the basis of inductive evidence drawn from his having seen many cases of operated patients sleeping after an operation, which would lead him to imagine how he would sleep after an operation (and if he can know how one sleeps after an operation and the kind of problems which operated patients undergo, he would be prepared to pay a private nurse to take care of him, in order to prevent himself from doing harm to his body)). By changing the situation one can cancel the alleged implication.

10.6 Conclusion

This chapter explores the possibility of deriving ‘de se’ interpretations of pronominals in attitude contexts through pragmatics. After discussing the philosophical literature, by focusing on the tension between a semantic and a pragmatic analysis of ‘de se’ inferences, I found it fruitful to utilize Harcourt’s idea that ‘de se’ interpretations may involve a mode of presentation like ‘I’ and thus, to respond to potential objections like Feit’s, I revised Higginbotham’s considerations suggesting that the first-personal dimension of PRO in constructions like ‘John remembers walking in Oxford’ should be further characterised by making use of a mode of presentation like ‘I’. The more pragmatic part of the chapter explains why sentences such as ‘John believes he went to the cinema’ are ‘de se’ by default, given that ‘de se’ interpretations entail ‘de re’ interpretations and, thus, pragmatics promotes the most informative interpretation. The chapter also explains the contrast between ‘John remembers going to the cinema’ and ‘John remembers his going to the cinema’ or between ‘John remembers going to the cinema’ and ‘John remembers he himself going to the cinema’. A non-negligible part of the chapter deals with the internal dimension of ‘PRO’ and claims that the internal dimension may be the result of a pragmatic, and not of a semantic, inference.

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Chapter 11

Consequences of the Pragmatics of ‘De Se’

11.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I deepen the considerations I expatiated on in the previous chapter and I intend to concentrate on the discussion on whether the ‘de se’ notion is reducible to the first person (it is quite surprising that the author who broached the issue of ‘de se’ thoughts opposes this line of thought, for various reasons). I consider various views that connect Immunity to Error through Misidentification to the first person and I refute some important objections by Jaszczolt.

‘De se’ attitudes (beliefs and other similar attitudes about the (possibly unnamed) thinking subject) constitute a very interesting, intriguing and hot philosophical and linguistic topic. Since Perry’s seminal article, it has been clear that the ‘de se’ mode of presentation of the reference, like other modes of presentation in general, has profound consequences on action. A universal truism about ‘de se’ modes of presentation is that they are irreducibly indexical. Despite the fact that this is mainly a philosophical topic, a number of linguists have been attracted by its aura of mystery and have tried to discipline its ineffability under a set of linguistic concepts (mainly drawn from the theory of anaphora or from logophoricity), trying to systematize the behavior of ‘de se’ under logical inference. The slide from philosophical to linguistic treatments is certainly laudable, as the systematicity of a linguistic treatment that disciplines the behavior of ‘de se’ from the point of view of logical inference is certainly welcome. In this chapter, my fundamental claim is that the most successful linguistic treatment, which I take to be that of Higginbotham (2003), needs supplementation by specific inclusion of the ‘I’ (or EGO) mode of presentation at the level of (interpreted) logical form. The main reasons for this are given in my previous chapter (also see Capone 2010a, b), following Feit (personal communication) and in Feit (2013) as supplemented by considerations of parsimony and reflection on inferential behavior. In this chapter, I want to open up this discussion again and examine the bifurcation between a strand of research (Castañeda 1966) that tries to eliminate the view that ‘he*’ can be reduced to the first-person pronominal and another strand

favoring the identification of the essential indexical with ‘I’ or anyway properties of the first-person pronominal (Perry 1979). I will also find it useful to let the discussion interact with considerations by Jaszczolt (2013), which seem to lead away from Perry’s considerations.

The structure of this chapter is the following:

- a. A resume of the classical papers on ‘de se’, including recent papers by Higginbotham (2003) and Recanati (2009). The discussion aims at connecting ‘de se’ with the first person pronoun.
- b. A discussion of the recent pragmatics literature on ‘de se’ attitudes (linguistics); again, the discussion at least in part revolves around the ‘de se’ notion and the first person pronoun;
- c. A discussion of pragmatic intrusion in connection with the first-person pronoun;
- d. A discussion of the logical connection between the first-personal dimension, the internal dimension and immunity to error through misidentification. Is immunity to error through misidentification dependent on the intrusion of the EGO concept in a ‘de se’ construction? What kind of relationship is there between immunity to error through misidentification and the internal dimension of ‘de se’?
- e. Pragmatics and the internal dimension (whether partial or full);
- f. Immunity to error through misidentification: semantic (Higginbotham 2003) or pragmatic (Recanati 2009)? Or how to diffuse the dichotomy. (Modularity and pragmatic intrusion).
- g. A discussion of contextualism as a solution to the problems raised by Coliva and Jaszczolt (in separate papers) to the first-personal nature of the first person pronoun.

11.2 Part I

11.2.1 ‘De Se’ in Philosophy

In this section I shall present what I take to be the most influential theories on ‘de se’. Higginbotham’s view is philosophical/linguistic, but I have decided to include it in this philosophical section because it is the only one that has the merit of unifying the first-personal character of ‘de se’, with phenomena such as the internal dimension of PRO and immunity to error through misidentification. I will mainly use the perspective outlined in Higginbotham (2003), because it is linguistically explicit in making recourse to anaphoric concepts and to notions taken from Fillmore’s theory, and I will supplement it with considerations by Perry (the idea that the essential indexical needs to make use of the concept ‘I’ at some level of (pragmatic) interpretation). After articulating this section in a relatively neutral way, I shall discuss the dichotomy in the views of Castañeda and Perry, opting for Perry’s views, and I will make connections between Higginbotham’s view of immunity to error through misidentification and Recanati’s novel treatment, which is pragmatically biased, if I understand it well.

11.2.1.1 Castañeda

In his seminal paper, Castañeda (1966) discusses uses of the pronominal 'he' in attributions of self-knowledge – hence his use of the term 'S-uses of he*'. Self-knowledge attributions normally have the following linguistic structure:

- (1) John knows he* is happy.

Castañeda claims that 'he' is an essential indexical in that it cannot be replaced a) by a pronominal which refers to some x; b) by a description used to refer to x; c) by a Proper Name used to refer to x; d) by a deictic; e) by the pronominal 'I'.

The claim by Castañeda is valid for verbs of psychological attribution, in addition to being applicable to verbs such as 'say', 'assert', 'deny' (assertive or quasi assertive verbs; this class of verbs is not discussed in depth by anyone, but my impression is that the link between these verbs and genuine verbs of propositional attitude is only a derivative one).

What should be emphasized is the claim that we cannot replace 'he*' in (1) with e.g. a definite description or with a demonstrative pronoun (the extension of the reasoning to genuine pronominals and Proper Names is straightforward).

Suppose we consider (2):

- (2) The editor of Soul believes he* is a millionaire.

In case we know that X is the just appointed editor of Soul but x does not yet know that, we may report (2) but not (3)

- (3) The editor of Soul believes that the editor of Soul is a millionaire.

The reason for this is that x does not recognize himself through the mode of presentation 'the editor of Soul'.

Analogously, we should not be inclined to use (4) with a deictic use of 'he' to express (2):

- (4) The editor of Soul believes he is a millionaire.

The editor of Soul may look at himself in a mirror, without recognizing himself and would assent to 'He is a millionaire' without having the disposition to assent to 'I am a millionaire'.

The second part of that paper is devoted to the discussion of the deictic 'I' in connection with the claim that there is a close relationship between 'de se' attributions and attributions using 'I'.

Given that Castañeda denies that the essential indexical can be expressed through 'I', it is not clear what the real aim of the second part of the paper is. My speculation is that, despite the alleged falsity of Carl Ginet's claim that 'de se' is reducible to 'I', somehow Castañeda thinks it is plausible that someone else will try to establish the connection between the essential indexical and 'I'.

Despite the complexity of the second part of the paper, we can single out some essential discussions. Castañeda claims that 'I' has **ontological** priority as well as epistemic priority. The ontological priority is based on the consideration that a cor-

rect use of 'I' cannot fail to refer to the object it refers to. This property is not shared by definite descriptions.

Epistemic Priority consists in the consideration that a person cannot remember facts about himself, without using the word 'I' in his memory. However, Castañeda claims that the word 'I' only has partial epistemic priority. In fact, when people distinct from the person who would use 'I' to refer to himself have to remember some facts, they have to make use of 'he' or 'he*' as in 'John knows that he* was happy'. The fact that definite descriptions, proper names and pronominals have to be eliminated to remember self-knowledge is counterbalanced by the fact that these descriptions are not eliminable when the same facts are reported from the outside.

The last, possibly decisive point Castañeda wants to establish is that he* is ineliminable, while 'I' can be eliminated. Consider what happens in (5)

- (5) I believe that I am a millionaire and Gaskon believes he* is a millionaire.

We can replace this with:

- (6) Each of two persons, Gaskon and me, remembers that he* is a millionaire.

It appears that 'I' is eliminated from the 'that' clause; however, it is shifted to the main clause. So this is not really a case of complete eliminability.

Another case in which a use of 'I' is eliminable in favor of a use of 'he*' is when we make a report of what someone asserts. For instance, suppose Privatus asserts 'I believe that I am a millionaire'. For everybody else, Privatus' first token of 'I' must yield some description of Privatus, but the second token of 'I' must be replaced by a token of 'he*'.

However, Castañeda does not mention the fact that the use of 'I' could be implicit in a use of 'he*'. In this case, eliminability is not clearly established.

Before closing this section on Castañeda, I want to discuss Castañeda's discussion of a suggestion by Carl Ginet, according to which 'he*' can be replaced by using 'I'. The proposal by Ginet is the following:

For any sentence of the form "X believes that he* is H" there is a corresponding sentence that contains no form of 'he*' but that would in most circumstances make the same statement. The corresponding sentence that will do the job is the one of the form "X believes the proposition that X would express if X were to say 'I am H' or perhaps more clearly "If X were to say 'I am H', he would express what he (X) believes".

Castañeda objects to this formulation on pragmatic grounds. He thinks that 'Saying' must be replaced with 'assertively uttering'. Even this, according to him, does not suffice given that one who says 'I am H' may express in context something completely different from 'I am H'.

11.2.1.2 John Perry

Perry (1979) deals with the problem of the essential indexical in relation to utterances such as:

(7) I am making a mess.

Perry takes utterances such as (7) to have a motivational force which utterances corresponding to (7) where 'I' is replaced by a definite description (e.g. the messy shopper) lack.

There are at least two examples Perry uses to show what is distinctive about the essential indexicals. The first one is that of the messy shopper. I am at the supermarket; I see a trail of sugar on the floor and I follow the messy shopper who caused it. However, when I realize that I am the messy shopper, I stop and I rearrange the torn sack of sugar. Clearly, the thought 'I am making a mess' has a motivational force which the equivalent 'The messy shopper is making a mess' lacks. The other example Perry uses is the following. A professor has a meeting at noon. He knows all the while that he has this meeting at noon; however, it is only when he thinks 'The meeting is now' that he goes to the meeting. Again, the use of the essential indexical has motivational force.

Perry tries to solve this problem by discussing a theory of propositions along the lines of Frege. He takes belief to be a relationship between a person and a proposition. The proposition believed consists of an object and a predicate attributed to the object. Perry focuses on the idea that the proposition may contain a **missing conceptual component**, say a Mode of Presentation of an object. Then he wonders if the essential indexical corresponds to some concept that fits the speaker/thinker uniquely when he thinks/says 'I am making a mess'. Perry's answer is that recourse to a concept that fits the referent uniquely will not do the job required. For example, even if I were thinking of myself as the only bearded philosopher in a Safeway Store West of the Mississippi, the fact that I came to believe that the only such philosopher was making a mess explains my action only on the assumption that I believed that I was the only such philosopher, which brings in the problem of the essential indexical again.

At this point, Perry considers if a treatment in terms of 'de re' belief can offer a solution to the problem of the essential indexical. Perry says that the most influential treatments of 'de re' belief have tried to explain it in terms of 'de dicto' belief. The simplest account of 'de re' belief in terms of 'de dicto' belief is the following:

X believes of y that he is so and so

Just in case

There is a concept α such that α fits y and X believes that α is so and so.

This is problematic because I can believe that I am making a mess even if there is no concept α such that I alone can fit α and I believe that α is making a mess. Another possible solution Perry considers is that of relativized propositions. Now, on a Relativized Proposition view, 'I am making a mess' is true or false at a time and

at a person. The problem is, how do we individuate the person at which the proposition is true? If we individuate it through a description, then the motivational force of 'I am making a mess' is lost, since one can say that the statement is true relative to the time t and the person 'the messy shopper', which is a description of the person who refers to himself through 'I'.

The solution Perry offers is that we should distinguish between objects of belief and **belief states**. Belief states are more abstract than fully articulated objects of belief and they should include a perspective or a context as well as the inclination to describe the belief by making use of an essential indexical such as 'I' or 'now'. Such states are recognizable because they have motivational force. Suppose various people have used the sentence 'I am making a mess'. What is it that all these belief states have in common? They have in common the same motivational force (this is a functional characterization, as Chalmers (1996) would say), as well as an abstract structure in which the believer identifies himself through the use of the word 'I' in describing his belief and the context is enough to give full articulation to this belief. We do not expect all thoughts entertained by use of 'I am making a mess' to be isomorphic, because they are identified in virtue of contexts that are different from one another.

Most importantly, we have shown that 'I' cannot be reduced to the α or to 'This α '. In other words, Perry has demonstrated the same properties which Castañeda attributed to he^* . It follows that Castañeda's ' he^* ' and Perry's 'I' are somewhat related.

11.2.1.3 Higginbotham (2003)

Higginbotham recognizes that there is something special about first-personal uses of pronominals such as those discussed by Castañeda. The merits of his discussion lie in his pointing out that constructions with PRO may even be more first-personal than uses of 'he himself' and in linking the issue of immunity to error through misidentification to the issue of the internal perspective in connection with PRO (in cases of verbs like 'remember', 'imagine', etc.). He claims that the propositional analysis articulated through the notion of anaphora and thematic roles is superior to the property-based view of Lewis and Chierchia. In fact, according to him, the property-based analysis of beliefs and attitudes '*de se*' does not allow the theorist to explain 1) immunity to error through misidentification; 2) the internal dimension of PRO in complements of verbs such as 'remember', or 'imagine'. (We'll test this in a later section).

Higginbotham accepts Perry's idea that '*de se*' attitudes involve a first-personal mode of presentation (involving sometimes the word 'I' or some related notion) and reformulates such a view through considerations based on anaphora and thematic relations. His considerations were given ample space in the previous chapter and, thus, will not be reiterated here.

11.2.1.4 Recanati and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification

Recanati expatiates on the nature of 'de re' thoughts and subsequently reflects on the relation between 'de re' and 'de se' thoughts. First of all, Recanati clarifies that in order to have a 'de re' thought, one must think of the object through a mode of presentation. However, the mode of presentation is irrelevant to truth-evaluation of the thought. To have a thought 'de re' about object *x*, there must be an **information link** between the object and the subject. Consider the thought that 'That man is drunk'. Here there is a demonstrative link between the subject of the thought and the object and the object is determined through a demonstrative mode of presentation – that is a relation of acquaintance with object *x* based on perception. However, as Recanati says, the property of being seen by the subject (that is the particular relation of acquaintance) does not appear in the content of the thought. According to Recanati, 'de re' modes of presentation involve contextual relations to the object. The object the thought is about is the object standing in the right contextual relations to the thinking subject. In general, 'de re' thoughts are based on relations in virtue of which the subject can gain information about the object. We call these 'acquaintance relations'. The subject can be related to the object through a **perception relation** or through a **communicative chain**.

What determines the reference (the particular relation of acquaintance with the referent) is something external, not represented by the content of the thought. Recanati clarifies that, by this, he means that no constituent of the thought stands for that relation of acquaintance. Recanati finds an analogy between the acquaintance relations that determine a referent for a pronominal or a definite description and the conventional meaning that determines the referent of the indexical 'I'. It would be mistaken to identify the referent of 'I' (of a token of 'I') with the character of this word.

Recanati identifies modes of presentations with **files** opened up when one is in the appropriate contextual relationship to an object. The file can also contain information about the properties of the object made available through a relation of acquaintance. The file is a mental particular that bears certain relations to an object. A file may be opened by encountering a particular object.

Demonstratives involve the creation of temporary files. When the situation one encounters is no longer available, one will have to replace this file with a new one, identifiable through a definite description. The file is merely a mode of presentation that allows one to provide solutions to Frege's puzzle, among other things.

A specific file is the 'self' file. A self-file contains properties one is aware of through proprioception, which provides information available to nobody else.

Recanati clearly states that a 'de se' thought is a thought about oneself that involves the mode of presentation EGO. To clarify the distinction between 'de se' and 'de re' thoughts that are accidentally 'de se', Recanati uses an example by Kaplan (1977). When I say 'My pants are on fire' I am having a thought about myself (as determined by proprioception, e.g. the feel of burning on the skin). However, if I look at a mirror and I see a person who looks like somebody else, I

may say 'His pants are on fire' with no implication that I am having a thought about myself determined by proprioception.

Recanati relates the property of immunity to error through misidentification to 'de se' thoughts and arrives at the conclusion that it is not the case that all 'de se' thoughts share this property.

Recanati discusses examples that are due to Wittgenstein, showing that proprioception determines 'de se' thoughts displaying immunity to error through misidentification. When I say 'My arm hurts' I say this because I have an inner experience about which I cannot be mistaken. Instead, if I say 'My arm is broken' basing this on visual experience of a broken arm which I mistake for my own, it is clear that my statement relies on the premise d is broken; d = that arm; $d = c$ (my arm). Since the premises on which my statement rests involve identification ($d = c$), then I can be mistaken about $c = d$ and the resulting statement can be mistaken too. Following Evans (1982), Recanati claims that 'de se' statements can also involve bodily properties. Since the attribution of bodily properties can be determined either through proprioception or visual experience, it turns out that a statement such as 'My legs are crossed' is ambiguous. On one interpretation, it shows immunity to error through misidentification. On the normal visual perception reading, it is vulnerable to error through misidentification.

Suppose I say 'My legs are crossed' on the basis of visual experience. Then I can fail to note that these are John's legs. My statement a is F rests on the identification $a = b$ and on the judgment b is F . Since there is a misidentification component, misidentification can occur.

Recanati focuses on an implicitly 'de se' kind of statement. When we say 'Pain' or 'There is pain', we are saying that there is a pain the subject is experiencing even if we are not explicitly representing the subject in the content. We can say that the content of the conscious state is not a complete proposition but the property of being in pain.

Implicit 'de se' statements are clearly immune to error through misidentification, since they are based on proprioceptive experience. Immunity is retained because the statement does not rest on premises such as b is F and $a = b$. It is not based on an identification act.

In the conclusive section of his paper, Recanati discusses the ideas by Lewis (1979), in particular the reduction of 'de re' to 'de se' thoughts and its relation to an egocentric perspective on the attitudes. First of all, it should be noted that, when discussing 'de re' thoughts, Lewis incorporates the acquaintance condition into the 'de re' thought. So 'John believes that Mary is pretty' comes out as

$\exists x = \text{John}, \exists y = \text{Mary}$, such x is acquainted with Mary, who has the property of being pretty.

The reason why this is done is that Lewis wants to reduce all belief to belief 'de se'. Now, while in case of belief that is genuinely 'de se' (Mary believes she is pretty), belief 'de se' can be reduced to attribution of a property to the self, this cannot be done in the case of belief 'de re', unless the acquaintance condition is incorporated

into the content of the thought. In other words, this is due to a conception of the attitudes that is too egocentric.

11.3 Part II

11.3.1 *Pragmatic Treatments*

In this section, I will report three types of pragmatic treatments. Capone (2010a, b) is a treatment based on Relevance Theory considerations. Jaszczolt (this volume) is based on her general theory of Default Semantics and merger representations and seems to be a step forward towards a contextualist theory of ‘*de se*’. Huang (2016) is based on a neo-Gricean theory of anaphora and assimilates ‘*de se*’ and logophoricity.

11.3.1.1 Capone (2010a, b) and the Pragmatics of ‘*de se*’

Capone (2010a, b) is an eclectic treatment combining linguistic, cognitive and philosophical considerations in order to predict pragmatic results. His approach is eclectic and is a rethinking of pragmatic scales à la Levinson/Horn/Huang in terms of considerations based on Relevance Theory. In essentials, his ideas, are very simple. If one accepts Higginbotham’s considerations on the logical forms of ‘*de se*’ and ‘*de re*’ beliefs (to pick up just the most representative of the attitudes), it goes without saying that the logical forms of ‘*de se*’ beliefs entail the logical forms of ‘*de re*’ beliefs. Hence the possibility of pragmatic scales. On a strictly Relevance Theory line of thinking, the ranking of ‘*de se*’, ‘*de re*’ in terms of entailment entails a ranking in terms of informativeness. Then it goes without saying that a ‘*de se*’ interpretation of a pronominal (where both interpretations are possible) is informationally richer and, thus, following the Principle of Relevance, greater cognitive effects, with a parity of cognitive efforts, are predicted. One may also concoct stories in which a ‘*de se*’ interpretation leads to some kind of action which the ‘*de re*’ interpretation would never cause (See Perry; see also Capone 2010a, b, the pill story). I have amply discussed all this in the previous chapter, so I will stop this discussion here.

11.3.1.2 Jaszczolt (2013) on ‘*De Se*’

Jaszczolt’s views about ‘*de se*’ need to be discussed with reference to her framework based on Default Semantics. Her view only accepts the levels of meaning that are necessary (indispensable), in line with **Modified Occam’s Razor**. Accordingly,

she posits compositionality at the level of Merger Representations,¹ rather than at the level of sentential meaning. Since sentential meaning is part of merger representations, this parsimony ensures that compositionality is calculated only once and that, when compositionality seems to break down at the level of sentential meaning, it percolates down to the sentential components from the merger representations, where pragmatics ensures compositionality. Now, the question Jaszczolt tackles, which is not devoid of theoretical interest, is whether ‘de se’ meanings belong to the grammar component (or the level of semantics) or, otherwise, to the contextualist level of meaning. Which attitude should prevail, in this case: Minimalism or Contextualism? The emerging attitude is the one that is found in Jaszczolt (2005). In fact, Jaszczolt believes that, properly construed, minimalism is compatible with contextualism. In particular, she takes grammar (the grammatical resources responsible for ‘de se’ interpretations) to provide defaults that are either promoted at the level of the contextualist component of meaning or, otherwise, abrogated through cancellation, costly though this can be. Jaszczolt takes issue with scholars like Chierchia who claim that pronominals (e.g. PRO) are fundamentally responsible for ‘de se’ interpretations, clarifying that other types of constructions can give rise to first-personal meanings as in the following examples (used in a first-personal way):

- (8) Sammy wants a biscuit;
- (9) Mummy will be with you in a moment.

Jaszczolt also proposes examples divesting grammar from its monotonic status based on cases in which an NP that is not a pronominal can be invested with pronominal, first-personal meaning, thanks to inferences accruing in context:

- (10) I believe I should have prepared the drinks for the party. In a way I also believed that I should have done it when I walked into the room. The fact is, the person appointed by the Faculty Board should have done it and, as I later realized, I was this person.

Now, this example can be taken in an ambivalent way. On the one hand, ‘I’, as used in the first two sentences, takes on the value of a definite description, once we arrive at the final sentence (The fact is....). Alternatively, on re-interpretation, the NP ‘The person appointed by the Faculty Board’ could acquire a first-personal meaning. The fact that various potential reinterpretations are latent does not deprive the example from the significance that it has for Jaszczolt: in other words it is not the level of grammar that can guarantee the first-personal dimension of a pronominal, but contextual interpretation is required as well. So, the upshot of all this is that grammar only provides **defaults capable of being** overridden, even if with some cost, but they can also be reinforced at the level of the contextual component of meaning, where they can be fully promoted as utterance interpretations.

¹ According to Jaszczolt (2005) Merger Representations represent a level in which semantic and pragmatic information can be combined to produce truth-conditional output (see Jaszczolt 2005 for a more specific and articulated view).

There are, nevertheless, some disturbing problems raised by Jaszczolt for my views expressed in Capone (2010a, b). If grammatical resources, such as pronominals (PRO, I, etc.) can only provide defaults capable of being overridden in context, my view that Higginbotham's considerations need to be supplemented by an explicitly first-personal constituent like EGO seem to go by the board. If we follow Jaszczolt, EGO is not, by itself, sufficient to guarantee a first-personal interpretation (as we saw through example 10) (the pronominal 'he' here could very well be taken to mean 'The person appointed by the Faculty Board' on a suitable reinterpretation). Furthermore, as Jaszczolt claims, many NPs normally disjoint in interpretation from pronominals can take on first-personal readings ('Mummy', 'Sammy' etc.).

Furthermore Jaszczolt takes the view that a pronominal like 'he*' is associated with a first-personal reading through cancellable pragmatic inference, which is somehow contrary to the notion of pragmatic intrusion I have developed through many publications. I usually claimed that pragmatic intrusions that are indispensable to rescue an utterance from a logical problem (take for example the problem raised by Feit in connection with uniqueness and discussed in the previous chapter) are not cancellable. I agree with Jaszczolt to some extent, as she also finds that the cancellability of the 'de se' inference is very costly, as in:

(11) John Perry believes that he is making a mess but doesn't realize it is him.

(11), however, cannot be a serious problem for my views, first of all because she grants that cancellability (abrogating the 'de se' inference) is a costly move. Second, the 'de se' interpretation arises only on condition that we identify 'he' with 'John Perry' by an anaphoric link and, thus, the first-personal reading is accessed only on top of this, let us say, possible interpretation. The cases like 'Mummy', 'Sammy' discussed by Jaszczolt in order to eliminate the view that 'de se' is a concept that is entrenched in the grammar, interesting though they are, only show that there are alternative expressive possibilities, that may very well be **parasitic** on the forms provided by grammar. Furthermore, the fact that there are constructions that are, at least potentially, **interpretatively** ambiguous, such as 'John believes he is clever', does not preclude the possibility that certain forms of pronominals encode first-personal meanings. It is probably the discussion which Feit and I proposed (see the previous chapter and Capone 2010a, b) to open the way for the possibility of 'de se' constructions needing a pragmatic increment involving the concept 'EGO'. Unfortunately, the radical question posed by Jaszczolt – a question I find extremely intriguing – is that the concept EGO alone is not sufficient in articulated linguistic texts to ensure the grasp of a first-personal concept (see the interesting example by Jaszczolt reported in (10)). However, I want to defend myself by saying that even if we grant that, in the articulated linguistic texts, words can be ambiguous and can be interpreted in different ways and, therefore, there is nothing that can prevent EGO from being interpreted as a description (an ordinary descriptive NP), the concept EGO which I propose to use in inference must belong to some language of thought, some kind of completely disambiguated **Mentalese**. And since pragmatic inference need not be dependent on written or articulated words, the words used in inferences (pragmatic or not) are words of mentalese that can be fully made explicit. What

ensures that EGO and EGO are the same word of mentalese both for the speaker and the hearer and for the speaker and the many hearers is that such an inference is indispensable in rescuing the statement from the problems raised by Feit (see the previous chapter). If the speaker and the hearer had different EGOS in mind, by extending the interpretation work, the aim of this pragmatic explicature would be defeated. On the contrary, I assume that the speaker and the hearer share the task of making interpretations plausible by obeying a normative Principle of Charity imposing that they amend possible logical deficiencies such as absurd interpretations or patent contradictions. Some cooperation and coordination work goes on between the speaker and the hearer and, thus, the multiple reinterpretations which the word EGO undergo in articulated speech cannot be assumed in a pragmatic inferential work capable of acting not only on explicit words, but on what is strictly required to make the interpretation work plausible (occurrences of Mentalese, in other words). Therefore, re-contextualizations leading us away from the concept EGO to NPs with various descriptive force are not necessary and are extremely costly. This is why hearers do not go for them.

Before closing this section on Jaszczolt, it is fair to point out that she manages to reconcile both minimalism and contextualism, by adding a level of Merger Representations where compositionality is operative, Modified Occam's Razor preventing compositionality from operating at the level of sentential meaning. Now, if these considerations make sense, it is clear that compositionality also works to combine components that are the result of pragmatic inference (the EGO concept I was in fact discussing) with components that are present at the sentential level. Thus a pronominal like 'he' that is potentially ambiguous at the level of semantics becomes an essential indexical (he*) in the sense of Castañeda, only after effecting basic compositional operations, like, for example, establishing an anaphoric link with some previous subject within the sentence (Jaszczolt says that local accommodation is preferred and, thus, the anaphoric linkage occurs within the minimal syntactic projection (the matrix sentence usually) and then by gluing the EGO concept to the pronominal 'he'). The essential indexical is fundamentally the result of two logical operations; (a) an anaphoric link within the minimal projected category; gluing the EGO concept onto 'he'. These operations occur at the level of the merger representations and thus allow the compositionality effects to percolate down the level of the sentence. These operations occur at an inferential level; thus it is not to be excluded that pragmatic principles like, for example, the Principle of Relevance are at work; yet it appears that Jaszczolt prefers to admit only a level of standardized inference and, thus, legitimately resorts to defaults.

