Alessandro Capone

Pragmatics and Philosophy. Connections and Ramifications

Springer

Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology

Volume 22

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This book is dedicated to my friend Marco Giuffrè.

Acknowledgments

The subtitle *Connections and Ramifications* reminds me of the illuminating words by James Higginbotham, Ph.D. examiner and eminent teacher. His words, advice, orientation, and example cannot be forgotten.

Other people provided me with excellent examples:

Wayne Davis commented on many of my manuscripts, and his advice has been like influential gymnastics for the mind.

Istvan Kecskes, a real friend and gentleman of old times, guided me with his advice. Istvan and his wife cannot be forgotten. Their faces remain impressed among the faces of the many angels who have assisted me.

Eleni Gregoromichelaki is another of these angels.

Jacob L. Mey, who has always been very critical of my style, has deeply influenced me as a scholar in pragmatics.

Keith Allan was my Australian angel, despite being agnostic.

Alessandra Giorgi and Denis Delfitto were my Italian angels and they have always been so helpful.

Franco Lo Piparo, Marco Carapezza, Francesca Piazza, Francesco La Mantia, Antonino Pennisi, Paola Pennisi, Alessandra Falzone, and Pietro Perconti were of great support.

Warm thanks are given to Judith Heaney, who took care of the revision of this book's form.

Contents

Chapter 1
Pragmatics and Philosophy (and the Semantics/Pragmatics Debate)

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1   Introduction

In this book, I shall argue that there is a close relationship between pragmalinguistics and philosophy and that pragmalinguistics not only takes into account empirical investigations based on language use, but also takes advantage of a more philosophical approach to language, where a number of *a priori* considerations can be applied to the formation of a theory of language. While there is no reason to deny (and there is every reason to assume) that abstract structures of language are operative in selecting meanings, pragmatics usually provides additional theoretical baggage and allows language users to expand on their limited resources, thus allowing them to be open to new uses which then, eventually, become part of the semantic/syntactic heritage. These expansion processes can be seen both at the semantic and at the syntactic level (see Huang 1994, 2000, 2014; Levinson 2000; Ariel 2008 on the syntax/pragmatics debate). Surely there are a number of controversial points in pragmatics. Are the conversational maxims *a priori* principles? Are they innate or are they learned? Are they derived from innate predispositions, where, ultimately, they are propagated, transmitted and inherited at the level of language use? These are important theoretical questions, on which a philosophical approach has some bearing. However, in this book I will not concentrate on these questions, but I will broach more modest topics. One of the topics I will confront is whether explicatures (or at least the pragmatic components of explicatures) are cancellable or not. This topic is concatenated with the more heavily theoretical topic of Grice's circle, a theoretical difficulty noted by Levinson (2000) which basically amounts to the claim that pragmatics takes input from semantics. However, the camp of contextualists has shown that (propositional) semantics cannot be independent of pragmatics, given that it is accepted that, in numerous cases, we must assume pragmatic intrusion into truth-conditional meaning. Thus, it follows that not only is it the case that pragmatics takes input from semantics, but that semantics takes input from

pragmatics. There may be two ways of breaking out of this circle. One is to argue, as I have done so in the past, that the circle is not pernicious given that explicatures (that is, the engine of the semantics/pragmatics debate) are after all, in principle and *de facto*, not cancellable. Thus, the pragmatic contributions that intrude into semantics acquire some of the features of semantics (like entailments, they cannot be cancelled on pain of contradiction or logical absurdity). The other is to reduce the circle and to state that there are indeed (many) cases of pragmatic intrusion; however, we should not be so pessimistic as to claim that in all cases semantics needs to be augmented by pragmatics. There are sentences which can be fairly well understood even independently of pragmatics and, furthermore, there are sentences where limited amounts of pragmatic intrusion can occur and where such intrusions can be somehow ignored, since the truth-conditional content of the sentence can be grasped by making abstract substitutions such as X did Y (for example, in the sentence 'He did this'). Such abstract substitutions are compatible with the spirit of semantics and capture a minimally augmented truth-conditional meaning, while one does not need to state that such cases cannot be understood without recourse to drastic pragmatic intrusion (Take as an example what happens during a grammar lesson. The teacher writes the sentence 'Mary is clever' on the blackboard. The students will not try to anchor 'Mary' to a referent, as they are well aware that this is an example). One has a grasp of the generic truth-conditions of such sentences (If X refers to a and Y refers to b, then a did b (Higginbotham 1985)), so one knows what the world has to be like if such sentences are true (a notion which, in my opinion, was captured but not adequately expressed or articulated in Cappelen and Lepore (2005), who, nevertheless, appeared to me to be proceeding in this direction). The idea that pragmatic meanings, contextual though they are, cannot be easily cancelled (and they are *entrenched*, to use an expression by Jaszczolt 2016), also seems important to me, given that it has much work to do in the areas of pragmatics and law (as my colleague Fabrizio Macagno suggested in a flattering personal communication). Once many resources and contextual clues have been mobilized to position the hearer on the correct interpretative track, it is not easy to cancel an intention because it is uneconomical to use so many resources when the speaker is willing (or ready or inclined) to deny a certain interpretation. This is not to say that a speaker never leaves himself the option of retracting a certain meaning (associated with a certain intention), but in this case s/he will not expend too much effort in the construction and projection of intentions through contextual clues. Thus, in this case, s/he will not make the effort to disseminate numerous clues in the text which will invariably lead to reasoning whose conclusion is a certain inference.

In the chapter 'On the tension between semantics and pragmatics', I capitalize on the notion of explicature (and non-cancellability) and on the notion of an abstract semantics. Here, I claim that speakers have a duty to make themselves understood and, thus, for this purpose, have a duty to avoid ambiguities as far as possible and to be as explicit as possible, particularly in cases where much is at stake for both the speaker and the hearer (e.g. laws, contracts, etc.). Such efforts are epitomized by the legislator and by public officials who have to encode public texts (such as laws, or sentences in court) while trying to avoid ambiguity and lack of clarity as far as

possible in order to guarantee univocal interpretations. However, we see that such efforts are often frustrated and that intentions often require pragmatic interpretations (some of the most obvious cases are constituted by anaphoric links, to emphasize ideas by Levinson and Huang on anaphora and pragmatics). Thus, even the most advanced texts combine literalism and contextualism (see Recanati 2004, 2010). I argue here that one prediction of my theory is that, once we accept that explicatures are NOT cancellable and are entrenched in the texts, the nature of uncancellability exerts strong pressure on the linguistic system so that such interpretations finally become conventional (cases of frozen pragmatics to use a felicitous expression by Larry Horn). Thus, Grice's circle is very productive at the linguistic level, as it expands the potential of an existing language by making use of limited pragmatic and linguistic resources, potentially enabling infinite changes (should human history be infinite or limitless). One of the most important points made by this chapter is that what happens at the level of the utterance (conventionalization) can, in theory, also happen to pragmatic principles. Even assuming that they were *a priori* or innate, a case can be made for modularizing them (an evident example in which this occurs is canons of construction, developed by law scholars to deal with interpretative disputes (see Carston (2002, 2013); Capone and Poggi (2016), Poggi and Capone (2017)).

A specific case in which I apply my theoretical considerations to pragmatic ambiguities is the attributive/referential ambiguity (in view of the semantics/pragmatics debate). There is no denying that, in this chapter, I was influenced by Jaszczolt's (2005, 2016) default semantics, which, I am inclined to believe, is a form of compass for pragmatic interpretation. However, I also add a more detailed discussion of the rationale for having the defaults that we do (referential interpretations appear to be promoted because they are more informative and are more strongly anchored to social reality) and a compelling discussion on modularization, based on important considerations by Karmiloff-Smith (1992).

In the chapter 'Knowing how and pragmatic intrusion', I apply the semantics/pragmatics debate to a philosophical topic (knowing how, which has to be distinguished from knowing that). Here, I specifically demonstrate that a philosophical topic can benefit from analytical pragmatic considerations. In fact, one of the most important contributions of this book is that we can apply pragmalinguistics to philosophy in order to solve a number of theoretical problems (for example, in one of my papers and in my 2016 monograph I applied knowledge of indirect reports to a philosophical problem (how simple sentences can constitute cases of inapplicability of Leibniz's law)).

The semantics/pragmatics debate is also fruitfully discussed and advanced by tackling two other important topics: quotation and indirect reports. It is not by chance that I present the chapter on quotation prior to the chapter on indirect reports. In fact, I see the two issues as being connected (I was enlightened here by considerations by Cappelen and Lepore 1997 and Saka's work on quotation) and I believe that one cannot reasonably and without prejudice understand the topic of indirect reporting without understanding the issue of quotation. In this book, I make no secret of the fact that I am considerably attracted to a pragmatic theory of quotation.

Formal or grammatical devices for projecting quotational meaning are certainly not sufficient and we are confronted with many examples (the most important of which involves oral language where the grammatical device of inverted commas is not easy to represent (hence, it can be dispensed with)) that cannot be dealt with in purely semantical terms. Thus, it appeared to me that the only alternative was a radical contextualist pragmatic theory of quotation. That this has many advantages can be seen by considering the theory of indirect reports that I advance, given that it has many points of contact with the theory of quotation and partly consists of projecting quotational interpretations into sections of indirect reports by using pragmatic principles and, specifically, pragmatic principles as applied to indirect reporting, which is a specific form of language use or a specific language game and requires its own praxis comprised of norms of interpretations aimed at protecting the original speaker from deviations in the form or content that s/he used. My view of the praxis of indirect reports is, admittedly, a synthetic one. I have dealt with this issue at length in a different book; however, I have found it useful to supply the readers (of Pragmatics and Philosophy) with at least some general considerations on this important praxis.

I devote a different, but related, chapter to the issue of how one can (indirectly) report ungrammatical utterances. Although this topic appears to be rather narrow and clumsy, it is of considerable importance for shedding light on the societal praxis of indirect reporting. Here, I mix considerations about impure 'de se' thoughts and indirect reports and I focus on a disconcerting case in which the focus of the report is a gender mistake. Should one correct such mistakes or not? In this situation, the theory of mind has something to say about the praxis of reporting, although I finally, rather surprisingly, conclude that, although the speaker's meaning is usually reported in indirect reports, in such problematic cases the reporter may opt for an out: reporting literal meaning and transferring the interpretative problem to the hearer (which is a surprising exception to my idea that indirect reports, in general, report interpreted meaning based on the speaker's intentions).

The book also contains a chapter on first person indirect reports. This chapter will illuminate the issue of indirect reports in disguise and of the multiple clues required in understanding an indirect report in disguise. Connections with the theory of *de se* are also illuminated.

I have included a chapter on conversational presuppositions, in which I demonstrate how a linguistic topic can benefit from a more theoretical, philosophical approach (based on meta-theoretical considerations). The concept of this chapter was inspired during the writing of my Oxford dissertation (and benefitted from discussions with the late Anna Morpurgo Davis) and has now only come to fruition after 23 years. Thus, I was able to make a number of connections with previously understood issues, for example, Grice's circle and the uncancellability of explicatures, indirect reports, quotation, pronominal clitics, contextualism, the attributive/referential ambiguity, law and pragmatic interpretation. This chapter can be regarded as being the intersection of all the considerations that I have proposed in the previous chapters of this book. It offers surprising results, the most important being that presuppositions are pragmatic inferences through and through. Examples from pronominal clitics, Levinson's 1983 chapter on presupposition, Simons

(2013) and Macagno and Capone (2016a, b) are fundamental in explaining and elucidating the nature of presupposition. Here, I voice the provocative idea that even if a language user had a confused notion of entailments and ignored the fact that factive predicates normally entail the embedded proposition, they would be able to derive the presupposition without entailments, given that in negative utterances we forgo entailments and that positive utterances can be seen, in a sense, to be used (at least potentially) to contradict their negative counterparts. Hence, they would have to share and inherit their pragmatically derived presuppositions. These considerations, in particular, stress the importance of philosophical speculation in resolving an issue that cannot otherwise be easily resolved from an empirical point of view. In any case, during the course of the chapter I offer many detailed empirical arguments which are based on cancellability, beginning with examples found in Levinson (1983), Simons (2013) and Capone (2013c) (not to mention Macagno and Capone (2016a, b)).

Another topic where it is important to show that we can disentangle semantic from pragmatic considerations is that of pronominal clitics. This chapter has waited almost two decades to be published and has been greatly advantaged by the growing literature on pronominal clitics. However, in the end, I have been the sole voice in claiming that pronominal clitics are associated with conversational presuppositions and that the way their interpretation works is through a pragmatic mechanism. Here, my previous considerations on cancellability (or rather the lack of it) in pragmatic inference is of enormous value (see also Capone 2003 and Burton-Roberts 2005) and helps me resolve otherwise insuperable difficulties, given that the meanings of clitics (in particular 'lo') become so entrenched that we really need a stretch of the imagination to show that they project defeasible meanings. Such presuppositional clitics require a rethinking of the common ground hypothesis and also a radical rethinking of the notion of presupposition, which I will be confronted with in the chapter on conversational (defeasible) presuppositions.

I conclude the book with more considerations on presuppositions and, in particular, presuppositions in indirect reports. The understanding of these requires an understanding of the asymmetries in access to context on the part of the speaker and hearer.

2 Contents of the Chapters

2.1 Part I: The Semantics/Pragmatics Debate

2.1.1 Chapter 2: On a Theory-Internal Problem in the Semantics/ Pragmatics Debate: How to Resolve Grice's Circle

In this chapter, I reconsider the discussion of the semantics/pragmatics debate and rejuvenate it by means of two important ideas: Grice's circle (discussed by Levinson (2000)) is apparent and certainly not pernicious; the fact that explicatures are not

cancellable means that the pragmatics we consider in pragmatic intrusion has some features in common with truth-conditional semantics.

One of the topics I will be confronted with is whether explicatures (or at least the pragmatic components of explicatures) are cancellable or not. This topic is concatenated with the more heavily theoretical topic of Grice's circle, a theoretical difficulty noted by Levinson (2000), and which can be summarized as follows. It is claimed that pragmatics takes input from semantics. However, the camp of contextualists have shown that (propositional) semantics cannot be independent of pragmatics, given that it is accepted that in numerous cases we must assume pragmatic intrusion into truth-conditional meaning. Thus, it follows that not only is it the case that pragmatics takes input from semantics, but that semantics takes input from pragmatics. There may be two ways of breaking out of this circle. One is to argue, as I have done, that the circle is not pernicious given that explicatures (which are the engine of the semantics/pragmatics debate) are, in principle and in fact, not cancellable after all. Thus, the pragmatic contributions that intrude into semantics acquire some of the features of semantics (like entailments, they cannot be cancelled on pain of contradiction). The other is to reduce the circle and to state that there are indeed (many) cases of pragmatic intrusion; however we should not be so pessimistic as to claim that in all cases semantics needs to be augmented by pragmatics. There are sentences which can be fairly well understood even independently of pragmatics and, furthermore, there are sentences where limited amounts of pragmatic intrusion can occur and where such intrusions can be somehow ignored since the truth-conditional content of the sentence can be grasped by making abstract substitutions such as X did Y (for example, in the sentence, 'He did this').

2.1.2   Chapter 3: On the Nature of Pragmatic Increments at the Truth-Conditional Level

At the time of writing the chapter on Grice's circle, it was evident that at least some empirical considerations were leading me in the direction of considering explicatures as being non-cancellable (at least in the most crucial cases, where the theory needed the explicatures to avoid a certain *impasse*). The theory was expanded in my paper (Capone 2009), where I somehow divorced the issue of cancellability of explicatures from Grice's Circle and where I introduced some complex theoretical considerations in favour of the idea that explicatures (at least their pragmatic components) are not cancellable. Since those seminal papers, I have written other articles which would appear to support, and be supported by, the paper on Grice's circle. We have reached a stage in which the various pieces of my theory are becoming interlocking in nature - like the various pieces of a puzzle. It will, therefore, be useful to revisit my old paper on Grice's circle, which is still very much relevant despite the fact that it was published a number of years ago. An idea that appears to support the considerations in my paper on Grice's circle was proposed by Burton-Roberts (personal communication) and discussed in Capone (2009). Once intentions are projected through pragmatic means, they cannot be cancelled (albeit they

can be retracted). What does this mean? Of course there is a difference between cancelling and retracting an intention. An intention that has been retracted has not been cancelled or made null. The speaker (whoever s/he is) makes it clear that she no longer endorses the position expressed earlier (in some previous utterance) through a conversational implicature, even though s/he would have to concede, when pressed by an interlocutor, that s/he no longer has the intentions which were manifested through the previous utterance, not because there is anything wrong with the previous utterance, but because s/he has changed her/his mind and no longer has that (communicative) intention. To cancel an intention which one has projected and communicated through a conversational implicature (in a particular context) is impossible. Why? This is because one has mobilized linguistic resources and contextual clues and cues that direct the hearer towards the recovery of the implicature. The intention was manifested through a number of contextual clues and cues, and since those were disseminated, it is no longer possible to revoke them and to make them inactive. They exist and they invariably lead us in the direction of the intention which was manifested. Of course, one can distinguish between *potential* implicatures and *actual* implicatures, by observing a difference in relation to their cancellability, with potential implicatures being easier to cancel. These features of intentionality I am highlighting rely on the theoretical considerations that texts are planned in advance and that linguistic and non-linguistic resources are mobilized with the aim of manifesting a certain intention. And once the intention has been sufficiently manifested, it is impossible to cancel, although it can be retracted.

2.1.3   Chapter 4: On the Tension Between Semantics and Pragmatics

In this chapter I offer my reflections on the relationship between semantics and pragmatics. I argue that semantics – the relatively stable and context-invariant meanings of language – is necessarily amplified by pragmatics, which is a way of transcending the possibilities of semantics (pragmatics amplifies the resources and potential manifested by a given state of a language). Pragmatic layers, especially if they meet the cognitive needs of language users and represent culturally salient concepts, tend to become semanticized. The situation is complicated by the postulation of explicatures, which, as I argue, are not cancellable and mimic the semantic resources of language. Like entailments they are not cancellable, but they share the features of all pragmatic inferences in that they are calculable. I propose that explicatures are **loci** of the tension between semantics and pragmatics, and, given the lack of cancellability, they are strong candidates for inferences that become semanticized. In this chapter, I see the tension between pragmatics and semantics exemplified by situations where an excessive weight is placed on semantics (legal documents, such as laws) and situations where an excessive burden is placed on pragmatics (pidgins like Tok Pisin). In this chapter, I also argue that the principles of language use tend to become semanticised in the form of discourse rules and I consider the praxis of language games, arguing that discourse rules, unlike pragmatic principles, have the advantage of being teachable and also of favoring the involvement of speakers in the communicative praxis.

2.1.4 Chapter 5: The Pragmatics of Referential and Attributive Expressions

In this chapter, I deal with the attributive/referential distinction. After reviewing the literature on the issue, I adopt Jaszczolt's view based on default semantics. I relate her view to Sperber and Wilson's (1986, 1995) Principle of Relevance. I argue in favour of the modularity hypothesis in connection with pragmatic interpretations. I also discuss the issue of modularization à la Karmiloff-Smith in connection with default inferences and, in particular, the referential readings of NPs. I then reply to considerations by Cummings (2009) and use data from the referential/attributive uses of NPs to show that the modularity hypothesis is defensible.

In this chapter, I clarify that the attributive/referential distinction (proposed by Donnellan) does not amount to a semantic ambiguity but must, at best, be considered to be a pragmatic (or interpretative) ambiguity, adopting Jaszczolt's (1999) views. In any case, dealing with this interpretative ambiguity is part of the semantics/pragmatics debate. In keeping with my theoretical perspective, I propose a univocal semantic elucidation of the meanings of definite descriptions and I argue that, in some contexts but not in others, the non-referential interpretation prevails, though one would expect *a priori* an expression like *The NP* to be preferentially interpreted referentially, since this is the most informative interpretation (the referential interpretation offers anchorage to the world). Having defaults is important, because the language user does not need to calculate an explicature every time, but simply has to modulate it in context and she will, at most, abandon the aprioristic interpretative hypothesis if the context is at odds with it. In keeping with my previous considerations on pragmatic intrusion, I also argue that such inferences are normally of the non-cancellable type.

2.1.5 Chapter 6: Knowing How and the Semantics/Pragmatics Debate

In this chapter, I shall deal with the pragmatics of knowing how utterances. Since 'knowing how' vs. 'knowing that' has received detailed treatment in philosophical literature, we cannot but pay attention to what philosophers have said. However, in the main, I want to stress those things that are needed for a theory of communication, rather than a theory of knowledge. Since a theory of knowledge and a theory of communication intersect at various points, this is not easy to do. For example, one reason why we utter sentences such as, "John knows that p", is to inform the hearer that p. On hearing a sentence like, 'John knows that p', the hearer is entitled to infer that p, provided that he trusts both John and the speaker. Nevertheless, I assume that epistemology and a theory of communication are different projects, with different aims, and it does no harm to reveal my bias towards a theory of communication. In beginning this chapter, my hope is that light will be shed on the pragmatic inferential processes involved in understanding apparently simple knowing how utterances.

Indirectly, my inferential approach serves to highlight many problems that have a bearing on the distinction between *knowing how* and *knowing that*, and on the

possibility of reducing knowing how to knowing that. My inferential approach shows that, despite recalcitrant data leading to the opposing view, the correct interpretation of these data will, in fact, lead to Stanley and Williamson's idea that knowing how is a species of knowing that.

I begin the chapter with a discussion of Stanley and Williamson's (2001) paper, according to which 'X knows how to p' must be analysed as 'X knows that there is a way w and that he can *p* in this way'. I then briefly expatiate on the notion of pragmatic intrusion, which will be of assistance in understanding the issue of knowing how. In section 4, I deal with a number of uses of the 'know how' construction, and I focus, among other things, on the asymmetry between knowing that and knowing how, as perceived by Snowdon. While one can deduce 'I know that p' from 'X knows that p', it is unclear whether one can deduce 'I know how to p' from 'X knows how to p'. I claim that the asymmetry is not so precise and I give reasons for that. I then move on to a discussion about opacity, which constitutes another reason for the asymmetry between knowing how and knowing that. I argue that opacity characterizes both knowing how and knowing that, and I answer some objections. In section 6, I discuss an objection to Stanley and Williamson's treatment of Gettier's problem. My analysis is that knowing how can be Gettiered. In section 7, I consider objections by Sgaravatti and Zardini to an assimilation of knowing how to knowing that is based on negativity arguments and closure principles. I argue that these objections are not well-founded and can be dissolved through pragmatic intrusion. In section 8, I consider a famous objection by Rumfitt and claim that it can be dissolved through pragmatic intrusion. In section 9, I consider various inferences in context and also argue in favour of pragmatic intrusion by considering a weak form of contextualism. I also consider interpretative problems with quantifiers and implicit arguments. In section 10, I argue in favour of a unified treatment of knowing how and knowing that, through pragmatic intrusion. I consider two alternative hypotheses. In section 11, I discuss knowing how and modularity of the mind, and claim that modular considerations need not be inimical to a unified treatment of knowing how à la Stanley and Williamson. In section 12, I argue that the considerations by Keith De Rose are also applicable to knowing how, in addition to knowing that. Finally, in section 13, I argue that Igor Douven's considerations on the pragmatics of belief apply both to knowing how and knowing that.

2.2   *Part II: Indirect Reports and Presuppositions as Pragmatic Phenomena*

2.2.1   Chapter 7: Quotation With and Without Quotation Marks

This chapter presents a purely pragmatic account of quotation and argues that it is able to accommodate all relevant linguistic phenomena. Given that it is more parsimonious to explain the data only by reference to pragmatic principles than to explain them by reference to both pragmatic and semantic principles, as is common in the

literature, I conclude that the pragmatic account of quotation I present is preferable to the more standard accounts. Alternative theories of quotation are treated in an intellectually honest way.

In this chapter, I embrace a drastic and radical pragmatic position, considering that the previous attempts to tame the theory of quotation were misguided because they focused solely on written language. This is a prejudice that we linguists and philosophers of language should dispose of. It is true that we have been trained primarily through the use of books and formal instruction, but we should not place a total emphasis on written language. There are dimensions of language, such as an oral one, which have to be discussed on their own merits. The oral dimension allows us to arrive at an unbiased attitude towards quotation and its practice, bearing in mind that inverted commas were only created for use in literacy. When we are faced with oral texts, inverted commas no longer come to our assistance (although some speakers in the USA make use of finger gestures to indicate inverted commas, thereby importing written language into oral language). Thus, we must rely on radical pragmatic ways of interpreting quotation (including cases of mixed quotation). We must find methods to differentiate between voices that dispense with grammatical devices. The considerations on quotation will be put to good use in the following chapter on indirect reports (which have the issue of the separation of voices and the hybrid issue of mixed quotation in common with quotation). Without this chapter on quotation, much of the most interesting consequences of the following chapter concerning indirect reports would never have been reached.

2.2.2   Chapter 8: Indirect Reports and Societal Pragmatics

In this chapter, I consider indirect reports to be one of the most important pragmatic topics, because it has the potential for showing that language is inherently dialogical (the same utterance can be seen as being produced by at least two speakers; of course, the notion of footing needs to be explicated and discussed). I believe that language users can produce and interpret indirect reports because they have mastered a social praxis, partially determined by conversational maxims and by the exigencies of language use. It is of great importance that an indirect report should report the content of an utterance without distorting the message (too much) or the presuppositions of the utterance. It would be utterly unfaithful if a speaker transformed the utterance, for example, by using racist words which were never used (or thought of) by the original speaker. There must, therefore, be constraints on form, and these must make reference to the attitude of acceptance/rejection which the original speaker (alternatively, an impartial judge, to answer an objection by Wayne Davis (p.c.)) would display towards the uttered report, were s/he capable of hearing it. There are many important considerations attached to indirect reporting (mainly arising from the issue of slurs).

2.2.3 Chapter 9: Maier on the Alleged Transparency of Mixed Quotation

In this chapter I propose, unlike Maier (2014), that quoted fragments in so called 'mixed quotations' (what I prefer to call 'mixed indirect reports') are opaque. This view of opacity is required, we propose, to preserve the difference between direct and indirect reports, direct reports involving possibly high levels of literality, accuracy and granularity, even if we concede, in keeping with Maier, that verbatim quotations are also susceptible to contextual standards of 'verbatimness', as Maier terms it. Maier's considerations against opacity and in favour of transparency are based on a shifted interpretation of indexicals, anaphoric reference, morphological adjustments (in Italian) and grammatical adjustments (transformations involving a different word order with respect to the original utterance in Dutch). Claim by claim, we are made aware that we should see things differently and that, after all, it makes sense to adhere to the conservative and classical Fregean claim that mixed quotations (and indeed quotations) are cases involving opacity. In fact, where would we be landed if we abandoned the idea that quotation in mixed quotation requires reference to an utterance understood to be verbatim, rather than through mere paraphrase? Is this not similar to arguing that quotation is also not an opaque context? Yet Frege, as highlighted by Evans (1982), insisted that intensional contexts were contexts providing evidence in favour of opacity and were at a level of meaning which was different from denotation (the other level of meaning which is constituted by senses or modes of presentation).

2.2.4 Chapter 10: First Person Indirect Reports

In this chapter, I deal with implicit indirect reports. First of all, I discuss implicit indirect reports involving the first person. Then, I prove that in some cases second person reports are implicit indirect reports involving a *de se* attribution. Next, I draw analogies with implicit indirect reports involving the third person. I establish some similarities at the level of free enrichment through which the explicature is obtained and I propose that the explicature is syntactically active, given that it sanctions anaphora.

An implicit indirect report is a report which does not explicitly display features of indirect reports (e.g. the verb 'say' or the presence of a reported speaker), but implies an evidential base requiring the structure of an indirect report. Most importantly, in this chapter I demonstrate that such structural elements are active from a syntactic point of view in that they allow anaphora under certain conditions. Although it is the speaker's meaning that matters in these cases, insofar as it intrudes into the explicature and it requires a certain (compulsory) logical form, the elements of the logical form implied at the level of the explicature are syntactically active. Furthermore, they sometimes require syntactic slots such as the experiencer and, furthermore, and somewhat surprisingly, in the case of second person reports what is being implied is a structure hosting a *de se* implicit attribution which allows an

internal perspective. Such implicit indirect reports with *de se* ramifications are to be considered as logophoric structures that present the perspective of a particular person, and in general the experience is linked to a time which is posterior to the event being narrated in the indirect report.

2.2.5   Chapter 11: What Happens When We Report Grammatical, Lexical and Morphological Errors?

In reporting what one has said, we should normally take the original speaker's perspective and try not to overly distort what s/he has said (I am presupposing that some kind of voluntary or involuntary distortion always takes place in indirectly reporting someone). However, despite my insistence on this claim, in this chapter I discover that there are important exceptions to it, given that, in the case of grammatical errors, the reporting speaker acts in his/her capacity as the author of the text (and even as author of the text for which the reported speaker is responsible) and, thus, wants to avoid projecting himself or herself as someone who makes, or is likely to make errors.

   In this chapter, I focus on a small aspect regarding the issue of indirect reports in order to establish leverage for a theory of the societal praxis of indirect reporting, and to see how this is shaped by not only theoretical, but also practical needs. In keeping with what I proposed in Capone (2010, 2016), I argue that we need a notion of *pragmatic opacity* for indirect reports. Here, I investigate the role that grammatical errors play in the practice of indirect reporting and what new pieces of knowledge they can add to the theory. It may appear that this topic is too narrow, too tangential and too unimportant, but it is small things that can change our view of the world. In this chapter, I make connections between impure 'de se' thoughts and grammatical gender. I argue that grammatical mistakes related to gender are puzzling because, by correcting them, one runs the risk of projecting an incorrect view of the mental life of the reported speaker. This is clearly a chapter where theory of action and theory of mind intersect (and theory of mind wins).

2.2.6   Chapter 12: Conversational Presuppositions. Presupposition as Defeasible (and Non-defeasible) Inference

In this chapter, I will attempt to establish the admittedly controversial claim that presuppositions are normally defeasible inferences, taking the lead from Levinson (1983), Simons (2013), Macagno and Capone (2016a, b). In passing, I will further justify some of the claims that we made in Macagno and Capone (2016a, b). I will also make a further attempt to explain those notions more clearly. Most importantly, I will capitalize on the distinction between potential and actual presuppositions, a distinction which may be parallel to the distinction between potential and actual conversational implicatures (see Levinson 2000, Levinson 1983, Huang 1994, Huang 2014). Levinson (1983) understands this distinction and assumes it to be of

importance, but in my opinion he does not sufficiently capitalize on this, and this is what I would like to achieve in this chapter. Furthermore, the terminology he uses is not exactly cast in these terms, but it is not unreasonable to borrow the distinction from the theory of generalized conversational implicatures, given that, as Atlas (2004) and Levinson (1983) state, there are many points of contact between conversational implicatures and conversational presuppositions.

The theories (of presuppositions) we have so far received have been fairly untidy. Certainly, much progress has been made in considering that the calculation of the inference under negation points to the phenomenon of conversational implicature (but also in those other embedding constructions where presuppositions survive despite semantic features which would strongly abort entailments (if presuppositions were entailments), such as modal contexts (*possible*, *unlikely*, etc.), epistemic contexts (*John believes that his cello is very expensive*), counterfactuals (*If the Queen of England were in Paris, she would go shopping in the most luxurious shops*), questions (Have you seen the President?), etc.). In particular, Kempson (1975), Wilson (1975), Atlas and Levinson (1981) and Levinson (1983) have promoted the view that presuppositions under negation and in contexts that normally block entailments are nothing but conversational implicatures. This view is most interesting, important and also quite reasonable, but admitting, as these scholars do, that there is an asymmetry between presuppositions as entailments in positive sentences and presuppositions as conversational implicatures in negative ones is quite untidy and also not parsimonious. Adopting Modified Occam's Razor (Grice 1989; Jaszczolt 1999), it would be best if, *ceteris paribus*, we would be able to deal with these inferences as if they were all conversational implicatures. The alternative view, that these inferences are entailments the whole way through, has been definitively discredited, and thus we should not go (back) in this direction. The asymmetry view is clearly untidy, but the alternative (considering presuppositions as conversational implicatures both in positive and negative contexts) is rather problematic, and, *prima facie*, not easy to accept (to say the least and needs to be defended at some length). Modified Occam's Razor predicts that a (radical) conversational implicature analysis of presupposition is preferable because it would eliminate unnecessary elements.

2.2.7 Chapter 13: The Clitic 'Lo' in Italian, Propositional Attitudes and presuppositiOns

The issue of presupposition is quite complicated in that, for the notion of common ground to work properly it has to be combined with the notion of accommodation. In my view, pronominal clitics project presuppositions which require no accommodation but are, instead, shared by both the speaker and hearer. Thus, potentially, they contribute to and appear to positively affect the issue of common ground. One of the most important features of this chapter is that it (finally) considers presupposition as a pragmatic relation, which can be computed thanks to M-implicatures (implicatures that exploit the maxim of manner or Levinson's M-Principle, given that the use

of a more marked, instead of a less marked, expression will implicate the complement of what is expressed by the unmarked expression). Thus, if the clitic-less expression does not project a presupposition, the clitic expression will project a presuppositionally charged meaning. These implicatures are very interesting and problematic because, *prima facie*, they appear to be not easily cancelled. However, through a somewhat complicated discussion of modal subordination, I have managed to tame this thorny issue.

In this chapter I have used pronominal clitics in Italian in combination with verbs of propositional attitude to shed light on the opacity effects caused by intrusive pragmatics (at the level of free enrichments/explicatures). Certain problems, as discussed by Schiffer (2000), completely disappear when the syntax, semantics and pragmatics of propositional clitics are discussed and such considerations are extended to propositional attitudes in general. In this chapter, I will add that a propositional clause must be in an appositional relationship (resulting from free enrichment and, thus, not actually present in the syntax) with the that-clause embedded in verbs of propositional attitude. I consider the consequences of this position. One of the most cogent results of this chapter is that pronominal clitics refer back to full propositions (if they refer to propositions at all) and not to minimal propositions. I take my own considerations on clitics to give support to the interesting and important considerations on emergent presuppositions by Kecskes and Zhang (2009, 2013).

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Part I
The Semantics/Pragmatics Debate

Chapter 2
On a Theory-Internal Problem in the Semantics/Pragmatics Debate: How to Resolve Grice's Circle

Abstract In this chapter, I reconsider the discussion of the semantics/pragmatics debate and rejuvenate it by means of two important ideas: Grice's circle (discussed by Levinson (Presumptive meanings, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000)) is apparent and certainly not pernicious; the fact that explicatures are not cancellable means that the pragmatics we consider in pragmatic intrusion has some features in common with truth-conditional semantics.

One of the topics I will be confronted with is whether explicatures (or at least the pragmatic components of explicatures) are cancellable or not. This topic is concatenated with the more heavily theoretical topic of Grice's circle, a theoretical difficulty noted by Levinson (Presumptive meanings, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000), which can be summarized as follows. It is claimed that pragmatics takes input from semantics. However, the camp of contextualists have shown that (propositional) semantics cannot be independent of pragmatics, given that it is accepted that in numerous cases we must assume pragmatic intrusion into truth-conditional meaning. Thus, it follows that not only is it the case that pragmatics takes input from semantics, but that semantics takes input from pragmatics. There may be two ways of breaking out of this circle. One is to argue, as I have done, that the circle is not pernicious given that explicatures (which are the engine of the semantics/pragmatics debate) are, in principle and in fact, not cancellable after all. Thus, the pragmatic contributions that intrude into semantics acquire some of the features of semantics (like entailments, they cannot be cancelled on pain of contradiction). The other is to reduce the circle and to state that there are indeed (many) cases of pragmatic intrusion; however we should not be so pessimistic as to claim that in all cases semantics needs to be augmented by pragmatics. There are sentences which can be fairly well understood even independently of pragmatics and, furthermore, there are sentences where limited amounts of pragmatic intrusion can occur and where such intrusions

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can be somehow ignored since the truth-conditional content of the sentence can be grasped by making abstract substitutions such as X did Y (for example, in the sentence, 'He did this').

1   Introduction

When I initially considered Grice's circle, it was unclear to me (or to anyone else, with the notable exception of Jacob L. Mey, editor of the Journal of Pragmatics) the kind of applications and extensions that the theory was to undergo. However, it is now apparent to me that these ideas about Grice's circle are in keeping with a modular picture of language use (Capone 2010, 2011), where a special module is reserved for pragmatics (or, at least, for specialized pragmatic processes dealing with generalized explicatures, rather than particularized implicatures, for which context-sensitive considerations and reasoning seem to be applicable). At the time of writing my paper on Grice's circle, it was clear that at least some empirical considerations were leading me towards considering explicatures as being non-cancellable (at least in the most crucial cases, where the theory needed explicatures to avoid certain impasses). The theory was expanded in my paper (Capone 2009), in which I divorced the issue of the cancellability of explicatures from Grice's Circle and in which I introduced some detailed theoretical considerations in favour of the idea that explicatures (at least the pragmatic components of explicatures) are not cancellable. Since those seminal papers, I have written other articles which would appear to support and to be supported by the paper on Grice's circle. We have reached a stage in which the various pieces of my theory are becoming interlocking in nature – like the various pieces of a puzzle. It will, therefore, be useful to revisit my old paper on Grice's circle, which is still very relevant, despite the fact that it was published a number of years ago. An idea that appears to support the considerations in my paper on Grice's circle was proposed by Burton-Roberts (personal communication) and discussed in Capone (2009). Once intentions are projected through pragmatic means, they cannot be cancelled (albeit they can be retracted). What does this mean? Of course there is a difference between cancelling and retracting an intention. An intention that has been retracted has not been cancelled or made null. The speaker (whoever she is) makes it clear that she no longer endorses the position expressed earlier (in some previous utterance) through a conversational implicature, even though she would have to concede, when pressed by an interlocutor, that she no longer has the intentions which were manifested through the previous utterance, not because there is anything wrong with the previous utterance, but because she has changed her mind and no longer has that (communicative) intention. To cancel an intention which one has projected and communicated through a conversational implicature is impossible. Why? This is because one has mobilized linguistic resources and contextual clues and cues that direct the hearer towards the recovery of a certain implicature. The intention was manifested through a number of contextual clues and cues, and since those clues and cues were disseminated, it is no longer possible to revoke them and make them inactive. They exist and lead us in the

direction of the intention which was manifested. Of course, one can distinguish between potential implicatures and actual implicatures, by observing a difference in relation to their cancellability, with potential implicatures being easier to cancel (less entrenched, to use recent terminology by Jaszczolt 2016). These features of intentionality I am highlighting rely on the theoretical considerations that texts are planned in advanced and that linguistic and non-linguistic resources are mobilized with the aim of manifesting a certain intention. And once the intention has been sufficiently manifested, it is impossible to cancel, although it can be retracted.

Frege (1956), Strawson (1950), and Stalnaker (1970) may be considered to be the first pioneers in the semantics/pragmatics debate, even if their considerations are not quoted at length in recent works by Carston (1999, 2002a), Bach (1994a, b) and Levinson (2000), with these perhaps being the best recent extensions of those ideas. The basic insights are that in many cases a sentence cannot constitute a complete thought; on such occasions, only an utterance is something that can be said to be true or false, as illustrated by the celebrated example "The king of France is bald" which is false in 2004, but perhaps was true at the time when France was a monarchy, depending on who the king was at that time and whether or not he was bald; on these refined and solid views, it would be incorrect to equate a sentence with a proposition unless all references therein are explicit (or unless the sentence expresses an analytic truth). (I found it hard to comprehend that Borg (2012) should adopt a position which differs significantly from Frege's, even though she explicitly discusses Frege's work). According to T. Williamson (p.c.), it would be incorrect to equate a sentence with a proposition as a general principle: even if all the references are explicit or the sentence expresses an analytic truth, the sentence should not be equated with a proposition, since its translation into another language will be a distinct sentence expressing the same proposition. In this chapter, I shall contribute to the semantics/pragmatics debate by proposing a number of tentative considerations on the nature of pragmatic intrusion into full propositional forms ready for truth-conditional evaluation – aware that I am tackling a topic that is particularly delicate and thorny (and about which different scholars will invariably reach different conclusions). After a preamble on the theory of semantics, I shall begin with what appears to me to be an interesting example of pragmatic intrusion which is worthy of lengthy critical discussion, and which serves to widen the scope of the standard examples of the notion of explicature. I believe that it also has a bearing on the analysis of 'Grice's circle', a theory-internal problem in the current semantics/pragmatics debate. It is the discussion of Grice's circle that is the main topic of this chapter. The problem amounts to the following. Implicatures take their input from what is said (as Recanati 2010 claims that no implicature can be computed unless something has been said, some proposition expressed), but what is said takes its input from pragmatics. There is a circularity that is pernicious in that it leads to a definitionally impossible task (Levinson 2000). Of course, not all circularities are pernicious as some simply involve an infinite regress that is finitely representable (see Kasher 1991 on mutual knowledge). However, in the case under consideration, the circularity is poor because we really need a starting point in utterance interpretation and we take that to be the semantics of a sentence. It is not a question of having

a finite representation of an iterated regress, but of stopping the regress so that we can **start** doing some interpretative work. It should be made clear that the circularity problem is not only a theory-internal problem in theories of the Gricean type, but it is a problem for truth-conditional semantics too. In fact, definitions of semantics usually assume that semantics deals with the context-independent (or context-invariant) aspects of meaning. (See, for example, Higginbotham's 1985 treatment of reference in pronominals).

2   Pragmatic Intrusionism: A Story

In order to expand the data on which standard discussions are based, I shall now deal with an example which has a bearing on the semantics/pragmatics debate. After discussing this example, I shall then consider Grice's circle.

M.V.M., who lives in Reggio Calabria on the other side of the straits of Messina, complains about the city traffic. The last time she visited Messina (the location of the conversation), she became stuck in traffic in Reggio for three quarters of an hour. She says: "I should have walked to the harbour. The distance between my house and the harbour is only a ten minute walk." I reply: "Then why don't you walk to the harbour, instead of getting stuck in the traffic?" She continues: "I have got a sore leg. And then, when I come back, I have got to go up and it takes much longer." By saying "The distance between my house and the harbour is only a ten minute walk", M.V.M means that "It only takes ten minutes to walk from my house to the harbour" and a motivation for attributing that meaning to her is that her house is situated above the harbour. She does not mean: "It takes ten minutes to walk from the harbour to my house." Presumably, she could rely on me, because I am aware that she lives somewhere up the hill, to understand that her intention is to inform me that the distance between her house and the harbour, when it is measured in terms of time, is equivalent to a ten minute walk beginning at her house and ending at the harbour. I understand that she means that it takes her ten minutes to walk from her house to the harbour and not to walk from the harbour to the house because the context of utterance (what she has previously said, as selected by my cognitive ability, which has a bearing on the utterance interpretation (Sperber & Wilson 1986)) makes it clearly evident that this is her **intention**. So far, she has been talking about the event of her getting trapped in traffic while driving from her house to the harbour. Supposing that this topic and her utterance "The distance between my house and the harbour is a ten minute walk" are connected, I make the inference that this distance (the length of the event of her going) amounts to the length of the event of her going from her house to the harbour. In the conversation, it is also clear that she is contrasting the event of her getting stuck in traffic for three quarters of an hour with the possible event of her walking from her house to the harbour. The contrast is more effective if the events being contrasted are sufficiently similar, that is if they both describe M.V.M.'s action of going from her house to the harbour. In context, it is clear that she cannot be contrasting her driving the car from her house to the

harbour with her walking from the harbour to her house, as they are not comparable events. Although both events involve covering the same distance, the direction of the walking/going is different[1].

My analysis might be objected to on the grounds that if M.V.M. is observing the maxim of Quantity, her particular addressee is licensed to assume that the reverse also holds. If not, M.V.M. should have added "but not the reverse."[2] I believe that, by discussing this chapter with M.V.M., she agreed with my understanding of what she meant (in context). Nevertheless, I think that this objection is stimulating, because it independently lends support to the sophisticated elaboration of Grice's maxim of Quantity by Levinson (2000). Levinson believes that Grice's maxim of Quantity must be split into the Q- and the I-Principle. The Q-principle states that we should not proffer an assertion that is weaker than our knowledge of the world allows, unless asserting a stronger assertion violates the I-Principle. The I-Principle states that we must produce the minimal semantic clues indispensable for achieving our communicative goals (bearing the Q-principle in mind). In the context specified, the I-principle allowed the participants to use underdetermined propositions because they could rely on a rich shared context. Thus, the Q-principle here does not apply because it conflicts with the I-Principle.

To say that this objection concerning what Grice's maxim of quantity has to say about this example can be easily dismissed by resorting to the interaction between Levinson's I- and Q- Principle is to not admit that the explicature is, in fact, a conversational implicature. The role played here by the I-principle is **simply** to promote underdetermination, while I believe that a specific interpretation is chosen by bearing in mind some crucial pieces of knowledge derived from the contextual background. Surely there are cases in which conversational principles play a more active role in explicature calculation (interacting with what I later term the GSDP), but the M.V.M. example is not a case in point.

I would now like to further this discussion. M.V.M. says "The distance between my house and the harbour is a ten minute walk." That amounts to "If you measure the distance between my house and the harbour, that is equivalent to a ten minute walk." Obviously, this needs further interpretation. One who is in the habit of walking from the harbour to M.V.M.'s house would say that it is false that the distance is a ten minute walk. In fact, it takes one eighteen minutes to walk up to M.V.M.'s house. However, we would not say that M.V.M.'s utterance is false. By saying, "The distance between my house and the harbour is a ten minute walk", she means that "It takes ten minutes to go down to the harbour from my house." Some semantic/pragmatic expansion is required to interpret the utterance in the correct way, that is, to represent her communicative intentions.

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[1] If we imagine the distance as a straight line with a number of points in between the extremes, we may suppose (with a certain amount of idealization) that when she is walking she passes through each section of the line (each section must be thought of as being large enough to allow this idealization).

[2] This interesting objection was raised by one of the referees.

3   Recent Views on the Semantics/Pragmatics Debate

Levinson (2000) proposes that pragmatics intrudes into propositional forms and thus is constitutive of truth-conditional meaning (read: truth-conditional content or what Szabó (2006) calls 'relative truth-conditions', as opposed to the 'absolute truth conditions' of a sentence which are the context-independent aspects of meaning) but, unlike Bach and Carston, he does not differentiate terminologically between inferences that contribute to propositional forms and inferences that take input from propositional forms. Arguably, Levinson (2000, 188) proposes a framework with a pre-semantic Gricean pragmatics 1 and a post-semantic Gricean pragmatics 2[3].

The examples that, in the current literature, support the analyses which have just been exposed are of the following type:

(1) If the king of France died and France became a republic, I would be happy, but if France became a republic and the king of France died, I would be unhappy.
(2) Take these three plates to those three people over there (there is another set of four plates close to the set of three plates).
(3) You will not die (said to John who has just cut his arm).
(4) I am not ready (to start the journey).
(5) The ham sandwich is getting hungry.

If only what is said literally is taken into account, (1) must count as a contradiction (on the above views). However, the statement is not contradictory, if we admit that pragmatics intrudes into what is said and that 'and' is interpreted as "as a result of that" (in accordance with Carston's analysis), or that it expands what is said (in accordance with Bach, who claims that there is some middle ground between what is said and conversational implicatures). In (2) scalar conversational implicatures either determine or further develop what is said, in this way determining full propositional forms. A scalar conversational implicature is one that takes its input from a lexeme that is part of an ordered set of expressions based on certain characteristics such as entailment, semantic relatedness and lexical simplicity (the scalar items must be equally lexicalised, according to Levinson (2000)). If two lexemes, x and y, form a Horn-scale <x, y>, such that x entails y, then by the use of y the speaker will implicate that, for all he knows, the stronger item is not applicable. Levinson (2000) argues that the references to the set of plates and the set of people in (2) are properly established/fixed by scalar implicatures that serve to properly differentiate the sets in question (without scalar implicatures, it is not possible to properly distinguish the set of three plates from the set of four plates, as the cardinal number would serve to refer to an unbounded series of objects, having just an inferior limit (at least three)). In (3), some expansion work is needed to transform the sentence into a statement that can be true (the statement will be understood to mean "You will not die from this cut"). Without this inferential expansion, the statement will be necessarily false

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[3]An anonymous referee has summed up Levinson's work in this way. I am inclined to agree with this referee's opinion.

(from a certain viewpoint; but I do not agree with this viewpoint). In fact, it might be possible to explain this example of expansion in a different way. It might be claimed that, in the absence of the process of expansion, the pragmatic anomaly exhibited by the sentence is the lack of relevant specificity, as is made clear by the positive version of this example. Suppose that an oncologist says to his patient "You are going to die." Presumably, he does not say something that is trivially true; on the contrary, we may assume that this utterance possesses relevant specificity (Bach 2002a). In (4), what is said needs to be completed, in order to arrive at a complete thought. (5) is a falsehood unless it is interpreted as meaning that "The person who ordered the ham sandwich is getting hungry." In addition to the examples discussed by Levinson (2000), one also needs to take into account examples such as (6):

(6) An editor of Natural Language Semantics (said pointing to some empty seats in
     the front row).

Stainton (1998) analyses the uses of quantifier phrases in isolation (which he distinguishes from cases of ellipsis, in that, according to him, one cannot begin a conversation with an elliptical sentence, because it relies on a context for its understanding). So, according to Stainton you can point to some empty seats in front of you and say "An editor of Natural Language Semantics", meaning that one of the seats demonstrated is reserved for an editor of Natural Language Semantics. Surely the quantifier in isolation cannot form a proposition of its own, and thus pragmatics intervenes to rescue this 'prima facie' implausible utterance fragment and provides as output what in the context sounds like the most plausible proposition intended: one of these seats is reserved for an editor of Natural Language Semantics. These uses of quantifier phrases in isolation are very interesting. It is not possible to go into them in greater detail, but at least a few things have to be said about Stainton's important proposal. Stainton calls these uses elliptical in a sense that 'elliptical' involves the elision of a linguistic constituent. However, in another, more technical sense of 'elliptical', he believes that these uses are not elliptical. Stainton has in mind cases of ellipsis such as "He doesn't", which, in a certain dialogic frame such as "Does John smoke?", means "John does not smoke". Stainton makes it clear that in 'ellipsis' proper the omitted constituent in an elliptical structure is recovered through the linguistic context. The author, having made all this clear, excludes the fact that the predicate in (6) is recovered through the preceding linguistic context (an adjacency pair in an earlier part or a previous assertion). Instead, he believes that the predicate is matched to the quantifier phrase (used in isolation) by accessing the most salient assumption. The story he provides is cast in the relevance theory model. Now, I believe his analysis is an important contribution to the semantics/pragmatics debate. In fact, Stainton states that the use of a quantifier phrase in isolation constitutes a statement that can be said to be true or false. This claim amounts to saying that the pragmatic inference that matches the quantifier phrase 'An Editor of Natural Language Semantics' to the predicate 'is going to sit there' provides a fully-fledged truth-evaluable proposition.

4   Grice's Circle

In this section I will address a theory-internal theoretical problem known as Grice's circle. So far we have considered the theoretical implications of some examples that are taken as standards in support of the recent views in the semantics/pragmatics debate. Now it is time to consider the difficulties experienced with each of these views. Firstly, it is unclear how pragmatics should be defined in these views (neither is it clear whether the authors in question actually attempt to provide a broad, general definition of pragmatics). All these views have abandoned the precise definitional proposal defined by Gazdar (1979) and Levinson (1983), according to which pragmatics amounts to meaning minus truth-conditional semantics (what Lyons 1987 called 'a negative view of pragmatics'). That proposal has the advantage of offering a picture in which semantics and pragmatics play complementary roles (albeit that picture is rather simplified)[4]. If you know what semantics is, you will know what pragmatics is. That proposal was consistent with Grice's original view of pragmatics, according to which conversational implicatures are cancellable. For Levinson (2000), who adopts the view that conversational implicatures contribute to truth-conditional content (read: propositional forms), the pragmatic enterprise that concedes that pragmatics intrudes into semantics (read: truth-conditional content or propositional forms) is a circular, hence definitionally impossible, enterprise. Conversational implicatures, in fact, take their input from what is said, but what is said takes its input from conversational implicatures; this is what I have called 'Grice's circle' above.

So far, we have confined our attention to generalized conversational implicatures. However, there are other types to consider as well. Grice has divided non-logical inferences into two types: **generalized** and **particularized implicatures**. Generalized implicatures are those that arise in a default context, that is, without the assistance of a particular context. Particularized implicatures are those that arise in particular contexts.

It is now time to turn attention to particularized implicatures. Consider the following example:

(7) A: I need to buy some petrol.
  B: There are two garages round the corner.

As Grice has noted, utterances need to be related (to one another) in order to make up a coherent and cooperative conversation. Thus, B's utterance will be interpreted as "If you want to buy some petrol, you will find some by going to either of the two garages round the corner." One may notice that this particularized implicature arises after the hearer constructs fully truth-evaluable propositional forms. Thus, it seems reasonable to suppose that some pragmatic mechanisms must have provided the full propositional forms (for example the scalar implicature arising from the use of 'two' must have been calculated before any relation implicatures

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[4] Bach (personal communication) believes that this picture is not only oversimplified, but confused.

arise). But the need to consider such implicated assumptions as part of the truth-conditionally evaluable content raises the question as to whether we should reformulate the notion of conversational implicature itself. In addition, another associated question arises: if an implicature contributes to truth-conditional content, is it then non-truth-conditional (that is, can it be cancelled)? I will first answer the latter question and then turn to the former.[5]

5   Can Implicatures That Intrude into Propositional Forms Be Cancelled?

A crucial question is whether we can cancel implicatures that intrude into propositional forms. It is interesting to note that Bach (2001a) claims that the inference that Jack and Jill are engaged to each other from "Jack and Jill are engaged" is an implicit element of communication, but is not part of what is said. "That it is not part of what is said is clear from the fact that it does pass Grice's test of cancellability" (p. 152). Although Bach has a literalistic sense of "what is said", contrary to other linguists (e.g. Carston), I think we can also extend his intuition to non-literalistic notions of what is said. When a law states that "The president of the USA must not tell lies" it does not admit exceptions and if a law states, for example, "If the President of the USA tells a lie and he does not admit that, he is to be prosecuted", then this is a non-literal, yet quite strict, notion of what is said and does not admit the idea that once we establish the proper anaphoric links between the pronominal and the definite description (albeit it is interpreted attributively), then we can go on to cancel the pragmatic intrusion/increment that contributed to the said proposition. So, I believe that we have a good basis for building serious, legalistic theories of what is said that will incorporate pragmatic intrusion. Consider again the examples (8), (9), (10) for the sake of convenience:

(8)   If the king of France died and France became a republic, I would be happy, but if France became a republic and the king of France died, I would be unhappy.

(9)   Take these three plates to those three people over there.

(10) You will not die (said to John who has just cut his arm).

Suppose someone utters statement (8) and then goes on cancelling the resulting implicature of causality:

(11) But I do not mean to say that if France became a republic as a result of the fact that the king of France had died, I would be happy and that if the king of France died as a consequence of the fact that France had become a republic, I would be unhappy.

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[5] From now on I shall discuss the phenomenon called 'Grice's circle' with reference to Levinson's view, while incorporating Carston's suggestion to differentiate implicatures from explicatures.

Cancelling the causality implicature that obviates a possibly contradictory (or otherwise highly indeterminate) statement, results in an unacceptable utterance: hence, in this case, it is not possible, in my view, to build the propositional form, allowing for pragmatic intrusion and then cancel the related implicature, without rendering the discourse incoherent. While in ordinary cases of implicature cancellation, the speaker can still be seen to have said something intelligible, something that is coherent in itself and non-contradictory, in cases where pragmatics contributes in a decisive way to the propositional form, that contribution cannot be withdrawn without causing havoc. It is clear, at this point, that while conversational implicatures can be denied and guarantee a way out for a speaker who does not want to fully commit himself to a certain position, explicatures are not loci where a way out can be given to a speaker and allow him or her to fully support the position s/he has expressed.

Likewise, in (9), the scalar implicature (exactly three plates; exactly three people) serves to identify reference. Thus, if it is used for reference fixing, it cannot be cancelled. It would be odd to add, as in (12) below:

(12) But I do not mean that the set of plates I am referring to constitutes only three plates.

The fact that the set constitutes three pieces may serve to distinguish it from a set of, say, four plates. Cancelling the implicature results in a statement that cannot be assessed as true or false (in that one of the NPs fails to refer). (To make the case more cogent, consider a simple pronominal like 'He'; once 'He' is assigned to the referent John, this reference cannot be changed in anaphoric links, as this would result in an incoherent discourse. As Levinson (1983) clearly shows, logic deductions essentially rely on keeping the referents fixed; thus, it would be unwise in such cases to accept that explicatures are cancellable, as that would destroy the value of a logic demonstration).

Presumably, example (10) needs some expansion which results in a particularized implicature and, thus, it would not be possible to cancel the implicature "not dying from this cut" without making a necessarily false statement. Without this expansion, the speaker is understood to mean that the addressee will never die – a highly implausible understanding, to say the least - or that he will not die at some unspecified time (a highly indeterminate reading in this case). The latter option is totally uninformative, since there are a great many times, t, when the statement is true and the hearer cannot be sure which t the speaker is referring to. Cancelling the implicature will result in attributing an implausible or totally obscure intention to him.

Examples like these, where implicatures intrude into propositional forms, along with the subsequent effort to cancel those very implicatures, can be multiplied *ad libitum*. If the inferential expansions in question cannot be cancelled without the resulting perception that the utterance is false or that it is not possible to assess it for truth, then we are faced with a class of inferential processes distinct from conversational implicatures (the latter, in fact, unlike explicatures, are still cancellable in the present view).

Such inferential completions/expansions are similar to implicatures in their mode of inference (considering that we need Gricean reasoning in the derivation of

implicatures), but unlike implicatures in that they cannot be cancelled; hence they are called 'explicatures', adopting Carston's terminology[6], to precisely distinguish them from implicatures. (It should be stressed that both implicatures and explicatures are pragmatic processes and that explicatures rely on implicatures, even if the final effects are different). Explicatures are inferential processes that complete or expand logical forms. Although they are constructed instantaneously and need not be reflexive or conscious, we "are still dealing with conceptual representations manipulated under constraints of rationality" (Recanati 2002, 121). They take their input from logical forms, whereas implicatures take their input from fully truth-evaluable propositional forms. While explicatures seem to be determined by the need to conform to the convention of truthfulness, conversational implicatures may skirt the issue of truth. Explicatures and implicatures are distinguishable in that the former serve to constitute a compound statement that can be true or false, whilst the latter serve to evade the issue of truth.

6   A Tentative Solution

In the preceding section, I have discussed a possible problem that theories of the semantics/pragmatics debate encounter, that is the non-cancellability of explicatures. It may turn out, however, that this theoretical problem carries the key to its own solution. Conversational implicatures take their input from what is said; they should not take their input from conversational implicatures. It might be objected, that, after all, what is said is also obtained thanks to pragmatic intrusion, and that in this way any solution is circular: we build on pragmatics to solve a pragmatic problem. I could reply that, although the mode of inference is pragmatic, the result obtained is part of the truth-conditional content and thus, in a sense, it lacks the essential features of pragmatics (defined as non-truth-conditional meaning). It is possible that what started its life as a pragmatic inference ends up being a truth-conditional aspect of meaning, due to a simple and plausible general semantic and monotonic discourse principle:

6.1   GSDP[7]

Avoid impossibilities and implausible propositions, if you can, by carrying out the necessary readjustments.

I devised this principle by borrowing it from the law that enjoins that no one is required to do what is impossible. This overarching principle bypasses any existing law.

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[6] The notion of "explicature" was originally proposed by Sperber & Wilson (1986).

[7] General semantic discourse principle.

We are now free to use conversational implicatures or to accommodate a number of assumptions (as defined by Stalnaker) in order to obey the overarching GSDP, but whatever we use for this purpose is conducive to a semantic non-cancellable layer of meaning (a fully truth-evaluable proposition). So whatever implicatures are under the scope of the GSDP lead to non-cancellable meaning augmentations (or increments). The principle transforms what starts life as pragmatics into semantics, but very conveniently so, because pragmatics, at this stage, can take its input from semantic information.

It might be thought that there is a relationship of some kind between the GSDP and Grice's maxim of manner. As Grice (1989, 27) states:

Finally, under the category of Manner, which I understand as relating not (like the previous categories) to what is said, but, rather, to how what is said is to be said, I include the super maxim – "Be perspicuous" – and various maxims such as:

1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly (Grice 1989, 27).

Assuming that the GSDP can be subsumed in Grice's Maxim of Manner[8], I believe that it cannot be incorporated in maxims 2, 3, and 4, while it might be argued that maxim 1 has sufficient latitude for incorporating it. In fact, it might be supposed that impossibilities and implausible propositions, once expressed, turn out to give rise to obscure expressions. The reader will not be totally persuaded by this reasoning, I presume, on account of the fact that Grice himself makes it clear that the category of manner relates not to what is said but to **how** what is said is to be said. One way to accommodate the GSDP under the first maxim of manner would be to acknowledge that the impossibilities and implausibilities we consider when we make recourse to explicatures derive from the way the propositions are expressed (that is, often from the underdetermination that results in interpretative ambiguity or obscurity). So, I believe that a linguist interested in accommodating the GSDP in Grice's first maxim of manner, would have to reformulate the principle in such a way as to stress that the impossibilities and implausibilities in question are 'prima facie' ones, derived from the way things were stated. Therefore, we need the following:

6.2   Revised GSDP

Avoid 'prima facie' cases of impossibilities and implausible propositions due to the use of semantic underdetermination, if you can, by carrying out the necessary readjustments.

The above definition makes use of the concept of underdetermination, which I am proposing to explain by using the words of Recanati:

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[8]A suggestion by an anonymous referee of the Journal of Pragmatics.

There is, I claim, no such thing as 'what the sentence says' in the literalist sense, that is, no such thing as a complete proposition which is autonomously determined by the rules of the language with respect to the context but independent of the speaker's meaning. As Bach highlights, what the sentence says, in the purely semantic sense, 'excludes anything that is determined by [the speaker's] communicative intention (if it included that, then what is said would be partly a pragmatic matter)'. It is for that reason that I state there is no such a thing: in order to reach a complete proposition through a sentence, we must appeal to the speaker's meaning and that is the lesson of semantic underdeterminacy (Recanati 2004, 59).

It may be considered that the if-clause contained in the GSDP ("if you can") renders the principle as being weak. What I mean by this is that if the text offers latitude for obtaining a plausible reading and avoiding impossibilities, then the reader must work out the necessary pragmatic adjustments, thereby promoting a plausible reading that is allowed (permitted) by the underdetermination present in the text. So, I believe, we must reformulate the principle to avoid confusion:

6.3   Revised GSDP

Avoid 'prima facie' cases of impossibilities and implausible propositions due to the use of semantic underdetermination, by carrying out the necessary readjustments (in the case that textual underdetermination makes that necessary).

7   Towards a Redefinition of Pragmatics

It would be beneficial to bear in mind that our ultimate aim is to precisely distinguish (if possible) between semantics and pragmatics. So, it would be useful to provide further arguments that tend to show that the GSDP is a semantic and not a pragmatic principle. The GSDP relates to explicatures, but in order to avoid impossibilities and implausible propositions, it clearly relies on contextual and background knowledge. Assuming that this consideration is reasonable, I would like to state why it is useful to consider it as a semantic principle. On the one hand, those who would like to avoid the proliferation of principles of interpretations would be tempted to subsume it into the first maxim of manner; however, on the other hand, even a pragmatically-minded linguist would have to acknowledge that the principle is semantic, in the limited sense that it relates to semantic interpretation and, in particular, to truth-conditional meaning. Leaving aside the possible latitude of the term 'semantics' (Lyons 1977 certainly sees semantics as comprising the pragmatic aspects of communication), I would like to stress here that the output of the principle is a thought that can be assessed as being true or false. So, it is certainly beneficial to have clarified matters, in the light of the ambiguity of the modifier 'semantic'. The principle may very well be pragmatic, but it definitely has a semantic output.

I have to admit that my approach in trying to rigorously distinguish semantics from pragmatics is not devoid of problems. After all, non-cancellability is also a property of conventional implicature. What is, then, the difference between an explicature and (if they exist at all) conventional implicatures?[9] The term 'conventional implicature' is, of course, Gricean. Instead, the current literature, with the exception of Bach (1999a), a champion of Gricean ideas, attempts to subsume the notion of conventional implicature into the notion of presupposition (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 2000) or the notion of procedural meaning (see Carston 2002a, b and authors cited therein). In the Gricean view, a conventional implicature is a non-cancellable inference that does not have truth-conditional content. Thus, if I say "John is poor but happy", I conventionally imply that there is an alleged contrast between being poor and being happy (these qualities are usually judged as being mutually exclusive).

My line of defence would be to state that the two phenomena, explicatures, and conventional implicatures, are not on a par. The fact that they both involve non-cancellable inferences does not require us to conflate the two categories, in the same way in which no semanticist would be bound to conflate entailments and conventional implicatures on the grounds that they both involve non-cancellable inferences. Most importantly, what militates against conflating (or even considering conflating) the categories of conventional implicature and explicature is the fact that the non-cancellability of conventional implicatures derives from them being lexical inferences which are attached to particular lexemes such as 'but' or 'even' (and is to be imputed to instructions that are part of our lexical knowledge), while the non-cancellability of explicatures derives from the application of the GSDP, which is not a lexical rule but a principle that enjoins us to maximise rationality and to avoid impossibilities or implausible propositions. The contrast is mainly between information that comes from the lexicon and information that derives from a *rational* approach to language use, from using rationality in promoting a certain meaning rather than any other. In other words, it is true that, in my view, conventional implicatures and explicatures are both non-cancellable inferences; but the fact that each of them is non-cancellable does not favour conflation, since explicatures are different types of inference which often provide missing constituents. Explicatures are calculated under the exigency of supplying an implicit constituent, whereas conventional implicatures are triggered by explicit lexical items (e.g. 'but').

