

Embedding explicatures in implicit indirect reports: simple sentences, and substitution failure cases

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I defend the view that all the semantically relevant elements are expressed at the LF level. In other words, I argue that, for the purposes of semantics, all the relevant propositional elements are the value of either a phonetically realized element or an implicit argument. The propositional elements not triggered by a phonetically realized element or an implicit argument, can be dealt with as either pragmatically imparted or as background presuppositions upon which a given speech act occurs.

(Corazza 2004, 70–71).

Abstract In this chapter, I am going to discuss a very interesting case brought to our attention by Saul (1997, 2007) and references therein: NP-related substitution failure in simple sentences. Whereas it is well known that opacity occurs in intensional contexts and that in such contexts it is not licit to replace an NP with a co-referential one (this would be illicit, substitution failure constituting a violation of the compositionality constraint, according to Salmon 1986, 2007, Richard 2013, Jaszczolt 2005), one would not expect that substitution failure (that is an exception to Leibniz's law) should also be exhibited by simple sentences (though they are not exhibited by all simple sentences) in the context of stories about Superman. The suggested explanation of these cases is to posit an embedding explicature, that is to say the insertion of structure (a sentential fragment such as 'We are told that' or 'As the story goes') that *ipso facto* creates an intensional context capable of blocking substitution. I consider various complications to this story in the light of important objections by García-Carpintero (p.c.) and, finally, I consider how this story fares when one applies constraints on explicatures along the lines of those proposed by Hall (2014) in an interesting paper.

In general, this chapter exploits interesting considerations by Norrick (2016) on the structural similarities between stories and indirect reports. Norrick believes

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there are important differences, but he is inclined to concede that we could study structural similarities. An important similarity, brought out by the examples discussed by Saul (2007), is that the narrative frame, once it is inserted into the interaction, can be left implicit and, during the act of narrating or referring to the story, one need not repeat the words ‘the story says’ or ‘we are told that...’ every time. Although implicit, these words are heard because they do some work at the structural level, as is shown by this attempt to resolve an otherwise intractable philosophical problem. The explicatures of simple sentences are perceived because they are integrated into the speakers’/hearers’ perception of the overall plan of discourse, as Haugh (2015) most interestingly notes:

As Haugh and Jaszczolt (2012) note, this means that any putative “communicative intention of A is embedded within his higher-order intention” (p. 101). In other words, to figure out the implicature that evidently arises here, the participants are necessarily making inferences about some kind of overall aim (...). According to this view, then, inferences about the intended implicature(s) (i.e. the speaker’s communicative intentions) arise concomitant with inferences about the overall aim of the speaker (...) (p. 96).

It follows from the considerations by Haugh that, since the explicature connected with simple sentences depends on the perception of the overall aim or plan of the conversation, it is not easily cancelled. Readers can check by themselves that the explicatures due to simple sentences cannot be cancelled, as cancelling them would involve returning to illogical discourses. (But these are merely consequences of what I said in Capone 2009a, b). Haugh’s considerations about the overall aim of the discourse are precious in explaining how the embedding explicatures I posit are calculated once and for all for the whole stretch of the discourse framed by the narrative act (or the perception of the narrative act).

Keywords Implicit · Indirect reports · Simple sentences and substitution · Explicatures · The semantics/pragmatics debate

1 Introduction

When I first read Saul (2007), I admit I was strongly tempted to stop reading that book as I thought that accepting that even in simple sentences there could be cases of substitution failure in connection with NPs amounted to accepting some kind of logical error which could be something Williamson (2016) calls ‘error-fragility’. Once a serious error is injected into a theory, more and more errors will pop up in ramifications of the theory. The following is an attempt to dissolve a complicated and puzzling philosophical problem that runs the risk of infecting our theories (philosophical and linguistic alike) and also an attempt to render our pragmatic theories of belief reports and opacity less error-fragile in general. A way to do this is to grant the importance of a non-cancellable type of pragmatic intrusion, recognizing the ubiquity of implicit indirect reports and admitting that opacity cannot be everywhere but must be confined to intensional contexts.

The upshot of this chapter is that several important consequences follow from accepting the theoretical claim that there is a class of indirect reports to be called ‘implicit indirect reports’. In using this terminology, I am freely adapting considerations found in Holt (2016) (in the context of a paper on indirect reports) and which I deemed of considerable importance. Its importance lies not only in the empirical claim itself, which is confined to a range of (mainly) conversational data, but in its applicability to problems that are thorny and of difficult resolution. The considerations I have in mind, to be spelled out at the outset of this chapter, will be conducive to the resolution of a problem created by substitution failure in simple sentences. That substitution failure (that is to say the non-applicability of Leibniz’s law) inside intensional contexts¹ was a problem for compositional semantics was no mystery (see Jaszczolt 1999, 2005, 2016, but also antecedent work by Richard (2013) and Salmon (1986, 2007)), but it comes as a surprise that the same effects that seem to be due to (that is to say, caused by) intentional contexts should also be noticed in extensional ones (see Saul 2007), or at least contexts we have no apparent reason to consider intensional, if we confine ourselves to literal meanings – a *prima facie* consequence of this might be that one could, in principle, be wrong about the kind of phenomena that occur inside intensional contexts or in the claim that these should be imputed to intensionality (Davidson 1968 wanted to prove that intensional contexts are more or less functionally equivalent to quotational contexts). But how could one be wrong about the nature (and causes) of opacity, which happens to be one of the most well studied phenomena in semantics and pragmatics (after the considerations by Frege 1892, Davidson 1968, Salmon 1986, 2007, Richard 2013 among numerous other important philosophers of language)? Intuitively, the only way out of this impasse is to look at the structure of the conversation to see if, from a communicative point of view, by reference to wide context, that is to say “any contextual information relevant to working out the process of enrichment² and established communicative practices” (Fetzer 2016), one could make further structure emerge, and, in particular, some unarticulated sections of the discourse, which must be there because their being there would make otherwise inexplicable phenomena explicable.³ (Certain moves seem to be required by Williamson’s awareness of error-fragility and the attempt to eliminate that⁴). This interplay of semantics and

¹That is that-clauses of verbs of propositional attitude, in general, among other things.

²See Hall 2014, 8; but also see Kecskes (2014) on context as prior experience that we carry in our memory.

³Unlike the view that context should be seen as “a selector of lexical features because it activates some of those features while leaving others in the background” (Kecskes 2014, 35), in this paper we hold the view that context also serves to insert structure at the sentential or inter-sentential level.

⁴Williamson (Oxford lecture) reflects on error fragility, that is to say the idea that once an error is inserted (injected) into a theory, it will systematically lead to further errors. Take, for example, the idea that Saul’s examples discussed in this chapter prove that opacity appears even in simple sentences, that is apparently non-intensional contexts. As my readers will see, this idea is taken up by Saka (2016) and extended to other examples, leading him to postulate universal opacity. (Also see another case brought up by Williamson p.c.). This is an illustration of what Williamson means by error-fragility. I have amply shown in a later section that universal opacity, as maintained by Saka, is wrong and is certainly a consequence of the idea that simple sentences can exceptionally be loci of opacity.

contextual information is a consequence of the general truism expressed by Wettstein (2016) that “*Context cannot be an afterthought in our thinking about the linguistic function of reports, any more than context can be an afterthought in our thinking about indexicals*” (Wettstein 2016, 417). Perhaps surface structure is not a good guide to what is said – this was already proven in connection with logical form as we found out in the most interesting work by Higginbotham and May (1981)⁵ (see Capone 2002 for a review) on quantification and scope ambiguity. But here, intuitively, it is not a question of logical form, as we are not dealing with sentential meanings,⁶ but it must be some obscure phenomenon related to discourse – one which can be illuminated through the theory of (conversational) explicatures – that is insertions of structures like ‘We have heard that...’ or ‘As the story goes...’. In an informal personal communication, Jaszczolt suggested to me that we should probably abandon the theoretical constructs of explicatures since these involve developing a logical form, while we know for sure that in many cases (e.g. cases of irony) we do not develop a certain logical form (by integrating it with further pragmatic information) but we completely have to discard it.⁷ I quite agree that the discourse processes I am trying to elucidate involve the integration of information coming from several sources (see Jaszczolt 2005 and 2016 concerning Merger Representations⁸) – some of these sources being related to background information

⁵As pointed out by Timothy Williamson (p.c.) this is also a point made by Russell. See his ideas on scope ambiguity in connection with definite descriptions (this is a topic discussed by Neale (2007) in detail).

⁶Timothy Williamson (p.c.) says “surely we are, because the truth-values of sentences are at issue”. Ok, I agree this is a complicated question. If we accept the hidden indexicality hypothesis, then obviously Williamson may have a point here, as the logical form has to be specified syntactically and semantically. If we take the position that free enrichment only is involved, the logical form (As the story goes/as we heard) is injected into the utterance, but this part of the logical form is not considered to be mandated by lexical or syntactic structure. So, Williamson’s remark that, indeed, it is a question of logical form can be intended in a stronger or in a weaker sense. If it is intended in a weaker sense, it does not really contradict, but it merely further specifies what I said.

⁷To make this less cryptic, consider a case such as ‘Nice weather, isn’t it?’. Jaszczolt’s consideration on irony and similar cases (e.g. jokes) is that one does not proceed incrementally, by summing up the proposition literally expressed with the pragmatic increments. The increments, in such cases, do not amount to additions, but to subtractions, since the hearer has to work out that the speaker does not literally intend that the weather is nice, but has to consider that this is to be understood echoically and thus the real proposition he accepts, instead, is that the weather is quite bad.

⁸A propos of Merger Representations, Jaszczolt (2016, 80) writes the following:

“A semantic representation so understood is called in DS merger representation. This representation is assumed to have a compositional structure. Compositionality is there a methodological but also an epistemological and metaphysical assumption, based on the argument from productivity and systematicity of conversational interactional patterns. The word ‘merger’ and the Greek letter sigma (Σ) that symbolizes summation, reflect the fact that information coming from different sources merges to produce one semantic structure. DS is still very much a theory in progress but at the current stage of its development, information is being allocated to the following sources: (i) world knowledge (WK); (ii) word meaning and sentence structure (WS); (iii) the situation of discourse (SD); (iv) properties of the human inferential system (IS); (v) stereotypes and presumptions about society and culture (SC)” (p. 80).

or social context.⁹ However, I propose to stick to the term ‘explicatures’ for a number of reasons, among which a conservative instinct, in addition to the desire to highlight the link between this chapter and previous work on the semantics/pragmatics debate. However, the suggestion by Jaszczolt is well taken and I am also persuaded that the term ‘explicature’ can be rejuvenated following Jaszczolt’s idea that in Merger Representations several sources of information are integrated and we do not necessarily proceed by privileging the logical form (the same ideas are expressed in a simpler way in Mey’s work on pragmemes (Mey 2001)). Among other things, Jaszczolt proposes that compositionality at the level of the sentence should be abandoned in favor of compositionality at the level of discourse.¹⁰ Now I want to accept this idea, but I want to put it upside down and say that, if we accept compositionality at the level of discourse, this must percolate to the level of the sentence (see Capone 2009b). In other words, both sentential and discourse-level compositionality avail of the same cognitive principles, presumably innate and universal (presumably compositionality at the level of discourse shares operations with a module that can be called ‘theory of syntax’, the integration occurring at a higher level (see Carruthers 2006)). From this, it follows that by studying compositionality at the level of the sentence, we have an immediate grasp of what happens at the level of discourse, except for the hard cases (notably belief reports, *de se* attitudes, and all the other cases of pragmatic intrusion I dealt with in previous work). However, in cases where compositionality seems to break down at the level of the sentence, compositionality at the level of discourse will prevent the sentential meanings from being devoid of meaning. This is a most interesting and exciting idea contributed by Jaszczolt (1999) through her work on belief reports – this chapter on embedding explicatures promises to be another step in this direction.