11.3.1.3 Yan Huang on 'De Se'

Yan Huang's treatment of 'de se' and pragmatics does not properly belong to the philosophy of language, being rooted in cross-linguistic analysis, a theory of anaphora and, also a theory of logophoricity; therefore, this discussion is necessarily brief. Nevertheless, I will try to sum up the essentials of this paper because they

point to how a pragmatic treatment of 'de se' should be handled. Huang starts with the characteristics of a quasi-indicator to establish obvious analogies with long-distance reflexives and logophoric elements which he takes to be the counterparts of quasi-indicators in West African languages and in Asian languages:

- (i) A quasi-indicator does not express an indexical reference made by the speaker;
- (ii) It occurs in *oratio obliqua*;
- (iii) It has an antecedent, which it refers back to;
- (iv) Its antecedent is outside the *oratio obliqua* containing the quasi-indicator;
- (v) It is used to attribute implicit indexical reference to the referent of its antecedent.

Huang agrees that expressions like 'he himself' or PRO are quasi-indicators in English and also mentions the presence of attitude ascriptions that can be partly 'de se' and partly 'de re'. The author discusses logophoric expressions in West-African languages and long-distance reflexives in East and South Asian languages showing that they can both function as quasi-indicators in the sense of Castañeda. Logophoric expressions can be used to mark logophoricity or logophora. By logophoricity, one means the phenomenon whereby the perspective of the internal protagonist of a sentence or discourse, as opposed to that of the current external speaker, is reported by using some morphological/syntactic means. According to Huang, it is hardly surprising that logophoric expressions are one of the most common devices the current, external speaker uses in attributing a 'de se' attitude to an internal protagonist. Huang points out that a logophoric expression usually occurs in a logophoric domain, namely a sentence or a stretch of discourse in which the internal protagonist is represented. In general, a logophoric domain constitutes an indirect speech. Logophoric domains are usually set up by logophoric licensors: logophoric predicates and logophoric complementisers (such complementisers being often homophonous with the verb 'say').

In Asian languages, since there is no special logophor, the essential indexical can be expressed by resorting to long distance reflexives. Long-distance reflexives in East and South Asian languages can be morphologically simple or complex. Marking of 'de se' attitude ascriptions is accomplished syntactically in terms of long distance reflexives. A long-distance reflexive is one that can be bound outside its local syntactic domain. Long-distance reflexivization occurs usually within the sentential complements of speech, thought, mental state, knowledge and perception.

In West African languages, the use of logophoric expressions is in complementary distribution with that of regular expressions like pronouns. As a result, any speaker of these languages intending coreference will also have to use a logophoric expression. If a logophoric expression is not employed, but a regular pronoun is, a Q-implicature will arise, namely neither a 'de se' interpretation nor a coreferential interpretation is intended.

Concerning Asian languages, while the use of a long-distance reflexive encodes both a ‘de se’ attitude and coreference, the use of a regular pronoun may or may not encode coreference, but *not* ‘de se’ ascriptions. So there is a scale <long distance reflexive, regular pronoun> modeled on Q-scales. The effect is that the unavailability of the semantically stronger long-distance reflexive will Q-implicate the speaker’s intention to avoid at least one feature associated with it, namely the ‘de se’ reading. If the unmarked regular pronoun is not used, but the marked long-distance reflexive is used instead, an M-implicature is created, that is not only coreference but a ‘de se’ interpretation is intended.

A different paper would be required to see how Relevance Theorists would deal with such phenomena. Suffice it to say that Huang’s considerations work on the ranking of informativeness, which is also what Relevance Theory does. According to RT an interpretation that yields greater contextual effects is to be preferred to one which does not yield the same amount of effects, cognitive costs remaining equal. Implicatures/explicature due to the use of marked expressions can be predicted by Relevance Theorists by paying due attention to cognitive effort, marked expressions usually requiring greater cognitive efforts.

11.3.2 *EGO or Not EGO? (A Discussion of Castañeda and Perry)*

While Castañeda (1966) in his seminal papers disseminated original ideas about ‘de se’ attitudes, and provided the basic examples alighting the theoretical discussion, he was clearly at a fork in having to decide whether ‘he*’ was completely irreducible (a clearly radical and original claim) or whether it could be partially reduced, say by making use of the concept EGO, to appear somehow in the semantic/pragmatic analysis of uses of the essential indexical. The other horn of the dilemma is certainly constituted by Perry’s ideas that beliefs ‘de se’ amount to specifications of mental states in which the concept EGO appears somehow (even if it could not be shown to be semantically present, it could be shown to be indispensable for a pragmatic type of analysis). While the considerations by Perry are quite straightforward and presumably presuppose the at least partial reducibility of ‘de se’ to the EGO concept, Castañeda’s considerations about the irreducibility of ‘de se’ are fully articulated and explicitly deny that recourse to the concept EGO, even if invoked through pragmatic machinery, could be useful.

First of all, consider, the claim that ‘I’ has **ontological** priority (such a priority consisting in the fact that a correct use of ‘I’ cannot fail to refer to the object it purports to refer). This claim is, in my opinion, reminiscent of the claim of immunity to error through misidentification; however, Castañeda limits this claim just to the first person pronominal and does not extend it, in the way Higginbotham does, to ‘he*’. If Castañeda is right, ‘I’ is immune to error through misidentification. However, if Higginbotham (based on Shoemaker 1968) is correct, ‘He*’ is also immune to error through misidentification. This provides ‘prima facie’ evidence

that 'I' and 'he*' are related (though we certainly do not want to say that 'I' is identical with 'He*'). Is it possible that the relation between 'I' and 'He*' is due to the fact that either 'I' should be expressed in terms of the concept 'He*' or that 'He*' should be expressed in terms of the concept 'I'? While, on the basis of these considerations alone, we cannot establish which direction we should go, we have at least established that it is implausible to think, the way Castañeda does, that 'He*' and 'I' are NOT related.

Feit (personal communication) in response to this, says:

I am not sure these are the same kinds of immunity to error. One kind is this: you cannot fail, or 'I' cannot fail, to refer. But the kind of error Shoemaker was interested in is different. It is this: you cannot be wrong in believing something because you misidentified somebody else as yourself. One problem with Higginbotham's paper, as I see it, is that he does not clearly distinguish these two different phenomena.

For example, consider my statement: "I was born on Corsica." There is immunity here in the first sense above, since my use of 'I' cannot fail to refer to me. However, there is no immunity in the second sense. That is, there is vulnerability to error through misidentification in Shoemaker's sense. For suppose I make my statement because I have just learned that Napoleon was born on Corsica, and because I mistakenly believe that I am Napoleon. This example is from Pryor (1999).

In reply to Feit's considerations, I need to say that, like Shoemaker's, my approach has both a semantic and an epistemological dimension. In particular, the epistemological approach is taken to be supervenient on the semantic approach. The case discussed by Feit (taken from Pryor 1999) is a case of an inferential extension to human knowledge. But the central cases of Immunity to Error through Misidentification are clearly not those where the subject (in the third person) is logically independent of a verb of propositional attitude but one which is embedded in the object of an attitude ("I remember I was walking in Oxford": the question of IEM is about the second subject). Clearly I cannot say 'I remember I was born in Corsica'² because I believe I am Napoleon and I just learned that Napoleon was born in Corsica. The reason why I cannot remember facts deduced through logical deductions is that remembering involves an internal dimension, as you remember from the inside; instead, logical deductions involve a dimension which is external to the event remembered. The internal dimension may be partly semantic, partly pragmatic; but whatever it is, it contributes to excluding the magic tricks of deduction and most importantly the idea that the thought cannot be first-personal or that the subject can fail to refer to himself. In any case, a person who thinks of himself as 'I', even if he does attribute himself the property 'I=Napoleon', still may think of himself as himself, despite the additional identification 'I=Napoleon'. The

²It would be best to use the example 'I remember being born in Corsica'.

example by Feit can only serve to illuminate the question of whether identification is always primary or whether there may be two types of identification: ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ identification. My claim would still be that primary identification, being independent of secondary identification, can work well to ensure that IEM occurs even in sentences like the one Feit brought to my attention. Furthermore, we need to consider what happens when we replace ‘remember’ with ‘believe’. Consider the statement ‘I believe that I was born in Corsica’. Suppose I believe this as a result of someone having led me to a misidentification of myself. I was led to believe I am Napoleon and then I deduced that I was born in Corsica. Since belief does not imply an internal dimension, the magic tricks of logical deduction cannot be excluded. Yet, paradoxically, to use some apparatus on the pragmatics of belief by Igor Douven (2010), after learning that I am Napoleon and after deducing that I was born in Corsica, I may well continue to remember that I was born in Corsica, but forget that I am Napoleon. IEM in this case occurs and shows that the identification $I = \text{Napoleon}$ is only secondary and cannot in any way prevent the thinker from thinking of himself under a neutral mode of presentation such as ‘EGO’. Second, Castañeda argues that ‘I’ only has **partial epistemic priority**. In other words, in order to remember things that happened to me or statements about me (the kind of statements that are found in encyclopedias, history books, etc.), I should eliminate modes of presentation of myself other than ‘I’, because this is the only way to be sure that I do not lose sight of the connection (of identity) between such modes of presentation and the mode of presentation ‘I’. (If I forget that Julius Caesar was my name I may very well forget most of what history books say about me (I being Julius Caesar)). To ensure transmission of memories in my mind, I must reduce all other modes of presentation of myself to the bare ‘I’.³ Now while this has some cogent plausibility (given all the other considerations Castañeda said to induce us to believe that ‘de se’ attitudes have a special status, distinct from ‘de re’ attitudes), Castañeda refuses to accept that eliminability of modes of presentation of ‘I’ is necessary to ensure that memories are retained when we report such states of the world in the third person, through statements such as (12)

(12) Caesar believes he* conquered Egypt.

Yet, on the one hand it is clear that sentences such as (12) are transformations of sentences such as (13):

(13) Caesar: I conquered Egypt.

Sentences like (12) are parasitic on the logical properties of sentences such as (13). Furthermore, preserving memories of facts such as ‘Caesar conquered Egypt’ may very well depend on what Caesar may be able to report himself, even if in exceptional cases. Since, in cases of amnesia, he may not be able to report ‘Caesar conquered Egypt’ but he may only report ‘I conquered Egypt’ it is clear that transmission of memories through utterances such as ‘Caesar remembers conquering Egypt’

³This consideration is of great importance. It appears to follow independently from Igor Douven’s (2010) paper on the pragmatics of belief.

ultimately depends on eliminability of any other modes of presentation of 'Caesar' in favor of 'I'. Thus, it is demonstrated that 'he*' preserves all the logical features of 'I', as far as the eliminability of modes of presentation other than 'I' are concerned and, therefore, is shown to be closely related to the use of 'I' (whether in thought or in speech).

Third, Castañeda wants to establish that 'he*' is ineliminable, while 'I' can be (logically) eliminated. (We have already discussed his arguments to this effect in a previous section).

However, Castañeda does not consider the possibility of pragmatic enrichments such as:

(14) John believes that he is ill (John thinks of himself under the mode of presentation 'Ego').

After all, it is this pragmatic enrichment which Castañeda's famous asterisk indicates. Castañeda wants to opt for a more radical thesis, according to which he* cannot be reduced to a simpler semantic/pragmatic analysis, but by doing so he ends up in trouble because he ends up giving up the possibility that immunity to error through misidentification notoriously associated with 'he*' depends on pragmatic enrichment of 'he' (that is related to 'I') and, thus, makes it impossible to transfer at least the concept of immunity to error through misidentification associated with use of 'I' to the use of 'he'.

11.3.3 Immunity to Error Through Misidentification Is the Result of Pragmatic Intrusion

If my considerations on what Castaneda says are correct, immunity to error through misidentification is a property which 'de se' constructions inherit from the property of the 'first-person'. However, if my claim that 'de se' constructions involve use of an implicit EGO component through pragmatic intrusion, it cannot be true that immunity to error through misidentification is a semantic property of 'de se' constructions, although we can legitimately say that it is a pragmatic property of 'de se' constructions, being derivative from the EGO component incorporated into 'de se' constructions through pragmatic intrusion.

Before proceeding, I want to cast aside some considerations which may jeopardize my discussion so far. Feit (personal communication) says:

The speaker of a 'de se' attribution (such as 'John believes that he* is clever') can fail to refer to the alleged believer, so there does not seem to be the kind of immunity in which 'I' cannot fail to refer. But the other kind of immunity (e.g. Shoemaker's) does not seem to be at all linguistic. One and the same belief can be immune to error when it is believed on first personal grounds (like introspection

etc.), and yet vulnerable to error when it is believed on other grounds. So, it seems to me that nothing in the semantics or even pragmatics should guarantee immunity. On this point see Pryor 1999 and Recanati 2009. (Neil Feit, personal communication)

My reply to Feit is brief. Concerning the fact that the speaker of ‘de se’ attributions can fail to refer to the believer does not worry me. IEM is only limited to the relationship between the subject of the belief and himself. Concerning the second worry, I note that in this chapter I try to reconcile epistemology and semantics claiming that IEM reconciles both dimensions. However, I want to bring out the consideration that epistemology is supervenient on the semantics. How can one introspect without using the first person? Is it plausible that there can be a phenomenon called ‘introspecting’ without first person attributions and the IEM which it can guarantee? My answer is negative.

After this de-tour, I need to stress that my idea that IEM derives from pragmatic intrusion is not an implausible speculation. However, before taking a definitive commitment, I want to explore further the consequences of Higginbotham’s claim that Lewis’ property-based treatment does not do justice a) to the internal dimension of PRO/de se constructions; b) to immunity to error through misidentification. Let us put this claim to the test immediately. Lewis, and Feit after him, claim that a sentence such as:

(15) John believes he is clever

can be represented as:

(16) John attributes to himself the property: being clever.

Can (16) vindicate the idea of an internal dimension being associated with PRO? If (16) is interpreted, as is most plausible, as (17):

(17) John attributes himself the property: PROarb being clever

it is clear that PROarb cannot be associated with an internal dimension. There is some inter-subjective property which anyone at all can have, and which is not specific to anyone at all: hence there can be no internal dimension attached to this property. However, Lewis or Feit could insist that although there is no internal dimension associated with PRO, internalization can occur through attribution of the property (perhaps a sort of semantic effect of the predicate on the object). The doubt remains that if PROarb expresses an intersubjective dimension, even by a relation of self-attribution, it will end up expressing an intersubjective dimension and NOT an internal dimension. The situation becomes more complicated when verbs such as ‘remember’ are considered. Consider (18)

(18) John remembers falling down the stairs.

Now, undoubtedly it is difficult to transpose this through a Lewis-style analysis; the most we can say is that John attributes himself the property: PRO_{arb} falling down the stairs. But PRO_{arb} deprives the property of any internal dimension at all.

I propose that we leave this undoubtedly complicated task to the followers of Lewis. (A way to solve this problem would be to resort to radical pragmatic intrusion and claim that the internal dimension is grafted pragmatically to the semantics). For the time being, the most we can make of this discussion is to decide whether we should derive immunity to error through identification from the internal dimension of PRO (or of a 'de se' construction) or whether we should derive the internal dimension of PRO (or 'de se') from immunity to error through misidentification. This is not a trivial question. We can make this question even more complicated by asking whether the internal dimension is derivable from the implicit use of EGO in 'de se' constructions. After all, we could have the following logical chain:

EGO > Internal dimension > immunity to error through misidentification.

If the logical chain above has some validity, and we can establish without doubt that EGO is a pragmatically enriched component of the 'de se' construction, then we 'ipso facto' show that the internal dimension of 'de se' and immunity to error through misidentification are consequences of pragmatic intrusion and, in particular, the incorporation of EGO in 'de se' constructions.

Have we got independent support for such a line of thought? Recanati (2009) has insisted that not all 'de se' constructions involve immunity to error through misidentification and that proprioception is involved in guaranteeing immunity to error through misidentification. What is proprioception? While the discussion is undoubtedly complicated, Recanati distinguishes between feeling that something is the case and seeing that something is the case. For example, I can feel that my arm is broken or I can see that my arm is broken. In case I feel that my arm is broken, proprioception is involved and there can be no case for error due to misidentification (it is proprioception that guarantees immunity to error through misidentification). If I see that my arm is broken, but I mistake your arm for my arm and I make an identification mistake, then immunity to error through misidentification is not guaranteed. While there is some truth in this discussion, it deserves deepening. However, unlike Recanati, instead of placing the burden on the distinction between perception and proprioception, I want to make immunity to error through misidentification depend (at least in basic cases like 'John thinks he is clever') on the awareness of the subject of the thinking experience. Of course, awareness of the subject of experience involves some kind of self-awareness and not proprioception proper or only perception, as the kind of immunity to error through misidentification in cases like 'John thinks he is clever' is different from the cases discussed by Recanati and does not concern objects of experience but subjects of experience. Thus, proprioception may not be the right concept in this case, because it is not the case that the thinking subject is engaged in proprioception in thinking (with some appropriate exceptions, of course: This thought makes me nervous; this thought makes me sad; this thought made me tremble; this thought made me faint). Thinking is the essential relation

necessary for establishing a thinking subject. It is the act of thinking to establish the subject and the identity between the subject of thinking and the subject of the thought.⁴ While the person who thinks (19)

(19) I think I am clever

is not particularly engaged in an interpretation process but provides the appropriate EGO concept by the act of thinking and this is enough to ensure immunity to error through misidentification, something different occurs in (20)

(20) John thinks he is clever.

Here the hearer/reader must simulate (as noted by Igor Douven 2013) an act of thinking and in simulating this act she supplies an EGO concept through inference. Of course, pragmatic inference, utilizing the principle of relevance, independently supports the simulation process and establishes the anaphoric link between John and ‘he’ and also supplies the EGO concept to be incorporated into the thought by pragmatic enrichment. Having done so, having established that John thinks of himself as Ego and that this is guaranteed by the act of thinking in itself, the hearer can simulate John’s mental state and, in particular, the internal dimension of the thought (he thinks he is clever or happy because he experiences cleverness or happiness) and the internal dimension of the thought serves to reinforce immunity to error through misidentification, already supplied through the EGO component pragmatically. If the EGO component has been supplied by the simulation of the act of thinking, one can also simulate that John **cannot** be mistaken about his own identity, that is to say about EGO.

From the above, I have deduced that the first-personal dimension of ‘de se’, as pragmatically implicated, is logically responsible for immunity to error through misidentification (we could also see this case as a case of immunity of error through misidentification being supervenient (in the sense of Chalmers 1996) on the ego-component of ‘de se’).

If the EGO component of a ‘de se’ thought is due to pragmatic intrusion (as I claimed), immunity to error through misidentification is a consequence of a pragmatic attribution in **reports** of ‘de se’ thoughts. In naturally occurring ‘de se’ thoughts which are not reported, it is the act of thinking and the identity between consequential acts of thinking that guarantees the EGO component, and, consequently immunity to error through misidentification. An opponent, at this point, may plausibly say:

But of course there is no pragmatic intrusion here, since the thought is not reported. In what sense, then, is immunity to error the “result” of pragmatic intrusion – as in the title of this section?

⁴Proprioception need not entail thinking that p, while thinking that p can be based on proprioception.

While I grant that my answer to this stimulating and provocative question is tentative, and possibly needs further refinement, I am provisionally content with the idea that what binds the EGO concept to the thinker of the thought is a pragmatic process of coindexation. This process is made more visible when we have anaphoric chains (embeddings with multiple uses of 'I'). While surely the question of interpretation does not arise when the speaker speaks (or just thinks), the question of interpretation arises when the speaker remembers what he said. When the speaker remembers what he said he turns into someone equivalent to the Hearer; and then matters of interpretation are relevant. Furthermore, the concept EGO becomes vacuous if it is not coindexed with some person in particular. And the coindexation process has some sense when the conversation makes use of other EGO concepts which are coindexed to different speakers. Furthermore, when the speaker tries to remember what he said, it is clear that pragmatics of belief as conceived by Igor Douven is applicable.

11.3.4 Why Immunity to Error Through Misidentification Is Logically Independent of the Internal Dimension of PRO/de se

Admittedly, the reasons I furnish in this section against making a logical connection between the internal dimension of PRO/de se and immunity to error through misidentification depend on previous considerations on the inferential behavior of de se/PRO, discussed in Capone (2010a, b) (also see the previous chapter). There I wanted to make the provision/expression of the internal dimension of PRO/de se' a pragmatic constituent of the report of the thought. However, after some discussion I moved towards the more balanced view that, in general, especially with verbs such as 'remember', the internal dimension of PRO is semantically associated with the specific construction (PRO, in our case). Then I have speculated that the internal dimension (constituent) supplied through the semantics is only partial or gappy (in line with views by Carston (2002) on semantic underdetermination) and that pragmatics is responsible in part for supplying a partial internal dimension. For certain other verbs, such as 'expect', 'know how', etc. I have speculated that the internal dimension constituent is fully provided through pragmatics.

Now, what are the consequences of accepting the views above for the plausibility of the view that immunity to error through misidentification depends on the internal dimension of PRO/de se? The most immediate consequence would be that, in the most straightforward cases, like 'expect', or 'imagine' 'de se' constructions ('he*' or 'she*') should not be associated with immunity to error through misidentification. Thus, someone who expects to leave for Rome tomorrow may legitimately hold some doubts as to whether he himself is involved in the thought that he will leave for Rome tomorrow. But this is absurd. Immunity to error through misidentification must be granted for cases such as 'expect' and 'imagine' as well and this

shows that immunity is not logically dependent on the internal dimension (which is implicated conversationally as part of explicatures in these cases, if my view in Capone (2010a, b) is correct).

In this connection, Neil Feit (personal communication) comments that:

This is absurd, given one kind of immunity to error, but not absurd given another. So you need to be clear which kind is at issue. If I read about somebody, whom I take to be myself, but mistakenly, and what I read reports that this person will leave for Rome tomorrow, then I will expect to leave for Rome. But this expectation is not immune to error in the Shoemaker sense.

Let us see how one can reply to Feit. Suppose that I am at the airport and that in the waiting hall there is a big mirror. There is someone who resembles me closely (same clothes, same type of hair, same type of nose) and I take him (say John) to be myself. Suppose I read the information on the ticket he has in his hand that is about to leave for Rome. Then, considering that that person is to leave for Rome and has got a ticket in his hand and take him to be myself, I conclude that I can leave for Rome tomorrow and thus I expect to leave for Rome tomorrow. Then I expect to be able to leave for Rome tomorrow. Surely this is a false belief, one that crucially relies on misidentification. However, despite there being a secondary misidentification, there is not a primary misidentification, in the sense that I am attributing myself the property 'about to leave for Rome'. The property misattribution does not jeopardize the process of referring to oneself in the right way.

What other consequences follow from the fact that the internal dimension of PRO/'de se' is only partially semantically expressed and partially pragmatically articulated in cases such as 'remember'? If we grant the logical dependence between immunity to error through misidentification and the internal dimension of PRO, we paradoxically arrive at the conclusion that the greater the pragmatic enrichment in connection with the internal dimension of PRO/'de se', the greater the immunity to error through misidentification. However, nobody says or is willing to accept that immunity to error through misidentification is a gradable notion.

The internal dimension of PRO is useful in establishing immunity to error through misidentification only in the cases where there can be doubt because a sentence is ambiguous. Consider, again an ambiguous sentence similar to Recanati's example:

(21) He thought his legs were crossed.

Depending on whether he was only seeing his legs crossed or was also feeling them (proprioception being involved), (21) presents (or does not) a case of immunity to error through misidentification. The internal dimension of the pronominal 'his' is clearly projected through a pragmatic enrichment and, thus, proprioception is responsible for promoting immunity to error through misidentification. The pragmatically enriched internal dimension and proprioception go hand in hand and serve to reinforce immunity to error to misidentification in the sense of disambiguating an interpretatively ambiguous sentence.

11.3.5 Wayne Davis and the Pragmatics of Belief

In this short section, I cannot do full justice to Davis' (2013) important and intriguing considerations on 'de se' attitudes. I merely point out that they show a similarity to my considerations, even if I am more explicit on certain matters that are of concern to the semantics/pragmatics debate.

Some disturbing problems are introduced when we accept, as is natural to do, Davis' distinction between 'thinking' and 'believing' or 'thinking' and 'knowing'. The problem of 'de se' seems to be related to double concepts or parallel concepts such as 'thinking/believing' or 'thinking/knowing'. In fact, a sleeping person, surely knows something like the proposition that, say, he teaches at Cornell University but we are reluctant to say that in the file where the belief is stored there is any mode of presentation of the referent/knowing subject that is particularly relevant say to action. What kind of action could the thinking subject be involved in? The un-dreaming subject has knowledge files that are indexed to himself without recourse to any particular mode of presentation. The fact that the referent is identical with the knowing mind is enough to ensure that knowledge is identified in the right way and then put to use in the right way when the sleeping subject becomes awake again. We do not need special words such as 'I' or 'Alessandro Capone' or 'the experiencer' or 'the knowing subject'. Identity in the knowing mind is established by the fact that memories are stored in the same mind. It is the files where knowledge is stored that establish identity and it is not even necessary to name those files. The files are in my mind and not in yours.

The sleeping subject, when he is not dreaming or when he is unaware of his dreams, cannot be an experiencing, thinking subject, and cannot be involved in any real or mental action. Thus there is no reason to suppose that a special mode of presentation of the reference may be relevant to action or may be involved in different kinds of actions or be causally relevant to any action.

It follows that in all cases of genuinely philosophically interesting 'de se' thoughts we are faced with two coupled propositional attitudes: thinking and believing, thinking and remembering, thinking and expecting. Now I cannot clearly draw all implications of this new line of thinking inaugurated by Davis' genial remarks, but I can point out that something new may come out of this.

In essentials, Davis thinks that 'de se' attitudes are to be explained by reference to deictic concepts. The thinking subject thinks of himself through a deictic. This is similar to what I have claimed myself, although Davis is more detailed. I was content with an 'I' concept, while Davis distinguishes between a deictic, a demonstrative and an anaphoric use of 'I'. The deictic use of 'I' is probably what is involved in 'de se' thoughts, deictic uses being licensed by what Davis calls 'presentations'.⁵ The thinker thinks of himself and has a presentation of himself that gives interpretation to his use (whether mental or verbal) of 'I'. I would probably depart from Davis

⁵ However, there may be chains of 'de se' subjects involving anaphoric connections between various occurrences of 'I' (see the following chapter on *impure* 'de se' thoughts).

in recognizing a dichotomy between the thinker's use of 'I' in thought, and the hearer's interpretation of 'I' or 'he*' in an ascription of thought. The thinker's use of 'I' in thought needs no special interpretation act and involves immunity to error through misidentification in that no identity is needed or established, as there is no interpretation problem from the point of view of the thinker, who surely has a 'presentation' of himself which is perhaps tacit and keeps track of himself and his identity through the act of thinking, rather than through the act of interpretation. The ascription of 'de se' attitudes (to someone else) involves an interpretation problem and tracking of the referent and mode of presentation used by the thinker either through a simulation process or through a pragmatic act of interpretation guided through the Principle of Relevance or both. The two perspectives are different and surely the use of 'I' in ascription of 'de se' attitudes involves both an internalized dimension and an external dimension. The deictic use discussed by Davis may be suitable to both dimensions, provided that we are clear that a 'presentation' or 'self-presentation' is involved in the thinker's awareness of ego, while a simulation or pragmatic interpretation is involved in understanding the presentation which the thinking subject experiences. Perhaps it would not even be incorrect to say that we can speak of a deictic use when we refer to the hearer's interpretation problem, while from the point of view of the thinker there is no interpretation problem and thus it is not a matter of establishing the content of the deictic thanks to contextual coordinates. All that is required is the thinking act and the thinking act is its own context and also its own content.

Before closing this section, should we be content with Davis's view? While surely Davis' story resolves the problems he himself raised to Higginbotham's theory (along the lines of the problems I myself discussed), he does so in an ambiguous way. Is the use of the deictic a semantic or a pragmatic component? I made it clear that pragmatics was involved in establishing the ego concept in 'de se' attitudes – even in cases of PRO that are particularly problematic for Davis since PRO does not receive content from a context and thus is not easily assimilated to a first-personal concept. If we accept Davis' considerations, we should have a double interpretation process. The provision of an Ego concept and, then, the interpretation relevant to a context of use (but this I admitted through lavish use of anaphora). However, from the point of view of the thinking subject there is no pragmatics, since he has direct introspective access to his/her own thoughts. Pragmatics is involved only from a third person perspective, that of a hearer who tries to reconstruct the speaker's thoughts and self-awareness.

11.3.6 'De Se' and Modularity of Mind: Cancellability?

Finally it is time to examine the issue of the cancellability or non-cancellability of the 'de se' inferences I have discussed at length. Non-cancellability *per se*, as Grice was well aware, does not militate against the pragmatic nature of an inference. I have claimed elsewhere that explicatures are non-cancellable and the motivation I

gave for this is that explicatures tend to be motivated by problems in the logical form, when a sentence is perceived to be blatantly false or a logical absurdity and pragmatics is there to help remedy the problem. Since the explicature is the *Deus ex machina* of the semantics, I have claimed in a number of publications that it is and should be non-cancellable. This seems to fit in with a modular view of pragmatic processes, as argued in a number of publications. (See Capone 2010a, b, Capone 2011 for detailed arguments).

We saw that the incorporation of the Ego concept was the Deus-ex-Machina of the semantic treatment à la Higginbotham, protecting this treatment from all the objections raised by e.g. Davis (2013). But we also saw that various contextual considerations especially those invoked by Jaszczolt (2013) could be used to show the contextual variability of 'de se' inferences.

A further reason for opting for a pragmatic treatment of 'de se' is, of course, the parsimony of levels that it affords us, as we can at least eliminate an important meaning component from the semantics, obtaining it for free from pragmatics.