Another problem with 'prima facie' appearing to militate against my view of the semantics/pragmatics debate is that, at least in some cases, explicatures appear to be cancellable. Consider the example[10]: *You are not going to die [from this little wound], because you are immortal anyway*. Suppose that the constituent [from this little wound] is deleted, to signal that the explicature is cancelled. Some may say that this is problematic for the theoretical apparatus I have so far described. However, I do not regard this objection as being fatal, although it is extremely illuminating and important. We should note that the use of a demonstrative in the 'prima facie'

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[9] This point was raised by an anonymous referee.

[10] This important example is by virtue of an anonymous referee.

explicated constituent points to some object in context. I assume that if a 'prima facie' explicature, such as "from this wound", is considered as a possible explication of the proposition being expressed, this is because the context provides 'prima facie' evidence in favour of the utterance being related to the wound. Presumably, before we start to process the explanation clause "because you are immortal anyway", the operation of the GSDP may prompt us to provide the explicature "You are not going to die from this wound", but the final addition of the explanation "because you are immortal anyway" may cause hearers to believe that the 'prima facie' explicature is removed, or cancelled. In fact, this example, which is aimed at proving that my approach may have some flaws, seems to provide support for my line of argument. We assume that we say things with a purpose in mind. Why is the speaker, in this case, saying "You are not going to die [from this little wound] because you are immortal" (with the explicated constituent understood as being deleted)? Presumably, he is comforting the hearer who has been worrying about a wound (say to his arm). The context of utterance, the fact that the hearer is worrying about a wound, may promote the explicature constituent [from this little wound]. Nevertheless, the speaker may deny this explicated constituent and say "No, there is no connection between what I was saying and the hearer's wound. I was just saying that generally and that was just a random thought". Now, if he assumes this, all we need to consider is the utterance/thought "You are not going to die because you are immortal." In this case, there is no implausible or impossible proposition expressed (whether the proposition is true is a different matter) and thus the GSDP will not apply (or will apply vacuously) and no explicature will arise as a consequence of the fact that the hearer is not going to die from his wound. In fact, this is not a case of explicature cancellation. Of course, one might dispute that such a conversational contribution obeys Grice's maxim of Relation, given that it is unconnected with what is happening in the situation, but surely the onus of explanation is now placed on those who propound such counterexamples.

Now, I do not want to give the impression that I undervalue the importance of this counterexample; in fact, I believe that it is important for a different reason. It shows that, despite all our efforts to include contextual effects when we process utterances and automatically provide explicatures, our efforts may go amiss because the perception of the contextual elements that affect interpretation may be biased towards only one point of view. For example, to justify the apparent unconnectedness between the utterance "You are not going to die because you are immortal" and the situation, we may resort to some stage setting such as in the following case. John is worrying about a cut on his arm. The philosopher Plato arrives, reading aloud from one of his books (about John): "You are not going to die because you are immortal." While he is reading, he intends to refer to John by the use of the pronominal "You". However, he is so absorbed in his reading that he does not bother to notice that his utterance may be interpreted as being connected with the scene he is a part of. From Plato's point of view, he only means that John is not going to die because he is immortal (in other words, he will never die). When we use the term 'the situation of utterance' we imply that all participants are aware of what is going on, of what is before their eyes, and that all their perceptions coincide to some

extent. But, it is natural that all perceptions are perspectived, to some extent, and this may very well cause conversationalists to sometimes arrive at different interpretations.

There is, I must admit, an important strand of consideration arising out of the example that has so far stimulated the discussion. It could be claimed that the example "You are not going to die [from this wound] because you are immortal anyway" compels us to see that the example "You are not going to die [from this little wound]" only functions insofar as it is presupposed that the wounded addressee, as is the case for all living beings, is mortal. In a setting where the addressee is immortal, it may be argued that the explicature does not arise. Hence, it must be possible to cancel the explicature in a situation where someone is informed about his immortality.

The assumption that presuppositions play a role in explicature derivation, as I have already noted in the M.V.M. example, is important, and I do not dispute that. However, the presuppositions in question are actual pieces of knowledge and, I hope you are in agreement, are not cancellable (they are only revisable, at best). A presupposition (of the non-linguistic kind) is either present or not. It is basically a known situation. If a presupposition leads you to perceive a certain meaning (by interacting with a certain sentence), you should not say that the meaning in question is defeasible on the grounds that the presuppositions might differ. In the case of explicatures, the context fixes an intention and it is no longer possible to deny that intention. In the case of (potential) conversational implicatures, contextual knowledge may lead you to form chains of reasoning that may lead to the abortion or promotion of an implicature, without having a crucial role in **fixing** an intention (in forcing you to think that an intention is the unique interpretation of the utterance). Surely, context, in the case of cancelled conversational implicature, may play a role in fixing an intention, in the sense of aborting an intention, but not in the sense of promoting it. Suppose you say "John and Mary went to bed." You may wish to convey the meaning that they went to bed in the same room. Contextual knowledge may lead you to form argumentative steps that lead you in this direction, but none of these inferential steps force you to go in this direction. If you say that John and Mary went to bed, the intention that they went to the same bed is promoted by contextual elements, yet these do not fix the intention, they do not force you to think that that intention is the unique cognitive state in which the utterance was proffered. Instead, explicatures, similar to the ones the literature has so far considered, seem to be cases in which contextual elements force you to think that the intention (attributed to the speaker proffering the utterance) is unique. I believe that, at least, this must all be assumed.

Another potential difficulty I would like to consider is the following: besides cancellability, context variability may be said to be a property of conversational implicatures. It appears that explicatures are context variable. For example, in the M.V.M. example, given that the earth is flat and all other things being equal, the additional meaning does not arise[11]. I agree that some conversational implicatures are context-variable, particularly those arising as a result of the application of the

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[11] This objection was raised by a referee.

maxim of relation (particularized implicatures). Yet, this is not necessarily a problem for my theory because we have to differentiate between conversational implicatures and reference assignment processes (assigning reference to a pronominal, for instance). Surely, we would not want to state that reference assignment is a case of conversational implicature, on the grounds that it is a context-variable phenomenon (after all "He is wise" may, in context, mean that John is wise or that Fred is wise, etc.). So, I do not think (and I believe many readers will agree) that being context-variable is a defining feature of conversational implicatures (generalized implicatures as a norm are not context-variable, albeit they can be cancelled in some contexts). We need to distinguish between defining and correlated features of a certain linguistic phenomenon. Certainly we would not want to include context variability amongst the hallmarks of conversational implicatures, even if we admit that context plays a role in particularized implicatures and also a role in implicature cancellation. If this does not suffice, scholars such as Stalnaker (1999, 54) claim that presuppositions are also sensitive to contextual variation, and this invariably proves that a wider range of phenomena than conversational implicature is sensitive to contextual variation.

In a sense, we can state that conversational implicatures are blind to whether the propositional form giving rise to them has been obtained by recourse to pragmatics. Implicatures are not sensitive to the pragmatic status of an inference once it has been precipitated as a truth-conditional aspect of meaning. Hence, the problem of "Grice's circle" does not arise, because, meanwhile, the implicature has been transformed into something that is not an implicature: viz. an explicature in Carston's (1999) terminology. Whereas implicatures are cancellable, explicatures are not: they arise out of what is said, that is, out of non-cancellable aspects of meaning.

We can still define 'core' pragmatics as dealing with inferential phenomena that take input from truth-conditional content and produce conversational implicatures as output. The problem is that we now have non-core pragmatics, a residue that deals with completions and expansions and generates full propositional forms, and thus seemingly jeopardizes a unified definition. The problem vanishes, however, if we define pragmatics as inferential phenomena that are **potentially** non-truth-conditional – i.e. non-truth-conditional unless they are needed to construct a full propositional form under the constraint of the GSDP.

Admittedly, the discussion so far has touched on an intricate issue and I do not wish to assume that my considerations cannot be denied. One further problem is that implicatures, when cancelled, may also result in incoherent discourse; in particular, implicatures that repair violations of the maxim of relation cannot be cancelled for this very reason. However, there is a solution to this difficulty. In the case of an incoherent discourse resulting from cancelling an implicature which is required to safeguard the relation maxim, the person responsible for the discourse is said to have generated a text that lacks coherence or intelligibility. While the fragments of this discourse have a truth-conditional content (they can be evaluated as true or false), it is difficult to simply put the pieces that are there together and form argumentative relations; but, since the pieces are there, we can say that some complete, albeit unconnected thoughts have been expressed from the point of view of

the truth-conditional content. If we are content with this solution, we can indeed say that relation implicatures can be cancelled without leading to the voicing of some incomplete or contradictory thoughts.

8   A Closer Look at Explicatures

The M.V.M. example has a bearing on the understanding of Grice's circle, in that we can easily adapt it to show that a conversational implicature takes its input from an explicature. Returning now to the previously discussed case, the question is how to interpret M.V.M.'s utterance: "The distance between my house and the harbour is a ten minute walk." We need to do a considerable amount of inferential work before we can obtain the full propositional form. First, we need to know who the speaker is, in order to know that the utterance means that the distance between M.V.M.'s house and the harbour is a ten minute walk. Then we need a scalar implicature: ten minutes > exactly ten minutes. We also need to complete the thematic roles projected by 'walk', assuming that the speaker, or someone sufficiently similar to the speaker (i.e. M.V.M.), is the person walking, and that the walk is from M.V.M.'s house to the harbour and not the other way round. However, even with all this expansion work, some further pragmatic enrichments could accrue to this utterance. Supposing that M.V.M. had said:

(13)   The distance between my house and the harbour is a ten minute walk. And I got stuck in the traffic with my car!

Presumably, she might **conversationally implicate** that, next time, she will walk down to the harbour. But then again, she might not. After all, she has to walk up from the harbour to her house, and that might take her eighteen minutes. She may not be prepared for this length of walk. But, perhaps, the context makes it evident that she is so upset by the chaotic traffic that she may well undertake the walk from the harbour to her house. We notice how this implicature is defeasible, in contrast to the explicature that it takes her ten minutes to walk down from her house to the harbour. After all, the latter is supported by our world knowledge and that – unless a miracle happens – is not defeasible.

I propose that we concentrate on this latter point: the defeasibility of the explicature. After all, if the context changes, we would not have such an explicature (but we would replace it with a different one). It is of importance here not to confuse defeasibility with context-dependency. A context provides some **objective** clues for the interpretation of an utterance (Recanati 2002). If the context was different, the utterance would be interpreted in a different way. So, if in the presence of a chair, I say "This chair is quite old", I cannot cancel the inference that this particular old chair is the one next to me. The context may change and my utterance "This chair is quite old" may in one context select a brown chair and in another, a yellow chair. But it would not usually be correct to allow some contextual clues to guide the interpretation of an utterance and then cancel the contextual implication on the grounds that

the context might have been different. So, in the case of M.V.M.'s utterance, we cannot solely allow the contextual clues to guide us to the interpretation "The distance between M.V.M.'s house and the harbour is measurable in terms of a walk from M.V.M.'s house to the harbour", and then cancel the explicature on the grounds that the context could have been different. In this particular context, the above interpretation is the only plausible one – no defeasibility applies. In fact, any alternative interpretation would be false in that context and would amount to the assumption that M.V.M. does not know that which, in fact, she knows very well – a rather unreasonable assumption. The explicature, in this case, enables us to make sense of an utterance which, otherwise, may very well appear to be false. Before concluding this section, I would like to compare the M.V.M. example with other standard examples. Consider again (8) repeated below as (14):

(14) If the king of France died and France became a republic, I would be happy, but if France became a republic and the king of France died, I would be unhappy.

Now suppose we cancel the explicature. We then end up with a sentence which, in Carston's view, is contradictory. However, in conjunction with Levinson's (2000) fictional *Obstinate Opponent*, we might claim that, after all, the contradictory sentence is rescued by virtue of a pragmatic readjustment resulting from the principle of charity. Levinson is quite right in noting that this tack would involve the premise that the sentence is a contradiction, as rescuing the sentence would impose some extra inferential burden. To start with apparent incoherences and then to move on to coherent meanings obtained through the principle of charity is not a good strategy – for one thing, this strategy does not represent the way in which we process such sentences[12]. But one might now object that a sentence like (14) is not contradictory. Generally speaking, contradiction, with the exception of sentences where an analytic constituent is negated, seems to be a logical property of statements (albeit, in a loose sense, we sometimes talk about contradictory sentences). We can posit time variables in the logical form of the conjoined sentences in (14), and when we instantiate these variables with specific adverbial or prepositional phrases (supplied with the aid of the Maxim of Manner), the sentence has the potential to form a perfectly coherent (or at least consistent or non-contradictory) utterance.[13] Of course, there is an implicature of consequence and this may very well render the statement more plausible. But this implicature is accompanied by one of a temporal kind. The two implicatures go hand in hand. They can even both be cancelled, in which case one is left with a logical form that is neither inconsistent nor incoherent from a temporal or causal implicature point of view.

In this deliberation, we will omit the endless discussions about the presence of time variables in logical forms. Some theorists may object to this strategy, by indicating that a view of matters which does not have to posit time variables in logical forms is more parsimonious. While this position is perfectly legitimate, these theo-

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[12] This strategy is also apparently refuted by Recanati's availability principle (Recanati (2002).

[13] It might be objected that, in this example, it is not so much the temporal dimension but the causal dimension that is at stake in the interpretation.

rists would have to show that sentences, in contrast to utterances, are contradictory. However, as the case of (overt or implicit) indexicals shows, it is utterances, and not sentences, that can be said to be contradictory (with the exception already being highlighted). Thus, when someone utters the statement in (15) below, he or she seems *prima facie* to produce a contradiction:

(15) *This is grey. This is not grey.*

Outside of its context and with a default anaphoric link between the first and second occurrence of 'this', the statement uttered in (15) would appear to be contradictory. However, it is straightforward to demonstrate that this sentence is neither contradictory nor non-contradictory. I once bought a stone at a mall which had a special property. It was grey but as you touched it, it became green in colour. In these circumstances, (15) would be a true utterance, which shows that, except for the case of analytic sentences, matters relating to contradiction need to be resolved in context. Even so, one might argue that not all sentences involve context-sensitive elements and that if a sentence is of the form *P and not P* (in other words, explicitly connecting a proposition and its negation), it must be contradictory. However, this is only the case under the tacit assumption that P is not a complex sentence and is not interpretatively ambiguous. If P is a complex sentence and, furthermore, allows for ambiguous interpretations, then one reading of P may produce a contradiction, while another reading of P may not (Jaszczolt 1999). The result of uttering *P and not P* is thus not necessarily a contradiction, as the utterance is contradictory only for one set of readings.

Returning to our previous example in (8), repeated below as example (16):

(16) If the king of France died and France became a republic, I would be happy, but if France became a republic and the king of France died, I would be unhappy.

It could be claimed (a position Carston might advocate) that the sentence as such, (and not the utterance), is contradictory. In this case, even though we cannot point to any explicit time variables (e.g. in the shape of time adverbs), the possibility of an interpretative ambiguity (as defined by Jaszczolt 1999) remains open. This is due to the fact that the temporal relations between the constituent sentences of each conjoined (complex) sentence (in this case the sentences are conjoined by 'but') have not been specified. A contradiction may only arise when we decide on a particular temporal configuration. The evidence of the configurations under which no contradiction arises (along with examples in which overt context-sensitive elements are present) allows us to say that the sentence is not contradictory *per se*.[14]

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[14] Something similar might be said of Levinson's (2000) 'plates' example. Matters such as reference must be resolved in context, as is well-known – but the sentence, without the explicature, still has a logical form that can be intelligibly understood and may provide the basis for further incrementations. My intention here is not to prove the relevance theorists or Levinson wrong. I have simply pointed out a different avenue of research, one that deprives Carston's and Levinson's ideas of their potential "explosiveness" (I use Levinson's (2000) term by stressing the fact that such considerations are the natural consequence of some classical assumptions by Frege, Strawson and Stalnaker. Grice's views were not necessarily different from their own).

My method of disposing of Carston's example of pragmatic intrusion may be considered to be too informal and that a more refined picture could be obtained by introducing implicit temporal adjuncts at the level of logical form, something which King & Stanley (2005) have actually accomplished. They formalize a sentence such as "Driving home and drinking three beers is better than drinking three beers and driving home" as: *Gen-x, y [better than (x driving home at t and x drinking three beers at t + 1), (x drinking three beers at t and x driving home at t + 1)]*. Their analysis is derived from the assumption that every clause must be tensed (either explicitly or implicitly) and that even non-finite clauses include an implicit tense phrase at logical form. Yet, their analysis can be attacked on the grounds that their claim is not syntactically motivated. When we claim that a sentence has an implicit argument (I.A.) or, in any case, an implicit syntactic constituent, we usually prove that it is syntactically active (it can act as a controller of PRO, for example, as in "The ship was sunk I.A. to collect the insurance"; or it can act as an antecedent for an anaphoric element (see the arguments in favour of small pro, for example). Endless discussions are caused by a lack of syntactic evidence for these implicit adjuncts – so I can assume that my analysis is less controversial, insofar as it makes no reference to implicit adjuncts, but only mentions the fact that there is an interpretative ambiguity, as defined by Jaszczolt 1999, in each sentence flanking 'better than'. In the light of the interpretative ambiguity, proponents of pragmatic intrusion cannot claim that the overall sentence is semantically anomalous (being obligatorily interpreted as "x is better than x") and, thus, must concede that it has a basic, stripped-down semantics that is underdetermined, and in need of contextualization, but yet not needing the incorporation of pragmatic information to function coherently as the solid foundational basis for further meaning increments due to the GSDP. Such increments would transform it into an assertion proper, an act of saying something that conveys information about the world (McDowell 1998). My analysis does utilise time variables and relies on the assumption that interpretative ambiguity springs from the lack of temporal specification for each clause in each complex sentence flanking 'better than'. Since temporal specification is needed to produce a thought, pragmatics contributes tense phrases (in their terminology, temporal adjuncts), without any commitment to there being anything in the sentential structure – a syntactically active empty category. I agree with Bach (2002a) in saying that the completion of what the speaker means involves the insertion of something that does not necessarily correspond to any syntactic constituent of the sentence.

The most problematic examples to dispose of are those based on conditionals, as these would appear to me to essentially depend on the semantics of conditionals for their understanding. Consider (17) (from Levinson 2000):

(17) If you ate *some* of the cookies and no one else did, then there must still be some left.

The truth of the consequent depends on the truth of the antecedent (we obtain this through a *modus ponens* inferential step): [[If a, b; a] ∴ b]. The problem here is that the antecedent of the conditional is a complex sentence and the consequent can only

be true on condition that the two parts of the antecedent are true together. However, the contribution of the second part of the antecedent is only essential if 'some' is interpreted contextually as 'some, but not all of the'; if 'some' were interpreted as 'all', then the second part of the antecedent would be superfluous as there would be a non-logical connection of consequence between eating all of the cookies and there being some left. Levinson takes pragmatic intrusion **in the antecedent** to be crucial in making sense of this conditional sentence and of the consequentiality connection between the antecedent and the consequent, but obviously, if we want to be pedantic, the interpretation of 'some' in the consequent will also need contextualization or pragmatic enrichment, on a par with 'some' in the antecedent. This is why, if we accept the attempt by King & Stanley (2005) to explain this example through the use of Stalnaker's semantics for conditionals and a notion of focus that selects a specific similarity constraint (only worlds in which some, but not all, of the cookies that are eaten are picked up), we have to apply the notion of focus to the occurrence of 'some' in the consequent too. Assuming that their treatment is a step forward in connection with the antecedent, the consequentiality connection that is, no doubt, expressed by this particular conditional also essentially depends on the pragmatic interpretation of 'some' in the consequent.

There are examples which *apparently* cannot be treated in the manner in which I have dealt with (17). Consider again Bach's (expansion) example (10), repeated below as example (18):

(18) You will not die.

(18) is more problematic than (8) and (9). (18) **seems** to express a falsehood, if taken literally.[15] Other examples, such as those involving genitive constructions also seem to be intractable to a purely semantic analysis (see Recanati 2002). Yet, all such examples do not point to a genuine pragmatic intrusion, but just highlight that the semantic layer of a sentence is just a minimal and sometimes even an incomplete proposition, one that leaves room for interpretative ambiguities. Unless an ambiguity is posited, (18) is certainly not to be given the semantics [$\forall$ t, x such that x is the hearer in C will not die at t]. One might argue that (18) has to be given the semantics [$\exists$ t, $\exists$ x and x such that x is the hearer in C and will not die at t]. The contextual parameters will fill the time variable or add other contextual adjuncts (due to this cut). Timothy Williamson (p.c.), however, convincingly argues that [$\exists$t, $\exists$x and x such that x is the hearer in C and will not die at t] is not a plausible reading of (18), because it is trivially true given that the hearer cannot die at all moments whatsoever. He suggests that what we need is a version of the universally quantified reading, but with a restriction on the quantifier to relevant times, presumably something like [$\forall$ t, t $\in$ D/T, X will not die at t], where the reference of X and the domain of quantification D/T are given contextually.

The most virulent attacks on classical Gricean pragmatics and classical semantics come from Chierchia (2001) and Recanati (2003). Their claim is that default

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[15] My own M.V.M. example is also more problematic than (15) and (16), as it introduces a kind of speaker-relativity that cannot only be dealt with in terms of an underdetermined logical form.

implicatures are computed locally at sub-sentential level (in fact, they are associated with syntactic constituents). The arguments are based on sentences such as the following:

(19) John believes he has three children

The theory proposed by Chierchia is intended to resolve the problem of how scalar implicatures are computed under embedding. Chierchia's claim is that the standard procedures for calculating scalar implicatures under embedding do not work. Presumably, he believes that there is no way to calculate scalar implicatures in belief contexts without the implicatures arising locally. I would take issue with him. If I utter "John believes he has three children" I attribute to him the same belief which I would have if my beliefs and his overlapped. What I believe is that he assents to the sentence "I have three children" (or to a translation of it in his own language). If I believed he would assent to the sentence "I have four children" (or to a translation of it in his own language) I would have said "John believes he has four children" (in order to avoid providing a contribution that is weaker than my knowledge of the world allows). But I did not say that. So my hearer understands that I believe that John does not assent to "I have four (or more) children" and he consequently concludes that I have meant that John believes he has exactly three children.

9   Does Bach's Proposal Avoid Grice's Circle?

One of the merits of Bach's implicature proposal is that it seems to avoid Grice's circle. According to Bach, implicatures take input from what is said (in the literal sense of 'what is said'). What is said, in his view, is what has been *literally* voiced, supplemented by contextual clues that enable the speaker to fix reference. Bach believes that we can remain agnostic as to whether the speaker means what the proposition says. I have some doubts about this, as a certain amount of speaker meaning must be involved in order to allow what is said to be properly determined by access to referents of pronominals, proper nouns, or definite descriptions. Bach may overcome this objection by saying that, after all, reference can be assigned at a further stage – more precisely at the stage in which implicatures are calculated, or even after this stage. But, on close reflection, Bach needs to say this in order to escape Grice's circle because, after all, the assignment of reference is based on pragmatic principles (for example, we determine the referents of proper names by selecting the most salient referents associated with such names), and implicatures, which are pragmatic levels of meaning, and would take their input from pragmatics if reference assignment occurred prior to their creation. The move that claims reference assignment to be parallel to implicatures is not altogether implausible, but is still not without its own problems – it involves our reasoning about certain schematic, to a certain extent even incomplete, propositions, while amending implausible or incomplete schematic interpretations by resorting to pragmatics. Even after

considering all this, we still have to determine if, and how, Bach escapes Grice's circle. Presumably, the implicitures contribute to full propositions and such propositions are the basis of further pragmatic reasoning. Consider, for example, (37), uttered by my D.Phil. student in the course of a conversation with me, his supervisor:

(20) The government has changed the rule for academic competitions. But I will not die.

Presumably, the (abstractly) false proposition (or, in my view, underdetermined proposition) *I will not die* has to be expanded to "I will not die as a result of this". Now, there is the issue of whether the metaphorical level of meaning ("I will not fail to obtain an academic job") should be part of this impliciture or whether it should merely be an implicature. If the latter, the implicature has to be worked out after the creation of the impliciture and Grice's circle comes into effect. Now, Bach might deny this by saying that both the non-literal meaning and the ('as a result of this') inferred constituent are part of an impliciture. It might be observed that the student can utter the first part of (20) in order to implicate that he would like me to write a good reference for him. I would argue that the second part of (20) reinforces this implicature, as it highlights the relevance of the government's policy to the student's needs. If we assume – as I do – that the complete utterance (and its constituent parts) conversationally implicate "I would be grateful if you could write a good reference", then the implicature does take its input from the proposition expressed and from the impliciture that serves to flesh it out. So, in this respect, Bach's view is not immune to Grice's circle either. What is needed is a solution similar to the one I have tentatively proposed above.

That implicatures take their input from the explicated meaning (the full explicated proposition meaning) is also accepted by Ariel (2002) with her example reported here in (21):

(21) We are allowed to bring in, … prior similar conduct.

She says that after reference has been fixed (we = the prosecutors) and disambiguation occurred (conduct = behaviour), a full propositional form has to be provided by integrating information from contextual knowledge. The full propositional form is something like: "The prosecutors are allowed **by law** to bring in evidence about the prior behaviour **of the accused**, similar **to that in the current case**". Then Ariel adds, there is the conversational implicature: "You will be testifying about prior similar conduct". So Ariel says that the procedure of inferential incrementation has got an order: what is said (in Gricean terminology), including reference fixing and disambiguation ⇒ explicatures/implicitures ⇒ conversational implicatures. She must assume, I believe, that implicatures and explicatures must be precisely differentiated. If they were not, it might be possible to calculate them in the same inferential step as explicatures. I believe that Ariel actually agrees that implicatures are to be differentiated from explicatures, because she states that conversational implicatures are communicated only implicitly (presumably, she means that

they can be withdrawn or retracted) and that they take more time to process (compared to explicatures).

Lepore & Cappelen (2005) discuss an example such as "I am happy". They say that the utterance, in addition to expressing the semantic proposition that X is happy (where x is fixed in context), might additionally state that X is no longer hungry, or that he is ready to meet his sister, or that her medication is working. It is interesting that Lepore & Cappelen use the words "the speaker might be saying that". They are surely implying that what is said in a specific context is fixed in the context. The question arises as to whether any further things that are said are conversational implicatures or, otherwise, explicatures. The boundary between the two is not easy to establish. What is said is derived pragmatically by allowing, what they term 'the minimal proposition', to interact with contextual information. 'Prima facie' the propositions expressed (the pragmatic augmentations) look like implicatures, because the authors, in order to express them, use words that are distinct or remotely related to the minimal propositions which are being semantically expressed. If these propositions are implicatures, they are easily cancelled. Furthermore, they must be derived by reasoning. Most importantly, conversational implicatures must not just entail the said proposition, but must add more so that the link between what is said and what is conversationally implicated need not be direct (a good case is the tutor's letter to the effect that John writes well in English, but which omits his abilities as a philosopher). 'Prima facie', all the meaning augmentations referred to by Lepore & Cappelen in the discussion of "I am happy" do not seem to entail the said proposition and are only indirectly related to it, if it is true that in various contexts "I am happy" means "I am no longer hungry", or "I am ready to meet my sister", or "The medication has worked". But my suspicion is that these meaning augmentations are elliptical for "I am happy that I am no longer hungry", or "I am happy to meet my sister", or "I am happy that the medication has worked". In all these cases, the pragmatically enriched proposition entails the minimal semantic proposition expressed by "X is happy that P in C", where P works very much like a propositional variable whose content is fixed in context. Presumably, "I am ready to meet my sister" is a genuine conversational implicature that takes its input from what is said, that is, from the sum of the minimal proposition and the explicature [I am happy that P + P = that my sister has arrived]. The conversational implicature is derived through further reasoning. In normal circumstances everyone is happy to see their sister, and thus the speaker must mean something else, presumably that he is ready to meet his sister.

10   Conclusion

Even though my considerations are not conclusive, I believe that my proposal is a possible way to resolve the dilemma called 'Grice's circle'. I believe that this chapter offers conclusions that will inevitably trigger further research. I do not exclude the fact that these ideas will, eventually, lead to a considerable reconsideration of

the radical picture of pragmatics that is accepted as standard these days. The considerations I have offered are quite modest, but I believe that a fuller picture can be reached over time. It is now time to further reflect on why explicatures cannot be cancelled and I will devote a chapter specifically to this issue, divorcing it temporarily from Grice's circle. In the following chapter, we will see that a deeper analysis of the notion of intentionality (in speaking) is crucial to demonstrating that explicatures are not cancellable (or should not be cancellable).

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Chapter 3
On the Nature of Pragmatic Increments at the Truth-Conditional Level

An explicature is a combination of linguistically encoded and contextually inferred conceptual features. The smaller the relative contribution of the contextual features, the more explicit the explicature will be, and inversely.

(Sperber and Wilson 1986, 182).

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to reflect on the necessity of the pragmatic development of propositional forms and to reach a better understanding of the level of meaning that Sperber and Wilson and Carston famously call 'explicatures' (or 'explicature') and to support the claim that (the pragmatically conveyed elements of) explicatures are not cancellable – unlike conversational implicatures (Someone alleged that my claim is not original; however, I have to modestly assert that I put forward this claim in my 2003 paper, which was revised and reprinted in 2006.). While Capone (RASK: Int J Lang Commun 19:3–32, 2003) (A paper that antecedes Burton-Roberts claim that explicatures are non-cancellable.) addressed the issue of the cancellability of explicatures from the point of view of Grice's circle, a number of important theoretical questions are raised and discussed here. In particular, I propose that the analysis of the notion of intentionality and of the nature of pragmatic intrusion will settle the question concerning the non-cancellability of explicatures. An explicature can be considered to be a two-level entity, in that it consists of a logical form and a pragmatic increment which this logical form gives rise to (in the context of utterance). However, both the initial logical form and the pragmatic increment are the target of pragmatic processes, in that we need a pragmatic process to promote the initial logical form to a serious intended interpretation and another pragmatic process to derive further increments starting from this initial logical form and being promoted to serious utterance interpretations.

1   Introduction

The boundary between semantics and pragmatics has been the object of much recent linguistic theorising and discussion. It is as an outcome of dialectical conflicts that superior theories emerge, in which a number of errors are corrected, arguments are refined and perspectives are broadened. The aim of this chapter is to reflect on the necessity of the pragmatic development of propositional forms and to reach a deeper understanding of the level of meaning that Sperber and Wilson and Carston famously call 'explicatures' (or 'explicature') and to support the claim that the pragmatically conveyed elements of explicatures are indeed not cancellable – unlike conversational implicatures. This is not (only) a polemical chapter, but a constructive one; in fact, it is intended to advance the discussion about the semantics/pragmatics debate by acknowledging the importance of the relevance theorists' contribution to the issue. Of course, the notion of explicature was originally advanced by Sperber and Wilson (see Sperber and Wilson 1986), but Carston, in a number of articles and in her book (Carston 2002b), discusses and further refines the notion. In fact, this author has written a monumental volume which does much service to the cause of pragmatics, and renders it a more rigorous discipline. Yet, if my concept is accepted that the pragmatically conveyed elements of explicatures are not cancellable, a number of connected ideas in that book must be revised: and it is possible that this theoretical move will precipitate positive consequences for the theory as a whole, as claimed in Capone's (2003, 2006) discussion of 'Grice's circle'. Here, however, for the sake of simplicity of discussion, we need to divorce the issue of 'explicatures' from that of 'Grice's circle'. While Capone (2003) addressed the issue of the cancellability of explicatures mainly bearing in mind Grice's circle, a number of theoretical questions pertaining to intentionality in general are raised and discussed here. In particular, it is proposed that the analysis of the notion of *intentionality* and of the nature of pragmatic intrusion will contribute to resolving the question regarding the cancellability of explicatures. An explicature can be considered to be a two-level entity, in that it consists of a logical form and a pragmatic increment which this logical form gives rise to (in the context of utterance). However, both the initial logical form and the pragmatic increment are the target of pragmatic processes, given that we need a pragmatic process to promote the initial logical form to a serious intended interpretation and another distinct pragmatic process to derive further increments starting from this initial logical form and being promoted to a serious utterance interpretation.

2   The Cancellability of Conversational Implicatures

I propose to resolve the issue of the cancellability of conversational implicatures before considering the issue of the cancellability of explicatures, as these two issues are interconnected, given that through the use of both implicatures and explicatures,

a speaker has the intention of having a certain meaning recognized by a recipient. In both cases we are faced with communications that are speaker-intended and which are not merely potential messages latent in the use of the communicative system.

By using one of Paul Grice's celebrated examples (1989, 33), it is obvious that things are not always straightforward. A is writing a testimonial about a student who is a candidate for a philosophy job, and his letter reads as follows: "Dear Sir, Mr. X's command of English is excellent and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours etc.". Surely the philosopher is not being prevented from writing more through ignorance, since the man is his/her student; furthermore, s/he knows that more information is required than s/he has offered. We can conclude, therefore, that s/he must want to impart information that s/he is reluctant to write down, or which s/he does not want to provide at an explicit level. Therefore, s/he implicates that he thinks Mr. X is not a good philosopher.

Assuming that the teacher manages to convey some message above and beyond what is literally said, and that the quantity of what is said (as well as the cost of processing all such information) is an element in the interception of the intention behind the communicated message, we cannot be sure how the cancellability test applies here. One may contend that the implicature is not cancellable. But it is doubtful whether the teacher will write a second letter to say "I apologize for that cryptic message; I was in such a haste; Mr X deserves a longer letter, which I now hasten to provide, as follows. (…) In fact, I recommend Mr X for the philosophy job in question". Implicated messages cannot be retracted in certain **official circumstances**; intentions cannot be unimplicated by further messages if the circumstances are such that they are unequivocally calculated.

An objection may be raised to such considerations. Some may say that the interpretation of the philosopher's revision is somewhat tricky: though the philosopher could deny not having supported his student, s/he certainly could not assert his/her support. Implicature cancellations are connected with the capacity to deny having implicated that Q by asserting P, but not the capacity to assert Q as a possible repair to having asserted P. But in a sense, this objection is based on the assumption that the implicature is somehow different from the one noted by Grice, that is, that the writer is not supporting Mr. X. In this interpretation, it makes sense to deny the implicature. But now, assuming that this is a reasonable interpretation, why is it that the philosopher's revision cannot explicitly support Mr. X? Presumably, the reason is that, in addition to the implicature that the writer was not supporting Mr. X's application, there is another salient implicature, namely that the philosopher thinks X is a poor philosopher. This is not an implicature that can easily be denied. The problem with this example, which is rather tricky, lies in the fact that language is embedded in a social situation, in which rules of conduct partially determine the meanings which words – or their absence – have acquired.

In the light of the following discussion, it may be useful here to distinguish between *generalized* and *particularised* conversational implicatures. Generalized conversational implicatures are default inferences, to use an expression advanced by Levinson (2000), that is inferential augmentations that get through in a default context, in the absence of particular clues about what the context is like, and in which

context plays solely a negative role, in that it can cancel an inference if a conflict arises between propositions already accepted in it and the default implicature. In the neo-Gricean framework advocated by Levinson, the common ground is regarded as being a bucket containing all the mutually assumed facts, by virtue of common knowledge or because they have been asserted. The defeasibility of implicature generation is explained in this way: we add the content of a new assertion to the bucket strictly in the following order, only if each incrementation is consistent with the contents of the bucket:

a. Entailments;
b. Quantity Generalized Conversational Implicatures

 i. Clausal;
ii. Scalar;

c. Manner Generalised Conversational Implicatures;
d. Generalized Conversational I-implicatures (due to the principle of minimization). (Levinson 2000, 90).

Particularised conversational implicatures are, instead, inferential augmentations in which contextual assumptions play a key role in determining/fixing a communicative intention through reasoning using those assumptions as premises. Of course, there may be disagreement as to the level or degree of conscious reasoning which is actually occurring in the calculation of particularised conversational implicatures. Relevance theorists, for example, prefer to concentrate on those inferences which occur at a subconscious level. But it cannot be excluded that both modes of inference are available and that we have to distinguish, case by case, between conscious pragmatic reasoning and subconscious pragmatic interpretative work guided by some pragmatic principle.

Some authors, such as Burton-Roberts, believe that particularized conversational implicatures, in contrast to generalized conversational implicatures, cannot be cancelled without contradicting what is intended. This correlates with the intuition that the more evident or manifest a speaker's intention is to implicate, the less cancellable the implicature will be. (Burton-Roberts 2006, 10).[1]

2.1 Why Is the Issue of Implicature Cancellation Relevant to the Issue of Explicature Cancellation?

The issue of implicature cancellation (in the case of particularized implicatures) is relevant to the issue of explicature cancellation because the examples – at least the most important and sensitive ones – of explicatures analysed by Wilson and Sperber (2002) and Carston (2002a) are examples of inferences in particular contexts. Consider the following utterance produced by Mary in reply to an invitation to join

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[1] PCI = particularized conversational implicatures; GCI = generalized conversational implicatures.

us for dinner. When she says 'I have already eaten', at the level of the propositional form we assign a constituent involving a temporal concept, and we understand her intention of saying that she has eaten some food at a time interval ranging from a couple of hours ago to a few minutes ago. We certainly do not construe Mary as saying that she ate some food 3 days ago, since this information would no longer count as an explanation for her refusal to have more food. Why is this the case? Intentionality is an important factor in our decision and, in particular, since intentionality cannot be assessed telepathically (to use an expression from Wedgwood (2007)), we must rely on features of the context to point us in the direction of the correct intention. We discard the hypothesis that Mary means that she ate food some days ago, as this would hardly be relevant to the interpretation of her answer to our invitation. A move that is relevant to an invitation to eat some food is either acceptance or refusal. Since no acceptance has been issued, Mary's utterance can only count as an explanation (of her decision to have no more food) and the explanation, to perform the right kind of work, must rely on the assumption that she has eaten immediately (or not too long) before the invitation, as human beings cannot eat food when their stomachs are full. If you now try to nullify this inferential work you will be unable to do so. The reason for this is that inferential communication is due to pragmatics and pragmatics cannot be overruled by pragmatics.[2] If this were so, then there would be no rational way to communicate with people.

Let me explain what I mean when I say that pragmatics cannot be overruled by pragmatics. This is not only a nice slogan, but a reminder as to what can be modified by what. That semantics can be modified by pragmatics is a possibility latent in the language system. We may safely assume that pragmatics can be used to boost the potential of the semantic system and that contextual modifications can somehow fuse with the semantics of a language to produce something that is more constructive, say a richer level of communication. However, when this is done, we have to stop. The reason for this is that when plausible communicative intentions are reached through pragmatic processes, we do not allow possible theoretical pragmatic augmentations to modify the result, because that will be short of being satisfactory. Saying that there are other possible contexts and that the explicature may be different because of consideration of them is like engaging in an abstruse game that goes beyond the recognition of plausible intentions, which necessarily have to take into account the present context and not contexts that are too far removed from the communicative situation to be able to guide and control communication. It is true, we can always find a possible context that renders our interpretation null, but why should we consider it after we have arrived at plausible intentions guided by the real context of the communicative situation? Is it not irrational to prefer a theoretical context to an actual one? Even Relevance Theorists have to admit that we always choose a context that is the closest one to the communicative situation, because preferring a theoretical unrelated context would put the speaker and the hearer to

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[2] However, I am not saying that a specific pragmatic heuristic principle cannot be overruled by manifest contextual assumptions. I am only saying that the ultimate pragmatic process cannot be undone.

greater processing costs. Thus, putting in question reasonable results only because there are theoretical alternatives is strongly anti-economical and for this reason I insist that pragmatics cannot be undone by pragmatics.

In both the particularised implicature and explicature cases, we are faced with the same problem. Pragmatics cannot be overruled by pragmatics. Only semantics can be overruled by pragmatics. In both cases, we are faced with intentionality that is evinced through the pragmatic resources of the language and, as such, cannot be retracted, as pragmatics cannot be overruled by pragmatics. It is not just the question of intentionality, as Burton-Roberts presents it, that decides the issue. Intentionality, on its own, is inert. It is in the head of the speaker and is not telepathically transmitted to the hearer. It is only through communication that the intentionality of the speaker is inferentially relevant to attributions of intentionality on the part of the hearer and it is inherent in the (actual) pragmatic process that no room is left for the cancellability of particularised implicatures or explicatures.

The reason why particularised implicatures cannot be cancelled is the same one that prevents explicatures from being cancelled. When a strong intentionality is projected, it can no longer be retracted. Retracting it would amount to undertaking the costly effort of deleting all or most contextual clues present in the discourse.

Implicatures, it is generally agreed, only arise if intended and are only recognised if intended. But then it should be impossible to cancel an implicature: how is it possible to withdraw/cancel what was intended to be implicated and was recognised as intended? An implicature could only be withdrawn/cancelled if it were NOT intended. But then it wouldn't BE an implicature (since implicatures by definition are intended); in other words, there would BE no implicature to cancel. This is relevant to the issue of explicature cancellation only in this respect: presumably, explicatures must be intended and must be recognised as intended. So the above applies to explicatures as well as to implicatures. And this consideration of regarding explicatures as uncancellable is IN ADDITION to the other considerations which you and I advance for stating that explicatures specifically cannot be cancelled. (Burton-Roberts, personal communication).

Perhaps this is rather strong. Should we abandon the cancellability test altogether (and thus avoid considering cancellability as being the hallmark of conversational implicature)? It is amazing, to say the least, that Grice who appeared to be content to couple his notion of conversational implicature with his notion of intentionality did not notice (or pretended not to notice?) the kind of *impasse* the two notions were leading to. The only cases of conversational implicatures that are really cancellable are those in which the intention to communicate an assumption *p* is least obvious, evident and recognizable. Presumably these cases, as Burton-Roberts seems to imply, should not even strictly be categorised as conversational implicatures. If this is so, then it is reasonable to adopt the compelling hypothesis that conversational implicatures are not cancellable (in practice[3]), which carries with it the implication

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[3] I remain open to the view that potential implicatures can be cancelled in the sense that their potential is not fully utilised in real conversation.

that explicatures are also not cancellable. Explicatures too, in fact are inferences which must be intended and must be recognised as intended.

Things are not so easy, though. We should/could find it useful to limit ourselves to the claim that only particularized implicatures are not cancellable, which involves the recognition of certain intentions (by the speaker) on the part of the hearer. These are the cases in which the pragmatic resources of the language point towards an unequivocal intention and thus make it awkward or difficult to cancel the intention.

One such case involves the attribution of a serious intention by a speaker by virtue of having proffered 'p'. Deciding whether the speaker seriously intended to say (to assert) 'p' is no small matter and clearly shows the nexus between pragmatic processing and arriving at a non-revisable (non-cancellable) intention. It should be noted, taking into account a point mentioned elsewhere by Bach (2001), that the semantic resources of a language are not sufficient by themselves to project intentionality. This is a point also reiterated by Recanati (2007, 37), who maintains (adopting Frege) that if a sentence lacks the force of a serious assertion, making the content of the sentence more complex by means of operators such as 'It is true that' or 'I assert that' will not change the situation, since whether or not an utterance is serious is a pragmatic matter – a matter of force and not a matter of (sole semantic) content.

Suppose I say 'Bush will be remembered for bringing prosperity to the USA' (in the written text here there is no disambiguating intonation and it is favourable that it should be so, because this shows the force of contextual assumptions). Although everyone might assume that I am using English conventions to express my thoughts, it is unclear whether that literal meaning is a firm or infallible guide to the speaker's intentions. You will not just look at the words I have used, but you will most certainly embed the sentence in the context in which it was produced. Given the mismatch between the semantic content of the sentence and the propositions in the right context (it is sufficient to observe the disastrous state of the stock exchange after Bush's presidency), you will use your reasoning abilities to decide that my intention cannot be to seriously imply that Bush brought prosperity to the USA. Now, Bach's considerations are attractive because they imply that no semantic device, whatsoever, can settle the issue of the seriousness of the speaker's intentions (this is a point he does not press). Suppose I say: 'Look, I am seriously telling you that Bush brought prosperity to the USA'. Surely, it could be useful to use the word 'seriously' to indicate that I am speaking with serious intention. The hearer will give the speaker another chance, and will again try to ascertain whether such intentions are plausible or not and whether they match the propositions which are usually accepted in the broad context of the conversation. However, after the search has produced no context in which the intentions could be deemed to be serious, the hearer will relinquish such a search and will settle for an interpretation according to which the speaker could be regarded as not being really serious. The truth is that if literal meanings are not sufficient to guarantee that the communicative intention behind the sentence is serious, no use of literal devices for expressing a serious intention will suffice. They will be undermined by the pragmatic resources augmenting the semantic resources

of a language. If we were zealous enough, we should be able to describe a great number of inferences of this kind, in which the contextual clues are rich enough to allow the hearer to recover an unequivocal intention. Suppose that my sister asks me whether I would like to eat more chocolates. Yet, I detect from the tone of her voice that she is insincere. We are faced here with a case in which the words say one thing, but the facial expression and tone of her voice say something else. Yet, the intention is in the speaker's mind. It is neither in her words nor in my mind. This is a case in which it is hard to prove what my sister's intentions really are. Yet, if she uses some conventional resources and appropriate contextualization clues, then we can at least access her professed intentions. The analogy with particularized implicatures here is that we have a message and we want to recover the intention behind it (the intention in the speakers' mind) on the basis of contextual clues. As in the case of particularized implicatures, the speaker could try to deny having had (or not having had) a certain intention, but she is betrayed by her tone of voice or by contextualization clues and, thus, it is possible to establish her intention, even if the speaker thinks that she could evade the question of what her true intention really is.

In a sense, it is beneficial that the task of rendering an intention as serious (of allowing hearers to say that a professed intention is serious) is to be assigned to pragmatics (as stated by Bach 2001) and not to semantics. Semantics can be overruled by pragmatics (as far as the assignment of serious intentions is concerned), but it is not the case that (vice versa) pragmatics is overruled by semantics. Furthermore, at least in principle, it should never be the case that pragmatics overrules pragmatics. It is a logical impossibility that pragmatics should be overruled by pragmatics. While it is plausible that semantics is overruled by pragmatics, as far as the issue of determining the seriousness of the speaker's intention is concerned (and it is plausible because there is the residual possibility of determining whether a speaker's intentions were serious or not), it is a logical impossibility that pragmatics should be overruled by pragmatics because, having eliminated the possibility that semantics could determine whether the speaker's intentions were serious or not, there is now no further possibility that the seriousness of the speaker's intentions can be expressed at all. By contemplating the possibility that pragmatics can be overruled by pragmatics, we are now facing the possibility of living in a world in which anything goes and in which chaos and luck prevail. It is reasonable to assume that everyone should reject the hypothesis that pragmatics is overruled by pragmatics – and this leads to the idea that particularized inferences are not cancellable. If they were cancellable, then that would amount to accepting that pragmatics can be overruled by pragmatics, and this is hardly a palatable view, as we have already seen.

Now, if these considerations are plausible, it is clear that the matter of inferring the speaker's intentions, given the context of the utterance and the clues used by the speaker (knowing that such a use will lead the hearer to infer a message) is such that it is not at all easy to retract intentions. As an example, consider the case of a public person (a famous and important politician) who harasses his female secretary by making an indecent proposal. Suppose he uses the line of defence that he did not really intend his message to be taken seriously. After all, if what Bach states is true and we need pragmatic processing in ascertaining whether someone seriously

intended to assert 'p', this line of defence would not be totally unreasonable. In this case, a problem arises in opposition to the one noted by Bach. The problem is not so much how to prove that the speaker's intentions were serious, but whether instead one could prove in court that one's intentions were not serious. Could the politician not say that he was only joking? The problem involves what kind of interpretation an utterance is given in a context, given that it is clear to the speaker (or at least it should be clear to him) that the contextual resources of the language will lead a hearer to infer a certain intention and that the context in which the utterance was produced will make it impossible to deny having had that intention. Pragmaticians have not given enough thought to this kind of problem. They take for granted that conversational implicatures (or explicatures) are cancellable, but in fact, in a number of contexts, it is not possible to lead the hearer to infer a certain intention by allowing her the freedom to cancel that inference. The fact is that, as highlighted in Capone (2005), we should pay attention to a number of linguistic phenomena in which the individual intentionality is expressed by resorting to the social intentionality involved in performing a certain action. In Capone (2005), I claimed that a number of inferences arise in context and are simply not cancellable. They are not cancellable because there are conventions or rules of semantic interpretation which are based on discourse practices and on contextual clues. These pragmatic phenomena are inferential contributions on a par with conversational implicatures, yet being based on actual aspects of context, they have all the features of particularised implicatures and, hence, cannot be cancelled (at least we predict that it is not easy to cancel them). Consider utterances such as "I saw you" in the classroom. The teacher notices that Michelangelo (his favourite student) whispers the answer to a question to his classmate. The teacher says "I saw you." This is not just an accusation, but an order for Michelangelo to stop what he is doing. How can this speech act be transformed into the speech act "stop prompting"? It is the social situation with the rules and expectations governing students' obligations and teachers' tasks that promote the **inhibitive interpretation** of "I saw you". In this context, it is out of the question that the utterance could count as a compliment – such an interpretation simply could not occur. In fact, no matter how highly the teacher regards Michelangelo (possibly even admiring him for wanting to help his fellow students), and even though Michelangelo knows that the teacher has this positive opinion of him, it is unlikely that he will choose the tortuous path of individual interpretation and proceed from considerations about his teacher's high esteem for him to the interpretation that the speech act counts as a compliment. Michelangelo will almost certainly prefer (or should prefer) the social path of interpretation to his own individual path (Jaszczolt 1999). Thus, he is able to establish that the teacher, despite his high opinion of him, actually wants him to stop whispering answers to his classmate. This is clearly a case in which, when the communicative intention is fixed, it should not be retracted.

Consider a case in which the individual intentionality and the social intentionality clash.

Pippo De Lorenzo wrote a letter to the University Chancellor protesting against a certain number of injustices, after imputing them to the Head of the Faculty. In this letter he threatened to appeal to the judiciary system. This letter caused a great deal

of trouble because it created strong resentment on the part of the Head of Faculty. After a few years, when Pippo De Lorenzo meets a mutual friend, he tells him:

(1) If you meet the head of the faculty, please pass him my regards and tell him that I sincerely wish him well.

On reflection, there is a clash here between the individual path of interpretation and the social path of interpretation (the resulting irony). We do not know whether Pippo De Lorenzo is sincere in expressing his intentions. However, let us suppose that he is. In this case, the social intentionality prevails over the individual intentionality and no matter how sincere his words are and how laborious Pippo De Lorenzo's efforts are to emphasise his sincerity by using words such as 'sincerely', the conventional effects of the words are undone by the pragmatic inferences that arise in this context as a result of the social intentionality. In vain, he could add sentences such as the following:

(2) Let him be sure that I mean what I say;
(3) And I really mean what I say.

These could not un-implicate the social intentionality latent in the message in the given context. If he really wishes to communicate a serious message of reconciliation, the speaker, who must be aware of the social intentionality latent in the effects of his words in this context, should either abort his intentions or carry out some reparatory moves such as the following:

> Making peace with the head of the Faculty;
> Ensuring that his apologies are accepted;
> Creating a cordial context that justifies his sincere expression of the words that he wants to utter through (1).

I assume that some will take the above example as supporting a view of pragmatics based on the hearer's reconstruction of communicative intentions. On the contrary, the above example supports the idea that there can be no communicative effort unless the individual and the social intentionality work in tandem. When the individual and social intentionality are divorced from each other, the communicative project has to be abandoned. Pippo De Lorenzo should, in fact, either abort his communicative project or ensure that the individual and social intentionality work in tandem, by altering the context through the steps I have proposed.

2.2 Explicatures as Developed Logical Forms

Levinson (1983) opts for a negative definition of pragmatics – pragmatics deals with non-truth conditional meaning. This view is tidy and orderly: semantics is the basis for conversational implicatures (Levinson accepts the slogan pragmatics = meaning – truth-conditions). However, as a final note, Levinson (1983) voices some doubts that this tidy and simplistic picture can be maintained, mainly because of the force of examples provided by radical pragmaticists.

Although various authors have discussed the role played by pragmatic inference in constructing a propositional form (e.g. Bach (1994), Levinson (2000), Recanati (2004), Stainton (1998)), in this chapter I shall concentrate on Carston's thinking, as crystallized in her 2002 book. Carston's idea of a pragmatic contribution to the proposition being expressed is distinctive because, unlike Bach, she believes that pragmatics contributes to what is said and, unlike Levinson (2000), she believes that the inferences that develop logical forms into propositional forms are explicatures and not implicatures.[4] Carston's ideas are similar to those of Stainton's and Recanati's, but they differ in their detail. Examples that illustrate the role played by pragmatics in fleshing out a propositional form are roughly of the following type:

(4) I am feeling better today;
(5) On the top shelf (uttered by a speaker who realizes that the hearer, making his breakfast, needs the marmalade);
(6) He wasn't wearing his glasses and mistook his wife for a hatstand;
(7) This fruit is green;
(8) It is raining.

To express a full proposition, (4) must imply a comparison between the present and a previous state (how the speaker was feeling, say, yesterday). (5) is clearly an elliptical utterance: it is not grammatically complete and requires the addition of a subject and a verb. (6) is a case in which conjunction contributes a causal notion to the full proposition being expressed. (7) also needs pragmatic intrusion, as we are left in doubt as to whether the outside of the fruit is green or whether the interior is so (by resorting to contextual knowledge, we may settle the issue); (8) also says that it is raining here, in the location where both the speaker and the hearer are situated.

Carston (2002a, 17) believes that examples such as these demonstrate that, in addition to a speaker standardly meaning something more or other than what she is saying, the 'what is said' of the utterance may itself involve more than the meaning of the linguistic expression used. Therefore, she believes that we have to distinguish between two notions: the linguistic meaning, the information encoded in the particular lexical-syntactic form employed, and the thought or proposition which it is being used to express, that is, what is said.

Carston embraces the underdeterminacy thesis, that is the view that the meaning encoded in the linguistic expressions being used (the relatively stable meanings in a linguistic system) underdetermines the proposition being expressed (what is said). The hearer must resort to pragmatic inference in order to determine the proposition which is being expressed by an utterance.

Carston has devised the Isomorphism Principle, a recent formulation of the principle stated in Fodor and Lepore (1991):

> If a sentence S expresses the proposition P, then the syntactic constituents of S express the constituents of P.

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[4] It is fair to acknowledge that radical pragmaticists such as Cohen (1971) have also discussed the phenomenon of pragmatic intrusion. Yet, I believe that their contributions were only programmatic, while Carston's contribution to this issue is systematic and fully-developed.

The approach defended by Carston allows for the fact that pragmatic processes can supply constituents to what is said solely on communicative grounds, without any linguistic pointer, in which case the Isomorphism Principle does not hold. I ought to mention here that Wilson and Sperber (2002) maintain an approach to semantic underdetermination similar to Carston's – but in this chapter I am mainly discussing Carston's approach because she is specifically concerned with explicatures. The move of abandoning the Isomorphism Principle is welcomed, because it allows us to assign a proposition on the basis of constituents that do not appear in the corresponding sentence's logical form.

2.3   An Alternative View (Bach 1994)

An alternative view of pragmatic intrusion is that advanced by Bach (1994). According to Bach, what is said does not correspond to a full proposition determined through pragmatic inference, but corresponds to a minimal proposition or to a propositional radical and is constrained by the following assumption:

> The elements of what is said must correspond to elements in the linguistic expression (the sentence under consideration).

Bach uses a test for distinguishing what is said which is provided by the following schema: 'S said that…'. He claims that only those elements of the original utterance that can be embedded without infelicity in the above schema are part of what is said.

Apart from his conception of what is said, Bach agrees with Relevance Theorists that pragmatics is needed to flesh out the proposition a speaker intends to express. He calls such pragmatic inferences 'implicitures'. He distinguishes mainly between two pragmatic processes involved in the determination of implicitures: *completion* and *expansion*. Completion is required for sentences that do not express a full proposition. Expansion is required for cases in which a sentence does express a full proposition but this cannot be considered to be the proposition a speaker really intends to express.

Bach's picture is not incoherent, albeit it is an approach that considers 'what is said' to be a propositional level of thought which is commendable itself, to a greater extent. Perhaps a testing case for which notion of what is said should be adopted is furnished by ironic utterances. Here, in the absence of rich contextual clues (the original context in which the words were proffered), it would be misleading to quote the words contained in the original utterance, as these may lead to a misrecognition of the communicative intention accompanying them (the same considerations apply to indirectly reporting ironic utterances, as Capone (2016) argued). In any case, I accept that the expression 'what is said' may be understood in two senses: what is A-said, the words uttered, and what is B-said, the thought communicated.

2.4 *A Paradoxical Example of Explicature*

Some authors, such as Cappelen and Lepore (2005), are unpersuaded by the standard examples offered by radical pragmaticists and discuss a specific point on pp. 64–65. They believe that if the standard examples of explicature do not have invariant truth-conditions, it could indeed be shown that no sentence has invariant truth conditions. Consider the sentence:

(9) John went to the gym.

One could argue that this sentence is not truth-evaluable since one could always go on to ask: how did he go to the gym? Did he walk to the vicinity? What did he do in the gym? etc. I believe that what the authors want to prove is that if we think hard enough, then every example of language use will exhibit semantic underdetermination, simply because we have set the standards of truth-evaluability too high.

Montminy (2006, 14), commenting on Cappelen and Lepore's work, writes that C & L's treatment of Incompleteness Arguments conflates a *lack of full specificity* with *incompleteness*: it conflates cases in which a sentence is not completely informative with cases in which the standard meaning of a sentence does not determine a complete, truth-evaluable proposition.

The point that Montminy probably misses is that there is such a wide gap between the interpretation of (10) as (11) and of (10) as (12).

(10) John went to the gym;

(11) John went to the vicinity of the gym:

(12) John went into (inside) the gym,

that one is tempted to say that this is also a case of semantic underdetermination: the full(er) proposition is supplied by enriching the propositional radical (to use Bach's words), which ought to be something like the following (if we accept, for the sake of argument, what Cappelen and Lepore state):

> John went (in)to an area vast enough to include the gym and its close vicinity (say the perimeter of its courtyard).

Surely, to (more) fully determine this proposition requires some narrowing down, that is, the addition of some concept. A move which is an option for Montminy, but which he does not make, is to take what Cappelen and Lepore say as being right and to argue that this is a case in which pragmatics intervenes to enrich a truth-evaluable proposition; and there is nothing wrong with it. Yet, this would not be the same as saying that no proposition at all is expressed by (12).

An alternative move would be to deny the acceptability of the data provided by Cappelen and Lepore. In any case, Montminy does not appreciate the real point of Cappelen and Lepore's discussion, which is a refinement of the question: how do we know when something is a full proposition? Is there not some latitude in deciding

whether an interpretation (whether semantically or pragmatically accessed) is a full proposition? And could we not push this latitude further in our search for complete propositions? And, finally, what does the expression 'a complete proposition' mean?[5] This final question is certainly important, since all researchers in the semantics/pragmatics debate propose the priority of pragmatic inference on the grounds that semantic interpretation does not provide a complete proposition (or a full proposition). Presumably, a full proposition is the minimal proposition that is truth-evaluable. However, if we are pedantic enough, we could always say that a proposition is not truth-evaluable and that we need (further) pragmatic inference to arrive at a truth-evaluable proposition. The problem is: where do we stop? It may be worth noting that truth-conditions mean something different for minimalists and for contextualists. Minimalists are not interested in what the world would have to be like for the sentence/utterance to be true (which they call the verification procedure), but merely in the formal procedure: "p" is true iff p, even if p is incomplete. Given this distinction, it goes without saying that contextualists are more exigent when it comes to deciding whether a sentence expresses a full proposition. However, as Lepore (personal communication) says, minimalists are not at all surprised to discover that many of the propositions we communicate are absurd, illogical and are a priori falsehoods, and they do not believe that it is the task of semanticists to account for these uses.

The considerations so far are also applicable to Carston's work. Is it possible that, if one thinks hard enough, every linguistic example requires pragmatic development into a proposition? Carston is not scared of this consequence, as she professes to be interested in knowing whether the gap between linguistic meaning and what is said is a contingent or necessary property of verbal communication (Carston 2002a, 15) and she has written a chapter in which she discusses whether pragmatic intrusion is a necessary feature of human communication. This is not the place for a lengthy discussion of Cappelen and Lepore (2005) – I refer the reader to an interesting discussion of the Inter-Contextual Indirect report test by Corazza (2007). Another paper that discusses the Radical Contextualist's response to C&L is the one by Wedgwood (2007), in which he addresses some apparently thorny problems for C & L, mainly the fact that, paradoxically, the semantics advocated by Relevance Theory is more minimal than the one advocated by C&L who allow a limited amount of pragmatic intrusion as far as pronominals and indexicals are concerned; not to mention the fact that the Intercontextual Disquotational Tests appear not to distinguish between homonyms and between use/mention. The discussion of these problems is worthy of a paper of its own, and therefore it is better to leave the matter here (see also Capone 2008b).

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[5] Burton-Roberts finds talk of full propositions bizarre. A proposition, by definition, cannot be non-truth-evaluable. He also asks: Why should a full proposition be the minimal proposition? Well, I am in agreement that something is either a proposition or it isn't, and if it must be truth-evaluable then, presumably, the expression 'a full proposition' is redundant.

2.5   *Explicatures*

Explicatures (the assumptions required to make a proposition truth-evaluable) must be precisely differentiated from implicatures (even if the basic inferential processes are shared). The notion of 'explicature' was originally advanced Sperber and Wilson (1986) who write:

(I)   An assumption by an utterance U is *explicit* [hence an 'explicature'] if and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U.

(II) An assumption communicated by U which is not explicit is implicit [hence an 'implicature'].

Carston (2002a, 117) argues that, together with pragmatic processes triggered by linguistic expressions, there are 'free' pragmatic processes which determine certain elements of the explicature on a purely contextual/inferential basis. She believes that the content of explicatures comes from two distinct sources, the linguistic expressions used and the context, and it is derived in two distinct ways depending on its source, by linguistic decoding or, otherwise, by pragmatic inference. She claims that the logical form, the output of the decoding phase, is solely a schema for the inferential construction of fully propositional assumptions.

   Burton-Roberts speculates that Carston's theory implies that explicatures are a development of the logical form L of the sentence uttered, if and only if P (asymmetrically) entails L.[6] For example, if I say "He shrugged and left" meaning (via explicature) "He shrugged and then left", it must be the case that the latter proposition implies the former (the explicature entails the encoded form it is a development of). However, Burton-Roberts (2005) contends that "If the encoded form can be entailed, it must deliver a truth-evaluable proposition" (p. 397) and this could be a problem with the notion of development. In a later section of this chapter, I note that cases of loosening such as, 'Sicily is a triangle', is problematic for the notion that an explicature entails the logical form from which it takes input.

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[6] Burton-Roberts (personal communication) states that he is only speculating that Carston, in fact, considers explicatures to be definable in terms of entailment (A is a development of B iff A entails B). This is a reasonable speculation. Her earlier Principle of Functional Independence declared that A cannot be an implicature of B if A entails B. Since a communicated assumption is EITHER an explicature OR an implicature (for RT), and it follows that any communicated assumption that entails the encoded logical form must be an explicature. So, with explicature defined in terms of "development", it is reasonable to speculate that development should be defined in terms of entailment.

3 Are Explicatures Cancellable?

Both Burton-Roberts (2006) and Capone (2006) converge towards the idea that explicatures cannot be cancelled. In the following sections, I will discuss Burton-Roberts (2006) and Capone (2006), with the aim of extending that discussion.

3.1 Burton-Roberts (2005) on the Non-cancellability of Explicatures.

It is interesting to see what Burton-Roberts (2005, 400–401) has to say on cancellability (of explicatures) in his short review of Carston (2002a). The author claims that it is not possible, in Carston's own terms, that explicatures should be cancellable. In fact, Carston states that the implicated assumptions that constitute the explicature are part of the proposition being expressed and, thus, are truth-conditional in nature. In this view, [+ truth-conditional] does imply [− cancellable]. If none of the truth-conditional content of the explicature can be cancelled, the explicature itself should not be cancellable. Cancellable implicature, then, is a logical impossibility according to Burton-Roberts.[7]

Carston may find the idea that (the pragmatically derived elements of) explicatures cannot be cancelled to be unpalatable because if her notion of explicature is to focus on the central role of pragmatics in human communication, freezing the implicatures in the notion of non-cancellable explicatures will amount to a non-insignificant concession to truth-conditional semantics. Readers may notice that Burton-Roberts' objections (to Carston) come from the perspective of truth-conditional semantics.

Burton-Roberts considers an example which Carston discusses on p. 138:

(13) She's ready but Karen isn't ready to leave for the airport.

Carston states that the explicature of 'She's ready' can be cancelled, because sentence (13) is not contradictory. In my view, Burton-Roberts correctly argues that sentence (13) cannot possibly be contradictory; it is statements that are contradictory: "contradiction must be assessed at the (propositional) level of explicature". Burton-Roberts' position is in line with my own considerations, expressed in Capone (2003, 2006). I also believe that sentence (14).