Now it should be clear to my readers that, while I largely accept complementarism between semantics and pragmatics, following Huang (2014), I take it that my views differ from Huang’s with respect to discourse compositionality, an idea I mainly took from Jaszczolt (2016, 2005). Setting aside this feature, my picture largely agrees with Huang’s complementarist view (Huang 2014), inherited from Lyons (1977), as I also take pragmatics to be concerned with language use, with

⁹See the important paper by Fetzer (2016) on the way we integrate information coming from the linguistic context with the one coming from the social context. It is of considerable theoretical importance that Fetzer (2016) introduces the difference between generalized and particularized practs (practs are the realizations of pragmemes in discourse). In the case of embedding explicatures, one could say that although we may learn how to derive them pragmatically in particular contexts, we can start to associate them with particular structures and, then, we no longer resort to all the steps required by the inference at the level of the particularized pract.

¹⁰For the idea of compositionality as something that is mainly achieved in discourse, see the important volume: Kamp, H. and U. Reyle, 1993. Another author who addresses the issue of compositionality in discourse, albeit more timidly, is Hall (2014), who explicitly writes about ‘composing’ unarticulated constituents into an explicature. At another place, Hall writes about compositionality at the level of discourse. Hall (2014) explicitly says that she will concentrate on unarticulated constituents as these seem to be more threatening to a principle of semantic compositionality for truth-conditional content.

non-conventional meaning, with context-dependence, with performance, with speaker's meaning and finally with elements of meaning that are not encoded (and, thus, are highly variable and optional). Despite accepting complementarism, I fully endorse a form of contextualism that sees the necessity of pragmatic intrusion only for the hard cases and, in particular, for cases intractable for the semanticist and I endorse some version of Recanati's (2010) truth-conditional pragmatics, without however wanting to be associated with a radical pragmatic treatment, as, after all, according to my view semantics and pragmatics coexist side by side peacefully and I endorse a kind of non-radical minimalism, accepting that, at least in simple cases, it is possible to know the truth-conditions of a sentence without saying anything or much more about the pragmatics of language (in the sense that if covert indexicals are present, then values are supplied in the normal way in which they would be assigned to pronominals). Intrusive constructions, as pointed out by Levinson (2000), may be problematic for semantics but may involve a complementary pragmatic picture, one where semantics is enriched and completed by pragmatics (following Huang 2014). In short, in this chapter I accept that both top-down and bottom-up pragmatic processes contribute to enriching the explicature, which is, or ought to be, a sort of middle ground between what is literally said and what is implicated, following considerations by Bach (2004).

2 The solutions so far

In her book 'Simple sentences, substitution and intuitions' Saul (2007) critically discusses a number of alternatives to my approach. In a short chapter, it is not possible to do justice to these treatments, but at least I would like to set the background to my own discussion of simple sentences.

Two main approaches to simple sentences can be considered to be of the contextualist type: a) Pitt (2001) and b) Moore (1999)/Forbes (1997a, b). Pitt claims that a sentence like 'Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent' should be understood as KAL-EL's alter ego¹¹ called 'Superman' leaps more tall buildings than KAL-EL's alter ego called 'Clark Kent'. Moore (1999) and Forbes (1997a, b) claim that modes of personification have a role to play in the semantics of Superman sentences. I will not repeat the details of the criticism leveled by Saul (2007) to Pitt, simply because I am persuaded that the pragmatic intrusion posited by Pitt is unnecessary once we grant a more general type of pragmatic intrusion that creates an intensional context. The view I propose in this chapter at least has the merit of stressing the role of intensionality in human language, while Pitt's story, interesting though it is, as Saul says, needs several adjustments and, in any case, does not seem to bring out the fact that intensionality is responsible for substitution failure in sim-

¹¹ As Saul (2007) puts it, in Pitt's view 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' are names for two alter-egos that Kal-El adopted on Earth. "Kal-El does everything either Superman or Clark does, and some things that neither of them do" (p. 32).

ple sentences. The ideas expressed by Moore and Forbes are more interesting and certainly go some way towards explaining the phenomena in question; but as Saul (2007) says, we are faced with problems like the following a) individuation of modes of personification is not easy or uniform among participants; b) it should be modeled on the basis of a causal theory of reference, with all its derivative problems; c) it has thorny problems due to the fact that modes of personification depend on whether the members of the audience are enlightened or not on the identity Clark Kent = Superman, while there is the dubious case that, in the case of mixed audiences including enlightened and unenlightened members, the sentence/statement fails to have a truth-condition in context. From my point of view, even if all these problems could be resolved (but their resolution is not straightforward), the solution proposed by Forbes does not bring out the fact that intensionality is involved in this story, contrary to what I propose in the following sections. Thus, while for Forbes there is an asymmetry between the explanation of anti-substitution intuitions in intensional contexts and the explanation of anti-substitution intuitions in simple sentences, I will argue against such an asymmetry.

Another position worth considering is the one by Barber (2000). This is based on conversational implicature, but starts from the premise that there is an asymmetry between contexts. In contexts in which participants are not enlightened on the identity Clark Kent = Superman, in a sentence like ‘Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent’, the NPs (though co-referential) have different cognitive significance, thus the statement could well be taken to be true. In contexts in which participants are enlightened, the sentence above is assessed in context as being blatantly false, as one cannot jump more tall buildings than oneself and, thus, a conversational implicature arises to rescue the felicity of the statement. Despite the similarity between Barber’s account and my approach, there are clear and straightforward differences, as I do not need to say at any point that the statement ‘Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent’ is false (literally speaking). While it is possible that in some cases – e.g. in ironies – we need to go through the step of recognizing that the proposition apparently expressed is *prima facie* false, we do not need to go through this step here (in the Superman simple sentences) and we do not normally go through this step. Another difference is that my approach avoids all the problems emerging from Saul’s (2007) discussion, not to mention the fact that my explanation is connected with facts about intensionality, whereas the intensionality dimension plays no role in Barber’s treatment (In fact, Barber is skeptical that Naïve Millians like Salmon and Soames can explain antisubstitution intuitions in simple sentences), but I show that they have ways to deal with this problem.

3 Implicit indirect reports

In this chapter, I will presuppose that the following two principles by Gibbs (1999) are operative in the pragmatics of language and are responsible both for pragmatic intrusion and the recovery of conversational implicatures:

Principle of speaker meaning:

Speakers and their addressees take for granted that the addressees are to recognize what the speaker means by what they say and do.

Principle of utterance Design:

Speakers try to design each utterance so that their addressees can figure out what they mean by considering the utterance against their current common ground. (Gibbs 1999, 121–122).

The two principles above can be responsible for the rich phenomena of pragmatic intrusion we are going to investigate in detail here. In particular, I shall assume that part of the speaker's meaning, in the case of simple sentences I am discussing, is that the hearer will reconstruct an unarticulated constituent with quasi-sentential structure on the basis of the common ground.¹² This constituent corresponds to an embedding sentential fragment like the following (where the parentheses hold the unarticulated constituent):

(I was told that) S.¹³

Unlike the unarticulated constituents discussed by relevance theorists or Griceans like Bach (1994), this constituent has quasi-sentential status (in that by completing it with an indicative sentence one obtains a sentence), in other words it is a

¹²In connection with 'unarticulated constituents', I am using terminology by John Perry 1986; also see Crimmins and Perry 1989 in connection with belief reports, a reformulation of the notion of 'guises' already discussed by Salmon 1986; also see Bach 2012.

¹³Although this might *prima facie* sound strange, even pragmatic intrusions can require further levels of pragmatic intrusions. It is not enough to reconstruct the constituent 'We are told that' as part of the explicature, but we need to reconstruct the illocutionary force of 'we are told that'. The speech act describes someone as performing an illocutionary act, but which illocutionary act? As Davis (2016, 308) says, we cannot say that an assertion is at stake, since the speaker may just be telling us a story. "But if he is telling a story, then he did not assert, affirm, or state that it did". It is clear that Davis' point is relevant to our discussion, as being aware that we are confronted with a story prepares us for the fiction that there are people with extraordinary powers, like Superman, and that, in the world of this story, Superman and Clark Kent are one and the same individual, although some characters in the story are not aware of this identity.

Timothy Williamson (p.c.) raises the following problem:

Postulating this extra constituent gets the truth-value wrong in a vast range of cases. If it is true that S but the speaker wasn't told that S, the original statement was true. If the speaker was told that S (in a non-factive sense of 'told') but it is false that S, the original statement was false. Adding 'I was told that' incorrectly reverses the truth-value in both cases. Although one should certainly take this problem into account, I am not particularly worried by it, as there are languages in which factive 'tell' is made explicit by a combination with a particle (e.g. the clitic 'lo' in Italian). Thus, there may well be semantic resources to make 'tell' factive, which is what we need to overcome the objection by Williamson (in English we may say things such as 'As the real story goes, ...' or 'We have heard it that S'). The objection based on the fact that a true proposition may turn out to be false if embedded in the constituent 'I was told that' in the case nobody told us that p can be defeated by considering that this problem does not arise in the context of superman stories. It is a general problem, but not one that arises in this context.

sentential fragment in the sense of Stainton (2009). This is not a novelty considering the details of my proposal about pragmatic intrusion discussed in Capone (2008), where I said that belief reports admit sentential pragmatic components (appositive sentences) as pragmatic components of the explicatures. One of the striking differences between the classical cases of explicature (or implicature, if we adopt terminology by Bach) is that explicatures are normally necessitated by incomplete logical forms often called ‘propositional radicals’ (Bach 1994), while the simple sentences we are confronted with here are apparently complete logical forms and certainly not ‘propositional radicals’ (*prima facie*). However, they are transformed into propositional radicals, once we contextualize them and we arrive at speaker’s intentions that are plausible in context. When we see that, in context, the apparently complete sentential form is indeed in need of completion we have to regard it on a par with other propositional radicals which wear incompleteness on their sleeves (see Huang 2014 on propositional radicals).

In this chapter, I adopt a version of semantic minimalism compatible with contextualism of the moderate or radical type (see Jaszczolt 2016; Saul 2002). As agreed by Borg (2012), there is a version of semantic minimalism according to which at least some sentences are truth-evaluable, which means that, if the corresponding statements are uttered, we know what the world must be like, at least partially (and this view is not incompatible with what I am going to say here), but there is also a stronger version according to which all sentences are truth-evaluable (this version Borg (2012) takes to be compatible with Frege’s ideas about semantics). I have amply proven in previous papers that this (latter) version of minimalism must be debatable given a lot of evidence based on reports of propositional attitudes, *de se* attributions, knowing how utterances, referential interpretations of semantically attributive utterances, indirect reports, etc. and that pragmatic intrusion is such a pervasive and systematic feature of communication systems that Jaszczolt (2005, 2016) correctly assumes that compositionality must be instantiated at the level of merger representations (that is representations where semantic, syntactic and pragmatic information merges) rather than at the level of utterances. In this chapter, I apply the idea of pragmatic intrusion again, but in such a way as to necessitate hidden structure which has work to do in composing with logical forms in order to explain phenomena that are typical of intensional contexts, although they occur at the level of simple sentences, which, intuitively, *prima facie* seem not to be intensional contexts. I argue that it is hidden structure to create intentional contexts, in a way that is largely unexplored by the current literature, especially Saul (2007), who is genuinely puzzled by such phenomena. On this, I will also follow Gregoromichelaki (2016, 118), who says that “as is well known, indirect reports, despite the supposed current speaker’s context perspective, block logical entailments that are encountered in “transparent” environments”.

On various occasions, I was brought to reflect on implicit indirect reports, and this time I will expatiate on embedding explicatures as a case of implicit indirect reports. To show you some examples of implicit indirect reports, consider two cases brought to my attention respectively by a philosopher of language and a conversation analyst:

- (1) John believes Mary went to the cinema
- (2) Allan has not been able to find any significant difference between direct and indirect reports. He also thinks that indirect reports could admit interjections as parts of mixed-quoted segments.