The last reason for opting for a pragmatic level of meaning in 'de se' attributions is the differential mechanisms of 'de se' thoughts in view of what happens in the mental processes of the thinker and of what happens in the mental processes of the hearer. The hearer is in a different position, both with respect to calculation of the Ego component and of the anaphoric links within the 'de se' ascription and with respect to the attribution of immunity to error through misidentification. The disparity between the position of the thinker and the position of the speaker/hearer in connection with pragmatic inferences was noted in an article by Jeff Speaks (2006), in which the author by reflecting on this disparity arrived at very surprising conclusions (one of these being the following, which I do not endorse: "The fact that a sentence S may be used in conversation to communicate (convey, assert) p can be explained as a conversational implicature only if S cannot be used by an agent in thought to judge (think) p (Speaks 2006, 6)). The disparity between the thinker and the speaker/hearers stance to the inference is due to the fact that luminosity is available in thought, introspection being a guide to one's intended meanings, while the meanings projected by the speaker and understood by the hearer in conversation do not rely on luminosity but on an explicit effort to get intentions across through contextual clues and cues.

While immunity to error through misidentification is presupposed for the thinker in virtue of the continuity afforded by the act of thinking (thus immunity seems to be an 'a priori' category of first-personal thought) and by the fact that in thinking the question of misidentification cannot arise; for the hearer, immunity is a logical consequence of the pragmatic inference involved in assigning an ego component to the 'de se' thought. Simulation and, also pragmatic interpretation flowing from the Principle of relevance are clearly involved.

The disparity between the speaker's perception of himself as himself and the hearer's ascription of 'ego' to the thinker has interesting consequences concerning cancellability. The speaker's perception of himself as himself is clearly non-cancellable; the hearer's ascription of EGO to the thinker of the 'de se' thought is driven by contextual clues leading the interpretation process in a certain direction,

from which it is impossible to go back (we are thinking of utterance tokens, not of utterance types). So both from the speaker's and the hearer's perspectives it is impossible to cancel the EGO component of the thought.

Implicitly, I have replied to qualms by Coliva (2003) about the idea that immunity to error through misidentification depends on the ego concept incorporated in 'de se' attitudes. Her main objection to this idea is that the use of 'I' in 'de se' thoughts (whether explicit or implicit) is not enough to guarantee a first-personal thought. Coliva speaks of the split between speaker's reference and semantic reference. Given this split (which has emerged especially in the discussions of Donnellan's attributive/referential distinction), it may not be correct to say that immunity to error through misidentification depends on the presence of a pronominal like 'I' in logical form. The case discussed by Bezuidenhout (1997) (Bill Clinton: The Founding Fathers invested me with the power to appoint Supreme Court justices) does justice to the ideas and doubts exposed by Coliva. In the example by Bezuidenhout 'me' is used attributively, and not referentially. Of course Coliva does well to address the issue of the pragmatic nature of the incorporation of the EGO-component in 'de se' attitudes. However, we get the impression that her skepticism on the idea of deriving immunity to error through misidentification is not completely justified, given the heavy presence of pragmatic intrusion in propositional forms. Given the non-cancellable character of the pragmatic inference which I posited in 'de se' thoughts, it should not be a problem that 'I' can be interpreted attributively, rather than referentially. Of course, my claim that immunity to error through misidentification follows from the Ego-like nature of 'de se' should be confined to cases where Ego is interpreted referentially. But, of course, this is presupposed by the 'de se' semantic/pragmatic analysis. Again, we should distinguish between the interpretation of the construction (e.g. I believe I am happy) on the part of the speaker, which heavily relies on Mentalese (the speaker has direct access to her own thoughts, and, thus, the 'ego' as used in 'de se' constructions is clearly and directly referential). When we examine the dimension of the hearer, we see that the interpretative problem of 'de se' constructions consists in assigning an inferential pragmatic increment that makes the logical form more plausible than it would otherwise be. The pragmatic enrichment, thus, could not make use of an un-interpreted EGO component, but has to make use of an interpreted EGO component, a component that is referential and not attributive. Of course, if we accepted a view in which the EGO component was assigned at the level of the semantics (say by identifying PRO with 'I' or an EGO-concept), then Coliva's objections could be certainly and dramatically applicable. But this is one more reason for opting for a semantic/pragmatic treatment, rather than for opting for a semantic treatment only. In a sense, we owe to Coliva the intuition that pragmatic intrusion resolves problems that would otherwise be (really) insuperable.

11.4 Conclusion

This chapter has been loaded with theoretical considerations and their consequences. Presumably we have reached a stage in which pragmatics, which originated in philosophy and was propagated outside philosophy giving impetus to communication-oriented linguistic views, can serve to throw light on philosophical topics. I cannot exaggerate the importance of considering the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification a consequence of pragmatic intrusion. It is true, we have reached a stage in which the theory has become loaded with various consequences of previously accepted views. However, it is the nature of interconnected considerations and interlocking ideas one finds in this chapter, that makes it rich, by provoking novel and perhaps radical discussions of phenomena of which we knew little or nothing, before putting some thought to pragmatic intrusion.

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Chapter 12

Impure ‘de se’ Thoughts and Pragmatics (and How This Is Relevant to Pragmatics and IEM)

I shall start this chapter with a few generic considerations on the pragmatics of ‘de se’ thoughts and I shall then move on to the distinction between pure and impure ‘de se’ thoughts, that clearly involves some pragmatic discriminatory ability. Since impure ‘de se’ thoughts need not be immune to error through misidentification (IEM), it must be clear that Immunity to Error through Misidentification (IEM) is not a semantic characteristic of psychological predicates but is available only after intervention of pragmatic considerations. Anyway, the issue of IEM is to be considered as merely tangential to the issue of ‘de se’ and, thus, I shall only reserve a final section for the definitive demonstration that IEM applies to certain psychological predicates only in the background of contextual considerations. IEM, in other words, is only pragmatic in nature. Although this is an important conclusion, it is deduced merely as a consequence of the analysis of ‘de se’ thoughts. The de-tour we are making is considerable, but not improper and without consequences.

12.1 Introduction

A ‘de se’ thought is a thought whereby the subject of the thought thinks about herself through a mode of ‘presentation’ that is distinctly ‘de se’ in so far as it does not include a descriptive component (other than a first-personal mode of presentation). Laborious though this presentation of the issue might appear to be, it is a step forward in the right direction, as it points out that after the inclusion of the first-personal component, no descriptive components or modes of presentation like *proper names* have to be included. Typical reports of ‘de se’ thoughts are:

- (1) Mary thinks she* is clever;
- (2) I think I am happy;
- (3) John thinks he himself is happy;
- (4) John remembers walking in Oxford.

It is interesting that the first-personal mode of presentation of the thinking subject need not include a name (even in the form of apposition), because even an amnesiac can entertain the thought:

(5) I think I am happy.

without having to recognize her name as part of the first-personal mode of presentation (of the subject) she uses in thought. (We may return to this issue later).

‘De se’ modes of presentation have a bearing on action (see Davis 2013; Perry 1979, etc. on this). If I realize that the chandelier is falling and there is an impending danger on myself, I may take action and escape; however, if I were to realize that the chandelier is about to fall on Alessandro Capone, whom I take to be someone possibly different from myself and were an amnesiac, I would fail to take action. A similar story was discussed by Perry (1979) to show the intimate connections between (‘de se’) thoughts and action.

In this chapter, I am going to discuss pure¹ and impure ‘de se’ thoughts. While pure ‘de se’ thoughts are associated with essential indexical modes of presentation (that have a bearing on action), involving no descriptive component (they are pure indexical modes of presentation), impure ‘de se’ thoughts involve subjects that can be associated with descriptive components (the question arises whether *pure* ‘de se’ thoughts correlate with Wayne Davis’ (2013) generic self concepts while *impure* ‘de se’ thoughts correlate with Davis’ specific self concepts, that is concepts determined by one’s introspective awareness (does not one’s introspective awareness include proper names as modes of presentation? I find evidence in Davis’s text that they do)). Impure ‘de se’ thoughts are also associated with actions in some related way (hence the definition of pure ‘de se’ attitudes as involving a motivational component (see Davis 2013) needs to be qualified further). Pragmatics is involved in this discussion, because, through context, we need to know whether a purely ‘de se’ or an impurely ‘de se’ thought is involved and we need to distinguish between the two distinct modes of presentation through pragmatic information. Semantic information is not sufficient to discriminate among them. Pure ‘de se’ thoughts also have a characteristic called IEM (Immunity to error through misidentification).² This characteristic depends on the fact that, since modes of presentations associated with subjects of thought are essentially indexical, in that they do not depend on any identification component (being associated with no descriptive component, following Evans 1982), the lack of a descriptive component leads to the impossibility of error through misidentification. However, if there is a species of ‘de se’ thoughts which are not purely ‘de se’ (in other words they need not exclude a descriptive component), it goes without saying that these should be associated with lack of IEM.

¹ ‘Purity’ in connection with reference unmediated by some descriptive component is a term used by García-Carpintero (2013, 76). Reasonably enough, the term ‘impure’ has been coined by myself in opposition to such a term.

² I am largely following Higginbotham (2003) in the thought that there is a connection between ‘de se’ thoughts and IEM.

I shall start with generic considerations on the pragmatics of 'de se' thoughts and I shall then move on to the distinction between pure and impure 'de se' thoughts, which clearly involve pragmatic discriminatory ability. Since impure 'de se' thoughts need not be IEM, it must be clear that IEM is not a semantic characteristic of psychological predicates but is available only after intervention/operation of pragmatic considerations. Anyway, the issue of IEM is to be considered only tangential to the issue of 'de se' (thoughts) and, thus, with the exception of the next section, I will only reserve a final section for the definitive demonstration that IEM applies to certain psychological predicates only in the background of contextual considerations. In other words, IEM is only pragmatic in nature. Although this is an important conclusion, it is deduced merely as a consequence of the analysis of 'de se' thoughts. The de-tour we are making is considerable, but not improper and without consequences.

12.2 On the Connection Between IEM and 'de se' Thoughts

Before proceeding, I will dwell briefly on the connection between 'de se' thoughts and IEM. This clarification will turn out to be useful in subsequent discussions. Consider an utterance such as:

(6) I believe I feel a pain in my leg.

I may be wrong in so far as the pain is not in my leg but in my arm, but I cannot be mistaken in so far as it is not myself who feels the pain (wherever it is). This is immunity to Error though Misidentification. I cannot be mistaken about the identity of the person who feels the pain.³ Now, it is interesting that (6) is a locus of the intersection of a 'de se' thought and of IEM. WE can provisionally say that if a thought is 'de se' then it must be characterized by IEM. However, if there is IEM, we are not 'ipso facto' confronted with a 'de se' thought. There are theorists like Evans (1982), who connect IEM with demonstrative utterances. According to Evans, these illustrate the phenomenon of IEM, as they are cases in which a speaker makes a judgment about an object, as it takes a certain predicate to be instantiated in the object identified through a fundamental idea (controlled by an information link but not through a descriptive component).

So in a demonstrative thought, like 'P (a)', there is no question of identifying a through an equation like $a=b$, where b is a descriptive component. Now while demonstrative thoughts exhibit the feature of IEM, they are clearly not 'de se' thoughts. In the case of 'de se' thoughts the source of the information that controls the identification of the subject comes from 'inside', whereas in demonstrative

³ As Recanati (2012) says, "to be immune to error through misidentification, a first-person judgment must be truly subjective. The subject must not be thought of as an object which one identifies as oneself; for, if it is, the judgment rests on an identity (' $b=$ myself') and is subject to identification errors".

thoughts like ‘That is white’ the source of information that controls the identification of the subject (through some fundamental idea) comes from outside.

It is true that Evans wants to demonstrate that knowledge of ourselves must be modeled after knowledge of the external world, as in utterances such as:

(7) I believe there is a tree.

the procedure utilized to obtain information concerning the external world is what controls the thought and gives us the content of the belief. Evans is categorical about semantic ascent, the procedure whereby by being confronted with thoughts about the external world, we automatically obtain thoughts about our own minds.

If this were always the case, there would be no doubt that there should be some overlap between ‘de se’ thoughts and demonstrative utterances, as, after all, saying ‘That is black’ would amount to accepting that the speaker thinks that he sees a black cat (if that is a black cat).

But the overlap is only partial. There are cases in which we are disconnected from the outside world (either because we wear black spectacles or special earphones producing no sound and blocking sound), and yet we have thoughts about the world and about ourselves. In these cases, Evans’ semantic ascent procedure is not available. These are cases of purely ‘de se’ thoughts, in which a speaker is connected to the subject of thinking only in thought. He knows that he is thinking that *p* not because he is connected with a world furnishing some information to the effect that *p*, but because the thinking (or the thought) is immediately available to him in his mind.

Thus, I would like to propose that these are genuinely ‘de se’ thoughts and that IEM, as occurs in them, is not necessarily identical to IEM as manifested in demonstrative utterances. A précis is required. In both cases, IEM is caused by the fact that the link with the source of information concerning a certain subject (or object) does not proceed through a descriptive component (if there is identification of the object, that is through a fundamental idea, as Evans says). However, in the case of a demonstrative judgment, the link with the information source providing an identification (however fundamental) of the object is external to the mind. Instead, in the pure cases of IEM in ‘de se’ thoughts, the source of information is inside the mind (or at least the body)⁴ of the thinking subject (and an appropriate channel for this information source is the subject’s own thinking). So perhaps we could distinguish between type IEM1 and type IEM 2, or we could opt for an abstract type, remembering that it is instantiated differently depending on whether the thought is ‘de se’ or demonstrative.

⁴The source of information may come from inside the body (proprioceptive information, as ‘I feel a pain in my leg’ (see Recanati 2012)) or from the flow of thought (inside the mind).

Before closing this section, I briefly address a point made by Davis, in noting that Higginbotham says that “a characteristic of ‘de se’ beliefs is “immunity to error through misidentification”” (Davis 2013, 32). Davis says:

Higginbotham is certainly on to something. With amnesia, Reagan can wonder whether Ronald Reagan is in pain without wondering whether he himself is. But Higginbotham overstates the difference. First, if I misidentified the sensation I am experiencing as pain, so that I mistakenly believe that I am in *pain*, then I also mistakenly believe that *I* am in pain. (Davis 2013, 32).

Now, I attach great importance to this example, because, even if it is different from the ones I will offer on contextual evaporation of IEM (or sensitivity of IEM to context), it mainly shows the same point. In some contexts, IEM gets through, in some contexts it doesn't. This is a context in which a state cannot be falsely attributed to the subject without making an error about the identification of the subject (the subject is necessarily the subject of the pain if the ascription is successful and not the subject of the pain if the ascription is not successful). However, there is a context in which IEM is unscathed. I do not just believe that I am in pain but I also believe that I believe that I am in pain. (Luminosity, to use a term by Williamson 2000). Then, although I can be mistaken as to the identity of the subject of the pain, I cannot doubt (and it cannot be doubted) that I am the person of whom I think that I think 'I am in pain' (whether or not it is correct that I am in pain). Now, if adapting the example a bit could preserve IEM, it is open to us to believe that similar or related strategies could show that in some cases IEM evaporates or is not stable. So is the tie with 'de se' semantic or a pragmatic? It could be useful to start with the assumption that it is a logical tie, related indirectly to the semantics.

The issue of the (possible) connection between 'de se' thoughts and IEM has also been the object of considerations by García-Carpintero (2013). Since these considerations are offered at different points in his paper, I need to extrapolate them (perhaps in a way that does not need the author's approval). These considerations seem to me to be of considerable importance, though we are still some way from a complete understanding of the issue. At one point, García-Carpintero says that he connection between 'de se' and 'IEM' is only indirect. I have myself previously said that the relationship is a logical one (or may be a logical one), although we are not clear yet how to define it. Provisionally I said that IEM need not imply a 'de se' statement (demonstrative utterances, which, according to Evans, involve IEM, only involve circumstantial, and not absolute IEM, if we follow García-Carpintero). Instead, a 'de se' statement seems to me to imply IEM. However, if the 'de se' statement is one in which the 'de se' component is added through pragmatics (e.g. John knows he* is happy), I quite agree that the connection between the 'de se' statement and IEM is indirect. It could also be 'indirect, in the sense that a 'de se' statement implies some yet to be specified proposition and this implies IEM. We are open to this possibility as well.

Now, I believe that my view converges with García-Carpintero's in that I too believe that a conception of 'de se' that only takes into account token-reflexive thoughts (e.g. The person who has this thought) is necessarily incomplete (see Capone 2010). The reasons given in García-Carpintero's article are compelling. The author takes ideas by Recanati (2007) on schizophrenic subjects, who are capable of holding thoughts such as 'The owner of this thought is happy', while being skeptical on the possibility that the thought really belongs to the patient's mind (perhaps it was inserted there by someone else – a problem which is not only theoretical but practical as thought-insertion is part of the practice of indoctrination, but I cannot go into this). In normal human beings, 'the 'de se' thought has both a token-reflexive part and a component reflecting the mental state underlying the content of the thought (some perspectival character-like component). In Capone (2010) I argued that this component is central and is provided through conversational implicature (being part of an explicature). García-Carpintero, instead, seems to be happy with the view that the coincidence of the token-reflexive component and of the perspectival component is a presupposition, at work in normal subjects but not in schizophrenic patients. The other reason for thinking that the token-reflexive components cannot be part of a motivational account relating thought to action (through maximal rationality) comes from a dialogue between Perry and another customer in the supermarket (think of Perry's supermarket story). The customer says 'You are the messy shopper' and then it dawns on Perry that he* is the messy shopper. However, there might be identification involved, as Perry needs to know that he is being addressed by the other customer who uses 'You are the messy shopper' (meaning 'The person I am addressing is the messy shopper'). I suppose the second explanation is a reason why García-Carpintero uses the term 'character-like' to describe the perspectival meaning of 'de se' statements. I have myself proposed in Capone (2010) that the word 'I' must appear in a 'de se' report of propositional attitude (even if at an implicit level, the explicature) and this is probably what the author has in mind when he says that 'de se' perspectival states are character-like.

Now, the moral of this story is that, if we follow the considerations above, we are to connect IEM with token-reflexive statements, rather than with 'de se' statements (according to García-Carpintero). It follows that the link between 'de se' statements and IEM is indirect, as the author said (without explaining this if not by implication of his other considerations). Now, I believe that we should be clear that the story by Recanati is more a story about clinical pragmatics than a story about how the mind usually works in normal cases. Thus, I suppose that the story about the dialogue in the supermarket seems to be more solid and foundational. So my idea that a 'de se' statement involves a report of IEM needs to be qualified with the view that the identification between a token-reflexive component and a perspectival component is due to a conversational implicature (actually an explicature) or a (pragmatic) presupposition.

But now we need an additional part of the story. I suppose the following must be true. Consider the possibility of using a genuinely 'de se' individuator (we may identify it through some symbol, such as #de se. This is a genuinely perspectival component. However, in ordinary conversation one may use, rather loosely, a non-

genuinely 'de se' individuator, say *de se. Let us call these individuators **a** and **b** respectively. Then we may suppose that the use of individuator **b** depends epistemically on **a**, just in case the reporter of the 'de se' thought believes or knows that for a property P, P applies to **b** in the thought by the reported thinker on the basis of believing or knowing that the reported subject would attribute the thought he had to himself by applying P to **a**. But this means that if the reported thinker/speaker self-attributed an IEM thought, the reporter also attributed to her an IEM thought. Individuator **b** depends epistemically on individuator **a** if the reporting speaker in using **b** *simulates* some mental process of the reported speaker in which he is assumed to be using **a**. Now this reminds us of Sosa (1995)'s treatment of the attributive/referential distinction (reported in García-Carpintero 2013, 78). There too pragmatic processes were involved, and I take Sosa's treatment as a basis for a treatment of indirect reports involving 'de se' thoughts and IEM.

12.2.1 *Is There Actually Any IEM?*

The issue of IEM as related to 'de se' thoughts is terribly complicated. Recently, two scholars have questioned its importance or real usefulness. Campbell (1999) and Howell (2007). Without getting into much detail, the main objection is that there is what appears as IEM only in the cases of psychological predicates, and this is highly suspicious, as the phenomenon may well be related (as I proposed) to such predicates. In short, Campbell proposes that IEM is related to the fact that the processes involved in the application of psychological predicates are dedicated. Now, the term 'dedicated' reminds us of issues pertaining to the Modularity of Mind (Carruthers 2006). A modular process is a dedicated mechanism, in that it has some dedicated procedure and is encapsulated, in the sense that it cannot have access to procedures outside it (say what happens in other modules of the mind). Thus, to provide an example, perception is encapsulated from the reasoning module (reflective procedures that produce inference through reasoning and deductive devices). Certain optical illusions exploit and show this encapsulation. Now, activities such as thinking are dedicated, as they occur in the mind; they are probably based in some encapsulated module, and they are strongly constrained. One such constraint – or dedicated process – is that the 'I' needs no descriptive component information before or in the process of its operation in judgment. If there are descriptive components, these are necessarily 'thin' (see Rosenthal (2011) on the coindexing between different occurrences of mental tokens of 'I'). If there is any such coindexing, it works either on the basis of a presupposition (and again we are confronted with the notion that these processes are dedicated and thus presuppose identity of the thinker in every subsequent and linked act of thinking) or on the basis of a linguistic rule, the character of 'I' allowing the speaker (or thinker) and the hearer to refer to an objective body, whose persistence guarantees continuity and linking of the selfs (the Kantian transcendental self). The quality of being dedicated mental processes

allows attributions of psychological predicates to escape a potential objection to IEM, the fact that some identification, however thin, must be required.

But then, if these processes are dedicated, what is the role of IEM? Is that a mere consequence of the fact that the process (say, of thinking) is dedicated?

But, of course, a problem for Campbell (1999) could be that there are indeed cases of IEM which are not linked to psychological predicates, the cases of demonstrative judgments discussed by Evans in three chapters of his impressive book ‘The varieties of reference’. In fact, contrary to Howell (2007), I have proposed that demonstrative judgments have in their grammar of use the application of psychological predicates, as any use of a demonstrative presupposes an information link between an object and the subject of thought – and this information link is, as Devitt (2013) says, a matter of being *in rapport* with an object, say through perception. In any case, Howell does well to say that IEM is a spurious category, including cases that are very different. I am inclined to side with Campbell who says that IEM is just the consequence of the assumption that a psychological process is dedicated – having its characteristic standard procedures. Nevertheless, with this important qualification, I will continue to use the term IEM. This is not particularly problematic, since in this paper I want to show that IEM depends on genuinely ‘de se’ thoughts and that it is controlled by pragmatic information. Of course, the considerations by Campbell and Howell square perfectly well with what I am going to say about IEM, since the cases of ‘pure’ ‘de se’ thoughts are genuinely cases where the processes in question are dedicated and work exploiting the presupposition that the thinking subject does not need to know anything about himself. Instead, the cases in which the thinking subject needs to be associated with some descriptive component, due to pragmatic intervention (and we remember that according to Louise Cummings (2009) cases of pragmatic inference involving world-knowledge are not genuinely encapsulated, thus presumably they cannot really count as dedicated processes) cannot really be said to be cases of dedicated processes. Pragmatic information providing an identification component through a descriptive feature militates against the status of dedicated processes.

12.3 What Does It Mean to Have a Purely ‘de se’ Thought

When I have a ‘de se’ thought, I attribute a property to the subject of the very thought that occurs to me and which I describe when I vocalize the utterance in the first person (a direct report) or which is described when someone else vocalizes the thought (by describing it through an indirect report based on what I said or on some behavior licensing the indirect report). The property is instantiated in the subject of the thought (I may think ‘I am in pain’). When we have a demonstrative thought (or a thought involving an object I can see), it will be said that I am in rapport with that object (Devitt 2013). To be in rapport with some salient object is to be governed (or controlled, to use Evans’ (1982) words) by information coming from that object. It is not clear whether it can be said (or whether it is useful to say) in the case of a ‘de

se' thought that the subject of the thought is in rapport with himself – certainly he must be aware of himself as a subject of thought – but this time this cannot occur through semantic ascent; in other words, it is not necessary that the subject of the thought becomes aware of some object which he perceives to come to the conclusion that there must be a subject of thought in addition to the experience of thinking that thought. I have already said that opting for semantic ascent and immediate introspective knowledge depends on the circumstances. Even if, in some cases, it suffices for me to have the thought that the sky is blue that I have observed the sky and seen that it is blue, Evans' position that semantic ascent also serves to identify the subject of thought sounds incredible, as the subject is always there from the beginning. Even if my senses were not functioning well or were not functioning at all, there is a subject of my thoughts and that is myself. Myself is available regardless of what I see or hear or of whether I really see something or hear something (although in case I am tortured or humiliated too much, the self may come under attack and become so exiguous that it will run the risk of being annihilated (a consequence of this may be suicide)). Thus, I take that the subject of thought is provided by the thinking activity in the sense that without the subject of thought, there could be no thinking activity. We could say that the subject of thought is presupposed by the thinking activity, but also that the thinking activity (if we have evidence of it) is evidence for there being, somewhere, a subject of thought.

Thus, when we have a thought such as:

(8) Mary thinks she is happy,

there must not only be happiness (instantiated, as Evans would say), but there must be a thinking subject thinking that she herself is happy. I suppose that a fundamental identification of the thinking subject is that it is somewhere, and exactly where the thought is and that she is thinking something. Now, it is possible that a fundamental component of 'de se' is that it is a thinking subject, while other descriptive components would have to be expunged from this *fundamental* identification. Presumably this is a 'de se' mode of presentation – rather exiguous, one could say. I may be criticized for allowing a minimal identification component into the 'de se' concept – yet, if we follow Evans, this is no great harm provided that we are prepared to allow that this is a fundamental identification component, which may involve some thin kind of identification but not an identification by description which would destroy IEM, a necessary accompaniment of *pure* 'de se' thoughts. We have IEM when it is not reasonable to ask (after having the thought 'I think I am in pain') 'Someone is in pain, but is it myself who is in pain?'. Analogously we have IEM when it is not reasonable to ask (after one has the thought 'I think I am in pain') 'Someone thinks he is in pain, but is it myself who thinks he is in pain?'. Here we have identified the thinking subject as someone who thinks, but nevertheless there cannot be any doubt as to who the thinking subject is, provided that he is characterized minimally, through a minimal and fundamental component (the person who is thinking this thought). The objections by Wayne Davis apply to this characterization of IEM, but these can be surmounted by resorting to luminosity and to recursion (if one has the IEM thought 'I think I think that I am in pain', it is not legitimate to ask the

following question: ‘One thinks that one thinks one is in pain, but is it myself who is doing the thinking?’).

It will be helpful, to avoid confusion, to say that even if a fundamental identification of the thinking subject is required for a ‘de se’ thought to be occurrent, it is necessary that no additional, non-thin (thus, thick) identification components should be added (to the fundamental identification of the reference), especially if they are of a descriptive type. Thus, although I may have all sorts of knowledge about myself – such as names, status, jobs, relations – I will not be using these identification components as part of the identification of myself – apart from (or on top of) my mode of presentation as a thinking subject. The reason for this is that I can have pure ‘de se’ thoughts, in other words I can think of myself in ways that are neutral as to who I am, except for the basic information that I am a thinking subject. Thus, when I think that I am clever (or stupid), I am not (necessarily) thinking that Alessandro Capone is clever. This essential identification of the reference is useful – we will call it a *modest* or *pure* identification. It is useful when we want to keep our thoughts skeletal – we may add information through pragmatics, if needed. But in some cases it is useful to have a modest characterization of the self. For example, we must allow that an amnesiac in having the thought ‘I think I cannot remember anything’ has a modest or minimal mode of presentation of the self – certainly one that cannot include ‘John’ or ‘Mary’ or ‘Joseph’. In fact, the semantics of ‘I think I cannot remember anything’ is in potential conflict with the attribution of a mode of presentation such as ‘Alessandro Capone’. If the speaker/thinking subject cannot remember anything, she cannot remember her name either – general amnesia includes amnesia about names. But of course, we need not consider only cases in which the semantics of the sentence expressing the thought precludes us from having a mode of presentation that includes a name. Consider, in fact:

(9) Mary thinks she has pretty hair.

In a background in which we know that Mary is amnesiac, we must exclude that she thinks of herself under the mode of presentation ‘Mary’.⁵

Now we understand why Castañeda (1966) or Perry (1979) or the others were inclined to call ‘de se’ pronominals essential indexicals. They certainly wanted to account for cases like amnesia or the absent-minded shopper who follows a trail of sugar and wants to find the person losing sugar. In Perry’s case, the problem is not

⁵ Garcia-Carpintero (2013, 80) says that “the amnesiac cases suggest also that descriptive individuator, whether or not they allow for ‘de re’ thought on the strictures of N, are unnecessary, for amnesiacs are able to think about themselves in a fully self-conscious way by using and understanding ‘I’ and related expressions for first-personal reference while ignoring everything about themselves”. However, this looks like a simplification. When I discuss Kant’s transcendental self, I present data to the effect that the ‘I’ must keep a file of what he said before to monitor his own speech for contradiction. Thus a truly amnesiac subject who only retains the ‘I’ mode of presentation of himself cannot successfully embark on the enterprise of making a coherent discourse devoid of contradictions. It is necessary that the ‘I’ should always come accompanied by a file on what he has said before.

caused by a mode of presentation equivalent with a proper name, but by a definite description like 'the absent-minded shopper'. Perry can finally remedy the situation and remove the sack of sugar with a hole in it, when he realizes that he himself is the messy shopper. In this case, it appears that too much information (like: The messy shopper) will be a distraction, whereas when he realizes that he himself is the messy shopper, he will find a solution to the problem.