(14) If the king of France died and France became a republic, I would be happy, but if France became a republic and the king of France died, I would be unhappy,

which 'prima facie' appears to be contradictory, is not really so. Even though here we cannot point to any explicit time variables (e.g. in the form of time adverbials), the possibility of an interpretative ambiguity (as defined by Jaszczolt 1999)

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[7]This reminds us of a concern which was already expressed in Levinson (2000, 166).

remains open. This is due to the fact that the temporal relations between the constituent sentences of each conjoined complex sentence have not been fully specified. A contradiction can only arise when we decide on a particular temporal configuration. The evidence of the configuration under which no contradiction arises allows us to say that the sentence is not contradictory *per se*. Some objections may be raised against my view that 'P and Q' is not a full proposition should be true if 'P and Q' could not receive truth-conditions. But the example clearly shows that 'P and Q' and 'Q and P' do have different propositions and that they are therefore propositions. That is fine, but I think we have to distinguish between the sentential level and the speech act level. At the speech act level, a proposition is richer than at the sentential level. When I say that 'P and Q' is not a full proposition (hence there is no contradiction at the sentential level in (14)), I am talking about the sentential level. I could agree in principle that, at the speech act level, 'P and Q' and 'Q and P' constitute different propositions.

So Burton-Roberts is correct in saying that (13) is not evidence in favour of the cancellability of explicatures. In particular, he believes that 'She's ready' in (13) can be interpreted in three ways:

(15) Pat is ready at time t to leave for the airport.
(16a) Karen is ready at time t to leave for the airport x;
(16b) Karen is ready for something (though we do not know what).

If interpretation (15) holds, the second clause of (13) surely does not contradict it. If interpretation (16b) holds, the second clause of (13) does not cancel it either. So (16a) must be the explicature that Carston has in mind. But it is precisely (16a) that is contradicted by the second clause of (13).

Burton-Roberts considers another example which is discussed by Carston on p. 138:

(17) He ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped.

The explicature of (17) is something like (18):

(18) Lionel ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped over the edge of the cliff.

For Carston, the explicature (17) can be explicitly cancelled by saying (19).

(19) He ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped, but stayed on the top of the cliff.

where 'jumped' is understood to mean 'jumped up and down'.

According to Burton-Roberts, (19) is not an example of explicature cancellation, but a *clarification* that (18) was not the explicature, in that the transitive meaning rather than the directional meaning of 'jump' is regarded as being relevant. Apparently, Burton-Roberts states that Carston is not allowed to take an ambiguous verb and then use a sentence that denies one of the two meanings of the verb, saying that, in this way, an explicature is cancelled (see Burton-Roberts 1994 for an interesting paper on ambiguity and explicature in which he argues that ambiguity is not a semantic concept, but at best is a phenomenon connected with utterances; whatever the version we accept, it goes without saying that pragmatics disambiguates utterances).

Now we are faced with an old problem. In an influential article, Sadock (1978) showed that cancellation is not a reliable test for conversational implicature, because one sense of an ambiguous expression can be explicitly cancelled in a sentence established for this purpose. However, if I am correct, Carston's example is surely a case in which a pragmatic inference is conveyed despite the ambiguity of a lexeme (in this case 'jump'). So, as Burton-Roberts states, what may appear as something that cancels the explicature, in this case results in a clarification move. What is being clarified is that the non-directional meaning of 'jump' is promoted through pragmatic inference, which then, as Carston states, contributes to an explicature.

3.2   Further Considerations on Non-cancellable Explicatures

Burton-Roberts (2006) distinguishes between **A-saying** and **B-saying**. A-saying is taken to be the literal words expressed in an utterance, which can be reported in abstraction from the original context in which they were produced (presumably to fix an intention). Roughly, A-saying corresponds to the words actually proffered by a speaker in communication (Burton-Roberts 2005 states that to report what a speaker has A said we must (and need only) quote her utterance); B-saying, instead, involves the assessment (the individuation) of the thought the speaker explicitly intended to communicate, and this may involve putting together both the words used and the pragmatic assumptions of the context to arrive at explicatures and to add these to what was literally expressed. B-saying involves fixing the speaker's communicative intention. Burton-Roberts (personal communication) adds:

In fact, to report a B-saying you don't have to use any of the actual words that were A-said. Thus, to accurately report what you B-said when you A-said "Fa caldo" (It's warm in here) I can report you as having said that it was hot. Similarly, a person who A-says "It's at 12 o clock" can be reported by "She said the meeting was at midday".

Burton-Roberts states that Carston's notion of explicature reconstructs what is B-said (I construe this as: explicatures correspond to a level of what is B-said). The author states that explicatures cannot be cancelled without contradiction of what is A-said or of what is B-said. They cannot be cancelled without contradiction of what is A-said because what is A-said is what has been linguistically encoded and does not yield a truth-evaluable proposition (if there is no proposition at this stage, no proposition can be retracted, or cancelled). Burton-Roberts deduces that 'cancellation without contradiction' must mean 'cancellation without contradiction of what is B-said. But he states:

> Then cancellation of explicature is clearly impossible as well. To allow that an explicature is cancellable would be to allow that an explicature can be cancelled without contradicting the explicature (that what is B-said can be cancelled without contradicting what is B-said). This looks straightforwardly contradictory. Furthermore, assuming a normal understanding of what is to be 'committed' to a proposition, what it is to 'overtly endorse' it and to 'express commitment' to it, it is clearly impossible for a speaker to cancel what she has explicated without contradicting herself (Burton-Roberts 2006, 4).

Furthermore, Burton-Roberts notices that Carston's claim that explicatures are cancellable shifts emphasis from the speaker's intentions to the hearer's reconstruction of these intentions, a move that is dubious in his opinion, since both for Grice and Sperber and Wilson (1986, 2005) pragmatics is all about intentions.

Burton-Roberts' insistence on the logical impossibility of cancelling explicatures is something that is immediately appealing. Yet, we have to ponder what it means to endorse or commit oneself to an explicature. Carston states that a speaker endorses explicatures, and that she commits herself to them – yet what does it mean to endorse a proposition, what does it mean to express commitment to it? Much depends on the way in which we define 'commitment' and 'endorsing a proposition'. In a sense, a speaker commits herself and endorses a proposition through conversational implicature as well – and if we adopt what Burton-Roberts says then there is no subtle difference between particularized implicatures and explicatures (actually Burton-Roberts, in a personal communication, stresses that he only stated that it is with PCI (particularized conversational implicature) that a speaker commits herself to having implicated the proposition). If a proposition is actually implicated, it cannot be un-implicated, that is cancelled without contradiction of the executed intention to implicate). Particularized implicatures are relatively strong commitments to a proposition.

However, if we adopt Bach's view (Bach 2001) that all messages express a speaker's commitment through pragmatics, since in any case a hearer must distinguish between a serious and an ironic interpretation of an utterance (see also Lepore and Ludwig 2005), we are led to the view that commitment is really a matter of 'explicature' and, therefore, Burton-Roberts is correct in claiming that when a speaker commits herself to a certain intention, that intention is no longer retractable.

Burton-Roberts (2006, 5) writes, concerning (apparent) explicature cancellation, that treating the relevant phenomenon as clarification, rather than as cancellation, seems to be an obvious solution to the otherwise serious problem of principle with explicature. If one claims that explicatures are cancellable, one must abandon Carston's intuitive account of explicature in terms of expressing commitment to, and endorsement of, a proposition.

However, Carston may reply by distinguishing between explicatures* and explicatures. Explicatures* are potential explicatures, with explicatures (without the asterisk) being actual explicatures. This move would presumably adopt an idea by Gazdar (1979), for whom potential implicatures are assigned *automatically* – that is, independently of any actual intention-to-implicate – to linguistic expressions on the basis of their semantic representation. 'Potential implicatures' only become actual implicatures when the relevant expressions are uttered in specific contexts. If they are not consistent with the available assumptions (mutually manifested) in the context, they are cancelled. Inconsistency with the context of the utterance – and thus cancellation – means that they cannot have been intended. A potential implicature is, then, an implicature that arises independently of an intention occurring in the mind of a speaker.

Adding leverage to the above ideas, Carston may want to distinguish between potential explicatures and actual explicatures. Explicatures (without the asterisk) are those which a speaker commits herself to and explicitly endorses. Explicatures∗ are only potentially endorsable, being propositions which a speaker potentially commits herself to.[8] Thus, explicatures∗ are cancellable (as Carston would say) while explicatures are not. Therefore, in a sense, both Carston and Burton-Roberts are correct. Yet, it can be demonstrated that (only) Burton-Roberts is correct if explicatures are a more restricted class than what Carston believes them to be (a move which circumvents several problems noted by Cappelen and Lepore 2005). Suppose we confine ourselves to calling 'explicatures' the inferential increments which are meant to deliver a full proposition where none is supplied by bare semantics, or to rescue a proposition from contradiction or logical impossibility (absurdity). These explicatures are in no obvious way 'potential explicatures'. They are necessitated by the contingencies of communication and by the fact that logical forms are too fragmentary or exhibit obvious lacunae. Since, in such cases, there are no explicatures∗, Burton-Roberts is correct in saying that explicatures cannot be cancelled.

What arguments would support the contention that there are just explicatures (actual explicatures) and not explicatures∗ (potential explicatures)? Burton-Roberts may well return to the definition of explicatures:

D1

An assumption (proposition) communicated by an utterance is an 'explicature' of the utterance if and only if it is a DEVELOPMENT of (a) a linguistically encoded logical form of the utterance, or of (b) a sentential sub-part of a logical form.

He might state that the distinction between ∗explicatures and explicatures calls for a complication of the definition D1 above, which would have to be modified, resulting in a definition such as in the following:

D2

An assumption (proposition) (possibly) communicated by an utterance is/would be an 'explicature∗'/'explicature' of the utterance if and only if it is a (possible) DEVELOPMENT of (a) a linguistically encoded logical form of the utterance, or of (b) a sentential sub-part of a logical form.

There is a further problem to consider. Burton-Roberts states that Carston's notion of explicature reconstructs what is B-said. What is B-said is something that actually occurs in the conversation and must be reconstructed on the basis of the speakers' intentions; thus, it should not to be described as being potential. If we distinguish between explicatures∗ and explicatures, we must abandon Burton-Roberts' tidy picture, according to which explicatures (unqualified) are a component of what is B-said. Explicatures∗, in fact, do not seem to be a component of what is B-said.

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[8] I should clarify that this is not a position that Carston has ever embraced. There are reasons to believe that Carston may react to Burton-Roberts in this way, but I have no textual evidence that she may be sympathetic to the hypothetical position expressed in this chapter.

In response, Carston may argue that, for definitional purposes, we should only use explicatures (without the asterisk), while explicatures∗ are just a theoretical construct which reminds us of the pragmatic derivation of the inference in question (as I have stated explicatures and implicatures share the same types of pragmatic processes). Explicatures∗ are only a reminder that some pragmatic processes occurred at some point in the utterance interpretation.

The distinction between explicatures∗ and explicatures is suspicious on independent grounds. Explicatures∗ possess all the properties of Gazdar's potential implicatures, and none of the properties of explicatures as pragmatically constructed propositional forms. To say that explicatures are cancellable amounts to saying that (potential) implicatures are also cancellable, and that comes as no surprise. The fact that there is a stage of pragmatic communication in which an inference is potential (before a proper explicature is calculated in context) is a recognition of the fact that the inference is potentially an implicature. But it is an implicature before it is calculated. After calculation, it becomes an explicature in the right circumstances, having been correlated with the speaker's communicative intention. And actual explicatures are indeed calculated inferences.[9] Of course, the only way to test a potential implicature is to check for its consistency with the mutual cognitive environment (the assumptions which are mutually manifest to the participants in the conversation). However, one discovers that, by checking whether the implicature is cancellable or not, the implicature does not need to be triggered. I agree that this is a problem because, in this case, all that cancellability amounts to is the fact that the implicature is prevented from arising. However, one could also consider the case that the hearer temporarily considers the conversational implicature, but then due to mutually manifest assumptions aborts this implicature. One way to test this intuition is to check with speakers what happens when, for example, a scalar item like 'some' is used and then the scalar implicature arising from it is cancelled. Should we say that the implicature is cancelled or that it never arose? Relevance theorists consider scalar implicatures in context, and thus discard the problem, as one context may favour a scalar reading, while another may not. However, the problem arises when, out of the blue, one says 'Some of the students arrived' Is it the case that there is a scalar implicature or not? I would say that it is. There are now two possibilities: a) the scalar item is proffered without a context that serves to abort its scalar implicature, but then the context is extended by a further proposition which is proffered linguistically and which defeats the implicature; this is a straightforward case of implicature cancellation; b) the scalar item is uttered in context, where some assumptions that militate against the scalar implicature are mutually manifest. In this case, the conversational implicature is prevented from arising.

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[9] Specific comments by Burton-Roberts persuaded me that 'explicatures∗' cannot be anything other than potential implicatures.

3.3   Capone (2006) on Non-cancellable Explicatures.

Capone (2006) considers some examples of pragmatic intrusion such as (20), (21) and (22):

(20) If the king of France died and France became a republic, I would be happy, but if France became a republic and the king of France died, I would be unhappy;

(21) Take these three plates to those three people over there;

(22) You will die (said to John who has just cut his arm).

Capone writes that cancelling a causality implicature that allows us to make sense of an otherwise contradictory (or at least highly indeterminate) statement results in an unacceptable utterance: hence, in this case, it is not possible, in his view, to build the propositional form, while allowing for pragmatic intrusion, and then cancel the related implicature without rendering the discourse incoherent. While in ordinary cases of implicature cancellation, the speaker can still be considered to have said something intelligible, something that is coherent in itself and non-contradictory, in cases where pragmatics contributes to the propositional form in a decisive way, such a contribution cannot be withdrawn without causing havoc.

It is quite easy to show that the explicatures in (21) and (22) cannot be cancelled.

3.4   Further Problems for the Idea That Explicatures Are Not Cancellable

It may be suggested that a crucial way of proving that explicatures are not cancellable is to highlight that they are part of a speaker's intentions. Presumably, one of Carston's reasons in claiming that explicatures are cancellable is that she believes that the hearer entertains the proposition conveyed by the speaker with a high degree of probability, but never with certainty (he can go amiss in the process of utterance interpretation). As Saul (2004) and Burton-Roberts (2005) indicate, relevance theorists focus on utterance interpretation, rather than on utterance production, and this may very well lead them away from recognizing the central importance of a speaker's communicative intentions, which must be a guide to utterance interpretation insofar as it manifests itself through semantic clues and pragmatic strategies (see also Bach 1998). Since intentions in some cases are fixed, so it goes without saying that explicatures, which are the correlate of those intentions, should be non-cancellable. Saul indicates that the speaker's intentions (once they are manifested in thought) are fixed, and that while the process of interpretation may finally provide one or more interpretations which may or may not be consistent with the original intentions, the communicative process started with those intentions and it is those which essentially matter. We should not be surprised, therefore, that there are loci in conversation where failure to attribute a certain communicative intention deprives

the utterance of truth-evaluability and it is these which make the case of non-cancellability compelling.

If Carston replies that some cases of implicatures are also the correlates of intentions (specifically generalized conversational implicatures), but are nevertheless cancellable (an indication that correlation with an intention does not prove that an explicature cannot be cancelled), one may reply that intentionality comes in various degrees and that we have some weaker and stronger forms of intentionality. Explicatures correlate with the stronger level of intentionality. If there is such a stronger level of intentionality, then explicatures cannot be cancelled, because they express intentions of the strongest type.

Is it reasonable to assume that there are different degrees of intentionality and that, specifically, intentionality occurs in a weak or strong form? Although I do not see this point discussed in great detail in literature on communicative intentions, I believe we can capitalize on ideas by Castelfranchi and Paglieri (2007) on a constructive theory of intentions. As I have stated, the intentions they discuss are not specifically communicative, they are mainly intentions to act. For example, I may form the intention to send a paper to JL for publication or I may form the intention to write a book. It may be safely assumed that communicative intentions are a subtype of the intentions Castelfranchi & Paglieri discuss, as it is possible for someone to form the intention to communicate P to H to inform her of the truth of P. Telling or informing someone of P can be seen as a form of acting. Castelfranchi & Paglieri provide a detailed analysis of the role of beliefs in goal processing – that is, in the cognitive transition from a mere desire (what they call a 'pro-attitude') to a proper intention. The main point of the paper is that goal processing and intention revision are largely determined by belief revisions and that, in order to activate, promote, drop, or suspend a goal, an intention, or an intentional action, one has to provide or modify the appropriate beliefs. Now, surely such a constructive theory of intentions presupposes that intentions come in various degrees and concerning the action A, one can have stronger or weaker intentions. Stronger intentionality, as the authors state, is activated by the provision of beliefs – so the greater the connection between an intention and a set of beliefs, the greater the likelihood that such beliefs will have an influence on the intention and will modify its degree of intentionality, by allowing it to move from the sphere of potential intentionality to the sphere of actual intentionality. I assume that as one moves from one sphere to the other, one can find different degrees of intentionality. Now, on the assumption that communicative intentions are a subclass of the intentions Castelfranchi and Paglieri discuss – and this assumption is not implausible for a theory stressing the connection between language and action – we should suppose that beliefs interact with intentions, not only at the level of intention formation, but also at the level of intention reconstruction by the hearer. A process analogous to the intention construction occurs, and the beliefs assumed to be in the mind of the speaker, which are mutually manifest to the hearer (because as Austin once stated, a man speaks!), can play a role in allowing the hearer to infer the degree of intentionality involved in the communicative action.

We now return to explicatures. The reason why explicatures correlate with a stronger form of intentionality is that they arise in circumstances where there cannot

be an 'out' for the speaker, where the communicative intention proceeds along the path of the only intentionality available, outside which all sorts of wild grass grows and imputing different intentions becomes so implausible as to impair rational communication. Explicatures are not there to rescue the utterance from all kinds of defective communicative effects, such as lack of informativeness, lack of relevance or lack of quality, but are there to furnish an uttered proposition, the speaker's thought, in the first place, the condition *sine qua non* for evaluating all other communicative deficiencies. The kind of deficiencies explicatures have to remedy include the lack of a truth-evaluable proposition or the lack of a plausible truth-evaluable proposition, one which is not irremediably contaminated by 'a priori' contradiction or logical absurdity. It is exactly these cases which shape intentionality within the strict mould of the rational assessment of the thought that the utterance must be taken to express.

On the relevance-theoretic view, we should also consider higher-order explicatures, which are the processes assigning illocutionary force to an utterance. Now, I think that if what we have said about the intentionality of explicatures is true, it must be applicable to higher-order explicatures. I have discussed the issue of the non-cancellability of inferences in discourse at length in my paper 'Pragmemes' (Capone 2005), where I provided various examples of non-cancellable inferences. I would, nevertheless, like to highlight that questions of truth are not at stake in higher-order explicatures. In such cases, therefore, we miss the connectedness between non-cancellability and pragmatic intrusion. We might also have a somewhat different story, considering the fact that utterances can be multi-functional at the level of illocutionary force. I do not suppose that all my considerations concerning pragmatic intrusion are applicable to higher-order explicatures.

3.5   On the Connection Between Non-cancellability of Explicatures and Pragmatic Intrusion

Suppose it is accepted that explicatures are cancellable. Then it becomes problematic when explaining why it is that explicatures are part of the truth-conditional content of a sentence. Surely, one of the advantages of claiming that an inference is truth-conditional is that it is part of the entailments of a sentence (and, thus, non-cancellable). If we do not want the content obtained through pragmatic intrusion to be part of the entailments of the sentence, why should we concern ourselves with pragmatic intrusion at all? After all, we could have a very orderly picture like that of Cappelen and Lepore (2005) in which what is said is mainly associated with linguistic semantics, and the various contextual phenomena which we claim are part of the truth-conditional content of a sentence could be easily assigned at the level of the utterance. Is this what we want? Presumably, a radical contextual claim is one that assigns constituents which are derived through pragmatics inside the sentential content (of course pragmaticians may differ on the specific details of their theories;

for example, in Capone (2006) I proposed alternative cases of pragmatic intrusion to the standard ones, which in my view were easily assailable (and in fact were attacked by Cappelen and Lepore 2005; the fact that Lepore, who was aware of my examples and never replied to them, is eloquent)). A version like mine, according to which explicatures are non-cancellable, is more consistent with the view that pragmatics provides constituents of thought that intrude into the sentential level of meaning, since entailments are not entailments unless one cannot deny them. One of the classical tests for entailments is the one devised by Strawson: if S entails P, one cannot utter S and say not P. So now my question is, do we have enough courage to argue in favour of full pragmatic intrusion? If we have, then we should accept that explicatures cannot be cancelled.

It may be argued that matters become simpler if we consider the explicature as a two-level entity, consisting of the entailments of the sentence uttered and the pragmatic increment that goes into the explicature. However, this segregational approach will not suffice because both the entailments and the pragmatic increments are subject to pragmatic processing. The entailments of the sentence uttered are promoted to being part of the speaker's commitment only after pragmatics rules out, for example, ironic interpretations. Pragmatic increments are combined with the semantic entailments of the sentence uttered only after such entailments are promoted through pragmatics to the intended meaning. At this point, there is no reason to segregate the constituents of the explicature, the semantic entailments derived from the sentence and the pragmatic increments based on them and on contextual assumptions.

At this point, I would expect the following objection. But then, if this is the way things are, why also accept that conversational implicatures are non-cancellable? Firstly, I only confined myself to the claim that particularised conversational implicatures are not cancellable. Secondly, the question is not whether it is an advantage to consider conversational implicatures as being cancellable, but whether it is fruitful to consider explicatures as non-cancellable. The difference in the argumentation in favour of non-cancellable particularised implicatures and of non-cancellable explicatures is that there are theoretical reasons because of pragmatic intrusion for insisting that explicatures are non-cancellable, whereas in the case of particularised conversational implicatures, we can only resort to arguments based on intentionality. Thus, there are stronger theoretical reasons in the case of explicatures for claiming that they are non-cancellable.

4   Refining the Notion of Explicature Further

Let us accept the following assumptions by Grundy (2000).

A. Explicatures amount to constitutive aspects of what is explicitly said;
B. Explicatures are not linguistically encoded but have to be pragmatically expressed;
C. Speakers are committed to the explicature of an utterance;

D. Explicatures are part of what is communicated and, thus, are overtly endorsed by a speaker.
E. Explicatures are motivated by the indeterminacy of language (see also Grundy 2000).

At this point, one should add, given the previous discussion, that explicatures are inferences that partially use linguistic meaning and partially use contextualization clues in order to fix (determine) the speaker's unequivocal intention. An explicature is, therefore, the reconstruction of an intention on the basis of what a speaker says in communication in response to the need to reach a full proposition. The full proposition reconstructed by the hearer is one that cannot be cancelled explicitly and that can be distinguished from implicatures due to the fact that implicatures are normally additional increments on top of explicatures. Explicatures are more fundamental increments because, without them, the proposition expressed would be either contradictory, or false, or communicatively very inefficient even at the sentential level. Explicatures are explicit in that they cannot be denied. It is hard to imagine how an implicature can be calculated if one does not resolve the issue of the explicature first. While Relevance Theorists have always been adamant that explicature and implicatures mutually adjust, I have serious doubts whether a conversational implicature can arise if issues such as reference are not first resolved.

We should distinguish actual from potential explicatures. Potential explicatures, like potential implicatures, are not cases of real intentionality (or of real intentionality assignment) but are hypothetical cases of intentionality assignment. When one deals with potential implicatures and potential explicatures one states something such as: On the basis of 'S' (the syntactic and semantic features of S) and on the basis of the fact that the speaker had a reason to use S (and did not use an alternative to S), the speaker intends that P, unless F, where F is some proposition to be derived from the assumptions manifest in context. The clause UNLESS F focuses on the hypothetical nature of potential implicatures and *explicatures. However, as far as actual explicatures are concerned, there can be no 'UNLESS F' clause. The calculation process in actual explicatures is over quickly and nothing further can be done with it. We can no longer think about it and process it any further in the light of other assumptions. The process leading to explicatures should be finite (both in the sense that we usually do not spend a long time in coming to an explicature, i.e. we do not ponder the case of explicature for months, and in the sense that when we acquire the propositional elements that are relevant to the case, we process the utterance, produce an explicature and close the interpretation process for good). An explicature case is not like a reasoning case where the evidence is sifted and the experts come to a decision, with the potential for the decision process to be reopened at any moment (for example, a trial in which new evidence is crucial and may determine a completely different outcome). An explicature case is closed when the communicative exchange moves beyond the next utterance. Thus, the evidence that is relevant to the communicative process is the evidence available at t, where t is some temporal variable that is indexed to the time of the utterance whose explicature we seek to elucidate and is upper-bounded by t', where t' is indexed to the utterance next to it.

By the time u' is uttered, the explicature of u is calculated on the basis of the evidence available **at that moment** and the case is not further opened. Now, this is important. If we sought further evidence and if u were to be contextualized say, for example, at different moments, t', t", t"', etc. the explicature could very well be different (given that it arises from the interplay of the linguistically expressed assumption and assumptions available in the context). **So an utterance could, in theory, be associated with distinct explicatures**. In order to avoid this inconvenience, we have to keep the interpretation process finite. And this is in accordance with the point that an explicature captures a **unique** intention. If the utterance were considered at different moments, different interpretative possibilities should arise (given the fact that different evidence might be available at different moments). But this is not possible since we have said that the intention to be assigned must be unique.

Now, these considerations are compatible with what Sperber and Wilson (1986) state about utterance interpretation. They also argue that the interpretation process is finite and instantaneous – in other words, when the best interpretation is obtained the process stops. My considerations on the intentionality of explicatures make these considerations cogent and provide further justification for them.

In this chapter, it will not be accepted that relevance-theory should only be a theory about the hearer's interpretations. We have seen that the philosopher Saul takes this to be RT's greatest weakness. Wedgwood (2007) also reiterates that RT is a theory from the hearer's perspective. My considerations presuppose that the speaker's perspective is a crucial element of RT as well. In any case, the main reasons in favour of non-cancellability of explicatures also favour taking RT as a theory of speaker's and hearer's interpretations, a theory having sufficient power to guarantee that the speaker's intentions, and the intentions inferred by the hearer, match. They must match because the speaker and the hearer rely on the same principles, because their minds are similar in their constitution and because they share the same cognitive inputs (perceptual stimuli) as well as a number of contextual assumptions that are mutually manifest.

The issue of the non-cancellability of explicatures is inherently connected with the issue of the match between the speaker and the hearer's (assigned) intentions, and this is simple to prove. If there was, say, no match in the speaker-hearer's intentions, we should be able to allow for the possibility that the speaker's and hearer's (inferred) intentions could go along separate paths. It would, thus, be possible to at least cancel one type of intention (either the speaker's or hearer's), but not both. But the notion that explicatures are not cancellable simply denies that either one type or the other type of intention can be denied (or cancelled). To accept that explicatures are not cancellable, in the sense of accepting that the hearer's intentions are not cancellable (without saying anything about the speaker's intentions), leads us nowhere, since one reason why the hearer's intentions are not cancellable is that they aim to reconstruct the speaker's intentions which are also not cancellable. Once we relinquish the idea that the hearer's intentions aim to reconstruct the speaker's intentions, there is no reason to adhere to the notion that explicatures are not cancellable. From the hearer's point of view they could very well be cancellable, as seen

in circumstances in which a hearer evaluates different readings of an utterance without being under pressure to uncover the speaker's intentions.

Returning to the issue regarding whether the relationship between an explicature and the logical form giving input to it is one of entailment, one should consider that an explicature consists of both a logical form and some implicated materials which are added to the logical form (let us suppose that logical conjunction serves to connect the two in the most basic of cases; instead, subtraction is the logical operation involved in cases of loosening). Now, if this is the notion of explicature we adopt, it is clear that it should entail the logical form it is a development of, in cases where explicature is an operation based on conjunction, since conjunction is truth-preserving and a logical form P surely entails itself under conjunction. Of course, in this view, an explicature should be subject to strong constraints: one such constraint is that the implicated materials should be compatible with the logical form the explicature is a development of.

For an explicature to be non-cancellable we need to assume that both the implicated part and the explicit logical form to be developed are non-cancellable elements of meaning. But, in a sense, even the logical form that is being developed is subject to pragmatic inference, since it must be mapped to a serious intention and we have seen that the assignment of serious intentions is primarily a matter of pragmatics. After this is completed, some implicated materials are assigned to the explicature and made compatible with the logical form that gave input to them, on the basis of this pragmatic process of intention assignment. It is inevitable that this should be a two stage process, with a double assignment of intentionality.

However, there are pragmatic processes that contribute to explicatures, such as loosening ("Sicily is a triangle") in which one cannot proceed in this way. Surely one cannot map the logical form 'Sicily is a triangle' to a serious intention and the implicated materials, 'Sicily has vaguely the shape of a triangle', when they are added to the logical form that gives input to them, require a loosening of the intentionality which is tentatively mapped to the logical form 'Sicily has the shape of a triangle'. Compatibility must be maximized and this is achieved by loosening one level of intentionality. Now, we have to accept that the explicature must only have one level of intentionality and that conjunction is, therefore, not the correct logical operation for explicature derivation in cases of loosenings. Explicature derivation sometimes involves addition, and sometimes involves subtraction. If addition is involved (ordinary conjunction) then two levels of intentionality clearly merge into one single level of intentionality. If subtraction is the logical operation involved in explicature derivation, then we have two levels of intentionality (non-serious; serious), but only one of them prevails. The implicated materials prevail over the literally stated logical form. In this case, the intentionality of the explicature is inherited from the intentionality of the implicated materials. I am therefore alleging that explicature derivation requires some (pragmatic) compositionality at the level of intentionality, due to the assumption (we have accepted) that the two components of the explicature must be compatible. (Pragmatic) compositionality means we must have some principles determining which level of intentionality prevails. In the case of conjunction, compositionality is derived from the logical operation 'logical

conjunction' and the compatibility assumption. In the case of subtraction, compositionality is derived from the compatibility assumption and also the assumption that at least one level of intentionality must project at the global (and strongest) level. The intentionality 'Sicily has roughly the shape of a triangle' has a stronger level of intentionality than 'Sicily is a triangle' given that, due to shared knowledge, it cannot be the case that Sicily is a perfect canonical triangle. Having decided which is the stronger level of intentionality, this will be project at the level of the global explicature. The fact that the explicature, broadly speaking, cannot be logically cancelled implies that in the situation where two components of the explicature are constituted by two distinct incompatible levels of intentionality, only one can project: they cannot both project as this would jeopardise the notion that the explicature is not cancellable.

It is an obvious consequence of the discussion to date that cases of explicatures based on loosening, insofar as they use the logical operation of subtraction, jeopardise the definition that explicatures entail the logical forms they are developments of. In fact, a loose triangle does not entail a triangle, that is clearly obvious. Nevertheless, there should be a logical operation which requires the explicature to entail **something like** the logical form it is a development of. To be more precise, the explicature 'Sicily has the rough shape of a triangle' requires us to observe a triangle to determine what the real shape of Sicily is like.

In light of the previous discussion, an explicature is a process of the following kind:

Starting from a logical form S, develop S by taking the Principle of Relevance into account and add the feature Te (truth-evaluability) to u (S) as a consequence of the consideration that u(S)/Te has greater contextual effects and fewer cognitive costs than u(S)/¬ Te.

The approach so far differs little from that of Sperber and Wilson or Carston in that they argue that, in specific cases, the search for relevance leads to the construction of explicatures. Instead, I argue that, in general, explicatures that maximise truth-evaluability are preferable on the grounds of the Principle of Relevance.

I would like to connect the notion of explicature to that of assertion in communication. We will not progress far in pragmatics unless we recognize that explicatures are part of assertions. The considerations so far significantly cohere with what Stainton (1994, 280) states about assertions when revising considerations by Sperber and Wilson (1986):

An utterance U is an assertion that P if and only if:

(a) Either P is the propositional form of U (i.e. P results merely by completing the Logical Form of U – i.e. by disambiguating it, enriching it and assigning it reference) or P could result merely by completing the Logical Form of U and conjoining it with another manifest Logical Form of the appropriate semantic type: and

(b) P is consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance (i.e. U actually communicates P).

In other words, Stainton also believes that explicatures form part of the asserted proposition and, thus, is implicitly committed to the non-cancellability of explicatures.

5   Conclusion

This chapter has assumed that pragmatic intrusion is a rather general phenomenon in language use and that Carston's notion of 'explicature' is very important. This notion may need refinement, and in this chapter I have highlighted the facts that have to be considered for this purpose. Cancellability appears to be an important factor which has led to some theoretical revision. Furthermore, the fact that, in some cases, it is difficult to distinguish between implicatures and explicatures if only empirical facts such as cancellation are considered, will inevitably lead us to tighten up the definition of explicatures.

Jaszczolt (personal communication) states that Carston may find the idea of non-cancellable explicatures to be problematic in that it goes against the idea of nonce-inference (context-driven inference) and makes explicatures more akin to unmarked, default meanings – not Levinson's highly cancellable defaults, but instead Asher and Lascarides' (2003) or Jaszczolt's (1999) defaults.

This is not necessarily an implication of what I have written so far. In Capone (2006) I have discussed in detail a case of explicature that required some form of contextual inference. Explicatures are uncancellable not because they necessarily correspond to a level of default inference, but because the purpose they fulfil is such that it makes them uncancellable. If they were easily cancellable, then it would be hard to see what role they could play in establishing the full truth-conditional meaning of an utterance. While it makes sense to state that a strategic potential implicature leaves an 'out' for the speaker, it is not reasonable to believe that explicatures give the speaker an 'out'. The purpose of committing oneself to a proposition is to leave no room for disagreement as to what the speaker actually means.

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Chapter 4
On the Tension Between Semantics and Pragmatics

Una tradizione plurisecolare ha quasi sempre perduto di vista che, in realtà, le forme linguistiche non hanno alcuna intrinseca capacità semantica: esse sono strumenti, espedienti, più o meno ingegnosi, senza vita e valore fuori delle mani dell'uomo, delle comunità storiche che ne facciano uso

(De Mauro 1965).

Abstract In this chapter, I offer my reflections on the relationship between semantics and pragmatics. I argue that semantics – the relatively stable and context-invariant meanings of language – is necessarily amplified by pragmatics, which is a way of transcending the possibilities of semantics. Pragmatic layers, especially if they meet the cognitive needs of language users and represent culturally salient concepts, tend to become semanticized. The situation is complicated by the postulation of explicatures which, I argue, are not cancellable and mimic the semantic resources of a language. Like entailments, they are not cancellable, but they share the features of all types of pragmatic inferences in that they are calculable. I propose that explicatures are loci of the tension between semantics and pragmatics, and given the lack of cancellability, they are strong candidates for inferences that tend to become semanticized. In this chapter, I see the tension between pragmatics and semantics exemplified by situations where an excessive weight is placed on semantics (legal documents, such as laws), and situations where an excessive burden is placed on pragmatics (pidgins like Tok Pisin). In this chapter, I also argue that the principles of language use tend to become semanticised in the form of discourse rules and I consider the praxis of language games, arguing that discourse rules,

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unlike principles, have the advantage of being teachable and of also favoring the involvement of speakers in the communicative praxis (Lo Piparo 2010).

1   Introduction

I have felt the need to revisit a previous paper,[1] whose (full) significance will be properly understood many years from now. In fact, after writing other papers, I have encountered problems which cannot easily be resolved unless one has an insight into the tension between semantics and pragmatics. In particular, whilst reading Carston's (2013) paper on pragmatics and the law, and in particular her insightful observations that the relationship between Gricean Principles and maxims of construction needs to be deepened, it was evident to me that considerations from my previous paper (Capone 2013) on the tension between semantics and pragmatics might be of use. In fact, in that paper and this chapter, I argue, among other things, that not only inferences become semanticized, but also pragmatic principles, which may plausibly yield to discourse rules. Canons of construction (inferences specific to the law, that reflect the Gricean maxims), to give an example, can be considered cases of semanticised Pragmatic principles – pragmatic competence based on Cognitive principles or general principles of rationality à la Grice has yielded to some form of semantic/discourse competence, which has been modularized – a specific module reflecting know-how, and formed as a result of interaction and learning (through training), is being created in the human mind. The shift from Principles to modularization involves a shift from genetic transmission to cultural transmission. This is a fact not noted by Carston – but one that deserves appropriate exploration and this is one aspect that I will discuss in this chapter. The main focus is on the transition from pragmatic to semantic information through the notion of loci of pragmatic intrusion. This will be explained gradually.

Why does a (human) language exist? The answer (one of many possibilities) might be that a language enables human beings to talk (talk about states of affairs and their thoughts, express feelings, get other people to perform tasks for them (see Jakobson 1960 on the functions of language) and transmit information from one generation to the next (propagation of culture[2]) with other human beings (and sometimes with animals, who may be receptive to certain commands and thoughts). It would be impossible to understand the workings of a language without reference to its users (Mey 2001) and we take pragmatics to be broadly related to how language users use semantic resources to produce speakers' meanings. Human beings use language to coordinate their actions[3] – and the presupposition, in such uses, is that other fellow human beings understand their words and their utterances. And the crucial question is: on what basis? Presumably, there are conventions that pair utterances and thoughts (or utterances and commands, etc.) (See also Mey 2001,

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[1] On the tension between semantics and pragmatics. "RASK: International Journal of Language and Communication", 2013, 37, 5–39.

[2] See Capone (2010), Introduction to Pragmemes.

[3] Of course, this is reminiscent of Lewis' ideas (on convention).

p. 43 on the paradox of conventionality vs. spontaneity). If you know the words of a language and you also know the syntactic configurations in which those words can appear, and the meanings expressed by those configurations, you are also in a position to understand what the meaning of an utterance (or any utterance) is. Of course, it is now universally accepted that you do not directly pair utterances and meanings, as such pairings are mediated by knowledge of words and of syntax. You can indeed say (and this is presumably a shortcut) 'This utterance means X' which makes it appear that you associate the utterance with a certain meaning. But this is a simplification. In the case of words, presumably, you learn meanings item by item (but there are exceptions, since there are composite words where it is possible to predict the overall result without having to individually learn the complex item; furthermore, consider that the meanings of words can be extended through pragmatics (Recanati 2004; Leonardi 2013)), for utterances (unless we consider some exceptions like idiomatic sentences) the meaning of the unit is mediated by lexical semantics and by the grammar of the language. In other words, if you consider 'John cut the fish' and 'John cut the fish with a knife', not only is it the case that you do not learn the meanings of these two utterances one by one, but there is a systematic relationship between the two utterances. It is clear that they must share some meaning and that one differs from the other because there is a constituent which adds further meaning (making explicit some semantic relations which were implicit in the other utterance, such as the instrumental function). If words and grammar are conducive to meanings and, thus, allow speakers to express and understand the thoughts that are expressed through them, then this must be due to a convention. Presumably, we identify a language with a convention, which was developed by the linguistic community as a whole and not by individuals, even if we assume that certain prominent public figures assisted in consolidating or spreading certain words (amazing though it may be, people like Alessandro Manzoni or Dante had an enormous influence on the Italian language; likewise, Shakespeare had an enormous influence on the English language, since he was the first author to completely master the techniques of language extension).[4] As De Saussure has struggled to emphasize to us, it is vain to try to identify parts of a language with individuals, although it is possible that linguistic changes generated by particularly powerful individuals were accepted by the majority of language users because such changes met the cognitive needs of the users, as they fulfilled functions for which there was an acute need in the society in question. So, we assume that there is a certain fluidity in a language, but we also accept that conventions play a major role.

In another paper (Capone 2013a), I argued that semantics is necessarily truth-conditional, as it is devised to express thoughts. If something is a thought, we can state:

It is true;
It is false.[5]

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[4] See also Traugott and Dasher (2002, 4) on groups which attempt to claim words for themselves (e.g. Yankee, Queer, Nappy) and, furthermore, the redefinition of words by legislative acts (e.g. 'harassment').

[5] Keith Allan (p.c.) believes that this is an oversimplification: on the whole, this may be true, but

Why should semantics be devised, if not for the purpose of expressing thoughts? And does a thought exist if only certain skeletal elements of it can be recognized and we cannot state whether it is true or false?

It is true that certain thoughts can be skeletal and pragmatics can flesh them out. But my argument is that we should be able to state 'It is true', or 'It is false' about the minimal thought expressible by a sentence.

Nevertheless, there are cases of pragmatic intrusion. We want to rescue thoughts from contradiction or absurdity and when semantics alone leads to possible contradictions or absurdities, pragmatics intervenes to discard them. So, while in a majority of cases, basic truth-conditions can be established on the basis of what is said (or written), in some problematic cases, the literal sentence exhibits a problematic property: it may be contradictory or absurd. In such cases, Pragmatics has a reparative function. Furthermore, in many cases, the literal truth-conditions are not sufficient for ordinary communication to take place, as they do not give enough information about our thoughts. Therefore, pragmatics intervenes to provide further flesh for semantics (to flesh out semantics, as Carston 2002 states).

Is it possible to say that semantics and pragmatics are in competition? Intuitively, if there is a competition or tension, this must be an infinite tension, one that can never be resolved. Semantics tends to be complemented and enriched by pragmatic layers. Once these pragmatic layers become sedimented in the language (and sedimentation occurs if a pragmatic innovation fills a slot which has become indispensible (because of its cultural salience), pragmatics is replaced (again) by semantics. (See Wierzbicka 2006 and Wong 2010's important work on language and culture). (On the grammaticalization of pragmatic inferences see Grice (1989), Traugott and Dasher (2002), Traugott (2004, 2012), Levinson (2000) (in particular the evolution of reflexives out of marked pronominal forms in old English), Nicolle (1998) and Ariel (2008)). Then semantic meanings are augmented through pragmatics, and so on *ad libitum*. So there is a circle, one that is productive and which is fed by cultural innovations and new cognitive needs, that goes from semantics to pragmatics and then from pragmatics to semantics. But if there is such a circle, this means that semantics plays some central (in a special sense of 'central') role and there cannot be pragmatics without semantics, but also there cannot be semantics without pragmatics. In the initial phase of language, human beings must have had pragmatic means of conveying their messages and expressing communicative intentions (gestures, gaze, tone of voice, shouting, etc., an arsenal which, though primitive, is still retained by modern language users (Volterra et al. 2004)). But then, such pragmatic means must have allowed them to settle on conventions about at least some basic words.

It is difficult to escape from the circle as semantics and pragmatics seem entangled to an extraordinary degree. Yet, in the actual workings of language, they would appear to have conquered autonomous roles. In most cases, it is possible to distinguish semantics from pragmatics, but there are points – which I call *loci of the ten-*

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there are thoughts which have an indeterminate truth value. I presume that Allan has in mind cases like the one discussed by Strawson in his famous paper on referring.

sion between semantics and pragmatics – where pragmatics becomes semanticised. In other words, while it is a rule that pragmatic inferences (at least the potential ones) are cancellable, in such loci of the tension between semantics and pragmatics, pragmatics mimics semantics and, thus, the inferences at stake, though pragmatic, are not cancellable. Burton-Roberts (2005 and 2010) imputes the lack of cancellability to the expression of strong intentions – when an intention is expressed (implicated or not), it cannot be cancelled (it cannot be un-implicated). Indeed, while I agree that intentions play a role in the cancellability (or rather the lack of it) of explicatures (and implicatures), I link this phenomenon to structural characteristics of the discourse where the inferences are judged not to be cancellable.

Is it possible that explicatures at the loci of the tension between semantics and pragmatics are stronger candidates for grammaticalization? If at these points, pragmatics mimics semantics, it is not impossible that these are the points where a grammaticalization process starts. Since, at these points explicatures are not cancellable, language users may start to believe that these inferences are beginning to acquire a grammatical status.

2   On Intentions, Semantics and Pragmatics

It might *prima facie* appear that semantics allows speakers to convey their (linguistic) intentions. And indeed, one needs semantics to articulate thoughts, commands or expressives. However, semantics alone is not sufficient. It appears to me, and scholars like Kent Bach (2001), that for semantics to work properly there is the need of a pragmatic path. Only against a background of clues and cues (Dascal 2003), do linguistic intentions emerge. Semantics alone would not be sufficient to fix intentions. To convince you that this is (must be) the case, consider a sentence written on a blackboard.

(1) Caesar was a dictator

Now, depending on the context, the example could be taken in many ways. It might be part of a history lesson and could therefore be uttered (or written) assertively, with the teacher being responsible for the utterance and, therefore, bound to provide further evidence should that be required (in case someone refuted the assertion). Or it could be (merely) a linguistic example, one that has been provided in the course of a linguistics lesson at the University and exemplifying some syntactic or semantic structure (see also Kecskes 2012, 191), and in this case it would not be uttered assertively. No one is intending to utter this sentence as part of an assertion and, therefore, no one is bound to provide further evidence should someone refute it. (As a linguistic example it can appear only on the blackboard without anyone voicing it; if it is uttered assertively, it must then, out of necessity, be linked to a voice that is responsible for the assertion). What can be deduced from this is that

intentions are never in the sentence, but outside it,[6] and thus the issue of intentionality is partly semantic and partly pragmatic. Once pragmatics (via contextual clues) fixes a serious intention, the words matter and it is semantics that tells you what specific intention the speaker has (or had) in uttering this or that assertion. Once you establish that 'Caesar was a dictator' was uttered assertively, you know through semantics what kind of thought the speaker has, whether it is a thought about Caesar, a judgment, a negative judgment, etc. (including all the entailments and logical consequences of what was said). But until a serious intention is fixed, the words are not conducive to specific intentions. I could say in response to 'I am Hume' that I am Kant ('And then I am Kant', without leading my hearers to assigning me the thought that I am Kant. They are well aware that I never thought that, although I said it (in a locutionary sense of saying). They are well aware that I mean 'Look I don't believe you are Hume' and thus my thought is indirectly related to the words that I uttered (but not in such a way that the words in the sentence can be considered to be constituents of the thought). In some cases, the intentions and words are separate and the intentions only flow from the contextual clues. When the intentions and words are not separate, but the words convey the speaker's thought that he has a serious intention of having his thought expressed by his words, the thought is announced by the contextual clues which fix a serious intention, and not by the words used. So, in a sense, the intentions are outside the words that are used (see also Mey 2001) and are also related to the words (just in case the intention outside the words can be established as a serious one). (We could also accommodate Kecskes' (2012) view that the speaker's intentions may include shadows of meaning that are private and need to be made explicit through recourse to clues, allowing us to transform a private act of parole (differing significantly from other apparently similar speech acts) into an act which is expressible through public language (even if it is not actually so expressed, but only grasps at the level of inference)).

So, in a sense, pragmatics is that area of study which pertains to intentions to a greater extent, whereas semantics is only related to intentions through the aid of pragmatics. Does this mean that intentions can be read telepathically? Of course the answer is negative, because even if semantics can work though pragmatics, pragmatics without semantics would be too impoverished to achieve the complexity of articulate thought. We could have no subordinative thoughts without semantics, no if-clauses, etc. So, on the one hand, semantics is indispensible for articulate thought, and on the other hand, we can state that pragmatics is the structural element on which semantics is built.

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[6] An extreme case would be: "I am seriously telling you that I am seriously telling you….that the Pope died. I am joking, of course".

3   Situations Where the Burden Is on Semantics

It may be believed that the main tension between semantics and pragmatics is revealed by cases in which a speaker (and her hearers) are under the exigency of reducing interpretative ambiguities. We can use the example of the law (legislative acts) as an extreme case where every effort is made to avoid ambiguity (interpretative or otherwise) and to reduce the interpretative options or choices that could be available to the hearer/reader. The kind of intentionality expressed by legislative acts is one that presupposes a perfect matching between the intentions of the legislator and the interpretations of the readers.[7] So we imagine that a certain amount of prolixity or carefulness would be required to guarantee such a matching and that context-sensitive elements, whenever possible, should be replaced with context-insensitive ones. We can easily imagine that pronouns are particularly insidious for the legislator – take the pronominal 'it'; this can be coindexed with any NP (noun phrase) available in the co-text, whether close by or further away (it can also be ambiguous between anaphoric and cataphoric uses). It is only pragmatics that instructs the hearer to prefer the coindexing of a pronominal with a matching antecedent that is as close by as possible. And, of course, pragmatics instructs the hearer/reader to choose an antecedent which ensures that the anaphoric link makes sense – to ensure that it conforms to most typical or stereotypical scenarios (Huang 1994). I assume that legal texts (as well as some academic ones) are at pains to reduce interpretative latitude (or the interpretative options) by allowing a pronominal to be followed by some apposition clause that specifies the context to a greater extent, disambiguating it as far as possible. But is it possible to completely reduce all interpretative ambiguities? The answer is probably negative – and if this is so, then it makes sense to argue that even legal texts require interpretation – an interpretation that conforms to the highest possible standards of rationality. We can assume that the legislator is as rational as possible and, therefore, we will attempt to deduce the most rational interpretations (Dascal and Wróblewski 1988) by comparing alternative interpretations. We are not going to go into the details here of the interpretation of legal texts. All we require is an example that portrays the basic tension between semantics and pragmatics, as we can see them pitted here against each other. Semantics tries to reduce the burden that falls on pragmatics, and pragmatics takes

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[7] I use the term 'the legislator' being fully aware of the potential attributive/referential ambiguity. A legal text – such as a law – is different from other texts, because the individual intentions of the actual legislator (the person) can be superseded in the situation where it can be proven that a certain interpretation (however different from the one the person had in mind when passing the law) is more rational. The law-maker is an entirely depersonalized entity, one who acts according to rationality. It follows that it must always be reasonable to attribute to her the most rational intention that can be reconstructed.

over when it is clearly provable that semantics alone is not sufficient.[8] Although speakers may want to make every effort to use semantics to express their thoughts, out of necessity there is some residue which requires pragmatic interpretation (and some residue of thought to be expressed through pragmatics in the absence of an alternative means). Now, in case we were tempted to state that semantics plays a more important role than pragmatics – given that pragmatics plays a complementary role – we must clarify that the very impossibility of expressing all thoughts through semantics shows that pragmatics is needed to go beyond the possibility of semantics. The case presently being discussed highlights the limits of semantics and that such limits can be overcome via pragmatics. So pragmatics not only involves a residue, but is something that allows us to transcend semantics.

4   Situations Where the Burden Is on Pragmatics

I have long been intrigued by the pragmatics of pidgins. Peter Mühlhäusler once gave me – long before publication – a manuscript (a rough copy) containing examples from Tok Pisin – a language spoken in Papua New Guinea. These texts clearly showed a language in which its users struggled to express their thoughts, in spite of the limited semantic resources available to them. The "main function of the plantations in this development was in stabilizing the unstable jargon English varieties known to the different recruits to form a standardized lingua franca" (Mühlhäusler et al. 2003, 5). I was struck by the fact that this population, living in a situation of close contact, had to maximize the otherwise impoverished semantic/syntactic resources by pragmatic *amplification*. Living in a situation where you can only share an impoverished language with your conversational partners, you have to make use of known vocabulary to express concepts for which you have no other words (this is similar to translating from current English into Latin; if some word cannot be translated exactly, you must use existing resources to create a new term that it is comprehensible by your hearers). Consider this example (from Mühlhäusler et al. (2003, 41); all the other examples of Tok Pisin are from the same source):

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[8] Keith Allan (p. c.) is aware of a potential problem here, since I assumed that pragmatics is philogenetically prior; so how does it come that semantics is prior to pragmatics in interpretation? Presumably, I am committed to there being some form of directionality in the interpretation process. Although I exclude that there is a discourse rule to the effect that one should first begin with semantics and then proceed with pragmatic interpretation, I believe that it can be easily assumed that the directionality principle works with indexical expressions and with the majority of lexical expressions that are subject to pragmatic enrichment. Semantics, however incomplete, is required to direct/guide the interpretation process. We need something which interacts with context to produce semantic values, and this cannot clearly be pragmatic, as it needs to be stable enough to produce a principled interaction with contexts. Pragmatic interpretations are not stable as they vary with context.

(2) You save where this man stop?

   Do you know where this man stays?

   I am interested the relationship between 'stay' and 'stop'. A person who stops somewhere is someone who is likely to stay for a while. While staying is a logical consequence of 'stop', it is clearly not equivalent to stopping, as that requires one further semantic element (the transition from movement to rest). So we have a(n inversed) metonymic relationship between 'stopping' and 'staying', which is exploited in pragmatic inference. The interpretation of 'save' is more complicated. Could 'save' be derived from the French 'savez'? (Keith Allan (p.c.) considers this to be a possibility). Or could it be the case that 'knowing' is considered to be a form of 'saving'? (The saving of mental impressions, memories, etc.).

   Consider now the following:

(3) He black fellow boy belong German consul. (p. 41)

   The black boy of the German consul.

   The definite article is expressed through a deictic expression (a pronominal) (which reminds us of the example of clitics in Italian, pronominals which add a definiteness effect to a certain NP (whether objectual or propositional). The preposition 'of' is expressed by 'belong' (a verb) which is capable of expressing a possessive relationship (the consul being the possessor).

   Consider now the following:

(4) Make open that fellow beer (p. 41)

   Open this beer bottle

   This example is interesting because the imperative mood is expressed by the verb 'make' which embeds the verb (which ought to be in the imperative mood). The bottle is referred to as 'fellow' which should be pragmatically interpreted as an object of some kind and, by collocation with 'beer' and having access to an appropriate frame, could be interpreted as 'bottle'.

   The imperative form, however, could be expressed merely by using tone of voice (indicated here by the use of an exclamation mark):

(5) One fellow tamiok he come! (p. 47),

   Bring me an axe!

   Here, the verb 'bring' is expressed through 'come', which clearly expresses movement towards the speaker (Mühlhäusler et al. 2003, 49).

(6) Yu no ken askim dispel askim (p. 15)

   You should not ask him this question.

   The modal 'ken' here is used to mean 'should'. Similar semantic changes are noted by Traugott (2012).

   The development of tense markers in Tok Pisin has attracted scholarly attention. The best known case is the reduction of the time adverbial 'baimbai' (future) to the forms 'bai' and 'ba'.

The past can be merely expressed through the word 'finish', which may well indicate that an action took place (the event came to completion), as in the following:

(7) Me-fellow work finish some-fellow Christmas b'long Rabaul

I have worked for several years in Rabaul.
(Here, we can additionally notice that 'years' is expressed as 'Christmas' (which is roughly the culmination of a year (metonymy)).

(8) Dispela meri I toktok, lukim em I lap

This girl is talking, see how she is laughing
Notice that the name 'Mery' is used to express the concept of 'girl' (metonymy again); the concept of the present continuous tense is obtained iconically by reduplication (toktok).

The plural forms of 'us' and 'you' are obtained by using the corresponding singular pronominals and attaching some materials so that through iconicity the plural is formed (yupela, mipela, pp. 147, 171) (see also Crowley 2008, 87 on reduplication as a way of expressing plurals in pidgins).

If-clauses are expressed by 'suppose' as in:

(9) Kaikai no got, suppose you be English (p.55).

I have no food, if you are English
I believe that a serious study of the texts collected by Mühlhäusler, et al. can highlight to readers the importance of pragmatics in amplifying impoverished semantic resources. Tok Pisin and similar pidgins can shed further light on the important role played by pragmatics in the development of language. Even in languages which appear to be fully developed, like English or Italian, there is room for innovation. Given that new technological discoveries, theories, etc. are likely to change our lives every day, new linguistic resources are needed to express this potential array of (new) meanings. Pragmatics can be seen as a readily available and economical way of amplifying the existing resources.

5   Cancellability of Intentions

The difference between semantic entailments and conversational implicatures/explicatures, according to the standard authorities (e.g. Carston 2002, 2010 and Levinson 2000) is that the former are not cancellable (without contradiction of what is said), while the latter are cancellable (without contradiction of what is said). The debate between Carston and Burton-Roberts has made it clear, among other things, that this dichotomy is not entirely plausible. While it might be plausible to say that potential implicatures (and explicatures) are cancellable, it does not make much sense to say that particularized implicatures are cancellable. Since, in these cases, intentions are fixed through contextual clues, it becomes exceedingly hard (and uneconomical,

according to Jaszczolt 2005) to cancel an implicature (to un-implicate a message). Paradoxically, in arguing against the plausibility of the dichotomy we also find cases of entailments which can be cancelled, as in the case of

(10) I knew that p but p turned out to be false.

In this case, the utterance adopts the meaning 'I believed I knew that p, but p turned out to be false'. These are clearly examples of parasitic or loose uses (Strawson 1952). However, this is just a veneer of cancellability. To observe that entailments are not cancellable (unless readjustments in their meanings occur through the principle of Charity) see the utterance: "Alessandro1 is bald but he1 is not bald". It is self-defeating (hence contradictory) to make such an assertion. Notice that the contradiction is more easily detected when a pronominal is used, because replacement of the pronominal with a proper name may tend to implicate (by an M-implicature à la Huang/Levinson) that the names are disjointed in reference.

What I find particularly interesting in the discussion about the tension between semantics and pragmatics is that explicatures can easily be shown to be uncancellable (implicated messages cannot be un-implicated). I held this position in Capone (2006, 2009 and 2013a) for a number of reasons, both theoretical and empirical. In this chapter, I will take for granted that, in general, explicatures cannot be cancelled (if they can be cancelled, they are either potential explicatures or, otherwise, merely conversational implicatures). So we have pragmatic inferences closely resembling entailments, as entailments cannot be cancelled without contradicting what is said. In some cases, pragmatic implicatures can be cancelled. Suppose I make a long speech about my financial difficulties at Oxford University where I'm studying as a D.Phil. student, and I dwell at length on the university tuition fees, accommodation fees, the cost of food, books, copybooks, etc. Then my sister and my brother-in-law to whom I am speaking might take this long tirade as evidence of the implicated message that I need further financial support. This is clearly a case where I can deny my intention (my having had that intention) because, although a number of clues could be mobilized to construct that intended meaning, there is no definitive or conclusive evidence that this is my communicative intention. Suppose I am the type of person who would never ask for money, which my sister knows full well, (presumably, knowledge of psychological states generally plays a role in non-monotonic inferences of the particularized type, being the background knowledge on which the inferential reasoning is based (see Perconti 2003, 100), then my message – if ever intended – could easily be retracted. One could argue that this is the case of a weak, rather than a strong, implicature and that only strong implicatures cannot be cancelled. It can safely be concluded that the evidence in favour of a communicative intention can either be weak or strong. If it is strong, it becomes hard to cancel the implicature. If it is weak, it becomes easier to cancel the implicature. (see Wilson and Sperber 2012 on implicatures vs. weak implicatures).

Supposing that when I state that implicatures or explicatures are not cancellable, I am solely confining myself to strong implicatures/explicatures (actually my position has to be that explicatures are always cases of strong implicatures needed for

structural reasons). It is clear that these implicatures or explicatures, insofar as they are not cancellable, resemble or **mimic semantic entailments.**[9] It is the nature (of the essence) of entailments that they are not cancellable without contradicting what is said, and if contradiction is *prima facie* plausible as in example (2), we must add that semantics gives way to a pragmatic interpretation that shifts the semantic form of the verb in question (there is a pragmatic slide from 'knows' to 'believes he knows', due to the Principle of Charity). So why does pragmatics need to mimic semantics? We are clearly at places (loci) of the tension between semantics and pragmatics, and pragmatics needs to be semanticised to rescue a certain otherwise ill-formed discourse (one exhibiting contradiction or logical absurdity).[10] Since cancelling the pragmatic inference implies returning to an ill-formed discourse, pragmatics must be semanticised and the inference has the status of an entailment. Since we defined an entailment as an inference that cannot be denied without contradiction of what is said, it is clear that explicatures are similar to entailments in one important aspect (though not in all aspects, as the pragmatic derivation still remains an important feature of them (calculability)).

6   The Slide from Pragmatics to Semantics

In Capone (2000), I studied verbs like 'sapere' (know) and I concluded that these are regularly subjected to a semantic shift. Little by little the value of 'know' becomes corroded because, alongside the legitimate sense of 'know', parasitic meanings (like 'believes he knows') coexist and compete for the same semantic field. It is clear that these parasitic uses (formally barely distinguishable from 'know' (or its translations in other languages)) gradually corrode the meaning of 'know', to the extent that in languages like Italian, 'sapere' (know) seems barely distinguishable from 'believe', with the difference being that in some cases it can be taken to imply true knowledge, while 'believe' seems to standardly implicate that someone does not know for certain that *p*. I would like to divorce the discussion from philosophical considerations. Philosophers (e.g. Hintikka) have conceded that there are parasitic uses of 'know',[11] but have been adamant in claiming that 'know' implies the truth of the known proposition. Linguistics may be different from philosophy to some extent and it is recognized that in some languages the amount (frequency) of loose uses of 'sapere' (under the meaning of 'believes he knows') is

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[9] In this case, I was advised that it might be easier to discuss semanticization of the pragmatic elements. In a sense, I agree and, in a sense, I do not. Traugott (2012) has shown that semanticization may take long periods of time to occur. What I believe is that these loci of the tension between semantics and pragmatics show, or could be taken to show, that semanticization is taking place.

[10] One of many examples that could be supplied is 'You will not die' (from this cut) spoken by a mother to a child. She does not mean 'You will never die', but 'You will not die from this cut'. This example originates from Kent Bach's famous paper on impliciture. See Carston (2002) for similar examples.

[11] This is simply a technical use of the term 'know' and its translation equivalents.

greater than in English. Since, even in these languages the concept 'know' plays some role (which is crucial in philosophical discussions but also in cases of scientific knowledge), we can predict that some constructions might be used by those languages to stabilize the meaning of 'know'.[12] Such constructions in languages like Italian, Spanish, Modern Greek, Serbo-Croat, Portuguese, Polish, Czech, etc. can be represented by pronominal clitics (Lo sapevo che Mario non era stupido! (lit. I it knew that Mario was not stupid!), which have the function of making a knowledge claim stronger than when a pronominal clitic is not used. Elsewhere (in Capone 2013a), I claimed that either modal subordination (to a previous assertion in discourse) or an M-implicature is responsible for the epistemic strengthening of this verb which is undergoing a corrosion process (even in tv programs, news broadcast etc. you can see the corrosion of verbs of knowledge). I will not further justify these positions here, but I will note that the M-implicature in these cases barely appears to be cancellable; so much so that, if it was not for the granting of modal subordination, one could be easily deceived into thinking that the M-implicature is nothing more than a semantic entailment. In any case, I am open to the idea that such an entailment (if posited) can be seen as an evolution of a pragmatic inference due to prolixity. So, in the case of clitics, we can see a semantic change in progress, with some strategies being aimed at stabilizing semantics, and some elements triggering pragmatic inferences which then end up being semanticized. (Of course, the fact that the M-implicatures of pronominal clitics are semanticised supports the idea that clitics emerge to stabilize the meaning of 'sapere' (and similar cognitive verbs such as 'capire', 'sentire', etc.). Obviously, they could not play this role if their inferences could be cancelled. The fact that factivity and presuppositionality intersect is no obstacle to the idea that clitics serve to stabilize meaning, since presuppositionality entails factivity.)

But this appears to be a predictable pattern. In many cases pragmatic inferences are stabilized (or standardized) by becoming default inferences and, then, by being incorporated into semantics. But we must ask ourselves why this extra step is needed. After all, if Occam's Razor (however modified) is accepted, it must play a role in keeping pragmatics and semantics separate, with pragmatics allowing us to obtain certain (additional) semantic readings for free. So why is it that, in due course, a pragmatic inference becomes semantic (often causing semantic ambiguity) contrary to the predictions of Modified Occam's Razor (which tells us to prefer a more parsimonious analysis, one which postulates fewer entities with all else being equal[13])? And now, the answer to this dilemma might be that the circumstances

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[12] Curiously, I found an example of the use of the indefinite article in stabilizing an old meaning of the word 'baiser' (Fr.), whose meaning shifted from 'kiss' to 'fuck' (Horn 2011). So, it would appear that a language has ways of stabilizing meaning in the face of an ongoing language change. Furthermore, such strategies attest to the fact that the change is still ongoing (we are in a phase in which semanticization is not complete). [See also Allan and Burridge 1991, p. 18.]

[13] However, notice that not all linguists take polysemy as being in opposition to linguistic economy:

"Far from being a defect of language, polysemy is an essential condition of its efficiency. If it were not possible to attach several senses to one word, this would mean a crushing burden on our

may change and an analysis which was preferable in certain circumstances will not be preferable in other circumstances.

Suppose, for instance that a language has an acute need for a concept which has become culturally salient or is in the process of becoming culturally salient and, thus, a term/word is required to illustrate this cultural saliency. Then, it is clear that circumstances have changed and that while, beforehand, the concept could be obtained for free through pragmatics, it has now been sedimented in the language and has become part of it and associated with some culturally salient aspect of society which needs to be represented semantically. We can presuppose – without much argument – that all aspects of social life that are culturally salient and important become semanticised, that is, represented through a word in a language. This amounts to admitting that words have a double function; on the one hand, they furnish concepts which are usable during communication or transactions; on the other hand, they are sedimented traces of what is culturally important in a society (this is in agreement with Wong 2010 (and reminiscent of Sapir)). It is clear that the shift from a pragmatic to a semantic inference has a cognitive cost (as a new lexeme has to be included in the language and must be memorized by its users), but the cost is counterbalanced by the cognitive effects – the term works as a flag or as a historical object in a museum: it tells us the story of its language and of its users; their mentality, their culture, and what was deemed important in that culture.