Occasionally, belief reports could be considered cases of implicit indirect reports. In connection with (1), we occasionally reconstruct a verb of saying, as that (sometimes) appears to be the only evidence we might gather in favor of attributing that belief to John.¹⁴

In (2) contextual clues lead us to consider ‘Allan has not been able to find any significant difference between direct and indirect reports’ an indirect report. We might reason like this: how do we know that Allan has not been able to find any significant difference? Presumably we know this because he said that in a paper or a book; thus the speaker is implicitly categorized as a reporter and, in particular, as an indirect reporter. We can reason in a similar way with ‘He also thinks that...’. How do we know that he thinks that...? Presumably because he said that in a book or a paper, thus the speaker is telling us that he said that and is implicitly qualifying himself as a reporter. Analogous considerations apply to an example by Holt (2016) (‘apparently she doesn’t like them’). Holt seems to contrast an expression like ‘apparently she doesn’t like them’ with an expression like ‘she said she doesn’t like them). She comes close to implicit indirect reports, in this example, although she does not care to draw some obvious consequences.

If such considerations or elaborations thereof are accepted, a further step is to say that in a number of cases we need explicatures that specify a verb of saying and a subject (an actor). In this chapter, I shall capitalize on the important consequences of the considerations by Holt, by applying them to the substitution problem for simple sentences (Saul 2007) and to a puzzling case of presupposition evaporation in Soames (2002). The general considerations on implicit indirect reports I intend to apply to substitution in simple sentences (or rather substitution failure) were fruitfully applied by myself and Macagno (forthcoming) to presuppositions. Cases like ‘Mary regrets going to Paris with John’ were analyzed as cases of implicit indirect reports by Macagno and myself, as though they amounted to assertions like ‘Mary says she regrets going to Paris with John’,¹⁵ an analysis which amounts to introduc-

¹⁴Timothy Williamson (p.c.) says “That confuses our evidence for a statement with its content”. I agree that we should avoid the identification of the evidence for a statement with its content (that is the content of the statement), but this does not prevent us from inserting into the statement an implicit constituent dealing with the evidence, in case it is understood that the provision of the evidence is part of what the speaker means (of course I am not saying that this should always occur).

¹⁵Timothy Williamson (p.c.) says that this gets the truth-value wrong if (a) she was lying or (b) she did regret it but didn’t say so. I propose to listen to Williamson, and to confine ourselves to a more limited claim. So I will not argue that this pragmatic increment will take place in general, but I will argue that it can take place occasionally if the increment conforms to the speaker’s intentions (as understood by the Hearer).

ing (or rather, injecting) modal structure in the discourse to prove that, after all, the presupposition (which is normally taken to be entailed by the use of the factive ‘regret’) is not or cannot be projected as an entailment (in the positive sentence) but must be projected, after all, as a conversational implicature. While, if Mary said that she regrets going to Paris with John, she is understood as presupposing that she went to Paris with John, the speaker need not be committed to this due to an entailment but due to a conversational implicature, given that he need not believe everything that Mary said. Although this may sound like a theoretical maneuver, you can clearly see that it does some work (as I tried to say in Capone 2000) in claims about verbs of knowledge, which in Italian but also in English, though not as clearly as in Italian, are subject to semantic erosion. This erosion may be systematically due to implicit indirect reports. Given that ‘X sa che p’ is on occasions interpreted as ‘X says he knows that p’,¹⁶ the knowledge claim turns out to be modalized. And this triggers semantic changes which need to be compensated, in Italian, by the use of the clitic ‘lo’ capable of strengthening the equivalent of the verb ‘know’ at least in certain presuppositional or anaphoric contexts (see Capone 2013a, b and Capone 2000). One may object that my considerations are strongly theory-laden and I must candidly admit that this is so. This is one of the places in which I am guided by theory, although we shall see that this theory has fruitful consequences, otherwise inexplicable.

4 Simple sentences

Simple sentences can sometimes be contexts for substitution failure of co-extensive expressions. Consider the following:

(3) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman went out.

Replacing Clark Kent with Superman in (3) clearly produces a false statement. In (4)

(4) Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent.

¹⁶Here we have an interesting objection from a philosophical point of view. Timothy Williamson (p.c.) says: “I don’t remember a single occasion when I heard that construction being used in a way plausibly so interpreted – the fact that the evidence for the knowledge attribution was X’s claim to know shows nothing to the purpose”. Here the perspective of linguistics may diverge from a philosophical perspective. I quite agree that one cannot – in general – argue in favor of the semantic or pragmatic equivalence between ‘X knows that P’ and ‘X says he knows that p’. Yet all I am saying is that there are contexts, in which ‘X knows that P’ is typically construed as ‘X says he know that p’. But this is not a philosophical point, this is a linguistic point. Thus, I do not expect Timothy Williamson to agree on this, because, understandably, he is worried that I am postulating a semantic/pragmatic equivalence. But I am opposed to such an equivalence as strongly as Williamson, as that would be quite pernicious. What I say is that in certain contexts, or in certain typical contexts, one may have this type of interpretations.

replacing Clark Kent with Superman generates a false statement (one cannot leap more tall buildings than oneself).¹⁷

Saul (2007) rejects fixing treatments by Forbes and Barber (which I briefly discussed in passing) and offers a psychological experiment showing that retrieving stories may well involve keeping two nodes or files for different (coextensive) names (actually, in the experiment, a name and a coextensive definite description). Although the considerations by Saul are of great theoretical interest, they need to be complemented by an approach like the one I am broaching here.

If we admit an embedding explicature in examples such as (3) and (4) we immediately show that these can be intensional contexts that block substitution.

- (5) [We are told (in the Superman story) that] Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman went out
 (6) [We are told (in the Superman story) that] Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent.

Manuel García-Carpintero (in a personal communication) voiced a very reasonable objection to this, expressed in the following:

After all, the story need not say anything about the character going in or out a phone booth. How can we accommodate this fact into this explanation?

I suppose the author has in mind a scenario in which a speaker says:

- (7) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman went out

without relying on the frame of the story (we all know). But this is the situation of the unenlightened (Saul 2007), which is easy to explain because, according to the unenlightened, ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ need not be co-extensive and thus he would naturally take (3) and (4) to have different truth-conditions.

This reply does not suffice for Saul, who in a p.c. writes that I should spell out in a more detailed way that the story may not e.g. contain the claim that Superman

¹⁷Neal Norrick p.c. says:

“You say of your example (3),

(3) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman went out.

that replacing ‘Clark Kent’ with ‘Superman’ clearly produces a false statement. But I see nothing wrong with:

Superman went into the phone booth and Superman went (back) out.

Superman went into the phone booth and Superman came (back) out.

Though they mean something different than (3):

The individual who is sometimes Clark Kent (mild mannered reporter, with glasses, in a business suit) and sometimes Superman (jumps tall buildings, sans glasses, in a red suit, with a cape) went into the phone booth as Clark Kent and came out as Superman”.

I agree with Norrick that these intuitions are correct. However, they do not interfere with what we have to say about the substitution failure problem. This case seems not to accord with the script of the story. Since the script is not followed, this is a context in which it is indifferent whether we use ‘Superman’ or ‘Clark Kent’.

leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent.¹⁸ I suppose that both García-Carpintero and Saul have in mind some reaction by someone who had read the story or who has watched the film, who says: “Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent”. The narrator of the story never said that and this appears to be an inference by the reader/recipient of the story (or film). In such a context, the explicature (*We are told that*) *Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent* cannot be constructed/calculated. Nevertheless, the NPs are not inter-substitutable.

There may be two types of answers to this very compelling objection.

A

It is true that in the story we never encountered the statement ‘Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent’. However, for some reason, the speaker is persuaded that this is what he heard or gathered from the story. Thus, although the statement built up through an explicature ‘(We have been told that) Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent’ is false, this is what the speaker means and although the statement may appear to someone¹⁹ false, it is not false because of the substitution problem (Superman leaps more tall buildings than himself). It is false even if the speaker believes it to be true.

B

The alternative answer proceeds as follows.

One does not only say the things literally said, but also the obvious consequences of what was said.²⁰ (According to Norrick 2016, the speaker can inject things she has

¹⁸Timothy Williamson (p.c.) writes:

“In any case, the fact that the examples are drawn from fiction is irrelevant to the way they are normally meant to be understood. If you want a genuine real life case, there was a man who changed his name from ‘Dalton’ to ‘d’Alton’ (he thought the latter sounded more upper-class). It is tempting to say ‘Dalton was born and d’Alton died’ and not ‘d’Alton was born and Dalton died’. The key issues are the same”.

Presumably this goes against my idea that the opacity in Saul’s example derives from the insertion of a constituent saying that we heard a fictional story. But we can deal with Timothy Williamson’s intriguing case in two ways. a) we could say that although we are not confronted with a fictional, but with a real story, we still understand the substitution failure to descend from our understanding the utterances as framed in the context of a (real) story; b) we could say that this is only a case of implicit quotation and the utterance has to be understood as ‘The man called ‘Dalton’ was born and the man called ‘D’Alton’ died. This case aligns with the cases provided by Saka and discussed here in this chapter.

¹⁹But not to him or people like him who are under the impression of having been told a story that includes this statement (which however was never pronounced).

²⁰It is of some interest that Norrick (2016, 97) believes that reported speech need not reproduce utterances that are actually spoken. He remarks that reporters can report talk they cannot have observed. (This remark is particularly suitable as a reply to García-Carpintero objection). Although Norrick’s remarks are confined to direct reports, it is not difficult to extend such considerations to indirect reports as well (we saw in a previous chapter that the distinction between direct and indirect reports is gradually being eroded).

not heard into a report - whether direct or indirect). This goes back to Higginbotham (p.c.), Capone (2001) (Modal adverbs and discourse) and to Saul (2007). So it is true that the speaker (the story teller) never said ‘Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent’, but if we include the obvious consequences of what she said, in a sense, although not in a literal one, she said: Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent. A problem that may be raised, at this point, is that since this level of what is said mixes both literal meaning and inferences, it cannot guarantee opacity, as opacity (normally) stems from literal sayings.²¹ There is something true about this objection; however, we have already departed from the view that opacity is necessarily linked to literal meanings (literal sayings), as is known from the pragmatic literature on belief reports (including work by Saul and by myself). Since opacity in belief reports is not induced by literal sayings but by pragmatic intrusion, there is no need to think that this objection is cogent (or is more cogent than similar objections to pragmatic treatments of belief reports).

The other possibility is to go along with Saka (see his conference abstract, 2016 and his paper entitled ‘Universal opacity’ (Saka 2016)) that a modal component is part of any assertion. This is known since work by Capone (2001). Saka (2016) allows intrusion of a component such as ‘the speaker is saying’ or ‘the speaker said’ or, alternatively, and more simply, ‘I believe that’. In his paper entitled ‘Universal opacity’, Saka (2016), rather courageously, goes as far as to say the following:

In this way, opacity is everywhere.

This should not be surprising. After all, whenever speaker S makes an assertion, S expresses a belief (...). This means that S implicitly reports S’s own belief; yet the report is not explicit because S does not actually *say* that S holds a given belief. That belief reports are implicit in acts of assertion is made clear by Moore’s paradox. B]. When S says ‘[a] it is raining, and [b] I don’t believe that it is raining’, S reports a belief by an utterance of [a] that is contradicted by [b]. Consequently, if belief reports are opaque then assertions generally are too (and if other attitude reports are opaque then other speech acts are opaque).

The proposal by Saka is less contextual than mine, but we have to see all of its consequences. One of them, I am afraid, is that in all contexts it is not possible to replace an NP with a coextensive one *salva veritate* (that is, keeping the truth-conditions the same). In particular, while Leibniz’s law applies in general, for the simple cases in which this law applies, Saka would have to provide contextual information that blocks substitutivity as demonstrated by Saul-like examples. And in default contexts, where there is no information to the contrary, it is not easy to delete this presumption that (coextensive) NPs cannot be intersubstituted.