12.4 Towards a Pragmatics of 'de se'

In two previous articles I have argued that 'de se' modes of presentation in many cases are provided through pragmatics. Now, I must admit the pragmatic demonstration is not easy. Surely there are easy cases, where there is an interpretative ambiguity and pragmatics will be responsible for resolving the ambiguity in question. Thus, to illustrate an easy case, consider the following (from Capone 2010):

(10) Mary thinks she is clever.

Now, it is clear (at least to those who are familiar with the 'de se' literature and Castañeda) that the sentence (10) shows up an interpretative ambiguity and can be understood as:

(11) Mary thinks she herself (or she*) is clever

(12) Mary thinks she (that woman there) is clever.

We may add a third interpretation which is both 'de se' and demonstrative:

(13) Mary thinks that she (herself/that woman) is clever. (The speaker points to Mary through a demonstrative gesture).

The interpretation (13) is not one that usually comes to mind and is possibly an interpretation which could only come to a logician's mind. I propose to set it aside, for the time being (there may be other places for this discussion). Now, if we only concentrate on (11) and (12), it is clear that, since there is an interpretative ambiguity, pragmatics must come into the picture to furnish an interpretation (either a default or a contextual interpretation). Here scholars may be at a fork; Relevance Theorists may invoke the power of the context to modulate meaning and to resolve interpretative ambiguities; neo-Gricean scholars, instead may opt for scalar mechanisms and, anyway, for default (conversational) implicatures/explicatures. Ambiguity resolution seems to me a matter of explicature, mainly following Grice (also Huang (2007) or Carston 2002). Now, let us leave aside the issue of actual interpretation, as I said there might be controversy about this. What is indubitably clear is that 'de se' attitudes provide room for pragmatic treatments – and without pragmatics it would be difficult to assess what kind of thought is produced by uttering a potentially ambiguous sentence.

Another pragmatic problem is brought out by sentences such as:

(14) Mary believes that she is happy.

even when we know, for some reason, that the interpretation the speaker has in mind is:

(15) Mary believes that she herself is happy.

The problem here, of course, is that (15) is an indirect report of some utterance by Mary or of some thought by Mary which we were somehow able to infer. This interpretative issue is not easy. We are at a quandary. Which is the source of the indirect report, an utterance or some salient state by Mary which allowed some inference on the part of the speaker?

In other words, the choice here is between an indirect report or a description. After all, if something similar to semantic ascent is a strategy available at least sometimes (as Evans says), an observer, by seeing Mary happy and believing that she cannot herself fail to notice that she is happy, comes to the conclusion that Mary believes she herself is happy. The issue is not uninteresting from a theoretical point of view, although we may be inclined to settle it by adopting the view that since Mary said that she is happy, someone reported that Mary believes she is happy (in case contextual clues militate in favor of this direction in interpretation (see Dascal 2003)). And thus (15) is something like an indirect report. Some pragmatic explanation must lie behind these considerations. It is not impossible that the hearer will run a simulation process and come to the conclusion that (15) is an indirect report. As I implicated, this might be a superficial explanation, but for the time being it will do. Because if we establish that this is an indirect report, then the pragmatic problems besieging indirect reports will recur.

Now suppose we can establish that the subject 'she herself' corresponds to 'I' in the equivalent direct report (remember that part of the pragmatic machinery concerning indirect reports consists in simulating the direct report underlying the indirect report). Thus, we think that the original speaker used 'I' (corresponding to 'she herself') in the 'de se' thought and that 'I' was first-personal. Now we should warn our readers that we cannot easily equate 'first-personal' with a 'I'-mode of presentation, even if to begin with I was inclined to think they are equivalent. It cannot be doubted that if a thought is 'de se', it requires a first-personal mode of presentation. However, as Higginbotham (2003) says, there are modes of presentation more first-personal than 'I' or 'she herself' (for example 'PRO' is more first-personal than 'I' or 'she herself'). Other authors warn us against too easy an identification of 'first-personal' with 'I' (see Coliva 2003; but also García-Carpintero (2013) based on Burge 2007). Bezuidenhout (1997), for example, notes that 'I' could be ambiguous between a referential and an attributive interpretation (The Founding Father attributed these powers to me = The President).⁶ Jaszczolt (2013) also warns us against

⁶Garcia-Carpintero (2013, 74) says that "believers in a substantive singular/general distinction will have to accept that some 'de re' ascriptions (those meeting Quine's criterion) report what in fact

the equivalence between 'I' and 'first-personal'. There may be controversy about these uses – could not, in fact, someone claim that these are loose uses? If these uses are loose, they are not grammatical, and the equivalence between 'I' and 'first-personal' is not jeopardized (I admit I am much in favor of this radical semantic possibility). I will, nevertheless, opt for the solution for which I have least sympathy, aware as I am that an obstinate opponent might want to argue against the equivalence of 'I' and 'first-personal'. Thus I adopt the view that 'I', which undoubtedly has a semantic potential for being first-personal, is interpretatively ambiguous in some cases and may, sometimes, receive interpretations that are not first-personal. But then this amounts to accepting that a 'de se' thought, even though first-personal, need not be expressed by 'I'. But this, despite all my concessions, I am not inclined to accept. And the reason for my obstinacy is that after all, in context, it is clear whether 'I' is first-personal or not. Given that we have accepted so far that a 'de se' interpretation in some context or in some default case is the consequence of a pragmatic process of interpretation (or disambiguation) resulting in an explicature, there is no reason not to accept as well that 'I', even if it occurs in the course of interpretation, may itself be in need of interpretation – the explicature consists in fixing not only the 'de se' interpretation but also the mode of presentation of the 'first-personal' component of the 'de se' thought. Since I am confident that when we say that Angela thinks she is sad, we report a situation of the type: Angela thinks: 'I am sad'. I have a presumption that 'I' is of paramount importance in 'de se' interpretations, because it reflects our ordinary mental processes and the mental words used in those processes. Even if we are not quite ready to adopt the mentalese hypothesis, we may safely adopt the view that, in thinking, people use mental occurrences of words. Now, this may not necessarily occur, but it may occur in some cases, and thus it would be realistic to describe those cases by using the words the thinkers had in mind when they thought something. Now, although there are points that would deserve deepening, this rather sketchy view of the pragmatics of 'de se' attitudes will do (I have written more in Capone (2010)).

Before closing this section, I want to discuss a case brought to our attention by Recanati (2012). This, too, is a case where pragmatic information is essential in bringing out the first-personal dimension of a thought. Recanati discusses the example: My legs are crossed. This is a case of an **implicit** 'de se' utterance. Contextual information must be brought to bear on the utterance to bring out its 'de se' meaning. The utterance can be construed as 'de se', if it receives the following interpretation: I feel as if my legs are crossed. The alternative interpretation could be: I see those legs crossed, which happen to be mine. In seeing those legs crossed, which I judge to be mine, I could make an identification mistake: in fact, they may not be my legs but someone else's. Only in the case of a 'de se' thought (the subject is thinking about himself that he feels as if his legs are crossed) can there be no error of identification and thus IEM is guaranteed. However, notice that only a pragmatic interpretation can bring out the 'de se' interpretation, hence IEM depends on pragmatic information. (Notice that no talk of IEM as a merely epistemic condition is

are general thoughts and viceversa...".

going on; we are talking of IEM as being expressed through the statement. This is NOT surprising since, if IEM is an epistemological state, then it can be transmitted through statements (although I agree that talk about IEM being communicated through a statement has not been standard; however, Recanati's point is important in that it made me think of this issue)).

12.5 The Pragmatics of Impure 'de se' Thoughts

I got the impression that to press a pragmatic story, we need to go beyond the boundaries of ordinary views about 'de se' attitudes. There is a consensus that 'de se' thoughts are pure 'de se' thoughts involving essential indexicals as modes of presentation of the reference. Essential indexicals are first-personal modes of presentation, more or less coinciding with 'I' or with other formal ways of marking the fact that they are essential indexical (e.g. *he**, according to Castañeda). The fact that there are essential indexicals as modes of presentation is a guarantee (combined with pragmatic intrusion) of IEM, because such pronominals are very skeletal from an informational point of view and do not include a descriptive component (if not a minimal one). Now that I think of it, even a pronominal may carry more information than an essential indexical may provide; thus '*she**' is not good enough to be an essential indexical because we may have a case like:

(16) Mary believes *she** is happy.

which does not fit well the case of the essential indexical. Given that '*she**' includes information that the subject of the thought is female and considering that the subject of thought may be amnesiac or drunk (or may not have noticed sex differences), Mary₁ may believe that X₁ is happy without believing that she is female or that happiness can be predicated of her body, which is female. This is not a trivial point, one which was probably not noticed by philosophers who mainly write in English, because after all, as I have myself insisted many times, she herself or *she** is equivalent to a first-personal pronoun and first-person pronouns in English are not inflected for the (gender) feature female/male. Perhaps it is an accidental fact about English that things are this way, but if we were to find a language with a first-personal pronominal inflected for male/female features, then the first-personal pronominal could no longer be an essential indexical.

But now my question is: is it really important or indispensable that a 'de se' thought should be a pure 'de se' thought (expressible through a first-personal pronominal (non inflected for female/male features))? The answer should be that sometimes a purely 'de se' thought is required, as without it we could not grasp the thought in question. This is the case of the amnesiac. Or the case of John Perry's messy shopper, who must discard all other forms of modes of presentation, to come to the identification the messy shopper = myself. This must surely be also the case of 'now'

because if I must go to an appointment at 12 o' clock and I do not realize that 'now' is 12 o' clock, I can miss the appointment (also see Davis 2013).

But are all cases like this? Are not there cases where the use of the essential indexical allows us to come to conclusions that cannot be applauded (by the proponents of the essential indexical)? Consider the following case.

Mary asks me: Are you John Smith?

I reply: Yes, I am John Smith.

Then she insists: Are you sure you are John Smith?

And I reply: Yes, I think I am John Smith (Or: Yes, I know I am John Smith).

Now I wonder what role the essential indexical plays in all this. If I thought that I (the person I only know through 'I') was John Smith, then my answer would appear like a guess.⁷ On the one hand, I am saying I know who I am; on the other hand, it must be assumed, to follow the essential indexical story, that I am allowed to think of myself only through the mode of presentation 'I' and attribute a Proper Name to this thin mode of presentation (plus reference). And this is a bit surprising, because a person who attributes himself the name 'John Smith' must at least know himself to have the name 'John Smith' and must use a first-personal mode of presentation which is not exactly an essential indexical. Of course, John can repeat the words just uttered by his sister, who knows he is amnesiac and say 'I am John Smith' (roughly meaning, I am John Smith, if what you say is true). In this further case, it is not implausible that 'I' should be the mode of presentation usable by an amnesiac and, thus, that 'I' should ONLY be first-personal and an essentially indexical mode of presentation. But the two cases appear to me to be different. We now also have a third case: 'Am I John Smith?', said by John. Here John, though not amnesiac, may be open to the possibility that he has another name (say in a different island, where he was brought up, he was known by a different name). In this case, John may use 'I' associating it with the mode of presentation 'Fred' and may possibly mean 'Is Fred John Smith?'. Now, this interpretation, perhaps a bit stretched but not impossible, is not that of an essential indexical.

Now consider a different kind of case.

John believes he is rich. Can John just think of himself in a first-personal way? For sure, supporters of 'de se' attitudes will insist that John has just been imparted the information that he is rich (that he has become rich), thus, although he does not know anything about whether in the past he was rich or poor, he now believes that he himself is rich. The case is, I admit, thorny because this is not just a belief report,

⁷ 'Am I John Smith?' and 'I am John Smith' would have to share a neutral (or minimal) mode of presentation of 'I'. But this neutral mode of presentation needs saturating information in the question 'Am I John Smith?', while in the answer the information in the predicate comes through antecedent knowledge that the speaker knows the identity of the subject.

but a case of belief-change. It may well be interpreted as ‘John has come to the belief that he is rich’. There was a change in the beliefs and thus John, who initially believed that he was poor, now believes that he is rich. In this case he may use a neutral mode of presentation. Despite the complexity of this contrived explanation, my considered opinion is that John cannot believe that he is rich if he thinks of himself through a neutral mode of presentation (neither rich nor poor) expressible as ‘I’. If you think of it a bit, if John had available in thought such a neutral mode of presentation (I, who know of myself nothing, let alone that I am poor or rich), he could not think that he is rich, because such a mode of presentation is compatible with his being poor. According to such a mode of presentation, for all he knows he could be poor, but then how can he believe that he is rich? There is clearly a clash between ‘rich’ (or believe-he-is-rich) and the presuppositions of his neutral mode of presentation of himself (for all he knows of himself, he could be either poor or rich).

Now consider John Perry’s example again. Why is it that John Perry cannot have knowledge that the messy shopper is himself by saying or thinking ‘Oh, John Perry is the messy shopper’? Surely there are cases like amnesia, but why should we be ready to concede so hastily that one of the most famous philosophers in the world should be amnesiac? Certainly he could be amnesiac, in which case the mode of presentation ‘John Perry’ will not switch on any light in his mind and he may fail to take appropriate actions to remedy the problem (sugar would continue to be spilled on the floor). But why should we invoke cases of amnesia so easily, if we know that in the real world where we and John Perry lives, these cases are extremely rare? In the normal cases, I may very well think ‘I think I John Perry⁸ am the messy shopper’ and nothing wrong occurs. The thinking subject – despite the thick and non-necessarily indexical mode of presentation can obtain knowledge of the appropriate facts and take action.

The last – but decisive – case I want to discuss derives from Rosenthal’s (2003, 2011) considerations on Kant’s transcendental self. The ‘I’ I consider in thought, whenever I have thoughts of the type “I believe that p” is not a single, unrelated occurrence of the mental token ‘I’ and is not merely referring to the self, intended as Davis (2013) says, as an event of introspective awareness (I am responsible for introducing (or adding) the word ‘event’ in association with ‘introspective awareness, which is mine and not Davis’). The occurrence of the word ‘I’ in other words does not merely select a slice of my mental life (which has some continuity) but should be identified (and this identification is taken by Rosenthal to be thin) with previous occurrences (in thought) of the word ‘I’. The identification between the various slices of mental life selected by different occurrences of ‘I’ is crucial in

⁸Where the apposition ‘John Perry’ may be an implicit constituent, something one does not have an occurrent thought of (to use words by Wayne Davis), but one could have an occurrent thought of, had one a chance to make this constituent explicit.

eliminating contradictions (or in attributing contradictions).⁹ Suppose that, in my past, I have supported the view that the environment comes before everything else. The person who issued this kind of statement can be identified with an environmentalist's position. However, today I argue that a certain speedway running from France to Northern Italy must be built and this has priority over everything. The person who holds this second position, in contradiction with my previous position, is a different slice of myself and one who cannot easily be identified with my previous self. When I say: I believe the speedway between France and Northern Italy must be built, some kind of pragmatic intrusion must occur at the level of the subject. And this pragmatic intrusion must aim at reconciling my previous self with my subsequent self. Unless the two selves are reconciled, it can hardly be said that there is continuity between the two different slices of 'I'. For continuity to occur (or for non-contradiction to hold) it is necessary that some identification component must be added to the subject. Rosenthal thinks this identification component is thin. Instead, as I have demonstrated, it is not thin at all, but thick, since non-contradiction essentially depends on this identification component. If eliminating contradiction can be considered an action (albeit of a mental type, some kind of hygienic action as Igor Douven (2010) proposes), then it is clear that the impure 'de se' thought is

⁹Rosenthal (in a p.c.) writes the following:

You assert that the I in the 'I think' that Kant thinks must be able to go with every thought is not a sequence of tokens of the mental analogue of 'I', but something that has the capacity to tie all one's thoughts together.

I certainly agree that that's something like what Kant had in mind. But there's a question about whether any such thing is there to be had. Simply stipulating that there is a mental item that will do the relevant unifying job doesn't show that there is any such mental item.

Note in that connection Kant's methodology: Establishing what is necessary for what is actual even to be possible. Kant takes the relevant unity of the self through time and across thoughts to be actual. He therefore argues that a unifying 'I' is necessary for that unity even to be possible.

That's fine—except that assuming that strong unity—we might in the context of my own article call it a thick unity—is question begging. I argue that there is an appearance of such strong unity, but that we have no reason to suppose that that strong unity is also real, in addition to being apparent”.

My reply to Rosenthal is that from a philosophical point of view, I am certainly sympathetic to Kant's considerations, which derive, on *a priori* grounds, the unity of different slices of the thinking subject. However, in a linguistic paper, like the present one, not as much as this is required. We can be sympathetic with Rosenthal that only a thin identification is required, as this may well occur through anaphoricity, that is to say coindexation. Coindexation need not involve stipulation, but is normally a pragmatic interpretative matter (the hearer associates the 'I' of a thought with the producer of that thought and then anaphorically links one 'I' to the next). Of course, the thinking subject need not interpret occurrences of 'I' (in his own thoughts) as anaphorically linked. They are already linked by the fact that they are uttered by the same voice (if just thought is considered, we may just assume that the thinker remembers whether his thoughts are his own and coindexes the 'I's of his thoughts with his own thoughts, from which it follows that the different occurrences of 'I' of his thoughts refer to the same person).

relevant to action.¹⁰ (The objection that people contradict themselves occasionally can be replied to by saying that part of textual practices in the law is to reconcile positions expressed over time and eliminating contradictions: thus what I said is not totally uninfluential).

In short, if we have to decide case by case whether ‘de se’ thoughts are genuinely first-personal (through an essentially indexical mode of presentation) or, otherwise, are associated with thick or impure ‘de se’ modes of presentation (which can be associated with rich information on top of the essentially indexical mode of presentation) a strong case has been made for pragmatics which will intervene to decide case by case whether we are faced with an essential indexical or not. Nothing but pragmatic information can tell us whether ‘she’ is a merely essential indexical or otherwise associated with rich information (a description). Now, it is interesting that these considerations are backed up independently by García-Carpintero’s (2013) general considerations:

The content is just a traditional proposition, *de dicto* or *de re*. The state is a specific condition of the subject by being in which a content is believed. Contents help accounting in coarse-grained way, for the role that propositional attitudes constitutively have in appraising the rationality of the subject, the adequacy of his beliefs to his evidence and of his actions to his beliefs and desires...but only in a coarse-grained way. To have a full account of rational action, for instance, we need not just the content but also the specific *state* through which the content is accessed, because, as Frege’s puzzles already established, traditional contents are not enough to appraise rationality and cognitive significance, ways of accessing them should be taken into consideration (p. 82).

Now, this quotation appears to me extremely important, because even if it was presumably intended to cover cases like Frege’s puzzles, and is presumably aimed at showing that a first-personal mode of presentation can explain its motivational force in action, it can be used for the opposite purpose, to show that even a first-personal (‘de se’) mode of presentation is not enough and this must be accompanied by other modes of presentations, such as e.g. proper names or files on information previously accepted by the subject of thought and which would allow the subject to monitor his speech for self-contradiction. After all, a coherent non-contradictory discourse is a way of instantiating the rationality of the speaker (or thinker) and considering that contradiction-elimination can be considered a mental action aimed at preserving the rationality of the speaker, we probably need to have tighter requirements than

¹⁰Rosenthal (in a p.c.) replies that the case of a person who cares (or actually manages) not to contradict herself is pretty rare. I agree with that. I agree that people can change their minds, over time. However, there are cases to conform to the one I have described, such as that of the rational law-maker who has to avoid and eliminate contradictions (Dascal 2003; Capone 2013). Furthermore, there are also contexts in which one is held to certain assumptions, as in the course of a logical demonstration.

making use of a pure 'de se' mode of presentation of the subject. Other additions (additional baggage) are needed, as we are often faced with impure 'de se' thoughts. However impure 'de se' thoughts can be, they must still retain a feature of the 'de se' thought, which is anaphoricity to a self which preserves the self-reflexive nature of the thought. However many additional modes of presentation we can use in referring to ourselves, we need in a sense to keep track of the self by some anaphoric coindexation of the thinking subject with the subject of the thought (e.g. I think I am happy). In this sense, this paper is in line with Higginbotham (2003).

12.6 Conclusion: IEM Again

And now we are back to the issue of IEM. How can we know whether a thought (and thus a statement) is IEM? It is IEM if a descriptive component is lacking from the mode of presentation used. Thus, if a genuinely 'de se' pronominal is used, there is likely to be IEM associated with it. But if the 'de se' thought is not really a pure 'de se' thought, then a descriptive component can accrue on top of the first-personal mode of presentation through pragmatics. If we accept considerations by Evans, the presence of descriptive features in a mode of presentation guarantee that IEM is destroyed. Why is it destroyed? It is destroyed because due to a descriptive component, questions about the identity of the referent can be asked. We have seen that IEM can be sensitive to pragmatic information. But, of course, this is a consideration that is based on a communicative approach to language – since language can be used to model mental representations, as Devitt (2013), says, it should not be excluded that epistemology and linguistics intersect at some point.

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Chapter 13

Attributions of Propositional Attitude and Pragmatic Intrusion

13.1 Preamble

In this chapter, as best as I can, I shall try to throw light on an issue that is mysterious and thorny and can be connected with a possible fork in the theories on the comprehension of propositional attitudes – attitudes induced by verbs such as ‘believe’, ‘know’, ‘understand’, ‘think’, ‘desire’ etc. (and their translations in the world languages), which have always led scholars to believe that an extensional semantics is insufficient, in that they introduce an intensional dimension, as is obvious, linked to the opacity problem. As far as attributions of belief and propositional attitudes in general are concerned, unlike what happens in citation proper, the problem of opacity is probably only a consequence of the pragmatic dimension of the utterance, but understandably it has heavy repercussions on the semantics of such expressions and our attempts to model it and make it acceptable. If it is true that a pragmatic view of such utterances can resolve complicated issues, the price to pay is substantial, in that pragmatic intrusion itself can lead to heavy charges with respect to such a theoretical picture, including the well-known problem of Grice’s circle (Levinson 2000) (also see the discussion in Capone 2006). But if the price to pay (for pragmatic intrusion) is a pragmatic theory that gives up the notion that pragmatic inferences are cancellable, we should be ready to pay such a price. Assimilating pragmatics to semantics is the first obvious consequence of the fact that pragmatic processes can tend to imitate the semantic ones. However, the non-cancellability of pragmatic inferences connected with explicatures can be imputed to a notion of strong intentionality which comes together with the theoretical instrument of the explicature and does not necessarily imply that the potential dimension of the inference should not be cancellable. With this précis, we can continue to work with a very flexible concept of pragmatics to be easily reconciled with the idea that great part of the inferential work is required by face phenomena, while another slice of pragmatics is required by the necessity of resolving thorny and delicate philosophical issues or theoretical problems.

13.2 Capone (2008)

If this preamble served to clarify the implications and dangers inherent in the new pragmatic theories of verbs of propositional attitude, now it is time to discuss the emerging theoretical picture in the clearest possible way, trying to do our best to reconcile two theories that are different in many respects even if they both attempt to resolve the problem of intensionality (if this is a problem, as one might believe this is the most interesting aftermath of a theory that considers synonyms both a useful instrument of communication and an important consequence of the fact that different people can think of the same facts while they experience different emotions and different sensations, due to their different psychological and cultural baggage). The theories in question are Capone (2008) and Richard (2013). It should be fair to clarify that Richard (2013) is a collection of previous articles and that such ideas go back to articles published in the nineties, as well as including more recent developments.

In Capone (2008) I devoted a lot of time and resources to the demonstration that pragmatic inferences connected with belief reports and, in general, with propositional attitude attributions have a truth-conditional impact. Such resources and demonstrations for me have been conclusive in demonstrating that pragmatic intrusion exists, is necessary, indispensable, useful and an ally of the concept of opacity – a phenomenon whereby replacing a NP (but also a VP or a V) in a sentence embedded in a verb of propositional attitude such as ‘believe’ produces a result that is not acceptable or satisfactory in that the person whose belief is being attributed might not accept (and normally does not accept) the result of such a transformation (and I call this a ‘transformation’ because speakers do not systematically change (or replace) NPs in belief utterances unless they have motivations of a communicative or informative type – if they do not do so for unethical reasons (in attempts to report an utterance that is false). Normally we say – and it would not be incorrect to say – that the substitution of a NP or VP(or V) can transform an utterance that is true into one that is false. The use of the modal verb ‘can’ is indispensable in that nothing prevents a speaker from accepting the same proposition under two different modes of presentation of the reference. However, *a priori*, we cannot know if (even if we can predict that) the speaker (the person who expressed the belief through a sentence S) would accept an attribution (or description) of such a belief that uses a synonymous sentence S’ instead of S. In general, therefore, it is correct to say that such transformations, necessary though they might be or seem to be from a communicative perspective, potentially lead from an utterance that is true to one that is false. The phenomenon of opacity might be considered semantic or pragmatic. It would be semantic if there was a semantic rule that bans the substitution of NPs or VPs in a sentence embedded in a belief utterance. If the existence (or plausibility) of such a semantic rule could not be demonstrated, it would (turn out to) be something pragmatic, even if not cancellable or not easily cancellable. To understand or

demonstrate that this rule is of a semantic type is not easy, but it is clear that if we start from a Russellian semantics in which we have no room for the notion of ‘sense’, if not by deriving this notion in a pragmatic way on the basis of communicative effects, saying that opacity is a semantic phenomenon does not make sense (or a lot of sense) and it even seems to be a logical incoherence (see Soames 2002). However, now we do not have the time, space and interest for a deep demonstration of the pragmatic nature of the notion of opacity, and this has to be postponed. It suffices to say that if pragmatic intrusion (into semantics) can be accepted as a theoretical construct, with the consequential even if not obvious acceptance of the notion of non-cancellability, then we will not have further reasons for wanting to demonstrate that semantics and not pragmatics is responsible for the opacity of verbs of propositional attitude.

13.3 General Considerations on Communication and the Principle of Rationality

We have already gone into the heart of the matter. And now, even if I run the risk of not impressing you with utmost clarity, I would like to anticipate some consequences of the theories which I intend to critically discuss and possibly reconcile – if it is possible to reconcile them. Capone (2008), in an upshot, is a linguistic theory, that is a theory in which utterances expressing (or attributing) propositional attitudes use certain modes of presentation of the reference and such uses pragmatically reflect the mental representations of speakers (whose beliefs we are reporting). In presenting such a pragmatic theory, through something which might resemble a default semantics of Levinsonian inspiration (see also Jaszczolt 2005) expressed through a theoretical apparatus drawn from Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986, etc.), but which after all is nothing but a synthesis of Grice’s maxims obtained using the very Occam’s Razor proposed or modified by Grice (whereby we must: not multiply our theoretical entities unless we obtain further advantages justifying such multiplications), I have considerably departed from the spirit if not from the letter of Relevance Theory which, as is well known, is interested in (non-conventional) inferences starting from utterances analyzed in a context which produces premises, which are themselves obtained using the Principle of Relevance. In this chapter, I further depart from the ideas by Sperber and Wilson, Carston (2002) and followers, in that, coherently with what I demonstrated in my review of Carston 2002, the tension between cognitive effects and cognitive efforts results from a synthesis of the Gricean maxims and also in that I have nothing else to say on mental architecture in addition to the consideration that all we really have to accept as a cognitive universal is that human beings in their communicative efforts reveal their human nature, that is rationality. We shall accept a provisional Principle of Rationality that is valid both for linguistic and non-linguistic actions:

The Rational subject uses his own resources with parsimony and aims at expansions of his resources that are in line with his needs.

From this principle or from appropriate modifications of it based on possible objections, we could probably derive all that we need to derive for the purposes of communication or of human action. I will not say more on cognitive and inferential processes in addition to a very important consideration by Soames (2015). Cognitive routes used by human beings in producing or understanding inferences can substantially differ from one another and our task is to work out a single model of inferential processes. Whatever model we furnish is substantially unsatisfactory or unrealistic as a theoretical picture – it is only an abstraction through which we try to capture the multiplicity of the pragmatic processes taking place in human minds. The moral of the story is that different human beings will employ different cognitive strategies in arriving at the same inference; but what is most important for us is that an abstract model, probably furnished by the Principle of Rationality discussed above, can give unity to all the cognitive routes that can be employed for the same inference. (We will not be surprised that the frugal heuristics by Gigerenzer et al. (1999) can be very different if we consider different speakers). The considerations just made are not a critique of Relevance theory but point to a tension existing in the very theory between a non-modular picture (or anyway a picture which did not require massive modularity) dating back to the years prior to 2000 and a modular picture based on massive modularity (starting from 2000). My considerations depart from such a picture in a significant way and take the theory back to a classical Gricean vision that considers the conversational maxims as the reflection of human rationality and that call to mind the Kantian notion of the *a priori* forms of knowledge. Here we do not have the *a priori* forms of knowledge but the *a priori* principles of communication,¹ where what is *a priori* is not necessarily innate but only the result of a theorization on what happens or must happen or must not happen during communication, a theory that in so far as it is useful, it is adopted and if adopted, it is culturally transmitted. I will not say anything more ambitious than this, even if the innateness hypothesis is obviously very appealing to cognitive scientists. But if what is not innate can be derived in an economical way from the employment of the resource of Rationality and from principles that cannot be easily put into question, such as the principle of Rationality given above, then we really have a considerable cognitive advantage and we brandish Occam's Razor with a view to avoid further discussions.

¹ Given that a theory of communication is also a theory of how knowledge is transmitted, by implication an *a priori* theory of communication is also an *a priori* theory of knowledge. This point seems to me not to be unimportant, although voiced in passing.