We are well aware that many metaphors (often) become semanticised. The little story above shows us why this should be the case despite the 'prima facie' predictions by Modified Occam's Razor. If one reflects further on semanticization and its implications, these can easily escape the 'everything being equal' part of Modified Occam's Razor (also given the pressure of cognitive effects which are seen as balancing cognitive efforts).

7   On the Sliding from Principles of Language Use to Rules

One thing that has struck me most since the inception of my career in pragmatics and which I would now like, however imperfectly, to explain is that much of the behavior which is predicted by pragmatic principles (avoid ambiguity, choose the least prolix expressions, be as informative as you can, be relevant) was taught to us at school in the form of rules (rules pertaining to the well-formedness of discourse). Italian teachers have interiorized the teachings of rhetoric and have imposed on us what was, *de rigueur*, only what resulted from obeying the principles of language use (These are found in Aristotle and many of his successors in their works on rhetoric/oratory/style (Allan 2010)). I assume that the same must have taken place

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memory: we would have to possess separate terms for every conceivable subject we might want to talk about. Polysemy is an invaluable factor of economy and flexibility in language; what is astonishing is not that the machine occasionally breaks down, but that it breaks down so rarely". (Ullmann 1962: 167–68).

elsewhere, at least in literate societies like Britain. The sliding from principles to rules requires that, at some stage, we study the grammatical facets of the Gricean maxims as part of a study of societal pragmatics, that is, of the pragmatic rules that society imposes on us.[14] It is clear that rules carry greater normative force than principles. You adopt a principle because you are persuaded of its utility, as there are certain advantages in following it which are not derived from the opportunistic following of rules with the aim of being accepted into society. You could see the same maxims now as principles of language use, now as rules – the rules of language games like writing or telling stories. I suggest that we should study these different facets of the same issue separately and armed with different methodology. Societal pragmatics deals with rules of use. Philosophical pragmatics deals with principles of usage. Consider the following example. Springer were publishing my new edited volume, therefore I sent the contributing authors a style sheet. When doing so, I was unaware that it contained two sections, one for social sciences and one for philosophy, etc. As a result, some authors conformed to one style and some to the other. Although the differences were minimal, they were not negligible. One required only the initials of Christian names, the other required full names. One required round parentheses, the other required full stops after both the Christian name and date. As I have said, the differences were minimal, but they prevented me from having a uniform result. Therefore, I wrote again to the authors saying that I felt I had made a mistake in not specifying exactly which style sheet they had to conform to (social sciences or philosophy) and asking them to remedy the problem. Some of them replied that the style sheet actually explicitly said that either full names or abbreviated names could be used. At this point, I thought that the mistake was not mine, but was instead the publisher's which had issued such an unusual style sheet, leading to a lack of uniformity between the bibliographies. And yet, surely it could not be the case that the publisher intended that there was a lack of uniformity between bibliographies in the same book. So, unlike some of my authors, I interpreted the style sheet as intending that editors were free to choose one format or the other, but they had to settle on one.

Now clearly, all this interpretative work could be seen as either descending from principles of language use (or principles of cognition informing communication) or from discourse rules. I prefer to opt for the consideration that, in this case, a normative component was at work and that editors were not allowed to interpret things as they wished, which produced a lack of uniformity between bibliographies. Abiding by the principles of language use allowed one some latitude which, in practice, was not possible, as one could literally interpret the style sheet as saying that the authors could opt for full or abbreviated names. The literal interpretation was not licit because one knows that, in an academic publication, uniformity of bibliographies is a must and a negative review could easily be written by a conscientious reviewer. Thus, the rules of academic discourse prevailed over the literal interpretation of the

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[14] It could be argued that the Gricean maxims are not rules but are directions for best behaviour. I have no argument with this, but there are ambits, for example academic discourse, where they have led to discourse rules.

discourse. And, of course, this reinforced the impression that by presenting different bibliographies under headings such as Social Sciences and Philosophy would lead authors to a multiplicity of behaviours. Principles of language use would have prescribed minimizing ambiguity or obscurity. But in this case – the context of academic writing – I prefer to see this as a matter of obeying discourse rules which prescribe that you should not be obscure when you write. The differences between the two approaches may be minimal – but they ultimately mean that rules of discourse should be investigated in connection with societal pragmatics and language games. Here, we have the language game of writing a collective book and both the editors and the authors must collaborate in this language game by following its rules. Avoiding ambiguity and following the standard of high quality academic publications could be considered to be the rules of this language game.

Before concluding this section, I would like to reflect on one further thing which relates to the general point of the section. We could argue that the maxim prescribing that one should avoid repetition works with the same effectiveness in both English and Italian. To some extent, we are willing to concede that violations of 'Be brief' lead to conversational implicatures or improprieties both in English and Italian texts. Again, we could see this as a maxim of language use or the result of applying a cognitive principle to communication (a repetitive verbal contribution clearly implies greater cognitive efforts than contextual effects).

But why is it that in Italian (especially in academic publications) repetition is avoided like the plague, while in English texts it is tolerated to some extent, especially if it serves to avoid ambiguity? It appears that there is a genuine clash between the maxim 'Be brief' and the maxim 'Avoid ambiguity'- and this clash is resolved in English by keeping both maxims, but establishing a hierarchy in certain cases where the need to avoid ambiguity is greater than the need to avoid repetition. In Italian, the preference for good style has won over the preference for maximizing informativeness. After all, given that, with some additional extra effort, contextualization allows one to achieve the correct reading, so one can opt for style. But then it appears that the difference between British and Italian texts mirrors different preferences. For the British, who are more pragmatic, quantity of information wins over style; in Italian, style is more important and clarity is sacrificed, even in view of the fact that contextualization can, with little extra effort, provide clarification on what was intended. Style then wins over quantity of information – and this conforms to cultural clichés which apply to the Italian language as being seen as having a social dimension. If we did not keep in mind this social dimension, we would find it difficult to explain the differences between the preferences in the two languages. So, should we settle on maxims of language use (or cognitive principles governing communication) or on rules of discourse determining language games? I would probably say that a multidimensional approach is needed, as a text is constrained by both the maxims of language use and the rules characterizing language games.

In my doctoral thesis (Capone 1998) I was fascinated by Higginbotham's idea (p.c.) that temporal sequence was the correct interpretation of conjoined sentences (sentences conjoined by 'and') as a result of a rule operating on stories. Of course, a problem was represented by the fact that 'and' is not only used in stories but is

used in speech acts. Perhaps the problem is resolved by considering speech acts as instructions to build possible stories. This is just an idea, but it could work very well. The attractive thing about Higginbotham's idea is that stories, being language games, (with an aim to inform, entertain, distract, etc.), need rules anyway. Thus, the idea that conjunction had a temporal sequence interpretation was in agreement with the general idea that stories have rules (classical beginnings stressing newsworthiness, moral endings, etc.). And of course, we are again faced with the alternative of considering the temporal sequence interpretation as the result of principles of language use or as the result of rules of discourse.[15] While at the time I was confused by this, I am no longer so, because we have seen that in many cases there can be a sliding from pragmatics to semantics. So, while the sliding is usually applied to the meaning of discourse, nothing prevents us from applying it to the rules of discourse – and thus claim that there may be a sliding from pragmatics to semantics. The obsession of Italian teachers with relevance, avoidance of repetition, clarity, etc. seems to support the idea that the sliding from principles of language use to discourse rules is justified in specific areas of discourse where there are advantages to glean from obeying the discourse rules. One of the advantages – is it not obvious? – is that they can be taught.[16] It is not obvious, however, that principles of language use can be taught. It does not make sense to teach them because they are ways of solving coordination problems and, thus, constitute the *a priori* forms of communication which are easily inferable on grounds of rationality or they are part of the cognitive make-up of the human mind – thus, they constitute *a priori* forms of communication which are hardwired in the mind. If principles of language use are hardwired or are easily inferable, it does not make sense to teach them. However, if there is a sliding from principles of language use to discourse rules, it is clear that it makes sense to teach the discourse rules. Furthermore, given that we have allowed the principles of language use and specific discourse rules applying to specific domains (e.g. academic discourse) to coexist side by side, it is possible that teaching discourse rules reinforces the tendency to apply principles of language use or, in the case of principles of language use of a cognitive nature, it helps to apply them properly.[17]

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[15] I found similar ideas – albeit more radical – in a paper by Wayne Davis (2012) in which he also considers the possibility that implicatures or explicatures are of a conventional type. Presumably, the difference between Davis and myself is that I tend to place an emphasis on the conventionalization process and I assume that, to begin with, calculability has to be assumed. I also connect conventionalization with certain domains of discourse – therefore I accept that, in general, conversational implicature analysis is to be accepted.

[16] Consider canons of construction in the legal practice. These could be taken to reflect Gricean Principles (Carston 2013), but only indirectly (thus the fact that there are clashes among canons of construction does not reflect well on the Gricean Principles). Canons of construction need to be learned – and we must also learn the priorities or how to establish priorities on the basis of moral considerations and social policies. This know-how is transferred from one lawyer to another.

[17] It may appear that there is tension between a modular story (one according to which pragmatic uses flow from principles of language use (presumably cognitive predispositions of the human mind)) and a modularization story (Karmiloff-Smith 1992), according to which a module is built up on the basis of experience (and generalizations, of course). This apparent redundancy may be

Is not the parallel coexistence of principles of language use and discourse rules a logical impossibility given that it would introduce unbearable redundancy? This is not a trivial problem. However, we are also capable of differentiating principles of language use from discourse rules. Discourse rules apply to specific domains – thus, the scope of principles of language use is much wider and more general. Second, in the same way as we would not want to say that an inference which becomes semanticised violates Modified Occam's Razor (because this grammaticalization is a flag of the cultural significance of the inference in question), we would not want to say that the parallel system of the principles of language use and discourse use is merely redundant and has no additional cognitive effects. Discourse rules attest that a language game of a specific type is involved – thus, knowing the rules enables the language game to be played. Furthermore, as in the case of the difference in the use of repetition in English and Italian texts, the different language games and their different rules may place greater emphasis on some cultural aspect. So, certain discourse rules flag that a certain language game is part of a certain culture. The correct perspective is not one that regards the grammaticalization of principles of language use as introducing redundancy, but one that introduces a double articulation – at a more abstract level we can see that discourse mechanisms are the outcome of principles of language use. At a more concrete level, discourse rules are needed to flag that a language game is part of more global and culturally-oriented language games. The discourse rules probably signal the embedding of a language game into wider language games.

The discourse rules are an essential part of the praxis of language games and the teaching of such rules is a means of making the praxis available to others (of introducing others to the praxis). You learn a language game by playing it, and the teacher who corrects a paper for her student makes the student participate in a praxis in which playing the language game is essential (see Lo Piparo 2010). Principles alone do not explain the dexterity and expertise with which learners learn a practice. Additional elements are added by the practice, such as attention and the ability to spot certain unwanted characteristics, analytic abilities, etc. Teaching a practice can best be exemplified by the example of the scientist who teaches students how to distinguish various parts of a cell, but to do so he must add the praxis to the linguistic generalizations he is offering. Only after the teacher practises with the students are they capable of distinguishing the different elements. (Or compare this to teaching someone how to distinguish between good and bad mushrooms; practice is essential. You must allow the student to make a mistake and you must correct the mistake several times).

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explained in this way. In the same way in which redundancy is built into the perceptive system to guarantee that it has maximum efficiency, and that if damage to an organ should prevent the perceptual system from working, there is another organ ready to replace it (we have two ears, two eyes, two hands (we suppose hands furnish tactile sensations), etc.), the modular faculty of discourse-construction and the modularized faculty of discourse construction allow human beings to cope with the devastating effects of strokes, which notoriously affect a certain part of the brain and prevents the faculties located there from working properly.

8 On Pragmatics and Culture

In this section, I shall propose that pragmatic principles (to work properly and produce their effects) need to interact with the discourse rules associated with particular languages. In other words, speakers must have a sensitivity to both the general principles of language use and to what is appropriate behaviour within a certain (linguistically bound) community of language users.

I have already highlighted the inextricable connection between pragmatics and culture, one which is not easily noticed if one concentrates solely on pragmatics and philosophy. I am happy to accept Jock Wong's (2010) considerations on the 'triple articulation' of language (a conception which is much indebted to Wierzbicka (2006)) and allow us to rethink the relationship between pragmatics and culture. I have pointed out some ways in which culturally salient concepts play a role in grammaticalization and I have (even if rather timidly) made the hypothesis that the same concept may lead to different inferential (metaphorical) outcomes in different languages, depending on the culture and its constraints.

Now, a significant difference between Wong and myself is that he regards the pragmatic enterprise and the cultural analysis enterprise as proceeding along different (and separate) paths. I have tried to reconcile general principles of language use with the idea that there are norms operating in discourse (some of which are concerned with culture or are affected by culture), which shows that, while principles of language use make the same predictions about use in all languages, different cultures may modulate norms about discourse in slightly different ways. Instead, Wong (2010) believes that the perspective on principles of language use and universal inferences and the cultural approach to pragmatic inference lead to different – presumably contradictory – conclusions.

Wong produces various examples in which a request (in the form of a question) is followed by (elicits) a reply which (by Anglo-American standards) should count as irrelevant. Here is one of his examples from Singapore English:

(11)
A: Do you want me to come to sign something now?
B: Can, can.[18]

Wong, in my opinion, rather hastily comes to the conclusion that Relevance does not feature in Singapore English, simply because the reply would appear to be irrelevant by English standards. Surely, 'Yes' as an answer counts as being more relevant (or should do). However, there are conventions of language use in Singapore English that make 'can can' a perfectly suitable reply, one that indicates willingness to cooperate with the request. Wong writes that, according to a script operating in Singapore English, a speaker is predisposed to conceptualise a 'yes' in terms of 'can', regardless of its relevance (or rather lack of relevance) as seen from an English perspective. It implies that the speaker sees the proposition as a good option and is prepared to go along with it.

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[18] Meaning: It can be like that.

But then, why should this pragmatic move be irrelevant? The fact that it would appear to be irrelevant to English speakers is of no importance to us, because relevance must be seen as a balance between contextual implications and cognitive effects. So, presumably, to make the utterance 'Can can' sufficiently relevant, one must explain why its potential obscurity (compared to a precise reply such as Yes) is offset by potential contextual implications (the possibility that one contemplates the action from the perspective of what can be done rationally and with little effort, rather than from a volitional perspective (I want to do this)). If the contextual implications offset the cognitive efforts, relevance is achieved – and that is all that is needed.

In any case, little extra effort is required to accommodate Wong's important considerations within a more unified picture aimed at integrating universal pragmatics and societal/cultural pragmatics. I have previously suggested that a double scheme is possible: universal pragmatics works in tandem with societal pragmatics, which obviously adds a cultural dimension. Resorting to cultural scripts, like the one proposed by Wong, is certainly important, and helps us understand how the integration of universal pragmatics and societal pragmatics can proceed.

9   Conclusion

I see the tension between semantics and pragmatics in the following way. There are cycles – we can hypothesize that at some primitive stage pragmatics was all that was needed to communicate. In the absence of words, communicative intentions could be expressed through gestures, grunts, shouting, tone of voice, gaze, etc. After words were coined, pragmatics played a pervasive role in boosting the potential of the system, by giving rise to drastic extensions of existing meanings. In the case of explicatures, pragmatics mimics semantics and accepts its truth-conditional (entailment-like) apparatus. Pragmatic inferences can become semanticised. After that, we may have another cycle of pragmatic extension, and Pragmatic Principles slide towards grammaticalization. This is the end of this story, *for the time being*.

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Chapter 5
The Pragmatics of Referential and Attributive Expressions

Abstract In this chapter I deal with the attributive/referential distinction. After reviewing the literature on the issue, I adopt Jaszczolt's view based on default semantics. I relate her view to Sperber & Wilson's Principle of Relevance. I argue in favour of the modularity hypothesis in connection with pragmatic interpretations. I also discuss the issue of modularization à la Karmiloff-Smith in connection with default inferences and, in particular, the referential readings of NPs. I then reply to some considerations by Cummings and use data from the referential/attributive uses of NPs to show that the modularity hypothesis is defensible.

1 Introduction

In this chapter I intend to discuss the issue of pragmatics and modularity of mind through an investigation of the attributive/referential distinction.[1] In particular, I want to reply to Cummings' (2009) recently expressed view that the processes involved in conversational inferences are not modular, in that they have unrestricted access to a knowledge data base and deductive inferences. She believes that general intelligence is responsible for pragmatic increments, whether conversational implicatures or conversational explicatures. In replying to Cummings, I reiterate my views expressed in Capone (2010c) and further produce evidence resulting from the investigation into the pragmatics of the attributive/referential distinction. Intuitively, default referential meanings of definite descriptions seem to be ideal candidates for modular inferential processes, because they are instantaneous, they arise by default, and are relatively encapsulated. I argue that such default interpretations may interact with contextual clues and that, in limited ways, the defaults can be overridden. But

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[1] Bezuidenhout (1997) also considers that the attributive/referential distinction has a bearing on the issue of modularity of mind and pragmatics, even though her conclusions differ from mine.

even in such cases, inferential processes are well encapsulated. Presumably, we need a notion of encapsulation that is particularly well suited and calibrated in view of the special inferential processes that constitute pragmatic interpretations. Encapsulation à la Fodor will not suffice; yet, there are alternatives to Fodor's view of encapsulation that do justice to the idea that pragmatic interpretations are not like scientific theories, which are capable of being revolutionalized an indefinite number of times; instead, they are finite, heavily constrained processes which utilize information that was previously made pertinent (or relevant) through cognitive nets (unlike Cummings, I believe that modular processes throw a net on what information can be processed and utilized; I call this form of modular encapsulation **net-throwing**, adopting a use by Cummings (2009)).

In this chapter, I argue that referential interpretations of NPs (and, in general, default inferences) are the result of modularization. I expatiate on the interaction between Karmiloff-Smith's (1992) theory of modularization and the theory of definite descriptions, and argue that the inferences available through the default semantics archive are nothing but re-descriptions of inferences that were originally available though the Principle of Relevance.

1.1 Keith Donnellan (*1966*): Reference and Definite Descriptions

Donnellan discusses definite descriptions such as:

(1) Smith's murderer is insane

and correctly points out that there can be two uses of definite descriptions: (a) the attributive and (b) the referential use. In the attributive use, (1) can be used to state that whoever is Smith's murderer is insane (the definite description denotes an x, such that x is Smith's murderer and for all y, if y is Smith's murderer, then y = x (Russell's uniqueness condition)); in the referential use, 'Smith's murderer' is used to refer to what the speaker needs to talk about, what he has in mind, a particular referent.

According to Donnellan, the attributive use is 'essential' and, presumably, the referential use is derivative (this is my inference, given Donnellan's use of 'essential' for the attributive use). In both uses, the definite description has a denotative function.

Donnellan takes denotation to be distinct from reference (or denoting from referring). He provides the following example to illustrate the difference:

(2) The republican candidate for president in 1964 will be a conservative.

As this was uttered before the elections, it is very improbable that the speaker had someone in mind and was speaking about Mr Goldwater, or was referring to Mr Goldwater; even if it could be stated that the definite description in (2) denoted Mr Goldwater (since he happened to be the republican candidate for President in 1964).

The attributive/referential distinction is not only observed in assertions, but also in **questions** and **orders**. If one were to ask:

(3) Who is the man drinking a martini?

one could, therefore, ask a question about a particular person who is drinking a martini (Who is that man drinking a martini?) or about whoever is drinking a martini (I know someone is drinking a martini: who is he?).

According to Donnellan, one does not only have a bifurcation between attributive and referential uses, but can also have referential uses coupled with attributive ones. The case discussed by Donnellan is the following. Suppose I am talking about Jones, whom I believe to be Smith's murderer and I say:

(4) Smith's murderer is crazy.

By saying 'Smith's murderer', I intend to refer to Jones; however, I am not using Jones' behaviour in the dock to justify my belief that Smith's murderer is crazy; I simply rely on the belief that whoever murdered Smith must be crazy to justify my assertion. In this case, we have a basic referential plus attributive usage.

Donnellan, in his paper, claims that the attributive/referential distinction serves to highlight some weaknesses in both Russell's and Strawson's views of definite descriptions. According to Donnellan, Russell's views must be complemented by the idea that a definite description does not only have a denotative use, but also a referential one. According to him, Strawson's view is incorrect on two accounts:

(a) He believes that if a definite description fails to refer because nothing fits it, then one cannot have made a true or false assertion (the question of its truth or falsity does not arise);
(b) He believes that a definite expression can have attributive or referential uses in different sentential frames, but he does not allow for the possibility that the same sentence can be (pragmatically) ambiguous. Instead, according to Donnellan, the same sentence containing a definite description can have either an attributive or a referential interpretation (it is pragmatically ambiguous).

Donnellan likens definite descriptions to Proper Names in that, like them, they can have referential uses.

Now, how does Donnellan refute claim (a)? His famous example is the following. Suppose that I say:

(5) The man drinking a martini is intelligent,

even if it turns out that he is drinking water, and NOT a martini, I may have succeeded in identifying the man. I have referred to a particular man, and I have said of that man that he is intelligent. And this claim turns out to be true, NOT false. Although Strawon would say that, in this case, we are not confronted with a false or true statement (the issue of truth or falsehood does not arise, according to him), according to Donnellan, the speaker has said something which counts as true.

Donnellan also discusses Linsky (1971) who makes the following considerations:

Said of a spinster, her husband is kind to her, the speaker may well refer to someone.
    Still the statement is neither true nor false.

Donnellan agrees with Linsky that, in this case, the definite description does not fit the referent, but nevertheless succeeds in referring to it (hence a presupposition of existence is not satisfied), the speaker cannot refer to someone in particular. However, he finds the claim that the statement made, 'Her husband is kind to her' is neither true nor false, to be more controversial. Donnellan claims that, in this case, what the speaker said is true, albeit we are reluctant to agree with the statement that 'Her husband is kind to her' because there is a **convention of use** prescribing that, if someone uses a definite description to speak about a referent, then he should use one that fits the referent. So, the problem we are confronted with in saying that the statement 'Her husband is kind to her' is true, is not a question of content, but a question of form. However, we might acknowledge that the speaker said something true about the intended referent.

The final aspect of Donnellan's discussion worthy of mention is that the uses of definite descriptions have possibly two presuppositions: a general presupposition that someone or other is C (where C is the denotation of the definite description); and a presupposition that someone in particular is C (only in the case of referential use). These presuppositions are added to the common ground, even if the speaker does not really believe them (referential use without the belief that the referent fits the description).

1.2   Searle on the Attributive/Referential Distinction

Searle (1979) discusses Donnellan's attributive/referential distinction at length in the light of his own views about speech acts and referring (or reference) as a speech act. Searle assimilates the cases discussed by Donnellan into his own considerations on speech acts, particularly with regard to indirect speech acts. As for an indirect speech act where he distinguishes between a primary and secondary speech act (or illocutionary force), in the case here of the attributive/referential distinction, he distinguishes between a primary and secondary reference. The primary reference is the act of referring to an entity through some aspect which may not coincide with the aspect explicitly expressed by the definite description. Thus, if by saying, 'Smith's murderer', I am referring to Jones, my statement 'Smith's murderer is insane' is true only in the case where the predication 'insane' correctly applies to the reference. If a definite description expresses some aspect which is different from the one actually used in referring to an entity, then the aspect encoded by the definite description is secondary.

Searle does not admit that there is a genuine pragmatic ambiguity (attributive/referential). According to him, what happens in the attributive use is that the aspect

to which the definite description refers is primary, rather than secondary, whereas in the case of referential use, the aspect under which the reference is established is the primary and not the secondary one (and the linguistic aspect used in the definite description is a secondary aspect). Furthermore, according to Searle, there is no compelling attributive/referential pragmatic ambiguity because, according to him, the attributive uses are also used to refer. Searle discusses at length the example used by Donnellan to demonstrate that attributive uses denote, but do not refer, and that denotation must be distinguished from reference. The case in question is the following:

A speaker who has uttered:

(6) The republican candidate for President in 1964 will be a conservative

did not intend to refer to Mr Goldwater, even if it happened to be the case that the republican candidate for President in 1964 was Mr Goldwater.

Searle deals with this cogent example by stating that, in a sense, it would be true to say that the speaker referred to Mr Goldwater, even if, due to the principles of pragmatics, one does not freely substitute an NP with another in an intensional context. The only reason why we cannot make this substitution is that we are forbidden by communicative principles, rather than semantics. Searle shows that, in some cases, one feels free to make similar substitutions in intensional contexts, but in others one does not, due to features of context and practical interests.

Searle's account of the referential/attributive distinction appears to have several faults. Firstly, he semanticises some facts which, in Donnellan's intentions, were intended to be pragmatic. While Donnellan never explicitly states that the statement is true, lest a definite description does not fit the referent but a reference is nevertheless successfully established, (he simply confines himself to the more modest claim that what the speaker has said is true), Searle writes explicitly about a statement which is true despite the fact that the definite description does not fit the referent (under the secondary aspect), because the definite description satisfies the referent under a primary aspect. One further problem is that he appears to have drawn analogies from his theory of indirect speech acts, and thus seems to have overemphasized the cases in which a definite description does not fit the referent. He appears to have made this case his standard, whilst on the other hand has relegated the case in which a definite description identifies a referent by virtue of its semantics to being 'secondary' (he explicitly writes about a secondary aspect being associated with the linguistic expression (the NP)). In my opinion, the most controversial idea is that attributive uses are also used to refer and there is no distinction between denoting and referring. Searle apparently takes issue with all those who believe that referring means having something in mind, and these number a great many (see Wettstein on having in mind). Furthermore, he extrapolates facts from indirect speech acts to give the impression that, in using a definite description such as 'Smith's murderer', one means something like 'Jones' and has a primary aspect in mind which is, let us say, an inferential augmentation and is part of the statement being made. Thus, when one says 'Smith's murderer', this amounts to saying 'The man over there' and one makes it appear that 'The man over there' is some kind of unarticulated constituent.

(In his paper, Searle discusses a definite expression's expressing a primary aspect on various occasions, giving the impression that the primary aspect is part of the statement being made, a sort of unarticulated constituent).

All things considered, it would appear to me that Searle's discussion about the attributive/referential distinction is not a significant advancement with respect to Donnellan's views, although it certainly points in the direction of inferential theories on the attributive/referential distinction. Crucial to all such pragmatic theories is the fact that there is a distinction between attributive and referential uses, a point which Searle wishes to refute.

1.3   Wettstein (1981) on the Attributive/Referential Distinction

Wettstein also believes that the distinction between attributive and referential uses (of definite) descriptions can be supported. However, he objects to Donnellan's idea that one can support such a distinction with considerations about what happens when the definite description fails to fit the referent. He believes that, while it is clear that in cases of attributive readings a statement is false (alternatively neither true nor false), it is controversial that in the case of referential uses the statement (made) is nevertheless true.

Leaving aside any controversial aspects, Wettstein argues that the case of referential use is supported by considerations about definite descriptions. He argues that Kripke (1977) is incorrect in thinking that the truth-conditions of the referential reading is captured by Russellian semantics, because Russellian semantics cannot account for what is being communicated in context through a definite description. Since Strawson's influential critique, it has been known that the Russellian truth-conditions for definite descriptions are NOT sufficient to account for communicative uses, since the uniqueness condition notoriously fails in most cases of ordinary use. When we say 'The book is on the table' there is nothing in the sentence that can allow us to pick out a unique table. According to Wettstein, defences of Russell, in keeping with elliptical completions of the definite expression, fail because on each use many completions are available and one does not easily know how to choose between them; neither is it clear whether the speaker has a completion in mind (he may simply have a demonstrative reference in mind). Wettstein, thus, believes that in most uses of definite descriptions the speakers' intentions in referring to a certain entity are settled by contextual clues (usually a demonstrative gesture). Wettstein notes that Donnellan's account of the referential uses of definite descriptions is very much consistent with this contextual perspective, in which reference is established demonstratively or, in any case, given the rich clues of the context. Furthermore, Wettstein goes on to argue that even attributive uses, which can be accounted for, apparently, through Russellian truth-conditions, demonstrate problems similar to referential uses, in that very often definite descriptions are incomplete and one must resort to demonstrative reference in order to fully specify the attributive reading (The murderer ➜ Smith's murder).

In summation, Wettstein is able to provide a very cogent and reasonable defence of the attributive/referential distinction.

1.4 Nathan Salmon's Reply

Salmon (1982) takes issue with Wettstein's treatment in that, according to him, Wettstein's approach amounts to a defence of the (semantic) ambiguity thesis. Salmon proposes distinguishing between the speaker's meaning and the sentence meaning. He claims that referential uses are nothing other than cases of utterer meaning and that both the utterer's meaning and sentence meaning should converge and have a common logical form. Salmon reminds us of the fact that it is not uncommon to find cases in which the sentential meaning and the utterer's meaning diverge, even if one predicts that the utterer's meaning is a development of the sentential meaning. In particular, Salmon claims that in both referential and attributive uses, the attributive reading, to be expressed semantically along the lines of Russellian truth-conditions for definite descriptions, is the common denominator.

Now, while Salmon's claims are clearly motivated, it would appear to me that Wettstein's view cannot be the real aim of his attack, simply because, even if Wettstein states that the referential/attributive distinction is of semantic significance, this does not amount 'ipso facto' to embracing a semantic ambiguity view. It is clear that the view that Wettstein defends is an underspecification or underdetermination one in keeping with ideas which have become fully explicit as a result of work conducted by Wilson and Sperber (2002), Levinson (2000), Carston (2002), amongst others. Wettstein's view is simply that, in most cases, definite descriptions do not uniquely identify a referent and, thus, the Russellian uniqueness condition would not be satisfied UNLESS pragmatic intrusion is allowed. The attributive/referential distinction is only of semantic significance in this sense. What this means (or what it should mean) is that no Fregean proposition can be expressed unless pragmatic intrusion is granted at the level of the interpretation of the definite description, which often happens to be referential.

In summation, it should be evident that, to some degree, there should be agreement between Salmon and Wettstein, and Salmon's position at least serves to clarify Wettstein's position with regard to the meaning of the statement "The attributive/referential distinction is of semantic significance".

There is a point expressed in Salmon's paper which is not without theoretical interest. He claims that while Wettstein easily arrives at the conclusion that even attributive readings have (partially) a referential interpretation when a complex NP includes tacit or implicit material, such as a pronoun, to be interpreted by reference to contextual information or a demonstration, this conclusion could be avoided along the following lines:

> The semantic content of a sentence such as 'His murderer is crazy' is some general proposition to the effect that the murderer relevant to a certain situation, as delineated in the context, is crazy. I see no compelling arguments against this position.

A more controversial example, discussed by Salmon, is the following. Consider the utterance:

(7) The murderer is Jones: Jones is the baby-sitter; the murderer and the babysitter are one and the same person.

Salmon considers that if Wettstein's ideas about referential use were accepted, then in the referential interpretation the attributive reading would not be relevant or applicable. But then (7) would have to mean that Jones is Jones. There are also problems with the attributive reading, since with this reading (7) would mean that whoever is the murderer, is whoever is the babysitter. But this cannot be the intended meaning. The problem which Salmon does not recognize is that (7) is actually a strong case for the defence of Wettstein's views. Wettstein's view is essentially that a definite description often requires completion (the completion being provided through contextual clues). What is the intended meaning of 'The murderer and the babysitter are one and the same person'? Obviously, it cannot be 'Jones is Jones' and it cannot mean 'Whoever is the murderer is the babysitter'. However, it can mean 'Whoever happens to be the murderer at t happens to be the babysitter at t'. This is a contingent truth; NOT a necessary truth. This is more than enough evidence to support Wettstein's underdetermination hypothesis.

1.5   Kent Bach and the Attributive/Referential Distinction

Bach (1981) paves the way for the pragmatic treatment of referential interpretations of definite descriptions. He assumes that referential interpretations, as with attributive ones, have a Russellian semantics, but adds that in addition to this basic semantic interpretation, one further layer of interpretation accrues because of the contextual determinations of the speech act. He adopts a similar position to Wettstein and claims that referential uses are akin to demonstrative reference. In uttering a referential use of 'The F', a speaker, according to Bach, will think of the referent under some aspect or mode of presentation which may or may not coincide with 'The F' and will expect the hearer/reader to think of the referent d, which the speaker intends to refer to, regardless of the mode of presentation through which the hearer thinks of the referent. Bach's considerations are a consequence of his distinction between sentence and the speaker's meaning. Bach considers that one should not be surprised if the speaker's meaning substantially (and systematically) diverges from the sentence meaning. His considerations about referential uses of definite descriptions simply mirror his considerations about the pragmatics of indirect speech acts. His considerations about definite descriptions are similar to Wettstein's, as he also believes that Russell's uniqueness condition can be satisfied only if incomplete definite descriptions are somehow completed through contextual clues. Bach does not provide a detailed analysis of the detour from sentential to the speaker's meaning in terms of Gricean pragmatics. I suspect that when he considers this detour, he is expecting that contextual clues will direct the hearer towards the right interpretation

of the definite description as referring to the referent that the speaker intends to refer to. Interestingly, Bach does not accept that having a referent in mind can explain referential uses.

Bach is not the only person to accept a pragmatic view of definite descriptions. Other eminent authors are Neale (1990) and Soames (1994). In contrast, Recanati (1989) proceeds in the direction of inferential increments called 'primary processes' that contribute to propositional forms. I am unable to discuss their views here due to space limitations, but I will return to Recanati's ideas in the final section.

2   The Semantic Turn: Devitt and His Critic

Devitt (2007) develops an anti-inferential or conventionalist account of referential readings of definite descriptions. Unlike Neale (1990) and Bach (2004), he does not accept that the transition from a quantificational reading to a referential reading is necessary. Instead, he proposes that there is a convention (of use), whereby, by the use of a definite description, the speaker intends to establish a causal/perceptual link to an object. Devitt opposes the particularized implicature view (of referential uses of definite descriptions) on the grounds that, according to him, it has no psychological plausibility, given that the preferred standard reading of definite descriptions is the referential one. He also opposes a standard, generalized implicature view of definite descriptions as he believes that it is simpler to posit a convention for the referential interpretation of definite descriptions. The main reason why he opposes the standard implicature view is that in this case, according to him, the implicature, if there is one, has become frozen or conventionalized. A further reason for opposing the generalized implicature view is that it presumably rests on the assumption that the quantificational reading of the definite description is a route towards the referential interpretation (it should play a role in the calculation of the implicature, even if this role has no psychological plausibility). In addition to this, Devitt argues convincingly that the uniqueness condition can also be obtained through his convention for referential usage. Furthermore, Devitt argues that a crucial problem for the quantificational reading is that the uniqueness implication can only be applied through recourse to contextual clues (see Wettstein). A further problem for inferential views like those of Bach's or Neale's is that they do not make explicit the inferential transition from the quantificational to the referential reading.

In short, Devitt opts for a conventional interpretation of referential use, thus paving the way for a semantic ambiguity that somehow needs to be resolved. But how should it be resolved? It would appear that pragmatics must be somehow involved in resolving this pragmatic ambiguity. A view that promotes the referential reading by default is preferable. Devitt's view goes some way towards a theory of default interpretation of definite descriptions but does NOT go all the way.

Bontly (2005) replies to various points made by Devitt. His counterarguments are quite interesting and can be shared to a large extent. From this discussion, I extrapolate a point which can be used to further advance the main ideas of this chap-

ter. Devitt argues that referential interpretations of definite descriptions are intuitively grasped (by the hearers), without the hearers having access to complex reasoning which takes into account the Cooperative Principle and the fact that q is required to show how the uttered sentence P follows the cooperative principle. For Devitt, the fact that the hearer has direct access to a referential interpretation is quite suspect and seems to militate in favour of the idea that there is a convention of use, a regularity of use, where by using a definite description, one is actually making reference to an entity (available in context). Bontly's reply to this argument is that standard implicatures are, in fact, cases where one does not have access to a conscious argument, or to complex reasoning invoking the Cooperative Principle and the fact that q is needed to ensure that P adheres to expectations about the Cooperative Principle. These are, in fact, cases in which one has direct access to the inference because the inference has become routinized, it has become standardized. Habit takes over with the implicature becoming intuitively grasped and the inferential process is short-circuited by weight of the precedent. Bontly states "Crucially …the default interpretation remains a conversational implicature; the interpretative habit stems from one's having calculated such implicatures in the past …" (p. 8). This is an idea which turns out to be quite useful. Now, as a critique of Devitt, Bontley's paper is quite persuasive, its most evident overall weakness is the lack of a clear and reasonable explanation as to how the conversational implicature is calculated. Bontley's main explanation seems to be that in a context in which it is evident that both the speaker and hearer are aware that the denotation singles out a particular referent, then that referent is what is intended to be talked about and what is to receive predicate attribution. While there is the possibility that the speaker and hearer, who are capable of identifying the referent through a descriptive condition (the one expressed in the definite description), do so in the course of conversation, it is not obvious to me that this is the correct form of explanation for a standard, generalized implicature. We would expect that a generalized implicature is, in general, calculable independently of the rich contextual clues. But in this case, rich contextual clues are relied on, with the difference being that one draws generalizations about what happens, or should happen, in a context in which the speaker and hearer are able to identify the referent through the descriptive condition of the definite description. If I am correct, the generalization appears to be such that, in all contexts in which the speaker and the hearer can proceed from an attributive use to an identification of the referent of the definite description, the description is interpreted as being associated with referential use. But for me, the explanation must be the other way around. If one knows that this use of the definite description is referential, then one can go on to identify the referent, for otherwise, one will not. In fact, even in a context in which the speaker and hearer can easily identify the referent, it is possible or probable that they will not opt for a referential reading, given that the attributive reading is what they have in mind or is more salient. Suppose that I see a corpse and my hearer sees it too, and we both believe that Jones is the murderer because he is our only strange neighbor, nevertheless I could exclaim in a raged tone: 'Smith's murderer is crazy; look at how the body was mutilated" and my tone of voice will advertise my intention to talk about whoever is capable of mutilating

poor Smith's body. (See also Donnellan's case of a mixed referential/attributive usage). Indeed, it is difficult here to choose between a referential and an attributive use, but there are inferential steps which may make the attributive reading more likely (such as a consideration of the modality of the crime, or playing the argumentative role of support in connection with the attributive reading). This could not play the same argumentative role in connection with the referential reading because, as we know Jones to be crazy, we do not need to support this belief about him since it is the most probable belief (by hypothesis).

3 Relevance Theory Approaches to the Attributive/ Referential Distinction

The first author to address the issue of the attributive/referential description within the framework of Relevance Theory was Rouchota (1992). For Rouchota, attributive and referential interpretations form part of the explicature which is developed on the basis of partial and fragmentary linguistic input, with semantic meaning being largely underdetermined. Thus, we have a radical departure from the previous pragmatic approaches which were closely related to Grice's views concerning conversational implicatures. It is true that Grice considered questions of reference and of ambiguity resolution to be part of the proposition expressed, but he relegated other important phenomena which are significant for propositional content to the status of conversational implicatures, things which are implicated beyond the expressed content (or said). Referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions are clearly part of the propositional content of the utterance. However, while Rouchota recognizes that the referential and attributive readings are part of an explicature, it is unclear whether she provides a pragmatic derivation similar to that of conversational implicatures. Instead, she treats definite descriptions as if they were similar to pronominals in referential usage and, like pronominals, capable of being saturated by information derivable through contextual clues. The attributive reading is similarly obtained through rich contextual clues. In short, there are contexts which promote a referential reading or a attributive reading. This is a heavily contextualist view, which does not take into account the possibility of generalized implicatures. While I and several other authors (e.g. Jaszczolt and Devitt) believe that the referential interpretation is standardly preferred, Relevance Theorists do not avail of this insight.

An advantage of this approach is to demonstrate that the length of the definite description may be connected with further implicatures. For example, a speaker who says, "The notoriously moody tennis player displayed his bad temper when he threw his racquet at his opponent's head" may implicate that he disapproves of the intended referent, McEnroe. Or a speaker who says, 'The fat customer is sitting in his usual chair" may well convey sarcasm. Consider now Rouchota's example, 'The man drinking the martini looks miserable'. She considers that the choice of the considerably longer definite expression instead of, for example, a demonstrative,

must have greater cognitive effects, in order to justify the cognitive costs incurred. Thus, an implicature may indicate that the man is drinking a martini because he is miserable. I believe that this is a contorted explanation, although it does have a grain of truth. If a definite description was preferred to a demonstrative, there must be a reason. This may involve politeness, given the precept that one should not point at people, particularly if they are aware that they are being pointed at. It is simply impolite to point at people because it is obvious that one is talking about them, not caring whether others notice that one is drawing attention to them. Another interesting case discussed by Rouchota is 'Napoleon is in bed', where a proper name is used which does not apply to the referent, meaning something like, 'The man who believes he is Napoleon is in bed'. This is an inverted commas interpretation. There are interesting remarks in this paper, one being that there must be strong contextual clues to justify an attributive reading. A man who shows surprise at the manner in which Smith was murdered and mutilated, may well say, 'Smith's murderer is crazy', without having someone in mind, meaning that the predicate applies to whoever is the murderer. Since he does not know who committed the crime, he cannot have someone in mind. Even if he did have a person in mind, strong contextual clues would militate in favour of an attributive reading. Suppose, in fact, that a further contextual effect is to strengthen the proposition that all murderers are crazy. Then such a strengthening would justify the attributive reading.

As I have said, despite Rouchota's interesting remarks, she does not address the important issue of default interpretations.

Bezuidenhout ([1997]) requires the interpretation of definite descriptions to be heavily context-dependent. She explicitly states that while the level of logical form is obtained through (interpretative) processes of a modular nature (operations pertaining to what Chomsky and his followers called the 'language' module), the pragmatic interpretation of definite descriptions is obtained through **non-modular** processes which have access to encyclopedic knowledge and to various types of information derived from the context. She makes it appear that the interpretation of definite descriptions is almost like the saturation process involved in the pragmatic interpretation of pronouns. While there may be differences, Bezuidenhout stresses the analogies. She opts for the underdetermination view of the meaning of definite descriptions and claims that pragmatic information will determine a referential reading in one context and an attributive reading in another. Her semantic view is based on Kempson's view that definite descriptions activate procedural meaning and that the definite article signals a procedure whose final phase is the recovery of a referent which is accessible in context. The underspecified semantics that Bezuidenhout provides for 'Smith's murderer is crazy' is the following:

MDD: Feature G is instantiated uniquely/accessibly by an x, which is F.

Interestingly, Bezuidenhout highlights the fact that cases of apparently referential interpretations can also lead to attributive interpretations, as in

(8) Sign: You are entering the Grand Canyon;
(9) Bill Clinton: The Founding Fathers invested me with the power to appoint supreme Court justices;

(10) Encountering a huge footprint in the sand: He must be a giant.

According to Bezuidenhout 'You' means 'Whoever is entering this place', by using 'me'. Bill Clinton intends to say 'whoever is the president' and 'He' means 'whoever made the footprint'. The reader is reminded that similar cases were demonstrated in Donnellan's paper.

Bezuidenhout's view is based on Relevance Theory because she too believes that meaning is largely underdetermined and that pragmatics serves to make the intended proposition explicit. She also believes that context plays a pervasive role in interpretation, given that the speaker must always make assumptions derived from background information which is relevant to the interpretation process.

What is unclear is to what extent Bezuidenhout's view is different from Neale's quantificational analysis. Neale's view of the semantics of definite descriptions is that the quantificational reading forms the basis of the referential reading. But, it appears to me that MDD is nothing other than a different way of saying that a definite description is assigned a semantic interpretation, that of a quantifier, and also includes a uniqueness condition and procedure pertaining to accessibility. The only differences that I am aware of are that Bezuidenhout adds a procedure pertaining to accessibility and she writes about explicatures rather than implicatures.

Powell (2001) is another interesting article written within the framework of Relevance Theory. Powell discusses the literature on attributive/referential distinction and claims that the issue of whether the attributive and referential interpretations constitute different propositions (having different truth conditions) must be disentangled from the issue of whether a definite description like, 'The murderer', is semantically ambiguous. Furthermore, Powell accurately distinguishes between inferential approaches like the one adopted by Neale (1990) or Kripke (1977), according to which one must distinguish between what is said and what is conversationally implicated, the latter being different from what is said, and those inferential approaches aimed at the notion of explicature, a proposition to which both literal meaning and pragmatic inference contribute. The main difference between Powell and previous theorists is that he relies on the notion of **procedural meaning**, a notion which he derived from Blakemore (2000), in order to account for attributive/referential uses of definite descriptions. According to him, definite descriptions encode procedures for the determination of either a referent or a descriptive content. Like other relevance theorists, Powell assumes that whether a definite description has an attributive or a referential reading must be settled in context. He states that in a context in which the referent satisfying the description is known, then the referential interpretation comes easily without extra processing efforts. It would appear that processing efforts are essential to the calculation of referential interpretations, assuming that the referential interpretation has greater contextual effects in such contexts. For Powell, the derivation of the attributive interpretation seems to require a calculation on the basis of possible alternatives. Given that a directly referential expression could be used, but was not, then the referential interpretation is automatically eliminated and the attributive interpretation is one which has the most contextual effects. This argument, however, is controversial, because even in the case of referential interpretations one could consider alternatives in which a directly

referential interpretation is used and one could, therefore, eliminate the referential interpretation on the grounds that greater processing efforts are involved. But even the argument pertaining to referential interpretation does not persuade me because, even in a context in which a referent could be clearly intended, an attributive interpretation could have greater contextual effects where certain argumentative relationships are established between the utterance and further utterances or implicit assumptions.

4   Jaszczolt on Default Semantics

While Relevance Theorists opt for a heavily contextual theory by taking into account the contexts in which the utterances are made, Jaszczolt (1999, 2005) does justice to the notion that the preferred reading of definite descriptions is a referential one. Her theory of definite descriptions is derived from a more general outlook on the interpretation of NPs, whether they are in normal contexts or embedded in intentional contexts. As Jaszczolt says:

> Although definite descriptions exhibit an ambiguity of use between the referential reading and the attributive one, these two readings are not on a par in processing; the referential reading is more salient than the attributive one. (Jaszczolt 2005, 108)

Jaszczolt discusses the example (11)

(11) The best architect designed this church.

According to Jaszczolt, the referential reading corresponds to the utterance that is accompanied by the mental state with the default, strong, 'undispersed' intentionality. In the case in which the hearer mistakenly believes that Sagrada Familia was designed by, for example, Christopher Wren, the intentionality is dispersed as it reaches the object that was not intended by the speaker; likewise, if the speaker falsely believes that Simon Guggenheim designed the Sagrada Familia, the intentionality is dispersed between the intended person and the object recovered by the hearer.

In general, Jaszczolt thinks that NPs strongly correlate with referential interpretations, as shown by her considerations on belief reports, for which she states that the default interpretation is 'de re': the believer is taken to believe a proposition about a certain referent.

5   Part II

1. **Modularity of mind**

In this chapter, I will not adopt modularity à la Fodor, but the notion of massive modularity (Carruthers 2006), which is, however, connected with Fodor's modular-

ity. The basic idea of modularity is that the brain has a modular organization and that each component of the brain is a module, with each module being related to other modules in the sense that each can take their input from, or provide input to other modules. We should not think of modules as specific regions of the brain, even if a module corresponds to a certain neural structure. Since modules can share parts, particularly if they are placed at interfaces, it would be wrong to locate a module in a certain area of the brain, as this would not do justice to interconnectedness. Modules are dissociable – and this is perhaps their most important characteristic. Dissociability means that if a certain module is damaged (completely or in part), then the remaining modules can still work autonomously, and it is even possible that some other module will try to replicate the processes which are characteristic of the damaged module. So we shall accept the idea of dissociability, but at the same time we shall have to admit that the human brain is also characterized by plasticity and that, even if certain cognitive processes are best implemented in a certain module, one could nevertheless try to replicate these processes in a different one (albeit the degree of specialization will be lost). Consider what happens when, due to a stroke, a person loses her ability to read or write. Some authors have agreed that the reading/writing module is the result of modularization (Carruthers 2006; Karmiloff-Smith 1992), rather than being an innate module, and that repeated practice has served to shape the reading/writing module, which has then been partitioned off from the perception module for object recognition. In other words, the reading/writing module is more specialized than the perception module, and although it may certainly share features with it, it has been partitioned off from the perception module, thereby forming an autonomous module. When the reading/writing module is damaged, then the patient can still make use of other modules and replicate the processes which were previously operative in the reading/writing module. Nevertheless, reading/writing competence will never be totally recuperated, because the processes occurring in these modules can never become highly specialized enough. They are only a shadow of the previous know-how, and never become perfectly suited to the specific task. So now we encounter another reason for positing modularity. Modules proliferate in order to adapt to the world's complexity and to develop processes that are perfectly suited to the cognitive needs of a human being. The reader will not be surprised to hear that we, as humans, are endowed with a double vision system. One system is suitable for identifying objects (and indeed also works for referring), while the other is more specialized for navigational needs (Carruthers 2006; Perconti 2008). We orient ourselves in motion through the latter vision system. The two systems are complementary. One is more suited for object detection, colour detection, the grasping of particulars, etc. The other is less sensitive to detail, but can provide data more quickly and is thus more suitable for navigation, an activity for which colours and small details matter little, and where it is more important to rapidly avoid objects.

The output from modules must be fast, because functional specialization is aimed at providing data very quickly for the various purposes involved in an activity. The output must also be mandatory. In other words, given an input, a module will obligatorily provide an output. This is especially useful in a world in which we,

and other animals, must defend ourselves from predators. We need both fast and obligatory reactions. My parrot, however affectionate, has no control over impulses such as:

Fly when a bigger animal tries to catch you.

Even if I just wanted to stroke my parrot, his modular processes and the hierarchies of their operations will determine its flight, despite the fact that he knows very well that I love him and he loves me, and he devotes most of his time to conveying his affection (singing, extending his right wing to salute me, turning in circles on one leg, dancing with a right-left and left-right movement each time he sees me). Nevertheless, he would fly away from me when I try to catch him, because his brain has been programmed in this manner and there is some modular activity instructing him to fly away when a larger animal approaches, whoever that may be. It is the 'whoever that may be' clause that will prevent him from making exceptions. Flying away from danger is more important than recognizing who the person or animal is, and that is why my parrot has been programmed in this way.

Another characteristic of modular processes is that they are encapsulated and much has been written about encapsulation. Massive modularity theorists have considerably weakened Fodor's encapsulation constraint. Encapsulation does not mean (should NOT mean) that a module has no access to another module, but that it has NO access to the operations of another module. It cannot see what is happening in another module, but it can see the result of modular operations, in the form of input (the input of one module is the output of another module). Modules are interconnected and, thus, take their inputs from, or provide inputs to, other modules. It is instructive to think of modular interconnectedness through the use of the metaphor of enzymatic processes. According to Barrett (2005), modules communicate through a common bulletin board, where the output of a module is made available to become the input for another module. Each time an operation is executed, something is added to the input but, nevertheless, the original input is labeled as having at least the same characteristics as it previously had. This is particularly useful when we are dealing with the relationship between literal meaning and explicatures. We assume that literal meaning receives inferential augmentations but is, nevertheless, available for other parallel inferences (we need to assign referents to pronominals through the perception module and also assign explicatures and implicatures, simultaneously; in order for all these parallel processes to exist, we need processes which will preserve structure, rather than being radically transformed. Every transformation is effected in such a way that structure is preserved).

2. **Encapsulation, default meanings and referential interpretations of NPs**

I have previously stated that the preferred interpretation of definite descriptions is referential. This is clearly the **default** reading. The notion of default reading deserves investigation in terms of the theory of modularity of mind. In fact, a default interpretation would appear to have many of the characteristics of modular processes: it is fast; it is mandatory (unless there are heavy contextual clues militating against a certain interpretation, one cannot but have access to it (for example, the

attributive interpretation of definite descriptions is unlikely to be selected UNLESS there are heavy contextual clues that favour it)); and it is encapsulated, in a sense which I will elaborate on. Encapsulation in pragmatics is of two different types: (1) activation of the inference in a pre-contextual phase; (2) net-throwing on the contextual information available. I will designate these two forms of encapsulation as Encapsulation∗ and Encapsulation∗∗. Basically, Encapsulation∗ means that you will opt for the default interpretation unless there are contextual clues that militate against it. Even if there are contextual clues that militate against it, the presumption in favour of default meanings is so strong that one tends to initially ignore context, only taking it into account when the default interpretation cannot really fit into that context. Encapsulation∗ is a form of isolation of the available information, a recognition that pragmatic interpretation must start with something and that default meanings are the basic building bricks of pragmatic interpretation. One has access to default meanings, in isolation from contextual information. Of course, contextual information is there, before our very eyes, but one pretends that it is not and proceeds in an orderly manner. This is the kind of isolation which a scholar imposes on himself when he chooses to read, for example, only literature that specifically deals with the attributive/referential distinction, leaving aside books on, for example, anaphora, however interesting they may be. Even if one makes connections, one needs encapsulation of some sort, and needs to rank the possible connections: thus, I will arrange the groups of books that I intend to read in a certain order. First, I will read books on the attributive/referential description, then books on reference, then books on anaphora, and finally I will read books on propositional attitudes. Each of these processes of reading a type of book is an **encapsulation process**. One deliberately ignores information which is likely to be relevant but not as relevant as the information that one is now considering.

This account of default readings is fairly compatible with what relevance theorists claim about experimental pragmatics. When a certain default inference is made, it must be made compatible with the context. In other words, a phase of situating the inference in context and of overriding it in case it does not fit it certainly occurs, and we must take this into account.

The inference from definite descriptions to referential readings, I have said, is quite standard. Adopting Jaszczolt (1999, 2005), I accept that there is a strong presumption in favour of referential readings. This is a more general phenomenon of NPs. In fact, Jaszczolt notices that NPs embedded in belief reports (inside the scope of the belief operator) tend to have 'de re', rather that 'de dicto' interpretations. Indeed, there is a connection between 'de re' interpretations and referential interpretations, since what is understood de re must also be understood referentially (although not the other way around).

Now we are at a fork in the road. Should we say that there are cognitive principles of a specialized nature which apply to NPs, which determine the referential interpretation of an NP in a default context? Or should we say that such default interpretations, which are sufficiently real and objective, can be explained by adopting a more general Relevance Theory perspective? If default principles that deal with the referential interpretations of NPs exist, then we must simply expose these

principles. However, if there are general mechanisms of inference, we must explain in what ways the default inferences (and in particular the referential readings) are obtained.

I have previously stated that RT approaches to definite descriptions were quite 'ad hoc' and did not explain the general case, although they could perhaps explain how inferences are operative in particular contexts. Thus, we need a general treatment of definite descriptions which will produce a default interpretation which is referential.

I assume that this is the way things stand. The human mind is geared towards maximizing contextual effects, while minimizing processing efforts. Referential interpretations are standardly more informative, because they serve to eliminate a greater number of states of the world. If an interpretation is referential, we know what the speaker is talking about, and we understand what the speaker predicates of a subject when applied to a particular person. Levinson (2000) and Huang (2000) explain anaphoric processes in a similar way. Pronominals tend to develop co-referential interpretations, since these eliminate a greater number of states of the world. They reduce cognitive uncertainty, if we want to use a more pretentious term. Now, if this explanation is accepted, the assumptions vocalized in Jaszczolt's default semantics could be said to follow from it. These are special cases of a more general case. But then why should we bother with defaults? The same parsimony principle (Modified Occam's Razor) which Jaszczolt invokes many times could be used to claim that we no longer need her more specialized principles (in particular her Default De Re Principle:

The Default De Re principle
The *de re* reading of sentences ascribing beliefs is the Default reading. Other readings constitute degrees of departure from the Default, arranged on the scale of the strength of intentionality of the corresponding mental state).

Now, there are two ways to respond to such a criticism. One could be to claim that the principle whereby an NP is assigned a referential meaning by default was originally derived from more general principles of cognition, but has now become a shortcut for the interpretation of NPs. One could even claim that we need a Reference module and that Jaszczolt's principles are part of that **innate** module.

Of course, this idea is interesting, instantiating the general idea that when the mind needs specialized principles to deal more efficiently with certain types of information, it develops a module that can deal with that type of information.

A more modest idea is that of **modularization**. We posit that modules are archives that store information derivable from routinely implemented pragmatic processes, and transform it into generalizations. Jaszczolt's Default De Re principle could be such a generalization.

Is there evidence that the mind can work in this way? Certainly there is. I previously mentioned the case of modularization in connection with writing/reading systems. The writing/reading systems may originally have been derived from the perception module, but then while these processes became specialized and were dedicated to a specific problem (how to read or write), the specialized information connected with this ability (the know-how) became modularized and a new module

developed. This is not to say that the module dedicated to writing and reading is innate. What is innate is the predisposition to develop such a module, the neural structures which give hospitality to the module and the principles for partitioning an existing module from a module that is being developed thanks to information obtained from the environment. The possibility of connections between the original module and the newly partitioned module must also be innate.

What I am saying is that, by learning how to read and write from the environment (our teachers, our parents, etc.), we store this specialized information in a module that is specialized for receiving and storing this type of information.

Could this also work for referential readings? Is it possible that they become standardized and that, when this happens, a module for reference is generated through modularization by the interaction between innate resources and data obtained from the environment?

I am in favour of the idea that there must be a module for reference which is the result of modularization, and that Jaszczolt's Default De Re principle and the principle relating to referential interpretations of NPs (definite descriptions in particular) must reside in this module. This module is not innately built, but is the result of interaction with the environment.

3.   **Karmiloff-Smith (1992) on modularization: the case of default semantics**

I assume that the issue of default inferences and of definite descriptions is closely linked with Karmiloff-Smith's discussion of modularization.

Karmiloff-Smith substantially alters the picture of modularity à la Fodor. While Fodor believes that there are input systems (e.g. vision) of a modular nature and that provide input to central intelligence, Karmiloff-Smith argues that development is the key to understanding the human mind. She states:

> Fodor takes as demonstrated that modules for spoken language and visual perception are innately specified. By contrast, I wish to draw a distinction between the notion of pre-specified modules and that of a process of modularization (which, I speculate, occurs repeatedly as a *product* of development). Here I differ from Fodor's strict nativist conception. I hypothesize that if the human mind ends up with any modular structure, then, even in the case of language, the mind becomes modularized as development proceeds. My position takes into account the plasticity of early brain development … (1992, 4)

> The modularization thesis allows us to speculate that, although there are maturationally constrained attention biases and domain-specific predispositions that channel the infant's early development, this endowment interacts richly with, and is in return affected by, the environmental input. (1992, 5)

Karmiloff-Smith's theory is a bridge between theories of innatism and theories like that by Piaget, who argues that the mind of the human infant is a 'tabula rasa' and only allows some domain-general processes like assimilation, accommodation and equilibration. Karmilof-Smith hopes to salvage aspects of Piaget's epistemology by arguing that there is far more to cognitive development than the unfolding of a genetically specified program (p. 11) Crucial to Karmilloff-Smith's program is the idea of Representation Re-description which involves a "cyclical process by which information already present in the organism's independently functioning special

purpose representations, is made progressively available, via re-descriptive processes, to other parts of the cognitive system" (p. 18). Conceptual re-descriptions are what allow human minds to make connections between domains of experience which, before the re-descriptive process, were unconnected. Karmiloff-Smith provides the example of the re-description of the concept 'zebra' as 'striped animal' which allows the child to make a connection between the animal 'zebra' and the road sign for a zebra crossing. Re-descriptions are of three types: E1 are not available to conscious access and to verbal report; E2 are only available to conscious access; E3 are available both to conscious access and to verbal report.

Karmiloff-Smith applies her ideas to various domains. However, I propose focusing on her chapter entitled 'The child as a notator' since the ideas contained therein closely connect with what was previously said about the reading/writing module, which appears to be a model for my idea of modularization as I intend to apply it to default inferential processes. Karmiloff-Smith's main idea is that reading/writing and drawing belong to different modules, as they imply different ideas about what should be done. Even small children are able to distinguish between a drawing and an instantiation of writing. Although, the products may not be precisely differentiated, they would, nevertheless, clearly insist that this is a drawing and that is an instance of writing. So they are clear about what the constraints on writing and drawing must be. They know that writing involves sequentiality, directionality and 'spatial frequency or periodicity' (p. 143).

As Karmiloff-Smith states:

> Indeed, preliterate children differentiate between drawing and writing even if their "drawings" are not much more than circular scribbles and their "writing" wiggly horizontal lines. But they are adamant about the distinction: "That's a dog" (a circular scribble unrecognizable to anyone but the budding artist) "and that says "Fido"" (equally unrecognizable, but a horizontal squiggly line). (…) Moreover, video tapes show that preliterate toddlers lift the pen much more frequently when pretending to write than when pretending to draw. The toddler goes about in the process of writing and drawing differently, even if the end products sometimes turn out similar. It is essential to distinguish product and process, because the toddler's notational products may at times appear domain-general to the observer, whereas their intentions and hand movements bear witness to a clear differentiation that they have established between the two systems. (p. 143)

Children who have been asked to distinguish between writing and drawing do not confound drawing with notation as they make clear-cut distinctions between the two notational domains. Drawings are rejected for written language and single elements are accepted for number, but rejected for writing, with linkage between elements being accepted for writing but not for number notation.

Karmiloff-Smith rejects the idea that these constraints are innate, while she accepts the idea that there are such constraints and that they are organized in modules (she furthermore says that the modules for writing/reading and drawing are in different hemispheres). Her reason for rejecting innatism and embracing modularization, in the case of the reading/writing module is that reading/writing, unlike verbal production, are relatively recent in terms of evolutionary time. She states that hundreds of thousands of years of evolution were needed for spoken language to become biologically constrained, but the use of cultural tools for writing dates back

only 5000 or 6000 years. So, it is implausible to invoke an innately specified bias for writing. (p. 147). Karmiloff-Smith argues that they are due to a process of modularization that is the product of learning during childhood.

My necessarily brief treatment of Karmiloff-Smith's ideas on modularization paves the way for my ideas about the modularization of inferential processes. In my previous paper on Default Semantics and the architecture of mind (Capone 2010c) I proposed that a default semantics archive is built to store regularities of inferential results. Jaszczolt's Default De Re Principle and the tendency to interpret definite descriptions as referential expressions may be due specifically to the standardization process which short circuits an inferential process to a cell in a memory system (a default semantics archive) which directly produces the result of the inferential process. We may propose that cells in the default semantics archive do not simply supply the results of inferential processes one by one, but may be organized in principles of a more general nature, such as the following:

For any NP, go to a referential interpretation first.

Such principles are the result of modularization, of learning, even if, obviously, they interact with more general principles of cognition such as Sperber & Wilson's Principle of Relevance, according to which relevance is a positive function of contextual effects and a negative function of processing efforts. I argue that referential interpretations of NPs are default because they obey the Principle of Relevance. In fact, a referential interpretation eliminates a greater number of states of the world, while an attributive interpretation is compatible with a certain number of referents (The President of USA: Clinton, Obama, Kennedy, …). In my view, fully identifying information is to be preferred to descriptive information (only) and, thus, the referential interpretation prevails at least in those cases in which the hearer is interested in specifically knowing who did the thing in question, who acted in such a way.

Furthermore, according to Karmiloff-Smith, modularization, involves re-description and, in particular, re-descriptions of the type E1, E2, E3. In the case of modularization involved in the creation of a default semantics archive, we certainly have the phase of re-descriptions E2, E3, since the default semantics archive allows access to both consciousness and verbal report. Re-description is clearly involved in the modularization process of the referential interpretation of NPs. In fact, before modularization, an NP must be considered as a semantic structure which allows interpretative ambiguities. Instead, after re-description, interpretative ambiguities are eliminated. Something has occurred to change the linguistic knowledge. The NP has been marked as + referential after re-description.

4. **Capone (2010c) on pragmatics and modularity of mind**

Capone (2010c) is a discussion of modularity of mind as applied to pragmatics. Capone accepts that a critical discussion of modularity of mind can improve our understanding of the semantics/pragmatics debate. The main points addressed by Capone are the following: (1) merger representations and enzymatic modular processes; (2) fast and frugal heuristics and satisficing strategies; (3) cancellability and (4) modularity; pragmatics and encapsulation.

Regarding the first point, Capone argues that Jaszczolt's theory of merger representations (Jaszczolt 2005) provides the principles of compositionality for acts of communication. Capone accepts that compositionality is best instantiated at the level of merger representations – representations that combine information derived from different sources (1) semantics; (2) lexical defaults; (3) socio-cultural defaults; encyclopedic knowledge). Capone argues that, since merger representations combine the outputs of both top-down and bottom-up inferential processes, a modular view, according to which modular connections are NOT pipes, must be accepted. Instead, modular connections must be conceived of as being enzymatic processes which take input from a common bulletin board and provide output to this very same bulletin board. Enzymatic processes explain how the outputs of a process can become the inputs for another type of process. Concerning point 2) (satisficing strategies), Capone considers inferential processes (of the unreflective type) to be instances of fast-and-frugal heuristics whose aim is NOT to obtain an optimal result, but only a result that is acceptable. As soon as an acceptable inferential process is instantiated, the search for pragmatic interpretation stops. Relevance Theorists have drawn attention to these inferential processes. These processes interact with our view of modularity because modular processes are also fast, automatic and finite.

Concerning point 3 (Cancellability), Capone argues that one of the main obstacles to a modular view of inferential processes is removed once it is recognized that explicatures are NOT cancellable (a point discussed at length in Capone 2006, 2009; see also Burton-Roberts' splendid 2005 paper). The convergence between Capone's previous work on the lack of cancellability of explicatures and modularity of mind is not mere coincidence. Lack of cancellability supports the view that inferential processes are modular in nature, given that they are not optional, but are mandatory (the cancellability of explicatures threatens the idea that inferential processes are mandatory).