Interestingly, Saka considers examples that allegedly prove universal opacity and that are certainly of considerable worth, although I should say they come from someone who has done a lot of work on quotation (whether explicit or implicit) and, thus, are biased towards implicit quotation. The most suggestive examples of his list are the following:

²¹ See Wettstein 2016 on the notion that indirect discourse is the child of direct discourse and belief reports the grandchild (Wettstein 2016, 418).

'Marilyn Monroe is glamorous' does not entail 'Norma Jean Baker is glamorous', even though Monroe and Baker have the same extension;

'Norma Jean Baker gave me her autograph' does not entail 'Marilyn Monroe gave me her autograph';

'Vampire refers to vampires' does not entail 'zombie refers to vampires', even though 'vampire' and 'zombie' have the same null extension.

It is not surprising that these sentences do not entail the sentences obtained by replacing an NP with a co-referential one, because there is a tacit reference to a name, and thus all of these (with the exception of the last) are cases of implicit quotations. The first sentence could be paraphrased, without losing much of its meaning, with 'The name "Marilyn Monroe" is glamorous' or with 'Both Marilyn Monroe and her name are glamorous', should one be unhappy with the former gloss. (Compare with "Cat" has three letters', an example well known to Saka and theorists interested in quotation). The second example is tricky. If Monroe gave me an autograph, then Baker gave me an autograph, although not the same autograph. If Monroe gave me her autograph, then Baker gave me her autograph, although the signature on it was not the one saying 'Baker'. (More plausibly, it is just a conversational implicature, Timothy Williamson p.c. says, that is responsible for the idea that Monroe gave me her autograph as Monroe). If Monroe gave me her autograph, then Baker gave me her autograph as Monroe. Saka does not consider that the entailment he prohibits is one that hosts a certain amount of pragmatic intrusion and completion. So while I agree that, if Monroe gave me her autograph as Monroe, it is not the case that she gave me her autograph as Baker, the incomplete (or semantically underdetermined) 'Monroe gave me her autograph' in a sense can be seen as entailing 'Baker gave me her autograph'. It is only once we recognize pragmatic intrusion (as affecting the constituent 'her autograph') that the entailment does not seem to work; but a sufficiently minimal semantics in the sense of Cappelen and Lepore (2005) should not really find these examples particularly problematic; in any case it would find suitable ways of dealing with them. The example about vampires and zombies seems to trade on the fact that 'vampire' and 'zombie' have a null extension and, thus, they have the same extension. But the fact that 'Vampire refers to vampires' does not entail 'zombie refers to vampires' is independently required by linguistic conventions and is not an exception (to Leibniz's law) which does not require that we should be able to replace zombie with vampire only because they have the same null extension. Presumably Leibniz's law is valid only for words that are coextensive and have a non-null extension. In the case discussed by Saka, no one can believe or is allowed to believe that if 'vampire' refers to vampires then 'vampire' refers to zombies (in the sense that the latter belief follows from the first).²² What blocks substitution in this case is the fact that there is a linguistic convention saying that the sentence 'Vampire refers to vampires' does not entail 'Vampire

²²To provide an easier case: if one believes P one must accept P or Q, but one cannot say that the specific belief 'P or Q' follows from P, given that the believer is equally justified in believing 'P or N', 'P or R', 'P or Z', etc. And there is no reason why on accepting P he was lead to believe 'P or Q' in particular.

refers to zombies' in the sense that the speaker who accepts the latter accepts it in virtue of the former²³

The last case discussed by Saka I would like to consider, which is less disturbing than the others, is the following:

'There's the Evening Star' said in p.m. does not entail 'There is the morning star' said in p.m. Here Saka mixes conditions on the use of definite descriptions which are quasi-names (appropriateness conditions due to presuppositions) with entailments (The evening Star presupposes that this expression is appropriate in a context in which it is evening; but this is not a semantic entailment). Of course, nobody says that that these two ways of saying things are equivalent, but this is due to conditions on language use (that is to say, presuppositions), rather than to entailments. Of course, someone who says 'There's the Evening Star' would never say, at the same time, 'There is the Morning Star', but this does not mean that in terms of Russellian semantics the two sentences are not equivalent. (However, Timothy Williamson in p.c. says "Surely the two sentences are indeed not logically equivalent on Russell's analysis). This mixing of conditions on language use and entailments is something we would not expect.²⁴

5 Soames' problem

Now we move on to Soames' really baffling problem. Another problem embedding explicatures (in implicit indirect reports) can fix is the one that baffles Scott Soames (2002) on p. 231 (actually pp. 231–33) of his 'Beyond Rigidity'.

Mary has learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel (the famous philosopher). But this presupposes she did not know that Peter Hempel was Carl Hempel.

²³Timothy Williamson writes (p.c.):

"There is no such convention. How would it have arisen? The case has never occurred to ordinary speakers".

I quite agree with Williamson that an ordinary speaker need not be aware of a negative convention saying that 'Vampire refers to vampires' does not entail 'Zombie refers to zombies' in the sense that the speaker who accepts the latter does not accept it in virtue of the former. However, in the same way in which there can be no convention concerning negative entailment, there can be no convention concerning positive entailment. Surely these cases never occur to ordinary speakers and thus they have never come to forming conventions concerning these cases. But if there are no such conventions, matters such entailment cannot be settled. Lacking semantic entailment, which is unlike logical implication, which is what Saka has uppermost in mind, there is no reason to say that a speaker who says 'Vampire refers to vampires' should derive in particular the thought 'Zombie refers to zombies'. (Given that many other words have null extension, there is not a reason for replacing a word having null extension with any other particular word that has a null extension, rather than another chosen at random. There could be so many replacements, why should one choose one and not another?). So it appears to me that Saka's interesting example is best dealt with by invoking the difference between semantic entailment and logical implication. (Substitution is licensed by entailment but not by logical implication).

²⁴However, a point on which Saka and myself agree is that Superman examples cannot be understood in isolation and need contextualization. This is compatible with everything else I am going to assert in this paper.

Therefore, she did not know that Peter Hempel was Peter Hempel (since Peter Hempel is coextensive with Carl Hempel²⁵). However, she certainly knew (and knows) *a priori* that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel. Alas, this looks like a contradiction.

This is a problem given that presuppositions are (standardly) considered (pragmatic) non-cancellable inferences. However, in Fabrizio and Alessandro (2016) (see also Macagno's abstract for the Palermo Conference, May 2016), we showed that in many cases presuppositions are cancellable inferences connected with constructions of explicatures. Consider what happens when we construct the plausible explicature:

(8) (Mary says) she has learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel.

This presupposes that, beforehand, Mary did not believe (or know) that Peter Hempel was Carl Hempel. However, this is only a cancellable conversational implicature.²⁶ Thus, although we are to accept that Mary did not know that Peter Hempel was Carl Hempel, this is only a cancellable inference and we need not be committed to the semantic logical form [Mary did not know that Peter Hempel was Peter Hempel], as a pragmatic inference involves deleting whatever elements are in conflict with our world knowledge.

An objection (reasonably) raised by Manuel García-Carpintero is that, after all, we may be in a context in which, although Mary learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel, she never says that she has just learned that. Thus reporting her change of state – the transition from a state in which she does not know that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel, the philosopher, to a state in which she does know (therefore has learnt) that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel – without her ever vocalizing that change of state – might be possible. In at least such a context, one must be prepared to say:

(9) Mary learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel

without being able to report:

(10) Mary said she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel.

However, in such a context it must be true that although she did not say she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel, she is disposed to say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel (should someone ask her an appropriate question). Thus, although this context is one in which Mary did not use a verb of saying, holding a

²⁵Williamson p.c. writes an intriguing comment: is a person really coextensive with himself?

²⁶Timothy Williamson writes (p.c.): No, it isn't. To learn something is to come to know it. Therefore learning it requires not having known it. Ok I agree with this, I have no quarrel with this. But here we are dealing with the projection problem of presuppositions in complex sentences, and it is notorious that 'say' is a plug to presuppositions (see Levinson 1983) and thus, if they are projected upwards, this must be done through conversational implicatures.

psychological process such as ‘learning’ (applied to this specific that-clause) goes hand to hand with having a disposition to say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel.²⁷ Now suppose we accept that it is not true Mary said that she learned Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel; this can be the case either because she did not say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel or because she did not say she learned that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel. But, of course, she knows that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel and thus she could have never learned that.²⁸ Thus, she did not say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel (even if she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel). But even if she did not say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel, this is something she might have said, even if she knew from the beginning that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel and thus she could not be ignorant that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel. Since Mary might be inclined to say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel, on the presupposition that she knew from the beginning that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel, she would not have said that she learned that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel, as she would have had no motivation to say that, given that if she had said that, she would said something patently uninformative. If Mary had no disposition to say that she learned that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel, then it cannot be true that she learned that Peter Hempel is Peter Hempel. End of the contradiction.

The most cogent problem in this analysis (as pointed out by Wayne Davis p.c.) is that one may learn something without having a disposition to say one has learned it (e.g. Davis p.c. says “Animals can learn without having a disposition to say anything” (about what they learned)). I do not personally find these objections problematic (one may say that human beings are different from animals, that human beings are trained in educational systems in which one way of testing whether one has learned something is to solicit replies concerning the content learned and people who are obstinate enough not to say what they have learned count as not having learned something. There are contexts (e.g. the school) where a teacher who says ‘Mary has learned that $3 \times 3 = 9$ ’ means ‘Mary systematically replies to my question about the product 3×3 by saying that it equals 9’. I do not say that these contexts are ubiquitous, but if there are contexts such as these, then at least in such contexts Soames’ problem does not arise. In addition to such a small victory, as a linguist

²⁷Timothy Williamson comments (p.c.) “No. In learning something, someone may forget not having known it, or simply have a strong disposition not to talk about such matters”. I agree with Williamson that this is a logical possibility, but how realistic is it? This is like saying that one who believes ‘p’ has no inclination to say ‘I believe p’ (because he may not be inclined to talk about what he believes). I agree that in some circumstances, he may have no reason to say p or have specific reasons to say ‘I do not believe that p’. But one should at least admit that if the speaker is motivated to say what he has learned, he has an inclination to say ‘I have learned that p’. (Verbs like ‘believe’ are treated like dispositional verbs by Davis 2005, as well as by many other authors).

²⁸Williamson (p.c.) writes: “Didn’t she learn it when she first heard about him?”. But if we know something *a priori*, what we learned when we first heard about Peter Hempel is not something we learned *a posteriori*, but something we could know in principle by reflecting on it. (All we had to learn was his name).

(but I understand that the point of view of the philosopher may be different), I argue here (and I understand it takes some courage to do so) that expressions like ‘X knows that p’ or ‘X remembers that p’ or ‘X learned that p’ are by default implicit indirect reports. There is nothing bizarre in the idea that there should be implicit evidentials in our western languages which match the explicit evidentials Levinson (1988) discusses in his work on footing and which, very often, are described by contemporary linguists in work on modality. In fact, it would be quite strange if English or Italian did not have such evidentials. I argue these evidentials are compressed and appear at the level of the explicature. I doubt that these considerations should interest philosophers, but they should be of concern to linguists. If such considerations are accepted, then Soames’ problem is dissolved.

There is one further way to argue that Soames’ problem is easily dissolved. We do not even have to accept that all or most contexts are contexts in which implicit evidentials are added in the explicature of the utterance (e.g. X said that...). Suppose that we can prove that there are, at least, some contexts in which such implicit evidentials are added. Suppose further there are other contexts in which one need not have any evidence that such additions are intended. The contexts that allow embedding explicatures are contexts where Soames’ problem does not arise. The contexts that do not apparently provide evidence in favor of embedding explicatures are contexts in which a thorny logical problem arises. Then it is obvious that speakers, who know that there are at least some contexts where embedding explicatures are required, will try to adopt a Principle of Charity stance and will try to interpret the utterance in a way that is not illogical. It is a consequence of this that rational speakers will then extend such contexts and allow for the possibility that the contexts where they are are such that the logical problems disappear. Thus, they will presuppose contexts similar to the ones where the embedding explicatures are required.