13.4 Pragmatic Intrusion Allows Us to Vindicate Frege's Ideas

I shall immediately say that the theory of propositional attitudes given in Capone (2008) is probably the consequence of having assimilated the lectures by James Higginbotham at the University of Oxford on verbs of propositional attitude (and it is notorious that Higginbotham had a very conservative view of semantics). It is obvious that notions can be transmitted from teachers to students, but in this case we have a pragmatic view that completely replaces the semantic view and has the same virtues (even if it may have different faults). We could say that in this chapter we have a pragmatic vindication of Frege's ideas. At this point, I have to say that I am firmly persuaded that this semantic view (and its pragmatic equivalent) has non-negligible virtues, in that the principal function of belief attributions is to represent the mental panorama of the person to whom the belief is attributed, rather than the mental representation of the speaker who reports the belief. In the current (pragmatic) theories there is the presupposition (and anyway the tacit acceptance) of the clearly not very appealing idea that the representation of a sentence embedded in a verb of propositional attitude does not refer to the mental representation of the person whose belief is reported but to the mental representation of the speaker who reports this belief. This is a counterintuitive idea as it violates every basic principle of rationality underlying communicative practices. If we want to describe Mary's belief, it is much easier to start with Maria's mental representations, rather than with our mental representations of Maria's representations, unless there is a problem that renders a deviation from such a practice necessary. Let us suppose that we have many cards (this example understandably has a Wittgensteinian flavor). On the external part of the card we do not find the content of the card but only the generic message: 'Representation of Mary's belief' or 'Representation of the representation of Mary's belief' or 'Representation of the representation of the representation of Mary's belief'. Which card will be chosen by a person interested in knowing what Mary believes? It is clear that as soon as meta-representative levels have been added (or multiplied) we depart more and more from the original representation of Mary's belief. The most rational addressee will prefer the card that represents Mary's belief more directly. However, if for some reason this card contains an obscure NP, then the recipient will try to choose a different card and, in order, the card exhibiting the a representation of the representation of Mary's belief (the order is determined by rational choice). This is the point of view of the addressee. Now let us move towards the point of view of the person who reports Mary's belief. Which card will be chosen by such a person? It is to be taken for granted that the speaker is aware of the interests of the addressee and knows that he prefers to have direct access to the belief of the person whose belief is reported, rather than to the representation of the representation of such a belief. The choice of the speaker, then, must model (or reflect) the choice (or the preference) of the addressee as determined by his practical interests. This description of the language game (as at this point it is evident that we are dealing with a Wittgensteinian language game where different possible moves

are available) reveals the fact that the person who reports the belief (or the belief attribution) uses the same linguistic moves that would be chosen by the addressee (in other words he is able to simulate his choices) because he puts himself into his shoes and simulates his interests. He can also anticipate comprehension difficulties if he knows that the addressee does not recognize a referent through an NP and, therefore, at this point he avoids the card of the direct representation of the belief because he knows that it would not be useful and he thus chooses a different representation, even if an indirect one. In this paper I have used a concept of rationality more abstract than the one used in my 2008 paper, where I adopted the **Communicative Principle of Relevance** to arrive at the same results. However, the description now is more satisfactory as it replaces an explanation which had some lacunae as it was fundamentally based on the idea that a more indirect representation implies greater cognitive efforts. The idea that now certainly emerges, namely that we have some language games and that the language game which is more in line with the interests of the addressee is chosen, is the demonstration that a more abstract principle of rationality is sufficient to explain various linguistic data, if not all. Anyway, we are now only interested in the demonstration that the linguistic facts presented in Capone (2008) can at last be explained in a satisfactory manner (or in a much more satisfactory manner).

Much more interesting is the comparison with Richard (2013) in addition to problems emerging from the article by Capone (2008) and discussed independently by Richard (2013). While the theory in Capone (2008), albeit it makes use of Relevance theory, had the ambition of explaining away the systematic nature of pragmatic inferences and of intuitions (mainly that connected with opacity and the non-applicability of Leibniz' law to propositional attitudes) and to demonstrate pragmatic intrusion (of default inferences, and how such inferences reach the level of non-cancellability or non-obvious cancellability), Richard's theory fails to explain in a systematic manner inferences (and opacity) through a default mechanism and, instead, offers a theory that is strongly contextualist, whereby in each context we have to make an effort to understand what the speaker says (or intends to say). Obviously, Richard's theory is useful especially for the cases which are problematic for a theory like Capone (2008), that is to say the cases of presumed cancellability of the default inference (that the NPs or VPs present in the sentence constitute modes of presentation of the reference for the believer). Clearly it is the theory of Capone (2008) that accords more naturally with Frege's theory, conferring so much importance to the words' senses, albeit it does not accept the suspicious step by which, according to Frege, in intensional contexts mysteriously and suddenly senses, rather than extensions, prevail. Instead, Richard's theory admits a potential gap between linguistic meaning and the senses associated with the words present in belief utterances (in the sentences embedded in the verb 'believe' or similar verbs) and admits that, potentially, there is no standard correlation between what is said (or reported) by the speaker and what is thought or believed by the subject whose belief is being reported. True, we might find ourselves in the situation in which the speaker systematically changes or replaces the words of the subject whose belief is reported and the addressee knows which functions map the words of the speaker to the

mental representations of the subject whose belief is reported. But since a single function is not sufficient to guarantee that this mapping works, then potentially the functions to work out are multiple and the inferential work of the addressee becomes really complicated, if not impossible. One of the mysteries of Richard's theory is that he does not explain in a detailed way how such a theory should work for utterances which are arbitrarily long and contexts in which it is not easy to work out such functions in an inferential way. It is not to be taken for granted that the addressee knows *a priori* that the word *x* of the speaker corresponds to the word *y* of the subject whose belief is being reported. At most, as I argued in Capone (2010) in an article on the social practice of indirect reports, the addressee knows (or can know) that a certain word is part of the cultural baggage of the speaker but not of the subject whose belief is being reported. For example, if the speaker uses racist terminology, and we know well that the subject whose belief is being reported is not racist, we have tangible reasons for doubting the correlation between the word used by the speaker (in the that-clause of the belief attribution) and the word actually used in the thought or discourse of the subject whose belief is reported. This is already complicated enough and at most we *qua* hearers can doubt the correlation or potential mapping but it is unlikely that we know how to set up the mapping work in a positive way, especially if the speeches reported are long enough. I would not like to say that it is impossible to expand and ameliorate Richard's theory, but I believe that a further step in this direction should be taken and that in the absence of further details allowing one to flesh out Richard's theory, one gets the impression that we replace Frege's theory with a theory which does not have its defects but has others. The considerations in Capone (2008), instead, at least have the advantage that one has a positive rule for the interpretation of belief reports and that we should not invoke the power of context (every time) to know what the speaker actually means.

Before proceeding with the discussion of the positive outcomes of Richard's (2013) theory, I would like to remind readers of one of the advantages of the theory discussed in Capone (2008) combined with the notion that explicatures are not cancellable, expressed in Capone (2009):

Consider the following utterance:

- (1) John believes that Hesperus is not Phosphorus.

Considering that in John's beliefs Hesperus and Phosphorus are two distinct celestial bodies, this sentence appears to be 'prima facie' true. However, we recall on the basis of Soames (2002) that the pragmatic theory confers an interpretation on top of the basic Russellian logical form. For Russellian semantics, the referent is the main point of departure for the logical form. But the referent of Hesperus and Phosphorus is the same. Therefore, if only a Russellian interpretation were to prevail, John believes something that is false (that is, that Hesperus is not itself).

And at this point we have a semantic interpretation according to which the same sentence expresses a belief that is false (a contradiction, in fact) and a pragmatic

interpretation according to which the same sentence is used to express a belief that is true (a non-contradiction). The only solution for this mystery is to take seriously the lesson in Capone (2009) on the non-cancellability of explicatures. Once the explicature is calculated, this is not cancellable and constitutes a semantic surrogate from a communicative point of view. The Russellian semantics, therefore, is overridden by the explicature which definitively furnishes the truth-conditions of the utterance.

A similar example can be found in Saul (2007):

(2) Louise believes that Superman can jump over more buildings than Clark Kent.

Given that Superman is nothing but Clark Kent, it is clear that the sentence expresses a belief that is necessarily absurd and false, in that it is impossible for a person to jump over more buildings than himself. Only a pragmatic interpretation can rescue this utterance and can do so through a non-cancellable interpretation – in fact, cancelling such an interpretation means returning to the problematic Russellian logical form in which the contribution of a NP is nothing but the referent of such an NP. Rehearsing the considerations expressed in Capone (2009), the non-cancellability of explicatures is due to a strong notion of intentionality and to the fact that explicatures are known to be necessary where the result of a mere semantic computation is highly unsatisfactory in that it is conducive to logical contradiction, to patent falsity or logical absurdity.

After this deviation, let us return to the theory of Richard (2013).

Richard's theory seems to have three advantages with respect to Capone (2008). In a very persuasive way, Richard (2013) lets us understand that the mode of presentation of the referent (or of the reference) (in the thought of the subject to whom we attribute the belief) does not necessarily correspond to the NP used in indirect speech. Consider the following example:

(3) Mary believes that he arrived in Paris

The use of the pronominal is no guarantee that in Mary's thought or belief there is an analogous pronominal (or the same pronominal) as mode of presentation of the reference. It is not impossible that Mary mentally used (or used in the utterance in which she vocalized her belief) the word 'Giovanni'. At this point, it is obvious that there might be a discrepancy between the mode of presentation of the reference as is used by the speaker and the mode of presentation of the reference as used by the thinking subject (with respect to the same individual). Then there should be a contextual rule such as the following:

He → 'Giovanni' (Mary believes that...)

Though really interesting, Richard's theory is to some extent hard to accept, in that the thinking subject might have chosen not 'Giovanni' as a mode of presentation of the referent, but for example an epithet, an evaluative term, or the very pronoun. How can we enter Mary's mind to establish which mode of presentation of the

referent she used? This journey of mental exploration is not easy, neither is it necessary. The speaker, unlike the hearer, knows which utterance or mode of presentation was used by Mary in vocalizing her belief (or her thought), but for convenience of the hearer or because she did not care (too much about the discrepancy between what was believed and what was reported), she replaced the mode of presentation of the referent with one that is more generic and certainly more informative, on the one hand (in that it immediately allows the Hearer to select the referent talked about), less informative on the other hand, in that the pronominal is less informative with respect to a proper name, in that it has a smaller number of cultural connotations. Certainly, the mode of pronominal presentation of the referent is neutral from an evaluative point of view (unless derogatory intonation is used) as it does not allow racist evaluations, etc. In the last analysis, the positive contribution of Richard's (2013) theory is that the correlation or potential mapping between the NP used in discourse and the one used in Mary's thought(s) fails. Therefore, this is one of the problematic points in the theory of Capone (2008) – I say 'problematic' not because a pragmatic theory does not admit exceptions or because pragmatic inferences cannot be cancelled (in fact the majority of philosophers/linguists following Grice admit that implicatures (and explicatures) are cancellable (with the consequent flexibility allowed by cancellability). Then we need a deeper exploration of the application of such ideas to the topic of belief attributions. Of course, in case it could be demonstrated that the explicatures of belief attributions are cancellable, following Capone (2009), I could always say that only the explicatures actually calculated and not the potential ones are not cancellable, in that they are connected with a strong notion of intentionality. However, I will not follow the easiest route, not only to persuade my most obstinate opponents, but also in order to persuade myself and in order to demonstrate that pragmatic intrusion has systematic semantic effects.

The case of pronominals, thorny and interesting though it might be, does not seem to be particularly devastating for my theory, in that we can easily presuppose that the semantic function of pronominals is to furnish descriptions which are as neutral as possible, devoid of evaluations or cultural connotations, and to mediate the identification of the reference (above all if the pronominal is accompanied by a demonstrative gesture). Let us suppose that this pronominal function is one of the semantic characteristics of language. Language utilizes pronouns to guarantee this function of neutrality. In such a case, there is no problem for my theory in that pragmatic inferences (following Huang 1994, 2000) must always be compatible with the semantics of the lexemes used. Therefore, semantics, in case of incompatibility, defeats certain pragmatic interpretations – but it defeats them not by cancelling them but by preventing them from arising. Therefore, in a sense of 'cancellable', inferences promoted by my inferential approach imputable to the Principle of Rationality continue to be non-cancellable, in that they have not been cancelled. It just happens, as in the case of pronominals, that they are not computed. If they are not computed, it does not make sense to say that they are cancelled or cancellable.

Another thorny case is that in which the speaker, in order to favor the Hearer who does not know a certain individual through an NP X, uses Y instead of X (A case

discussed in Devitt (1996). In this case, Y cannot be the mode of presentation of the reference mentally used by the subject whose belief is reported by the reporting speaker. In this case, it makes sense to have (or infer) a function mapping from Y to X. According to Richard (2013), such a function is inferred in a contextual manner. We cannot read directly in the mind of the thinking subject, nor do we have direct access to his discourse. We use the indirect speech of the speaker to have access to the mind of the thinking subject. But if, for opportunistic reasons, the speaker decided to replace an NP or VP, we cannot easily infer the mapping from Y to X if not by questioning the speaker further. At most, in the context in which we are, we can entertain the doubt that the indirect speech does not establish the function $Y \rightarrow Y$, but the function $Y \rightarrow X$. In other words, the contextual situation can at most alert us as to the awareness that the principle of Rationality does not predict the interpretation of the sentence in a correct way. Then is our inference cancellable? In order to understand well how the communicative processes work we have to model the situation which we are discussing in a realistic way. Let us suppose that the speaker uses the mode of presentation X of the referent, that is an NP, for the first time in the embedded sentence of a belief report. The speaker S has no reason to depart from the practice described in Capone (2008). However, let us suppose that, faced with such an utterance, the Hearer points out that he was not able to identify the referent. Then at this point, the speaker must repair his communicative contribution, through what in English is called ‘repair-work’ by conversation analysis. The speaker must effect a replacement (of an NP) in order to repair the communicative defect. But at this point it is clear, due to the dynamics of communication and to the request for a clarification, that a replacement is being made. At this point the Principle of Rationality no longer predicts the interpretation whereby the mode of presentation of the reference ‘prima facie’ is the mode of presentation used by the thinking subject. But it is absurd, at this point, to speak of the cancellability of the inference. Such an inference is not cancelled in that it does not arise due to the semantic characteristics of the discourse. It is as if I said:

Everyone came. Therefore some came.

It is absurd to think that in this segment of the discourse ‘some’ conversationally implicates ‘Not all’. The potential inference does not have practical consequences and is not cancellable. This is shown by the fact that the following discourse is terribly defective:

All came. Therefore some came. But I did not intend to say that not all came.

The difficulty in understanding this segment consists in the impossibility of cancelling an implicature which could not logically arise in the first place.

Obviously, the speaker (and consequently the addressee) can give up the default interpretation even if his belief attribution occurs in the absence of an immediately prior context in which the hearer shows that he does not understand the reference of the NP embedded in the belief report. What is really indispensable is that there

should be a memory trace of the episode that generated the repair-work. And this memory can be both in the speaker's and in the Hearer's minds. Even on the basis of a mere memory, ordinary pragmatic practices are suspended and this is due to the semantics of the discourse, which necessitated a voluntary and strategic deviation from the ordinary practice. As in the case of pronominals, we can consider this deviation the result of a discourse rule – but even a discourse rule can be considered a semantic device and, therefore, it is obvious that a rule will order the interpretations and will promote some while it will eliminate others. To speak about the cancellability of the pragmatic inference, in this case will not be correct, in that in this case it is NOT the contextual information that defeats the pragmatic information, but there is a conflict proper between semantic rules and pragmatic principles. And it is obvious that the semantic rule wins (Following Huang 1994). To make a semantic example, consider the English compound 'a toy elephant'. Certainly by it we do not want to say that the sense of 'elephant' is cancelled, given that it is modified by the word 'toy'. It just happens that the rule for modification has it that the meaning of 'elephant' be modulated when it is combined with the modifier 'toy'.

The third difficulty for Capone (2008) comes from the translation of the sentence embedded in the verb 'believe' or similar cognates. Consider the sentence (4) in English, translated into Italian:

- (4) Putin believes that Paris is the most beautiful European capital.
- (4b) Putin crede che Parigi sia la capitale più bella dell'Europa

In this context, it is obvious that the speaker, in reporting a belief, is using a translation of an utterance which externalized or reported such a belief. It is possible that the speaker learned such a belief from a British magazine (The Economist, for example) and that the journalist of the Economist translated a Russian utterance by Putin. The utterance (4b) is in Italian but can originate from an English utterance which had its origin from an utterance from Russian. Then it is obvious – and this can easily be derived from Richard's theory – that in this context we have a function that maps from 'Parigi' to the Russian translation of 'Parigi' (it counts as a defect in Richard's theory that if we do not know the Russian name of 'Paris' we cannot establish such a mapping). Nevertheless it is clear that what is at least predicted by Richard's theory is that we cannot select the function mapping from 'Parigi' to 'Parigi'. Capone's (2008) theory seems to have some problems, at least in the sense that the standard inference predicted by the Principle of Rationality (and its application to language games) does not get through. But in this case, no rational human being could predict that the Principle of Rationality induces us to believe that the NP in the sentence embedded in the belief utterance should correspond to the NP actually used in Putin's thought. The Principle of Rationality will certainly have to take into account the fact that the belief is reported through a translation and, therefore, there cannot be a correspondence between the NP used by the speaker and the one used by the subject whose belief we are reporting. Therefore it is right to say that the inference is not cancelled, in that in fact it never arose in this context. Furthermore, we could think of a discourse rule such that in the cases of possible translations it will compel us not to associate the mode of presentation of the

reference used in the translation with the referent of an NP. If we think that a discourse rule may even have a semantic character, then it is clear that one rule prevails over a different one. It is not the case of a cancellation of a pragmatic inference. (interaction with the late Jim Higginbotham at one point confirmed my idea that discourse rules could lead to uncancellable results).

We can also think of another strategy to treat such cases. Cases of indirect discourse in which it is obvious that we make recourse to a translation are nothing but parasitic cases (one could claim, although this claim is rather bold), parasitic uses of language, sentences we might avoid in that they do not conform to the semantic-pragmatic mechanisms of language. In other words, we might simply consider an utterance such as ‘Putin believes that Paris is the Capital of Europe’ false, albeit it is (wrongly considered) acceptable (and comprehensible) from a communicative point of view. We might consider it more the result of a translation practice which is now consolidated than an utterance that is really well-formed. Of the two solutions, this is certainly the strongest one, the most radical one, the one which we are least inclined to defend, while the previous solution seems to be more acceptable, less complicated and less risky. In this case I will not say more to defend this risky solution in addition to the general consideration that the most radical ideas are often the ones which effectively have a greater number of positive consequences.

13.5 Conclusion

Although this research leads us one step further with respect to Capone (2008), there are still points to clarify, like for example pragmatic intrusion into utterances of belief ‘de se’ and the complex relationship with the notion of Immunity to error through misidentification. We must still clarify the privileged relationship between indirect discourse and attributions of belief that look like a particular case of indirect discourse (of an implicit kind). But these are complex topics and although I have written extensively on some of these, one needs to find the time and the courage to tackle them in a systematic manner by comparing them.

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Chapter 14

Simple Sentences, Substitution and Embedding Explicatures (The Case of Implicit Indirect Reports)

I defend the view that all the semantically relevant elements are expressed at the LF level. In other words, I argue that, for the purposes of semantics, all the relevant propositional elements are the value of either a phonetically realized element or an implicit argument. The propositional elements not triggered by a phonetically realized element or an implicit argument, can be dealt with as either pragmatically imparted or as background presuppositions upon which a given speech act occurs. (Corazza 2004, 70–71).

In this chapter, I am going to discuss a very interesting case brought to our attention by Saul (1997, 2007) and references therein: NP-related substitution failure in simple sentences. Whereas it is well known that opacity occurs in intensional contexts¹ and that in such contexts it is not licit to replace an NP with a co-referential one (this would be illicit, substitution failure constituting a violation of the compositionality constraint, according to Salmon 1986, 2007; Richard 2013; Jaszczolt 2005), one would not expect that substitution failure (that is an exception to Leibniz's law) should also be exhibited by simple sentences (though they are not exhibited by all simple sentences) in the context of stories about Superman.² The suggested explanation of these cases is to posit an embedding explicature, that is to say the insertion of structure (a sentential fragment such as 'We are told that' or 'As the story goes') that *ipso facto* creates an intensional context capable of blocking substitution.³ I

¹Namely that-clauses of belief reports embedded in the verb 'believe' or a similar verb of propositional attitude or that-clauses of indirect reports, following Forbes (1997a, b)). Saul is using her cases to cast doubt on what is supposedly well known. Saka, in his article, which I discuss later on, also extends the cases which are exceptions to Leibniz's Law.

²At least for some simple sentences, Leibniz's law seems to work (see Saul 2007, 2); however, as Saul says, following a venerable tradition "Millianism faces an important obstacle. Co-referential names do not seem freely substitutable in all sentences..... Embedding a sentence within a belief report seems to have the result that co-referential names can no longer be freely substituted without change of truth-conditions" (Saul 2007, 2).

³Timothy Williamson (p.c.) objects to this that "This violates the intention with which Superman cases are normally used in the literature. We are supposed to imagine a world in which something like the Superman stories are *true* and in which the relevant speech acts are performed. Thus, by hypothesis, speakers are not adverting to any story; they may simply be reporting what they have seen. They need not be relying on anyone's testimony. Thus no such additions are relevant".

consider various complications to this story in the light of important objections by García-Carpintero (p.c.) and, finally, I consider how this story fares when one applies constraints on explicatures along the lines of those proposed by Hall (2014) in an interesting paper.

In general, this chapter exploits interesting considerations by Norrick (2016) on the structural similarities between stories and indirect reports.⁴ Norrick believes there are important differences, but he is inclined to concede that we could study structural similarities. An important similarity, brought out by the examples discussed by Saul (2007), is that the narrative frame, once it is inserted into the interaction, can be left implicit and, during the act of narrating or referring to the story, one need not repeat the words ‘the story says’ or ‘we are told that...’ every time. Although implicit, these words are heard because they do some work at the structural level, as is shown by this attempt to resolve an otherwise intractable philosophical problem. The explicatures of simple sentences are perceived because they are integrated into the speakers’/hearers’ perception of the overall plan of discourse, as Haugh (2015) most interestingly notes:

As Haugh and Jaszczołt (2012) note, this means that any putative “communicative intention of A is embedded within his higher-order intention” (p. 101). In other words, to figure out the implicature that evidently arises here, the participants are necessarily making inferences about some kind of overall aim (...). According to this view, then, inferences about the intended implicature(s) (i.e. the speaker’s communicative intentions) arise concomitant with inferences about the overall aim of the speaker (...). (p. 96).

It follows from the considerations by Haugh that, since the explicature connected with simple sentences depends on the perception of the overall aim or plan of the conversation, it is not easily cancelled. Readers can check by themselves that the explicatures due to simple sentences cannot be cancelled, as cancelling them would involve returning to illogical discourses. (But these are merely consequences of what I said in Capone 2009a). Haugh’s considerations about the overall aim of the discourse are precious in explaining how the embedding explicatures I posit are

The objection by Williamson is interesting in many ways. I agree that in a hypothetical scenario one may proffer assertions consisting of Superman sentences without having the intention of making reference to a story merely intending to report what one has seen. But the question is whether the ordinary contexts in which Superman sentences are uttered are contexts in which one merely reports what one sees. I am persuaded that such assertions make sense in the background of stories. The speaker is somehow requiring the hearer to imagine an imaginary world. However this world has to conform to a story which is in the background. This is enough to create an intensional context, in my opinion. However, the intensional context need not be equated with the fictional world presupposed. An insertion of ‘We are told that...’ is enough to create an intensional context.

⁴Norrick writes: In sum, indirect reports may constitute or contain narratives, and narratives may take the form of indirect reports, generally accompanied by ‘she/he said’ and similar expressions, and they often contain indirect reports as in dialogue, again generally accompanied by ‘she/he said’ and similar expressions, but these relations are contingent, rather than necessary’ (p. 95).

calculated once and for all for the whole stretch of the discourse framed by the narrative act (or the perception of the narrative act).

14.1 Introduction

When I first read Saul (2007), I admit I was strongly tempted to stop reading that book as I thought that accepting that even in simple sentences there could be cases of substitution failure in connection with NPs amounted to accepting some kind of logical error which could be something Williamson (2016) calls ‘error-fragility’. Once a serious error is injected into a theory, more and more errors will pop up in ramifications of the theory. The following is an attempt to dissolve a complicated and puzzling philosophical problem that runs the risk of infecting our theories (philosophical and linguistic alike) and also an attempt to render our pragmatic theories of belief reports and opacity less error-fragile in general. A way to do this is to grant the importance of a non-cancellable type of pragmatic intrusion, recognizing the ubiquity of implicit indirect reports and admitting that opacity cannot be everywhere but must be confined to intensional contexts.

The upshot of this chapter is that several important consequences follow from accepting the theoretical claim that there is a class of indirect reports to be called ‘implicit indirect reports’. In using this terminology, I am freely adapting considerations found in Holt (2016) (in the context of a paper on indirect reports) and which I deemed of considerable importance. Its importance lies not only in the empirical claim itself, which is confined to a range of (mainly) conversational data, but in its applicability to problems that are thorny and of difficult resolution. The considerations I have in mind, to be spelled out at the outset of this chapter, will be conducive to the resolution of a problem created by substitution failure in simple sentences. That substitution failure (that is to say the non-applicability of Leibniz’s law) inside intensional contexts⁵ was a problem for compositional semantics was no mystery (see Jaszczolt 1999, 2005, 2016), but also antecedent work by Richard (2013) and Salmon (1986, 2007), but it comes as a surprise that the same effects that seem to be due to (that is to say, caused by) intentional contexts should also be noticed in extensional ones (see Saul 2007), or at least contexts we have no apparent reason to consider intensional, if we confine ourselves to literal meanings – a *prima facie* consequence of this might be that one could, in principle, be wrong about the kind of phenomena that occur inside intensional contexts or in the claim that these should be imputed to intensionality (Davidson 1968 wanted to prove that intensional contexts are more or less functionally equivalent to quotational contexts). But how could one be wrong about the nature (and causes) of opacity, which happens to be one of the most well studied phenomena in semantics and pragmatics (after the considerations by Frege 1892; Davidson 1968; Salmon 1986, 2007; Richard 2013 among numerous other important philosophers of language)? Intuitively, the only

⁵That is that-clauses of verbs of propositional attitude, in general, among other things.

way out of this impasse is to look at the structure of the conversation to see if, from a communicative point of view, by reference to wide context, that is to say “any contextual information relevant to working out the process of enrichment”⁶ and established communicative practices” (Fetzer 2016), one could make further structure emerge, and, in particular, some unarticulated sections of the discourse, which must be there because their being there would make otherwise inexplicable phenomena explicable.⁷ (Certain moves seem to be required by Williamson’s awareness of error-fragility and the attempt to eliminate that⁸). This interplay of semantics and contextual information is a consequence of the general truism expressed by Wettstein (2016) that “*Context cannot be an afterthought in our thinking about the linguistic function of reports, any more than context can be an afterthought in our thinking about indexicals*” (Wettstein 2016, 417). Perhaps surface structure is not a good guide to what is said – this was already proven in connection with logical form as we found out in the most interesting work by Higginbotham and May (1981)⁹ (see Capone 2002 for a review) on quantification and scope ambiguity. But here, intuitively, it is not a question of logical form, as we are not dealing with sentential meanings,¹⁰ but it must be some obscure phenomenon related to discourse – one which can be illuminated through the theory of (conversational) explicatures – that is insertions of structures like ‘We have heard that...’ or ‘As the story goes...’. In an informal personal communication, Jaszczolt suggested to me that we should probably abandon the theoretical constructs of explicatures since these involve develop-

⁶ See Hall 2014, 8; but also see Kecskes (2014) on context as prior experience that we carry in our memory.

⁷ Unlike the view that context should be seen as “a selector of lexical features because it activates some of those features while leaving others in the background” (Kecskes 2014, 35), in this paper we hold the view that context also serves to insert structure at the sentential or inter-sentential level.

⁸ Williamson (Oxford lecture) reflects on error fragility, that is to say the idea that once an error is inserted (injected) into a theory, it will systematically lead to further errors. Take, for example, the idea that Saul’s examples discussed in this chapter prove that opacity appears even in simple sentences, that is apparently non-intensional contexts. As my readers will see, this idea is taken up by Saka (2016) and extended to other examples, leading him to postulate universal opacity. (Also see another case brought up by Williamson p.c.). This is an illustration of what Williamson means by error-fragility. I have amply shown in a later section that universal opacity, as maintained by Saka, is wrong and is certainly a consequence of the idea that simple sentences can exceptionally be loci of opacity.

⁹ As pointed out by Timothy Williamson (p.c.) this is also a point made by Russell. See his ideas on scope ambiguity in connection with definite descriptions (this is a topic discussed by Neale (2007) in detail).