Concerning point 4 (encapsulation), Capone argues that pragmatic processes are unlike theory-formation (whereby a theory is continuously revised). They have access to limited information, which is encapsulated through the Principle of Relevance (see the discussion by Capone on modules on the fly). Capone concentrates on inferences which are automatic and belong to the non-reflective type. More could be said about non-automatic, reflective inferences, about which Cummings (2009) has much to say. We shall now consider Cummings' views in the next section.

5. **Louise Cummings, modularity and pragmatics**

Cummings (2009) discusses the same issues considered by Capone (2010c), but arrives at different conclusions. I assume that the main difference between Cummings' and Capone's ideas is due to a different focus. Cummings uses examples of reflective inferences, in which a speaker embarks on a reflective task which uses explicit arguments and reasoning in order to calculate the intended point of an utterance. Instead, Capone focuses on unreflective inferences of the fast and automatic type, and in which the calculation of the implicature is not available for conscious access. It is not surprising, therefore, that they should arrive at different

conclusions. Yet, intuitively both types of inferential processes are operative in non-logical inference, and thus 'prima facie' both authors say something important. Surely, in discussing implicatures, we must take into account both non-reflective and reflective inferences; yet, it should be clear that unreflective inferences have a privileged status, since they enter into primary pragmatic processes insofar as they contribute to explicatures, to the explicit contents of utterances and thoughts. Considerations about reflective pragmatic processes are surely important, and yet they cannot be used in isolation to prove Cummings' main point: that is, that pragmatic processes are NOT modular.

Cummings discusses two views of modularity: she approves of the former and criticizes the latter. Cummings accepts Kasher's (1991) idea that there is a pragmatic module which processes speech acts and determines the illocutionary force of an act of communication on the basis of presumptions which are usually triggered by the syntactic form of the utterance. There are rough correlations between declarative form and the force of an assertion; between imperative form and the force of an order or command; between an interrogative form and the force of a question. These correlations are standardly used to calculate the force of an utterance, but they can be overridden and, thus, in context, the force of an utterance can be quite different from the presumptions calculated in the pragmatic module. A central system receives input from the pragmatic module and determines the particular illocutionary forces of utterances in context.

This view contrasts with that of Theory of Mind (ToM) theorists, for whom the demarcation of the Theory of Mind module is obtained by certain restrictions on the flow of information between the psychology faculty and other cognitive domains. Segal's (1996) is the most representative voice in the ToM camp:

> In particular there may be a one- or two-way filter to information. In Jerry Fodor's (1983) terminology, intentional modules may be 'informationally encapsulated': some of the information of the subject's mind outside a given module may be unavailable to it…And going the other way, intentional modules may exhibit 'limited accessibility'; some of the information within a module may be unavailable to consciousness…I suggest that if a set of appropriately related psychological states exhibits either informational encapsulation or limited accessibility, then they constitute an intentional module (Segal 1996, 143).

Cummings dismisses this important theoretical step by the following complex reasoning:

> However, for our present purposes, a modular approach to ToM is only interesting to the extent that it can explain certain features of pragmatic interpretations. For example, a ToM module must be able to capture the relative ease with which a listener is able to recover the implicature of an utterance. We will see that these beliefs are not domain specific or established in advance of interpretation, as they would have to be if they were mediated by the processes of a cognitive module. In fact, many of the beliefs that are integral to utterance interpretations are not even beliefs about our interlocutor's mental state (although, of course, many others are). We will also see that beliefs are revised, rejected and reinforced by a whole range of contingencies in the listener's environment and by other beliefs that are stored in memory or that are the product of more general inferential processes (…). It is difficult to see how these various contingencies and other beliefs can even get access to a ToM module, given its informational encapsulation. In the absence of such access, one can-

not begin to imagine how a ToM module can capture the cancellability of implicatures and the defeasibility of presuppositions, for example. (Cummings 2009, 161)

The worthy point that Cummings is making is that a ToM module must integrate different sources of information, some of these pertaining to encyclopedic knowledge, the beliefs of the hearers, and also the logical inferences being made online by the hearers. It is clear that the final result of pragmatic inference must be able to combine different sources of information. The term merger representations devised by Jaszczolt (2005) does justice to this idea that pragmatic inference combines different sources of information. For pragmatic purposes, the main sources of information to be integrated or merged with others are the results of default inferences and the result of genuine pragmatic inference based on rationality principles. But given that a global pragmatic process must incorporate a less global pragmatic process, is it impossible that at some stage of the pragmatic process some form of encapsulation not defined along the lines of Fodor (1981) but along the lines of theorists of massive modularity (Carruthers 2006) can be posited? At some point in her most interesting discussion, Cummings states that it is not the case that one throws a net over the information that is accessible to pragmatic processes. She believes that pragmatic processes are permeable to a whole range of knowledge and deductive inferences. In my consideration, I will use the terms **net-throwing** and **permeability** as key terms in the discussion of genuine pragmatic processes. Net-throwing is important because there must be ways of limiting the information to be considered in calculating a conversational inference. Net-throwing mainly consists of obeying the Principle of Relevance which applies not only to the calculation of inferences, but also to the provision of contextual information to the inferential process. Context does not provide an unrestricted flow of data, but provides a restricted flow of information. The only information that goes through the net is relevant information, which is likely to interact with linguistic data in interesting and fruitful ways, by incrementing them and optimizing their potential meaning. Furthermore, contrary to what Cummings and Kasher accept, the processing of pragmatic inference is UNLIKE theory-formation. In theory formation, theories are developed, challenged, revised, and the process is probably infinite. Instead, utterance processing must occur in real time, and is usually completed by the time the next utterance occurs and the conversation flows in the direction of what is said next. Usually, there is no time to go back and revise interpretations, following the procedure of theory-formation. If theorists use the notion of cancellability to prove their point that pragmatic processes are permeable to different sources of information, one would have to reply that, yes, pragmatic processes are permeable to different sources of information, but are under the constraint that the pragmatic process is finite, fast and circumscribed to the present. Furthermore, while potential implicatures and explicatures are usually cancellable, once intentions are fixed in context it would be amiss to cancel them. This is an idea that I expressed in Capone (2006, 2009, 2010c) (but also see Burton-Roberts's 2005 important work) and supported by Burton-Roberts (personal communication). So, I agree that a pragmatic process is permeable, but it is **instantaneously permeable**, and, thus, it is completely different from theory formation, which occurs without any time constraints. While theory

formation is a collaborative process involving many scientists, utterance interpretation generally involves two speakers (or a limited set of speakers located in space close to one another). So, the main difference between theory formation and utterance interpretation is that the environment of the conversation provides fundamentally crucial (perceptual) input to the pragmatic processes. Such a constraint is obviously not in place in theory formation, where scientists are usually situated in various parts of the worlds, and the setting does not play a crucial role in anchoring utterances in time and place. The inferential process in ordinary conversation is necessarily circumscribed and encapsulated, and the most crucial form of net-throwing that occurs is due to time and place.

What about the constraint that when optimal relevance is achieved, the interpretation process stops? Is this not a form of encapsulation? Cummings, in her discussion of schizophrenia, mentions a notion of praeter-relevance as advanced by important work by Cram and Hedley (2005). A problem which schizophrenic patients experience is that they process utterances without stopping when the first interpretation satisfying the Principle of Relevance is obtained, but they go on making further inferences. If Cummings mentions such a problem, then surely it must be the case that an inferential process is finite and has stopping rules. And this means it is circumscribed, which is surely a limit to permeability. Permeability occurs to some extent, but is not unconstrained. Therefore, I will discuss **circumscribed permeability**, which is still a modular notion.

As I have said, Cummings provides an interesting example of reflective inference, in which a number of pieces of information flow into the interpretation process. The example is shown in the following:

(12) Sam: Do you come here often for a walk?
      Tom: I hold down two jobs, so what do you think? It's not as nice as it used to
           be. Owners are letting their dogs foul the pavements and there is litter
           everywhere. It was local teenagers who vandalized the benches.

Cummings is clearly correct in saying that a number of pieces of information flow into the inferential process, as indeed we need to take into account certain beliefs such as 'People who have two jobs have little leisure time'. There is no doubt that a number of beliefs must be involved. Yet, it is the Principle of Relevance that circumscribes the process and prevents one from resorting to unnecessary beliefs. Furthermore, her example is clearly a case of **reflective inference**, whereas I stated that in order to investigate the issue of modularity it would be best to examine cases of non-reflective, instantaneous inferences.

6. **Further considerations on modularity and definite descriptions**

I propose to use the issue of definite descriptions to throw light on the issue of modularity of mind, given that cases of the referential use of definite descriptions are those of non-reflective, instantaneous and automatic inferences. My view contradicts what Bezuidenhout (1997) states about the non-modularity of the pragmatic processes involved in interpreting definite descriptions. As I have previously said, default inference is, in itself, a case of encapsulation since it requires the inference

to be encapsulated and processed in isolation from contextual information for an infinitesimal period of time. Contextual information flows in during the second stage, when the speaker or hearer needs to assess whether it fits the context, or whether it should be replaced with a more tailored inference. Both default inference triggering and contextual tailoring are processes involving encapsulation. Contextual tailoring involves encapsulation in that the context being considered is circumscribed by the Principle of Relevance. Suppose that you hear:

(13) The President of the United States arrived in Italy today.

If the sentence was uttered in 2010, you would tend to think that it was Obama that had arrived today in Italy. There is a default interpretation pressing to become an actual implicature, and the features of the context are such that they filter this implicature in. In general, the feature PAST Tense reinforces the default interpretation because it is unlikely that the speaker wants to talk about a past event without having an actor for that event (see Higginbotham 2009). And the actor cannot be whoever is the President, but someone in particular. (13) states that there is a president of the USA, which is uniquely identifiable, and Obama, who is the President, arrived in Italy. We could go on to say that, if there is an actor, then the actor fills the denotation of the definite description, and this will give us the referential interpretation by default. But if this is the case, then the case must be extended to the progressive as well:

(14) The President of the USA is flying to Italy today.

Not only does the definite description trigger a referential interpretation by default, but the sentential frame favours this referential interpretation. The sentential frame, by default, can be said to play a role in promoting a default inference. Things are not very different in the future, provided that the time is specified:

(15) The President of the USA will fly to Italy tomorrow.

The hearer is unlikely to interpret the sentence as meaning that whoever is the President of the USA will fly to Italy tomorrow, since 'tomorrow' specifies the time at which the event is located, and if an event is located at a certain time, there must be an actor at that certain time.

Consider now an important example discussed by Powell (2001):

(16) The President of the United States changes every 5 years.

Powell believes that uses of (16) are meta-representational, because we cannot clearly intend a referential interpretation, nor can we intend that whoever is the President of the United States changes every 5 years. According to him, (16 expresses a proposition to the effect that the denotation of the descriptive individual concept corresponding to 'the President of the United States' changes every 5 years. Powell writes:

> This interpretation is accessed, as ever, via considerations of relevance: neither the straight-forward *de re* or descriptive interpretations achieve optimal relevance, since, for both the construction of a context in which the interpretation yields sufficient contextual effects puts

the hearer to too much processing effort. The proposed interpretation, however, yields suf-
ficient contextual effects... (p. 122)

Something along the lines of what Powell proposes must be true. However, it should be clear that the reason why the meta-representational interpretation occurs here is that the sentential frame is different from (14) and (15). We are not confronted with an action which is located at some point in time, but with a generic sentence. Since a generic sentence has generic validity, not limited to a certain period of time, we understand that the sentence cannot talk about a particular president, since it is necessary that presidents will be different at different periods, and the possible interpretation 'Whoever is the President changes every five years' cannot be the right one, because it would, presumably, state that whoever is the President he changes his clothes every 5 years (which is pretty implausible, isn't it?). The meta-representational interpretation goes through because, as Powell says, it yields sufficient contextual effects. Given that we arrive at the explicature in order to avoid implausible literal meanings, it is clear that it is not at all easy to defeat the inference, as intentionality is fixed by the search for plausibility

Now, in the picture that I am proposing, default interpretations are tried first, but if they do not yield sufficient contextual effects, they must be replaced with interpretations that are more tailored to the context. Sentential frames signal, in general, whether default interpretations get through or not.

It may be claimed that certain sentential frames instead promote attributive readings. Consider, in fact, (17)–(19):

(17) John wants to become the President;
(18) John wants to be the President;
(19) John wants to be appointed professor of Linguistics.

Clearly, these are NOT referential uses, but are attributive ones. In (17) John wants to have the attribute 'The President' (and wants the transition from not being the President to being the President); in (18) John wants to have the attribute 'the President', but no mention is made of wanting the transition from not being the President to being the President. Also in (19), John wants to have the attribute 'Professor of Linguistics'.

In none of the above examples (17), (18) or (19) do we have the interpretation 'John wants to become Obama'. The referential interpretation which, as we have seen, usually arises as a default, will be aborted in this case because of the general belief that it is impossible to try and be another person, however hard one may try. Even if I wanted to, I could never be Obama. Would it be reasonable to say that in these cases the default is cancelled? Is it not preferable to say that sentential frames like 'become NP' also have default interpretations, and these are different from the referential interpretations? This issue would clearly not be otiose. However, I cannot resolve it here. Consider now the following cases, the first of which is discussed in Higginbotham (2009):

(20) Heimson believes he is Hume;
(21) Heimson believes he is the President of the USA.

(20) has a 'de se' interpretation and Heimson can believe he is Hume only if he does not believe that he is Heimson (Heimson being different from Hume). It makes sense to utter (20) if we know that Heimson does not think of himself under the mode of presentation 'Heimson' but only under a first-personal mode of presentation (see also Capone 2010a)[2]. If we replace the proper name with a definite description, we obtain a sentence like (21) whose preferred interpretation is not the referential reading, but the attributive one. In other words, we are charitable enough to use a minimal departure from rationality, and, thus, even on the assumption that Heimson is crazy and believes extravagant things about himself, we can assign him the least extravagant belief. Believing oneself to be the President of the United States involves a smaller departure from rationality than believing oneself to be another person (to be Obama, for example). Thus, in interpreting sentences like (21), by default, we adopt the minimal possible departure from rationality and we prefer one of two interpretations, if it is the least extravagant thing to believe. This **charitable** interpretation will be preferred over the least charitable one. We may assume that more charitable interpretations get through by default. So, in interpreting (21), we initially try the referential interpretation, but then by default opt for the more charitable interpretation. In calculating the explicature we opt for plausibility and this is why we are reluctant to abandon the explicature and to cancel it.

Now, we have seen that there are departures from default interpretations. This means that default interpretations interact with sentential frames or other contextual assumptions. Does this imply that we must abandon the modularity hypothesis? My reply is: in no way! The only thing that the modularity hypothesis compels us to accept is that pragmatic processes are fast, mandatory and encapsulated. In case (21), it is clear that we do not consider different hypotheses and chose one, and then are open to the possibility that the hypothesis is revised. The interpretation process is finite, and for this process only information that is relevant is utilized. In particular, we utilize information to the effect that people who believe they are the President of the United States are more normal than people who believe they are Obama. And why do we utilize this piece of information? We do so because it helps us choose between the referential and attributive interpretation. Given that our interpretative problem is how to choose the referential or attributive interpretation, we bring extra information into the process, only on condition that it helps us resolve our original problem. So the basic constraint to follow in bringing in additional information is the Principle of Relevance which induces us to maximize information and to look for interpretations which maximize contextual effects, with minimal processing effort.

We have seen that definite descriptions usually involve referential interpretations. However, Bezuidenhout (1997) has shown that the question of attributive/referential distinction also arises with pronominals. Bezuidenhout considers cases like the following:

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[2] Even this is the result of pragmatic interpretation, since believing to be one person involves a smaller departure from rationality than believing oneself to be two (different) persons at the same time.

(22) Sign: You are entering the Grand Canyon;
(23) Bill Clinton: The Founding Fathers invested me with the power to appoint supreme Court justices;
(24) Encountering a huge footprint in the sand: He must be a giant.

Bezuidenhout takes (22) to mean that the visitors are entering the Grand Canyon; (23) means that the Founding Fathers invested the American President with the power to appoint supreme Court Justices; and (24) means that whoever left the footprint in the sand must be a giant.

These examples are of great interest because they instantiate cases in which a pronominal, despite the fact that it has a referential interpretation by default, is assigned an attributive interpretation due to contextual assumptions. But this means we must assume that pronominals have referential interpretations by default. In some cases, however, these default interpretations are overridden by contextual information. Since we know that it is not the case that the Founding Fathers invested Clinton with the power to appoint supreme Court Justices, we assume that what is meant (the m-intended point) is that the President, whoever he might be, was given such powers by the Founding Fathers. Cummings leads us to believe that the informational increments due to contextual processing which enter into the interpretation are cancellable. Cancellability, according to Kasher (1991) and to Cummings (2009), attests to the fact that pragmatic inference is a truly global inferential process, like theory-formation. Yet, is it not clear that, when we settle on a reasonable interpretation of (24), the other alternative has to be abandoned and the inference is hard to cancel? So, while inferential augmentations seemed to prove Cummings' point, in fact they prove to be most problematic for the claim that explicatures are cancellable (they also prove to be thorny for Bezuidenhout (1997) who claims that the processes involved in interpreting NPs are not modular). We often resort to explicatures to show that an implausible interpretation is replaced by a plausible one. But it is this need for plausibility that militates against easy cancellation of the inference. And if an inference is not cancellable, then a case can be made for the view that the inferential process responsible for it was modular in nature.

Before ending this chapter, I would like to turn my attention to an example discussed by Allan (2010) in an important paper in which he considers reference as an act of communication. The gist of Allan's view is that reference is an act of communication which exploits contextual clues utilized by hearers to establish the intended referent. Having been immersed in the theory of Pragmemes broached by Mey (2001) and further discussed by Capone (2005), it is not surprising that Allan should compel us to see reference as a process that relies heavily on contextual clues. While discussing Jaszczolt's view that "intentionality cannot be called a process, it is an instantaneous 'firing at', 'targeting' objects, it is not an object of passing from sense to the referent" (Jaszczolt 1999, 112) and that definite descriptions trigger, by default, referential interpretations, Allan considers a counterexample. Consider:

(25) The best architect designed this church.

According to Jaszczolt, in context this sentence means that Antoni Gaudì designed la Sagrada Familia because socio-cultural defaults are immediately activated on hearing the sentence. Instead, according to Allan, the preferred interpretation in this case is the attributive reading, while he concedes that conversational implicatures are responsible for identifying the referent with Antoni Gaudì. According to Allan, the default interpretation is attributive. The speaker means (something like): 'X designed this church, and he is the best architect'. What should we make of Allan's critical position? Does it seriously militate against Jaszczolt's view that NPs are referential by default? And does this view militate against my modular view of pragmatics, according to which pragmatic interpretations are fast, automatic, mandatory and encapsulated, at least in the case of non-reflective inferences? An easy answer to this question would be to say that even fast, mandatory and encapsulated inferences are sensitive to contextual information and can evaporate if there are contextual clues that militate against them. However, this is NOT the point of Allan's objection to Jaszczolt. He claims that in this case the default interpretation is attributive. We should concur with Allan if we recognize that various examples are similar to (25):

(26) The worst murderer killed Jones;
(27) The best butcher sold us the meat for the evening dinner;
(28) The most beautiful actress was chosen for the party;
(29) The singer who had the best voice was asked to sing at my wedding.

The use of superlative constructions points to a use of the definite description which is not referential but argumentative. By default, the utterance is given an argumentative role (support of another statement) and the hearer is driven to search for the argumentative relation which serves as the glue for the utterances under consideration. Is this a case in which a default overrides another default? It is not impossible to argue that different sentential frames are associated with different defaults. Another possibility must be considered. The more material we add to a definite description the more likely it is that it will be interpreted attributively. While we predict referential interpretations for definite descriptions on the assumption that the referential interpretation is more informative, adding descriptive material lends greater weight to the dimension of cognitive efforts and, in order to counterbalance this weight, the attributive interpretation prevails with the understanding that it has a function in determining the argumentative role of the utterance. It seems to me that the considerations triggered by Allan's ideas on definite descriptions lead us to a position that is very different from the one embraced by Recanati (1989). In fact, according to Recanati, referential interpretations require heavy contextual processing, while attributive interpretations do not (and this is line with his view that definite descriptions are unmarked with respect to the feature + referential, while directly referring expressions (e.g. proper names, pronominals, demonstratives) are marked with respect to the feature + referential). In my view, adopting Jaszczolt, Devitt, and also Allan to some extent, definite descriptions associated with certain sentential frames are marked as + referential by default, while other sentential frames are marked as – referential by default, depending on the amount of

processing effort involved by the presence of extra linguistic materials. It is also possible to see things differently, with the issue not being a matter of having different defaults, but of showing that the addition of further descriptive material changes the default. The role played by the Principle of Relevance in triggering the search for argumentative relations seems to attest to the fact that the default interpretation of definite descriptions is determinable through the Principle of Relevance and, thus, the inferential process is encapsulated, as predicted by the modularity hypothesis.

6   Conclusion

It is not unusual to end a chapter by posing further questions which the discussion has raised. Why is it that the human mind is programmed to store and use 'default interpretations'? This relates to the number of simplification principles that the mind uses in order to reduce the complexity of the reality with which it is ordinarily confronted. Default interpretations can be seen as an attempt to model reality in a more simplified way. Contextual augmentations have the potential to calibrate inferences to make them better suited to particular contexts, to add richness to the schematic nature of basic pragmatic inference.

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Chapter 6
Knowing How and the Semantics/ Pragmatics Debate

Abstract In this chapter, I deal with know how vs. know that from a linguistic point of view and I point out a number of pragmatic inferential phenomena. It is of some interest that this is a chapter in which linguistics and philosophy intersect and that a linguistic treatment of inferential behavior has to be provided in an illuminating way for philosophy. I mainly use and develop ideas by Stanley and Williamson (J Philos 2001).

1   Introduction

In this chapter I shall deal with the pragmatics of knowing how utterances. Since 'knowing how' vs. 'knowing that' has received detailed treatment in philosophical literature (see Fantl 2009 for a good review), we cannot but pay attention to what philosophers have said. However, in the main, I want to stress those things that are needed for a theory of communication, rather than for a theory of knowledge. Since a theory of knowledge and a theory of communication intersect at various points, this is not easy to do. For example, one reason why we utter sentences such as, "John knows that p", is to inform the hearer that p. On hearing a sentence like, 'John knows that p', the hearer is entitled to infer that p, provided that he trusts both John and the speaker. Nevertheless, I assume that epistemology and a theory of communication are different projects, with different aims, and it does no harm to reveal my bias towards a theory of communication. In beginning this chapter, my hope is that light will be shone on the pragmatic inferential processes which are involved in understanding apparently simple knowing how utterances.

Indirectly, my inferential approach serves to highlight many problems that have a bearing on the distinction between knowing how and knowing that, and on the possibility of reducing knowing how to knowing that. My inferential approach shows that, despite recalcitrant data leading to the opposing view, the correct interpretation of these data will, in fact, lead to Stanley and Williamson's idea that knowing how is a species of knowing that.

I begin this chapter with a discussion of Stanley and Williamson's (2001) work, according to which 'X knows how to p' must be analysed as 'X knows that there is a way w and that he can p in this way'. I then briefly expatiate on the notion of pragmatic intrusion that will be of assistance in understanding the issue of knowing how. In Sect. 4, I deal with a number of uses of the 'knowing how' construction, and I focus, among other things, on the asymmetry between knowing that and knowing how, as perceived by Snowdon. While one can deduce 'I know that p' from 'X knows that p', it is unclear whether one can deduce 'I know how to p' from 'X knows how to p'. I claim that the asymmetry is not so precise and I give reasons for that. I then move on to a discussion about opacity, which constitutes another reason for the asymmetry between knowing how and knowing that. I argue that opacity characterizes both knowing how and knowing that, and I answer possible objections. In Sect. 6, I discuss an objection to Stanley and Williamson's treatment of Gettier's problem. My analysis is that knowing how can be Gettiered. In Sect. 7, I consider objections by Sgaravatti and Zardini to an assimilation of knowing how to knowing that is based on negativity arguments and closure principles. I argue that these objections are not well-founded and can be dissolved through pragmatic intrusion. In Sect. 8, I consider a famous objection by Rumfitt and claim that it can be dissolved through pragmatic intrusion. In Sect. 9, I consider various inferences in context and also argue in favour of pragmatic intrusion by considering a weak form of contextualism. I also consider interpretative problems with quantifiers and implicit arguments. In Sect. 10, I argue in favour of a unified treatment of knowing how and knowing that, through pragmatic intrusion. I consider two alternative hypotheses. In Sect. 11, I discuss knowing how and modularity of the mind, and claim that modular considerations need not be inimical to a unified treatment of knowing how à la Stanley and Williamson. In Sect. 12, I argue that the considerations by Keith De Rose are also applicable to knowing how, in addition to knowing that. Finally, in Sect. 13, I argue that Igor Douven's considerations on the pragmatics of belief apply both to knowing how and knowing that.

2 Stanley and Williamson on Knowing How

Stanley and Williamson (2001) question Ryle's (1949) considerations on the distinction between knowing how and knowing that, a distinction which has engaged many philosophers of mind and language. In addition to this, they question Ryle's claim that an action of any kind requires a previous act of thinking, to be counted as intelligent. In this chapter, I will not dwell on this second and important issue, but concentrate on whether or not knowing how can be subsumed into knowing that. Stanley and Williamson question Ryle's distinction on the basis of linguistic arguments – a move which has caused Michael Devitt some perplexity (since he claims that metaphysic claims should be settled by metaphysic arguments (Devitt 2011). Yet, it is untrue that Stanley and Williamson simply deal with the linguistics of 'knowing how'; they also deal with the various connected phenomena typical of

propositional attitudes (e.g. Gettier's problem; the opacity problem). It simply turns out that many of the problems encountered in the discussion of the distinction between knowing how and knowing that can be resolved – if not dissolved – through the recognition of pragmatic intrusion. In this chapter, I want to claim that one cannot understand the issue of knowing how independently of the understanding of the phenomenon of pragmatic intrusion.

In principle, I am sympathetic to Stanley and Williamson's (2001) 'linguistic' treatment of knowing how, since, in this case, linguistics and philosophy intersect to a greater extent than in a number of different issues.

To simplify things, Stanley and Williamson take cases of 'knowing how' to be cases of indirect questions (embedded questions) (In a later version of this paper, in press, Stanley cites Higginbotham (1993)). From this perspective, a sentence such as 'Ann knows how to ride the bike' has the same truth-conditions as 'Ann knows that there is a way w, which is a way for Ann to ride the bike'. To be more explicit, this must be interpreted as 'Ann knows that there is a way w such that she can ride the bike in way w'. This proposal admits three kinds of pragmatic intrusion: a) assigning the 'some rather than all' interpretation to the knowing how sentence (Ann knows some way (not all ways) which is a way for her to ride the bike); b) assigning a deontic modal interpretation to the infinitival construction (Ann knows how to ride the bike ➜ Ann knows there is a way w such that she can ride the bike in way w); and c) assignment of a 'de se' interpretation to PRO (Ann knows that w is a way for her to ride the bike; NOT: Ann knows that w is a way for one to ride the bike; I will return to this point at a later stage).

The proposal becomes more complicated when it comes to modes of presentation. In keeping with the considerations about propositional attitudes, given that 'know' is like 'belief' in giving rise to opacity problems, it would be better if one introduced the notion of modes of presentation of the reference. The reference can present itself to the knower in different ways. To account for the cases in which knowing how is equivalent to having a skill, Stanley and Williamson introduce the notion of a practical mode of presentation. (Basically, in addition to being told how to p, you can be shown how to p, by a practical mode of presentation (Look, this is how you must ride a bike!)).

3   Pragmatic Intrusion

Pragmatic theory deals with inferential phenomena that are intentional. On the one hand, a speaker conveys a message by using non-linguistic means (or by combining linguistic means with features of the context that orient interpretations in the correct direction); on the other hand, a hearer is busy trying to retrieve the speaker's intention. Essentially, communication must be seen as a matter of projecting and recovering intentionality through multiple clues, linguistic or otherwise, disseminated by the speaker and available to the hearer. The speaker uses a number of clues to convey her intention, aware that the hearer will use them for recovering that very

intention. While Grice's project confined itself to recovering and studying conversational implicatures (mainly cancellable, reinforceable, non-conventional and calculable inferences), neo-Griceans (e.g. Levinson 2000) and Relevance Theorists (Wilson and Sperber 2002; Carston 1999) recognized that more is at stake than conversational implicatures and that the same processes available for the projection and recovery of conversational implicatures, can be utilized in the recovery of explicatures, inferential contributions (or augmentations) that are said to make an utterance truth-evaluable. Relevance theorists ponder on the issue of the truth-evaluability of sentential meanings, and come to the conclusion that sentential meaning is mainly underdetermined. In other words, were we ONLY to know what a sentence means, we would only know a little of what is being communicated and the sentence would not be truth-evaluable, simply because many other elements of a pragmatic type enter into truth-evaluation. I have written about this in Capone (2006, 2008, 2009a) by exploring the issue of whether the pragmatically obtained elements of explicatures are cancellable or not. My main conclusion is that explicatures are NOT cancellable. This is an assumption that can be utilized for examining knowing how and pragmatic intrusion. I will not dwell on pragmatic intrusion here, because the reader has the opportunity to read about it elsewhere; however, I will produce a number of examples representing cases of pragmatic intrusion. Consider the case in which Mary is asked whether she would like to come for breakfast and she replies, "No, thanks; I have already had breakfast". Clearly, she does not mean that she has had breakfast, say, on the previous day or a week ago; presumably, she means that she has had breakfast on the morning of the invitation. This makes her contribution relevant to the previous invitation. Similarly, if someone asks you whether you have turned the gas off, presumably they are NOT asking you whether you turned the gas off ten days ago, but a few minutes ago, say, before leaving the house. One of the most celebrated cases of pragmatic intrusion is the following one by Carston: 'It is better to meet the love of your life and get married, than get married and meet the love of your life'[1]. Now, clearly settling temporal specifications into utterance interpretation is of importance in the evaluation of the utterance. 'Better' requires that the two propositions being compared are different, but UNLESS we specify (by free enrichment) the temporal specifications inside each sentential fragment, we either create a potentially false sentence or a sentence whose truth-conditions are radically underdetermined and about which one cannot say whether it is true or false. Various authors have written about pragmatic intrusion. There is no space here for a discussion, but see Capone 2006 for a review; also Claudia Bianchi 2001.

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[1] This example is originally Cohen (1971).

4   On the Uses of 'Knowing How'

What does one communicate when one says (1)?

(1) John knows how to fix the bike.

Is it different from what one says through using (2)?

(2) John knows how Napoleon lost at Trafalgar.

Intuitively, one feels that (1) is connected with expertise, as John has the expertise to fix the bike, even if he may not be able to articulate his expertise apart from pointing to his actions "This is the way I do it".

On the contrary, we have a feeling that (2) attributes articulated knowledge to John, which he may be able to articulate through a series of answers.

The question becomes even more complicated, as there are contexts in which the speaker's meaning is ambivalent and points to both expertise and articulated knowledge (Damschen 2009). Consider, in fact, (3)

(3) John is a driving instructor. He knows how to drive.

Unlike an ordinary driver, John not only knows the technique involved in driving cars, but he can also articulate it through answering questions posed by the learners. He must be able to teach learners, not only by pointing to the way he does it (This is how you must do it!), but by giving articulate answers to questions and by explicit teaching.

So, it is clear from the start that we are faced with an ambiguity, even in cases where both readings are possible simultaneously (the two readings not being mutually exclusive). We are faced with a possible **interpretative** ambiguity. Since one of the explicit aims of pragmatic theories is to avoid semantic ambiguities (see Jaszczolt 1999), we opt from the start for an interpretative ambiguity, meaning that we must aim to provide a logical form that, by interacting with contexts, furnishes specific interpretations.

It is very instructive to begin this chapter with an asymmetry, as highlighted by Snowdon (2003), between knowing that and knowing how.

John knows that p ➔ I know that p
NOT: John knows how to p ➔ I know how to p

➔ symbolizes the entailment relation.

Actually, the phenomenon should be described using a greater number of details.

A person who utters 'John knows that p' is committed to knowing that John knows that p. Since that person is aware of the obvious consequences of what she knows, she also knows that p, given the fact that if John knows that p, p is true.

Therefore, Snowdon's inferences integrate both semantic and pragmatic information. Timothy Williamson's (1996) influential work on the assertion of 'X knows that p', we reasonably assume that a speaker who utters 'X knows that p' is committed to having knowledge that X knows that *p*. This knowledge is involved in describing the inferences discussed by Snowdon.

The asymmetry is striking and seems to point in the direction of a split treatment of knowing how and knowing that. However, it is instructive to see that my knowing of *p* from knowing that X knows *p* is the result of communication. Analogously, it is not implausible in a communicative[2] context that one should proceed from

X knows how to do p

to

I know how to do p.

It is sufficient for me to see how X does *p* to realise how I should do *p*. Of course, this is the case for simple tasks but not for complex ones, where learning is a matter of learning dispositions and integrating simple dispositions into complex dispositions. Now, even if it is limited to simple tasks, this inferential schema is useful in resolving epistemological problems of the following type. I am a child. I observe John jump from one big stone to another. I wonder whether I can do it. There is no way of solving the problem unless I adopt the inferential schema:

John knows how to do it;
I am the same size as John and I have the same physical abilities;
If one is the same size as John and has the same abilities, one knows how to do it by
    looking at the way John does it.
:
Therefore, I know how to do it.

Now, it should be borne in mind that this inferential schema works for simple skills, but it does not work for complex ones. However, since complex skills can be reduced to simple skills, one would hope that inferential schema will also work for complex skills.

If this is the case, then the asymmetry highlighted by Snowdon (2003) is not an insuperable obstacle to a unified treatment of knowing how. Nevertheless, it should remind one that differences exist, 'knowing that' giving rise to inferences from 'X knows that p' to 'I know that p' through linguistic communication, and 'knowing how' giving rise to inferences of the type 'X knows how to p' therefore 'I know how to p' not (only) through linguistic communication, but through demonstration (or a mixture of demonstration and linguistic communication).

Most importantly, 'knowing how' can be **communicated**. In these cases, it behaves like 'knowing that'. Knowledge can be transmitted through speech acts if the known proposition is not yet known by a third person and is deemed to be of use to her (say, it has a bearing on a question which is of crucial importance to her,

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[2] Communication may also be of a non-linguistic type.

either because she asked a question or because her behaviour evinced eagerness to know a certain fact). One can say things such as:

(4) John taught me how to ride a bike;
(5) John learned how to ride a bike from Mary;
(6) John told me how to cook lasagna;
(7) John explained to me how to do the exercise;
(8) He taught me how to cook lasagna and I remember it well.

Depending on the scenarios in which these sentences are used, they may implicate that the way one learned, or was taught, was a verbal one. Words like 'teach', 'tell', 'explain' all involve the use of explicit instructions, possibly in combination with being shown They contrast strikingly with 'show', which involves non-verbal ways of teaching. 'Learn' is perhaps neutral, lying somewhere between learning by being taught through verbal instruction and learning by being shown how to do something.

However, there are uses of 'knowing how' that are very different, or appear very different, from 'knowing that':

 (9) John knows what being operated on is like;
(10) John remembers what falling down the stairs is like;
(11) John imagines what falling down the stairs is like;
(12) John tried to explain to me how it hurts to fall down the stairs.

What is known in these cases is an inner experience (an internal point of view) which cannot be communicated, or can only be partially communicated.

There are some uses of 'knowing how' which are odd, probably because knowing how involves explicit instruction, practice, and ability.

(13) ? John found out how to cook lasagna;
(14) ??John guessed how to cook lasagna;
(15) Mary knows in part how to cook lasagna.

If John was shown two cards, each describing a procedure for cooking lasagna, and just tossed a coin to guess which card is correct, he would not be exhibiting knowledge that this is the correct procedure for cooking lasagna. John's method of determining how to cook lasagna is strange and can be interpreted as saying that John found the instructions how to cook lasagna (but he need not know how to cook lasagna, because he is not good at following instructions). (15 is used to support the distinction between knowing how and knowing that. It is claimed that one can have partial knowledge that, but not partial knowledge how. It would appear to me to be the other way around: one cannot have partial knowledge that, but can have partial knowledge how. In fact, consider a worker who is being instructed on how to execute a procedure; as it is late in the day, the rest of the procedure will be taught to him the following day. In this case, he has partial knowledge how, which will be developed into full knowledge how when certain other skills have been integrated.

Since Ryle (1949), it has long been debated whether knowing how involves ability. Surely, if I know how to ride a bike, I can ride a bike. However, the question is

whether this inference is an entailment or an implicature. Implicatures (in particular, potential implicatures) are defeasible, whereas entailments are not (cases in which entailments are defeated are merely cases of loose usage). The philosophical literature is adamant about this. Snowdon argues convincingly that, while in many cases, if one knows how to *p*, one can *p*, this is not always the case. In particular, ability is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for knowing how to p (See also Bengson et al. 2009). The standard examples discussed by Snowdon are cases like the following:

I know how to ride the bike. However, I have just had an accident and I have broken my leg. Thus, it appears that I cannot ride the bike. Nevertheless, I still know how to ride the bike. When I recover, I will ride the bike again without any problems.

Various authors recognize that while ability is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowing how, in many cases when one says:

(16) John knows how to cook spaghetti

it is implied that he can cook spaghetti.
It has been proposed that this is a conversational implicature. Surely this must be the case, given that conversational implicatures are non-monotonic inferences, and may arise standardly (standard implicatures). It is our world knowledge that licenses the 'ability' implicature when one says 'X knows how to p'. We know that, if there are no special impediments, knowing how *ipso facto* creates the ability to do p. In other words, we are empowered to do p by our knowledge on how to p.

5   Opacity

Those who wish to emphasize the contrast between knowing how and knowing that typically invoke two characteristics of knowledge claims: opacity and Gettier's problem (1963). Knowledge claims are typically opaque; in other words, substitutability of identicals (Leibniz's law) does not work inside the scope of a knowledge/belief operator. Suppose that Elizabeth = the Queen of England. Then in a sentence such as (17)

(17) Elizabeth greeted the Polish ambassador

one can replace 'Elizabeth' with 'The Queen of England' without changing the truth conditions of the sentence. However, in a sentence such as (18)

(18) Mary knows that Elizabeth greeted the Polish ambassador

one cannot freely replace 'Elizabeth' with 'The Queen of England' (in the case where Elizabeth = the Queen of England) UNLESS one also knows that Mary is aware that Elizabeth = the Queen of England. In keeping with Nathan Salmon (1990), one tends to interpret opacity pragmatically. Truth-conditionally, the sen-

tence 'Mary knows that Elizabeth greeted the Polish ambassador' is the same as the sentence 'Mary knows that the Queen of England greeted the Polish ambassador', however they differ in the implicated import. Someone who utters (18) somehow commits themselves to accepting that Mary knows Elizabeth through the mode of presentation 'Elizabeth' and NOT through another mode of presentation. Thus, one might not accept that Mary knows Elizabeth under the mode of presentation 'The Queen of England' and, therefore, might not accept statement (19)

(19) Mary knows that the Queen of England greeted the Polish ambassador.

Those who state that knowledge how and knowledge that claims are completely different have the opportunity to deny that opacity applies to knowledge how. Suppose that John regularly attends Karate classes and knows how to perform a move involving three steps; let us also suppose that there is a type of dance, let us call it the Cuckoo dance, which involves these three steps. Then we could describe John, who knows how to practice Karate, as someone who knows how to engage in the Cuckoo dance. Yet, he would hardly be willing to describe himself as someone who can practice the Cuckoo dance. When asked whether he can practice the Cuckoo dance he would answer the question negatively. But why should it matter whether John is willing to accept that he can practice the cuckoo dance? We know that, if we took the time to explain what the cuckoo dance is like to him, he would be able to do it.

There does, therefore, appear to be an asymmetry between knowing that and knowing how. When we come to knowing that, the subject's judgements about what he knows are important. After all, one usually knows that he knows that p (but see Williamson 2002 for the claim that one who knows p need not know that he knows p). If the subject's judgements are important, then one hardly knows that p UNLESS one knows that he knows that p and, if p is presented under a different mode of presentation, the risk there is that the subject will not accept that he knows that p under mode of presentation q, because he has introspective access to his knowledge state and he does not find the proposition q there.

Now, the contrast between knowing how and knowing that, in terms of opacity, seems to depend on two facts: luminosity; and pragmatic intrusion. Concerning luminosity, I am inclined to say, in keeping with Williamson (2002), that not in all cases in which one knows p, one knows that one knows p, albeit normally luminosity is implied. Concerning pragmatic intrusion, we must remember that opacity is heavily dependent on it. There may be pragmatic reasons why pragmatic intrusion occurs to a greater extent in knowing that claims than in knowing how claims. Knowing how claims, in fact, are normally connected with practical problems. Why do I know whether John knows how to p? Presumably, I want to know whether John knows how to p because I need to p. And if I know that John knows how to q, and knowing how to q is equivalent to knowing how to p, then I can use John's know-how for the purpose of resolving my practical problem. On the contrary, knowledge that claims are not connected with practical problems, but with inferential knowledge. Often I need to know that p, because p, together with q, tells me whether n, and I need to know whether n is true in order to do F. (And I can know p if I know

that John knows that p). Opacity is clearly a problem in inferential knowledge, since it is a **limit** to what can be inferred when given a knowledge claim. Surely it would help me to know that Mary knows that the Queen of England will be here today – I would know that there is a likelihood that there will be traffic congestion and I will avoid driving in the city centre. Yet, there is no way to extract this information from knowledge that Mary knows that her friend Elizabeth will be here today.

So, my conclusion is that knowing that and knowing how behave differently with respect to opacity, not because they are inherently different claims, but because they serve different purposes. It is the function of the claims that makes them appear to be different with respect to opacity.

6 Gettier's Problem

Many have found it reasonable to assume that if knowing how is not completely different from knowing that, then it is vulnerable to Gettier's problem. In short, Gettier's problem concerns the fact that a proper knowledge claim must not admit devious types of justification. For instance, the following case does not count as knowledge.

John sees Billy drive a new Mercedes. He concludes that he is the owner of that new Mercedes. Thus, he is able to make the inference that either Billy or Fred bought a new Mercedes. It then emerges that Fred bought a new Mercedes, but Billy did not (he was simply testing Fred's car). Then, by pure chance, it is true that Fred bought a new Mercedes; hence, it is true that either Fred or Billy bought a new Mercedes. John believed that either Fred or Billy had bought a new Mercedes; he was somehow justified in coming to that belief. So, are we able to say that he knew that Fred or Billy bought a new Mercedes? The standard answer has been negative and epistemologists have pondered on the nature of the justification. In short, the justification must be non-devious.

Now, can knowing how claims be Gettiered? Stanley and Williamson (2001) answer this question positively and contrive a case to show that knowing how can be Gettiered. Suppose that John wants to learn how to fly a plane and does so through the use of a flight simulator. Wicked Fred changes the simulator's programs with the intention of disorienting John, thus preventing him from learning how to fly a plane. Yet, despite his evil intentions, by chance the simulator activates the correct programs designed to train a learner how to fly a plane. When he finishes his simulation courses, John is actually able to fly a plane and everyone admires him for his skill. Can we say that he knows how to fly the plane? If he knows how to fly a plane, he only knows it by chance. Surely the success is fortuitous, and even if AFTER he actually proves that he is able to fly a plane and we are willing to grant him know-how, we would be reluctant to allow him to fly it if we became aware how evil Fred had manipulated the simulator. After seeing what Fred has done to the simulator, we would predict that John would be unable to fly the plane, and we would be unwilling to allow him to fly it because we believe that he has not the required know-how.

It has been objected by Poston (2009) that, appearances notwithstanding, John has know-how. He knows how to fly the plane, and that is all that matters when revealing that knowing how cannot be Gettiered. Yet, it would be reasonable to suppose that when John knows how to fly a plane, he knows all the procedures involved with flying a plane and all the ways w in which one can fly it, that w is a way for him to fly the plane. How does he know that w is a way to fly the plane if he has only learned this way following the interference of an evil instructor? If knowing how has to be learned, it must be learned correctly. This case is analogous to knowing that. Suppose that Mary tells me that Fred is in Paris. Fred happens to be in Paris, but Mary is evil enough to tell me a lie. Do I really know whether Fred is in Paris? The justification for my belief is devious, and thus I do not really know. In the same way, when an evil instructor tells (or shows) me that w is a way to fly a plane, hoping that I will make a mistake and, unaware to him, w proves to be an efficient way of flying the plane, then it is only by chance that I am able to fly it, because my justification for believing that w is a way for me to fly the plane is devious.

7   Sgaravatti and Zardini Against the Assimilation of Knowing How to Knowing That

Before moving on to a deeper treatment of knowing how vs. knowing that, I would like to consider some interesting objections by Sgaravatti and Zardini (2008) to the subsumption of knowing how into knowing that. The objections are intelligent and worthy of discussion. The analysis, according to which knowing how is subsumed into knowing that, in keeping with Stanley and Williamson, amounts to more or less the following:

John knows how to ride the bike = def John knows that there is a way w which is a way to ride the bike.

This analysis is still incomplete in that it requires the introduction of a modal element, but this will not alter the essence of our discussion.

Now, Sgaravatti and Zardini argue against Stanley and Williamson on the basis of negativity. Consider (20)

(20) John knows how to square the circle.

Translated through Stanley and Williamson's semantics, this would amount to:

(21) John knows the answer to the question of how he can square the circle

or

(22) John knows that w is an answer to the question of how he can square the circle.

However, Sgaravatti and Zardini argue, John knows that a perfect answer to the question of how to square the circle is, 'In no way!', but nevertheless he cannot square the circle. When the negativity argument is introduced, Stanley and Williamson's treatment faces a serious problem.

However, if I were them, I would not be concerned with the problem of negativity. If one were to answer 'In no way!' to the question of how to square a circle, I assume that Stanley and Williamson's view would be that one has no answer to it.

If you were to ask me to make eight loaves of bread by using just two loaves, or how one can make eight loaves of bread by using just two loaves, I would not be able to provide a satisfactory answer to your question. Knowing how involves providing a *satisfactory* answer to a (practical) question, and not just any answer. If providing any answer to the question of how I can ride a powerful motorbike enables me to ride it, then, I (who cannot ride a powerful motorbike) could qualify as knowing how to ride a powerful motorbike. But it is not any answer that is required, but an answer which allows me to carry out a task. In Sgaravatti and Zardini's case, could we honestly say that the answer 'In no way!' provides a satisfactory answer to the question of how to square the circle? If it does not, then we should not be surprised if one cannot manage to square the circle, even if one is able to provide an answer (and this turns out to be inadequate).

If anything, Sgaravatti and Zardini's contribution clarifies what is or must be intended when one states that w is the answer to a question. Presumably, the notion of Relevance (à la Sperber and Wilson 2004) may be of help. Relevance is defined (by Sperber and Wilson) in terms of contextual effects and processing efforts. There are three ways in which a newly presented piece of information may interact with the context to yield a contextual effect: (i) it may combine with contextual assumptions to yield a contextual implication (that is a logical implication derivable neither from the contextual assumptions nor from the new information alone); (ii) it might strengthen an existing assumption; and (iii) it may contradict and lead to the elimination of an existing assumption.

Now, let us reconsider whether the answer 'In no way!' is relevant to the question, 'How can one square the circle?'. Does this answer create cognitive effects which justify the effort of vocalizing it? Indeed, one thing the answer does is it questions the question and categorizes it as a question that cannot be answered. But then, 'In no way!' is NOT an answer to the question, but is a challenge of the question which more or less amounts to, "Why did you ask me such an absurd question?". Then, if it is not an answer to the question, it is not in conflict with the fact that nobody actually possesses this know-how. I assume Relevance Theory and, in general, theories about communication have a role to play in clarifying this intriguing case, as discussed by Sgaravatti and Zardini. At this point, I want to question whether the situation we have just encountered is a case of **pragmatic intrusion**. Pragmatic intrusions are cases in which a pragmatic inference allows truth-evaluability. If I remember correctly, the cases of pragmatic intrusion discussed by Carston (1999) were those in which, unless pragmatic intrusion was posited, one ended up with a logical form which could lead to contradictory interpretations. Consider one of those examples:

(23) If the King of France died and France became a republic, I would be happy; but if France became a republic and the king of France died, I would be unhappy.

In this sentence there is the potential for contradiction if only truth-conditional elements of meaning, which are deducible from semantics, are considered. However, in context the sentence is NOT contradictory, provided that the correct temporal relations are assigned at the level of the utterance. In Sgaravatti and Zardini's case, we have a potential contradiction:

(24) John knows the answer to the question of how to square the circle: "In no way"; but he does not know how to square the circle.

However, once pragmatic intrusion is considered, and the pragmatics overrides the semantics of 'John knows the answer to the question of how to square the circle: "In no way!"' by yielding the interpretation 'John challenged the question of how to square the circle as being absurd', the contradiction raised by Sgaravatti and Zardini merely disappears. We should not be surprised that this happens because this is in keeping with many cases of pragmatic intrusion.

The case of 'In no way!' being given as a reply to the question of whether one can square a circle is clearly a case of metalinguistic negation. According to Horn (1985, 134), metalinguistic negation is a means by which a previous utterance can be objected to on any grounds. In our case, however, the utterance is an answer to a question, not to a statement, and thus it is a challenge to the (reasonableness) of the question.

Another objection by Sgaravatti and Zardini to the propositional view of knowing how, which I would like to consider, is the following. It is well known that knowledge suffers from failures of the closure principles under logical consequence. In particular, the following principle of closure of knowledge that under known logical consequence fails:

CLP:
If s knows that Po, that P1, that P2,…and s knows that <Po>, <P1>, P2>,… entail <Q>, then s is in a position to know that Q.

An example given by Sgaravatti is the following. Elia is told that if Carla is gorgeous, then her husband will be jealous. Elia does not know that Carla is Carla Bruni. He sees some pictures of Carla Bruni in a magazine and says to himself, "How gorgeous!". Yet, he is not in a position to make the inference that Carla's husband is jealous.

Sgaravatti and Zardini state that this failure of the closure principle is applicable to knowledge that but NOT to knowledge how. They give the following example. Consider (25)

(25) Calum knows how to kill a man,

which is a true statement. On the basis of (25) we can say that the following statement is also true:

(26) Calum knows how to kill Kirima.

Given that the general competence acquired by Calum in relevant murdering methods is sufficient to give him knowledge about how to kill a man in general, it is also sufficient for giving him knowledge about how to kill Kirima in particular.

The authors devise the following principle of the closure of knowledge how under indefinite instantiation:

CPI:
If s knows how to A an F and d is a typical F, then s knows how to Ad/an F.

Some pragmatic questions are neglected in considerations of this argument. What could (25) possibly mean? If it means that there is a man x such that Calum knows how to kill Kirima, then the argument does not work and CPI does not follow. CPI would uncontroversially follow if (25) meant (27):

(27) For all x, x a man: Calum knows how to kill x.

But as Sgaravatti and Zardini claim, this is not what is usually understood by (25). (25) ought to be given (pragmatically) the interpretation (28):

(28) For all x, x a typical man: Calum knows how to kill x.

Now, on the assumption that if one knows how to P, one would have to succeed if one tried to p, CPI amounts to saying that in no case is it possible that, if John is a typical man, Calum would fail to kill him, were he to try. And yet, it is possible that Stanley and Williamson gave John a magic shield and he did not die, even if Calum tried to kill him. So, apparently, there is something wrong with the CPI.

I have one further objection to Sgaravatti and Zardini's claims. Surely, in order for CPI to count as a challenge to the considerations about closure principles which are applicable to knowledge that, there would have to be an entailment from 'a man' to 'Kirima'. But there is no such entailment (this is why the authors resort to considerations of typicality). Thus, it is unclear whether the closure principle for indefinites, as devised by the authors, is in some ways equivalent or similar to the closure principle for knowledge that.

In fact, if the considerations about opacity that I previously discussed are correct, everything militates against having closure principles for knowing how.

8   Rumfitt and 'Savoir + Infinitive'

Rumfitt (2003) proposes a strong objection to Stanley and Williamson. He considers a wide range of languages where 'knowing how' is expressed through a construction of the type 'savoir + infinitive' (e.g. French, Italian, Russian). It appears that there is a difference between

(29) Giovanni sa nuotare

(lit. John knows to swim)

and

(30) ?Giovanni sa come nuotare.

(John knows how to swim).

If it is at all well formed, (30) seems to conform to Stanley and Williamson's semantic elucidation for knowing how (there is a special way w of swimming and Giovanni knows w). (30) is probably appropriate to situations in which one of several ways of swimming is suited to the situation (in that a particular goal is being pursued). One also has the feeling that (30) allows a continuation as in:

(31) John knows how to swim (to impress the examiners).

The material in parentheses is supplied contextually through free enrichment. So summarising, one has the impression that 'sapere nuotare' and 'sapere come nuotare' have different meanings.

Stanley and Williamson can reply to Rumfitt that 'savoir + infinitive' is a 'know how' construction after all, insofar as it is possible to analyse it as having a question word as part of pragmatic intrusion (presumably, free enrichment). But then the question arises as to why there should be such a marked difference between (29) and (30). A possible answer to this question – one which is favourable to Stanley and Williamson – is that there is indeed a contrast between (29) and (30), but that is NOT a matter of semantic entailments, but a matter of explicature. Assuming that (29) and (30) have got the same semantic/syntactic structure, then the more prolix and marked (30) will trigger some explicatures (M-explicatures, according to Horn (2009), Levinson (2000), and Huang (2000)). According to a Relevance Theory perspective, given that the more explicit 'come' (how) would be associated with the same semantic reading, it would be more costly to the hearer to utter one more word; thus, to make this cost bearable, one would have to offset the processing cost with suitable contextual effects. Thus 'come' (how) triggers a conversational inference which is aimed at completing the sentential structure with a purpose clause.

9 Inferences in Context

When one examines cases of knowing how, one may notice a variation between two different cases.

(32) John knows how to drive the car;
(33) John knows how to fix the bike;
(34) John knows how to ride the bike;
(35) John knows how to cook lasagna;
(36) John knows how to persuade the coach to let him play;
(37) John knows how to teach a history lesson;
(38) John knows how to arrive at the office by the shortest route.

All these cases are similar; yet they involve different shades of meaning. In (32) we appear to be confronted with a case of (skill) know-how. However, if the sentence is embedded in a context in which a mother tells her son to ask for John's help in learning to drive the car, it is conversationally implied that her son should ask for verbal instructions. (33) seems to implicate that John also knows how to find the tools needed to fix the bike. (34) appears to express a skill; however, if the sentence is situated in a context in which help is being sought on how to use a professional bike, 'bike' is interpreted here as 'professional bike' and the sentence is promoted from describing a skill to describing competence, articulated through instructions. (35) may range between an interpretation according to which John is being attributed a skill (he knows how to cook lasagna by rote) and an interpretation according to which he is being attributed a source of knowledge (he knows how to cook lasagna; he has a cookery book in the kitchen and resorts to that book when he needs to cook lasagna. In this case, 'knows how' actually implicates that one knows 'where' to find a recipe). (36) implies that John has worked out a strategy as to how to persuade his coach to let him play. (37) may indicate that John has a special method for teaching a history lesson or that he has rehearsed a history lesson and (38) suggests that John is able to calculate the shortest route to his office. In different contexts, 'knowing how' sentences take on different shades of meaning.

There are other types of pragmatic interpretation with knowing how sentences. Consider, for example, scope ambiguities, as in the following:

(39) John knows how to fix a bike;
(40) John knows how to ride a bike;
(41) John knows how to calm down the dog;
(42) John knows how to fix every bike.

In (39) and (40) it is unlikely that the indefinite NP has scope over the verb of propositional attitude. Thus we can exclude the interpretations:

(43) There is a bike: John knows how to fix it.
(44) There is a bike: John knows how to ride it.

The natural interpretations of (39) and (40) would appear to be the following:

(45) If there is a broken bike, John knows how to fix it.
(46) If there is a bike, John knows how to ride it.

In (41), 'the dog' escapes the scope of the verb of propositional attitude and has scope over it. As Jaszczolt (1999) correctly insists, NPs tend to be correlated with 'de re' readings by default. I have argued in Capone (2009a) that this story must be coupled with a RT explanation but I cannot go into this here. (42) has different interpretations. If there is a domain of quantification which is salient, then 'every' will be interpreted as quantifying over elements from that domain (See Stanley 2007). If there is no such domain present, then it will have a genuinely universal quantification reading. HOWEVER, it will not be understood that John knows how to fix every bike (at the same time). What is probably needed is a selection function that selects the variables individually, and NOT cumulatively.

For all x, x a bike, John knows how to fix it (SEL FUNC one by one);
For all x, x a bike, John knows how to fix them (SEL FUNC all at once).

Presumably, bound variables must have formal properties correlating with different selection functions.

World knowledge is what enables the speaker/hearer to have access to the most reasonable or plausible reading. It is implausible that one can fix all bikes at the same time. Thus, this interpretation is NOT selected. The default interpretation is the one that accords with socio-cultural defaults (see Jaszczolt 2005).

There are other problems concerning 'knowing how' interpretations. Let us assume that part of the story of knowing how utterances is that they are interpretable in the following way:

(47) John knows how to ride the bike
(48) John knows that there is a way of riding the bike w and this is a way for him/ one to ride the bike.

The choice between one interpretation and another is not trivial, and obviously depends on the context of the utterance. A certain context of utterance will favour one interpretation over another. However, one gets the impression that the default reading is shown below in (49):

(49) John knows that there is a way of riding the bike w and this is a way for him to ride the bike.

Presumably, the reading which has greater contextual implications (cognitive effects) wins. While in the majority of cases there is coincidence between the way one rides the bike and the way John rides the bike, we are describing the situation from John's perspective and not from anyone else's; thus, it is natural that John has developed a way to ride the bike that accords with his natural inclinations. This is clearer in the following example:

(50) Alessandro knows how to drive the car on an Italian motorway.

Italian motorways are such that when a car enters the motorway from a slip road, you either need to slow down or drive in the left hand lane to avoid an accident. Indeed, this is an idiosyncratic way of driving. But Alessandro has developed his own personalized way of driving. I assume that the natural interpretation of (50) is that Alessandro has his own way of driving in an Italian motorway. This is the interpretation which has richer cognitive effects and conforms to Alessandro's perspective.

One further problem is the interpretation of the deontic modal.

(51) John knows how to fix the bike

Is equivalent to

(52) John knows that there is a way w and that is the way to fix the bike.
(53) Roughly means (54):
(54) John knows that there is a way w and is the way he can fix the bike.

It is a matter of pragmatics that 'can', rather than 'must' is chosen. 'Can' involves a greater degree of freedom than 'must'. One assumes that activities like fixing bikes, etc. are performed according to free will, and not under coercion. Again, it is socio-pragmatic defaults that are at work here.

Another intriguing interpretative problem is whether (55) should have one of the following interpretations.

(55) John knows how to arrive at Trafalgar Square in 5 min.
(56) John knows some way w and w is a way he can reach Trafalgar Square in 5 min;
(57) John knows all the ways w such that he (John) can reach Trafalgar Square through w.

It appears that philosophers prefer interpretation (56). Again socio-cultural defaults are at work here. It is rarely the case that one knows all the ways to do p, and to know how to do p, it is sufficient to know one way of doing p, rather than all possible ways. The most stringent interpretation is thus discarded. One settles on 'some' as a default.

There are other inferences to consider. There are implicit restrictions to knowing how claims. Consider, in fact, the following (from Hawley 2003):

(58) John knows how to drive (American cars);
(59) She knows how to drive (European cars);
(60) She knows how to cook (for an informal dinner);
(61) She knows how to cook (as a chef in a restaurant).

In all these cases, the context of the utterance restricts its truth-conditions. Contextualism can provide an explanation as to why there can be so much variation in the truth-conditional import of the utterance. In all the cases above, there is a restriction on the truth-conditional claim; this restriction is implicit and must be inferred pragmatically. Typical scenarios and situations of use can provide the materials for the pragmatic restrictions. Of course, one might reply (à la Cappelen and Lepore 2005) that one must then allow for an unlimited number of pragmatic increments. (58) could mean:

(62) John knows how to drive in a Sicilian motorway;
(63) John knows how to drive in chaotic traffic;
(64) John knows how to drive among drunk people;
(65) John knows how to drive a scooter.

I agree with Cappelen and Lepore that there can be many (even too many) contextual increments. But this does not make contextualism less appealing, provided that we know how to combine the basic sentential meanings with the contextual variables that lead to possible increments.

10   A Unified Treatment of Knowing How: Pragmatic Intrusion?

It has been claimed that knowing how utterances are characterized by an interpretative ambiguity. They are sometimes understood as describing abilities or skills; they are sometimes taken as describing knowledge of ways one can do p. Surely, there are a number of cases in which 'knowing how' sentences appear to describe skills. The blacksmith has mastered a certain skill. He does not need to be able to articulate his knowledge, since many of the operations he executes are automatic. However John, who knows how to reach Trafalgar Square in 5 min, does not have a skill. He was able to perform a calculation and evaluate the shortest route to Trafalgar Square. He is able to say that w is the way he knows will enable him to arrive at Trafalgar Square in 5 min. He is also able to say why he chose w rather than w'. This is not a skill or an ability, but is real knowledge.

Given this clear bifurcation in the uses of knowing how, one can hypothesize that the different uses are based on a single logical form[3]:

(66) John knows … how to *p*

Which is then pragmatically enriched to

(67) John knows the answer to the question how to *p*;
(68) John knows the technique how to *p*.

This amounts to claiming that (66) is a fragmentary semantic schema that needs to be enriched in context. Certain contexts promote skill interpretations; other contexts promote knowing the answer to the question whether *p* interpretations.

Another solution might be to adopt Stanley and Williamson to a certain degree. At some point Stanley and Williamson claim that the way in which one can *p* is presented to the speaker/hearer through a practical mode of presentation. But this is clearly applicable to skills, but not to know-how that is theoretical. Furthermore, we should distinguish between a practical and an indexical mode of presentation. The indexical mode of presentation is of use in cases like the following:

(69) John showed me how to fix the bike and I learned it.

For this example to work, John, rather than explaining how to do things, showed the hearer how to fix the bike, presumably by saying, "This is the way to do it." This is not only a practical mode of presentation, but also an indexical mode of presentation.

Now, I am in favour of having a unitary logical form such as:

(70) John knows the answer to the question how to fix the bike.

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[3] Brogaard (2009) leads us in this direction, although he is not specific about pragmatic intrusion and what kind of underdetermined logical form is needed.

One can, in fact, enrich this logical form by making use of a practical mode of presentation. Surely, this is more compatible with the situation in which both a practical and a theoretical mode of presentation are involved. Consider again the situation in which one says:

(71) John knows how to drive the car,

implying that, since John is a driving instructor, he has both articulate knowledge he can teach and practical knowledge he can show. In this case, it is unclear given the logical form:

(72) John knows …. how to drive the car

how to arrive at the multiple interpretation (skill and articulate knowledge). Surely (73) is a bit far-fetched:

(73) John knows the answer to the question of how to drive and also the technique of how to drive.

However, (74) is not:

(74) John knows that there is a way w in which he can drive the car.

W can be presented through a practical or theoretical mode of presentation; but there is nothing to prevent the speaker from using and expecting the hearer to infer a double mode of presentation of this way of driving.

Why is (73) far-fetched and implausible? I assume that a reason why (73) is implausible is that it says that John knows two (distinct) things, and this is not in accordance with our understanding of daily use, while (74) can be interpreted as meaning that John knows one thing, which may be presented to him in different ways according to the demands of the context.

11 Knowing How and the Modularity of Mind

Before closing this chapter, I would like to address three different issues which have a theoretical bearing on one's decision as to whether to treat know-how and theoretical knowledge as being distinct or, otherwise, unified. It has been claimed in the literature that knowledge how and knowledge that belong to different modules of the brain. There are studies on dissociations between knowing how and knowledge that. (For a review, see Williams 2008 and also Young 2004; for a detailed treatment of the distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge, see Devitt 2011. An amnesic patient can lose her knowledge that without losing her knowledge how. This is amazing, to say the least. To those who are not persuaded by this, consider what happens when I am on the motorway and, without seeing the car in front of me, I suddenly stop my car. I am amazed. I know that I did not see that car, but I stopped my car nevertheless. It is NOT a miracle occurring or an angel assisting me. We have a dual visual system, one of which is specialized in seeing objects, the

other being specialized in knowledge how. I was not involved in an accident because the visual system specialized in motion orientation was able to orient my motion path and to block it. In other words, I know how to drive my car on the motorway, even if I do not see the car in front of me (because, for example, I am distracted by thinking about something else).

Now, I do not want to delve into this type of argument and then claim that it is incorrect, but I would like to know what it shows. Does it highlight that there is no connection between knowing how and knowing that? Is an expert driver not able to articulate his know-how and put it into writing, for example, by writing a manual on how to drive a car? Analogously, cannot a man who lives by buying shares on the stock exchange articulate his tacit know-how and write a book on how to make investments? Assuming that there are different compartments in the mind for techniques and strategies, for skill know-how and articulated know-how, is it impossible to argue that a certain knowledge that claim (tacit or overt) is associated with a practical mode of presentation that resides in the knowledge how module?