6 Objections

Now it is natural to discuss some thorny objections that come to mind, in order to exorcise them or, at least, in order to diminish their cogency. So far I have discussed the enrichment cases called ‘embedding explicatures’ or ‘implicit indirect reports’ as possible cases of free enrichments.²⁹ These cases certainly seem to share

²⁹Borg (2012, 22–23) says: “I’ll use the term ‘free pragmatic enrichment’ as the label for pragmatic effects on semantic content which are driven solely by pragmatic, contextual demands concerning appropriate interpretation, that is to say, for pragmatic effects on semantic content which are not required by any lexico-syntactic element in the sentence”. Huang (2014) on free enrichment says: “We have already seen in chapters 2 and 7 that in this case, although there does not seem to be an overt indexical or covert slot in the linguistically decoded logical form of the sentence uttered, the logical form nevertheless needs to be conceptually enriched. The process of free enrichment is “free” because it is entirely pragmatically rather than linguistically based. Free enrichment is a typical optional and contextually driven ‘top-down’ process (Recanati 2004, 24–6)” (p. 313).

important features with other cases of free enrichment, mainly the fact that the truth-conditional import of the utterance cannot be calculated without the pragmatic part of the explicature and that we also need to posit extra structure within the sentence in order to ensure certain plausible and desirable truth-conditional effects. These cases of explicatures are, admittedly, more complex than the ones usually considered in the literature, as they amount to adding a sentential (or quasi-sentential) constituent and also creating embedding (with its correlated opacity effects). Indeed, to be completely fair, these embedding explicatures share the same characteristics with cases of implicit arguments, which, as I suggested in Capone (2013a, b), are part of pragmatic intrusion and explain away alleged cases of free enrichment, providing an explanation which, as Jaszczolt (2016) would say, would lean towards minimalism (or indexicalism - hidden or aponic indexicality, as Neale (2007) calls it - which is a way of rescuing minimalism). However, in Capone (2013a, b), I tried to explain away complicated cases of pragmatic intrusion by resorting to minimal implicit arguments, generally pronominals or null pronominals, availing myself of general syntactic considerations already available in the Chomskyan literature about implicit arguments (Roeper 1987). But these syntactic elements were minimal and not of the sentential type. Instead, here in this chapter we are faced with the necessity of resorting to null elements which are not minimal, like pronominals, but consist of sentential fragments and complementizers that embed other sentences. In short, although I tentatively started the chapter with the hypothesis that we may be confronted with (admittedly unusual) cases of explicatures, now that I carefully examine all the options that are available, I should candidly say that we need to evaluate both the option that the kind of implicit embeddings I called 'implicit indirect reports' may be free enrichment processes providing explicatures with constituents or that they may (much more simply) be implicit arguments, in other words covert indexicals to adopt parlance by Stanley. Let me start with the option that these embeddings, after all, are nothing but implicit arguments (or are like implicit arguments). Following Pietroski (2005a, b), these look like external arguments in the sense that they are not internal as they are not mandated by the valence structure of verbs and, therefore, cannot correspond to internal arguments. Positing such implicit structure is like an admission that all sentences have combinatorial possibilities and that the structure I posit is not *ad hoc*, but general enough to cover all cases. So such implicit arguments are not optionally there in order to rescue the problem of lack of substitution in simple sentences, but they must be there in any case. Such a solution would not be *ad hoc* if we considered it an elegant way of accommodating the considerations by Saka (2016) on assertion – given that assertions, according to Saka, are tacitly (or implicitly) modalized, thanks to sentences like 'I believe that' or 'I know that' which are prefaced to all assertions (but admittedly, pace Saka, other modals could fill the implicit slot, such as 'I was told that', as otherwise this theory of assertion would be too idealized and would not allow examples of ordinary discourse in which one implicitly modalises an assertion by getting it across that one has only heard or guessed the asserted fact). It is of some interest that Saka's treatment, which assumes some kind of implicit argument, although I do not think he spelled out the semantic and syntactic details of this

proposal,³⁰ kills two birds with the same stone: it provides a belief (or knowledge) operator, when required, otherwise it provides a weaker modal operator, something along the lines of ‘I was told that’ (evidentiality comes into the picture as Levinson (1988) has magisterially explained in his article on footing and the world languages; furthermore, Saka has no serious problem in accepting that sometimes knowledge by hearsay is understood to motivate the assertion (‘told’ can also have a widespread non-factive use, but it can also have a factive use, as made explicit by the clitic ‘lo’ in Italian (Giovanni lo ha sentito che p)). So, the very fact that my treatment agrees or seems to agree with the specifics of Saka’s treatment is not ‘ad hoc’. However, it should be granted that the kind of implicit arguments I adopted in my proposal are applied only optionally, otherwise opacity would be systematically generated and this is not really desirable. In order to make Saka’s considerations more malleable we would have to consider them not as applicable in the way I construe my implicit indirect reports, the latter being definitely optionally inserted. Given that Saka’s modal components seem to be more stable and less optional than my embedding explicatures, I suppose that the right results are obtained by conjunction insertion (that is the insertion of a conjunctive structure) as in the following structure: Mary went to the cinema (and I believe this/I know this). This is one way to prevent the implicit modal from having scope over the full simple sentence thus creating opacity and preventing NPs in general from being substitutable following Leibniz’s law.³¹ My explanation seems to me to accommodate facts noted by Saka but also seems to be required by further considerations. In fact, it is independently motivated by cases of conversational elliptical structure (or sentential fragments, as called by Jaszczolt 2016, 64) as in:

(11)

A: What did John say?

B: “Mary is in Paris”

we certainly need to contextualize the answer by B and, in order to make sense of it; we need to insert some structure at the level of the explicature, namely: (John said that) Mary is in Paris. The only difference between the embedding explicatures I am

³⁰Williamson (p.c.) claims that this view is not equivalent to his view on assertion (at some point I thought there was a similarity):

“No, this is NOT and never was my view. That the speaker knows is not even implicitly part of the content of the assertion. Claiming otherwise gets the truth-value of many assertions wrong, e.g. when the speaker is Gettiered or aims to be lying but in fact speaks the truth”.

³¹Timothy Williamson (p.c.) produces the very good objection that “the second conjunct is still as opaque as before and thus infects the conjunction with opacity. In fact, since the second conjunct entails the first conjunct, the conjunction is equivalent to the second conjunct after all, which is back to the previous proposal”. If there is a way out of this problem, this must be to avoid the use of conjunction altogether. One can use the full stop, to signal that we have two distinct assertions proffered at different times: P. I know that P. Another solution is to say that the knowledge component is provided through presupposition. I think the latter is the safest.

writing about in the case of simple sentences and the explicature in the above example is that the latter case looks like a case of direct quotation; but it need not be so analyzed (or at least not necessarily) given that English syntax allows the deletion of the complementizer (not to mention the fact that at least some original philosophers like Donald Davidson tried to explain indirect discourse through direct quotation taking the complementizer *that* to have more or less the function of a demonstrative that refers to the following sentence). If we had doubts about the reasonableness of these considerations, we can tamper with the example a bit and replace it with the following:

(12)

A: What did John say?

B: That Mary is in Paris.

Clearly, we cannot have a sentence with a complementizer without a verb and such a verb without a subject; thus we need to reconstruct the sentential fragment ‘John said’ as part of the logical form, which is integrated into the explicature. So, we have gleaned independent evidence in favor of treating implicit embeddings as implicit arguments, syntactic slots that are required in order to make sense of the sentence and also of the statement.³² Needless to say, these implicit arguments (in the case of embedded explicatures) would have to work like sentential variables which would need to be saturated in context (see Recanati 2004, 2010, 2001; Huang 2014 on saturation processes) by resorting to bits of information that are relevant and come from common ground (see Stalnaker 2014 and Walczak 2016 on common ground).³³

Let me now consider the alternative option. Suppose that the implicit embeddings (as part of explicatures) are mandated by free enrichment processes. Such processes would require inserting structure even if we assume that no structure is mandated at the level of logical form (in other words, we dispense with the indexicalist hypothesis). These would be cases of expansions, as Huang (2014) and also would call them. Expansions, following Huang’s (2014) important considerations, need not entail the logical form which gives input to them. This consideration, which seems to me to be of considerable importance, explains why apparently simple sentences are not interpreted ‘de re’, while simple sentences which are genu-

³²Williamson (p.c.) says: “But there is no good motivation to manifest blatantly elliptical cases as in (11) and (12) to ordinary cases”. I agree we should reflect on this. If anything, Williamson’s consideration steers us in the direction of the free enrichment view.

³³“Saturation is a pragmatic process whereby a given slot, position or variable in the linguistically decoded logical form is contextually filled. In other words, in this type of pragmatic enrichment, a slot, position or variable must be contextually saturated for the utterance to express a complete proposition” (Huang 2014, 312). As the reader can work out for herself, my proposal is not in line with standard proposals about saturation, as we need a two step level: the provision of a (sentential) variable; assigning value (or saturating) this sentential variable. This two step process, obviously, occurs instantaneously, and thus cannot be part of conscious or reflective inference.

inely simple sentences are normally interpreted ‘de re’ and, thus, do not give rise to the opacity effects dealt with by Saul in her important book. Inferential behavior with respect to opacity and Leibniz’s law makes it clear that the input logical form and the expansion obtained pragmatically are different in that they have different entailments and one does not entail the other (the expansion does not entail the input provided by a genuinely simple sentence). *A priori*, we know that the free enrichment hypothesis is preferable because it does not place a burden on structure – a human being who constructs the explicature need not know (in the Chomskyan sense of *know*) that the sentence has that structure, but the structure can be created ‘ad hoc’, if necessary, by using syntactic fragments that are used anyway in sentences such as ‘John said that’ or ‘I was told that’. The only doubts we may have about free enrichment concern constraints on explicatures. In a paper by Hall (2014), which seems to me to be of some importance, constraints on explicatures are required to answer the charges (by indexicalists like, e.g. Stanley (2007) or Ostertag (2008) that free enrichment processes could overgenerate examples since they are not, after all, (sufficiently) constrained. As Ostertag (2008, cited by Hall 2014, 7)) writes:

While the Contextualist remains faithful to speakers’ intuitions, there is a question whether she can give a principled account of how we arrive at the relevant proposition. If the mechanism underlying pragmatic enrichment are truly “free” – unconstrained by logical form – then there is a real worry that our speaker’s capacity to interpret those utterances freely enriched by context will elude systematic treatment. (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 May).

In contrast with free enrichment processes, which are held to be unconstrained (and in any case it is not easy to establish well consolidated constraints that can stop over-generation), indexicalism is seen to be less susceptible to this kind of over-generation problems, since it is clear that a pragmatic enrichment is triggered only when there is something in the linguistic structure that mandates it; if there is nothing in the linguistic structure to mandate it, then there will be no question whether the pragmatic enrichment arises or not (Hall 2014).