¹⁰ Timothy Williamson (p.c.) says “surely we are, because the truth-values of sentences are at issue”. Ok, I agree this is a complicated question. If we accept the hidden indexicality hypothesis, then obviously Williamson may have a point here, as the logical form has to be specified syntactically and semantically. If we take the position that free enrichment only is involved, the logical form (As the story goes/as we heard) is injected into the utterance, but this part of the logical form is not considered to be mandated by lexical or syntactic structure. So, Williamson’s remark that, indeed, it is a question of logical form can be intended in a stronger or in a weaker sense. If it is intended in a weaker sense, it does not really contradict, but it merely further specifies what I said.

ing a logical form, while we know for sure that in many cases (e.g. cases of irony) we do not develop a certain logical form (by integrating it with further pragmatic information) but we completely have to discard it¹¹. I quite agree that the discourse processes I am trying to elucidate involve the integration of information coming from several sources (see Jaszczołt 2005 and 2016 concerning Merger Representations¹²) – some of these sources being related to background information or social context.¹³ However, I propose to stick to the term ‘explicatures’ for a number of reasons, among which a conservative instinct, in addition to the desire to highlight the link between this chapter and previous work on the semantics/pragmatics debate. However, the suggestion by Jaszczołt is well taken and I am also persuaded that the term ‘explicature’ can be rejuvenated following Jaszczołt’s idea that in Merger Representations several sources of information are integrated and we do not necessarily proceed by privileging the logical form (the same ideas are expressed in a simpler way in Mey’s work on pragmemes (Mey 2001)). Among other things, Jaszczołt proposes that compositionality at the level of the sentence should be abandoned in favor of compositionality at the level of discourse.¹⁴ Now I

¹¹ To make this less cryptic, consider a case such as ‘Nice weather, isn’t it?’. Jaszczołt’s consideration on irony and similar cases (e.g. jokes) is that one does not proceed incrementally, by summing up the proposition literally expressed with the pragmatic increments. The increments, in such cases, do not amount to additions, but to subtractions, since the hearer has to work out that the speaker does not literally intend that the weather is nice, but has to consider that this is to be understood echoically and thus the real proposition he accepts, instead, is that the weather is quite bad.

¹² A propos of Merger Representations, Jaszczołt (2016, 80) writes the following:

A semantic representation so understood is called in DS merger representation. This representation is assumed to have a compositional structure. Compositionality is there a methodological but also an epistemological and metaphysical assumption, based on the argument from productivity and systematicity of conversational interactional patterns. The word ‘merger’ and the Greek letter sigma (Σ) that symbolizes summation, reflect the fact that information coming from different sources merges to produce one semantic structure. DS is still very much a theory in progress but at the current stage of its development, information is being allocated to the following sources: (i) world knowledge (WK); (ii) word meaning and sentence structure (WS); (iii) the situation of discourse (SD); (iv) properties of the human inferential system (IS); (v) stereotypes and presumptions about society and culture (SC) (p. 80).

¹³ See the important paper by Fetzer (2016) on the way we integrate information coming from the linguistic context with the one coming from the social context. It is of considerable theoretical importance that Fetzer (2016) introduces the difference between generalized and particularized practs (practs are the realizations of pragmemes in discourse). In the case of embedding explicatures, one could say that although we may learn how to derive them pragmatically in particular contexts, we can start to associate them with particular structures and, then, we no longer resort to all the steps required by the inference at the level of the particularized pract.

¹⁴ For the idea of compositionality as something that is mainly achieved in discourse, see the important volume: Kamp, H. and U. Reyle, 1993. Another author who addresses the issue of compositionality in discourse, albeit more timidly, is Hall (2014), who explicitly writes about ‘composing’ unarticulated constituents into an explicature. At another place, Hall writes about compositionality at the level of discourse. Hall (2014) explicitly says that she will concentrate on unarticulated constituents as these seem to be more threatening to a principle of semantic compositionality for truth-conditional content.

want to accept this idea, but I want to put it upside down and say that, if we accept compositionality at the level of discourse, this must percolate to the level of the sentence (see Capone 2009b). In other words, both sentential and discourse-level compositionality avail of the same cognitive principles, presumably innate and universal (presumably compositionality at the level of discourse shares operations with a module that can be called ‘theory of syntax’, the integration occurring at a higher level (see Carruthers 2006)). From this, it follows that by studying compositionality at the level of the sentence, we have an immediate grasp of what happens at the level of discourse, except for the hard cases (notably belief reports, *de se* attitudes, and all the other cases of pragmatic intrusion I dealt with in previous work). However, in cases where compositionality seems to break down at the level of the sentence, compositionality at the level of discourse will prevent the sentential meanings from being devoid of meaning. This is a most interesting and exciting idea contributed by Jaszczolt (1999) through her work on belief reports – this chapter on embedding explicatures promises to be another step in this direction.

Now it should be clear to my readers that, while I largely accept complementarism between semantics and pragmatics, following Huang (2014), I take it that my views differ from Huang’s with respect to discourse compositionality, an idea I mainly took from Jaszczolt (2016, 2005). Setting aside this feature, my picture largely agrees with Huang’s complementarist view (Huang 2014), inherited from Lyons (1977), as I also take pragmatics to be concerned with language use, with non-conventional meaning, with context-dependence, with performance, with speaker’s meaning and finally with elements of meaning that are not encoded (and, thus, are highly variable and optional). Despite accepting complementarism, I fully endorse a form of contextualism that sees the necessity of pragmatic intrusion only for the hard cases and, in particular, for cases intractable for the semanticist and I endorse some version of Recanati’s (2010) truth-conditional pragmatics, without however wanting to be associated with a radical pragmatic treatment, as, after all, according to my view semantics and pragmatics coexist side by side peacefully and, I endorse a kind of non-radical minimalism, accepting that, at least in simple cases, it is possible to know the truth-conditions of a sentence without saying anything or much more about the pragmatics of language (in the sense that if covert indexicals are present, then values are supplied in the normal way in which they would be assigned to pronominals). Intrusive constructions, as pointed out by Levinson (2000), may be problematic for semantics but may involve a complementary pragmatic picture, one where semantics is enriched and completed by pragmatics (following Huang 2014). In short, in this chapter I accept that both top-down and bottom-up pragmatic processes contribute to enriching the explicature, which is, or ought to be, a sort of middle ground between what is literally said and what is implicated, following considerations by Bach (2004).

14.2 The Solutions So Far

In her book ‘Simple sentences, substitution and intuitions’ Saul (2007) critically discusses a number of alternatives to my approach. In a short chapter, it is not possible to do justice to these treatments, but at least I would like to set the background to my own discussion of simple sentences.

Two main approaches to simple sentences can be considered to be of the contextualist type: (a) Pitt (2001) and (b) Moore (1999)/Forbes (1997a, b)). Pitt claims that a sentence like ‘Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent’ should be understood as KAL-EL’s alter ego¹⁵ called ‘Superman’ leaps more tall buildings than KAL-EL’s alter ego called ‘Clark Kent’. Moore (1999) and Forbes (1997a, b) claim that modes of personification have a role to play in the semantics of Superman sentences. I will not repeat the details of the criticism leveled by Saul (2007) to Pitt, simply because I am persuaded that the pragmatic intrusion posited by Pitt is unnecessary once we grant a more general type of pragmatic intrusion that creates an intensional context. The view I propose in this chapter at least has the merit of stressing the role of intensionality in human language, while Pitt’s story, interesting though it is, as Saul says, needs several adjustments and, in any case, does not seem to bring out the fact that intensionality is responsible for substitution failure in simple sentences. The ideas expressed by Moore and Forbes are more interesting and certainly go some way towards explaining the phenomena in question; but as Saul (2007) says, we are faced with problems like the following (a) individuation of modes of personification is not easy or uniform among participants; (b) it should be modeled on the basis of a causal theory of reference, with all its derivative problems; (c) it has thorny problems due to the fact that modes of personification depend on whether the members of the audience are enlightened or not on the identity Clark Kent=Superman, while there is the dubious case that, in the case of mixed audiences including enlightened and unenlightened members, the sentence/statement fails to have a truth-condition in context. From my point of view, even if all these problems could be resolved (but their resolution is not straightforward), the solution proposed by Forbes does not bring out the fact that intensionality is involved in this story, contrary to what I propose in the following sections. Thus, while for Forbes there is an asymmetry between the explanation of anti-substitution intuitions in intensional contexts and the explanation of anti-substitution intuitions in simple sentences, I will argue against such an asymmetry.

Another position worth considering is the one by Barber (2000). This is based on conversational implicature, but starts from the premise that there is an asymmetry between contexts. In contexts in which participants are not enlightened on the identity Clark Kent=Superman, in a sentence like ‘Superman leaps more tall buildings

¹⁵ As Saul (2007) puts it, in Pitt’s view ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ are names for two alter-egos that Kal-El adopted on Earth. “Kal-El does everything either Superman or Clark does, and some things that neither of them do” (p. 32).

than Clark Kent', the NPs (though co-referential) have different cognitive significance, thus the statement could well be taken to be true. In contexts in which participants are enlightened, the sentence above is assessed in context as being blatantly false, as one cannot jump more tall buildings than oneself and, thus, a conversational implicature arises to rescue the felicity of the statement. Despite the similarity between Barber's account and my approach, there are clear and straightforward differences, as I do not need to say at any point that the statement 'Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent' is false (literally speaking). While it is possible that in some cases –e.g. in ironies – we need to go through the step of recognizing that the proposition apparently expressed is *prima facie* false, we do not need to go through this step here (in the Superman simple sentences) and we do not normally go through this step. Another difference is that my approach avoids all the problems emerging from Saul's (2007) discussion, not to mention the fact that my explanation is connected with facts about intensionality, whereas the intensionality dimension plays no role in Barber's treatment (In fact, Barber is skeptical that Naïve Millians like Salmon and Soames can explain antisubstitution intuitions in simple sentences), but I show that they have ways to deal with this problem.

14.3 Implicit Indirect Reports

In this chapter, I will presuppose that the following two principles by Gibbs (1999) are operative in the pragmatics of language and are responsible both for pragmatic intrusion and the recovery of conversational implicatures:

Principle of Speaker Meaning

Speakers and their addressees take for granted that the addressees are to recognize what the speaker means by what they say and do.

Principle of Utterance Design

Speakers try to design each utterance so that their addressees can figure out what they mean by considering the utterance against their current common ground. (Gibbs 1999, 121–122).

The two principles above can be responsible for the rich phenomena of pragmatic intrusion we are going to investigate in detail here. In particular, I shall assume that part of the speaker's meaning, in the case of simple sentences I am discussing, is that the hearer will reconstruct an unarticulated constituent with quasi-sentential structure on the basis of the common ground.¹⁶ This constituent corresponds to an

¹⁶ In connection with 'unarticulated constituents', I am using terminology by John Perry 1986; also see Crimmins and Perry 1989 in connection with belief reports, a reformulation of the notion of 'guises' already discussed by Salmon 1986; also see Bach 2012.

embedding sentential fragment like the following (where the parentheses hold the unarticulated constituent):

(I was told that) S.¹⁷

Unlike the unarticulated constituents discussed by relevance theorists or Griceans like Bach (1994), this constituent has quasi-sentential status (in that by completing it with an indicative sentence one obtains a sentence), in other words it is a sentential fragment in the sense of Stainton (2009). This is not a novelty considering the details of my proposal about pragmatic intrusion discussed in Capone (2008), where I said that belief reports admit sentential pragmatic components (appositive sentences) as pragmatic components of the explicatures. One of the striking differences between the classical cases of explicature (or implicature, if we adopt terminology by Bach) is that explicatures are normally necessitated by incomplete logical forms often called ‘propositional radicals’ (Bach 1994), while the simple sentences we are confronted with here are apparently complete logical forms and certainly not ‘propositional radicals’ (*prima facie*). However, they are transformed into propositional radicals, once we contextualize them and we arrive at speaker’s intentions that are plausible in context. When we see that, in context, the apparently complete sentential form is indeed in need of completion we have to regard it on a par with other propositional radicals which wear incompleteness on their sleeves (see Huang 2014 on propositional radicals).

In this chapter, I adopt a version of semantic minimalism compatible with contextualism of the moderate or radical type (see Jaszczolt 2016; Saul 2002). As

¹⁷ Although this might *prima facie* sound strange, even pragmatic intrusions can require further levels of pragmatic intrusions. It is not enough to reconstruct the constituent ‘We are told that’ as part of the explicature, but we need to reconstruct the illocutionary force of ‘we are told that’. The speech act describes someone as performing an illocutionary act, but which illocutionary act? As Davis (2016, 308) says, we cannot say that an assertion is at stake, since the speaker may just be telling us a story. “But if he is telling a story, then he did not assert, affirm, or state that it did”. It is clear that Davis’ point is relevant to our discussion, as being aware that we are confronted with a story prepares us for the fiction that there are people with extraordinary powers, like Superman, and that, in the world of this story, Superman and Clark Kent are one and the same individual, although some characters in the story are not aware of this identity.

Timothy Williamson (p.c.) raises the following problem:

Postulating this extra constituent gets the truth-value wrong in a vast range of cases. If it is true that S but the speaker wasn’t told that S, the original statement was true. If the speaker was told that S (in a non-factive sense of ‘told’) but it is false that S, the original statement was false. Adding ‘I was told that’ incorrectly reverses the truth-value in both cases.

Although one should certainly take this problem into account, I am not particularly worried by it, as there are languages in which factive ‘tell’ is made explicit by a combination with a particle (e.g. the clitic ‘lo’ in Italian). Thus, there may well be semantic resources to make ‘tell’ factive, which is what we need to overcome the objection by Williamson (in English we may say things such as ‘As the real story goes, ...’ or ‘We have heard it that S’). The objection based on the fact that a true proposition may turn out to be false if embedded in the constituent ‘I was told that’ in the case nobody told us that p can be defeated by considering that this problem does not arise in the context of superman stories. It is a general problem, but not one that arises in this context.

agreed by Borg (2012), there is a version of semantic minimalism according to which at least some sentences are truth-evaluable, which means that, if the corresponding statements are uttered, we know what the world must be like, at least partially (and this view is not incompatible with what I am going to say here), but there is also a stronger version according to which all sentences are truth-evaluable (this version Borg (2012) takes to be compatible with Frege's ideas about semantics). I have amply proven in previous papers that this (latter) version of minimalism must be debatable given a lot of evidence based on reports of propositional attitudes, *de se* attributions, knowing how utterances, referential interpretations of semantically attributive utterances, indirect reports, etc. and that pragmatic intrusion is such a pervasive and systematic feature of communication systems that Jaszczolt (2005, 2016) correctly assumes that compositionality must be instantiated at the level of merger representations (that is representations where semantic, syntactic and pragmatic information merges) rather than at the level of utterances. In this chapter, I apply the idea of pragmatic intrusion again, but in such a way as to necessitate hidden structure which has work to do in composing with logical forms in order to explain phenomena that are typical of intensional contexts, although they occur at the level of simple sentences, which, intuitively, *prima facie* seem not to be intensional contexts. I argue that it is hidden structure to create intentional contexts, in a way that is largely unexplored by the current literature, especially Saul (2007), who is genuinely puzzled by such phenomena. On this, I will also follow Gregoromichelaki (2016, 118), who says that "as is well known, indirect reports, despite the supposed current speaker's context perspective, block logical entailments that are encountered in "transparent" environments".

On various occasions, I was brought to reflect on implicit indirect reports, and this time I will expatiate on embedding explicatures as a case of implicit indirect reports. To show you some examples of implicit indirect reports, consider two cases brought to my attention respectively by a philosopher of language and a conversation analyst:

- (1) John believes Mary went to the cinema
- (2) Allan has not been able to find any significant difference between direct and indirect reports. He also thinks that indirect reports could admit interjections as parts of mixed-quoted segments.

Occasionally, belief reports could be considered cases of implicit indirect reports. In connection with (1), we occasionally reconstruct a verb of saying, as that (sometimes) appears to be the only evidence we might gather in favor of attributing that belief to John.¹⁸

¹⁸ Timothy Williamson (p.c.) says "That confuses our evidence for a statement with its content". I agree that we should avoid the identification of the evidence for a statement with its content (that is the content of the statement), but this does not prevent us from inserting into the statement an implicit constituent dealing with the evidence, in case it is understood that the provision of the evidence is part of what the speaker means (of course I am not saying that this should always occur).

In (2) Contextual clues lead us to consider ‘Allan has not been able to find any significant difference between direct and indirect reports’ an indirect report. We might reason like this: how do we know that Allan has not been able to find any significant difference? Presumably we know this because he said that in a paper or a book; thus the speaker is implicitly categorized as a reporter and, in particular, as an indirect reporter. We can reason in a similar way with ‘He also thinks that...’. How do we know that he thinks that...? Presumably because he said that in a book or a paper, thus the speaker is telling us that he said that and is implicitly qualifying himself as a reporter. Analogous considerations apply to an example by Holt (2016) (‘apparently she doesn’t like them’). Holt seems to contrast an expression like ‘apparently she doesn’t like them’ with an expression like ‘she said she doesn’t like them’. She comes close to implicit indirect reports, in this example, although she does not care to draw some obvious consequences.

If such considerations or elaborations thereof are accepted, a further step is to say that in a number of cases we need explicatures that specify a verb of saying and a subject (an actor). In this chapter, I shall capitalize on the important consequences of the considerations by Holt, by applying them to the substitution problem for simple sentences (Saul 2007) and to a puzzling case of presupposition evaporation in Soames (2002). The general considerations on implicit indirect reports I intend to apply to substitution in simple sentences (or rather substitution failure) were fruitfully applied by myself and Macangno (Forthcoming) to presuppositions. Cases like ‘Mary regrets going to Paris with John’ were analyzed as cases of implicit indirect reports by Macagno and myself, as though they amounted to assertions like ‘Mary says she regrets going to Paris with John’,¹⁹ an analysis which amounts to introducing (or rather, injecting) modal structure in the discourse to prove that, after all, the presupposition (which is normally taken to be entailed by the use of the factive ‘regret’) is not or cannot be projected as an entailment (in the positive sentence) but must be projected, after all, as a conversational implicature. While if Mary said that she regrets going to Paris with John, she is understood as presupposing that she went to Paris with John, the speaker need not be committed to this due to an entailment but due to a conversational implicature, given that he need not believe everything that Mary said. Although this may sound like a theoretical maneuver, you can clearly see that it does some work (as I tried to say in Capone 2000) in claims about verbs of knowledge, which in Italian but also in English, though not as clearly as in Italian, are subject to semantic erosion. This erosion may be systematically due to implicit indirect reports. Given that ‘X sa che p’ is on occasions interpreted as ‘X says he

¹⁹ Timothy Williamson (p.c.) says that this gets the truth-value wrong if (a) she was lying or (b) she did regret it but didn’t say so. I propose to listen to Williamson, and to confine ourselves to a more limited claim. So I will not argue that this pragmatic increment will take place in general, but I will argue that it can take place occasionally if the increment conforms to the speaker’s intentions (as understood by the Hearer).

knows that *p*’,²⁰ the knowledge claim turns out to be modalized. And this triggers semantic changes which need to be compensated, in Italian, by the use of the clitic ‘*lo*’ capable of strengthening the equivalent of the verb ‘know’ at least in certain presuppositional or anaphoric contexts (see Capone 2013a, b and Capone 2000). One may object that my considerations are strongly theory-laden and I must candidly admit that this is so. This is one of the places in which I am guided by theory, although we shall see that this theory has fruitful consequences, otherwise inexplicable.

14.4 Simple Sentences

Simple sentences can sometimes be contexts for substitution failure of co-extensive expressions. Consider the following:

- (3) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman went out.

Replacing Clark Kent with Superman in (3) clearly produces a false statement. In (4)

- (4) Superman leaps more buildings than Clark Kent.

replacing Clark Kent with Superman generates a false statement (one cannot leap more buildings than oneself).²¹

²⁰ Here we have an interesting objection from a philosophical point of view. Timothy Williamson (p.c.) says: “I don’t remember a single occasion when I heard that construction being used in a way plausibly so interpreted — the fact that the evidence for the knowledge attribution was X’s claim to know shows nothing to the purpose”. Here the perspective of linguistics may diverge from a philosophical perspective. I quite agree that one cannot – in general – argue in favor of the semantic or pragmatic equivalence between ‘X knows that P’ and ‘X says he knows that p’. Yet all I am saying is that there are contexts, in which ‘X knows that P’ is typically construed as ‘X says he knows that p’. But this is not a philosophical point, this is a linguistic point. Thus, I do not expect Timothy Williamson to agree on this, because, understandably, he is worried that I am postulating a semantic/pragmatic equivalence. But I am opposed to such an equivalence as strongly as Williamson, as that would be quite pernicious. What I say is that in certain contexts, or in certain typical contexts, one may have this type of interpretations.

²¹ Neal Norrick p.c. says:

You say of your example (3),

- (3) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman went out.

that replacing ‘Clark Kent’ with ‘Superman’ clearly produces a false statement.

But I see nothing wrong with:

Superman went into the phone booth and Superman went (back) out.

Superman went into the phone booth and Superman came (back) out.

Though they mean something different than (3):

The individual who is sometimes Clark Kent (mild mannered reporter, with glasses, in a business suit) and sometimes Superman (jumps tall buildings, wears sun glasses, in a red suit, with a cape) went into the phone booth as Clark Kent and came out as Superman.

Saul (2007) rejects fixing treatments by Forbes and Barber (which I briefly discussed in passing) and offers a psychological experiment showing that retrieving stories may well involve keeping two nodes or files for different (coextensive) names (actually, in the experiment, a name and a coextensive definite description). Although the considerations by Saul are of great theoretical interest, they need to be complemented by an approach like the one I am broaching here.

If we admit an embedding explicature in examples such as (3) and (4), we immediately show that these can be intensional contexts that block substitution.

- (5) [We are told (in the Superman story) that] Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman went out
- (6) [We are told (in the Superman story) that] Superman leaps more buildings than Clark Kent.

Manuel García-Carpintero (in a personal communication) voiced a very reasonable objection to this, expressed in the following:

After all, the story need not say anything about the character going in or out a phone booth. How can we accommodate this fact into this explanation?

I suppose the author has in mind a scenario in which a speaker says:

- (7) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman went out

without relying on the frame of the story (we all know). But this is the situation of the unenlightened (Saul 2007), which is easy to explain because, according to the unenlightened, ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ need not be co-extensive and thus he would naturally take (3) and (4) to have different truth-conditions.

This reply does not suffice for Saul, who in a p.c. writes that I should spell out in a more detailed way that the story may not e.g. contain the claim that Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent.²² I suppose that both García-Carpintero and

I agree with Norrick that these intuitions are correct. However, they do not interfere with what we have to say about the substitution failure problem. This case seems not to accord with the script of the story. Since the script is not followed, this is a context in which it is indifferent whether we use ‘Superman’ or ‘Clark Kent’.

²² Timothy Williamson (p.c.) writes:

In any case, the fact that the examples are drawn from fiction is irrelevant to the way they are normally meant to be understood. If you want a genuine real life case, there was a man who changed his name from ‘Dalton’ to ‘d’Alton’ (he thought the latter sounded more upper-class). It is tempting to say ‘Dalton was born and d’Alton died’ and not ‘d’Alton was born and Dalton died’. The key issues are the same.

Presumably this goes against my idea that the opacity in Saul’s example derives from the insertion of a constituent saying that we heard a fictional story. But we can deal with Timothy Williamson’s intriguing case in two ways. (a) we could say that although we are not confronted with a fictional, but with a real story, we still understand the substitution failure to descend from our understanding the utterances as framed in the context of a (real) story; (b) we could say that this is only a case of

Saul have in mind some reaction by someone who had read the story or who has watched the film, who says: “Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent”. The narrator of the story never said that and this appears to be an inference by the reader/recipient of the story (or film). In such a context, the explicature (*We are told that*) *Superman leaps more buildings than Clark Kent* cannot be constructed/calculated. Nevertheless, the NPs are not inter-substitutable.

There may be two types of answers to this very compelling objection.

A

It is true that in the story we never encountered the statement ‘Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent’. However, for some reason, the speaker is persuaded that this is what he heard or gathered from the story. Thus, although the statement built up through an explicature ‘(We have been told that) Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent’ is false, this is what the speaker means and although the statement may appear to someone²³ false, it is not false because of the substitution problem (Superman leaps more buildings than himself). It is false even if the speaker believes it to be true.

B

The alternative answer proceeds as follows.

One does not only say the things literally said, but also the obvious consequences of what was said.²⁴ (According to Norrick 2016, the speaker can inject things she has not heard into a report – whether direct or indirect). This goes back to Higginbotham (p.c.), Capone (2001) (Modal adverbs and discourse) and to Saul (2007). So it is true that the speaker (the story teller) never said ‘Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent’, but if we include the obvious consequences of what she said, in a sense, although not in a literal one, she said: Superman leaps more buildings than Clark Kent. A problem that may be raised, at this point, is that since this level of what is said mixes both literal meaning and inferences, it cannot guarantee opacity, as opacity (normally) stems from literal sayings.²⁵ There is something true about

implicit quotation and the utterance has to be understood as ‘The man called ‘Dalton’ was born and the man called ‘D’Alton’ died. This case aligns with the cases provided by Saka and discussed here in this chapter.

²³ But not to him or people like him who are under the impression of having been told a story that includes this statement (which however was never pronounced).

²⁴ It is of some interest that Norrick (2016, 97) believes that reported speech need not reproduce utterances that are actually spoken. He remarks that reporters can report talk they cannot have observed. (This remark is particularly suitable as a reply to García-Carpintero objection). Although Norrick’s remarks are confined to direct reports, it is not difficult to extend such considerations to indirect reports as well (we saw in a previous chapter that the distinction between direct and indirect reports is gradually being eroded).

²⁵ See Wettstein 2016 on the notion that indirect discourse is the child of direct discourse and belief reports the grandchild (Wettstein 2016, 418).

this objection; however, we have already departed from the view that opacity is necessarily linked to literal meanings (literal sayings), as is known from the pragmatic literature on belief reports (including work by Saul and by myself). Since opacity in belief reports is not induced by literal sayings but by pragmatic intrusion, there is no need to think that this objection is cogent (or is more cogent than similar objections to pragmatic treatments of belief reports).

The other possibility is to go along with Saka (see his conference abstract, 2016 and his paper entitled ‘Universal opacity’ (Saka 2016)) that a modal component is part of any assertion. This is known since work by Capone (2001). Saka (2016) allows intrusion of a component such as ‘the speaker is saying’ or ‘the speaker said’ or, alternatively, and more simply, ‘I believe that’. In his paper entitled ‘Universal opacity’, Saka (2016), rather courageously, goes as far as to say the following:

In this way, opacity is everywhere.

This should not be surprising. After all, whenever speaker S makes an assertion, S expresses a belief (...). This means that S implicitly reports S’s own belief; yet the report is not explicit because S does not actually *say* that S holds a given belief. That belief reports are implicit in acts of assertion is made clear by Moore’s paradox. B]. When S says ‘[a] it is raining, and [b] I don’t believe that it is raining’, S reports a belief by an utterance of [a] that is contradicted by [b]. Consequently, if belief reports are opaque then assertions generally are too (and if other attitude reports are opaque then other speech acts are opaque).

The proposal by Saka is less contextual than mine, but we have to see all of its consequences. One of them, I am afraid, is that in all contexts it is not possible to replace an NP with a coextensive one *salva veritate* (that is, keeping the truth-conditions the same). In particular, while Leibniz’s law applies in general, for the simple cases in which this law applies, Saka would have to provide contextual information that blocks substitutivity as demonstrated by Saul-like examples. And in default contexts, where there is no information to the contrary, it is not easy to delete this presumption that (coextensive) NPs cannot be intersubstituted.

Interestingly, Saka considers examples that allegedly prove universal opacity and that are certainly of considerable worth, although I should say they come from someone who has done a lot of work on quotation (whether explicit or implicit) and, thus, are biased towards implicit quotation. The most suggestive examples of his list are the following:

‘Marilyn Monroe is glamorous’ does not entail ‘Norma Jean Baker is glamorous’, even though Monroe and Baker have the same extension;

‘Norma Jean Baker gave me her autograph’ does not entail ‘Marilyn Monroe gave me her autograph’;

‘Vampire refers to vampires’ does not entail ‘zombie refers to vampires’, even though ‘vampire’ and ‘zombie’ have the same null extension.

It is not surprising that these sentences do not entail the sentences obtained by replacing an NP with a co-referential one, because there is a tacit reference to a name, and thus all of these (with the exception of the last) are cases of implicit quotations. The first sentence could be paraphrased, without losing much of its meaning, with 'The name "Marilyn Monroe" is glamorous' or with 'Both Marilyn Monroe and her name are glamorous', should one be unhappy with the former gloss. (Compare with "Cat" has three letters', an example well known to Saka and theorists interested in quotation). The second example is tricky. If Monroe gave me an autograph, then Baker gave me an autograph, although not the same autograph. If Monroe gave me her autograph, then Baker gave me her autograph, although the signature on it was not the one saying 'Baker'. (More plausibly, it is just a conversational implicature, Timothy Williamson p.c. says, that is responsible for the idea that Monroe gave me her autograph as Monroe). If Monroe gave me her autograph, then Baker gave me her autograph as Monroe. Saka does not consider that the entailment he prohibits is one that hosts a certain amount of pragmatic intrusion and completion. So while I agree that, if Monroe gave me her autograph as Monroe, it is not the case that she gave me her autograph as Baker, the incomplete (or semantically underdetermined) 'Monroe gave me her autograph' in a sense can be seen as entailing 'Baker gave me her autograph'. It is only once we recognize pragmatic intrusion (as affecting the constituent 'her autograph') that the entailment does not seem to work; but a sufficiently minimal semantics in the sense of Cappelen and Lepore (2005) should not really find these examples particularly problematic; in any case it would find suitable ways of dealing with them. The example about vampires and zombies seems to trade on the fact that 'vampire' and 'zombie' have a null extension and, thus, they have the same extension. But the fact that 'Vampire refers to vampires' does not entail 'zombie refers to vampires' is independently required by linguistic conventions and is not an exception (to Leibniz's law) which does not require that we should be able to replace zombie with vampire only because they have the same null extension. Presumably Leibniz's law is valid only for words that are coextensive and have a non-null extension. In the case discussed by Saka, no one can believe or is allowed to believe that if 'vampire' refers to vampires then 'vampire' refers to zombies (in the sense that the latter belief follows from the first).²⁶ What blocks substitution in this case is the fact that there is a linguistic convention saying that the sentence 'Vampire refers to vampires' does not entail 'Vampire refers to zombies' in the sense that the speaker who accepts the latter accepts it in virtue of the former²⁷

²⁶ To provide an easier case: if one believes P one must accept P or Q, but one cannot say that the specific belief 'P or Q' follows from P, given that the believer is equally justified in believing 'P or N', 'P or R', 'P or Z', etc. And there is no reason why on accepting P he was lead to believe 'P or Q' in particular.