Surely a knowledge how claim could be **minimal**. A person who knows how to drive a car can have minimal knowledge that by knowing that w is a way of answering the question of how to drive the car, while storing the practical mode of presentation with which w is associated in a different module of the brain. Such a minimal knowledge that is not impossible. Stanley and Williamson's claims are not incompatible with current theories on the modularity of mind, since they can allow practical modes of presentation to be stored in a module which is reserved for know-how.

12   Knowing How and Contextualism

Now I will address the problem of epistemic contextualism. Assuming that contextualism à la Keith De Rose (2009) is valid (one can accept it fully or in part), how does the bifurcation between knowing how and knowing that fare in the light of contextualism?

Contextualism in epistemic philosophy is the notion that the same knowledge claim can have different truth conditions in different contexts. The utterance

(75) Mary knows that the bank is open on Saturday

may be true or false depending on the situation of the utterance. In a low stake situation, the claim may be true, while in a high stake situation the claim may be false. Can this be applied to knowing how claims too? Intuitively one would say that contextualism provides the strongest objection to the propositional view of knowing how. (How can skill cases of know-how be sensitive to low and high stake situations?). Yet, in a considered analysis, this is not the case. Consider the situation in which John is asked to open a safe which is fitted with an explosive device and timer. In 5 min the explosive device will explode. In this situation, if we ask whether Mary can open the safe, we may waver, even if we know that she has done so

efficiently in the past. We do not know whether she can do it in 5 min. The bifurcation between high stake and low stake situations and varying truth conditions can be transferred from knowing that to knowing how. And this would appear to support the lack of a rigid division between knowing that and knowing how.

13   Knowing How and Igor Douven's the Pragmatics of Belief

Another test for the assimilation of knowing how to knowing that is Igor Douven's (2010) 'The pragmatics of belief'. Douven proposes that when we store a belief (in the form of an assertion, or a sentence, or a thought), we avoid storing it along with inferential augmentations which may lead us to later remember something which was not the case. This is termed epistemic hygienics. A striking example derived from that paper is the reference to Gettier's problem. Suppose I know that p. Then, even if I can infer 'p or q' from 'p', it would not be appropriate to store 'p or q' in memory if that is going to create trouble at a later stage, thereby leading me to believe something that is false or unjustified. We may remember that it is the shift from 'p' to 'p or q' that creates havoc in Gettier's problem. Keeping 'p or q' in memory when one believes 'p', creates trouble as this may lead to an apparently justifiable belief which happens to be true.

The Principle which will help us avoid many future problems is the following:

Epistemic Hygienics (EH): Do not accept sentences that could mislead your future selves.

Another interesting example, given by Douven, is the following:

(76) Peggy's car is blue;
(77) Peggy's car is bluish.

Now, it is clear that if Peggy's car is blue, it is also bluish (blue being a stronger gradation of bluish). However, if one commits to memory 'Peggy's car is bluish' when one believes that it is blue, one is committing to memory a piece of information which will mislead one's future self. Douven compares memorizing or committing to memory with writing notes (e.g. turn off the gas) which will be of use to our future selves. If memories are like notes, we should avoid writing notes that may mislead our future selves.

Douven's paper is not only of great importance to epistemology, but also to pragmatics. He shows that pragmatics and epistemology are intimately connected. While his story can be interpreted in the light of the more general principles of cognition (a memory that is misleading is obviously a case in which a believed assumption is more costly than beneficial in terms of cognitive effects; positive cognitive effects being those which put me in touch with reality, not those which drive me away from it), I cannot do so in this chapter. I will confine myself to asking the innocent

question as to whether the pragmatics of belief also applies to knowing how (knowing the entailing belief). Here, another critical question arises. Does knowing how involve belief? Well, the treatment of knowledge by Williamson may come to our assistance here. While all, or almost all, philosophers insist that belief is more basic than knowledge, Williamson (2002) insists that knowledge is more basic than belief. The case of knowing how would appear to attest that he is correct. One who is skilled in making a tie knot may have no beliefs about how to make a tie knot. He simply knows a practice. Of course, he must *minimally* believe that there is a way of making a tie knot.

Returning to the pragmatics of belief, it helps to choose an example in which a strategy and not a skill is involved. Consider again the case in (78), which happens to be true:

(78) John knows how to reach Trafalgar Square in 5 min.

Surely then, he knows how to reach Trafalgar Square in 6 min, in 10 min, or in an hour.

Suppose when he is asked the question as to whether he can reach Trafalgar Square in 5 min, John considers the answer, yes he can do it. Then he considers the logical consequences of this. He arrives at the conclusion that he can reach Trafalgar Square in 10 min. He can also reach Trafalgar Square in 100 min. Suppose that, as a result of his logical deductive abilities, he goes on enthusiastically computing the answers to all the least stringent questions. He may then forget the answer with which he started, that which answered the question as to whether he could reach Trafalgar Square in 5 min. Douven's epistemic hygienics will, therefore, prevent John from memorizing all the logical consequences of his answer, which, if pursued endlessly, will distract him from keeping his answer in mind.

Therefore, knowing how obeys Douven's epistemic hygienics. Thus, the case for a dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is made weaker.

14 Conclusion

Devitt (2011) argues that epistemology should be divorced from linguistic considerations as Stanley and Williamson's ideas are mainly based on linguistic considerations, and NOT on metaphysical issues. Now, while there are indeed reasons for Devitt's assertion, this chapter, on the whole, shows that philosophy and pragmalinguistic considerations are deeply entangled. When matters of inference are being discussed, it is also worthwhile considering pragmatic intrusion. There are reasons for believing that almost all questions that pertain to knowing how can be analyzed with reference to pragmatic intrusion – that being a pervasive feature of human communication. Given what Igor Douven states about the pragmatics of belief, we are not surprised that knowledge, as well as belief, is strictly connected with the notion of communication and that many of the arguments that pertain to the sphere of epistemology can also be illuminated by pragmatic intrusion.

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Part II
Indirect Reports and Presuppositions as Pragmatic Phenomena

Chapter 7
Quotation With and Without Quotation Marks

Abstract This chapter presents a purely pragmatic account of quotation and argues that it is able to accommodate all relevant linguistic phenomena. Given that it is more parsimonious to explain the data only by reference to pragmatic principles than to explain them by reference to both pragmatic and semantic principles, as is common in the literature, I conclude that the account of quotation I present is preferrable to the more standard accounts. Alternative theories of quotation are treated in an intellectually honest way.

Keywords Theories of quotation · Pragmatics · Explicatures · Cancellability of explicatures · Modularity of mind · Modularity and pragmatics · Language games

1 Introduction

This chapter presents a purely pragmatic account of quotation and argues that it is able to accommodate all relevant linguistic phenomena.[1] Given that it is more parsimonious to explain the data only by reference to pragmatic principles than to explain them by reference to both pragmatic and semantic principles, as is common in the literature, I conclude that the account of quotation I present is preferrable to the more standard accounts. Alternative theories of quotation are discussed in a critical way.

The chapter is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, I address, in a general way, the problems which a pragmatic theory of quotation must tackle: the asymmetry between written and oral language; the possibility of quoting a sentence originally uttered in a different language; the fact that in oral language nothing can be demonstrated through a demonstrative pronominal; the fact that we can master the practice of quotation in languages other than our own; and also the fact that we can learn the

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[1] I assume that this chapter, which is an exercise in radical pragmatics, draws much from Recanati's ideas and pushes them to extreme limits.

quotation practice without formal instruction (we do not find a manual about how we go about quoting other people).

In Sect. 3, I discuss the standard theories of quotation (including some old ones like the demonstrative theory) and after a discussion of the disadvantages of these theories, I focus on Recanati's theory, which opens the way to a radical pragmatic perspective. I also consider mixed quotation and propose that pragmatic intrusion can easily deal with it. In Sect. 4.1, I connect the discussion of quotation with the discussion of the cancellability of explicatures. Then, in Sect. 4.2, I discuss certain differences between Saka's view and my own, which are dependent on my focus on interpretation problems. Finally, in Sect. 4.3, I deal with camouflaged quotations and I argue that they can be dealt with in terms of pragmatic intrusion.

2   On Quotation

Quotation is an important practice, because it allows one to separate a person's voice from the reporter's voice in a direct or indirect report (where mixed quotation occurs). In fact, in direct quotation we attribute words as well as thoughts to other people. Given that, in quotation, it is most important to separate one's voice from another, we predict that quotation is not merely a semantic phenomenon, given the availability of pragmatic resources that suggest the speaker's differentiation between their own voice and another. Consider a sentence like (1), where English words are ascribed to a non-English speaker:

(1) Galileo said, 'The earth moves!'

Such uses, accepted by Sperber and Wilson (1986, 228) and Recanati (2010, 223), argue in favour of a radical pragmatic view of quotation. In fact, given that the hearer can easily infer that the quoted item was uttered in a language other than English, it is evident that pragmatic resources must be involved in quotation. I should point out from the outset that, although quotation is standardly taken to involve quotation marks, this must be regarded as the result of a focus on written language; in fact, there can be more than one way of signaling quotation, and in spoken language one can use certain devices that distinguish between voices, for example by portraying the different qualities of the voices. This is one of the many available resources capable of indicating that a speaker is quoting an expression, or an utterance, or a portion of an utterance.

In written English, the practice of quotation involves placing a phrase or sentence within quotation marks. However, it is accepted practice that symbols are not used for quotations in logic textbooks (for those cases in which it is clear that one is discussing the forms of words, and not their extension). What happens in spoken language is even more liberal (Washington 1992). It may be that a philosopher, reading aloud a passage from her article, will be at pains to say 'Quote', then the quoted words, then 'Unquote'; and sometimes we signal, through the use of finger dancing, that quotation marks are to be somehow perceived. However, in the remaining cases,

most people fail to use quotation marks in spoken language, since it is clear what the intended meaning is from the context, whether one is talking about words or about a word's extension.

Probably the most troublesome cases for philosophical theories of quotation are quotational devices such as italics. If one assumes that a demonstrative element is present in the sentence, then surely the italicized part cannot count as the demonstrative element (the demonstrative element is perfectly explicit in Davidson's analysis) in, for example, Davidson's analysis of quotation. One reason for objecting to the view that italics can be used as a demonstrative element is that a demonstrative is normally an entity which can be distinguished from the thing being demonstrated; in the case of italics it is not easy to distinguish a demonstrative element, as the words being mentioned and the demonstrative element should be fused together. This is like using a road sign that points to itself, say, by virtue of changing its colour. Why is it that a road sign like this does not exist? It does not exist because we regard the road sign as pointing to something external to it and not to something within itself. This is, presumably, what is behind the idea of demonstrating something. Surely we could use a road sign in this way, by relying on some marked characteristics to point to the fact that the authority who made use of the road sign wanted it to point towards itself; but this would make the road sign difficult to understand, because the road sign is intended to demonstrate something outside itself; once we become used to the demonstrative practice, it would be difficult to modify it by adding peculiarities.

Returning to italics, these can be used to show that an expression is being mentioned (but it is not a way of pointing to the expression). At this point, it may be convenient to distinguish between using a demonstrative and demonstrating (as Reimer 1996 does). While it could be somehow argued that even if the use of italics is a way of demonstrating an object (say, a word), surely it cannot be granted that italics amounts to usage of a demonstrative pronominal, because such a pronominal would have to be external to the object being demonstrated. I take it to be a universally accepted that in language use, a demonstrative can be used to point to anything but itself; of course there may be apparent difficulties with this, such as cases like, "This sentence is blue". Here, the demonstrative refers to itself (as well as to three other words). Things are not so straightforward, though. I can say, "This sentence is blue", by inviting the hearer to look at the way in which the sentence is written (actually a written token of the sentence) and I am inviting the hearer to consider the whole sentence and not just the demonstrative; it happens that the demonstrative is part of the sentence, but it cannot be used to demonstrate itself in isolation from the sentence in which it occurs; this is a clear limitation to the notion that a demonstrative can demonstrate itself. Paolo Leonardi (personal communication) considers that there are more complicated cases like, 'This utterance is false', in which 'this' stands for the entire utterance; or the case in which I am asked to point to an Italian demonstrative and I answer, 'This'. Regarding the second case, I would be happy to consider it as a compressed use; what the speaker means is: This is it: 'this'. Regarding the former case, notice that, at least with some demonstratives, the self-referential use is impossible, as in 'That utterance is false', which means that it may

be legitimate to claim that 'This utterance is false' is not a real demonstrative but is a parasitic use of demonstratives. 'This utterance is false' means 'The utterance I have just proffered is false'; but now it is clear that 'This', in this case, is nothing more than a definite article in combination with an implicit description.

Now, even if we concede that italics could be used (pragmatically?) to demonstrate an object, its demonstrative power could never amount to the power of a full pronominal, given that it would necessarily have to point to a demonstrated object but could not point to an italicized object. However, Saka (personal communication) states that this seems to be false. Consider: "*Blue* is in italics". But Saka's example makes explicit use of the word 'italics' and it is this word which helps the italics to demonstrate the expression in italics, the italics are part of the mentioned token. Without the explicit use of the words 'in italics', the hearer would be unaware whether the speaker intends the italics to be part of the quotation or not. It appears that, when no explicit words accompany such uses, it is the speaker's intentions which make matters clear.

Suppose one accepts that quotation marks are a grammatical device, one that is used by virtue of knowing a convention about language (and about a particular language). How is it that we are mainly able to understand how quotation works in languages which are not related to our own? We can interpret quotation even if we are not fully aware or have never been formally instructed that a certain grammatical operation is needed to obtain quotation. This seems to point towards pragmatic theories of quotation.

Suppose there was no convention for signaling quotation in the language and suppose there was really nothing to point to quotational uses. Nevertheless, it is universally accepted that in the case of human languages, a language must be able to somehow express the cognitive operation 'quotation', and if there are no explicit resources, then it must use resources which are not conventional. Presumably, there is a tendency in human languages to develop grammatical resources that make the quotation operation available on the basis of pragmatic resources. The clear-cut asymmetry between formal quotation operations in the written language and pragmatic quotation operations in oral languages attests that pragmatics is somehow responsible for quotation and that it is necessary to accept some sort of 'pragmatic intrusion'. (For additional arguments that pragmatic quotation precedes formal quotation, see Saka 2006, section IV.2.)

Wayne Davis (personal communication) opposes this view:

> "If by 'explicit resources' you mean morphological or punctuation conventions, then I think your claim is clearly false. In particular, I believe there are conventions in relation to intonation and phrasing that function like quotation in speech. Contrast the way we say *John said a word* (meaning that John uttered at least one word) with the way we say *John said 'a word'*.

Now, I quite agree with Davis that, in oral language, we find resources which allow us to point to a self-referential function. However, one must explain cases such as *John is 'very happy',* where there can be no colons parasitic in the written language and where one must find some implicit resources to signal that the speaker is mimicking John's utterance (or voice). Would Davis say that conventions of language

use are available in such cases? It is unfortunate, for such a view, that one has many ways of marking John's utterance as belonging to John: one can use a voice that mimics John's voice, or use facial expression to dissociate oneself from that portion of the utterance, or use a different quality of voice to separate the various portions of the utterance, etc. Is there a limit to what one can do to contrast the two portions of the utterance? Provided that the contrast is made clear, one can choose whichever way one prefers.

It can be argued that it is convenient to state that the cognitive operation 'quotation' is, after all, always pragmatic, and that written language has grammaticalized resources which are otherwise available through pragmatics. It is not impossible to argue that quotation, even in the case of written languages, is a pragmatically effected operation. If there is such a possibility, then the asymmetry between written and oral uses is eliminated in one stroke. All things being equal, one would tend to choose a theory that is more parsimonious and tends to reduce the levels of meaning (by adopting Grice's famous 'Modified Occam's Razor'; Grice 1989: 47). Of course, it is possible that the simplest theory will not sufficiently explain most details and data; in which case, this possibility ought to be reconsidered. I hope this will not happen in this case.

Before launching such a reductive and 'radical' enterprise, I would like to preliminarily consider whether a theory of explicature can assist our understanding of quotation. If we adopt Recanati's idea, a theory of explicature can explain many of the subtleties of quotation. What we should be clear about, however, is not whether some feature of the theory of explicature can help our understanding of quotation, but whether the theory of explicatures can be completely applied to quotation. Explicatures deal with intuitions about truth. Is truth at stake when quotation is concerned? Surely, if one utters (2)

(2) 'Time' has four letters

then the utterance can be said to be true if one attributes the predication 'has four letters' to a particular type of expression. It can be said to be false if, despite quotation marks, it is interpreted as attributing the predication to the metaphysical entity Time.

So, in a preliminary way, we have established that questions of truth and falsity are at stake in the case of quotations and, thus, explicature is a potentially relevant notion/tool that offers us a promise to tame the mysterious offshoots of quotation theory. I should also state, likewise preliminarily, that I will attempt to resolve some of the issues which have beset Recanati's application of the notion of explicature to the issue of quotation.

3   Overview of Theories of Quotation

In this section, I shall succinctly discuss the major theories on quotation. After discussing the defects of the old theories, I will focus on Recanati's view which allows for the radical pragmatic treatment of quotation practice.

3.1   Quotations Are Names

Attributed to Tarski (1933) and Quine (1940), this view considers quotations names. To take an example, if we consider the sentence "three' has five letters', we could replace 'three' by stipulation (we can replace it with a, and then state that a has five letters[2]). The internal structure of the quotation is not considered to be important and, in fact, the quotation is taken to be a simple expression. While surely this is the first step towards explaining **opacity** or lack of substitutivity (we cannot replace 'three' with a synonymous expression, if it existed, *salva veritate*), there are problems that militate against this theory. It obscures the grammatical and recursive operation through which quotation works (Davidson 1984). Furthermore, it does not exactly apply to those cases of quotation in which we quote from an unknown language (in this case we are unsure what letters to use to express certain sounds). It does not exactly apply to one of the functions of quotation, that of inventing new words or coining new definitions, which are possibly infinite.

3.2   Quotations Are Descriptions

This view, by Tarski (1933) and Quine (1964), states that a quotation is a description which is obtained by concatenating each successive letter of the quoted material. One of the disadvantages of this is that we cannot quote from unknown languages (presumably because we are not sufficiently familiar with either the phonetics or written symbols of the unknown language) and the quotations are largely unstructured. Thus, this view does not do justice to the systematicity of language. (surely an utterance is not only a concatenation of words, but has a grammatical structure which is derived from more general principles that are connected systematically. This has been widely known since Chomsky's work; concatenations of words are not the only elements involved in quotation. When we quote a syntactically well-formed expression, we usually want to show what a person has said, and what he has said usually includes the intention of producing a well-formed syntactic object). A further problem is that, in many cases, quotations work at the level of both use and mention; for such cases, this is not a suitable theory (compare 'John said that 'Mary is crazy"; see also example (4)).

To overcome some of this theory's difficulties, Geach (1950) proposed that we should consider the quoted materials to be concatenations of words. However, even if some structure is introduced, this will not suffice, since we also need to know more about syntactic structure (e.g. that 'John went to the cinema' is a sentence in English).

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[2]A reviewer takes issue with this. However, since I am not going to defend this view, I will not object to the referee.

3.3 *The Identity Theory of Quotation*

It has sometimes been claimed that, in quotations, expressions refer to themselves or are identical to themselves. This view can not solely be credited to Frege (1892), but also (exactly a century later) to Washington (1992). While this theory can, in principle, explain the asymmetry between written and spoken language, it is probably biased more towards oral language. It considers quotational devices as being not indispensable. Nevertheless, the quotation operation is determined by a semantic rule: identify the expression with itself. This view has evident problems since, after all, we have multiple ambiguities appearing in the quotation. Sometimes the expression is a phonetic form and sometimes a phonological form, or a syntactic form, or a lexeme, or a string of lexemes, etc. (a point denied by Cappelen and Lepore 1999 and 2007, section 7.1.3, but maintained by Capone 2009 and Saka 1998, 123; 1999; 2005, 191; and 2011, section 6). So 'identity with the expression' does not really shed light on the multiple uses of quotation; hence it is clear that quotation does not comprise a simple rule such as 'establish identity with the expression'. (See also Reimer 1996, who explicitly expresses her reservations concerning the identity theory, based on her idea that an expression does not really refer to itself, but in most cases of quotation refers to a type, and in many cases one must establish what type is involved through the pragmatic resources that mobilize contextual clues).

Another author opting for the identity theory of quotation is Garcia-Carpintero (1994). This scholar considers the possibility of a pragmatic theory of quotation, but then opts for the identity theory. I would like to counter the pessimistic view held by Garcia-Carpintero on conversational explicature (actually he uses the term 'conversational implicature'). Garcia-Carpintero is aware that in various cases we could replace or supplement the demonstrative theory of quotation through pragmatic considerations. He considers the vocal utterance of 'Barcelona has 9 letters'. Since accepting that the city of Barcelona has 9 letters will commit us to a falsity, we interpret the sentence as meaning the expression 'Barcelona' has 9 letters.

Garcia-Carpintero's worry, however, is that once we accept a pragmatic view that is totally unconstrained by semantics, we are forced, by considerations of theoretical parsimony, to accept the identity theory of quotation. I would resist this theoretical step. The identity theory of quotation cannot work *unless* we supplement it with a pragmatic theory, and if we supplement it with a pragmatic theory, we shall have both a semantic principle and a pragmatic theory – which is less parsimonious than if we only had a pragmatic principle. The identity theory cannot work on its own due to the multiple (interpretative) ambiguities of the expression quoted.

3.4   Demonstrative Theories

Davidson's theory of quotation has been called the 'demonstrative theory' (actually, the demonstrative theory has been renounced by its most prominent advocates (Cappelen and Lepore, 1999)). Davidson takes the quotation marks to be the referring expression. What is located between the quotation marks is the expression which is being mentioned or demonstrated. Davidson's theory is based on both the notion of demonstration and on demonstratives. An expression such as "Cat' has three letters' becomes 'The expression of which this is a token has three letters. Cat'. One of the original merits of Davidson's analysis is to have separated the quoted expression from the sentence in which the quotation occurs. Presumably, this is what happens when one coins new definitions. (In coining new definitions, we need to keep the definiens and the definiendum separate; in a definition we invest a word with a meaning (or with a more exact meaning); when we say we shall use the term 'intentions' to refer to what the speaker intends to communicate, we are taking a word (or a term) and we are attributing to it a circumscribed meaning: thus it is convenient to separate the word we want to explain from the explanation, which is what happens when we use the demonstrative 'this' in the explanation and the term to be explained is within quotation marks). There are, nevertheless, some shortcomings in this type of theory. It is not clear how one can account for recursive quotation as "the".[3] Cappelen and Lepore (1999) claim that one should do without recursive quotation. However, it is clear that there is an asymmetry between written language, in which recursive quotation clearly has a point, and oral language, where it is not obvious what its function would be. Given the fact that quotation marks are not actually used in oral language (except gesturally, as in 'finger dancing'), it is unclear how recursiveness can be obtained. (It would also be difficult to remember long iterated quotations in oral language; consequently, recursiveness should be explained with reference to written language). Another problem of the demonstrative theory is that quotation marks actually work as a subject. Thus, it would be possible, in principle, to have a sentence such as (3) in written language:

(3) ' ' has three letters.

But this is an impossibility. I suppose Davidson has to bite the bullet and say that example (2), despite appearances, is well-formed, albeit false. (What about ' ' has zero letters'? For more on empty quotation, see Sorensen 2008 and Saka 2011.)

3.5   Mixed Quotation

An interesting problem which was raised by Davidson and then developed further by Cappelen and Lepore (1997), concerns 'mixed' quotation. It is clear that sentences such as (4) are meaningful and grammatical:

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[3] See also Gómez-Torrente (2001, 133).

(4) John said that Mary is 'a lioness'.

Cappelen and Lepore dismiss the view that one can append to the indirect quotation a phrase such as 'and the words which John really used are 'a lioness'':

John said that Mary is a lioness;
And by the way, he used the words 'a lioness' in uttering what he said.

Instead, Cappelen and Lepore capitalize on the fact that mixed quotation displays features of both direct and indirect quotation. Thus, what they do is combine Davidson's analysis for indirect quotation with that of direct quotation. (However, notice that the analysis based on the parenthetical 'And by the way …' was dismissed because it multiplied entities. It is unclear whether the double Davidsonian analysis is more reductive than the parenthetical analysis). Basically, Cappelen and Lepore's analysis means that (4) can be elucidated in terms of (5):

(5) There is an utterance u such that the speaker same-said the content of u and that is u and there is an utterance u' such that the speaker same-tokened the utterance u' and that is u'.

As far as I can understand, a virtue of the Davidsonian approach is that semantics and pragmatics are impossible to untangle, since the hearer must recover the referent of 'that'. While things might be easier in written language, this would surely be a rather complex pragmatic task in oral language. An approach in keeping with Geurts and Maier (2005) might be preferable. Geurts and Maier resort to the notion of pragmatic intrusion to account for cases of mixed quotation, by accepting that there is more structure here than is visible. Thus, an utterance such as 'When in Santa Cruz, John orders '[ei]pricots' at the local market' is analyzed as 'When in Santa Cruz, John orders what he calls '[ei]pricots' at the local market'. This method cannot be directly applied to all cases of open quotation. Observe what happens in 'John said that Mary 'is a lioness'. I propose that we can make use of an appositive structure, as in 'John said of Mary that she is a lioness, which he said by uttering the words 'a lioness''; in any case, a free enrichment view of mixed quotation appears preferable in light of the fact that the convoluted double layer meaning à la Cappelen and Lepore is avoided. Alternatively, one could paraphrase 'John said that Mary 'is a lioness' with 'John said that Mary is what he calls 'a lioness''. However, these considerations presuppose a disambiguation, since a possible interpretation of the latter paraphrase is that John said that Mary is a lioness (the lioness is called 'Mary').

The explicature account of open quotation, in keeping with Geurts and Maier (2005), appears to be substantially flawed to an author such as Saka (2011). I believe that Saka's considerations are not implausible, but they can be seen in a different light by taking into account Douven's (2010) view on the pragmatics of belief. Basically, Saka doubts that an utterance such as 'When in Santa Cruz, John orders '[ei]pricots' at the local market' can be truth-conditionally equivalent to 'When in Santa Cruz, John orders what he calls '[ei]pricots' at the local market', the reason being that what John calls 'eipricots' in Santa Cruz is equivalent to what he calls 'aepricots' in a different location. Geurts and Maier's insertion of the material 'what

he calls' serves to create transparency, instead of opacity. However, the result of substituting coreferential expressions can be avoided if one follows, as is reasonable, Igor Douven's (2010) Epistemic Hygienics (EH):

Do not accept sentences that could mislead your future selves.

It is possible to argue that Douven's Epistemic Hygienics, which is a fairly plausible principle, may be related to Sperber and Wilson's Principle of Relevance. Since, after all, the explicature through which pragmatic intrusion is constructed is a pragmatic process, Epistemic Hygienics is clearly relevant and applicable, and it furnishes the correct results in the case being considered. In fact, by replacing '[ei] pricots' with '[ae]pricots' in an explicature, one obtains a result which is likely to mislead one's future self. Replacing '[ei]pricots' with '[ae]pricots' has the immediate result that, in the future, the speaker can no longer remember which word(s) John used when buying apricots in the local market in Santa Cruz.

3.6   Decisive Objection to Demonstrative Theories

We have already witnessed some shortcomings of the demonstrative theories of quotation. The problem of recursion (which was noted and dismissed by Cappelen and Lepore) is one such serious shortcoming. But the most problematic shortcoming of all is that demonstratives and demonstrations work well in the case of written language, where we have quotation marks and inscriptions between quotation marks, but much less so in the case of oral language. Demonstrations and demonstratives require pointers, but it is unclear whether spoken words can be used in this way: firstly, because of the lack of pointers; and secondly, because it is unclear what and where the pointers should point to. And if this were not enough, just as the identity theory of quotation is jeopardized by the ambiguous uses of quotation, the demonstrative theory poses a parallel problem. Even if pointers were available and one could point towards a location, it is unclear whether semantics is responsible for identifying the metalinguistic level required by this particular quotation; and even if we accepted the machinery of Davidson's ingenious semantic treatment, we would have to amplify it by pragmatics.

Pragmatics would have to perform three steps in oral language:

Provide pointers;
Point at something physical;
By virtue of pointing at something physical, point to a particular linguistic object.
   (This point recursively involves pragmatics as one needs to explain how one can
   refer to a type by referring to a token).

From this, it becomes evident that the pragmatic tasks have been multiplied unnecessarily.

The pragmatics of quotation can avoid the first two steps. The third step also needs drastic reformulation, since one needs to dispose of the notion of 'pointing

at', which seems to require the use of demonstratives. All we need is to recover the speaker's intentions and this can be achieved by resorting to the multiple clues and cues used by the speaker.

So, in a sense, I am not only arguing against theories of quotation that make use of demonstratives, but also against Recanati's theory of quotation, since this involves demonstrations that exhibit a certain type. My view is that singling out the metalinguistic type involved in a particular quotation does not require pointing or demonstrating. Functional applications of a predicate are much more efficient than pointing, since it is a fact that a certain predicate applies to a certain type which freely gives us that thing which other theorists have to point at.

3.7   Recanati's Theory of Quotation: Towards a Purely Pragmatic View of Quotation

At this point, I conclude my short summary of the theories of quotation by briefly discussing Recanati's ideas. Recanati's theory is clearly deeply indebted to pragmatics. He still uses terms like 'demonstrating' but, in fact, he abandons the Davidsonian theory by conferring on it a more pragmatic dimension.

The key point in Recanati's analysis is that an expression is being demonstrated by being quoted through the device of *conventional implicature*. But this view is immediately tainted by an ambiguity problem. What is being demonstrated (assuming that it **is** being demonstrated) is not just an expression, but what Bennett (1988) calls a feature associated with an expression. Conventional implicature analysis would work well if one could show that the thing being demonstrated is an expression. But this is not the case in many instances. Sometimes it is just a concatenation of phonetic symbols (which is not an expression in the full sense of a linguistic string which has a form and an extension), sometimes it is a lexeme and sometimes it is a sentence. Things that are capable of being 'demonstrated' are too disparate to allow one to hope that they can be unified. And if they cannot be unified, it makes no sense to say that a quotation singles out an expression by conventional implicature. Conventional implicature analysis would, by necessity, require being complemented by a conversational implicature type analysis. And this will immediately lead to an unnecessary multiplication of levels. Furthermore, a problem with this view is that conventional implicatures, at least according to Grice, require a linguistic trigger. Words such as 'but' and 'therefore' are examples of the triggers of conventional implicatures. But these are words that are associated by convention with certain meanings (even if they operate at a level of procedural meaning). It is unclear which words have to perform the same semantic-pragmatic task in the case of the conventional implicature involved (somehow) in quotation. While Davidson's analysis has an element which carries out the task of selecting the quoted expression, namely punctuation marks that function as demonstratives, there is no equivalent in Recanati's account. The fact that quotation marks are used in written language

surely does not prove much, since they could be replaced by italics, in which case it is unclear which elements would convey the alleged conventional implicature. But the most critical problem is that, in oral language, there are no quotation marks at all; in fact, it is even possible not to have quotation marks in written language. Therefore, it is unclear whether there is a candidate for a suitable trigger at the level of words in the operation of quotation.

Wayne Davis (personal communication) has one objection to this view: "I did not understand the problem you see with the ambiguity of quotation. Whenever anyone uses a demonstrative pronoun like 'this', there are many possible referents compatible with the meaning of 'this' even when supplemented with a pointing. So why is the fact that there are several possible referents in any case a problem with the claim that quotation involves demonstrating an expression?"

My answer is simple. Demonstration is canonically used in contexts where, by demonstrating an object or individual, one provides an answer to a question (whether voiced or not). So, if you ask me, "who is John?", and I answer, 'That is John' (only John and Mary are visible), I use the demonstration informatively, because my act of demonstrating an object has unambiguously selected/picked the correct individual. If there are a hundred boys concentrated in the same courtyard and I say, 'That is John', pointing my finger at the group, there is little chance that my demonstration act will be successful. I will probably have to call, 'John!', and when he replies, I could then demonstrate 'That is John'. But at this point the demonstration is quite superfluous. My argument for quotation is the same. Demonstrating is superfluous and we need alternative pragmatic means for establishing what the quoted item is. (However, in support of the conventionality of quotation one could say that, whether or not demonstration is superfluous, quotation marks succeed in establishing what the quoted item is. But I am unsure whether this is correct. Take the following case. 'This is what John said: ' '. What is the quoted item? Could it be John's silence? Could it be the lack of an item to be quoted? This is the terrain where pragmatics has certain advantages).

4   Towards a Pragmatic View of Quotation

In general, a pragmatic theory which accepts that quotation is performed through conventional implicature, but also admits the shortcomings of this hypothesis by remedying them through a reparative conversational implicature, is surely not on the right track because it falls short on parsimony and contradicts Modified Occam's Razor that the pragmatic view alone suffices.

As Bennett (1988) states, we need a level of implicature to also exclude unintentional features of the reported message. Considering only written language; if Sally writes

(6) John wrote: MARY must NOT come

Then she will probably implicate that there is a reason why she is reporting some of the words in capitals, the reason being that this was the way the original message was printed. In keeping with Sperber and Wilson (1986), the cognitive effort involved in forcing the reader to distinguish between capitals and lower case must be offset by appropriate cognitive rewards, and the easiest way to make sense of the reader's additional effort is to convey that the reporter wants the reader to appreciate how the words were originally printed.

Wayne Davis (personal communication) does not agree with my explanation. It is possible that the extra effort is balanced by the intention to convey that the high-lighted words were of particular importance to the reporter, or that the reporter wanted to highlight a contrast with what John said (Mary will come). Or perhaps the reporter is merely trying to highlight words that were barely legible when Mary wrote them. It is possible to have other interpretations than the one which immedi-ately comes to mind. However, it should be possible to order interpretations accord-ing to their relevance. Since the font used in the report is of immediate relevance to the question of how John wrote the sentence, this intention has priority over any other, the latter probably requiring a greater number of contextual clues to reinforce them (or to promote them to the intended interpretation).

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of pragmatically-based theories is the fact that, as in example (6) which displays only English words, they do not represent a quote from another language (like Latin, in which case the highlighting would alert us to the fact that these were actually words written in a foreign language). However, once we abandon the tenet that quotation is a semantical device and that it is always expressed by quotation marks (whether explicit or implicit) that point to tokens, we can make sense of this apparently bold pragmatic claim. The fact that a quoted text may have originated in a different language is a challenge to semantic theories of quotation, because it shows that the objects a quotation points to, may be multiple and can be more abstract than the tokens quoted, thus requiring principles of prag-matic interpretation, rather than semantic rules. In order to explain why the canoni-cal interpretation of quotation is to select a fragment of text in the same language as the reporter utters it, we again need to invoke Relevance Theory with its insistence on relevance as the balance between cognitive and processing efforts. Since the reporter did not quote the words uttered in a different language, the cognitive effects are sufficiently large if the linguistic expression that was originally used was English. Placing greater cognitive efforts on the hearer by using a different lan-guage, would have to be offset by greater contextual effects.

A problem which Recanati (2008) faces in responding to considerations about mixed quotation is that, in fact, the implicatures associated with mixed quotations are not cancellable. Consider (7):

(7) John said that Mary is 'a bore'.

If one tries to cancel the interpretation that John uttered the words 'a bore', one fails to do so, according to Cappelen and Lepore (2005). One could try to rescue Recanati's pragmatic analysis by saying that, after all, 'a bore' need not have been uttered by John. It is possible that the reporter was echoing someone else and he is stressing this echoic relationship. This is not implausible. However, at the end of a chain of inference, we will come eventually to someone who actually uttered the words 'is a bore' and we will also have to admit that there is an echoic relationship between Mary's words and that echoed person. But this, in practice, means that Cappelen and Lepore are correct in insisting that the explicature (because the level of meaning that is resorted to in quotation is an explicature) cannot be cancelled. But this is not something undesirable. This data complies with the picture of non-cancellable explicatures which I detailed in Capone (2009). In that paper, I essentially highlighted that, fundamentally, once the speakers' intentions are manifested, they can no longer be cancelled. The reason for this is that a speaker uses many contextual clues in conveying an intention, and once these clues are *disseminated* or made available through a text, it is impossible to go back and withdraw an intention. The intention can be retracted, but never cancelled. I have shown in my chapter on the attributive/referential distinction that referential or attributive interpretations cannot be cancelled; and this is due to the richness of the clues disseminated in a text.

Since intentions can only be fixed pragmatically, and as literal meaning is essentially inadequate in fixing intentions without the help of pragmatics, what was manifested as intended cannot be undone. It can be retracted, but this does not mean that an explicature disappears. Consider the following example of a quotation:

(8) 'Red' has three letters

In interpreting (8), what we clearly should NOT do is to establish an identity between an expression and the expression quoted, because there is no such simple rule, and we have already said that the word 'expression' is ambiguous. By stating 'red', we do not select a word, but we select a written form. In other words, we need to *subtract* the meaning level from the lexeme before arriving at the intended linguistic unit. First of all, we establish that the unit 'red' is semantically inert, in other words that we are focusing on something different from its extension. But we do so, not through Washington's identity rule, but through pragmatics. We exclude the fact that the extension of 'red' is being intended because the statement 'red has three letters', interpreted as being about the colour red, is blatantly false. Once we exclude the fact that a referential entity is being intended, we need to find out which feature of the expression is being focused on. Since 'three letters' immediately activates our encyclopedic knowledge (in this case that strings can have letters), we will select a written string. Notice that in the complex cases succinctly described through pragmatics, we do not demonstrate anything at all, nor do we use implicit demonstratives. This does not amount to the exclusion of demonstratives from playing a role in quotation, as one can clearly have things like:

(9) Look at the way this is written,

where one demonstrates an inscription or a shape by pointing at a sample of writing. Of course this possibility exists, but it is more naturally confined to the written language and to particular types of inscriptions.

What I have said about the non-cancellability of explicatures seems to reinforce the picture of pragmatics and modularity which I presented in Capone (2010a, 2011b). In Capone (2011b), I replied to Cummings (2009) by stating that pragmatic processes of the non-reflective type are non-cancellable, are driven by fast-and-frugal heuristics and by mandatory operations bounded by the Principle of Relevance, which operates by throwing a net on information that can be processed and which could direct or orient the pragmatic interpretation process. Of course, I assumed that parts of the pragmatic processes need not be mandatory or encapsulated, particularly if we focus on reflective inferences (I doubt whether reflective inferences are involved in quotation at all). It appears that inferences involved in quotation are fast, mandatory, automatic and encapsulated. This is the manner in which the mind works, no matter what the language. We could devise an experiment to test for encapsulation. Suppose, in a certain fragment of language, you stipulate that quotation marks mean 'Start looking for an expression which is located two metres away'. Then present the subject to be tested with an example such as "Cat' has three letters'. You then need to decide whether, in this case, the quotation will be interpreted along cognitive routines, dictated by universal cognitive principles, or whether the quotation marks will be interpreted in a procedural way by following the explicit stipulation. My guess is that the interpretation of quotation follows a path of interpretation that is different from the stipulated interpretative routines.

Paolo Leonardi (personal communication) is not convinced by this thought experiment. He says: "The experiment does not persuade me at all, because we do not see any expression from two metres away, and to stipulate something out of the blue and find that it is unnatural when there is a usage that is established by a linguistic "convention", is predictable whatever the experiment" (my translation). There are two things which do not convince me regarding Leonardi's line of thought. Firstly, if I see a certain bus at a distance and observe that it is bus number 8, I have seen an expression at a distance (of course I have seen a token of that expression; but it is not impossible for me to say that expression is a number, in which case I am not pointing to the token, but to the type). Secondly, Leonardi assumes that the meaning of quotation is provided by a convention (a linguistic convention, in fact), which explains why the experiment of stipulating a certain meaning for the quotation marks is not successful; the conventional meaning is always preferable to the arbitrarily stipulated meaning. However, if one does not assume that quotation is regulated by a linguistic convention (as I do), the experiment makes sense. Let us only conditionally accept the experiment, as indicated by Leonardi. If the view that quotation is expressed by pragmatic means is accepted, then it will follow that the pragmatic inference will be mandatory.

I anticipate receiving an objection as to why I have not (yet) stated how quotation is to be interpreted in written cases. My response to this is simple. Quotation works in a similar way to all cases of marked expressions, where the use of a marked expression signals a deviation from an ordinary pattern of usage. (It is tempting to see analogies with the cases of anaphora referred to by Levinson 2000 and Huang 2007)) Cognitive efforts must be offset by cognitive rewards, if we accept Sperber and Wilson's theory. Thus, one way to make sense of the marked pattern is to assume that it correlates pragmatically with an interpretation that is an alternative to the interpretation that normally occurs in normal use – an alternative to the extensional use of an expression. This alternative obviously has a metalinguistic character.

Of course, this is not the end of the story. I quite agree with Wayne Davis (personal communication) that, if this were to be the end of the story, then we would have to account for why, in the example "red' has three letters', we do not choose an interpretation according to which the sentence means that any word with the same meaning as the quoted word has three letters, or that the word in quotation marks, read backwards ('der'), has three letters, etc. It is clear that pragmatic considerations of a contextual form play a role here. In particular, encyclopedic knowledge plays a role in enriching the explicature.

Could we explain quotation by resorting to default semantics (Jaszczolt 2005)? I am not sure whether I have a definitive answer. I have argued in Capone (2011a) that items of the lexicon that are associated with certain default pragmatic interpretations are stored in a default semantics archive. However, in this case, we have no words, since the quotation marks are interpreted (see Saka 1998 and Washington 1992) as punctuation marks. They exhibit structure, and are treated on a par with subscripts that are used in syntactic notation to signal phrase markers. It is, therefore, difficult to equate quotation marks with items that can be characterized through default semantics. Although I do not admit many contextual elements in my view of quotation, I predict the interpretation of quotation entirely through pragmatic principles. I assume there is a certain systematicity in the way pragmatic effects are obtained.

4.1   Quotation and Cancellability

Now, before getting into the details of quotation, I want to establish the particular notions to I will refer to during the discussion of my views of quotation. For years, I have voiced an unorthodox view of explicatures, stating that this view has the immediate advantage of solving the problem of Grice's circle[4] (a problem noted by Levinson 2000). In short, this view claims that explicatures are not cancellable. I have usually defended the weaker version of this view, distinguishing between

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[4]Conversational implicatures take input from truth-conditional meaning, but truth-conditional meaning depends on pragmatic intrusion; thus, we have a double application of pragmatic principles.

potential and actual explicatures, and stating that only actual explicatures are not cancellable. I will not revisit here all the arguments that I have used to persuade readers of Capone (2009) about non-cancellable explicatures; it suffices to say that explicatures, in my theoretical view, arise particularly in those cases in which the semanticist is forced to state that literal meanings lead to contradiction or patent falsity. To rescue an apparently plausible and well-formed sentence from accusations of falsity or contradiction, one needs to posit an explicature. This view is more parsimonious than other available views, and is in keeping with my idea that one should try to adhere to a classically semantic picture, whenever possible, preferably by using the armory of implicit indexicals or variables. In brief, I believe that, in general, semantics provides the guidelines for the use of a linguistic expression and tells us, or instructs us, on how to use it and how to interpret it. I believe that sentential meanings are not necessarily gappy (that is, they cannot serve to express a truth-evaluable proposition), even if sometimes they happen to be gappy, in which case it is our task to show that pragmatics is necessary in explaining the phenomenon of pragmatic intrusion, how what is said, is still said despite a shortfall in the semantics of the sentence.

I have attempted to connect my ideas about the non-cancellability of explicatures with views on modularity of mind and their intersections with the pragmatics of language. Unlike some orthodox views in pragmatics (such as defended by Kasher 1991 or Cummings 2009), but in keeping with views held by other eminent pragmatics scholars (Sperber and Wilson 2002, Wilson 2005, Carston 1996), I accept that at least part of pragmatic interpretation is modular in nature; I respond to the standard objections to the modularity of pragmatics by expatiating on the virtues of my view, according to which explicatures are not cancellable. I have shown elsewhere that fast-and-frugal pragmatic heuristics determine the interpretation of a linguistic expression instantaneously, without necessarily re-opening the interpretation case whenever a piece of potentially conflicting information presents itself. The reason for this is that interpretation processes are bounded by the Principle of Relevance, which (as I said above) is like a net-throwing principle (it filters away information that does not interact in a fruitful way with the assumptions being considered) and determines the availability only of information relevant to the interpretation process. The fact that, in my view, explicatures are not cancellable, seems to conflict with Kasher's idea that pragmatic inferences are not encapsulated because their defeasible nature means that every piece of information drawn from encyclopedias can interact with existing interpretations, thereby leading to re-interpretations (or modified interpretations). Non-cancellability and encapsulation seem to go hand-in-hand in my view. My views on pragmatic intrusion may seem to be in conflict with Recanati's views on truth-conditional pragmatics; however, there are various points in Recanati (2010) which seem to indicate that pragmatic intrusion cannot be easily cancelled. Recanati is at pains to explain these cases away, whereas if one were to accept my view that intrusive explicatures cannot be cancelled, one would not need to explain those points that are conflicting with the assumption that pragmatic increments are cancellable. My views about pragmatics are best exemplified in Capone (2009), where I endeavored to explain that a theory of pragmatics

should be a theory of (communicative) intentions, and that intentions are fixed in context through a number of clues and cues to be disseminated by the speaker and utilized by the hearer. Once intentions are fixed and messages are implicated, they cannot be un-implicated, as stated by Burton-Roberts (personal communication).

In the present section I will show why my considerations on the pragmatics of quotation are important from the point of view of a general theory of pragmatics. I want to show that understanding the issue of quotation has a bearing on the way we understand pragmatics and, in particular, on the issue of cancellability of explicatures.

I will purposely keep this section short, so as not to run the risk of developing a separate chapter. Even so, this section contains all the essentials of my proposal. I mainly want to address a reply by Carston (2010) to Burton-Roberts (2005) on the non-cancellability of explicatures. Since both my treatment of explicatures and discussion about cancellability intersect with Burton-Roberts' considerations, I will take Carston's objections as applying, *mutatis mutandis*, to my own views. First of all, Burton-Roberts considers the possibility of cancelling an explicature to be *logically* impossible. Why should this be the case? Let us recall that the need for an explicature is dictated by the fact that a sentential meaning is often gappy. Thus, we can predict, using logical assumptions, that cancelling an explicature from the utterance of a sentence, whose meaning was gappy to begin with, cannot result in a contradiction. This process is quite unlike implicature cancellation, which usually results in an utterance which is not apparently contradictory, but where the possibility of contradiction is real. There is no way to disprove the theory, if we begin with the assumption that a sentential meaning is gappy or underdetermined.[5] Carston opposes this sophisticated reasoning, by saying that her students normally cancel implicatures/explicatures, for example in, 'She's ready, but Karen isn't ready to leave for the airport' and find the following 'She's ready but she isn't ready' to be contradictory, despite the fact that the sentential meaning is gappy. So, Carston's point is that people can and do, quite confidently, assess examples like the ones just given for contradictoriness and can express judgments of contradictoriness or non-contradictoriness.

At this point, readers will realize that it is not easy to make a theoretical choice. We are at an impasse: theoretical considerations vs. the intuitive judgments of normal speakers. I propose to suspend our judgments for the time being; Burton-Roberts even claims that in many cases explicatures cannot be cancelled without conveying a sense of contradiction and, as Carston states, his position is even stronger, since he also takes cases of particularized implicatures to be non-cancellable, on the grounds that once intentions have been fixed, they cannot be revoked. At

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[5] In other words, contradiction is a property of statements, not of sentences and thus the cancellability test cannot be applied to sentences; an explicature is usually added to a sentence to transform it into a full proposition; but then we cannot apply cancellability to return to the original sentence. To apply cancellability, we would have to show that the sentence and the actual explicatures are not contradictory; but to show they are contradictory we need to compare statements, not a sentence and a proposition (the explicature).

this point, Carston admits that there are problems. However, she insists that, for Grice, cancellability was only a diagnostic for the notion of conversational implicature (and not even the most important one, given the decisive role played by calculability) and that it was based on two main ideas: conversational implicatures can be either explicitly cancelled or contextually cancelled. Burton-Roberts has only shown that explicatures cannot be explicitly cancelled (at least, he has highlighted cases in which it is difficult to cancel an explicature). However, he has not demonstrated that explicatures cannot be contextually cancelled.

But things are not that simple. Thus, I have argued (for example in Capone 2003, 2006 and 2009) that explicatures cannot be cancelled on various theoretical grounds. Some evidence for this is derived from accepting that explicatures are often used as a tool for resolving a theoretical problem or for showing that an utterance which otherwise has the appearance of a falsehood or contradiction, is not false or contradictory. If the explicature is a tool for rescuing a particular utterance by resolving a potential contradiction or logical absurdity, it is clear that cancelling the explicature turns out to be very problematic.

Carston, however, insists that Burton-Roberts and I are misguided as we consider utterance processing to be an online process, while the notion of cancellability has more to do with it being a (theoretical) diagnostic, a test that must be passed by simply considering potential, rather than actual explicatures.

Now, in my 2009 paper, I was prepared to assume that one has to make a distinction between potential and actual explicatures and that my notion of non-cancellability of explicatures was limited to actual explicatures and, presumably, did not affect potential explicatures. However, my current perspective on quotation compels me to consider (or rather, reconsider) whether what Carston says about the cancellability of explicatures on the basis of contextual cancellation has complete generality; and the outcome of my consideration is not positive. Consider what happens when we have explicatures relating to vocal utterances such as 'Bold has four letters'. Given what Carston states, it would be possible to cancel this explicature if we changed the context (this is what contextual cancellation amounts to). But, it is unclear how we should change the context in this case. Presumably, we need a context in which our assumptions of normality are suspended. Consider John, the madman. Is he so mad as to be able to attribute the predicate 'has four letters' to a person who is bold (assuming an interpretation in keeping with the somehow defective utterance 'The bold has four letters', which we may be inclined to attribute to him)? Seeking a context that legitimizes the cancellation of the explicature leads us to a situation where we have to suspend judgments of rationality; and if we indeed have to suspend such judgments, then we probably would be better to abandon our attempts to build a theory of rational interpretation of communication. After all, our theoretical assumptions are based on rationality (even Relevance Theory, which is less reflective than Grice's pragmatics, involves principles of rationality, such as judging the amount of cognitive efforts compared to the amount of cognitive effects). So, such a drastic departure from rationality will do our theory no good. Searching for contexts in which quotational readings can be cancelled is not easy, and even in cases of open quotation, where a portion of the utterance is cited (hence

attributed to another person), one mobilizes resources that lead the hearer towards understanding the explicature – which is why undoing the explicature is irrational because it will annul the systematic and intended effects of mobilizing resources, a process which has both a production and a cognitive comprehension cost. The very idea that cognitive costs are decisive in interpreting utterances and in determining explicatures runs counter to the theoretical option of having cancellable explicatures. This is an extremely costly move, as Jaszczolt (2005) also admits.

4.2 Compatibility with Saka's View

Before completing my discussion about explicatures, it will be important to consider if, and to what extent, my treatment of explicatures is compatible with Saka's view of quotation. Saka (1998) may accept my account of explicature (or part of it), but still insist that a minimal semantics for quotation must be provided; this is what is supplied by the identity principle and its rule that an expression is identical to its nonce referent. Saka may very well insist that we can minimally differentiate use and mention, and that mention involves the identification of an expression with its nonce referent. Saka minimally characterizes use and mention in the following way:

(u)
Speaker S uses an expression X iff:

  (i) S exhibits a token of X;
  (ii) S thereby ostends the multiple items associated with X (including X's extension);
  (iii) S intends to direct the thoughts of the audience to the extension of X.

(m)
Speaker S mentions an expression X iff:

  (i) S exhibits a token of X;
  (ii) S thereby ostends the multiple items associated with X;
  (iii) S intends to direct the thoughts of the audience to some item associated with X other than its extension.

Now, while I do not doubt that this is a laudable definition of the distinction between mention and use, and one that is interesting from a philosophical point of view, I doubt that this is a semantic distinction adopted by the speakers of a language such as English or Italian. In fact, if, as I assume, the pragmatic process has, as its aim, to obtain the most specific interpretation possible, it will be clear that in all possible uses of mentioned expressions, a speaker commits herself to (m) by virtue of the logical implications of the explicature. Consider what happens when one hears the utterance ''shhhh' is a pleasant sound'. One clearly concentrates on the phonetic string and thus, by explicature, it can be assumed that (m) is obtained. To have a pragmatic process that starts with (m), and then is enriched by the ulterior inference

that we are talking about a phonetic string and not the normal extension of a word, involves an extra step. Furthermore, adopting (m) as a basic semantics involves knowing whether one is faced with the task of first pragmatically disambiguating whether rule (u) or rule (m) is applicable, and then adding further pragmatic increments. In other words, one needs at least two pragmatic steps, plus a semantic step, whereas a single pragmatic step would be preferable. (Saka's work is not presented as a theory of interpretation. However, in this chapter we are faced with the task of providing a theory of interpretation which is based on the speaker's intentions).

4.3   Camouflaged Direct Quotations

People occasionally say things such as:

(10) I 'almost killed her'

using some contextual clue to indicate that some portion of the utterance does not belong to them. For example, one can use the device of mimicking someone else's voice (as highlighted by Recanati 2010) to mark a segment of one's own utterance as representing someone else's voice or point of view.

In written cases, one can use orthographic devices to impute certain segments of one's utterance to someone else (see the examples from Dickens quoted by Recanati (2010: 301) which involve extensive mimicking).

If we want to opt for a unified treatment which handles the aforementioned examples in the same way as was accomplished in the cases of explicit direct quotations (to be more precise, where the verb 'say' or a similar verb is used), we need some way of marking off a segment from the remaining part of the utterance and conversationally implicate, by stylistic marking, that the segment is marked for special interpretation: a case of mention rather than a case of use. Stylistic marking is important and does not necessarily involve mimicking or closely imitating the model of the voice to be reproduced. All that is required is that one uses a different style. So, one could differentiate some serious portions of the utterance from some segments uttered in a style that is evidently, blatantly and intentionally different from the rest: say a joking tone of voice, laughter, etc. Stylistic marking is important and suffices in triggering an implicature through the heuristics we are used to. What is marked is not used in a normal way and carries messages concerning the point of usage.

The gist of Recanati's treatment of ironic distancing from certain portions of the utterance or assuming an authoritative voice by imitating or representing an authoritative voice, is that one implicates the reason for the departure from ordinary usage (what he calls the 'quotational point'): in other words, one implicates what intended effect one wants to achieve (or the purpose of the quotation). Consider again (10) (I 'almost killed her'). How should we interpret this? One natural way is to make use of Geurts's (2005) treatment of mixed quotation and to allow for pragmatic intrusion. In other words, we could render an utterance of (10) as (11)

(11) I did something which she described/would describe as almost killing her.

I would like to call (10) a case of camouflaged quotation, because the ascribee (the person who is responsible for the quoted segment of the utterance) is hidden and part of the intended meaning must be somehow reconstructed by inserting some material. Clearly, in (11) contextual considerations are responsible for someone opting for the past or conditional tense. In this case, we see that there is a division of labour between default inferences (the triggering of a departure from normal usage through the usage of a stylistically marked portion of the utterance) and contextualized or particularized inferences. We need to know what the speaker has in mind, who uttered that segment of utterance in the past, and other relevant pieces of information which allow us to recover the purpose of the quotation and its intended source. In this case, the speaker probably wants to minimise the seriousness of what he has done by implicating that the source is in the habit of exaggerating things and amplifying them in a disproportionate manner. I have no objection to Recanati's wish to retain the source and the purpose of the quotation as particularized implicatures, rather than generalized ones, provided that it is made clear that the full interpretation of the quotation requires (1) a segment of the utterance which is sufficiently marked to produce M-implicatures (implicatures due to the use of a marked expression, an expression which deviates from the unmarked form in that it is more prolix or less frequently used); and (2) an explicature which reconstructs, at least partially, the speaker's communicative intention in connection with the explicated articulation of the utterance. This would normally insert words such as 'I did what X (the source) would be prepared to describe/described as Y'.

A remaining, and not negligible question is whether it is possible, in all cases of implicitly quoted sources, to articulate the implicit portion of the utterance through an explicature in keeping with Geurts and Maier. Consider the utterance 'Einstein arrived'. Suppose this utterance is prompted by a situation in which a person is under the delusion of being Einstein. Then this utterance could mean that the person who believes himself to be 'Einstein' has arrived. This could be taken as the implicature/explicature of the utterance. The implicature/explicature of the utterance would involve reconstruction of the agent through an objective description and then attribution of some mode of presentation of the referent, which uses words likely to be uttered by the source. It is a question of time and patience to see whether all examples can be dealt with in terms of explicatures; but it should be said that if things were so, an important aspect of the theory would involve an emphasis on the explicature which would partly be due to generalized implicatures and contextualized inferences.

We may very well wonder if camouflaged quotations are cases of cancellable or are, otherwise, non-cancellable explicatures. I have stated that the explicature involves two stages: spotting a segment that is stylistically marked and then attributing a source on the basis of contextual information. The two tasks are probably connected, depending on how closely the marked portion of the utterance mimics the source. Here, we are in no doubt that there are sufficient contextual clues to set the interpretative enterprise on a trip of no return. If a segment of the utterance is

stylistically marked, there must be a reason for that, which invariably triggers the implicature. If a portion of the utterance is labelled, by common knowledge, as belonging to a certain person who is the source because he always used those words in the past, then there are sufficient contextual clues to identify the source. The explicature thus obtained is clearly non-cancellable. Lack of cancellability does not require conventionality (conventionality may play some role, but not a decisive one), but considering the fact that if one mobilizes the semiotic resources towards a pragmatic inference, it is difficult, if not impossible, to go back and pretend that those resources were never mobilized, that there was no reason for disseminating the text with an abundance of interpretative clues. The theory of relevance predicts that it would be uneconomical to cancel an explicature obtained by mobilizing contextual clues, because the cognitive efforts involved would have to be expended in vain, in case an explicature has been cancelled.

5   Conclusion

In this chapter, contrary to the accepted view of quotation, I have adopted a thoroughly pragmatic approach, dispensing with Recanati's view that quotation is partially due to conventional implicature and partially to conversational implicature (especially open quotations which seem to be cases where pragmatic interpretations abound). I am persuaded that the radical pragmatic view defended here is more parsimonious.

   I am persuaded that quotation, by virtue of its pragmatic mechanisms, can be compared to a language game. It is a practice – a social practice – which very closely resembles the phenomenon which Goffman called 'framing'. Framing activities very often operate on the basis of stylistic information. Consider for instance a film with many flashbacks. It is indispensable that we should be able to distinguish a series of events which unfold in chronological order from another series which does not. Marking the differences in terms of style is what allows viewers to recognize such framing activities. In the same way, a university lecturer may insert some windows in his lecture, connecting the lecture to the present time and the present occasion (the location, the type of audience) and of course, he faces the same problem that one faces in quotation: having to mark stylistically a temporary break of frame (the lecturer may mark such breaks of frame by assuming a more humorous tone of voice). Similarly, conversations at work are marked by stylistic signals, such as, using a dialect as opposed to using standard language, which is reserved for the most institutional parts of the proceedings. Many examples of this type can be found to characterize the connection with quotation that is emphasized here. Quotation, being a *social practice*, one needs to be embedded in societal activities in order to see how the practice works and how to practice it. Very often, it is the specific language game one is involved in that serves to frame the quotational part of one's discourse. Definitions – which may occur at an early stage in a book, a lecture or an academic chapter – are part of a societal practice in which speakers and the audi-

ence take their time to reflect on and define the terms that are being used more frequently and systematically. In the context of this *definitional language game*, it is clear that words lose their extensional value and that we need to mark certain portions of the utterance as referring to words or expressions. Quoting other people's words *verbatim* is also an important practice, which usually involves reporting the context in which the words occurred since, when deprived of their contexts, words are like orphans and are deprived of most of the force which they acquire in the context of specific language games. Consider, for example, what happens if a certain headmistress, in the course of a meeting, says: suppose I say 'teacher Buccheri is an idiot'. This fragment of reported speech cannot be reported in isolation from its context: one would not know the form of embedding in which the words occurred. The first framing activity is one of supposition; the second framing activity is one of exemplification. Suppositions are speech acts which involve a marked departure from normal assumptions; likewise, exemplification is an activity requiring a different frame (devising an example assumes that the exemplified event is not real). Assuming that the above example, despite its various possible embeddings, does not lose much of its aggressive force, and that a real complaint can be reasonably lodged on account of this, nevertheless, if (in the course of a legal controversy) the context in which the example occurred were to be deleted, one could very well believe that the headmistress was crazy. The practice of reporting must at least include the competence required in reporting those parts of the context which could reveal the depth of the embedding – in other words, the various levels of framing.

Can the notion that quotation is a *language game* detract us from the idea that pragmatics is involved in understanding what game one is faced with? Not necessarily. On the one hand, one must learn the practice of citing context as well as words, when one reports an utterance. On the other hand, citing context can lead to various augmentations of meaning. Having to infer the point of the quotation implies that its point is variable, being tied to what the reporter has in mind at the time of the utterance. Hence, a pragmatic reconstruction is certainly required. Furthermore, the facts dealing with the stylistic nature of the quotational language game need not be learned piecemeal, but may well be integrated in a general pragmatic competence which involves resorting to the pragmatic Principle of Relevance (and, in particular, inferring an M-implicature).

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Chapter 8
Indirect Reports and Societal Pragmatics

For this essay, a report is X's re-presentation to Y of what Z said. It is often the case that Z is identical with X at some earlier time. Occasionally, Y and X are the same person, but that is of little interest in this essay. X's report is never exactly identical with Z's utterance; even if the same words are captured, the context is different, the voice will be different, the speaker's intentions may be different, the medium may be different. Often X will choose to render the report more coherent by rearranging what was said, and/or more vivid by embellishing the original to attract and/or maintain audience attention. When X's report ρ is compared with Z's utterance v, the accuracy of ρ depends on whether or not Z's message in v can be reconstructed from it. In other words, the content of ρ is dependent on the content of v. An accurate report ρ re-presents the illocutionary point of the source utterance v.

(Allan 2016, 211–212).

Abstract Indirect reports are segments of speech which involve a dialogic dimension (clearly constituting a case of polyphony) and, thus, studying them offers a chance for linguistics to again appropriate its original status as a theory that deals with linguistic signs and communication. The practice of indirect reporting intersects with a theory of knowledge because, through an indirect report, knowledge is imparted on the basis of which the hearer will decide whether or not to act and how he should take action. In this chapter, I discuss the issue of opacity and try to defend a pragmatic view of opacity in connection with indirect reports (on the other hand, I believe that opacity in direct quotation is mainly a semantic issue). I try to explain opacity pragmatically, although I accept that there are numerous exceptions that one has to account for (namely, the replacement of NPs with the aim of facilitating the establishment of reference). In this chapter, I also consider the issue of slurs in terms of the opacity of a pragmatic form, and I then accept that we have to consider the societal constraints on the use/mention of slurs (more or less as exceptions to the application of pragmatic opacity).

1 Indirect Reports and How They Affect Theoretical Linguistics

In this chapter, I am going to discuss and expatiate on the social praxis of indirect reporting. That this is an important topic is demonstrated by the fact that, for many decades, not one book had been written on this issue – although some papers, particularly from a philosophical viewpoint, spurred on by Donald Davidson's genial intuition about 'saying that', were disseminated on this topic (the philosopher's merit was to focus on semantic opacity by claiming that an utterance of, for example, 'John said that Mary is in Paris' should be divided into two and analysed as, 'John said that. Mary is in Paris'). Philosophers like Cappelen and Lepore (1997, 2005) very intelligently intuited that a theory of indirect reporting is at the basis of the semantics/pragmatics debate; however, within theoretical linguistics, there has been a noticeable silence for several decades on the issue of indirect reporting, possibly because scholars have had the premonitory intuition that a correct (or plausible) view of indirect reporting is likely to have drastic effects on our view of general linguistics (given that it will make the notion of communication appear central to a theory of linguistics). Linguists are notorious for dealing with sentences, with the exception of some resolute scholars like Labov and Fenshel (1977), so much so that Goffman (1981) in his Forms of Talk has volunteered some ironic remarks about sentences being 'orphans'. Linguists deal with sentences by depriving them of their natural contexts (conversations) and even believe that conversation should not be the natural object of linguistic investigation. Instead, as Volosinov clearly stated in his important considerations on indirect reports, indirect reports (even if they are normally reduced to sentences/utterances or to brief textual sequences) cannot be studied without a dialogic conception of language (utterances can be uttered collaboratively by two speakers, in which case an indirect report would at least involve three voices, including the original speaker's whose point of view is being represented (Goodwin 2007)). They are clearly sites where two (or more) voices merge (the hearer's task is clearly to know how to separate such voices to make sense of the utterance), they are cases of an utterance which consists of a minimum of two utterances by different speakers (this is the so called phenomenon of polyphony). Is this consideration not sufficient to show that dialogue or conversation analysis is involved in analyzing sentences (even minimal units such as 'John said that Mary is in Paris')? A view of linguistics which, from the very start, exploits a dialogic notion is not palatable, particularly to those scholars who have long been antagonistic towards a view of language that supports central notions such as communication and dialogue. (But surely it is palatable to those of us who believe that communication must play a central role within linguistics). Dialogicity is an important notion which helps to explain how discourses are structured and how they are constrained by their public dimension (for example, the issue of slurs; in reporting slurs, dialogicity is very important, because the public dimension increases the danger of uttering or reporting a slur and may even contribute to transforming mentioning into using a slur; without dialogicity, this otherwise inexplicable *transformation* could not be accounted for).