The main answer by Hall to such charges is that a) the examples cannot be over-generated (at random) because pragmatic processes generating them should have access to context and to valid arguments (though explicatures may not be a matter of deduction);³⁴ b) free enrichment processes should always be local and thus enrichment processes that are not local should be excluded; c) the over-generation of explicatures should be paralleled by the over-generation of conversational implicatures, but this does not occur because conversational implicatures/explicatures are calculated on the basis of arguments or procedures that are rational and not irratio-

³⁴On p. 7, Hall (2014) says “With free enrichment processes in general, it is straightforward to explain why they do or do not occur. Hearers infer an implicature – also a ‘free’ pragmatic effect – if it is required for the interpretation to meet the expected level of informativeness, relevance, etc., if the contextual premises for doing so are sufficiently accessible, and if the speaker can reasonably be taken to have intended the hearer to make the inference”. Of course this is reminiscent of my considerations in Capone (2006, 2009).

nal; d) inferential augmentations in explicatures should be minimal and cannot reflect the processes involved in implicatures that are of the deductive type and, thus, are far from being minimal (they are also augmentations which are not propositional but sub-propositional (see Hall 2014, 18)).³⁵

Hall writes as follows:

Implicatures are properly inferentially warranted – logically warranted – because they follow deductively from premises. Between logical form and explicature, however, there is no relation of logically valid inference, and free enrichments, merely involving operations over sub-propositional constituents, do not follow logically from anything, but are recovered on the basis of their high accessibility in the context of utterance (Hall 2014, 18).

Although I do not dwell on a detailed defense of Hall's ideas, it seems to me that the essence of them is that explicatures and free enrichment processes, like conversational implicatures, should be constrained by rationality considerations and these immediately rule out the bizarre examples created *ad hoc* by Stanley.³⁶ In passing, I should note that Hall takes into serious consideration and explains away the idea by Elbourne (2008) that, in general, we cannot over-generate explicatures by conjoining an argument with another argument, in other words we cannot create (parallel) arguments through free enrichment processes.

Elbourne's argument seems to be that in the following case

(13) Everyone likes Sally (and his mother)

we are inserting an argument into the structure of the verb 'like' in addition to the one we already have; this is not licit and we must have something to block this (hypothetical) inference (Everyone likes Sally: Everyone likes Sally and his mother (in other words, this inference has a structure which must be blocked). In details, Elbourne's (2008, 99) constraint is as follows:

It is not possible in pragmatic enrichment to add extra arguments to those contributed by items in the syntax.

But this constraint can hardly be a syntactic or a semantic one, since nothing prevents me from adding an argument to another through conjunction, as that is always allowed by syntactic structure and semantic composition rules. It is also to be

³⁵This is enough to exclude NP or VP conjuncts which would need to be derived from fully propositional premises, often through deductive inferences (see various discussions in Hall's paper on how such arguments can be constructed e.g. p. 11). As Hall writes, "Once the interpretation settles into a valid argument, the pragmatic processes that contribute to explicature are those whose effect has been local, modifying a sub-propositional constituent of logical form, while the processes that result in implicatures are those whose effect is global, in that they are represented as following logically from fully propositional premises" (p. 19).

³⁶A crucial objection by Hall to the over-generation charges by the indexicalists is that "these indexicals do not exclude other pragmatic effects, which means that the indexicalist is just as susceptible as the contextualist to the examples that the former levels against the idea of pragmatic enrichment, such as (7) above" (p. 8).

doubted that this constraint follows from specific pragmatic rules such as the one advocated by Hall, which amounts to this:

free enrichment processes must be local.

Why should they be local? In what sense local? If by ‘local’ Hall means modification³⁷ (presumably of a constituent by the insertion of a modifier), and this appears to be the case given that she is replying to Stanley who considers **set intersection** (modification) a licit enrichment,³⁸ then there are cases which are not local, such as ‘The ham sandwich has to pay the bill’ (cases of deferred reference as genuine cases of pragmatic intrusion have been discussed by Hall (2014) and Stanley (2005) see also Nunberg (1995), Recanati (2004), who called them cases of ‘semantic transfer’ and Levinson (2000)).³⁹ Here free enrichment does not amount to modification, but to insertion of structure ‘(The person who ordered) the Ham sandwich has to pay the bill’.⁴⁰ The kind of free enrichment we have in belief reports, according to most pragmaticians, such as e.g. Salmon (1986, 2007), Richard (2013) or Soames (2015) amounts to adding another argument (under the mode of presentation *x*) and even authors like Bach who resort to clausal apposition require extra constituents like ‘qua NP’ (Bach 2000). Furthermore, Capone (2008) has treated belief reports as involving implicit appositive sentences, which clearly do not work as modifiers of NPs, but the modes of presentations of each NP embedded in the verb of belief had to be associated (through some sort of binding) with a constituent to be extrapolated from the sentential appositive (as in: John believes that Mary is happy [MoP/s Mary is happy]), thus, although in a dubious sense one could say that the sentential appositive is a local enrichment process because it simply modifies a sentence through apposition, the cross-reference by constituents of the sentence embedded in the belief verb to constituents (modes of presentation) of the sentential apposition could not and could never occur in a way that Hall could describe as ‘local’ (anaphora may well be involved and this is not a local relation). Thus the locality constraint seems to me to be an *ad hoc* measure, one which does not flow from general principles of rationality and is contradicted in practice by data. Surely I would agree that,

³⁷And indeed there is evidence that this is what she means as she quotes Recanati (2004) saying that what is meant by a local pragmatic process is that “one modifies non-propositional subparts of the linguistic logical form and, as Recanati puts it, it is the modified meaning of these subparts that goes into the composition process” (p. 14).

³⁸However, it should be noted that, according to Hall, set intersection is not the only instantiation of modification, as one can always modify an NP through disjunction (Frenchmen (or Belgians)).

³⁹Hall stresses the fact that although Stanley tries to account for pragmatic intrusion through covert indexicals, whenever this is possible, he makes the concession that at least in the case of deferred reference we are confronted with a genuine case of pragmatic intrusion that is not mandated by linguistic structure.

⁴⁰I remind readers that ‘free enrichment’ is usually taken by the literature to mean free of linguistic control’. Free enrichments could be seen to be pragmatic processes complementary to those mandated by covert linguistic structure in that the effects of context are linguistically optional (Hall 2014).

everything being equal, one would have to prefer a local to a non-local free enrichment process, but since not all things are equal, such a constraint, in practice, would lose its efficacy. But why should the locality constraint be required, if Hall's other constraints work pretty well in ensuring that Stanley's counterexamples are not over-generated? I propeud for parsimony in the case of explanations and I think that if a constraint can be proven to be efficient we do not need a battery of alternative or similar constraints. (Hall's main method of blocking over-generation of explicatures is to say that the explicature should be motivated in a rational way). But now, let me pause a bit to explain what would change for my little theory if we accepted the locality constraint by Hall. In such a case, we would not be able to say that the embedding explicature is a local free enrichment as it does not amount to (simple NP) modification (sentential fragments like those discussed by Stainton would be reserved to a similar destiny). The fact that it does not amount to modification but to positing a sentential fragment might persuade us to take sides with the indexicalist hypothesis, but not necessarily, because I have already said that the localist hypothesis conflicts with a range of data we could explain as free enrichments. Most importantly, mixed indirect reports could not be accounted for by free enrichment if the localist hypothesis was adopted,⁴¹ and given that it would be difficult to posit implicit arguments at any position in the structure and given that mixed segments of indirect reports could occur everywhere and even concern determiners or prepositions, then by Hall's view mixed indirect reports could neither be cases of implicit arguments (being explainable by the indexicalist hypothesis) nor cases of free enrichment. I propose to drop the requirement of locality, downgrading it to a desideratum, making it necessary that if a process can be local rather than global, it will be local. But this is only a desideratum of the theory and not a stringent constraint that would tell us to abandon the free enrichment hypothesis, in the case of embedding explicatures.

7 Free enrichment

Now one may accuse me of not having settled on any one option in particular in trying to answer the question whether my embedding explicatures are implicit arguments or otherwise free enrichments and indeed I find it difficult to settle on a certain option because it is not yet clear what the advantages or disadvantages are.

⁴¹In 'Mary said that "Elisabeth" went to London', the explicature we obtain is: Mary said that Elisabeth (whom she called 'Elisabeth') went to London. Here the pragmatic component of the explicature is not a local process of modification but amounts to insertion of structure. (One has to replace "Elisabeth" with: Elisabeth, whom she called 'Elisabeth. This hardly looks like modification or a local process, as to have modification one would have to have: "Elisabeth" whom she called "Elisabeth", but this would be an absurd kind of modification).

It is possible that faced with a new set of data and of phenomena, we may have to take a decision.⁴²

However, there is something which urges me to make up my mind and opt for the free enrichment option. Obviously, the flexibility of free enrichment is something that is desirable, because we do not know or predict what kind of work will be placed on implicit embeddings in the future. Furthermore, there is a range of data, namely the ones discussed by Saka (Saka 2016), which persuaded me that there are advantages in choosing optional pragmatic processes like free enrichment. It is true that something is needed along the lines of ‘I believe’ or ‘I know’ to modalize an assertion, and this must be an implicit element of the assertion, possibly an implicit element corresponding to ‘I believe that p’ or ‘I know that p’. However, it immediately strikes us that such a treatment would predict opacity effects for any assertion and any assertion would *ipso facto* amount to a propositional attitude report and thus would make opacity obligatory. But we know that the kind of data focused on by Saul (and Saka) is not the normal data we have and that NPs positions in assertions (unless embedded in subordinate that-clauses) are, in general, referentially transparent and allow existential quantification – thus they are subject to Leibniz’s law. And it is desirable that it should be so, otherwise Leibniz’s law would never be applicable. Even if we can alternate between ‘I know that p’, ‘I was told that p’ etc. these alternations all involve some opacity effects and thus would render the application of Leibniz’s law void. So, there are clearly advantages in having the embedding explicature like an optional enrichment, because this means that in some cases it does not occur. Thus, unless we have near-intractable data to explain, we may say that there are no implicit arguments as embedding structures. The considerations by Saka can be independently explained away by assuming a different kind of enrichment, a conjunctive enrichment (this too, by the way, would contradict Hall’s locality constraint, which I thus propose to abandon). A speaker who says ‘P’ is normally understood as having said ‘P (and I know that p)’ or ‘P (and I have heard that p)’. (Again, the second conjuncts make the conjunctions opaque, according to Williamson’s p.c.; a solution to this further problem would be required; this solution is likely to hinge

⁴²Unlike many other scholars, Neale (2007, 82) does not believe that we should find deep differences between the (aphonic) indexicality approach and the free enrichment approach. He writes:

“However we proceed, the heavy lifting is done by pragmatic inference because interpreting utterances of sentences containing aponic “indexicals” is a pragmatic, richly inferential matter, the product of integrating linguistic and non-linguistic information. The only substantive difference between the way the heavy-handed pragmatist sees the process of identifying the proposition expressed and the way someone postulating aponic elements in syntax sees it is that the latter is just *insisting* that the search for and integration of contextual information in the interpretation process is triggered syntactically. To the best of my knowledge, no-one has ever attempted to produce an argument designed to show that an item in syntax is necessary for such a search to be triggered or for such integration to take place. (Such an argument would have to come from empirical psychology, of course, not from armchair speculations about the nature of language or the nature of mind)” p. 82.

around the notion of presupposition, which also has some work to do in the philosophy of language; anyway, it would take a different paper to settle this problem). Such free enrichments are not exactly local because they do not amount to modification of an NP and, thus, they would be illicit like the other types of enrichments noted by Stanley (as evidence that free enrichment must be unconstrained) and which Hall wanted to exclude by a locality constraint. This locality constraint does not really work, if we have to accommodate data such as these – and there is no alternative to having to accommodate such data because the alternative proposal is rather pernicious since it amounts to saying Goodbye to Leibniz’s law. If my proposal is accepted, it goes without saying that Saka’s proposal (which amounts to accepting the considerations by Saka in the hope that we’ll be able to explain away substitution failure in simple sentences) also cannot work, as that too involves adding an implicit argument or in any case something stable or not optional. Optionality is an important key that allows sufficient flexibility for my proposal.⁴³ Optionality can be seen to follow from certain considerations, that are standard in pragmatics, about the effects of context on interpretation, as pointed out by Saul (2007, 8):

Audiences are meant to rely on background assumptions that help in guiding them to the speaker’s intended message. In different contexts, different background assumptions will come into play. As a result, utterances of one sentence in two different contexts may carry two different implicatures. (Saul 2007, 8).