²⁷ Timothy Williamson writes (p.c.):

There is no such convention. How would it have arisen? The case has never occurred to ordinary speakers.

The last case discussed by Saka I would like to consider, which is less disturbing than the others, is the following:

‘There’s the Evening Star’ said in p.m. does not entail ‘There is the morning star’ said in p.m.

Here Saka mixes conditions on the use of definite descriptions which are quasi-names (appropriateness conditions due to presuppositions) with entailments (The evening Star presupposes that this expression is appropriate in a context in which it is evening; but this is not a semantic entailment). Of course, nobody says that that these two ways of saying things are equivalent, but this is due to conditions on language use (that is to say, presuppositions), rather than to entailments. Of course, someone who says ‘There’s the Evening Star’ would never say, at the same time, ‘There is the Morning Star’, but this does not mean that in terms of Russellian semantics the two sentences are not equivalent. (However, Timothy Williamson in p.c. says “Surely the two sentences are indeed not logically equivalent on Russell’s analysis). This mixing of conditions on language use and entailments is something we would not expect.²⁸

14.5 Soames’ Problem

Now we move on to Soames’ really baffling problem. Another problem embedding explicatures (in implicit indirect reports) can fix is the one that baffles Scott Soames (2002) on p. 231 (actually pp. 231–33) of his ‘Beyond Rigidity’.

Mary has learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel (the famous philosopher). But this presupposes she did not know that Peter Hempel was Carl Hempel. Therefore, she did not know that Peter Hempel was Peter Hempel (since Carl

I quite agree with Williamson that an ordinary speaker need not be aware of a negative convention saying that ‘Vampire refers to vampires’ does not entail ‘Zombie refers to zombies’ in the sense that the speaker who accepts the latter does not accept it in virtue of the former. However, in the same way in which there can be no convention concerning negative entailment, there can be no convention concerning positive entailment. Surely these cases never occur to ordinary speakers and thus they have never come to forming conventions concerning these cases. But if there are no such conventions, matters such entailment cannot be settled. Lacking semantic entailment, which is unlike logical implication, which is what Saka has uppermost in mind, there is no reason to say that a speaker who says ‘Vampire refers to vampires’ should derive in particular the thought ‘Zombie refers to zombies’. (Given that many other words have null extension, there is not a reason for replacing a word having null extension with any other particular word that has a null extension, rather than an another chosen at random. There could be so many replacements, why should one choose one and not another?). So it appears to me that Saka’s interesting example is best dealt with by invoking the difference between semantic entailment and logical implication. (Substitution is licensed by entailment but not by logical implication).

²⁸ However, a point on which Saka and myself agree is that Superman examples cannot be understood in isolation and need contextualization. This is compatible with everything else I am going to assert in this paper.

Hempel is coextensive with Carl Hempel²⁹). However, she certainly knew (and knows) a priori that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel. Alas, this looks like a contradiction.

This is a problem given that presuppositions are (standardly) considered (pragmatic) non-cancellable inferences. However, in Macagno and Capone (2016) (see also Macagno's abstract for the Palermo Conference, May 2016), we showed that in many cases presuppositions are cancellable inferences connected with constructions of explicatures. Consider what happens when we construct the plausible explicature:

- (8) (Mary says) she has learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel.

This presupposes that, beforehand, Mary did not believe (or know) that Peter Hempel was Carl Hempel. However, this is only a cancellable conversational implicature.³⁰ Thus, although we are to accept that Mary did not know that Peter Hempel was Carl Hempel, this is only a cancellable inference and we need not be committed to the semantic logical form [Mary did not know that Peter Hempel was Peter Hempel], as a pragmatic inference involves deleting whatever elements are in conflict with our world knowledge.

An objection (reasonably) raised by Manuel García-Carpintero is that, after all, we may be in a context in which, although Mary learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel, she never says that she has just learned that. Thus reporting her change of state – the transition from a state in which she does not know that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel, the philosopher, to a state in which she does know (therefore has learnt) that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel – without her ever vocalizing that change of state – might be possible. In at least such a context, one must be prepared to say:

- (9) Mary learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel

without being able to report:

- (10) Mary said she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel.

However, in such a context it must be true that although she did not say she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel, she is disposed to say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel (should someone ask her an appropriate question). Thus, although this context is one in which Mary did not use a verb of saying, holding a psychological process such as 'learning' (applied to this specific that-clause) goes hand to hand with having a disposition to say that she learned that Peter Hempel is

²⁹ Williamson p.c. writes an intriguing comment: is a person really coextensive with himself?

³⁰ Timothy Williamson writes (p.c.): No, it isn't. To learn something is to come to know it. Therefore learning it requires not having known it. Ok I agree with this, I have no quarrel with this. But here we are dealing with the projection problem of presuppositions in complex sentences, and it is notorious that 'say' is a plug to presuppositions (see Levinson 1983) and thus, if they are projected upwards, this must be done through conversational implicatures.

Carl Hempel.³¹ Now suppose we accept that it is not true Mary said that she learned Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel; this can be the case either because she did not say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel or because she did not say she learned that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel. But, of course, she knows that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel and thus she could have never learned that.³² Thus, she did not say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel (even if she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel). But even if she did not say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel, this is something she might have said, even if she knew from the beginning that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel and thus she could not be ignorant that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel. Since Mary might be inclined to say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel, on the presupposition that she knew from the beginning that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel, she would not have said that she learned that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel, as she would have had no motivation to say that, given that if she had said that, she would said something patently uninformative. If Mary had no disposition to say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel, then it cannot be true that she learned that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel. End of the contradiction.

The most cogent problem in this analysis (as pointed out by Wayne Davis p.c.) is that one may learn something without having a disposition to say one has learned it (e.g. Davis p.c. says “Animals can learn without having a disposition to say anything” (about what they learned)). I do not personally find these objections problematic (one may say that human beings are different from animals, that human beings are trained in educational systems in which one way of testing whether one has learned something is to solicit replies concerning the content learned and people who are obstinate enough not to say what they have learned count as not having learned something. There are contexts (e.g. the school) where a teacher who says ‘Mary has learned that $3 \times 3 = 9$ ’ means ‘Mary systematically replies to my question about the product 3×3 by saying that it equals 9’. I do not say that these contexts are ubiquitous, but if there are contexts such as these, then at least in such contexts Soames’ problem does not arise. In addition to such a small victory, as a linguist (but I understand that the point of view of the philosopher may be different), I argue here (and I understand it takes some courage to do so) that expressions like ‘X

³¹ Timothy Williamson comments (p.c.) “No. In learning something, someone may forget not having known it, or simply have a strong disposition not to talk about such matters”. I agree with Williamson that this is a logical possibility, but how realistic is it? This is like saying that one who believes ‘p’ has no inclination to say ‘I believe p’ (because he may not be inclined to talk about what he believes). I agree that in some circumstances, he may have no reason to say p or have specific reasons to say ‘I do not believe that p’. But one should at least admit that if the speaker is motivated to say what he has learned, he has an inclination to say ‘I have learned that p’. (Verbs like ‘believe’ are treated like dispositional verbs by Davis 2005, as well as by many other authors).

³² Williamson (p.c.) writes: “Didn’t she learn it when she first heard about him?”. But if we know something a priori, what we learned when we first heard about Peter Hempel is not something we learned a posteriori, but something we could know in principle by reflecting on it. (All we had to learn was his name).

knows that *p*' or 'X remembers that *p*' or 'X learned that *p*' are by default implicit indirect reports. There is nothing bizarre in the idea that there should be implicit evidentials in our western languages which match the explicit evidentials Levinson (1988) discusses in his work on footing and which, very often, are described by contemporary linguists in work on modality. In fact, it would be quite strange if English or Italian did not have such evidentials. I argue these evidentials are compressed and appear at the level of the explicature. I doubt that these considerations should interest philosophers, but they should be of concern to linguists. If such considerations are accepted, then Soames' problem is dissolved.

There is one further way to argue that Soames' problem is easily dissolved. We do not even have to accept that all or most contexts are contexts in which implicit evidentials are added in the explicature of the utterance (e.g. X said that...). Suppose that we can prove that there are, at least, some contexts in which such implicit evidentials are added. Suppose further there are other contexts in which one need not have any evidence that such additions are intended. The contexts that allow embedding explicatures are contexts where Soames' problem does not arise. The contexts that do not apparently provide evidence in favor of embedding explicatures are contexts in which a thorny logical problem arises. Then it is obvious that speakers, who know that there are at least some contexts where embedding explicatures are required, will try to adopt a Principle of Charity stance and will try to interpret the utterance in a way that is not illogical. It is a consequence of this that rational speakers will then extend such contexts and allow for the possibility that the contexts where they are such that the logical problems disappear. Thus, they will presuppose contexts similar to the ones where the embedding explicatures are required.

14.6 Objections

Now it is natural to discuss some thorny objections that come to mind, in order to exorcise them or, at least, in order to diminish their cogency. So far I have discussed the enrichment cases called 'embedding explicatures' or 'implicit indirect reports' as possible cases of free enrichments.³³ These cases certainly seem to share important features with other cases of free enrichment, mainly the fact that the truth-conditional import of the utterance cannot be calculated without the pragmatic part

³³Borg (2012, 22–23) says: "I'll use the term 'free pragmatic enrichment' as the label for pragmatic effects on semantic content which are driven solely by pragmatic, contextual demands concerning appropriate interpretation, that is to say, for pragmatic effects on semantic content which are not required by any lexico-syntactic element in the sentence". Huang (2014) on free enrichment says: "We have already seen in Chaps. 2 and 7 that in this case, although there does not seem to be an overt indexical or covert slot in the linguistically decoded logical form of the sentence uttered, the logical form nevertheless needs to be conceptually enriched. The process of free enrichment is "free" because it is entirely pragmatically rather than linguistically based. Free enrichment is a typical optional and contextually driven 'top-down' process (Recanati 2004, 24–6)" (p. 313).

of the explicature and that we also need to posit extra structure within the sentence in order to ensure certain plausible and desirable truth-conditional effects. These cases of explicatures are, admittedly, more complex than the ones usually considered in the literature, as they amount to adding a sentential (or quasi-sentential) constituent and also creating embedding (with its correlated opacity effects). Indeed, to be completely fair, these embedding explicatures share the same characteristics with cases of implicit arguments, which, as I suggested in Capone (2013a, b), are part of pragmatic intrusion and explain away alleged cases of free enrichment, providing an explanation which, as Jaszczolt (2016) would say, would lean towards minimalism (or indexicalism – hidden or aphonic indexicality, as Neale (2007) calls it – which is a way of rescuing minimalism). However, in Capone (2013a, b), I tried to explain away complicated cases of pragmatic intrusion by resorting to minimal implicit arguments, generally pronominals or null pronominals, availing myself of general syntactic considerations already available in the Chomskyan literature about implicit arguments (Roeper 1987). But these syntactic elements were minimal and not of the sentential type. Instead, here in this chapter we are faced with the necessity of resorting to null elements which are not minimal, like pronominals, but consist of sentential fragments and complementizers that embed other sentences. In short, although I tentatively started the chapter with the hypothesis that we may be confronted with (admittedly unusual) cases of explicatures, now that I carefully examine all the options that are available, I should candidly say that we need to evaluate both the option that the kind of implicit embeddings I called ‘implicit indirect reports’ may be free enrichment processes providing explicatures with constituents or that they may (much more simply) be implicit arguments, in other words covert indexicals to adopt parlance by Stanley. Let me start with the option that these embeddings, after all, are nothing but implicit arguments (or are like implicit arguments). Following Pietroski (2005a, b)), these look like external arguments in the sense that they are not internal as they are not mandated by the valence structure of verbs and, therefore, cannot correspond to internal arguments. Positing such implicit structure is like an admission that all sentences have combinatorial possibilities and that the structure I posit is not *ad hoc*, but general enough to cover all cases. So such implicit arguments are not optionally there in order to rescue the problem of lack of substitution in simple sentences, but they must be there in any case. Such a solution would not be *ad hoc* if we considered it an elegant way of accommodating the considerations by Saka (2016) on assertion – given that assertions, according to Saka, are tacitly (or implicitly) modalized, thanks to sentences like ‘I believe that’ or ‘I know that’ which are prefaced to all assertions (but admittedly, pace Saka, other modals could fill the implicit slot, such as ‘I was told that’, as otherwise this theory of assertion would be too idealized and would not allow examples of ordinary discourse in which one implicitly modalises an assertion by getting it across that one has only heard or guessed the asserted fact). It is of some interest that Saka’s treatment, which assumes some kind of implicit argument, although I do not think he spelled out the semantic and syntactic details of this

proposal,³⁴ kills two birds with the same stone: it provides a belief (or knowledge) operator, when required, otherwise it provides a weaker modal operator, something along the lines of ‘I was told that’ (evidentiality comes into the picture as Levinson (1988) has magisterially explained in his article on footing and the world languages; furthermore, Saka has no serious problem in accepting that sometimes knowledge by hearsay is understood to motivate the assertion (‘told’ can also have a widespread non-factive use, but it can also have a factive use, as made explicit by the clitic ‘lo’ in Italian (Giovanni lo ha sentito che p)). So, the very fact that my treatment agrees or seems to agree with the specifics of Saka’s treatment is not ‘ad hoc’. However, it should be granted that the kind of implicit arguments I adopted in my proposal are applied only optionally, otherwise opacity would be systematically generated and this is not really desirable. In order to make Saka’s considerations more malleable we would have to consider them not as applicable in the way I construe my implicit indirect reports, the latter being definitely optionally inserted. Given that Saka’s modal components seem to be more stable and less optional than my embedding explicatures, I suppose that the right results are obtained by conjunction insertion (that is the insertion of a conjunctive structure) as in the following structure: Mary went to the cinema (and I believe this/I know this). This is one way to prevent the implicit modal from having scope over the full simple sentence thus creating opacity and preventing NPs in general from being substitutable following Leibniz’s law.³⁵ My explanation seems to me to accommodate facts noted by Saka but also seems to be required by further considerations. In fact, it is independently motivated by cases of conversational elliptical structure (or sentential fragments, as called by Jaszczolt 2016, 64) as in:

(11)

A: What did John say?

B: “Mary is in Paris”

we certainly need to contextualize the answer by B and, in order to make sense of it; we need to insert some structure at the level of the explicature, namely: (John said that) Mary is in Paris. The only difference between the embedding explicatures I am writing about in the case of simple sentences and the explicature in the above

³⁴ Williamson (p.c.) claims that this view is not equivalent to his view on assertion (at some point I thought there was a similarity):

No, this is NOT and never was my view. That the speaker knows is not even implicitly part of the content of the assertion. Claiming otherwise gets the truth-value of many assertions wrong, e.g. when the speaker is Gettiered or aims to be lying but in fact speaks the truth.

³⁵ Timothy Williamson (p.c.) produces the very good objection that “the second conjunct is still as opaque as before and thus infects the conjunction with opacity. In fact, since the second conjunct entails the first conjunct, the conjunction is equivalent to the second conjunct after all, which is back to the previous proposal”. If there is a way out of this problem, this must be to avoid the use of conjunction altogether. One can use the full stop, to signal that we have two distinct assertions proffered at different times: P. I know that P. Another solution is to say that the knowledge component is provided through presupposition. I think the latter is the safest.

example is that the latter case looks like a case of direct quotation; but it need not be so analyzed (or at least not necessarily) given that English syntax allows the deletion of the complementizer (not to mention the fact that at least some original philosophers like Donald Davidson tried to explain indirect discourse through direct quotation taking the complementizer *that* to have more or less the function of a demonstrative that refers to the following sentence). If we had doubts about the reasonableness of these considerations, we can tamper with the example a bit and replace it with the following:

(12)

A: What did John say?

B: That Mary is in Paris.

Clearly, we cannot have a sentence with a complementizer without a verb and such a verb without a subject; thus we need to reconstruct the sentential fragment ‘John said’ as part of the logical form, which is integrated into the explicature. So, we have gleaned independent evidence in favor of treating implicit embeddings as implicit arguments, syntactic slots that are required in order to make sense of the sentence and also of the statement.³⁶ Needless to say, these implicit arguments (in the case of embedded explicatures) would have to work like sentential variables which would need to be saturated in context (see Recanati 2004, 2010; 2001; Huang 2014 on saturation processes) by resorting to bits of information that are relevant and come from common ground (see Stalnaker 2014 and Walkczac 2016 on common ground).³⁷

Let me now consider the alternative option. Suppose that the implicit embeddings (as part of explicatures) are mandated by free enrichment processes. Such processes would require inserting structure even if we assume that no structure is mandated at the level of logical form (in other words, we dispense with the indexicalist hypothesis). These would be cases of expansions, as Huang (2014) and also Bach (1994) would call them. Expansions, following Huang’s (2014) important considerations, need not entail the logical form which gives input to them. This consideration, which seems to me to be of considerable importance, explains why apparently simple sentences are not interpreted ‘de re’ while simple sentences which are genuinely simple sentences are normally interpreted ‘de re’ and thus do not give rise to the opacity effects dealt with by Saul in her important book. Inferential

³⁶ Williamson (p.c.) says: “But there is no good motivation to manifest blatantly elliptical cases as in (11) and (12) to ordinary cases”. I agree we should reflect on this. If anything, Williamson’s consideration steers us in the direction of the free enrichment view.

³⁷ “Saturation is a pragmatic process whereby a given slot, position or variable in the linguistically decoded logical form is contextually filled. In other words, in this type of pragmatic enrichment, a slot, position or variable must be contextually saturated for the utterance to express a complete proposition” (Huang 2014, 312). As the reader can work out for herself, my proposal is not in line with standard proposals about saturation, as we need a two step level: the provision of a (sentential) variable; assigning value (or saturating) this sentential variable. This two step process, obviously, occurs instantaneously, and thus cannot be part of conscious or reflective inference.

behavior with respect to opacity and Leibniz's law makes it clear that the input logical form and the expansion obtained pragmatically are different in that they have different entailments and one does not entail the other (the expansion does not entail the input provided by a genuinely simple sentence). *A priori*, we know that the free enrichment hypothesis is preferable because it does not place a burden on structure – a human being who constructs the explicature need not know (in the Chomskyan sense of *know*) that the sentence has that structure, but the structure can be created 'ad hoc', if necessary, by using syntactic fragments that are used anyway in sentences such as 'John said that' or 'I was told that'. The only doubts we may have about free enrichment concern constraints on explicatures. In a paper by Hall (2014) which seems to me to be of some importance, constraints on explicatures are required to answer the charges (by indexicalists like, e.g. Stanley (2007) or Ostertag (2008) that free enrichment processes could overgenerate examples since they are not, after all, (sufficiently) constrained. As Ostertag (2008, cited by Hall 2014, 7)) writes:

While the Contextualist remains faithful to speakers' intuitions, there is a question whether she can give a principled account of how we arrive at the relevant proposition. If the mechanism underlying pragmatic enrichment are truly "free" – unconstrained by logical form – then there is a real worry that our speaker's capacity to interpret those utterances freely enriched by context will elude systematic treatment. (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 May).

In contrast with free enrichment processes, which are held to be unconstrained (and in any case it is not easy to establish well consolidated constraints that can stop over-generation), indexicalism is seen to be less susceptible to this kind of over-generation problems, since it is clear that a pragmatic enrichment is triggered only when there is something in the linguistic structure that mandates it; if there is nothing in the linguistic structure to mandate it, then there will be no question whether the pragmatic enrichment arises or not (Hall 2014).

The main answer by Hall to such charges is that a) the examples cannot be overgenerated (at random) because pragmatic processes generating them should have access to context and to valid arguments (though explicatures may not be a matter of deduction)³⁸; b) free enrichment processes should always be local and thus enrichment processes that are not local should be excluded; c) the over-generation of explicatures should be paralleled by the over-generation of conversational implicatures, but this does not occur because conversational implicatures/explicatures are

³⁸On p. 7, Hall (2014) says "With free enrichment processes in general, it is straightforward to explain why they do or do not occur. Hearers infer an implicature – also a 'free' pragmatic effect – if it is required for the interpretation to meet the expected level of informativeness, relevance, etc., if the contextual premises for doing so are sufficiently accessible, and if the speaker can reasonably be taken to have intended the hearer to make the inference". Of course this is reminiscent of my considerations in Capone (2006, 2009).

calculated on the basis of arguments or procedures that are rational and not irrational; d) inferential augmentations in explicatures should be minimal and cannot reflect the processes involved in implicatures that are of the deductive type and, thus, are far from being minimal (they are also augmentations which are not propositional but sub-propositional (see Hall 2014, 18)).³⁹

Hall writes as follows:

Implicatures are properly inferentially warranted – logically warranted – because they follow deductively from premises. Between logical form and explicature, however, there is no relation of logically valid inference, and free enrichments, merely involving operations over sub-propositional constituents, do not follow logically from anything, but are recovered on the basis of their high accessibility in the context of utterance (Hall 2014, 18).

Although I do not dwell on a detailed defense of Hall's ideas, it seems to me that the essence of them is that explicatures and free enrichment processes, like conversational implicatures, should be constrained by rationality considerations and these immediately rule out the bizarre examples created *ad hoc* by Stanley.⁴⁰ In passing, I should note that Hall takes into serious consideration and explains away the idea by Elbourne (2008) that, in general, we cannot over-generate explicatures by conjoining an argument with another argument, in other words we cannot create (parallel) arguments through free enrichment processes.

Elbourne's argument seems to be that in the following case

(13) Everyone likes Sally (and his mother)

we are inserting an argument into the structure of the verb 'like' in addition to the one we already have; this is not licit and we must have something to block this (hypothetical) inference (Everyone likes Sally: Everyone likes Sally and his mother (in other words, this inference has a structure which must be blocked). In details, Elbourne's (2008, 99) constraint is as follows:

³⁹ This is enough to exclude NP or VP conjuncts which would need to be derived from fully propositional premises, often through deductive inferences (see various discussions in Hall's paper on how such arguments can be constructed e.g. p. 11). As Hall writes, "Once the interpretation settles into a valid argument, the pragmatic processes that contribute to explicature are those whose effect has been local, modifying a sub-propositional constituent of logical form, while the processes that result in implicatures are those whose effect is global, in that they are represented as following logically from fully propositional premises" (p. 19).

⁴⁰ A crucial objection by Hall to the over-generation charges by the indexicalists is that "these indexicals do not exclude other pragmatic effects, which means that the indexicalist is just as susceptible as the contextualist to the examples that the former levels against the idea of pragmatic enrichment, such as (7) above" (p. 8).

It is not possible in pragmatic enrichment to add extra arguments to those contributed by items in the syntax.

But this constraint can hardly be a syntactic or a semantic one, since nothing prevents me from adding an argument to another through conjunction, as that is always allowed by syntactic structure and semantic composition rules. It is also to be doubted that this constraint follows from specific pragmatic rules such as the one advocated by Hall, which amounts to this:

free enrichment processes must be local.

Why should they be local? In what sense local? If by ‘local’ Hall means modification⁴¹ (presumably of a constituent by the insertion of a modifier), and this appears to be the case given that she is replying to Stanley who considers **set intersection** (modification) a licit enrichment,⁴² then there are cases which are not local, such as ‘The ham sandwich has to pay the bill’ (cases of deferred reference as genuine cases of pragmatic intrusion have been discussed by Hall (2014) and Stanley (2005) see also Nunberg (1995), Recanati (2004), who called them cases of ‘semantic transfer’ and Levinson (2000)).⁴³ Here free enrichment does not amount to modification, but to insertion of structure ‘(The person who ordered) the Ham sandwich has to pay the bill’.⁴⁴ The kind of free enrichment we have in belief reports, according to most pragmaticians, such as e.g. Salmon (1986, 2007), Richard (2013) or Soames (2015) amounts to adding another argument (under the mode of presentation *x*) and even authors like Bach who resort to clausal apposition require extra constituents like ‘qua NP’ (Bach 2000). Furthermore, Capone (2008) has treated belief reports as involving implicit appositive sentences, which clearly do not work as modifiers of NPs, but the modes of presentations of each NP embedded in the verb of belief had to be associated (through some sort of binding) with a constituent to be extrapolated from the sentential appositive (as in: John believes that Mary is happy [MoP/s Mary is happy]), thus, although in a dubious sense one could say that the sentential appositive is a local enrichment process because it simply modifies a

⁴¹ And indeed there is evidence that this is what she means as she quotes Recanati (2004) saying that what is meant by a local pragmatic process is that “one modifies non-propositional subparts of the linguistic logical form and, as Recanati puts it, it is the modified meaning of these subparts that goes into the composition process” (p. 14).

⁴² However, it should be noted that, according to Hall, set intersection is not the only instantiation of modification, as one can always modify an NP through disjunction (Frenchmen (or Belgians)).

⁴³ Hall stresses the fact that although Stanley tries to account for pragmatic intrusion through covert indexicals, whenever this is possible, he makes the concession that at least in the case of deferred reference we are confronted with a genuine case of pragmatic intrusion that is not mandated by linguistic structure.

⁴⁴ I remind readers that ‘free enrichment’ is usually taken by the literature to mean free of linguistic control’. Free enrichments could be seen to be pragmatic processes complementary to those mandated by covert linguistic structure in that the effects of context are linguistically optional (Hall 2014).

sentence through apposition, the cross-reference by constituents of the sentence embedded in the belief verb to constituents (modes of presentation) of the sentential apposition could not and could never occur in a way that Hall could describe as local (anaphora may well be involved and this is not a local relation). Thus the locality constraint seems to me to be an *ad hoc* measure, one which does not flow from general principles of rationality and one which is contradicted in practice by data. Surely I would agree that, everything being equal, one would have to prefer a local to a non-local free enrichment process, but since not all things are equal, such a constraint, in practice, would lose its efficacy. But why should the locality constraint be required, if Hall's other constraints work pretty well in ensuring that Stanley's counterexamples are not over-generated? I propend for parsimony in the case of explanations and I think that if a constraint can be proven to be efficient we do not need a battery of alternative or similar constraints. (Hall's main method of blocking over-generation of explicatures is to say that the explicature should be motivated in a rational way). But now, let me pause a bit to explain what would change for my little theory if we accepted the locality constraint by Hall. In such a case, we would not be able to say that the embedding explicature is a local free enrichment as it does not amount to (simple NP) modification (sentential fragments like those discussed by Stainton would be reserved to a similar destiny). The fact that it does not amount to modification but to positing a sentential fragment might persuade us to take sides with the indexicalist hypothesis, but not necessarily, because I have already said that the localist hypothesis conflicts with a range of data we could explain as free enrichments. Most importantly, mixed indirect reports could not be accounted for by free enrichment if the localist hypothesis was adopted,⁴⁵ and given that it would be difficult to posit implicit arguments at any position in the structure and given that mixed segments of indirect reports could occur everywhere and even concern determiners or prepositions, then by Hall's view mixed indirect reports could neither be cases of implicit arguments (being explainable by the indexicalist hypothesis) nor cases of free enrichment. I propose to drop the requirement of locality, downgrading it to a desideratum, making it necessary that if a process can be local rather than global, it will be local. But this is only a desideratum of the theory and not a stringent constraint that would tell us to abandon the free enrichment hypothesis, in the case of embedding explicatures.

⁴⁵In 'Mary said that "Elisabeth" went to London', the explicature we obtain is: Mary said that Elisabeth (whom she called 'Elisabeth') went to London. Here the pragmatic component of the explicature is not a local process of modification but amounts to insertion of structure. (One has to replace "Elisabeth" with: Elisabeth, whom she called 'Elisabeth. This hardly looks like modification or a local process, as to have modification one would have to have: "Elisabeth" whom she called "Elisabeth", but this would be an absurd kind of modification).

14.7 Free Enrichment

Now one may accuse me of not having settled on any one option in particular in trying to answer the question whether my embedding explicatures are implicit arguments or otherwise free enrichments and indeed I find it difficult to settle on a certain option because it is not yet clear what the advantages or disadvantages are. It is possible that faced with a new set of data and of phenomena, we may have to take a decision.⁴⁶

However, there is something which urges me to make up my mind and opt for the free enrichment option. Obviously, the flexibility of free enrichment is something that is desirable, because we do not know or predict what kind of work will be placed on implicit embeddings in the future. Furthermore, there is a range of data, namely the ones discussed by Saka (forthcoming), which persuaded me that there are advantages in choosing optional pragmatic processes like free enrichment. It is true that something is needed along the lines of ‘I believe’ or ‘I know’ to modalize an assertion, and this must be an implicit element of the assertion, possibly an implicit element corresponding to ‘I believe that p’ or ‘I know that p’. However, it immediately strikes us that such a treatment would predict opacity effects for any assertion and any assertion would *ipso facto* amount to a propositional attitude report and thus would make opacity obligatory. But we know that the kind of data focused on by Saul (and Saka) is not the normal data we have and that NPs positions in assertions (unless embedded in subordinate that-clauses) are, in general, referentially transparent and allow existential quantification – thus they are subject to Leibniz’s law. And it is desirable that it should be so, otherwise Leibniz’s law would never be applicable. Even if we can alternate between ‘I know that p’, ‘I was told that p’ etc. these alternations all involve some opacity effects and thus would render the application of Leibniz’s law void. So, there are clearly advantages in having the embedding explicature like an optional enrichment, because this means that in some cases it does not occur. Thus, unless we have near-intractable data to explain, we may say that there are no implicit arguments as embedding structures. The considerations by Saka can be independently explained away by assuming a different kind of enrichment, a conjunctive enrichment (this too, by the way, would contradict

⁴⁶Unlike many other scholars, Neale (2007, 82) does not believe that we should find deep differences between the (aphonic) indexicality approach and the free enrichment approach. He writes:

“However we proceed, the heavy lifting is done by pragmatic inference because interpreting utterances of sentences containing aphonic “indexicals” is a pragmatic, richly inferential matter, the product of integrating linguistic and non-linguistic information. The only substantive difference between the way the heavy-handed pragmatist sees the process of identifying the proposition expressed and the way someone postulating aphonic elements in syntax sees it is that the latter is just *insisting* that the search for and integration of contextual information in the interpretation process is triggered syntactically. To the best of my knowledge, no-one has ever attempted to produce an argument designed to show that an item in syntax is necessary for such a search to be triggered or for such integration to take place. (Such an argument would have to come from empirical psychology, of course, not from armchair speculations about the nature of language or the nature of mind)” p. 82.