At this point, we can understand why linguists have tried to resist the notion of indirect reporting and also why there has been such a long silence on this issue. Crucially, the theory based on indirect reports is at odds with the form of linguistics we are today inheriting from formal schools (with the exception of socio-linguistics and anthropological linguistics). But now that this silence has been broken (Capone 2016; Eckardt 2014), it is time to reconcile the classical view of linguistics as being competence-driven with the view of pragmatics as being performance-driven. From the very start, it should be clear that I will assign principles of language use the important role of reconciling competence with performance. Also, I am not denying that competence plays an important role in language and, in fact, much of what I have to say about language use is likely to slide into a theory of competence (given what I have said earlier in Chap. 4 about the tension between semantics and pragmatics). However, although my intentions are conciliatory, I will not relinquish the idea that indirect reports are probably cases which show (here and there) the necessity of pragmatic intrusion in semantics. Independently of this, the very fact that the main problem for indirect reporting is how to separate voices (the original speaker's and reporter's) seems to introduce an irreducibly dialogic dimension into the notion of indirect reporting, which theoretical linguistics has to take into account and can no longer afford to ignore or trivialize.

2   Why Do we Need Indirect Reporting?

Utterances are events and, as such, it may sometimes be important to narrate them. The shift from dialogue (the context where the utterance is situated) to narration involves 'extracting' the event from the textual sequence in which it belongs and placing it, after some suitable transformation, into a different textual sequence and context (I assume that the (new) context is the set of assumptions which can be used to fully understand the new sequence). Since the participants in the new textual sequence are different from those in the previous textual sequence, we can reasonably assume that an utterance which was, initially, interpretable in the light of common ground CG1, is now interpretable (or should be made interpretable) in the light of CG2. Given that indirect reporting may involve some form of narrative shift, it is important that this shift at least preserves, or summarizes, or is compatible with features that belonged to CG1. Frankly, I have to admit that I do not believe that narrators or indirect reporters make an effort to sum up the context of the utterance they intend to narrate, although, in principle, there is nothing that should prevent them from providing a summary of the context (in addition to a summary of the utterance). However, I am persuaded that an indirect reporter must be faithful to the original situation of the utterance and must capture or report elements that determine (even if not completely) the interpretation of the original utterance (in ways that capture the original speaker's intentions) or, in any case, s/he must report the utterance in such a way that is compatible (and not incompatible) with the original situation of the utterance. (The reporter must, first of all, play the role of an interpreter, which involves reconstructing the speaker's

intentions in the light of available clues where the language used by the original speaker is the same as that used in the report, or, otherwise, translating the words where the language used by the original speaker is different from that used in the report; very often, the hearer has to reconstruct the role of the reporter as interpreter/translator on the basis of clues available in the context).

But why should we bother to narrate utterances? Why bother to say that someone said P? If we judge that from P, the hearer (the intended co-participant or addressee) can extract information which is likely to affect his/her life and to modify his/her conduct in ways that are beneficial for him/her, then we take the trouble to report P. Why should we not just confine ourselves to reporting P? Why do we also bother to report that X said P? There may be multiple reasons. We might want to establish that someone is to be praised or blamed for the utterance. Or, more simply, we might want to support the truth of P by specifying who said P, because X is more authoritative than ourselves. Or, even if we have some negligible doubts about P, where we are open to the possibility that P is true and beneficial to the addressee, we may want to cite X as an informant, so that the addressee can decide for himself whether X is sufficiently reliable and should be trusted or not. In other words, indirect reports very often work as transmission chains and the hearer is capable, at any point in the chain, to form his/her own judgment as to whether the chain is reliable or not and whether s/he has to take action from it.

Now, these considerations may appear to be rather trivial, but the emphasis on *action* is important because it explains why opacity is sometimes superseded by transparency (opacity means that we are not permitted to freely replace an NP with a coextensive one without changing the truth-conditions of the utterance, in the context of that-clauses; transparency is a semantic property that allows the replacement of an NP with a coextensive one (e.g. normally the external argument of a verb is in a transparent position)). When we indirectly report utterances, it is important to furnish information and not misinformation and, thus, to use NPs that, in addition to illuminating the speaker's mental life, can shine a light on the addressee and allow him/her to identify a referent. In the social praxis of indirect reporting, there is always a tension between the exigencies of theory of mind and the exigencies of theory of action. These have to be somehow reconciled. The flexibility that pragmatic theory allows – due to explanations that exploit the principles of usage and that sometimes allow one pragmatic mechanism to have precedence over another – could not be achieved solely by semantics.

3   The Limits to Transformations

We typically have two utterances in indirect reports, with one being encapsulated in the other: the original speaker's and the indirect reporter's. Given the lack of quotation marks, it is often difficult to intercept the boundaries between the two utterances, given that the indirect reporter may choose quasi-literally what the original speaker has said or, rather, paraphrases what the original speaker has said, which

may differ in some way from the original utterance. The paraphrase is often determined by the context of the indirect report. Faced with a question such as, 'Can you briefly tell me what Ann said?', the indirect reporter has no other option but to provide a paraphrase/summary of the original utterance; clearly, he has to ensure that the summary is relevant to the interests of the hearer and, thus, anything outside these interests will be discarded, unless its omission amounts to a modification/alteration of the main purpose of the original speaker's utterance. There are many ways in which the message's words can be (legitimately) transformed, but one general constraint is one that applies to all paraphrases: regardless of the transformation of individual words or syntax, one should not get the impression that the message has been (drastically, deliberately) altered to suit the reporter's purpose. In fact, there are reasons for sometimes changing the words which were used in the original message, given that such an utterance has been removed from its original context (assuming that the message was suitable or was made suitable for that context and the recipients that were present) and has been transferred to a different context characterized by different hearers which may have a differential linguistic competence (for example, suppose that the original message contained some words of Latin, but that the indirect reporter judges that, in a different context, his hearers do not possess sufficient linguistic competence in Latin; then, he will judge it appropriate to translate those words into English).[1] It is not just the problem of translation (from one language to another) which the indirect reporter is confronted with; she often has to adapt NPs to the hearer and use different names where she believes that a particular name will not illuminate a (referential) light for the hearer; by replacing an NP with a coextensive one, she will ensure that the addressee will intercept the referent (Devitt 1996; Capone 2010; Wettstein 2016). Thus, transformations ensure a referential anchorage. (But this happens at the detriment of opacity, which is said to apply to intensional contexts like that-clauses of indirect reports. A theoretical move is needed to reconcile opacity in that-clauses with the practical needs of the reporter).

Does this mean that any transformation will suffice? In Capone 2010, 2013 and 2016 I was opposed to the idea that any transformation would be licit, as very often the concealed purpose of transforming the text is not only to adapt the text to the new situation, but also to (intentionally, deliberately) somehow alter the message (having a specific purpose in mind). All changes that are aimed at modifying the message, of presenting the message in a new light, are potentially suspicious (In fact, if I replaced what my friend John had said with a sequence of slurs, I would be deliberately causing a quarrel between John and my hearer who was being slurred (as if he was being slurred by John)). We should at least accept the constraint that not any transformation will suffice and that transformations are only licit if they do

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[1] Allan (2016) makes the point that both direct and indirect reporting may contain features of indirectness and uses the problem of translation to highlight this. You can directly report in your own language what someone, speaking in a different language, has said: this involves a level of indirectness. This point is well taken. Sometimes, in fact, as I have indicated in Capone (2016), it is not easy to differentiate between direct and indirect reporting.

not modify the illocutionary point of the message (the speaker's intentions behind the message, as reconstructed through cues and clues present in the original speaker's context (see Dascal 2003)). Furthermore, we should not accept (as licit), transformations that somehow modify the attitude of the original speakers to the referents (particularly human referents) being talked about. To be blunt, we should avoid injecting racism or any other form of prejudice into the discourse by using words that have strong racist connotations (e.g. slurs), by attributing them to the original speaker. To preserve the face of the original speaker, we need to somehow recognize that he must have some say into what can be reported regarding what he has said. He can express judgements (and reservations) on how the message is paraphrased/ translated ("This is not what I said", "But you have completely altered what I said", "I said this but I did not mean that …"). The parameter of the original speaker's judgment should certainly be taken into account when judging whether the paraphrase involved in the indirect report was legitimate (or NOT), although I should concede a point made by Wayne Davis p.c. in criticizing my views (Capone 2016). A biased or racist speaker may be somewhat pleased in being paraphrased or reported in a way that betrays his racism – and thus his judgment on the paraphrase may not be sufficient. He may end up approving a paraphrase that grossly distorts the main speaker's point. Thus, we need the paraphrase to be approved by at least by two agents: the original speaker and an impartial judge, who can compensate against any distortions contributed by the original speaker's own prejudices. (In any case, one would do well to distinguish between approving and agreeing with. The fact that I agree with a position does not mean that I publically approve that position. In fact, I may never approve a paraphrase of what I said, even if it expresses a position I agree with, in case it was not my intention to express that position in public).

But it is not only a question of racism. The original speaker may also object to the indirect report for matters pertaining to style. She may say: "But this was not my style. I would have never put the point this way". Style sometimes matters, and, to say the least, one should avoid injecting the paraphrase with grammatical errors, particularly if they were missing in the original speaker's statement (an eminent university professor would deeply resent being reported, particularly by a journalist, through the use of an ungrammatical or even slightly ungrammatical sentence). Sometimes, even purging mistakes could be impeded if we concede that, at least in journalism, the notion that the speaker's speech should be monitored for mistakes is at the heart of paraphrasing (probably because being faithful to the text and concentrating on mistakes would count as a distraction from the main point that the reporter wants to make when reporting an utterance; not to mention that the authoritativeness of the speaker would decrease which the reporter, at least in some cases, would not want to happen). It is incredible that academic texts are, for the most part, edited by anonymous copyeditors who correct these texts and present them as if the corrections were the author's. Clearly, following considerations by Goffman on footing, these texts have two authors. It is surprising that authors often do not devote a footnote to thank these collaborative (invisible) authors; in my view these should be

considered as being cases of appropriation. Should one quote or indirectly report such texts, one is surely not quoting or indirectly reporting a single author, but two authors.

Even though I state that indirect reports should be benign and stylistic problems should be remedied (because these would be a distraction from the content), sometimes altering the style may be an abominable form of omission. This is true of the famous twitter by Donald Trump which stated that, "China steals United States Navy research drone in international waters – rips it out of water and takes it to China in unpresidented act". Trump later tried to correct this mistake, but the international press all reported his spelling mistake as it revealed gross ignorance (and one would not expect the President of the USA to be an ignoramus).

4   Do the Intentions of the Original Speaker Count?

From the outset, we have to decide on whether a good practice of indirect reporting should rest on literal meaning or whether one should recognize the reporter's duty to report (primarily) the speaker's meaning and not confine herself to the literal meaning. This is an important dilemma. One has to say, from the outset, that the speaker's meaning appears to be critical in indirect reporting (and more so than literal meaning). The reason for this is that sometimes, albeit not in general, the speaker's meaning supersedes the literal meaning, and, therefore, merely reporting the speaker's meaning would amount to giving the impression that one is transforming the message and tipping the scales in favour of an unintended interpretation. In Capone (2016) I discussed these notions in some depth:

> It suffices to say that, for the time being, I am inclined to accept a view that indirect reports, usually or normally, report an interpreted utterance and thus encapsulate features of the context of the utterance, although I would probably have to concede that in the presence of insufficient clues, an indirect report may be taken to minimally report the locutionary content of what was said. However, this is not the default interpretation of an indirect report, and we need an abundance of clues to discard the default interpretation involving a reference to the (original) speaker's meaning. Intuitively, one reports an uninterpeted locutionary act only if there are ambiguities and one is not able to resolve the ambiguity by coming to a plausible (preferred) interpretation. Proffering an indirect report that is very close to the literal act amounts to a surrender: one is not able to report the speaker's meaning because there are irreducible ambiguities and one wants to get the hearer involved in settling the ambiguity, which requires an investment in responsibility (Capone 2016, 2).

If the literal interpretation is not intended by the original speaker, then it is not appropriate to report the utterance literally. In Capone 2016, I emphasized at least three points. The indirect reporter is allowed to report the utterance literally only if there is no discrepancy between the literal and non-literal interpretation; the indirect reporter has to report the utterance literally where there is some interpretative ambiguity that she cannot easily resolve and, thus, by reporting the utterance literally, she concedes that there is an interpretative dispute which, as such, ought to be passed on

to the hearer. Otherwise, the indirect reporter has a duty to report the utterance non-literally, being faithful to the speaker's intentions. However, given that a speaker knows that, in principle, a reporter may avail herself of the option of reporting the utterance literally, if the matter is important to her, she should adopt a principle of Prudence and avoid (projecting) non-literal interpretations, given that the hearer can report what she said in a literal way, albeit not legitimately. A speaker who means something other than what was reported literally (and illegitimately) has the option of defending herself by listing the contextual cues and clues that modified her intended interpretation in the original context and, also, of specifying how the reporter deliberately transformed the meaning of her words.

Linguists/philosophers of language, such as Cappelen and Lepore (2005), have used indirect reports as a way of testing meaning (whether a contribution is semantic or pragmatic) and they defend the idea that indirect reporting should primarily reveal the semantic point of the utterance. I have no quarrel with this idea, although, in keeping with what I have previously stated, the crucial question is what happens when the speaker blatantly departs from literal meanings. Anyway, my intention is not to contradict Cappelen and Lepore's meta-theoretical point. When we have a context like Cappelen and Lepore's, we know what the purpose of the indirect report is – testing a theory of semantics – and we may also accept that purpose and state that, for that limited purpose, what indirect reports reveal is semantic in nature. However, given that in real life we have accepted that one should indirectly report utterances non-literally (particularly if they depart from a literal meaning), we should be aware that Cappelen and Lepore's test is controversial. We have already stated that, in some contexts, it is not appropriate to report an utterance literally (if there is an interpretative ambiguity that one is unable to resolve), and thus we may very well concede Cappelen and Lepore's point. However, we should then at least warn our readers that indirect reports can be seen both as a test for semantics and as a test for pragmatics, and we should know what the context is so that we are able to select one option over the other. Even accepting this possible divergence is akin to conceding that indirect reporting is no test after all (in fact, it is doubtful whether there can be automatic tests that can help us separate semantics from pragmatics, given that at least sometimes they (these two levels) are fairly entangled). We already know from the outset what the semantics is like, and we do not need indirect reporting to show us that a certain interpretation is the legitimate semantic one. On the contrary, it makes sense to use indirect reports to test pragmatic meaning, since this involves altering and adding levels to semantic meaning.

5   Opacity

It is now time to discuss (to some degree) the issue of opacity. It is well known that that-clauses are intensional contexts, that is contexts in which it is not licit to substitute an NP (but it could also be another element of the sentential structure, such as a verb, for example) with a coextensive one (one which denotes the same object),

because the result is (or may be) a drastic change in truth conditions. For opacity, the most commonly studied objects are that-clauses that depend on verbs like 'believe' or 'say'. Undoubtedly, there are some notable differences between 'say' and 'believe', although there are also some similarities because one who says *p* typically (though not invariably) is one who believes *p*, and one who believes *p* must show at least an inclination to say *p*, at least in response to the question whether *P* is true or not. Despite the differences (the most obvious of which is that one can say *P* without believing *P*, given that anyone can be a liar), both 'believe' and 'say' end up being intensional, that is, blocking Leibniz's law on that-clauses which is dependent on them. The reason why someone who believes P need not believe Q (even if P and Q are coextensive) is that she may withdraw assent to Q because she does not recognize that a referent of an NP in Q is coreferential with an NP in P. One may believe that Cicero is a very good orator without believing (and knowing) that Tullius is a good orator. Analogously, someone who says P need not feel bound to accept that Q (and, above all, need not be inclined to say that Q) even if P and Q are coextensive, in case he does not realize that saying P amounts to saying Q.

Some may believe that opacity is mainly a matter of semantics. It is the nature of the verb 'believe' or say' that blocks the application of Leibniz's rule. Yet there are a number of exceptions to this rule because, as we have already rather hurriedly seen, there may be tension between a theory of mind (and a theory of saying) and a theory of action. Action may not be possible unless we deliberately change, at least in some cases, the NPs that allow the hearer to have a referential fix on a certain object (Korta and Perry 2011). If we want the hearer to take action, we should be capable of at least replacing an NP with which the hearer is not familiar, with an NP which the hearer is (indeed) familiar. If we show a preference for a theory of action, we have to neglect a preference for a theory of mind. In any case, if there are rules stating that indirect reports (including belief reports) are opaque contexts, these rules are invariably bound to have many exceptions (one notable exception is the fact that, in many cases, what is said or believed appears to be expressed in the reporter's language, while intuitively it had to be thought of in a different language, given that the original speaker was the speaker of a different language). Now, while I am not opposed in principle to semantic opacity, being a scholar in pragmatics, I have to at least consider the plausibility of having an opaque view of intensional contexts based on pragmatic principles, particularly in the case of indirect reports, Intuitively, this would allow opacity to be sufficiently flexible, allowing all the exceptions that we have so far discussed to edge into that-clauses. But this amounts to accepting that it is difficult to define the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics and that our semantics tolerates a non-negligible dose of pragmatic intrusion. Actually, we have done much more than decree that there is a certain amount of pragmatic intrusion into semantics, but we have already accepted the rather radical idea that what has so far looked like a semantical rule is, in fact, entirely due to a principle of language use (we have not as yet invoked Gricean maxims to explain pragmatic opacity, but in Capone (2010, 2013, 2016) I have made reference to a paraphrase/style/form rule that appears to be within the scope of pragmatics. And it

is this rule that is responsible for opacity (although we now concede that, in the case of indirect reports, opacity is something of a pragmatic nature). The flexibility of our pragmatics allows this rule to be defeated whenever a theory of action is ranked higher than a theory of mind, that is, when the vocalization of an indirect report is aimed at favouring a certain action on the part of the hearer, and such an action would never take place unless, or until, s/he recognizes the referent of an NP or s/he comes to know a certain fact in English, the only language known to her, even if the original speaker uttered a proposition in the only language known to her (e.g. Latin or Russian). Flexibility need not amount to cancellability, as there are many aspects of discourse which still have to be studied before one can say that opacity, or the lack of it, in discourse is defeasible or not. The fact that there are some discourse rules that tell us to behave in a certain way, rather than in another, need not be a clear indication that a phenomenon is cancellable. In fact, in that context the phenomenon need not be cancellable. However, I am aware that this discussion is not straightforward and, furthermore, requires a semanticised notion of discourse rules which we are not familiar with. However, I am not skeptical about the idea that, in future years, we may be able to come to a better and deeper understanding of these issues (and how they are, for example, related to discourse rules that determine repair work). So, while we shall not now proceed in this direction, I want to at least take stock and highlight the definitive results of this discussion. The result, so far, is that even if it is difficult to accept a semantic rule which determines opacity (in indirect reports), we know that opacity is a default characteristic of the that-clauses of indirect reports, and this is due to pragmatics (what we can call pragmatic opacity). Pragmatic opacity is sufficiently flexible to accommodate exceptions to opacity, cases in which the report (and the reporter) forgets about the prescriptions of pragmatic opacity but freely replaces an NP with another. Now, despite the substitutions, there may be some pragmatic mechanism which marks an NP that is within an intensional context as being thought of through some form which need not coincide with that NP and which represents the mode of presentation of the original speaker/believer of the referent of that NP. (Thus, I would partially accept what Richard (2013) states about the contextual nature of belief reports, but would not accept that, in the default case, the NP present in the utterance is taken to represent the mode of presentation of reference for the original speaker). So far, I have more or less expatiated on the fact that pragmatic principles which determine opacity may have to be flexible, and may have to be superseded in the situation where a theory of action becomes prevalent with respect to a theory of mind. But it may be useful to give an explanation of how a pragmatic theory of opacity works by reporting a discussion which I presented in Capone (2016). This was presented by making reference to a theory of language games, but only with the purpose of giving a didactic illustration of the pragmatic rationale involved in opacity (it is clear that other speakers may use alternative strategies (see Soames 2015), so I am not claiming that this is the most favourable one).

In current (pragmatic) theories, there is the presupposition (or at least the tacit acceptance) of the clearly not very appealing idea that the representation of a sentence embedded in a verb of propositional attitude does not refer to the mental representation of the person whose belief is being reported, but to the mental representation of the speaker who reports this belief. This is a counterintuitive idea as it violates every basic principle of rationality which underlie communicative practices. (I do not deny that there are exceptions to take account of, and that there are contexts in which the main speaker is considered to be culpable for any impropriety of the indirect report). If we want to describe Mary's belief it is much easier to start with Mary's mental representations, rather than with our mental representations of Mary's representations, unless there is a problem that renders a deviation from such a practice necessary. Let us suppose that we have many cards (this example understandably has a Wittgensteinian flavour). On the external side of the card we do not find the card's content only a generic message: 'Representation of Mary's belief' or 'Representation of the representation of Mary's belief' or 'Representation of the representation of the representation of Mary's belief'. Which card will be chosen by a person who is interested in knowing what Mary believes? It is clear that as soon as meta-representative levels have been added (or multiplied) we depart further and further away from the original representation of Mary's belief. The most rational addressee will prefer the card that more directly represents Mary's belief. However, if for some reason this card contains an obscure NP, then the recipient will try to choose a different card and, in order, the card exhibiting a representation of the representation of Mary's belief (the order of which is determined by rational choice). This is the point of view of the addressee. Let us now consider the point of view of the person who reports Mary's belief. Which card will be chosen by such a person? It is taken for granted that the speaker is aware of the interests of the addressee and knows that he prefers to have direct access to the belief of the person whose belief is being reported, rather than to the representation of the representation of such a belief. The choice of the speaker, then, must model (or reflect) the choice (or the preference) of the addressee as determined by his practical interests. This description of the language game (because at this point it is evident that we are dealing with a Wittgensteinian language game where different possible moves are available) reveals the fact that the person who reports the belief (or the belief attribution) uses the same linguistic moves as would have been chosen by the addressee (in other words he is able to simulate his choices) because he puts himself into his shoes and simulates his interests. He can also anticipate comprehension difficulties if he knows that the addressee does not recognize a referent through an NP and, therefore, at this point he avoids the card showing the direct representation of the belief because he knows that it would not be useful, and he thus chooses a different representation, even an indirect one. (In general, when we cannot achieve something directly, we adopt strategies that allow us to obtain it indirectly).

6   Direct Versus Indirect Reports

The idea that I have developed about indirect reports is very much indebted to the one I have formed about quotation (see Chap. 7 on quotation). To be frank, I would never have arrived at this view of indirect reports without undertaking a detour through the analysis of quotation, which has led me to a totally radical pragmatic theory of quotation (following the directions and signposts disseminated in Saka 2006, 2011). However, one of the negative consequences of such pragmatic theories (of quotation and of indirect reports) is that it becomes very difficult to distinguish between direct and indirect reports. To my knowledge, there are pragmatic ways of interpreting direct reports as indirect reports and there are pragmatic ways to interpret indirect reports as direct reports, or as having mixed-quoted segments. Given such views, it is not completely evident how one practice can be distinguished from the other, although one option open to us is to discuss the default semantics of direct reports and the default semantics of indirect reports. But it is not necessary to resort to such a move, which, when one considers it, has the same problems as pragmatic theories of quotation and of indirect reports. Default interpretations can be abandoned when/once it is clear that the context offers contextual clues that are incompatible with them and lead to their deletion. In Capone (2016), I attempted to emphasize the syntactic difference between direct and indirect reports, namely the fact (if this is a hard and true fact) that while in direct reports one can tolerate the presence of discourse markers (if one reports a voice, one can also report (directly) the kind of discourse markers used by that voice), in indirect reports the presence of some discourse markers is not tolerated very well – in fact a number of scholars have argued that they should be banished from these discourse positions. The discourse marker which has the strictest selection restrictions is 'But'; the utterance, 'John said that But Mary is very clever', sounds to me to be not well-formed (from a discourse and a sentential point of view), and the reason for that (if there is a reason) is that the complementizer is filled twice by 'that' and by 'But', which, being a connective, plays more or less the same semantic role as 'that' in conjoining two sentences. Now, some scholars, for example, Keith Allan (personal communication) have insisted that if we accept that indirect reports allow mixed-quoted segments, there should be no reason why (semantically and pragmatically speaking) connectives/discourse markers should not appear in such positions. Of course, at this point it is important to discover whether a discourse marker works like a genuine discourse marker or whether it may occasionally have the syntactic function of a connective. If it is a connective (syntactically), regardless of the story on mixed-quoted segments, it cannot appear in complementizer-filled positions (observe how the situation somehow improves when the complementizer is absent as in 'John said But Mary didn't go to Paris').[2] Now, why am I insisting on this theoretical position?

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[2]There are problems with other discourse markers, such as 'however', 'Oh', 'well' and 'anyway'. While these may function syntactically as sentence adverbials (and not necessarily as connectives), a problem that I can see is their insertion after 'that' (as in "Mary said that, however, she would never go to Paris"), even assuming that the claim about mixed quotation (invoked by Keith Allan

I am doing so because I believe that it is important to distinguish, at least from a theoretical point of view, direct from indirect reports. Opacity is a notion that requires, for its postulation, direct reports and it is imported into indirect reports only because, pragmatically, they can be seen as representing the voice of the original speaker, and the original speaker may object to the substitution of certain words (particularly in favour of foul language, obscenities, racist words, bad stylistic options, ungrammatical sentences, etc.). As was previously stated, opacity is pragmatically imported into indirect reports (thus, it is pragmatically rather than semantically justified, regardless of Donald Davidson's genial paratactic view. Davidson's view is applicable only if we consider opacity to be a pragmatic creature. Davidson was fundamentally right about 'saying that' but not because his semantic analysis can be defended (or is defensible), but because it can be translated into a pragmatic analysis which can take on the burden of Davidson's semantic hypothesis).

Now, if, by adopting the views of radical pragmaticists we accept that there are no boundaries between direct and indirect reports, we end up having trouble in justifying opacity, we would have to state at this point that not even in direct reports is it a semantic notion – something which I very much doubt. The only plausible alternative is to say that, despite the many cases of overlap between direct and indirect reports, there are principled ways by which to keep them distinct semantically, and this helps us establish that opacity has a semantic (rather than a pragmatic) cause. I am not saying that people cannot have alternative views but, for me, it is difficult and not very plausible to claim that opacity is, in all cases, pragmatic through and through. This would mean that opacity need not depend on the semantics of the verb 'say', but this is clearly problematic because, at this point, we would have to extend this reasoning to all other intensional verbs such as 'believe' or 'know', and if the pragmatic claim was the only thing that we could commit ourselves to, then we would have no (semantic) principled way to form a class of intensional verbs. It would then be, by pure chance, that intensional verbs are intensional, that is, they create opacity. Then this claim is a small step towards arguing that there is universal opacity here and that even positions outside extensional verbs can be opaque – a position which I have vigorously and strenuously opposed in Capone (2016), solely for the reason that universal opacity is an untenable hypothesis based on a proliferation of examples which do not show anything at all (except that there are a number of exceptions). Accepting universal opacity (which would surely be a totally radical pragmatic view) is similar to saying that all NP positions in a sentence are potentially opaque. I am not interested in such a claim, because if all positions are potentially opaque, then why should we bother to make the opaque/transparent distinction? Indeed, we would even have problems in stating that some positions are transparent.

(personal communication)) works, and creates an interpretative ambiguity which cannot be easily resolved in the absence of contextual clues. Who is responsible for the voice, at this point: the reporting speaker or the reported speaker? Pragmatic principles, like those used in Capone (2010), would ensure that the voice is attributed to the reported speaker, but, of course, there may be contextual clues inferring the opposite. This may be why people are reluctant to insert discourse markers in that-clauses of indirect reports.

7 Slurs

A discussion of the issue of slurs (words that are used to disparage some racial categories (Allan 2016) due to their perlocutionary effects) is of some theoretical interest within the context of indirect reports in determining whether my theory about indirect reports makes (or does not make) the right kind of predictions for slurs (as embedded in indirect reports). In other words, I want to study the interconnections between the issue of slurs and the issue of indirect reporting. What my theory predicts is that one cannot (out of the blue) take a non-racist (non-slurring) expression and replace it with a racist expression (or a slur) and embed it in the that-clause of an indirect report, attributing it to the person who presumably uttered the original utterance. In other words, we cannot attribute slurs to those who have not uttered them, just because they are coextensive with non-slurring expressions. Opacity is a guarantee that one cannot engage in this practice and that if one did, this would count as an illicit (immoral) action, almost equivalent to a lie. The reason why one cannot make replacements of this kind is that, although one, by doing so, would be telling the truth from a factual point of view (if just the referents and the denotations of the predicates were considered), one would be distorting the truth about the attitudes of the (original) speaker towards the referents. By attributing a slur to the original speaker, we are pretending that she is racist (when possibly she is not or she would not like to be regarded as racist). In other words, we are projecting an attitude which either she does not have (towards the referent) or which she would prefer not to be attributed to her (at least in public). (One can very well be racist but pretend that this is not the case). So, as far as I am concerned there can be no doubt about this, and it is evident that opacity protects the original speakers from having slurs being attributed to them.

Now, the most significant theoretical question is, instead, what happens if an indirect report contains a slur (embedded in the that-clause). Given that, in keeping with Volosinov, an indirect report is an instance of dialogicity and an example of polyphony, and given that we are well aware that there are different voices and we would like to keep the original speaker's voice separate from that of the indirect reporter, how can we set out to do this? How can we distinguish between voices and whose voice should we attribute to the slur? Should we attribute the slur to the original speaker, to the reporter or to both? According to Anderson and Lepore (2013) both actors are involved in slurring, even if they believe that responsibility for it mainly belongs to the reporter (Their view is largely dependent on the notion that a slur has a semantic potential for slurring and contrasts, for example, with Keith Allan's (2016) view, which considers slurring effects to be perlocutionary effects). Instead, my theory about indirect reporting makes the opposite predictions. It is mainly the original speaker who is responsible for slurring given that the indirect report is about him/her, and if the original speaker had not uttered the slurring expression, then the reporter would have a duty not to report the slur, falsely implicating that the slur was uttered by the original speaker. I believe that Anderson and Lepore and myself start from different premises, and we should be clear about what

is happening and why my predictions are different. According to Anderson and Lepore, there is an indictment against uttering slurs, whether in direct locutions or indirect reports. The reason for this is that there is an edict against using slurs. However, in direct quotations we can in theory refer to slurs, even if we are not using them. But there is an indictment against mentioning slurs, anyway. Given this edict (societal rule), either using or mentioning slurs should be prohibited. Thus, the reporter, if he used or mentioned a slur, would also be guilty. But the fact that the reporter is guilty of something does not mean that he is mainly responsible for the slur or that the slur belongs to his voice. In uttering the slur (while reporting it) he may be complicit because he did not make a substitution (the use of a weaker expression such as, e.g., the N-word (see Allan 2016 for this euphemism)). We can agree that he may have said something that is not politically correct. But he has certainly not projected himself as being principally responsible for the slur, given the possibility that the original speaker was responsible for it, and if the original speaker had never uttered it, it would be snide on the reporter's part to use a slurring expression in reporting what the original speaker said, thereby creating an interpretative ambiguity. If anything, the speaker has the duty to make the interpretation process as smooth as possible for the hearer and this involves predicting, and possibly eliminating, (by the use of alternative more neutral expressions) interpretative ambiguities. In Capone (2016), I correctly insisted that it should be possible, at least in theory, to report a slurring expression without being guilty of slurring. This is more or less what happens in a linguistic book, where we mention (in Lyons' 1977 use of 'mention') a slur and we certainly do not want to be seen as using the slur (also see Allan 2016), as being complicit or as being racist (in other words, I insist that there should be a difference, at least in theory, between using and mentioning a slur and that the latter action should be less culpable). It is true that the scholar who writes about slurs has to do some repair work in order to get his story correct (and avoid the accusation of being racist), but this is certainly possible, and it is part of our linguistic resources that we can offset the negative potential of a word by explaining why we are using it (or, rather, mentioning it) in a theoretical discussion).

Of course, there are many contexts in which slurs can be used (or mentioned) and in some contexts the implications of the action (of slurring) may be stronger and more negative. In an informal conversation, one may very well report a slurring expression with the intention of accusing the original speaker of saying something which was not correct (societally speaking, given that the slur denoted racism). However, when we talk on radio or television, it may be completely out of the question to use or mention a slurring expression (see Mey's Preface to Capone (2016)). A curious aspect to this, which is of great consequence but on which we cannot dwell long, is that given the public dimension of radio or television talk, the mention of a slur becomes 'ipso facto' a usage of the slur. Why is it that there is such a strong **transformation** (from mention to usage)? (And authors, such as Anderson and Lepore, are silent here on the issue of this possible and powerful transformation which is itself of great theoretical importance from a linguistico/pragmatic point of view). The reason cannot be semantic but must be pragmatic. The speaker who

intends to report (an example of the usage of) a slurring expression knows that he is speaking to a wide national audience and that the slurring expression may sound offensive, at least to a section of the population. Furthermore, it may count as a **precedent** to further future uses. Moreover, he knows that there is an interpretative ambiguity and that it is likely that the audience will interpret his utterance as attributing the slur to the reported speaker. However, given that he is speaking in public, he should do something to distance himself from the reported voice. If there was an alternative to the slurring expression (e.g. the N-word) and he did not use it, then he would show himself to have little concern for the feelings of those who feel insulted by the use of the N-word. Therefore, it appears that there is a convention like the following:

> When you speak in public to make an indirect report, you should place maximum distance between yourself and the reported speaker's words in case the reported speaker uses words that are offensive, at least to a section of the audience, because the use of mass media multiplies the offensiveness of the slurring expression.

The reason why the usage (or mention) of slurs in speeches, which are projected through mass media (at the national level), is prohibited is that there are priorities about what should be done and what should be avoided. It is like choosing not to do something which is fundamentally benign because some people may distort the nature of the deed. Creating precedents of usage through quotation (in contexts in which it is not absolutely clear whether one is quoting, rather than using, an expression) before a wide national TV audience is never advisable. Even when quoting, one may hurt other people's feelings and evoke a social problem – and one may wish to avoid this in certain circumstances in which there is no focus on a problematic issue.

Now, I believe that something of this nature must be operative in language, however it only works for special situations. Certainly, it is not applicable to scholastic books that discuss slurring expressions and their potential offensiveness. There must be ways in which to talk about slurs which do not amount 'ipso facto' to slurring. And this corroborates my views on indirect reports and the implicit practices that attribute the slurring expression to the original speaker rather than to the indirect reporter.

8   Conclusion

Indirect reporting is an important practice and one which we cannot do without. It is a practice similar to describing or reporting an event, but in this case the peculiarity of the reporting is that we are confronted with a linguistic event. In the same way in which we can report an extra-linguistic event, we can focus on some, but not all, details, and we can thus transmit a partial view of what has happened. In general, this is sufficient to allow the hearer to grasp what has happened and to utilize such knowledge for the purpose of action. Reporting is almost never a neutral action,

since in reporting we are actively interpreting what has happened, in this case a linguistic event. Thus, the act of reporting amounts to an act of interpretation/paraphrasing of the original event. This is why, in the default case, an indirect report is designed to report what the speaker intended to say and thus encapsulates all the contextual clues that might be utilized for the purpose of extracting knowledge from the original speech act (conversely, reporting an utterance verbatim may sometimes be a way of obscuring the intended meaning of the speech act).

It may be important to study all the facets of indirect reporting – in particular implicit indirect reporting. There has been little written concerning this, with the exception of some articles on quotation by Elizabeth Holt and some discussions of these notions in the final chapter of Capone (2016) (Capone utilizes indirect reporting to shed light on the mystery of substitution failure in some simple sentences (see Saul 2007)). It may also be important to investigate the connection between indirect reports of the implicit kind and presuppositions, something that has been studied in Macagno and Capone (2016) and Macagno and Capone (2017).

Another important aspect to the investigation of indirect reports is to shed some light on the connection between translating and indirectly reporting; another important facet is to investigate the interpretation of laws as a peculiar case of indirect reporting. Polyphony is an important notion here, given that passing a law amounts to making a collective speech act, in which the voices of many agents have to intersect (and a compromise must be reached). Clearly these are all topics for future discussion, as I have been restricted here to what can reasonably be examined within the confines of a short chapter. Let me reiterate that indirect reports are an important feature that promises to shed light on the reason d'être of linguistics, that is, its relationship with a theory of communication. I find it hard to imagine a form of linguistics which expunges a theory of communication, although linguists of Chomskyan origin have done their best to segregate/insulate linguistics from a societally inspired subject in which the main object should be the investigation of the role of communication in society. We should be trying to rectify this mistake which has been perpetuated by generations of scholars of the formal school of thought.

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Chapter 9
Maier on the Alleged Transparency of Mixed Quotation

Abstract In this chapter I propose, unlike Maier (Semant Pragmat 7, 2014), that quoted fragments in so called 'mixed quotations' (what I prefer to call 'mixed indirect reports') are opaque. This view of opacity is required, we propose, to preserve the difference between direct and indirect reports, direct reports involving possibly high levels of literality, accuracy and granularity, even if we concede, in keeping with Maier, that verbatim quotations are also susceptible to contextual standards of 'verbatimness', as Maier terms it. Maier's considerations against opacity and in favour of transparency are based on a shifted interpretation of indexicals, anaphoric reference, morphological adjustments (in Italian) and grammatical adjustments (transformations involving a different word order with respect to the original utterance in Dutch). Claim by claim, we are made aware that we should see regard things differently and that, after all, it makes sense to adhere to the conservative and classical Fregean claim that mixed quotations (and indeed quotations) are cases involving opacity. In fact, where would we be if we abandoned the idea that quotation in mixed quotation requires reference to an utterance understood to be verbatim, rather than through mere paraphrase? Is this not similar to arguing that quotation is also not an opaque context? Yet Frege, as highlighted by Evans (The varieties of reference, OUP, Oxford, 1982), insisted that intensional contexts were contexts providing evidence in favour of opacity and were at a level of meaning which was different from denotation (the other level of meaning which is constituted by senses or modes of presentation).

1 On the Social Praxis of Indirect Reporting

It is rather unusual that, for many years, the issue of indirect reports has been neglected by linguists, even though it has attracted the attention of philosophers like Davidson and, subsequently, his advocates. Linguists have never been attracted by

the issue of indirect reports (and pragmatics), presumably because this is an issue requiring the centrality of speaker's intentions and a theory of communication and dialogue. In fact, Volosinov has stressed that an indirect report is a locus of dialogicity, as it involves different voices being integrated into a single utterance (the reporter and the reported speaker). Recently, Cappelen and Lepore (2005) have returned centrality to the issue of indirect reports, because they have construed them as a diagnostic test for a theory of meaning and, in particular, they wanted to support their theory of semantic minimalism through indirect reports. It is regretful, however, that indirect reports seem best suited for demonstrating, if they are indeed needed to demonstrate anything, that a speaker's meaning has centrality in a theory of meaning even if, in some cases, as shown in Capone (2018), the indirect reporter, when faced with an interpretative ambiguity, prefers to report an utterance in a literal, or almost literal way, passing on an interpretative problem (or uncertainty) to the hearer.

The implications of the research on indirect reports have compelling consequences for a theory of linguistics. Linguistics cannot neglect issues such as communication as it is simply untrue that the main function of language (as many formal linguists accept) is to express and articulate thought. The main function of language is communication (Davis 2016) and this, of course, needs to be integrated with the task of articulating thoughts.

We would not be surprised if further research on indirect reports provokes a revolution in the field of linguistics, giving centrality to aspects which have been ignored for many years while communication theory lost favour with orthodox linguists.

Capone (2010a, 2016) discussed at length the social praxis of indirect reporting, considered as a pragmeme (Mey 2001) or a Wittgensteinian language game. Capone concluded with the following principle:

Paraphrase/Form Principle
   The that-clause embedded in the verb 'say' is a paraphrase of what Y said, and meets the following constraints: Should Y hear what X said Y had said, Y would not take issue with it as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrase of the original utterance. Furthermore, Y would not object to the vocal expression of the assertion, based on the words following the complementizer 'that' on account of its form/style. (Capone 2010a)[1]

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[1]A serious objection to Capone's Paraphrase Principle was raised by Franco Lo Piparo (personal communication). Lo Piparo stated that the Paraphrase Principle is anchored too much to the original speaker's approval with regards to the legitimacy of the indirect report. However, in some cases, the speaker is not the best authority to judge what he says, and what he is really saying only emerges in interaction with the addressees. We assume that the cases which Lo Piparo has in mind are those in which, by saying something, we offend a hearer and we are only aware of that when the hearer tells us. We assume that if Lo Piparo is considering the perlocutionary effects of the utterance, then his objection may not jeopardise the Paraphrase Principle which is primarily intended to encompass illocutionary effects and what the speaker means or says, without considering the perlocutionary effects, whether intended or unintended. Another response to Lo Piparo's objection is to combine his objection with the one raised by Wayne Davis (p.c.) and offer the same reply; when the original speaker is likely to fail to be sufficiently objective, then the indirect report has to be approved by an impartial judge.

This principle explains, amongst other things, why we cannot replace a neutral word with a slur, as a speaker who is not racist would never approve a report of his or her speech in which a slur has been used. This principle guarantees 'pragmatic opacity', that is, the notion that the distance between a word and another word replacing it in the context of a paraphrase of an utterance should not be too great, according to the reported speaker.

2   Mixed Indirect Reports (or Mixed Quotations) and Opacity: Against the Transparency View of Mixed Quotations.

We report what other people have said for a number of reasons (we sometimes report what we have said ourselves). Certainly, by proffering an indirect report we want to focus on someone's utterance – if not on his words, at least on the speaker's proffered point of view. Perhaps the reason why we report the utterance is to inform the hearer of the truth of the proposition p, by holding the reported speaker responsible for that proposition. If the hearer recognizes that the speaker is relatively authoritative on matters that bear on p, then she will come to believe the proposition p. (This mechanism is at the heart of the practice of citation in academic work). But this is only one out of a number of possible reasons. Perhaps we want to accuse the reported speaker of saying something that could hurt the hearer of the report, or perhaps we want to let the hearer know that someone said p, without wanting to commit ourselves to p.

   Certainly there is a difference (or there ought to be) between

(1) John said that p
(2) John said 'p'.

(2) is a verbatim quotation, but there is, nevertheless, as Maier states (see also Capone 2016), no guarantee that the words were not somewhat transmuted, as the standards of precision may vary depending on the context (Maier 2014). In Capone 2016, it was highlighted that we need to distinguish between direct and indirect reports at least syntactically, and one criterion of the distinction was that direct reports admit discourse markers at the beginning of the quoted segment, while indirect reports either do not include such discourse markers or they are rather clumsy if used after the embedding complementizer (an example could be *Mary said that But John is in Paris*; another example could be *Mary said that Ok John is in Paris*, where the Ok seems to be encapsulated in an implicit mixed quotation rather than being part of a purely indirect report; in other words, *Ok* forces the mixed quotation interpretation).

   There has recently been much focus on mixed quotation, which appears to share both the conventions used for the indirect reporting of an utterance and those used for quoting an utterance or a fragment of an utterance verbatim. We assume that

what Maier states about verbatim quotation also applies to the quoted fragment of mixed quotation.[2] How loose are the standards of precision, given a particular context of utterance? (Since it is not possible to remember all the words that were heard, it is plausible that the reporting speaker is making some changes without being aware of them).Yet, one has the impression that if there are reasons for using quotation marks for a section of an indirect report, this is due to the intention of exploiting the conventions for verbatim quotation and using high standards of precision (there may be exceptions arising in particular contextual circumstances, but this is another matter). In fact, what would be the point in precisely segmenting the utterance and having a portion of it encompassed by quotation marks, if the standards of verbatim quotation are always quite loose? This would appear to be a waste of time and the contrast, in itself, is an indication of an implicature (an M-implicature according to Levinson 2000) to the effect that the standards of verbatim quotation are quite strict or are certainly stronger than those used in other sections of the indirect report which are unmarked by quotation indicators. Therefore, we are already confronted with a phenomenon which is not semantic, but is partially pragmatic. In themselves, quotation marks do not guarantee the use of the strictest standards of verbatim quotation; thus, an M-implicature is responsible for the message being expressed and a contrast is exploited semiotically (and pragmatically) to express more than what would have been conveyed by quotation marks. Of course, quotation marks are present in the written medium, but except for some conventions which have only been introduced relatively recently, like finger-quoting (finger-dancing), one does not actually have a grammatical device in oral language by which to convey the grammatical significance of quotation marks. When speaking in public, those conventions which are exploited are parasitic on those of written language. Surely, one can use prosodic indicators to signal quotation marks in oral language, but many are persuaded that there is no significant difference between a mixed-quoted fragment of an indirect report in oral language and the corresponding indirect report without quotation marks. Yet, it is reasonable to assume that there should be ways to signal that a different voice is being parroted, including imitation of voice quality (professional speakers are relatively adept at changing their voice in the middle of an utterance, to indicate quotation; for example, a male actor may impersonate a female voice by considerably modifying his voice quality).

One property of mixed indirect reports (which is less confusing terminology than 'mixed quotation') is that there is an entailment relationship between the statement containing the mixed-quoted fragment and the corresponding indirect report from which the quotation marks have been removed. Consider the following contrast:

(3) John said that Mary "really likes offending people".
(4) John said that Mary really likes offending people.

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[2] Of course, to be fair to Maier's compelling paper, he makes an interesting distinction between quotation and mixed quotation. In quotation proper, the quoted segmented between the quotation marks is syntactically an NP. In mixed indirect reports (what Maier terms mixed quotation), the quoted fragment (encapsulated between the quotation marks) is syntactically any grammatical category that suits the constituent which it is occupying syntactically (it could be an N, a V, etc.).

If one understands (3), one therefore understands (4). The hearer can say that (4) is the gist of what has John said.

However, it is impossible to reconstruct (3) from (4), because one who accepts (4) need not accept (3), although it is likely that John has said something like, "(she) really likes offending people".

After a brief discussion of the data which seem *prima facie* to favour an opaque interpretation of mixed quotation (what we call 'mixed indirect reports' in this chapter) but is then rejected, Maier's main point is that mixed quotations are preponderantly transparent. I will briefly clarify what is meant by 'opacity' and 'transparency'. Opacity is a characteristic of belief reports (intensional contexts), whereby it is illicit to replace an NP (or some other grammatical category) with a coextensive one without changing the truth conditions of an utterance (see Evans' discussion of Frege). Transparency is a characteristic of reports whereby it is licit to replace an NP with a coextensive one. Intensional contexts are, notoriously, contexts where Leibniz's law is not applicable.

Now, an interesting point to note about belief reports, indirect reports and other intensional contexts is that philosophers and linguists have long accepted that they admit a (semantical) ambiguity and, thus, an indirect report or a belief report is ambiguous between an opaque and a transparent interpretation. I am not persuaded by the semantical ambiguity account, and in this opinion I will adopt the judicious considerations in Jaszczolt (1999) and subsequent work. At best, we recognize that there is an interpretative ambiguity here, and I am inclined towards accepting that these indirect reports (even belief reports can be subsumed into indirect reports) have default opaque interpretations, what Capone (2018) called 'pragmatic opacity'. This is not to say that contextual considerations cannot tilt the balance in favour of transparency. Thus, the view I embrace shows some degree of flexibility. There are occasions in which it is reasonable to believe that the speaker of an indirect report (in other words, the reporter) deviates from pragmatic opacity in order to ensure that the hearer recognizes a referent, by replacing an NP which was presumably uttered by the original speaker with a different NP which is more likely to be understood by the recipient (see Devitt 1996; suppose A has two different names and we know that the hearer in question recognizes A by one name but not by the other. Then, it would be reasonable to opt for that name which has a greater chance of being recognized by the hearer). Of course, we know that we are going a bit fast. Perhaps one should mention some considerations of undoubted importance which are due to Capone (2008). To explain what we now call 'pragmatic opacity', Capone assumed that an utterance of (5)

(5) John believes that Mary is crazy
should be understood as
John believes that [[Mary is crazy] [MoP 'Mary'_ MoP 'is'_ MoP 'crazy']]

Capone is not stating that this is the deep logical form of the sentence/utterance, but only that the appositive structure which has been syntactically appended to the S [Mary is crazy] is a pragmatic increment at the level of free enrichment that is supported by the combinatorial/syntactic potentialities of the language used (English).

A structure that may be *latent* can be used in a free enrichment process to provide structure, allowing the correct interpretation of the utterance and explaining pragmatic opacity. Of course, Capone considered this to be the default interpretation of belief statements, which in his opinion could be overridden by contextual considerations (the most obvious context in which this structure is illicit is the case of translation).

Now, this is a means of preparing common ground which will be exploited in my objections to Maier.

As I have stated, Maier, after briefly illustrating cases that demonstrate the opacity of mixed indirect reports (what he calls cases of 'mixed quotation'), demonstrates that there are exceptions and that transparent interpretations are also licit. Could this be the obvious consequence of the fact that both indirect reports and belief reports are (semantically or pragmatically) ambiguous between an opaque and a transparent interpretation? It could well be as a consequence of that, even if we are reluctant to accept it. There may be an interpretative ambiguity in indirect reports where there is no explicit use of quotation marks; however, in mixed indirect reports where there are quotation marks, at least in written language, the quotation marks act as a grammatical device indicating opacity, or so we believe. (Maier would appear to be of the same opinion regarding pure quotation).

Indirect reports and belief reports are pragmatically ambiguous (as Capone 2010a has proposed) because mixed quotation can only be pragmatically signalled if no explicit use is made of quotation marks. We may construe a constituent as being implicitly or pragmatically framed by quotation marks because we may use/exploit certain pragmatic principles and the obvious considerations that flow from them. A speaker who does not use the slur 'nigger' (an example from Davis 2016) is unhappy being reported by the use of an indirect report in which the word 'nigger' appears (illicitly). A reported speaker has certain rights, amongst these is the right not to see his/her speech distorted and transmuted in pejorative ways that s/he never intended. A limit to what paraphrasing can do (the magics of same-saying, to use a word dear to Davidson) is that speaker-intended interpretations (speaker meanings) should be projected by an indirect report, as the reporter is not free to change the words of the reported speaker and use language which s/he abhors (see Wieland 2013; Capone 2016) or is ashamed of. This helps to briefly explain the notion of pragmatic opacity by showing what happens if there is no pragmatic opacity blocking a speaker from using an indirect report in a way that is not accepted by the current social praxis. It is the social praxis that guarantees opacity.

Now, if one way of explaining opacity is to resort to pragmatic opacity and to accept that indirect reporting almost amounts to using implicit quotation marks on certain segments of the discourse, allowing quotation to be used in a non-strict manner due to the contextual standards of acceptability of variable granularity as far as accuracy or verbatimness is concerned and accepting the logical step of demonstrating (and accepting the demonstration) that mixed quotation is transparent, amounts to a self-defeating purpose. It appears to us that the view of pragmatic opacity and Maier's view that mixed quotations (quoted segments in indirect reports) are pragmatically transparent clash in a number of ways.

Now, regardless of the data that Maier provides in support of his views, there are cogent philosophical reasons for wanting to keep direct quotation distinct from indirect quotation (indirect reports). Opacity can only be explained through a theory of quotation (in fact, the considerations by Davidson concerning the semantic opacity of indirect reports have usually been disputed by other scholars, even though they remain a significant contribution to the theory of indirect reports, insofar as they show the connection between opacity and direct quotation, which through an artifice have also appeared in the logical forms of indirect reports, according to the now abandoned Davidsonian view). Opacity is directly derived from quotation, as the following demonstrates.

(6) John said: 'That man is crazy'
(7) John said 'That nigger is crazy'.

Although 'That nigger' has the same singular reference as 'That man', one would never dream of replacing (6) with (7), as that would involve attributing racist intentions to John. But we know that John is not racist, has never been, and never will be. (Even if we do not know whether he is racist, we have no right to make him appear like one). Thus, we are placing words in his mouth that he did not want to say. Abandoning opacity has two implications:

(a) We can report one's literal words anyway we like;
(b) We can indirectly report one's words anyway we like.

But this runs contrary to the social praxis of indirect reporting and verbatim quotation, even if we were to allow, as Maier does, contextual standards of verbatimness. But even if we were to accept the loosest standards of verbatimness, there is no doubt that any honest person would consider the deductive step from (6) to (7) to be also highly controversial, implausible and immoral.

Now I want to consider in some depth the Maier's data that appear to support (semantic/pragmatic) transparency.

Maier considers examples of indirect reports in Dutch, a language where mixed quotation involves word order adjustment. In the case of mixed quotation, we switch from SOV to SOV word order, examples of which are the following:

(8) ∗ Jan zegt dat hij "zal idiot een kockje eigen deeg geven"
(lit. John says that he will that idiot a cookie of own give)
(9)Jan zegt dat hij "die idiot een cockje van eigen deeg zal geven"
(lit. John says he's give that idiot a cookie of own dough will give).

While (8) is not grammatical/acceptable, example (9) in which the word order has been changed, according to a convention of the Dutch language, to express the mixed indirect report, is perfectly grammatical.

Maier assumes that transparency is involved here because the mixed quotation imperfectly reflects the word order of the utterance proffered in isolation. However, his objection would be decisive if one were not able to reconstruct the original utterance on the basis of the transformation of the indirect report cum mixed quotation. But in fact, these grammatical transformations highlight the focus on opacity

because, given the grammatical structure and the obligatory transformation involved, one knows how to reconstruct the original utterance. Thus, the indirect report is derivatively faithful to what was said *verbatim* in the literal utterance. It is not a superficial transformation that prevents us from seeing the quoted fragment. True, we have to reconstruct it through inference, but we are able to do so, and thus, going back through the transformation, we can preserve semantic opacity.

Another reason for disputing opacity is provided through studying examples from Italian. In this language, one can use indirect reports in which at least some words are transmuted, but given these transmutations, the words between the quotation marks have to be adjusted in order to follow grammatical requirements such as agreement with, for example, gender. The example provided is the following:

(10) A: Gli uomini italiani mi sembrano molto carini
      B: Ken ha detto che le persone italiane "mi sembrano molto carine".

Now, while I am aware that, according to a number of philosophers/linguists, the quotational context is a context that allows a shift in reference of the pronominal 'mi' (to me) (the pronominal I is not interpreted relative to the speaker of the indirect report but relative to the reported speaker (see Cummings 2016)), the Italian example appears quite poor to me because of the use of '"mi"'. It is possible that English and Italian differ concerning these atrocious interpretations (Schlenker 2003). (But this may be a pragmatic account, as anything that prevents the narration from being smoothly interpreted can be seen as increasing cognitive processing, thus creating an unjustified cognitive load). However, let us suppose that the sentence is also satisfactory in Italian. Then the readjustment of the noun which is inflected for the feminine gender (which is possible but certainly not very idiomatic) can be considered to be a transformation which is required by grammar. But then this appears to be a neutralization context with regard to gender, meaning that the hearer will not draw any inference concerning the actual word used by the original speaker (or may contemplate the possibility that the original speaker used either one form or the other).

But, I want to stress that I am relying on complex theoretical considerations, because those, like ourselves, who are much in favour of opacity may deny these data. One may state that these are loose, sloppy uses, but they are not really grammatically correct and they need not reflect/attest semantic competence. I believe that either through this radical reduction (distinguishing between performance and competence phenomena) or through invocation of a neutralization context, this (apparently thorny) example can be explained. At least, it does not give us serious reasons for concern regarding the Fregean theory of opacity.

Another way that Maier uses to defend semantic transparency is that, unlike other theorists who claim that indexicals like 'I' shift their interpretation in mixed quotation, he believes that this is not always the case. He provides examples like the following:

(11) When asked, Bob Dylan said that he continues his music career because "he made a vow years ago, he sold his soul and must keep up to his end of the bargain".

But we would not necessarily be concerned by examples like these, as they look like transformations. The speaker is aware that the discourse would be difficult to process if he inserted indexicals like 'I' because, in general, these indexicals tend to be interpreted with reference to the context of the embedding utterance; thus, he makes it easier for the hearer to process the discourse by making some substitutions. But Maier himself accepted that direct reports are subject to contextual standards of verbatimness and this may be a context in which these standards are relaxed to attend to the needs of the hearer, who may be genuinely impeded in his interpretation of the discourse by atrocious operators (according to Schlenker 2003).

Another example provided by Maier is the following:

(12) The sign says, 'George Washington slept here" but I don't believe he did.

This clearly could be transmuted into:

(13) The sign says that George Washington slept here, but I don't believe he did.

It is clear that Maier takes anaphoric reference by a pronominal to an antecedent in a quotation segment to be illicit from a grammatical point of view. Yet, he somehow forgets that he accepted that (12) entails (should entail):

(14) The sign says that George Washington slept here, but I don't believe he did.

This is not a secondary entailment, but a primary one, as one cannot mean (12) without at the same time meaning (14). But if one accepts (14), one clearly sees how the anaphoric resolution proceeds, as 'he' does not take its reference from 'George Washington' (in quotation marks), but from the denotation of the expression George Washington, which is simultaneously being used (denotationally) and mentioned. The anaphora is to the denotational meaning NOT to the mention of 'George Washington': end of the story.

3   Conclusion

I have so far examined Maier's argumentation in favour of the transparency of mixed quotations. Now, even if all his arguments were sensical (and I hope that I have demonstrated that his arguments are based on questionable assumptions or implicit premises), one still has to demonstrate what advances can be made if we abandon the idea that quotation is *per excellence* an opaque context, from which follows that indirect mixed reports (mixed quotations) are also opaque. Once we abandon the distinction between quotation (opacity) and indirect reports (pragmatic opacity), we have no principled basis for distinguishing between two of the most important categories of a theory of communication and meta-representation.

It is of some interest that, so far, the problem of the logical form of mixed quotations has not been addressed satisfactorily. Maier should accept, given his syntactic view of mixed quotation, that a sentence such as:

(15) John said that "Mary is in New York"

Means something like: John said what he referred to when using the words 'Mary is in New York'. Maier explains the meaning of mixed-quoted segments through the following notation:

ɿX [E (x, 'σ', X)]
= the X that the source x expressed with her use of the phonological string σ. (Maier 2014, 7: 25).

Now, while I agree that this is a step forward in understanding the syntax of mixed quotation, I wonder whether this is sufficient. Could this semantics be compatible with an ironic interpretation of 'Mary is in New York'? If we talk about the speaker's reference, a host of pragmatic problems, like, for example, highlighting the possibility of an ironic interpretation of the phrase between quotation marks, emerges. Now, if ironic interpretations amount to what Grice has described as cases in which the speaker makes as if to say p, it follows *ipso facto* that we have to deny the entailment relationship between (16) and (17):

(16) John said that "Mary is in New York"
(17) John said that Mary is in New York.

In fact, if we take/accept the ironic interpretation, we must conclude that John did not say that Mary is in New York, but, perhaps, the opposite (for example, in the situation where he was blatantly smiling when he said it). Maier may reply with, "Who cares if we have to abandon the entailment view? Perhaps this consequence is not totally unwelcome". But, of course, such a possibility makes it difficult for us to explain how anaphoric reference can be linked to an NP within the quoted fragment. After all, Maier may reply that he insisted on the transparency of mixed quotation from the beginning and his theory is, therefore, not incoherent. Coherent though it may be, it is unclear how Maier can explain anaphoric (denotational) reference to NPs within the quoted fragments. Presumably, he would need such NPs to establish referents that are accommodated in the global discourse representation due a pragmatic fix (accommodated presuppositions). Thus, he needs to add the notion of presupposition in order to account for anaphoric reference. But this account appears more like deixis than anaphoric reference. We can imagine a situation in which someone said, 'He is happy', and 'he' is anaphoric to John, whose referent is added to the context (accommodated) in order to account for the anaphoric resolution. But this case of anaphoric resolution is exactly the case which is involved in deixis, while we are currently discussing linguistic anaphora and not deixis. See what happens in the following example:

(18) John said that "he likes himself".

The anaphoric reflexive has to be bound within a local domain, according to Chomskyians, and thus the reflexive needs an antecedent within the minimal clause. We have no excuse for accommodating an antecedent (or something that can work as the antecedent) at the top level in discourse representation. My idea based on the entailment hypothesis (the mixed quotation entails the corresponding indirect report without mixed quotation) naturally explains cases of anaphoric resolution that are grammatically driven, while the pragmatic approach based on accommodation cannot do so naturally, that is without implying that, after all, even simple cases of reflexive interpretation are not determined by grammar but by pragmatics (alternatively, Maier can state that in the context of mixed quotation reflexives need not be bound within the local domain; this looks like a neutralization context for a grammatical rule). But this appears to be too much of an *ad hoc* solution. I believe that under the entailment hypothesis grammatical anaphora is explained because the entailed sentence provides a denotational NP that furnishes the referent which the anaphor (the reflexive) refers back to.

At this point, readers may reply that I have not yet given any positive indication as to how to fix the logical form of mixed indirect reports. Now, considerations by Capone (2008) may offer the solution. Instead of positing appositives at the level of the merger representation, we can simply say that the meaning of mixed indirect reports is rendered by a conjunctive structure like the following:

H1: John said that he likes himself and he said that by uttering the syntactically concatenated words 'he likes himself'.

Of course, a disadvantage of this solution is that it bans speaker-meant interpretations of the quoted fragment. But then we need to ask why one would want to use mixed quotation (that is mixed indirect reports), if one's purpose is simply to use language quotationally (saying that the quoted fragment is not used seriously but is used ironically amounts to accepting that it is merely mentioned, which then amounts to the acceptance that pure quotation is involved). But even if we were to accept Maier in that one can use indirect reports purely quotationally, this would appear to be in conflict with his idea that mixed quotations are transparent. If the purpose of quotation is to demonstrate an utterance as it was mentioned and not as used, why would we want to say that mixed quotation can be used in a purely quotational way and this should amount to accepting transparency? Indeed, accepting that quotation amounts to the mentioning of an utterance corresponds to claiming that the expression is used opaquely. Perhaps (all) Maier wants to say is that mixed quotation can be interpretatively ambiguous between purely quotational and transparent uses. But even this benevolent interpretation seems to accept a theory that is rather odd. Given that one can use mixed quotations either purely quotationally, or denotationally and quotationally, it is not at all evident why the speaker should not opt for pure quotation and thus avoid ambiguities? The Gricean precept that we should avoid ambiguities makes it implausible that we should use mixed quotation in a purely quotational way. Therefore, Grice has the last word on this issue.

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Chapter 10
First Person Implicit Indirect Reports

1   Introduction

In this paper, I deal with implicit indirect reports. First of all, I discuss implicit indirect reports involving the first person. Then, I prove that in some cases second person reports are implicit indirect reports involving a *de se* attribution. Next, I draw analogies with implicit indirect reports involving the third person. I establish some similarities at the level of free enrichment through which the explicature is obtained and I propose that the explicature is syntactically active, given that it sanctions anaphora.

   An implicit indirect report is a report which does not explicitly display features of indirect reports (e.g. the verb 'say' or the presence of a reported speaker), but implies an evidential base requiring the structure of an indirect report. Most importantly, in this paper I demonstrate that such structural elements are active from a syntactic point of view in that they allow anaphora under certain conditions. Although it is the speaker's meaning that matters in these cases, insofar as it intrudes into the explicature and it requires a certain (compulsory) logical form, the elements of the logical form implied at the level of the explicature are syntactically active. Furthermore, they sometimes require syntactic slots such as the experiencer and, furthermore, and somewhat surprisingly, in the case of second person reports what is being implied is a structure hosting a *de se* implicit attribution which allows an internal perspective. Such implicit indirect reports with *de se* ramifications are to be considered as logophoric structures that present the perspective of a particular person, and in general the experience is linked to a time which is posterior to the event being narrated in the indirect report.

I first considered the issue of implicit indirect reports when reading a paper by Elizabeth Holt that was submitted for my collection on indirect reports and pragmatics (Springer 2016). There was little discussion about implicit indirect reports because the focus was on indirect reports in general, but there was sufficient to allow me to give some consideration to this topic in Capone (2016) (implicit embeddings), and now in the present chapter.

The issues addressed by this paper go beyond the topic being explicitly discussed, as issues are raised on the nature of the explicature involved in semantic/pragmatic analysis and the possibility that elements of the explicature are syntactically active. Such considerations can also be extended to other types of explicatures and have to be pursued in due course.

I also find it rather surprising that from a speaker's intentions we can go on to reconstruct the explicature and its syntactic configuration, an aspect which is not normally discussed in the literature. That the explicature should have a compulsory syntactic configuration as a result of the speaker's intentions is somewhat novel in the literature.

For example, when I discussed belief reports and their opacity (Capone 2008), I found it useful to explain the explicature by pointing to a syntactic configuration, which would solve lots of problems arising from the introduction of modes of presentation. I proposed to analyse an utterance such as "John believes that Mary is clever" as consisting of an articulated sentence and an appositive sentence conjoined to it. The appositive sentence merely expresses a concatenation of modes of presentation, while the simple sentence only represents referential interpretation of an articulated sentence. Anaphoric links between elements of the appositive sentence and nodes of the simple sentence would allow us to reconstruct pragmatic opacity. This resolves the thorny problems of the logical form of belief reports, because the pragmatics of the utterance is helped by the reconstructed syntactic analysis of the actual sentence uttered and the sentence which is in the air, an unarticulated sentence rather than an unarticulated constituent.