We obviously need to adapt Saul’s words to our discussion by noting that she does not firmly distinguish between implicatures and explicatures as we do. For her, conversational implicatures too contribute to what is said. In our terminology, explicatures, rather than conversational implicatures contribute to what is said.

8 On Corazza’s dilemma (Corazza 2004)

Re-reading the quotation of Corazza’s important volume at the beginning of this article, one may be in doubt as to whether the component of meaning which we are (almost) unanimous in calling an ‘explicature’ could derive from a pragmatic mechanism similar to conversational implicature or may be due to a presupposition. It

⁴³At this point, the reader might be curious about the way I propose to reconcile Williamson’s considerations about knowledge with my proposal (mainly the view that assertion requires knowledge). One can accommodate Williamson’s knowledge rule for assertion by saying that, typically, an assertion commits one to ‘P (and I know P) (if the residual problems can be resolved). But what happens when an embedding explicature occurs? Well, in this case one has the following structure: (I heard that) P (and I know P). The constituent (and I know that P) may be aborted in case, in context, the speaker is casting doubt on the veridicality of what he heard. This is ok, since ‘I heard that p’ need not count as an assertion of unqualified P, although in some cases it can be said as part of an assertion that P. An alternative view is that ‘I know that p’ is provided through presupposition. On such a view, it would be even easier to reconcile the presupposition with the insertion of the sentential fragment ‘We were told that...’.

strikes me that many elements imported from the context into the utterance (e.g. the referents of deictic expressions or pronominals or proper names) are actually provided through presuppositions: in other words, there is a direct link between presuppositions and the saturation of certain explicit or implicit elements. However, in the case of implicit indirect reports (embedding explicatures) we need not be faced with cases of saturation as it is quite possible that there is nothing present in the logical form either through realized phonetic elements or unrealized phonetic elements (null pronominals, in other words). In fact, I argued against the *prima facie* palatable hypothesis that a hidden indexical may be responsible for the embedding explicature as, granting this, one would have to explain its optionality, given that if it were not optional, then it would over-generate opacity, which is intuitively not the desired result. Given that, in this case, the explicature is constructed through free enrichment, it is dubious that there is a direct link (consisting in saturation) between the presuppositions of the utterance and the posited hidden indexical (if we decide to posit it). Nevertheless, this case of free enrichment is somehow related, in a way to be further specified, to the presuppositions accessible in the common ground. Surely, in the case of Superman sentences, we must presuppose that we are dealing with a story and that the statements uttered are implicitly modalized through ‘I was told’ or ‘we are told’ components – components unlike the ones we deal with in ordinary conversation where the facts told are backed up by the moral authority of the speaker and thus promise to be true. Here we know well that we are dealing with a story (whether fictional or not) and we have a bias towards falsity. Nevertheless, it is somehow presupposed that we know (or rather we are acquainted with) the things we are saying because we were told them. The structure of the explicature may perhaps be required by some rationality requirements – the fact that, unless we calculate the explicature, we would be faced with a statement that is false or absurd or illogical and, thus, the presupposition may be recruited for providing the stuff the explicature is made out of, given that it promises to cure this breach in logicity. However, we do not have to go as far as to notice that the statement otherwise would be false, but it may well be the result of our ordinary practices that we integrate a presupposition as part of an explicature when the following question is latent and salient in the context: how do we know what we are told? In ordinary conversations, this question may well be formulated explicitly, but in specific language games, like narrating stories, this question may be particularly salient and even part of the mechanics of the language game (and its rules). Although I do not think that I have exhaustively answered the question (implicitly) posed by Corazza, at least we have a platform for its discussion now.

9 Evaluating a different proposal

Now I would like to consider an alternative proposal by Corazza (2010), which is of great theoretical interest. Corazza proposes a solution that kills two birds with a single stone. By using reflexive truth-conditions, he resolves both the Giorgione

sentences problem and the Superman sentences problem. I do not have anything to say about the Giorgione problem, where the solution seems to work well. However, I will say something concerning the solution of the substitution problem for simple sentences through reflexive truth conditions. In a rather sketchy way, I sum up Corazza's solution as follows. Consider the following example:

(13) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out.

The reflexive truth-conditions, according to Corazza, are the following:

There are two individuals x and y and conventions C and C^* such that

- (i) C and C^* are exploited by (13)
- (ii) C permits one to designate x with 'Clark Kent' and C^* permits one to designate y with 'Superman'
- (iii) X went into the phone booth and y came out

These accompany the incremental truth conditions, which are as follows:

That Clark Kent/Superman went into the phone booth and Clark Kent/Superman came out.

According to Corazza, one's ignorance (or pretended ignorance) of the identity statement (Superman is Clark Kent) is to be accounted for through the reflexive truth-conditions.⁴⁴

There are grounds for dissatisfaction with this story. First, it is not clear how the substitution problem arises. Since $x = y$ and there are conventions allowing x to be called 'Clark Kent' and y to be called 'Superman' both x and y could be called, indifferently (and in fact this is the case in the story) either 'Clark Kent' or 'Superman'. Thus one could always try to make substitutions (of coreferential expressions) and these should be licit. If anything, what should prevent the substitution would have to be a context that creates opacity, but this is not discussed at all. Thus it is a mystery how the substitution problem arises. The other problem, that cannot be fixed, is that this analysis states rather clearly that there are two individuals, and this is not the case. If we posit two variables, we may well presuppose that these stand for two different individuals. Now, Corazza might modify this and say that no, there are not two different individuals, but two stages of the same individual, to be called x and y . However, we would require a further modification. The conventions C and C^* would have to specify when x is to be called 'Clark Kent' and

⁴⁴This goes more or less in the direction of what Wayne Davis (2016, 292) says when he argues that his ideational view of meaning can resolve Frege's problems in a straightforward way:

"Defining meaning as idea expression rather than reference enables natural solutions to Frege's and Russell's problems. People do think about Santa Claus even though Santa Claus does not exist, and such thoughts have a part conventionally expressed by the name 'Santa'. So 'Santa' has a meaning even though it has no referent. The thought "ammonia is poisonous" is distinct from the thought "NH₃ is poisonous" even though ammonia is NH₃. Since 'ammonia' and 'NH₃' express different thought parts, they have different meanings, even though their extensions are identical." (p. 292–293).

when *y* is to be called ‘Superman’. However, given that at any time Clark Kent can be turned into Superman and vice versa, it is not clear when the two rules *C* and *C** should be operative (there is a fuzzy territory as in ‘Superman stood two minutes in the telephone box’ (suppose the phone booth has no glasses and a person inside it cannot be observed). Since we do not see how he is dressed, the rules *C* and *C** could very well allow him to be called both ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ for the two minutes in question). Thus the possibility of substitution is always present and, paradoxically, even Corazza’s treatment cannot prevent us from making the substitution. However, inserting an opacity inducing context like an indirect report (“we are told that”) can guarantee that substitution cannot be licitly effected, because in a quotation context it is the words, rather than the referents, which matter.

Ultimately, we could obtain some synergy by combining Corazza’s treatment and mine together. My treatment would put a stop to substitution for cases when we do not know which rule to apply, whether *C* or *C**. Corazza’s reflexive truth conditions are important because they explicitly refer to modes of presentation and also to the systematic ways in which these modes of presentation are to be introduced or exploited – we know that Clark Kent has to be called Superman when he dresses (and acts) as Superman and that he has to be called Clark Kent when he dresses (and acts) as Clark Kent. These rules, that are encapsulated in the reflexive truth-conditions, are part of the way we understand the story, normally, even if, by themselves, they could never guarantee lack of substitution. The difficult cases are, obviously, covered by my little theory.

10 A fundamental objection: Davis (2016)

I have tried to imagine what kind of objections could be leveled by Davis to my approach. Davis could say that, after all, we are making too much of this case of substitution failure. After all, is it not clear that the same person can have distinct attitudes to two coextensive sentences/statements if they are presented to him through different (sentential) modes of presentation?

Two examples by Davis (2016) could be used to prove the point that a person may assent to *P* while not assenting to *P* if this proposition is presented to him in a different guise.

- (14) Washington led the Continental Army to victory;
- (15) The first U.S President led the Continental Army to victory.

Davis writes that “The propositions they express have the same truth-conditions, but are not the same”. Could not we, then, *mutatis mutandis* apply Davis’ considerations to Superman sentences and claim that, in these cases too, the propositions are different, although they appear to be the same? If such a claim were to stand, then we would certainly not need a story in terms of implicit indirect reports, in the same way in which we do not need a story in terms of implicit indirect reports in the case

of (14) and (15). Intuitively, even though (14) and (15) happen to have the same truth-conditions, they are different propositions, and thus it follows directly from this that someone might assent to (14) but fail to assent to (15) (say because he is ignorant of the identity Washington = The first U.S. President). There is no need for implicit indirect reports when one has to explain why the same speaker can assent to (14) but need not assent to (15).

However, in the case of (14) and (15) it is much easier to explain why they constitute different propositions. Such a view (whether correct or not) flows from considerations that are internal to the theory by Davis, who, at a previous point in his paper, says “I argue at length that thoughts have constituents structure – specifically a phrase-structure syntax” (p. 291). Is it not evident that (14) and (15) have different constituent structure? I would say it is, because in (14) we only find a name, which refers to *x* through a contextual function (presumably of the causal type), while in (15) we find a name and a definite description and the reference of the definite description is both a function of the name and of the descriptive part of the NP that constitutes it. In particular, ‘Washington’ refers directly through a contextual function, while the definite description refers through a function that exploits encyclopedic knowledge: first of all we have to know who the first US President is and then we will know who the speaker is referring to.

Is not this case very different from Superman sentences, where the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are taken to be referring directly? Suppose, however, Davis takes a de-tour and says, “But after all, ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ here do not work (in this context) as genuine names, as when we hear them, we do not search the context of our lives to establish a direct referential link, but we need to search the context of the narrations and we more or less understand ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ as ‘The persona ‘Clark Kent’ refers to in the story’ and ‘The persona ‘Superman’ refers to in the story’”. This is enough to create an intensional context and to insulate the search of the referents confining it to the context inside the story and not to the context outside the story.

Although I admit this would be a clever move on the part of Wayne Davis, I wonder whether it would be very different from my own move, which also creates an intensional context by an explicature at the sentential level. Davis’ move would be to create the explicature at the NP level and to keep it confined to the NP level. However, since his NP explicature would strongly presuppose a statement of the kind “we are told that...” or ‘the story tells us that...’, his story would need both an explicature and a presupposition, while my story only requires an explicature to work. (Thus parsimony considerations seem to be conducive to my view). Furthermore, somehow this presupposition would have to be incorporated into the level of what is said because it has to do some work explaining how the statement ‘Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent’ happens to be informative despite the fact that one surely cannot leap more tall buildings than oneself (at some temporal point *t*). If it is not taken as a contradiction, this is because the presupposition ‘There is a story according to which Superman and Clark Kent are different personae’ is operative. This presupposition cannot be cancelled until we make sense of the statement as non-contradictory.

11 Objections by Stephen Schiffer (p.c.)

In this section I shall consider important objections by Stephen Schiffer (p.c.). I report them in full, as they appear to me to be extremely interesting. I will reply to them one by one. Schiffer says:

1. Consider the following sentences:
 - (a) Lois kissed Superman but lied about it to Clark Kent.
 - (b) Lois kissed Superman but lied about it to Superman.

- (c) In the Superman story Lois kissed Superman but lied about it to Clark Kent.

- (d) In the Superman story Lois kissed Superman but lied about it to Superman.