Hall's locality constraint, which I thus propose to abandon). A speaker who says 'P' is normally understood as having said 'P (and I know that p)' or 'P (and I have heard that p)'. (Again, the second conjuncts make the conjunctions opaque, according to Williamson's p.c.; a solution to this further problem would be required; this solution is likely to hinge around the notion of presupposition, which also has some work to do in the philosophy of language; anyway, it would take a different paper to settle this problem). Such free enrichments are not exactly local because they do not amount to modification of an NP and, thus, they would be illicit like the other types of enrichments noted by Stanley (as evidence that free enrichment must be unconstrained) and which Hall wanted to exclude by a locality constraint. This locality constraint does not really work, if we have to accommodate data such as these – and there is no alternative to having to accommodate such data because the alternative proposal is rather pernicious since it amounts to saying Goodbye to Leibniz's law. If my proposal is accepted, it goes without saying that Saka's proposal (which amounts to accepting the considerations by Saka in the hope that we'll be able to explain away substitution failure in simple sentences) also cannot work, as that too involves adding an implicit argument or in any case something stable or not optional. Optionality is an important key that allows sufficient flexibility for my proposal.⁴⁷ Optionality can be seen to follow from certain considerations, that are standard in pragmatics, about the effects of context on interpretation, as pointed out by Saul (2007, 8):

Audiences are meant to rely on background assumptions that help in guiding them to the speaker's intended message. In different contexts, different background assumptions will come into play. As a result, utterances of one sentence in two different contexts may carry two different implicatures. (Saul 2007, 8).

We obviously need to adapt Saul's words to our discussion by noting that she does not firmly distinguish between implicatures and explicatures as we do. For her, conversational implicatures too contribute to what is said. In our terminology, explicatures, rather than conversational implicatures contribute to what is said.

⁴⁷ At this point, the reader might be curious about the way I propose to reconcile Williamson's considerations about knowledge with my proposal (mainly the view that assertion requires knowledge). One can accommodate Williamson's knowledge rule for assertion by saying that, typically, an assertion commits one to 'P (and I know P) (if the residual problems can be resolved). But what happens when an embedding explicature occurs? Well, in this case one has the following structure: (I heard that) P (and I know P). The constituent (and I know that P) may be aborted in case, in context, the speaker is casting doubt on the veridicality of what he heard. This is ok, since 'I heard that p' need not count as an assertion of unqualified P, although in some cases it can be said as part of an assertion that P. An alternative view is that 'I know that p' is provided through presupposition. On such a view, it would be even easier to reconcile the presupposition with the insertion of the sentential fragment 'We were told that...'.

14.8 On Corazza's Dilemma (Corazza 2004)

Re-reading the quotation of Corazza's important volume at the beginning of this article, one may be in doubt as to whether the component of meaning which we are (almost) unanimous in calling an 'explicature' could derive from a pragmatic mechanism similar to conversational implicature or may be due to a presupposition. It strikes me that many elements imported from the context into the utterance (e.g. the referents of deictic expressions or pronominals or proper names) are actually provided through presuppositions: in other words, there is a direct link between presuppositions and the saturation of certain explicit or implicit elements. However, in the case of implicit indirect reports (embedding explicatures) we need not be faced with cases of saturation as it is quite possible that there is nothing present in the logical form either through realized phonetic elements or unrealized phonetic elements (null pronominals, in other words). In fact, I argued against the *prima facie* palatable hypothesis that a hidden indexical may be responsible for the embedding explicature as, granting this, one would have to explain its optionality, given that if it were not optional, then it would over-generate opacity, which is intuitively not the desired result. Given that, in this case, the explicature is constructed through free enrichment, it is dubious that there is a direct link (consisting in saturation) between the presuppositions of the utterance and the posited hidden indexical (if we decide to posit it). Nevertheless, this case of free enrichment is somehow related, in a way to be further specified, to the presuppositions accessible in the common ground. Surely, in the case of Superman sentences, we must presuppose that we are dealing with a story and that the statements uttered are implicitly modalized through 'I was told' or 'we are told' components – components unlike the ones we deal with in ordinary conversation where the facts told are backed up by the moral authority of the speaker and thus promise to be true. Here we know well that we are dealing with a story (whether fictional or not) and we have a bias towards falsity. Nevertheless, it is somehow presupposed that we know (or rather we are acquainted with) the things we are saying because we were told them. The structure of the explicature may perhaps be required by some rationality requirements – the fact that, unless we calculate the explicature, we would be faced with a statement that is false or absurd or illogical and, thus, the presupposition may be recruited for providing the stuff the explicature is made out of, given that it promises to cure this breach in logicity. However, we do not have to go as far as to notice that the statement otherwise would be false, but it may well be the result of our ordinary practices that we integrate a presupposition as part of an explicature when the following question is latent and salient in the context: how do we know what we are told? In ordinary conversations, this question may well be formulated explicitly, but in specific language games, like narrating stories, this question may be particularly salient and even part of the mechanics of the language game (and its rules). Although I do not think that I have exhaustively answered the question (implicitly) posed by Corazza, at least we have a platform for its discussion now.

14.9 Evaluating a Different Proposal

Now I would like to consider an alternative proposal by Corazza (2010), which is of great theoretical interest. Corazza proposes a solution that kills two birds with a single stone. By using reflexive truth-conditions, he resolves both the Giorgione sentences problem and the Superman sentences problem. I do not have anything to say about the Giorgione problem, where the solution seems to work well. However, I will say something concerning the solution of the substitution problem for simple sentences through reflexive truth conditions. In a rather sketchy way, I sum up Corazza's solution as follows. Consider the following example:

(13) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out.

The reflexive truth-conditions, according to Corazza, are the following:

There are two individuals x and y and conventions C and C^* such that

- (i) C and C^* are exploited by (13)
- (ii) C permits one to designate x with 'Clark Kent' and C^* permits one to designate y with 'Superman'
- (iii) x went into the phone booth and y came out

These accompany the incremental truth conditions, which are as follows:

That Clark Kent/Superman went into the phone booth and Clark Kent/Superman came out.

According to Corazza, one's ignorance (or pretended ignorance) of the identity statement (Superman is Clark Kent) is to be accounted for through the reflexive truth-conditions.⁴⁸

There are grounds for dissatisfaction with this story. First, it is not clear how the substitution problem arises. Since $x=y$ and there are conventions allowing x to be called 'Clark Kent' and y to be called 'Superman' both x and y could be called, indifferently (and in fact this is the case in the story) either 'Clark Kent' or 'Superman'. Thus one could always try to make substitutions (of coreferential expressions) and these should be licit. If anything, what should prevent the substitution would have to be a context that creates opacity, but this is not discussed at all. Thus it is a mystery how the substitution problem arises. The other problem, that

⁴⁸ This goes more or less in the direction of what Wayne Davis (2016, 292) says when he argues that his ideational view of meaning can resolve Frege's problems in a straightforward way:

"Defining meaning as idea expression rather than reference enables natural solutions to Frege's and Russell's problems. People do think about Santa Claus even though Santa Claus does not exist, and such thoughts have a part conventionally expressed by the name 'Santa'. So 'Santa' has a meaning even though it has no referent. The thought "ammonia is poisonous" is distinct from the thought "NH₃ is poisonous" even though ammonia is NH₃. Since 'ammonia' and 'NH₃' express different thought parts, they have different meanings, even though their extensions are identical." (p. 292–293).

cannot be fixed, is that this analysis states rather clearly that there are two individuals, and this is not the case. If we posit two variables, we may well presuppose that these stand for two different individuals. Now, Corazza might modify this and say that no, there are not two different individuals, but two stages of the same individual, to be called *x* and *y*. However, we would require a further modification. The conventions *C* and *C** would have to specify when *x* is to be called ‘Clark Kent’ and when *y* is to be called ‘Superman’. However, given that at any time Clark Kent can be turned into Superman and vice versa, it is not clear when the two rules *C* and *C** should be operative (there is a fuzzy territory as in ‘Superman stood two minutes in the telephone box’ (suppose the phone booth has no glasses and a person inside it cannot be observed). Since we do not see how he is dressed, the rules *C* and *C** could very well allow him to be called both ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ for the two minutes in question). Thus the possibility of substitution is always present and, paradoxically, even Corazza’s treatment cannot prevent us from making the substitution. However, inserting an opacity inducing context like an indirect report (“we are told that”) can guarantee that substitution cannot be licitly effected, because in a quotation context it is the words, rather than the referents, which matter.

Ultimately, we could obtain some synergy by combining Corazza’s treatment and mine together. My treatment would put a stop to substitution for cases when we do not know which rule to apply, whether *C* or *C**. Corazza’s reflexive truth conditions are important because they explicitly refer to modes of presentation and also to the systematic ways in which these modes of presentation are to be introduced or exploited – we know that Clark Kent has to be called Superman when he dresses (and acts) as Superman and that he has to be called Clark Kent when he dresses (and acts) as Clark Kent. These rules, that are encapsulated in the reflexive truth-conditions, are part of the way we understand the story, normally, even if, by themselves, they could never guarantee lack of substitution. The difficult cases are, obviously, covered by my little theory.

14.10 A Fundamental Objection: Davis (2016)

I have tried to imagine what kind of objections could be leveled by Davis to my approach. Davis could say that, after all, we are making too much of this case of substitution failure. After all, is it not clear that the same person can have distinct attitudes to two coextensive sentences/statements if they are presented to him through different (sentential) modes of presentation?

Two examples by Davis (2016) could be used to prove the point that a person may assent to *P* while not assenting to *P* if this proposition is presented to him in a different guise.

- (14) Washington led the Continental Army to victory;
- (15) The first U.S President led the Continental Army to victory.

Davis writes that “The propositions they express have the same truth-conditions, but are not the same”. Could not we, then, *mutatis mutandis* apply Davis’ considerations to Superman sentences and claim that, in these cases too, the propositions are different, although they appear to be the same? If such a claim were to stand, then we would certainly not need a story in terms of implicit indirect reports, in the same way in which we do not need a story in terms of implicit indirect reports in the case of (14) and (15). Intuitively, even though (14) and (15) happen to have the same truth-conditions, they are different propositions, and thus it follows directly from this that someone might assent to (14) but fail to assent to (15) (say because he is ignorant of the identity Washington = The first U.S. President). There is no need for implicit indirect reports when one has to explain why the same speaker can assent to (14) but need not assent to (15).

However, in the case of (14) and (15) it is much easier to explain why they constitute different propositions. Such a view (whether correct or not) flows from considerations that are internal to the theory by Davis, who, at a previous point in his paper, says “I argue at length that thoughts have constituents structure – specifically a phrase-structure syntax” (p. 291). Is it not evident that (14) and (15) have different constituent structure? I would say it is, because in (14) we only find a name, which refers to *x* through a contextual function (presumably of the causal type), while in (15) we find a name and a definite description and the reference of the definite description is both a function of the name and of the descriptive part of the NP that constitutes it. In particular, ‘Washington’ refers directly through a contextual function, while the definite description refers through a function that exploits encyclopedic knowledge: first of all we have to know who the first US President is and then we will know who the speaker is referring to.

Is not this case very different from Superman sentences, where the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are taken to be referring directly? Suppose, however, Davis takes a de-tour and says, “But after all, ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ here do not work (in this context) as genuine names, as when we hear them, we do not search the context of our lives to establish a direct referential link, but we need to search the context of the narrations and we more or less understand ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ as ‘The persona ‘Clark Kent’ refers to in the story’ and ‘The persona ‘Superman’ refers to in the story’”. This is enough to create an intensional context and to insulate the search of the referents confining it to the context inside the story and not to the context outside the story.

Although I admit this would be a clever move on the part of Wayne Davis, I wonder whether it would be very different from my own move, which also creates an intensional context by an explicature at the sentential level. Davis’ move would be to create the explicature at the NP level and to keep it confined to the NP level. However, since his NP explicature would strongly presuppose a statement of the kind “we are told that...” or ‘the story tells us that...’, his story would need both an explicature and a presupposition, while my story only requires an explicature to work. (Thus parsimony considerations seem to be conducive to my view). Furthermore, somehow this presupposition would have to be incorporated into the level of what is said because it has to do some work explaining how the statement

‘Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent’ happens to be informative despite the fact that one surely cannot leap more tall buildings than oneself (at some temporal point *t*). If it is not taken as a contradiction, this is because the presupposition ‘There is a story according to which Superman and Clark Kent are different personae’ is operative. This presupposition cannot be cancelled until we make sense of the statement as non-contradictory.

14.11 Objections by Stephen Schiffer (p.c.)

In this section I shall consider important objections by Stephen Schiffer (p.c.). I report them in full, as they appear to me to be extremely interesting. I will reply to them one by one. Schiffer says:

1. Consider the following sentences:

- (a) Lois kissed Superman but lied about it to Clark Kent.
- (b) Lois kissed Superman but lied about it to Superman.
- (c) In the Superman story Lois kissed Superman but lied about it to Clark Kent.
- (d) In the Superman story Lois kissed Superman but lied about it to Superman.

While (c) and (d) presumably have truth-values, (a) and (b) don’t have truth-values because ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ don’t refer, notwithstanding that someone who actually uttered a Superman sentence would be understood to be talking about the Superman fiction. Saul, however, explicitly says that we are to suppose the Superman story was true, i.e. that (a) and (b) aren’t about characters in a fiction but about actual people. In other words, we’re to regard (a) and (b) the same way we’d regard the pair

- (e) Joe Frasier fought Mohammad Ali but never fought Cassius Clay.
- (f) Joe Frasier fought Mohammad Ali but never fought Mohammed Ali.

Now, is your theory intended to apply to (a) and (b) only in so far as they’re read as being about a fiction, or is it intended to apply to those sentences as though they’re about what actually happened? In other words, is your theory supposed to apply to (e) and (f) in the same way it applies to (a) and (b)? When you say that sentences like (a) and (b) contain the “embedding explicature” ‘We are told (in the Superman story) that’, it’s impossible to understand you to be giving a theory that would apply if (a) and (b) are supposed to be factual statements about the actual world, i.e. impossible to read you as giving a theory that applies to (e) and (f). On the other hand, in discussing other examples you seem to write as though you’re giving a theory that does apply to sentences like (e) and (f), and, further, it would be very puzzling if your intuitions about (e) and (f) differed from your intuitions about (a) and (b). Since the issue about substitution failure is important only if it motivates the claim that sentences like (e) and (f) can differ in truth-value, from now on I will proceed on the assumption that you do intend to accommodate such sentences.

Ok, now my answer to the objections by Schiffer so far is the following. First of all the question, which is presupposed, that if 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' are understood to be fictional names, then the sentences/statements containing them are neither true nor false. One could argue that regardless of this being so or of this potential problem, by replacing a term with another one moves from a story that is the story we know to a story that is not the story as we know it (the one we are familiar with given the fiction in question). Although we could not apply (or it does not make much sense to apply) the terms 'true' or 'false' (as in 'This is a true story' or 'This is a false story'), we get the impression that one moves from a canonical story to a non-canonical one. One may reply 'But this is not the right story' or 'But this is not the story as I know it' or 'This is not what the story says'.

Now the problem connected with sentences/statements (e) and (f).

(e) Joe Frasier fought Mohammad Ali but never fought Cassius Clay.

(f) Joe Frasier fought Mohammad Ali but never fought Mohammed Ali.

I am glad Schiffer brought out this issue, because this can disconnect the substitution problem from fiction. Here there is no fiction or fictional stories involved, although the speaker is clearly narrating a (real) story. The examples by Schiffer clearly connect the issue of intensionality with the issue of intentionality (an issue brought up several times in comments by Williamson and by Schiffer). Substitution failure in Schiffer's example works because, although Frasier had the intention of fighting Mohammad Ali, he never had the intention of fighting Cassius Clay. In other words, he had the intention of being involved in an event which could be narrated as fighting Mohammad Ali but not in one which could be narrated as fighting Cassius Clay. Here intensionality is created by intentionality (in the sense of having intentions). I am retaining somehow the notion of a story, although this is not indispensable, as someone might argue.

Now Schiffer, taking up some comments by Timothy Williamson (p.c) says that it is not clear in my treatment if I am dealing with examples (a) and (b) if they were somehow to be treated like (e) and (f), that is to say without making any reference to a fictional story. It is clear that at several points in my paper I assume that the intensionality problem may be related either to the fact that the superman sentences are cases of fictional reports or that they could be considered as cases of intensionality created by implicit reports like 'we are told that' or 'as the story goes'. Presumably, following Schiffer, we should make a difference between the two types of insertions (indirect reports), and we should be inclined towards accepting that intensionality is created by insertions of 'we are told that' or of 'The story says....'. It is true that I sometimes said 'we are told (in the story) that' is an appropriate insertion, but here 'story' can be ambiguous as, after all, one can have a real story or a fictional story. If Saul and her colleagues insist (in a way that seemed implausible to me, to tell the whole truth, as I see it) that superman sentences should be considered in a background in which no fiction is considered, then, forced to make a choice, I would have to consider only insertion of 'we are told that', leaving it open whether the story in question is fictional or not, although we can also leave it open that we

accept the presupposition that the story in question is something like a real story or, anyway, a story which we are inclined to consider real or at least not fictional.

Schiffer also says:

Two questions about (e) and (f) are: (i) Do, or might, the propositions expressed by (e) and (f) in literal utterances of those sentences differ in truth-value? (ii) It's difficult to imagine how a speaker could mean anything in uttering (f), but suppose she could. Could the proposition a speaker would mean in uttering (e) differ in truth-value from the one she'd mean in uttering (f)? It's quite clear that the answer to (the question in) (ii) is yes. The only interesting and important question is (i), which is clearly the question Saul was addressing with respect to her examples. Even if we assume you're offering a theory that's supposed to apply to sentences like (e) and (f), it's not clear to me how you'd answer (i). That's because I don't know how you understand the unclear notion of "explicature," especially when at the end of your chapter you wonder whether the "embedded explicature" 'We are told (in the Superman story) that' might be due to "free enrichment."

Ok, my reply to Schiffer here is that in a background like the one presupposed by Saul, 'story' in the sentence 'We are told in the Superman story' could be given a non-fictional meaning. We may say things like the 'Obama story' or the 'Clinton story' without implying that this is a fictional story. (If there are implicatures to this effect, these should be cancellable and thus are unlikely to be problematic). As to the question (i), I would say that the two statements have different truth-conditions because intensionality is created by intentionality. Intentionality attribution is implicit (when the speaker says 'Joe Frasier fought Mohammad Ali but never fought Cassius Clay' he fully intends that the action was intentional, not that it happened; you can see the difference by replacing an intentional verb with an unintentional verb like e.g. 'kill') but needs to be fleshed out at the level of the explicature. I assume this case is different from the Superman cases. The examples (e) and (f) are different from Saul's Superman sentences, because the latter can be handled in terms of embedding explicatures, as I did.

Schiffer also says:

If your theory is intended to apply to (e) and (f)—and thus to (a) and (b) on the assumption that the Superman fiction is factual—then what can the embedded explicature be? It can't contain the word 'story'. Is it supposed to be 'We are told that'? If so, then I completely agree with Williamson that that would get the truth-conditions very wrong: 'We are told that Joe Frasier fought M.A. but never fought C.C.' can be true when (e) is false, and (e) could be true when 'We are told that ...' is false. (I found your suggestion that 'tell' could be read as factive to be extremely implausible.) In fact, isn't it highly unlikely that someone who believes *that Mohammad Ali was a boxer but Cassius Clay wasn't* believes it because she was told it?

Schiffer's consideration about the factivity of 'tell' are clearly contradicted by Italian data, where the clitics support factivity (e.g. Giovanni lo ha detto che p). In such a case although we are told that p, p must be true. There are constructions in Italian or English where factivity is promoted, although normally it is contextual considerations that promote it. Consider the statement 'John TOLD me you were in Rome'. Stress on 'told' increases the factivity of 'tell' and introduces a presupposition (the same thing happens when we say 'John KNOWS you were in Rome'). A fact presupposed is normally true and presupposition and factivity normally are

connected. The only problem that Schiffer here could raise (and perhaps raises) is that, given that the constituent is due to free enrichment (but the same consideration would be applicable if the constituent was a hidden indexical), we have contextual considerations applying twice, once to insert a constituent like 'We are told that' and once to presuppose factivity. My reply to Schiffer is simple: So what. Once we accept drastic (I do not say 'radical') contextualism, we are committed to contextualism through and through. I found a similar case in my analysis of Immunity to Error through Misidentification and 'de se' in this monograph. 'I' is a mode of presentation that must be inserted pragmatically in order to project a really 'de se' thought'. But 'I' (as argued by Jaszczolt, Coliva, Bezuidenhout) need not be first-personal. Yet, in context, it must be clear that it must be first-personal. Thus contextualism intrudes twice into the truth-conditions. The story seems to be complicated, but so what?

The case considered by Schiffer (and by Timothy Williamson too), is that the embedding utterance 'We are told that p' could be false, while 'p' is true. Yes, this can occur in principle, but it does not occur in the contexts we are considering, where both 'p' and 'we are told that p' is true.

Schiffer also says:

Consider:

- (g) We are told that Joe Frasier fought Mohammad Ali but never fought Cassius Clay. Surely this is true just in case what we were told is the proposition expressed by the complement clause. But if that sentence expresses a proposition, that proposition can hardly be that we are told that we are told that But if the clause expresses a proposition without any supplementation, then so do (e) and (f), which would be inconsistent with your theory (or so I assume, since I'm not confident I know precisely what your theory is).

Here Schiffer's objection is that I am committed to recursively injecting pragmatic intrusion into sentences like 'We are told that Joe Frasier fought Mohammad Ali but never fought Cassius Clay'. We should have something like 'We are told we are told...'. But since I opted for free enrichment, which is optional, I am not really committed to this position. I exclude that pragmatic enrichment should occur unless there is a reason. My position is that explicatures are normally required by the need to resolve illogicalities, absurdities, etc. When there are no such problems, I do not posit pragmatic intrusion.

Finally, Schiffer says:

Consider the sentence

- (h) J. K. Rowling wrote *Harry Potter*.
I should think that that sentence is true just in case the referent of 'J. K. Rowling' wrote *Harry Potter*. But can you say that if your theory is supposed to apply to sentences like (e) and (f)? I don't think so. For consider:
J.K. Rowling wrote *Harry Potter* but she didn't write *Career of Evil*.

J.K. Rowling wrote *Harry Potter* but Robert Galbraith wrote *Career of Evil*. (J.K.R. = R..G.—‘Robert Galbraith’ is the *nom de plume* she uses for her detective novels.) It seems to me that you must treat this pair in the same way you’d treat (e) and (f), but that would seem to entail that (j) isn’t true iff the referent of ‘JKR’ wrote *Harry Potter*, and by an obvious extension it seems you’d also have to say the same thing about *every* sentence containing a proper name. But then you’d be hard pressed not to stop there: Consider ‘He was a decathlete’, when pointing to a photo of Caitlyn Jenner taken before her sex change, and ‘She wasn’t a decathlete’, when pointing to a photo of her taken after her sex change. I think it would be unfortunate if your theory committed you saying to that, for no singular term α is it the case that ‘ α is F’ is true iff the referent of α is F.

My reply to Schiffer is the following. The examples discussed by him are undoubtedly interesting, but they can be explained away in a different way than by the considerations I applied to superman statements. Of course if we accept that the semantic contribution of a name is its referent then it must be true that J.K. Rowling wrote *Career of Evil* too. However, there is pragmatic intrusion, which can be understood in the following way:

J.K. Rowling wrote *Harry Potter*, under the name J.K. Rowling, but wrote *Career of Evil* under the name Robert Galbraith. (Here we have no need to resort to the explicature ‘We are told that’). Concerning the issues of sex changes, there are clearly problems of identity, but here intuitions are not stable. You can look at the picture of someone who had a sex operation and say ‘He looked happy’ or ‘She looked happy’ and they may be considered both true. Thus, this example does not motivate a good objection towards a referential theory of proper names and pronominals, which was presupposed in this chapter.

14.12 Conclusion

The picture emerging so far is one that supports Jaszczolt’s view about merger representations and discourse compositionality. Jaszczolt may even be right that logical forms are not privileged components of meaning as the processing may start with a bias produced by our accepting certain assumptions about the stories fiction we have heard. Superman sentences (or simple sentences), as Saul calls them, are not simple at all and in fact are quite complex. The complexity is added by the structure of the discourse in which they typically and most naturally occur (that is to say Superman stories). It is the context of the story that biases us towards certain complexities and Saul is certainly right that we do not need to assess such sentences as false in order to start searching for plausible interpretations. These interpretations are already inherent in the stories we are faced with. Such stories bias us and predispose us towards accessing such interpretations. We put all the information we have

together and we form Merger Representations that plausibly assign meanings to these sentential fragments. It is in such representations that we realize that these are only fragments of interpretation and we provide full structure.

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General Conclusion

(Where We Are Going)

Given that we put several threads together in the Introduction, we should try to do so (again) in the General Conclusion. This is a book about indirect reporting, which, at one point, takes a certain direction. In addition to writing about general practices, it focuses on belief reports and reports of propositional attitudes in general. Hence the sliding towards ‘de se’ thoughts and then ‘impure de se’ thoughts. At one point it is clear that the book intersects with the (general philosophical) theory of knowledge and, specifically, with the theory of mind. The real hero of this book, however, has been ‘communication’ as we made a strong case for the intersection of the theory of knowledge and epistemology with the theory of communication. There is some common territory that needs to be charted and this book is a step in this direction. That the method used here is fruitful is shown by the last chapter of this book in which I seem to have demonstrated that the apparently ‘prima facie’ surprising theory on substitution failure in simple sentences (Superman sentences, in general) can be easily accounted for if one starts with the notion that there are things such as ‘implicit indirect reports’ that create explicit intensional contexts. I have talked about embedding explicatures (perhaps a notion that is antithetical in many respects to embedded implicatures) to make it palpable that implicit indirect reports (implicit as they are or though they are) create intentional contexts that block substitution of co-extensive NPs (or Vs or VPs) *salva veritate*.

This book has been written as a mosaic with interlocking parts. It is easy to imagine that the theory will have to be revised and improved in many ways and, at some point, someone will be able to do more or better on these topics. However, the definitive result of this book is to have shown that there are many interlocking parts and that the global results of the theory are improved by working at the interfaces between the chapters.

The readers will not fail to note that for me the most exciting parts were those relating to the social practice of indirect reporting, belief reports and a theory of anaphora, attitudes ‘de se’ and Immunity to Error through misidentification, non-

cancellability of explicatures in belief reports and substitution failure and embedding explicatures. The other parts will surely be developed by someone else one day, although in this book they were somehow treated as ancillary information. There are areas where more work needs to be done. We can easily imagine that, when we have a deeper and better theory of quotation, this will have repercussions on the theory of indirect reports. The readers will not fail to notice that my approach to indirect reports depends to a large extent on my view of quotation, expressed elsewhere (see Capone 2013). In the end I decided not to include that chapter here, because it was difficult to justify its presence in the overall economy of the book. But that chapter is really presupposed and inclined me to think of indirect reports in the way I think of them due to the pervasive role that quotation (implicit quotation) plays in ordinary linguistic use. It is predictable, given this connection with what I said elsewhere (see Capone 2013), that these views will have to be revised, extended, or even be abandoned to give room to better views once we have a better theory of quotation. But it is not surprising that a theoretical process/progress should proceed in this way and should very much depend on our willingness to systematically eliminate error and accept novel ideas if they prove to be useful and sound.

Thus, now that I have just finished this exhausting enterprise, I already envision new shapes and forks which the theory might take in the future. Despite this tremendous effort of accumulating knowledge, at one point we have to realize that we are already the past, but it is of some comfort that the definitive result of this book is, hopefully, to stimulate research in the fundamental area of indirect reports, which is crucial for the understanding of the pragmatics of language. It is unclear why no single monograph has been written on this at the international level for many many years – but this only proves that the neglect for this topic has probably created a gap with systematic (possibly negative) effects on general pragmatic theory. As Timothy Williamson says, error generates error and I can easily prove that the pragmatic theory we have today is deliberately incomplete and does not address certain important topics, such as, e.g., the non-cancellability of explicatures. Since error generates error, we can easily anticipate that this book has the potential for changing the general outlook on pragmatics. But now much depends on how my readers take it and on whether they are willing to propel this research forward or not. And, of course, I am not entirely sure that this small miracle will take place.

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