While (c) and (d) presumably have truth-values, (a) and (b) don't have truth-values because 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' don't refer, notwithstanding that someone who actually uttered a Superman sentence would be understood to be talking about the Superman fiction. Saul, however, explicitly says that we are to suppose the Superman story was true, i.e. that (a) and (b) aren't about characters in a fiction but about actual people. In other words, we're to regard (a) and (b) the same way we'd regard the pair

- (e) Joe Frasier fought Mohammad Ali but never fought Cassius Clay.
- (f) Joe Frasier fought Mohammad Ali but never fought Mohammed Ali.

Now, is your theory intended to apply to (a) and (b) only in so far as they're read as being about a fiction, or is it intended to apply to those sentences as though they're about what actually happened? In other words, is your theory supposed to apply to (e) and (f) in the same way it applies to (a) and (b)? When you say that sentences like (a) and (b) contain the "embedding explicature" 'We are told (in the Superman story) that', it's impossible to understand you to be giving a theory that would apply if (a) and (b) are supposed to be factual statements about the actual world, i.e. impossible to read you as giving a theory that applies to (e) and (f). On the other hand, in discussing other examples you seem to write as though you're giving a theory that does apply to sentences like (e) and (f), and, further, it would be very puzzling if your intuitions about (e) and (f) differed from your intuitions about (a) and (b). Since the issue about substitution failure is important only if it motivates the claim that sentences like (e) and (f) can differ in truth-value, from now on I will proceed on the assumption that you do intend to accommodate such sentences.

Ok, now my answer to the objections by Schiffer so far is the following. First of all the question, which is presupposed, that if 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' are understood to be fictional names, then the sentences/statements containing them are neither true nor false. One could argue that regardless of this being so or of this potential problem, by replacing a term with another one moves from a story that is the story we know to a story that is not the story as we know it (the one we are familiar with given the fiction in question). Although we could not apply (or it does not make much sense to apply) the terms 'true' or 'false' (as in 'This is a true story' or 'This is a false story'), we get the impression that one moves from a canonical story to a non-canonical one. One may reply 'But this is not the right story' or 'But this is not the story as I know it' or 'This is not what the story says'.

Now the problem connected with sentences/statements (e) and (f).

- (e) Joe Frasier fought Mohammad Ali but never fought Cassius Clay.
- (f) Joe Frasier fought Mohammad Ali but never fought Mohammed Ali.

I am glad Schiffer brought out this issue, because this can disconnect the substitution problem from fiction. Here there is no fiction or fictional stories involved, although the speaker is clearly narrating a (real) story. The examples by Schiffer clearly connect the issue of intensionality with the issue of intentionality (an issue brought up several times in comments by Williamson and by Schiffer). Substitution failure in Schiffer's example works because, although Frasier had the intention of fighting Mohammad Ali, he never had the intention of fighting Cassius Clay. In other words, he had the intention of being involved in an event which could be narrated as fighting Mohammad Ali but not in one which could be narrated as fighting Cassius Clay. Here intensionality is created by intentionality (in the sense of having intentions). I am retaining somehow the notion of a story, although this is not indispensable, as someone might argue.

Now Schiffer, taking up some comments by Timothy Williamson (p.c) says that it is not clear in my treatment if I am dealing with examples (a) and (b) if they were somehow to be treated like (e) and (f), that is to say without making any reference to a fictional story. It is clear that at several points in my paper I assume that the intensionality problem may be related either to the fact that the superman sentences are cases of fictional reports or that they could be considered as cases of intensionality created by implicit reports like 'we are told that' or 'as the story goes'. Presumably, following Schiffer, we should make a difference between the two types of insertions (indirect reports), and we should be inclined towards accepting that intensionality is created by insertions of 'we are told that' or of 'The story says....). It is true that I sometimes said 'we are told (in the story) that' is an appropriate insertion, but here 'story' can be ambiguous as, after all, one can have a real story or a fictional story. If Saul and her colleagues insist (in a way that seemed implausible to me, to tell the whole truth, as I see it) that superman sentences should be considered in a background in which no fiction is considered, then, forced to make a choice, I would have to consider only insertion of 'we are told that', leaving it open whether the story in question is fictional or not, although we can also leave it open that we accept the presupposition that the story in question is something like a real story or, anyway, a story which we are inclined to consider real or at least not fictional.

Schiffer also says:

Two questions about (e) and (f) are: (i) Do, or might, the propositions expressed by (e) and (f) in literal utterances of those sentences differ in truth-value? (ii) It's difficult to imagine how a speaker could mean anything in uttering (f), but suppose she could. Could the proposition a speaker would mean in uttering (e) differ in truth-value from the one she'd mean in uttering (f)? It's quite clear that the answer to (the question in) (ii) is yes. The only interesting and important question is (i), which is clearly the question Saul was addressing with respect to her examples. Even if we assume you're offering a theory that's supposed to

apply to sentences like (e) and (f), it's not clear to me how you'd answer (i). That's because I don't know how you understand the unclear notion of "explicature," especially when at the end of your chapter you wonder whether the "embedded explicature" 'We are told (in the Superman story) that' might be due to "free enrichment."

Ok, my reply to Schiffer here is that in a background like the one presupposed by Saul, 'story' in the sentence 'We are told in the Superman story' could be given a non-fictional meaning. We may say things like the 'Obama story' or the 'Clinton story' without implying that this is a fictional story. (If there are implicatures to this effect, these should be cancellable and thus are unlikely to be problematic). As to the question (i), I would say that the two statements have different truth-conditions because intensionality is created by intentionality. Intentionality attribution is implicit (when the speaker says 'Joe Frasier fought Mohammad Ali but never fought Cassius Clay' he fully intends that the action was intentional, not that it happened; you can see the difference by replacing an intentional verb with an unintentional verb like e.g. 'kill') but needs to be fleshed out at the level of the explicature. I assume this case is different from the Superman cases. The examples (e) and (f) are different from Saul's Superman sentences, because the latter can be handled in terms of embedding explicatures, as I did.

Schiffer also says:

If your theory is intended to apply to (e) and (f)—and thus to (a) and (b) on the assumption that the Superman fiction is factual—then what can the embedded explicature be? It can't contain the word 'story'. Is it supposed to be 'We are told that'? If so, then I completely agree with Williamson that that would get the truth-conditions very wrong: 'We are told that Joe Frasier fought M.A. but never fought C.C.' can be true when (e) is false, and (e) could be true when 'We are told that ...' is false. (I found your suggestion that 'tell' could be read as factive to be extremely implausible.) In fact, isn't it highly unlikely that someone who believes *that Mohammad Ali was a boxer but Cassius Clay wasn't* believes it because she was told it?

Schiffer's consideration about the factivity of 'tell' are clearly contradicted by Italian data, where the clitics support factivity (e.g. *Giovanni lo ha detto che p*). In such a case although we are told that *p*, *p* must be true. There are constructions in Italian or English where factivity is promoted, although normally it is contextual considerations that promote it. Consider the statement 'John TOLD me you were in Rome'. Stress on 'told' increases the factivity of 'tell' and introduces a presupposition (the same thing happens when we say 'John KNOWS you were in Rome'). A fact presupposed is normally true and presupposition and factivity normally are connected. The only problem that Schiffer here could raise (and perhaps raises) is that, given that the constituent is due to free enrichment (but the same consideration would be applicable if the constituent was a hidden indexical), we have contextual considerations applying twice, once to insert a constituent like 'We are told that' and once to presuppose factivity. My reply to Schiffer is simple: So what. Once we accept drastic (I do not say 'radical') contextualism, we are committed to contextualism through and through. I found a similar case in my analysis of Immunity to Error through Misidentification and 'de se' in this monograph. 'I' is a mode of presentation that must be inserted pragmatically in order to project a really 'de se'

thought'. But 'I' (as argued by Jaszczolt, Coliva, Bezuidenhout) need not be first-personal. Yet, in context, it must be clear that it must be first-personal. Thus contextualism intrudes twice into the truth-conditions. The story seems to be complicated, but so what?

The case considered by Schiffer (and by Timothy Williamson too), is that the embedding utterance 'We are told that p' could be false, while 'p' is true. Yes, this can occur in principle, but it does not occur in the contexts we are considering, where both 'p' and 'we are told that p' is true.

Schiffer also says:

Consider:

(g) We are told that Joe Frasier fought Mohammad Ali but never fought Cassius Clay.

Surely this is true just in case what we were told is the proposition expressed by the complement clause. But if that sentence expresses a proposition, that proposition can hardly be that we are told that we are told that But if the clause expresses a proposition without any supplementation, then so do (e) and (f), which would be inconsistent with your theory (or so I assume, since I'm not confident I know precisely what your theory is).

Here Schiffer's objection is that I am committed to recursively injecting pragmatic intrusion into sentences like 'We are told that Joe Frasier fought Mohammad Ali but never fought Cassius Clay'. We should have something like 'We are told we are told...'. But since I opted for free enrichment, which is optional, I am not really committed to this position. I exclude that pragmatic enrichment should occur unless there is a reason. My position is that explicatures are normally required by the need to resolve illogicalities, absurdities, etc. When there are no such problems, I do not posit pragmatic intrusion.

Finally, Schiffer says:

Consider the sentence

(h) J. K. Rowling wrote *Harry Potter*.

I should think that that sentence is true just in case the referent of 'J. K. Rowling' wrote *Harry Potter*. But can you say that if your theory is supposed to apply to sentences like (e) and (f)? I don't think so. For consider:

J.K. Rowling wrote *Harry Potter* but she didn't write *Career of Evil*.

J.K. Rowling wrote *Harry Potter* but Robert Galbraith wrote *Career of Evil*.

(J.K.R. = R..G.—'Robert Galbraith' is the *nom de plume* she uses for her detective novels.) It seems to me that you must treat this pair in the same way you'd treat (e) and (f), but that would seem to entail that (j) isn't true iff the referent of 'JKR' wrote *Harry Potter*, and by an obvious extension it seems you'd also have to say the same thing about every sentence containing a proper name. But then you'd be hard pressed not to stop there: Consider 'He was a decathlete', when pointing to a photo of Caitlyn Jenner taken before her sex change, and 'She wasn't a decathlete', when pointing to a photo of her taken after her

sex change. I think it would be unfortunate if your theory committed you saying to that, for no singular term α is it the case that ' α is F' is true iff the referent of α is F.

My reply to Schiffer is the following. The examples discussed by him are undoubtedly interesting, but they can be explained away in a different way than by the considerations I applied to superman statements. Of course if we accept that the semantic contribution of a name is its referent then it must be true that J.K. Rowling wrote *Career of Evil* too. However, there is pragmatic intrusion, which can be understood in the following way:

J. K. Rowling wrote *Harry Potter*, under the name J.K. Rowling, but wrote *Career of Evil* under the name Robert Galbraith. (Here we have no need to resort to the explicature 'We are told that'). Concerning the issues of sex changes, there are clearly problems of identity, but here intuitions are not stable. You can look at the picture of someone who had a sex operation and say 'He looked happy' or 'She looked happy' and they may be considered both true. Thus, this is example does not motivate a good objection towards a referential theory of proper names and pronominals, which was presupposed in this chapter.

12 Conclusion

The picture emerging so far is one that supports Jaszczołt's view about merger representations and discourse compositionality. Jaszczołt may even be right that logical forms are not privileged components of meaning as the processing may start with a bias produced by our accepting certain assumptions about the stories fiction we have heard. Superman sentences (or simple sentences), as Saul calls them, are not simple at all and in fact are quite complex. The complexity is added by the structure of the discourse in which they typically and most naturally occur (that is to say Superman stories). It is the context of the story that biases us towards certain complexities and Saul is certainly right that we do not need to assess such sentences as false in order to start searching for plausible interpretations. These interpretations are already inherent in the stories we are faced with. Such stories bias us and predispose us towards accessing such interpretations. We put all the information we have together and we form Merger Representations that plausibly assign meanings to these sentential fragments. It is in such representations that we realize that these are only fragments of interpretation and we provide full structure.

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