Concerning indirect reports in disguise, we can say that a syntactic analysis is coupled with a certain semantic-pragmatic interpretation and helps guide the interpretation. That syntactic analysis is conducive to meaning, but the syntax is not at the level of the articulated sentence but is part of a pragmatically reconstructed sentence. The fact that unarticulated pragmatically reconstructed constituents should have some syntax is not surprising, though some may be prepared to deny this. If an unarticulated constituent is a sentence, it must have some syntax, but this does not come from the explicit logical form but from the mind of the reader who reconstructs the interpretation.

We assume that more examples than are under discussion in this paper can be subjected to a similar analysis, as most cases in which one cannot directly know another person's mind but gets to know it through what a speaker has said, potentially constitute cases that can be analysed as implicit indirect reports. Even innocent remarks such as, *John has a pain in his stomach*, can be analyzed as implicit indirect reports, given that the question arises as to how we know what is happening in John's mind or body if he has never told us what has happened to him. Since we cannot know what he feels like telepathically, it must be reasonable to assume that we know this by some other means and, presumably, through what John has said to

us about his corporeal sensations. A speaker's intentions prevail and a deeper logical form has to be reconstructed. The Wittgensteinian idea that at least a number of utterances must have a logical form that is different from what is superficially testified by the utterance is, therefore, vindicated.

I received a stimulating comment by one of the reviewers of this paper, which runs like this:

> The idea is very stimulating and interesting, but perhaps the author extends a little too much the possibility of considering statements, for example in the first person, as "implicit indirect reports." In fact, if we consider the author's example "John has a pain in the stomach" it can be considered as an indirect report because, as maintained by the author, "John could have told me he had a stomachache." And therefore the expression is correctly understood as an implicit indirect report. Although this could be true in many cases, I do not think that I can state that this kind of sentence is always an implicit indirect report. For example, I can say that "John has pain…" because I saw
>
> john contorting like when people have stomach ache, or because I know he has ingested a poison. Further, how do we know that a person feels depressed? Canonical evidence is provided by the person's utterance which expresses feelings and state of depression. Thus, 'You feel depressed' is
>
> pragmatically equivalent to 'You say you feel depressed', which is an indirect report. Thus, utterances such as (5) can be considered indirect reports in disguise. This is true but only if we consider the sentence "You are depressed" based on the previous utterance "I feel depressed." But what if just you look depressed?

I have great respect for this position. However, it actually helps build up the case that the inferences I am talking about are pragmatic, since they are defeasible in certain contexts, or because they are sensitive to contextual information, which plays some role in promoting them or in demoting them. I suspect, nevertheless, that the reviewers have somehow interpreted me as saying or proposing that these are default inferences, in which case they would be right that at least in certain cases they would not arise. However, I suspect that these are genuinely contextual inferential phenomena, where the context plays a role not only in cancelling an inference but also in promoting it. Needless to say, I agree with the reviewer that there are contexts in which we look at someone and know that she is depressed, without waiting to hear her utterance. But in some cases (e.g. telephone conversations), linguistic information is essential and in reconstructing the inferential layers of the response we see that some pragmatics is required to make a report an indirect report in disguise. All in all, I agree with the reviewer that here there may be different cases to note and discuss.

2   The Scope of Pragmatics

Semantics deals with aspects of meaning that are independent of context.[1] These are relatively stable and provide a structure upon which further meanings can accrue to the utterance.[2] Normally, semantics is fueled by words and the syntactic glue that combines them. Scholars in pragmatics believe that semantics is underdetermined, which means that even if we know the semantics of a certain expression, we do not know enough to know what the world is like (exactly). We more or less know what the world must be like, but this may not be enough for the purpose of knowledge. Capone (2013) has expressed the view that there may be a certain degree of exaggeration in this under-determinacy claim. At least certain words have stable meanings. If we know, for example, that there is a rose in Capone's house, we know what kind of flower we can expect there to be in that house. However, I admit that many examples are unlike this simple one and may advance the view that there are pragmatic increments to utterance interpretation which are fuelled through explicatures – that is, inferential enrichments are often of the free type (see cases of belief reports, knowing how attributions, indirect reports, attributive/referential attributions, *de se* attributions, etc.). I also agree that enrichments processes may go beyond reference assignment and ambiguity reduction. My view is that rationality can provide suitable expansions to sentential meanings.[3] When one takes into account what the speaker can rationally mean, we can reconstruct what s/he says. Very often such expansions serve to enrich the lexicon or the syntax. In other words, they are powerful ways of maximizing the linguistic resources of a language. Pragmatics is like a set of tools that can amplify the power of the language user. But, of course, this is no more than a metaphor, albeit a useful one, particularly for those languages such as pidgins which are impoverished and are stripped of semantic and grammatical resources. Thus, pragmatic enrichments range from reference fixing (saturation processes) and ambiguity resolution to free enrichments of the expansive type, (often) aimed at resolving logical problems such as blatant falsehood, contradiction and absurdity. These increments are the pragmatic components of explicatures. There has been a debate within the literature about whether these increments are cancellable or not. Pragmatists (notably Carston 2002) believe that pragmatic inferences,

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[1] Although, in some cases, semantics appears to be like an instruction which takes context as input, in a particular way, and gives a specific truth-evaluable content as output.

[2] Semantics provides a platform on which further meanings can be constructed. Most importantly, the unenriched logical form is capable of working as a premise in an act of reasoning which is conducive to fuller interpretation, provided that basic operations such as reference fixing and disambiguation have occurred.

[3] Synthetically, rationality is what leads to processes of reflective and unreflective inference in which a number of premises, including the literal meaning and the disseminated contextual clues, are put together (combined) in an argument that leads to a full interpreted proposition. The Gricean maxims or suitable equivalents (in expanded or compressed form) also work as premises in the argument. Since in an argument, we normally need something that leads from a set of premises to a conclusion, that is, a warrant, we can assume that in pragmatic inference the role of the warrant is played by the necessity of having speakers' intentions that obey canons of informativity.

explicatures included, ought to be cancellable, with cancellability being the hall-mark of pragmatic inference. Other scholars, for example, Capone (2003, 2006, 2009, 2013) proposed that the pragmatic components of explicatures ought not to be cancellable due to strong intentionality and to the fact that they are expected to resolve logical problems, which would remain if the explicature was cancelled (Jaszczolt 2016 writes about entrenched meanings, while she is not particularly explicit about the cancellability of explicatures). Thus, explicature cancellation would result in anomalies at the discourse level, in the cases of explicatures dealt with by Capone. (Of course, if the notion of explicature is extended, as proposed by relevance theorists, to cases of conversational implicatures (e.g. the quantifier 'some'), then Capone's considerations are not immediately applicable). Capone's considerations make sense if a strong notion of explicature is considered and if attention is confined to cases like those originally discussed in Carston's work.

In this paper, I am going to discuss the issue of implicit indirect reports. Thus, I need to provide some useful background that will enable the reader to make progress in the understanding of what is to follow. Indirect reports are usually micro-narrations relating utterances (an utterance is surely an event from a Davidsonian perspective) without doing so *verbatim*, that is, by reporting the exact words proffered by the original speaker.[4] They are usually summaries of stories, in which small details can be omitted, although the reporter is not allowed to offer a perspective that is totally removed from the perspective of the original speaker. Indirect reports are implicitly logophoric, in that they must be aimed at reproducing the perspective of the original speaker – at least they should not alter it too much and they should not present a self that is drastically different from the self of the original speaker. For example, it is not usually licit to replace some words with epithets or slurring expressions, even if the denotation is the same, because doing so would amount to representing the original speaker as someone who would use epithets or slurs, which is not (or need not be) the case. The perspective should not be altered – thus, indirect reports could be considered implicitly logophoric. Indirect reports are usually employed when the hearer is removed in space and time from the event of the utterance being reported. The context that facilitates the understanding of the pronominals contained in the indirect report is usually (with some exceptions) the context of the hearer, since the hearer has to have access to referents and the best way to have such access is to situate pronominals in a context which is accessible to the hearer. The original context of the utterance, being removed in time and space from the hearer, cannot be useful for the purpose of constructing reference. Furthermore, presuppositions need to be satisfied and they have to be satisfied in a context that is accessible to the hearer, not in one that is only accessible to the reporter or to the original speaker. For the time being, these considerations may suffice to allow the hearer to proceed with reading the presentation of the topics being discussed in this paper. Finally, indirect reports can either be explicit or implicit. If they are implicit,

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[4] Some believe that verbatim direct reports are a fiction, given that due to memory limitations we always make changes in the reported utterance. However, it should be taken for granted that, at least in the written medium, verbatim quotation does makes sense.

one usually has to reconstruct who the reporter is and when the report was proffered. Usually, one has to first of all resort to some contextual clues to understand that an implicit indirect report is needed and, secondly, in order to reconstruct the structure of the indirect report. Implicit indirect reports are more common than imagined, even though one can find very little in the literature by which to construct a theory of implicit indirect reports. Some clues can be found in Holt (2016) and in Capone (2016), who devotes a chapter to simple sentences, substitution failure and implicit indirect reports. The present paper is also a small step in the direction of the theory of implicit indirect reports.

3   First Person Implicit Indirect Reports

Suppose A says:

(1) I am depressed.

This may overlap, or otherwise be very different in content from (2)

(2) I feel depressed.

If it does not overlap with (2), it can be said to be uttered on the basis of a warrant provided by some other speaker's utterance, such as 'You look depressed/You are depressed'.

   Something very similar can happen in the second person. A can say:

(3) You are depressed.

This may overlap with either (4) or (5):

(4) You look depressed.
(5) You feel depressed.

If it overlaps with (5), (3) (You are depressed) is an implicit indirect report, something said on the basis of the warrant given by an utterance of (5) by the person whose state of mind is being described by (3). How do we know that a person feels depressed? Canonical evidence is provided by the person's utterance which expresses her feelings and state of depression. Thus, 'You feel depressed' is pragmatically equivalent to 'You say you feel depressed', which is an indirect report. Thus, utterances such as (5) can be considered to be indirect reports in disguise. An utterance is an indirect report in disguise when accepting it amounts to accepting an utterance on which it can be based, and without which there would be no evidence for the utterance in question. An indirect report normally has an implicit base, which is the explicit direct report on which it is based. Without such an implicit base, the utterance makes no sense, it has no evidential support, and amounts to an admission that the speaker is saying something without an evidential base.

The considerations above can be taken to introduce the issue of implicit indirect reports, but also the issue of the specularity relationship between the first and the second person (singular). In a dialogue, the addressee can act as a mirror and can be a source of self-knowledge for the first person subject. Anything that is first person can be referred to as second person, and anything that is second person can be referred to as first person. In this kind of game, anyone who uses the third person (e.g. 'He is depressed'), can be seen as speaking and acting from outside the game. Normally, a subject who uses the first person does not refer to himself by name; and a subject who uses the second person to refer to the addressee does not use a name, but prefers to use a pronominal. (The reason why we use pronominals for ourselves, rather than names, is possibly linguistic economy, given that a name needs a different kind of contextualization and can potentially pick up many referents, while the pronominal 'I' can, at most, pick up one referent in the context of the utterance, relative to the utterance). Someone who is outside the game can use either a pronominal or a name to refer to the participants in the I-you language game. A dialogical game involves the use of pronominals by the actors in order to refer to the actors who are playing the game. Anyone outside the dialogic game can use a name for the actors in the game. It is as if the use of pronominals vs. names marks an imaginary boundary between the I/you and the they, i.e. those who are inside the game and those who are outside.

Now, consider the following utterance:

(6) I never wanted to jump off the swing.

The speaker was three years old at the time of the event. He has pictures of that event, but he does not remember the event through memories from the inside (he does not have memories of himself being on the swing and not wanting to jump off when his sister wanted to join in the game).[5] As Higginbotham (2003) states, he has external memories that he was on the swing, because his mother and father told him about that event (alternatively he has some pictures as evidence of that event), he remembers the event from the outside, but he does not remember it from the inside. According to Higginbotham (2003) and Capone (2010), there is a difference between (7) and (8)

(7) I remember that I was on the swing
(8) I remember being on the swing.

The control construction [I remember PRO being on the swing] is even more first-personal than the one with the first-person construction, as it involves a genuine self-based perspective which allows remembering from the inside. If the memory is linked with joy (or, alternatively, with pain), one should remember the joy or the

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[5] Interesting interpretative issues emerge. Is (6) equivalent to 'I remember I never wanted to jump off the swing'? The other interpretative possibility is: 'I remember never wanting to jump off the swing', which is even more first-personal than the former interpretation. As Higginbotham (2003) would state, the latter interpretation is more logophoric in that it involves the internal perspective of the speaker qua the experience and subject of the act of remembering.

pain if one has remembered it from the inside. But if one remembers the event because someone has told one about it, and that person forgot to describe the associated sensations (experienced from the outside), one would not be able to remember them.

Returning to (6), given that the speaker was three years old (as attested by the pictures that he still owns), he could not (normally) remember the event from the inside and, thus, the recipient of the utterance will reason that the event is a memory based on someone else's recollections. Thus, it is not a direct report, but must be an implicit indirect report. This means that (6) must be embedded in something like (9),

(9) [I was told (by my mother) that] I never wanted to jump off the swing.

The sentential fragment flanked by the square brackets has been reconstructed. It is not part of the logical form of the sentence, but it is part of the explicature through which the utterance is understood. We may well, at this point, ask ourselves how active these components of the explicature can be. We may want to know if something like the following, which allows explicit anaphora, is licit.

(10) [I was told (by my mother) that] I never wanted to jump off the swing; thus, at one point, I started asking her whether my sister was unhappy about that.[6]

As far as we are aware, a structure like (10) involving an anaphoric link between 'her' and 'my mother' does not seem to be licit. The use of 'her' must be sanctioned either by an anaphoric site ('my mother') or by a referent salient in context. If neither of the two cases materializes, the utterance is uninterpretable and, thus, fails to be licit. However, it is possible that the explicature should be minimal and, thus, we should have (11) rather than (10):

(11) [I was told (by someone) that] I never wanted to jump off the swing; thus, at one point, I started asking her whether my sister was unhappy about that.

Utterance (11) does not appear to be much better than (10), but this may be due to the fact that 'her' has specific features while 'someone' has non-specific features. In fact, (12) appears to be much better than (11) because the null pronominal 0 in the object position with respect to 'ask' has unspecific features.

(12) [I was told (by someone) that] I never wanted to jump off the swing; thus, at one point, I started asking 0 whether my sister was unhappy about that.

It is true that we have now reached a dilemma. How can we know if 0 has independent reference or whether it is anaphorically linked with 'someone'? They may

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[6] *Vividness* should be taken to be an inferential syntactic structure which is associated with past tense reports (especially second person reports) requiring a logophoric interpretation. The structure is hosted through the syntactic device of a relative clause construction in an event which is implicit in the semantic/syntactic analysis of the main verb expressing the substance of the report, while we can say that the implicit event of the semantic analysis (a Davidsonian event structure) potentially hosts the syntactic construction that expresses vividness. A vividness implicit structure must be triggered by a number of contextual clues that say something about the participation of the speaker in the reported event.

happen to have the same reference by pure chance. Yet it cannot be as a result of pure chance, as demonstrated by the following more specific interpretative act:

(13) [I was told (by someone (who knew the event in that he participated in it) that] I never wanted to jump off the swing; thus, at one point, I started asking 0 (who knew the event in that he participated in it) whether my sister was unhappy about that.

The conclusion we have reached is fairly important, provided no flaws can be found in the argument, because it demonstrates that the explicated part of the explicature, that is the implicit component of the indirect report, is syntactically active at the level of anaphoric connections. Of course, the price we had to pay in order to reach this conclusion was to resort to minimality. We saw that, by choosing a more explicit (and specific) explicature, we could not obtain the same result.

Clearly, for (13) to make sense, 'someone' and 0 must be restricted in the same way, because someone who was not present at the event (someone selected at random in an arbitrary way) could not necessarily be able to reply to the question being asked. This does not mean that, in deriving the explicature, we cannot further enrich the minimal explicature through further expansion. We can indeed, but we have to be careful to maintain the minimal explicature in the expanded construction so that anaphoric phenomena can still be licensed.

4   Second Person Indirect Reports and Implicit 'de se' Attributions

Now consider a variation on (6) (I never wanted to jump off the swing):

(14) You never wanted to jump off the swing.

The person who utters (14) can be my father (or mother) who has vivid memories of the events in question (sitting on the swing, not wanting to jump off the swing, etc.). However, if my sister says (14) (or something like (14)), given that she (my sister) was also too young to remember, it is likely that spoken by my sister, (14) is a sort of echo of what my father or my mother used to say in their narrations of the past (I remember this story recurred several times in my life). Thus, spoken by my sister, the utterance should be seen as having an implicit base, which is an indirect report like:

(15) I was told (several times) that you never wanted to jump off the swing

or

(16) Dad used to tell us that you never wanted to jump off the swing.

Our readers may now become impatient and begin to ask why we are making such a fuss about (14), which is a report, and possibly an indirect report in disguise. The fuss we are making about (14) is justified, because if (14) is merely based on an

indirect report (and thus is an indirect report in disguise) its vividness is taken away. *Vividness* is like the direct participation in an event and is the recording of sensations linked to that event and experienced in that event. Thus, if (14) were not an indirect report, it would have a vividness that (14) qua an indirect report lacks: the sensations associated with the event and experienced from the inside. My sister, seeing that I never wanted to jump off the swing, may have experienced sensations of envy. Now, while the report may be not explicit about these experiences of envy, unless it is based on an indirect report, it should have a structure that reserves a slot for the experience at the syntactic level. Thus, our claim is that the implicit indirect report (14) would be different, syntactically, from the report (14) which is not based on an implicit indirect report. Thus, (14) which is interpreted as being something different from an indirect report, would have the following structure:

(17) You never wanted to jump off the swing in event e experienced by myself.

Adopting logical notation:

There is an e, e < utterance U (You never wanted to jump off the swing) and you
    never wanted to jump off the swing in e and e has at least two participants (you,
    I) and e was experienced from the inside by myself.

If (14) is interpreted as being an implicit indirect report, it should have a different structure along the lines of (18)

(18) There is an event e, and e < U (e is in the past with respect to U) and e has at
      least two participants (You, the indirect reporter) and e is the event of your not
      wanting to jump off the swing (at any of times t….tn of interval T) and U was
      reported to me by the indirect reporter in event e′, such that e < e′ < U.

Now, although the event is narrated from an external point of view being based on someone's else's narration, it is not to be excluded that there may be further structure to this utterance, given that the speaker, in reporting what was reported to her, may be an experiencer with respect to the event of the indirect report through which she knew the reconstructed event. In fact, in listening to the report, she may experience envy. Now, if I am correct, there should be a syntactic slot for the experiencer attached to the indirect report, along the following lines:

There is an event e, and e < U (e is in the past with respect to U) and e has at least two participants (You, the indirect reporter) and e is the event of your not wanting to jump off the swing (at any of times t….tn of interval T) and U was reported to me by the indirect reporter in event e', such that e < e′ < U and I was the experiencer with respect to the indirect report of U.

Could there be a syntactic motivation for this analysis? Perhaps data like the following will provide a syntactic motivation:

(19) You never wanted to jump off the swing and I resented that.

In (19), the pronominal 'that' is surely anaphoric, but anaphoric to what? The utterance could be ambiguous in two ways:

(20) You never wanted to jump off the swing and I resented that (the fact that you
      never wanted to jump off the swing).

This is a double implicit indirect report, as the feeling of resentment may have been reconstructed through the memory provided by the indirect reporter, who did not restrict herself to telling a story of an external event but also gave expression to feelings which were expressed at those times by one of the participants. Thus, (20) should be pragmatically equivalent to

(21)   You never wanted to jump off the swing and I resented that (the fact that you never wanted to jump off the swing), as my mother told me.

Thus, in (21) there are two indirect reports and the events reported may belong more or less to the same period (or they may be part of a sequence in the same period in the past).

   A different interpretation of (19) would be the following:

(22)   You never wanted to jump off the swing (mum used to tell us) and I resented that.

Could 'that' be now anaphorically linked to 'Mum used to tell us?'. This is not very plausible, although we are not sure whether it is possible or impossible. But (22) appears to be different from (21), due to the temporal specification of the event of resenting. While in (21) the event of resenting is located in the past with respect to the indirect report (my mother told me), in (22) it seems to be in the future with respect to the event of mum's telling of the story. Now it ought to be clear that (22) has further structure:

(23)   You never wanted to jump off the swing (mum used to tell us and I was the experiencer in the event of her telling us and I experienced x during and after her telling us) and I resented that.

It is clear at this point that the resentment concerns the experience x and not the real event, because the speaker cannot remember the event of resenting S's not wanting to jump off the swing, from the inside. Instead, the speaker can experience the event of resentment from inside by hearing the indirect report, and only after hearing the indirect report. What is being resented is not the fact but the experience of the fact experienced through the indirect report.

   When we look at all this, we clearly see that, after all, (14) is not only an indirect report in disguise and not only a case of a double indirect report, but it is also a case of a 'de se' indirect report (in disguise). Reference to participation or experience of an event from the inside takes us back to Higginbotham's (2003) view of *de se* reports. De se reports with PRO, according to Higginbotham, involved direct participation and experience of an event from the inside. Now, if this is the case, we can propose a minor, but not negligible or insignificant, modification of (23):

(24)   You never wanted to jump off the swing (mum used to tell us) and I remember experiencing x, I was the experiencer in the event of her telling us and I experienced x (during/after her telling us) and I resented that.

Now, it seems to me that (24) has the structure of a *de se* report and, thus, satisfies certain desiderata of *de se* reports with respect to internal participation and from experiencing a memory from the inside.[7]

We have seen that by reasoning on the utterance and on what the evidential base for it ought to be, we have reconstructed an explicature which has a relatively complex logical form. Could this explicature be cancelled? Now, while Capone believes that explicatures are not cancellable for certain motivations, such as with issues of strong intentionality and logical well-formedness, we have specific reasons here to maintain that the explicature is not cancellable. In fact, cancelling the explicature means proceeding backwards in the enrichment process. But we should remember why we needed the enrichment process: we reconstructed an evidential base and a reasonable way to do so was to reconstruct the discourse that preceded the utterance (14). Unless an evidential base is reconstructed, the utterance remains up in the air. How does the speaker know that X never wanted to jump off the swing? The event being referred to belongs to a time in the past during which the speaker was too young to remember what happened. Thus, she has to rely on her mother's memories and the narrations available to her memory. Reconstructing the evidential base is not easy. An objection we may receive is that a hearer may not be interested in the evidential base for the utterance. When a speaker speaks, we trust him and accept what he says, unless there are reasons for not doing so. Why should we care about his evidence? We may believe that the issue of evidence is negligible, particularly if the events in question do not involve a substantial modification of our habits, attitudes or actions. Why should we care how one knows a fact? That he indeed narrates a fact is sufficient warrant for believing that the fact is to be considered. But this is like admitting that, if someone were to be challenged by the question "How did you come to know this?", he would not be able to reply. But this is not what is involved in the praxis of asserting things, narrating stories or facts. The evidential base may be implicit, but we should always be able to make it explicit, should it be required.

5   Operation Cases

Now, consider the following utterance.

(25)   When I was operated on, the surgeons had to use a special tube so that I could
          breathe.

By the standards established by the previous examples, this can also be considered as an implicit indirect report. As everyone knows, when one is being operated on, one is unconscious and, thus, cannot be aware of the techniques or instruments

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[7] It is most interesting that these considerations conform with Jaszczolt's (2016) view that "both I and you can be regarded as pertaining to modes of reference *de se* or self- ascription" (her argument is that when one attributes a quality (or predicate) to the second person, the attribution must be recovered by the addressee by using the first person).

being used. The speaker was himself told by his doctors (after the operation was over) that they had to use a special tube so that he could breathe, because a normal tube was too thick. All he remembers is the preparations for the operation and the moment he was given an injection of narcotic – he slept and did not see any of the events happening to him. Given that this is a stereotypical situation, the recipient of (25) is able to assess that the speaker does not know this fact first-hand, but that he has second-hand knowledge and, thus, his report is based on another person's report (the surgeon's). Therefore, the recipient is able to reconstruct the utterance (26):

(26) (I was told by one of the surgeons that) When I was operated on, the surgeons had to use a special tube so that I could breathe.

Now, suppose that the recipient replies:

(27) This happened to me too.

An opponent of the explicature view might respond that such a reply will be anaphoric to only one portion of the utterance – that is, the explicit part, but cannot be anaphoric to the implicit part. In other words, 'This' is anaphoric to the fact 'that the surgeons used a special tube so that I could breathe', except for the reference of 'I', which should be switched to the current speaker and the reference of 'the surgeons', which has to refer to the surgeons in a different context (the context of the recipient's memories). The form of anaphora being used here is quite sloppy. It is not the specific fact that is being taken up anaphorically, but the general structure of the fact, while the references of certain NPs are to be anchored in a new context. However, the opponent of the explicature view may maintain that even this kind of sloppy anaphora cannot be applied to the implicit component of the explicature. Thus, 'This' cannot refer to the whole utterance 'I was told by the surgeons that when I was operated on, a special tube was used so that I could breathe'. But are we sure that this must be the case? Consider the following case:

(28) A: (I was told by one of the surgeons that) when I was operated on, the surgeons had to use a special tube so that I could breathe.
      B: This happened to me too. My surgeon told me the same story.

(28B) can be interpretatively ambiguous. It can either mean 'This fact (the surgeons used a special tube) happened to me too' or 'This fact (I was told that the surgeons used a special tube) happened to me too'. In the case in which 'This' refers to the story by the surgeons, anaphora must be said to be sanctioned by an implicit component of the explicature. B's utterance simply makes the explicature explicit and disambiguates that section of the utterance which is being referred to anaphorically.

We have made enough progress in showing that the explicature is syntactically active in sanctioning anaphora, either through a part of it (a nominal) or through the whole utterance as reconstructed through the explicature.

6 Extending the Analysis

The story we have told so far is similar to that proposed by Capone (2016), a propos of simple sentences and substitution failure. The Fregean apparatus has so far been applied to belief reports and verbs that introduce intensional contexts. We would normally expect replacements of NPs to be licit in simple sentences (*salva veritate*), but not in intensional contexts, such as 'Mario believes that Elizabeth is in Rome'. Given that Mario does not believe that Elizabeth is Queen Elizabeth in disguise, even if we know this identity we cannot freely replace 'Elizabeth' with 'the Queen of England', because Mario would never give his assent to that substitution, given what he knows and believes.

However, Saul (2007) discusses various cases in which even in (apparently) simple sentences Leibniz's Law does not work and substitutions are not licit, as they result in sentences having different truth conditions. One such case is:

(29) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman came out.

If we replaced 'Superman' with 'Clark Kent' we would obtain, according to Saul, a statement having different truth-conditions.

How can this be? We do not need to invoke universal opacity, as Saka p.c. does, to explain cases like these. Capone's solution (in Capone 2016) was to posit that an intensional context is created through an explicature, as in the following case:

(30) (The story says that/we are told that) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and
       Superman came out.

In other words, (29) is an implicit indirect report. Capone (2016) invoked the machinery of explicatures and, in particular, free enrichments to explain this example (and similar ones). Given the implicit indirect report in which there is a verb of saying, we now have an intensional context, and this suffices to explain why substitutions of coextensive NPs cannot occur (*salva veritate*). Now, given that this case, even if it does not involve the first person, reminds us of those cases which were previously discussed concerning the first person, we want to establish whether the explicated (implicit) parts of the explicature in (30) are also syntactically active. This would be a positive step towards demonstrating that a case can indeed be made for the presence of an explicature.

Certainly, it only takes a small stretch of the imagination for us to conceive examples like the following:

(31) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman came out and a similar
       story can be said of Spiderman.

The reconstructed explicature in (31) is spelled out in (32)

(32) (The story says that/we are told that) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and
       Superman came out and a similar story can be said of Spiderman.

Now, while we have made some progress in demonstrating that the explicature is syntactically active because it is a site for anaphoric uptake (similar), we should reply to the skeptic's objection that in this case 'story' can be taken in a (more) factual sense. We do not need to presuppose that the story we are talking about is a fictional one, as it may be a story about real world facts. We can accept that there may be an ambiguity of this sort. But the purpose of explicatures is also to settle ambiguities and to select one reading out of possible number. Thus, in one reading, the story is not a factual one, but a fictional one. And this is all that is required to explain that substitution of an NP with a coextensive one (*salva veritate*), in such an *ad hoc* intensional context, is not licit.

7   Conclusion

This paper shows us how we should deal with explicatures. It is not sufficient to state that there is an explicature. We would have to extend such a story by demonstrating that the explicature has certain logical properties and is syntactically active. One way of showing that an explicature is syntactically active is to demonstrate that it can sanction anaphora. Possibly, we need to further discuss this important topic, but at least we have shown that we need to create a new chapter on the theory of explicatures. Most importantly, we have noticed that a large gap may exist between what is said and what is intended, and that superficial syntax is a poor guide to the complex logical form of the utterance. When we talk about the logical form of the utterance, we are referring to the explicature and its syntactic configuration. After all, even if explicatures are pragmatic devices (consisting of a sentence and a pragmatic component that can be added to the sentence or can supersede the sentence altogether), they need to have a syntactic structure, and we have proven that speakers' intentions can help shape the syntactic structure of an explicature.

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Chapter 11
What Happens When We Report Grammatical, Lexical and Morphological Errors?

The reporter's ability to convey the speaker's point would be increased substantially were we to allow her to alter her formulations dynamically.
Thus arises "indirect discourse," relating that someone said that p. We don't use quotation marks, perhaps to signal that we are not providing, or may not be providing, the speaker's words, even more or less. The reporter chooses a sentence that in the current context conveys the original speaker's point and, as it were, puts this sentence into the speaker's mouth.

Wettstein (2016, 419).

Abstract In this chapter I expatiate on what happens when one has to indirectly report ungrammatical utterances. How can the issue of grammatical, lexical and morphological errors affect our understanding of the practice of indirect reporting? What kind of problems are generated by such issues? The general practice seems to be to ignore or edit errors, when indirectly reporting them, concentrating on content. However, there are cases in which this practice is unsatisfactory and in which reporting has to resort to mixed quotation. Grammatical and morphological errors lead us to some paradoxes about indirect reporting (one of these being that sometimes it is impossible to provide an indirect report without resorting to mixed quotation) and, furthermore, lead us to revise the general considerations concerning the praxis of indirect reporting.

1 Introduction

An utterance is a speech event of some kind, usually situated in a context of which the speaker and the addressee are aware and which they want to exploit for the purpose of understanding what is meant by the speaker (the intended message). An utterance, adopting terminology by Mey (2001) and his subsequent work, is a

pragmeme, in that it is situated not only in a semiotic and social context but also in a cultural context (Wong 2010). Reporting an utterance is also a pragmeme and often requires translating the content of what was said from one cultural context to another (Wettstein 2016). We can understand to a fuller extent the praxis of indirect reporting (which is a pragmeme, according to Capone 2010a, and also a language game, using terminology in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations) if we situate such a pragmeme in a cultural context. We may well expect that different cultures will employ different types of praxis. We may expect that, if we could analyse the pragmeme 'indirect report' in the most representative of world languages, something fairly general and uniform would characterize the praxis across languages, probably determined by the communicative exigencies to which such indirect reports are subordinated, but we would also probably note cultural diversity (see Capone and Nodoushan 2014, for example). We would also expect that the praxis of dealing with lexical, morphological and grammatical errors is deeply and overwhelmingly influenced at the cultural level. Due to our restricted point of view, we provide some insights concerning the languages that we are familiar with (e.g. Italian and English), but we are aware that the praxis could be completely different in languages where, for example, there is no notion of grammatical error. The emphasis on uniform grammar is part of the cultural heritage of Western languages, with their insistence on the written medium. So, we do not know what happens in those languages where there is not such a strong normative component being applied by the written medium.

Indirect reports normally conflate two utterances, each of which is situated in their respective contexts. Let us order contexts from a temporal point of view as C' and C", C' being prior to context C", where (C") amounts to the context of the reporting utterance. The relationship between these contexts is not easy to understand. Sometimes presuppositions embedded in an indirect report and pronominals have to be interpreted with respect to the context of the reporting utterance, simply because there are not sufficient clues available for interpretation to proceed through C' (despite what Wieland 2013 states about the pervasiveness of both contexts). Since the hearer normally has access to C" but not to C', unless it is presupposed that s/he also knew that context or unless the speaker provides sufficient clues which are capable of re-constructing C', if not in its entirety, at least partially or minimally, the speaker will expect him/her to saturate pronominals through C" or to search for the satisfaction of presuppositions in C" (given that presuppositions need to be satisfied for interpretation to proceed smoothly).

Indirect reports are a form of assertion and what Sanford Goldberg (2015) states in his invaluable book about assertion applies here – issues of epistemology, ethics and philosophy of language arise. People report what other people (or even themselves) have said for a number of reasons. They may want to inform the hearer that *p* is true, but at the same time dissociate themselves from the assertion that *p*, or not completely identify themselves with the assertion that *p*, but provide a third person as an *authoritative* informant.[1] If the reported speaker is sufficiently authoritative,

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[1] Although one may have to say, adopting Stalnaker (1999), that the role of an assertion is to add something (new) to the common ground. Normally (albeit not always), in the case of indirect

then the hearer has reasons to accept the proposition that *p* and base her future actions on that knowledge (or presumed knowledge). The cases in which one reports what one said (in the past) are not so frequent, but may also be of interest in describing the praxis of indirect reporting. Vahid Parvaresh (personal communication) made me aware that one may report on what one said, in order to correct someone else's report about what one said.[2] The reasons for reporting what another person has said may be diverse, though. On the one hand, we may want to provide valuable information to someone whose actions are to be based on deliberations, and such deliberations have to be based on practical reasoning which take correct beliefs about reality as their input. The information contained in the indirect report may be a way of adjusting the beliefs of the subject involved in the deliberations and practical reasoning to those of the world. (In this case, the direction of fit from the utterance to the world is two-way; because, on the one hand, the utterance adjusts to information about the world that contains the reported utterance; on the other hand, it adjusts to information about the world contained in the reported utterance). On the other hand, we may want to use an indirect report to criticize someone for what s/he has said, implying that we are all responsible for what we say and that such a sense of responsibility involves taking the blame for something that was improperly said or which expressed false information or, in any case, information not likely to be beneficial to the hearer of the indirect report (even true information can do some damage if it is supplied in the wrong context). Spies usually report things that are beneficial to their addressee(s) but which might harm the original speaker.

There is also the case where the indirect report is distorted in order to not damage the original speaker of the reported utterance. Even if the original speaker could be accused of saying something false or disparaging, the reporter may do his/her best to be diplomatic and not expose the culprit. Of course, the reporter, in this case, is, strictly speaking, violating the principles involved in the praxis of indirect reporting, but s/he is doing that for a noble reason. Although distortion is introduced into the discourse, this is done in order to protect the original speaker and to avoid creating animosity between the addressee and the original speaker. Neutral terms, that are descriptively satisfactory, could be chosen. (This may include the replacement of an offensive term with a neutral one). This may be the opposite of what happens when one reports what one said to a person, on an occasion during which that person's behaviour has upset him or her, by using an indirect report disguised as a

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reports one uses the report to add the embedded proposition *p* to the common ground and, thus, ends up adding both the embedding proposition and the embedded proposition to the common ground.

[2] I am not saying that a report of what one has said in the past is automatically a correction of someone else's report of one's own speech; it can count canonically as a correction, but it may also be something else. We may report what we have said to reiterate something already said, if proof is needed that that utterance was due or expected. Of course, the correction could take either a negative form as 'I did not say that p' or a positive form, as in 'I said that p' (or 'I said that *p* not *q*; or I said that *p* by using such and such words, not such and such words). If the correction takes a positive form, then it is the contextual relationship to what has occurred earlier in the dialogue that labels it as being a correction of a previous report.

direct report (A professor may report a conversation with a student saying 'I said, you idiot, you should know that….' (these words are taken to be the translation of an Italian utterance)). In this case, we do not have quotation proper or a strictly direct report, because as Davis (2016) states, a direct report has to make reference to the words used in the original utterance.[3] Of course, a professor cannot use the word 'idiot'; thus, the hearer may understand that there is exaggeration of the language being used in the direct report, which instead functions as an indirect report in disguise, from which one has to subtract the word 'idiot', while adding that the professor actually prevented himself from uttering that word, only actually using it in thought. This is an interesting example of an interpreted indirect report being disguised as a direct report – a case of reporting one's thoughts in reporting what one has said. (Of course, it needs to be stated that this is Italian praxis, as I am unsure whether we can apply the same process to English culture).

However, in normal situations, when reporting what one has said, we should usually take the original speaker's perspective and try not to distort what s/he has said too much (we are presupposing that some kind of voluntary or involuntary distortion always takes place in indirectly reporting someone (see Wettstein 2016)). Sometimes we are not aware of such distortions. Sometimes we are fully responsible for those distortions. An important and most interesting case of distortion is when we report what was said in a non-literal way through a literal indirect report, which closely corresponds to a direct report. The purpose of an indirect report would be to normally report the speaker's meaning and not literal meaning (Capone 2016a; Wieland 2013; Cappelen and Lepore 2005; Wettstein 2016; Davis 2016); thus, if literal meaning is reported instead of the speaker's meaning, some damage is done (or could be done) to the original speaker, whose intentions are being altered. The immorality of reporting utterances like this rests on the fact that the speaker, by reporting the utterance literally, is hiding the contextual clues that have determined a transformation of the utterance and sanctioned its licit interpretation. This is what Capone (2016a) called a *deliberate suppression* of the clues available in the context of the original speaker's discourse.

Volosinov (1971) thought that indirect reports were a special site which one ought to study in order to draw out the dialogic nature of language, as these are sites where (at least) two voices coexist side by side (I assume that the issue of footing (Goffman 1981) with respect to different voices needs to be addressed separately). We believe that the relative neglect of the study of indirect reports in linguistics (with a negligible number of publications on this topic, even if we also include the field of philosophy) shows a neglect for a form of linguistics where dialogue or dialogicity play an important role (with rare exceptions, we have to visit anthropology or sociological departments to encounter and study conversation analysis). Instead, by shifting the focus back to indirect reports, we want to propel forwards a concep-

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[3] As Maier (2014) states, quoting Bonami and Godard (2008), even verbatim quotation is subject to contextual standards (of precision). In this context, the standards may be rather loose and the pragmatics of the discourse attributes a section of the discourse to mental thinking rather than to saying.

tion of linguistics where the notion of communication is attended to and respected, and where language is not considered to be merely an instrument of thought. Thought and communication have to be somehow integrated (see Davis 2016).

The issue of there being at least two (separate) voices in indirect reports, complicates the notion of footing (which, as I said in Capone 2016a, intersects with the issue of indirect reports and, in particular, presuppositions in indirect reporting, see the chapter in this book). The original speaker is without doubt the *principal* with respect to the utterance being targeted by the indirect report (the one who takes on responsibility both for the concepts being expressed and the words used) and also the *author*[4] of his utterance, if we exclude some exceptional cases; he is also without doubt the *animator* of his words, that is, the person who proffers the words. The indirect reporter is the *author* of the words used in the indirect report because he chooses them from a number of words that could render the paraphrase of the original utterance (the fact that he can choose shows that he can be the author of his own words). The reported speaker can only be considered to be the *author* of the words used in the indirect report derivatively – the hearer of the indirect report has to work out what kind of words he (the reported speaker) uttered from the gist of what was reported by the reporter. Furthermore, the hearer has to decide whether the reporter's words represent the original speaker's words, even if only through the medium of paraphrase. Using some pragmatic principles proposed by Capone (2010a), the words of the reporter should not excessively distort the reported speaker's words and should be faithful to their spirit, if not to the letter (if the reported speaker does not recognize himself in the indirect report then something rather snide has occurred and an illicit transformation has been executed). From the way I am portraying things, it is not completely clear whether the reported speaker is the *author* of the reported utterance, although derivatively he is. Is the reporter the *principal* with respect to the indirect report? This point is not completely clear, either. He is not responsible for the content of the embedded utterance, the original speaker has to take responsibility for that (provided he recognizes the reported words as being his or her own). However, he is responsible for taking the initiative of proffering the indirect report and for uttering something which, although attributed to a different person, must be sufficiently faithful to the spirit of what the original speaker said (if not to the letter). So, in a sense, we have two authors, two principals and two animators (it is obvious that both the original speaker and the reporter must be an animator of words, although the discourse animated by the reporter is syntactically different in that it exhibits syntactic embedding through a complementizer (in English or in Italian)).

In this chapter, I focus on a small aspect regarding the issue of indirect reports, namely reporting ungrammatical utterances, in order to establish leverage for a theory of the societal praxis of indirect reporting, and to see how this is shaped by not only theoretical, but also practical needs. In keeping with what I proposed in Capone (2010a, 2016a), I argue that we need a notion of *pragmatic opacity* for

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[4] Gibbs (1999) makes a distinction between the writer and the author in his chapter 'Questions of authorship'. However, in the context of this chapter I will largely ignore this issue.

indirect reports. Paul Saka (personal communication) suggested that I should explain from the outset what I mean by **pragmatic opacity**. While semantic opacity largely depends on the fact that after the verb 'say', the reported sentence is bracketed by inverted commas (to express the speaker's possible dissociation) and that, given the presence of the inverted commas, we are in an intensional context and it is not licit to replace an NP with a coextensive one, substitution failure in indirect reports is explained pragmatically and mainly by reference to the Paraphrase Principle which is reported later in this chapter. Replacing a term with a racist one, for example, in an indirect report, is not licit, since the original speaker, who is presumably not racist, may object to the paraphrase which has completely distorted what he said by adding an unwanted dimension (social/racial hatred). (See Davis 2016). Opacity is also pragmatic but there are some exceptions.[5] The most notable exception is the case of translation, because this is 'ipso facto' a context (or requires a context) in which the speaker has to considerably depart from the style and language used by the reported speaker.

In the light of pragmatic opacity, in this chapter I investigate the role that grammatical errors play in the practice of indirect reporting and what new pieces of knowledge they can add to the theory, from the point of view of societal practices involving goodwill, given that in indirect reporting one may want to concentrate on content and, in particular, on speakers' meanings. It may appear that this topic is too narrow, too tangential and too unimportant, but it is small things that can change our view of the world. That this is an important topic was first noted by Davis (2016) who believes that the key to understanding the difference between direct and indirect reports is the consideration that "When utterances are elliptical or ungrammatical, a completely accurate quotation will have to contain the same defects" (Davis, 2016, 308), but this is not the case, as Davis implies, for indirect reports. Of course, I am not the first linguist/communication theorist to focus on errors. There is vast wealth of literature on repair work in conversation analysis (see Levinson 1983 for an overview). But most importantly, Goffman (1981) concentrated on the fact that there may be countless errors, false starts, hesitations, etc. in radio talk. Yet, hearers are prepared to do some compensatory editings, since they know that the speech is extemporaneous and, thus, cannot have been edited in advance, unlike written texts. We *qua* hearers show a positive attitude and recognize that the role of the speaker is particularly problematic. In editing errors, we show goodwill towards the speaker, because we know that anyone of us in his/her position would face the same problems. Now, I just want to state that, at least in some strands of Goffman's work, there is this idea that errors could be an important topic of investigation. If anything, this

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[5] My views clearly differ from those of Davis (2016), who is persuaded that indirect reports are characterized by an ambiguity between a transparent and an opaque interpretation. Depending on the context, we should disambiguate the report. It is not clear whether the ambiguity Davis mentions should be semantic or, otherwise, interpretative. Semantic ambiguity is avoided by scholars in pragmatics, who resort to Modified Occam's razor as a shield. If the ambiguity is of the interpretative type, then Davis's views will not be radically different from mine, except for the fact that in Author (2010) I assumed that, in default contexts, indirect reports are opaque for pragmatic reasons (adopting considerations expressed by Higginbotham in his Oxford lectures).

chapter demonstrates that Cummings (2016) is quite right when she says that indirect reports involve quite high level complex skills, such as theory of mind and executive function (e.g. how to plan an utterance and how to move between the current context and that of the reported speaker).

Before proceeding, I should warn the reader that, in this chapter, I am primarily referring to implicit mixed quotation in indirect reporting as a tool for reporting grammatical errors (when it is needed, because generally the reporter tries to avoid reporting them for reasons which will be explained later).[6] We do not need the actual presence of inverted commas to have mixed quotation in indirect reports. We have pragmatic means by which to signal mixed quotation. Furthermore, I accept that mixed quotation is different from quotation proper in that:

> In pure quotation, an expression is referred to, but understanding the expression is not necessary for understanding a sentence in which it appears. In mixed quotation, in contrast, an expression is referred to (…), but understanding the expression is crucial also to understanding the sentence in which it appears. In this sense, in mixed cases, an expression is both used and mentioned. (Lepore and Ludwig 2007, 150; see also Davidson 1979)

In all my papers on indirect reports, I have often relied on the assumption that mixed quotation is operative through pragmatic opacity.

2 Indirectly Reporting Grammatical or Lexical Errors: An Example.

On January 6th, an article appeared in Repubblica, an important Italian newspaper (online version), which read:

> Metà argentino metà italiano: il Papa usa il termine "nostalgioso"
> Durante la messa in San Pietro per la festa dell'Epifania, Papa Francesco ha utilizzato il termine "nostalgioso". Una parola usata in Argentina, che significa nostalgico, malinconico. Ma che ha pronunciato in italiano.
> "Il credente 'nostalgioso', spinto dalla sua fede – ha detto il Pontefice argentino – va in cerca di Dio, come i magi, nei luoghi più reconditi della storia, perché sa in cuor suo che là lo aspetta il suo Signore"

Being half Argentinian and half Italian, the Pope used the term 'nostalgioso' which means 'nostalgic' or 'melancholic'. Although, in this case, the report is direct and not indirect, it shows that sometimes reports (whether direct or indirect) can focus on syntactic or lexical or morphological errors. The norm, however, seems to be that not too much should be made of errors, but instead editings can be produced. Certainly, this is not the first time that the Pope has made similar errors, being a

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[6] Maier writes: "Many researchers have pointed out that direct and mixed quotation, unlike regular indirect discourse reporting, allows the reporter to slip into the reported speaker's idiolect, reproducing any speech disfluencies, typos, grammar and spelling errors, sociolects, even a completely different language, without herself being associated with these linguistic peculiarities" (Maier 2014, 7).

foreigner who speaks Italian during his sermons. But, to my knowledge, this is the first time (or one of the first times) that the press decided to highlight a mistake in the Pope's speech (another mistake which the press focused on was in John Paul II's first speech as Pope (immediately after his election): "Se mi sbaglio mi corrigerete"). Nevertheless, note that in the short article on January 6th there is no mention of the term 'mistake' and, thus, even if the author of the article intended to highlight the mistake, he does so in an indirect way and which comes in conjunction with an (indirect) explanation of why the error occurred, perhaps to solicit a more lenient attitude on the part of the audience (the readers of the online paper). In a tacit way, the author of the article is highlighting that the mistake consists of using an Argentinian word, but pronouncing it in Italian. However, we do not know whether the Pope intentionally made this "error". Could he, after all, be amused by using Argentinian words in the context of an Italian sermon? And why does he not ask his collaborators to correct his mistakes? From the fact that he does not ask for corrections to be made, we may infer that he may be unhappy to see his errors corrected. Perhaps he thinks that hearers will be more sympathetic towards him if they know that he writes his own speeches, that he is both author and principal of his discourse (in keeping with Goffman 1981). Failing to give the impression that he is the author of his own speeches may convey the false impression that he is not the principal either, that someone else is responsible for the ideas being expressed, an impression that he clearly wants to avoid by using his own accent and his own mistakes to convey communicatively and indirectly that he is the author and principal of his own discourse – actually, this is a most interesting example of where errors can be taken to intentionally (conversationally) implicate something.

Matters, such as intentions, which are important for pragmatic interpretation, cannot always be investigated completely in the absence of an informant who is willing to recall and reformulate the intentions s/he had in vocalizing a portion of text – even assuming that one will always be able to recall such intentions. While there is certainly no issue with regard to having intentions for saying what one has said, one should not always take it for granted that one can remember the specific intentions underlying a particular segment of a certain text. We may be uncertain about whether the Pope, by making certain errors (or rather by failing to accept corrections made by auxiliary authors) intentionally implicated that his discourses were his own. However, there may be some clues that this (the act of avoiding being corrected by language specialists) was done intentionally and, if it was done intentionally, it was done for a purpose. We may use practical reasoning or practical deliberation in order to decide what this purpose might have been.

3   Making Mistakes: The Importance of Authorship

Normally, we can fairly reasonably assume that when we make mistakes, we are the animators, authors and the principals of such mistakes (applying Goffman's 1981 terminology, expressed in his article on footing, to the case in question); however, it

is far from evident whether reporters are eager to be animators with respect to such mistakes – very often they would prefer to gloss over such mistakes and to pretend that they did not occur (something which more or less happens during radio talk, as highlighted by Goffman (1981), as it is natural that speakers, while speaking extemporarily, should make mistakes and, thus, hearers adopt a benevolent attitude to such mistakes (whether corrected or not)). There may be reasons for this, and we will soon turn our attention to a thorough investigation of them. In short, the reason for such editings is that reporters do not want to appear to be the *authors* of these mistakes, something which is very likely to happen if the editings are not effected. (We can call this type of ambiguity not an interpretative ambiguity but an *authorial ambiguity*, as it is unclear who the author of the text is). Avoiding this type of ambiguity is the main reason which drives reporters to edit reported texts, perhaps rather drastically, preventing readers from knowing what really happened in the reported speech event). However, sometimes such mistakes need to be pointed highlighted by someone. In the case of the Pope's error, I doubt that there was a malicious intent on the reporter's part in reporting the mistake – in fact, much repair work was done by the reporter to repair the mistake, including avoiding use of the term 'mistake' (which almost amounts to understatement), giving an implicit explanation and also implicitly suggesting that this is the way the Pope wants to speak (from the fact that the word 'mistake' was not pronounced, one can perhaps reason that the reporter does not consider this to be a mistake, but is instead the Pope's style (a kind of intended bilingual text) – in Levinsonian terms (Levinson 2000), what is not said is not said, and given the avoidance of the term 'mistake' one can make guesses about the authorial intentions on the part of the reporter).

However, in some other cases, one should indeed focus on mistakes. Consider an examining committee who has to inspect a book in a competition for the position of full professor. If there were a couple of mistakes, the committee would probably pretend to ignore them (after all, all books display mistakes of some kind, whether they are missing commas, spelling errors or even missing words). However, if the mistakes were systematic and very frequent, then the committee would feel morally obliged to report such mistakes in an explicit way and, in the end, express a negative judgment on the author (the judgment being motivated by commenting on the observed errors). (Of course, we need to be aware that Western society is more dependent on written texts and dimensions of normativity, which may be lacking in those societies where there is no written medium and little focus on literacy and grammatical norms). We have now seen that the context may vary considerably and that the attitude of the reporters can be quite different, depending on the context, the purpose of the indirect report and other variables. We have now seen that sometimes mistakes can be reported, and that sometimes – perhaps most of the time for reasons I will elucidate later – such mistakes are not reported but are willingly ignored (and even corrected/edited). After all, an indirect report amounts to no more than a summary (a condensed paraphrase) of what the speaker has said and, if direct reports are often made grammatically correct by the reporter through spontaneous corrections of the original speaker's mistakes, to a greater extent we should expect that summaries/indirect reports should ignore part of what was said and, thus, whatever mis-

takes occurred therein. (At this point you may be surprised to learn that even direct speech involves editings, but we accept this on the basis of what is stated by Allan (2016)). When we report the gist of another person's speech (in an indirect report), the focus is usually on the content and not on the words, style or grammatical peculiarities, although we could, strictly speaking, highlight errors in the original text through mixed quotation. In Western society, indirect reports are usually rendered through paraphrase, which is a transformation of a previous speech that adopts certain eliminations, generalizations, additions, steps in pragmatic inference, etc. (see Wieland 2013; Cappelen and Lepore 2005). A paraphrase can be considered to be a transformation of a message aimed at brevity, on the one hand, and expansion, on the other. On the one hand, the indirect reporter may want to reduce the size of the message by using legitimate techniques, such as summary, generalization and elimination; on the other hand, the reporter has to act like an interpreter, drawing inferences about the speaker's meaning. Thus, the reported message can sometimes be considered to be an expansion of a previous message.

4   The Social Praxis of Indirect Reporting

We have already stated the subject matter of this chapter: the praxis of indirect reports. The reason why we are interested in grammatical (or lexical or morphological) errors is not so much because this is an important topic in itself, but because it promises to throw light on the practice of indirect reporting, which is a social praxis. Needless to say, we have seldom ever received explicit instructions on how to paraphrase an utterance, how to report it indirectly. (As Lepore and Ludwig (2007) and Wettstein (2016)[7] state, we have not been given an instruction manual so that we can carry out interpretation work). The praxis exists but has to be learned by playing the language game. For many games, you cannot understand them unless you start playing them, and you have to learn them by playing them. This is a case in point. As soon as you engage in the praxis, you can see what is going wrong and, little by little, you can adjust to the practice. People never explicitly tell you the rules which are involved in the practice, but they can teach you by acting as models and by reacting to mistaken conduct. You learn from others through their reactions, attitudes, and explicit comments (teachers), as you practice the praxis. There is much about the practice which you are not able to learn by either instruction or imitation, as the communicative exigencies inherent in the practice determine the way in which the practice is realized/instantiated. The constitutive purpose of the practice is what determines the constitutive rules involved in the practice. So much about the praxis has to be inferred from the general purpose of the practice.

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[7]Wettstein states, "And the reporter's latitude – which features of the original to highlight or downplay – seems just like that of the translator. Finally, as with translation, the rules for how to balance all of this, how to correctly report speech, have never been written" (Wettstein 2016, 421).

In this chapter, I will be ambivalent, as I have been recently (particularly given Capone (2010a, 2016a) and Capone (2017)), about the fact that the social praxis of indirect reporting is something that is either learned in the course of playing the indirect reporting game or as something that is aided by the application of universal principles (whether of a cognitive type or just *a priori* constraints on thought). This is a very interesting, intriguing and thorny issue, one which cannot be dealt with here and which will have to be postponed to a later date (to say that I have not yet completely made up my mind on this issue is to concede that modularization can play a crucial role in the praxis of pragmatic interpretation, even if one were able to show that pragmatic principles are genuinely universal, *a priori* or innate (another fork opens up here, on which I will say nothing at this point)). In Capone (2016a), I have primarily focused on the idea that there can be a social praxis of indirect reporting and this can be somehow learned, transmitted, propagated, and made part and parcel of one's own culture. (Notice that these ideas are not far removed from those which I applied to pragmemes in Capone (2017)). This idea need not be at odds with more genuinely cognitive approaches to pragmatics, as I demonstrated in my seminal paper Capone (2010a) on the social practice of indirect reports. (See also Capone 2017).

In Capone (2010a, 2016a), I have advanced the view that indirect reports involve pragmatic opacity (genuine direct reports instead involve semantic opacity which is strictly dependent on the semantic effects of the verb 'say' and the quoted segment following it; see Davis (2016)). So, between semantic and pragmatic opacity, some general constraints seem to be operative on direct and indirect reports, appearing to show that we are dealing with a sufficiently unified category. By advancing the view of pragmatic opacity, I have tried to rescue some important considerations from Higginbotham's Oxford lectures (namely the fact that direct and indirect reports can be seen as sufficiently related categories when it comes to the issue of opacity). Presumably, such considerations date back to Donald Davidson's (1968) treatment of indirect reports, what has become known as the paratactic view. Although this view has been shown to be indefensible, it clearly captures some similarities (in terms of opacity) between direct and indirect reports. Presumably, such ideas could be rescued if one accepted that the view of pragmatic opacity is viable for indirect reports, and is a counterpart of semantic opacity which applies effectively to direct reports and seems to follow (paradoxically) from the kind of considerations which Davidson wanted to apply (without much hope of success) to indirect reports (a pragmatic view which actually served to rescue the interesting, but thorny, Davidsonian idea). Once we have a colon after 'say', and a segment to be enclosed within quotation marks, we understand where the opacity originates from, since replacing any term within the quoted segment amounts to modifying the quoted segment in ways which the original speaker would not approve, as his/her approval is not only related to the things s/he said, but to the way s/he said what s/he said (Davis 2016; Wettstein 2016). Of course, the quotation marks are a grammatical device indicating citation (literal word-for-word citation). But the fact that the inverted commas are missing is not in itself an indication that they are actually missing. Any utterance with a colon after 'say' is ambiguous between a verbatim citation

interpretation and looser citation interpretation; the words can be cited but they may also be seen to be more loosely related to the words which were actually uttered, either in the sense that there may be some words missing; they are only a fragment of the words said) or in the sense that they are transformations of the original words (translation is perhaps the most innocent of such transformations).

In Capone (2010a), I argued that reporting what one said is not only a matter of reporting the content of what was said, but also of avoiding ways of formulating content that the original speaker would clearly not approve of. Although the reporter and the original speaker can be considered to be *same-sayers*, adopting Davidson's terminology, they would not be *same-sayers* if the reporter decided to report what the original speaker said by using a sentence or a style which the original speaker would never approve of, because the style is not his or because the sentence used words which were offensive to some social categories (while the sentence used by the original speaker would not be offensive to any social category). Basically, the reporter cannot modify at will the message originally uttered by altering it in such a way that it ends up containing a slur, or racial expression, or an epithet, or an example of bad style which the original speaker did not utter and would, in fact, never be inclined to utter. If the reporter modified the original message in such **devious** ways, then the original speaker would be correct in withdrawing his approval from the end-product (of the indirect report) although, in a sense, the content is the same (if only the truth-conditional meaning is concerned), after such a devious transformation; thus differing from what was argued by Davidson, the original speaker and the reporter would no longer count as same-sayers. The notion of same-saying involves not only semantic but also pragmatic equivalence. If one adds the purpose of offending a category of human beings to one's words, the pragmatic equivalence could no longer be maintained because the speaker's meanings would turn out to be totally different. The speaker's meaning is of paramount importance in the interpretation of indirect reports, except for those exceptional cases in which the reporting speaker wants to pass an interpretative ambiguity to the hearer, thereby postponing interpretation of the message.

When discussing indirect reports and slurring, Capone received a formidable objection by Wayne Davis (personal communication, reported in Capone 2016a). In Capone (2013, 2016a), I stated that the reporter cannot transform the message as he wishes and introduce a slurring expression into the that-clause of an indirect report, because the original speaker is unlikely to approve of it. Yet, Wayne Davis (p.c.) objects that a speaker who has not used a racist, slurring expression (in public) may, in fact, like being reported by using a slurring, racist expression; although he could not be racist in public, he may nevertheless enjoy portraying himself as being racist in private, and the reporter who reads his intentions and translates them through a slur does not run the risk (in this case) of being disapproved of. I thought that this objection, although formidable, was not decisive, and in reply I still argued that in order to guarantee that the correct praxis (of indirectly reporting) is in place, one should not only look at whether the original speaker would approve/disapprove of the indirect report, but one would also have to look at whether an impartial judge would approve/disapprove of it. If the original speaker cannot be sufficiently objec-

tive to judge whether the praxis is correct or not, an impartial judge might make that decision. So, although the original speaker may find pleasure in being reported (in private) as if he were racist, the impartial judge is likely to decide that this indirect report should NOT be approved of. In other words, a disjunction of the original speaker and an impartial judge is needed in order to express the idea that an indirect report is something which needs approval and which can only be sanctioned if it is likely to be approved by someone who is in a position to judge the result of the *transformation* involved in indirectly reporting an utterance (either the reported speaker or an impartial judge). Of course, an interesting objection is that a disjunction is too weak a condition. This grants us the liberty of choosing the impartial judge over the original speaker, which is a means of excluding a perspectival position; the position of the impartial judge need not represent the position of the original speaker. In fact, the impartial judge may be impersonal, detached or indifferent concerning issues such as style which may be foremost in the mind of the original speaker. This problem is clearly not easy to resolve.

5 Grammaticality Errors and Social Praxis

Now the case of grammaticality errors seems to be quite different from what we have seen so far. In the case of deviations from the original speaker's style and language, the original speaker might not be pleased (in general). However, if the original speaker's grammar is amended (and improved), s/he would have no reason to complain, since the corrections are made in order to place her/him in a more positive light. Perhaps this is what s/he wants. On the contrary, if grammatical errors are injected into one's speech because of transformations, then surely the original speaker would not be happy about this. So, we predict that the original speaker would be happy to be corrected (even in public) and, furthermore, s/he would find it irritating to see her/his text transformed and many errors injected into it. If I am correct, injecting mistakes is never done, the reason being that semantic and pragmatic competence considerably restrict the game of indirect reporting and protect the rights of the original speakers to see their speech being transformed in only legitimate ways. Of course, one might wish to consider a strange game in which a discourse is reported in such a way that many errors (of a grammatical type) are introduced, and the hearer has to guess whether the error belongs to the reporter or to the reported speaker. But this would, curiously enough, be a language game which is totally different from the one that we ordinarily play when we utter indirect reports, because in ordinary cases we do not want the hearer to have to distinguish who the error belongs to. Of course, paradoxically, such an unusual language game highlights not what happens when grammatical errors are injected on purpose but when they occur naturally, because also in such cases the hearer has to decide whether the error belongs to the reported speaker or the reporter.

Let us begin with a straightforward case. Professor Higgins is a famous grammarian, well known for being pedantic and harshly criticizing people who make bad

use of punctuation. In this case, transforming the speech and injecting errors into it (whether deliberately or not) does not produce the kind of speech whose form can be identified with Higgins – the content may be the same (to the extent that it is not changed by punctuation, because we know that in numerous cases punctuation serves to avoid interpretative ambiguities). We are fairly sure that Higgins would never say that the text was his own, although he may well accept that the content was fairly similar to what he expressed, unless a modification in punctuation or grammar resulted in a change to the thought being expressed. He would certainly not approve of the reporting, not because the report indicates that himself and the reporter are same-sayers (to use Donald Davidson's words), but because the report points to a different (and unequivalent or differential) grammatical competence. The reason for not accepting the report is not so much, as in the case of modifications through slurs or other racial expressions, that unwanted perlocutionary and illocutionary intentions are added and that the changes, in terms of lexis, turn out to modify the relationship between the original speaker and potential (even if unintended) audiences; in this case, the reason for not accepting the report involves matters such as status, professional pride and clarity of thought, given that a lack of punctuation may result in disruption to the clarity of thought. A consequence of these considerations is that the practice of indirect reporting should avoid, as much as possible, intentional and unintentional pejorative modifications of the text produced by the original speaker. If ameliorative modifications are acceptable, up to a point, pejorative modifications are not, clearly because they damage the face of the original speaker, they reveal a possibly malevolent attitude on the part of the reporter, and they violate rules which concern being fair to what a speaker has said, etc. Now, this is essentially a question of authorship. The reported speaker who notices that errors are injected in her/his text cannot approve the text, although s/he might be inclined to approve the content of the text, because the text reveals a different author, someone who has a differential grammatical competence. Now while, in theory, grammatical mistakes could be just performance problems (the same way in which I forget to add an h to a in a verb in Italian if I am particularly stressed or angry), they are not normally taken to be such, but the practice seems to be geared towards regarding grammatical errors as attesting bad competence. True, a genuine ambiguity arises when the question is being considered as to whether the errors are performance or competence problems in theory. But no one questions this because, given the ambiguity, the pejorative interpretation has to be avoided. Thus, no one wishes to see a journalist make a number of mistakes when reporting one's speech, as giving rise to the question as to whether the hearer will interpret these errors as performance problems. Given the possibility that they can be regarded as being competence problems, the reported speaker may be unhappy about the way in which the text was transformed.

Now we should focus as much as possible on changes whose aim is to ameliorate the original text and to purge mistakes. There may be a number of reasons why the reporter may want to correct errors – if some are found – in the original speaker's speech. As I have stated in Capone (2016a), an indirect report is a case of collaborative speech (not in the sense that two speakers are actually collaborating, but in the

sense that two voices merge and it is not easy to distinguish one from the other). The problem the reporter is faced with is that, although pragmatic opacity would be conducive to attributing grammatical or punctuation errors to the original speaker (since the focus of an indirect report is on what the original speaker said through implicit mixed quotations being attributed to him), a greater amount of clarity results from attributing the style and words to just one speaker (rather than being unsure as to who is responsible for what), given that the hearer is more interested in knowing what the speaker has said rather than what the reporter said and, finally and more crucially, because by radically modifying the original speaker's speech, the original speaker would no longer be willing to approve the veridicality of the indirect report). After all, the text is his own and he can be considered to be the author of the text, even if he is not the principal, in Goffman's (1981) terms. Thus, he could be seen to be the source of ungrammaticality (this is obviously the case for oral indirect reports, because in written indirect reports mixed quotation is unambiguously marked through the use of inverted commas). Should we then abandon the principle that I stated in Capone (2010a), which seemed to account for much of what happens in the practice of indirect reporting?

> Paraphrase/Form Principle
>   The that-clause embedded in the verb 'say' is a paraphrase of what Y said, and meets the following constraints: Should Y hear what X said Y had said, Y would not take issue with it as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrase of the original utterance. Furthermore, Y would not object to the vocal expression of the assertion, based on the words following the complementizer 'that' on account of its form/style. (Capone 2010a)[8]

There may be two ways by which to salvage the Paraphrase/Form Principle. One is to say that, while Professor Higgins, in seeing himself reported, could object to the report because it was pejorative, original speakers whose texts have been ameliorated would have no reason to object to the editings (they may be very well pleased with the editings). However, one may object, anyway, on other grounds. Suppose I use my dialect, of which I am particularly proud, and someone else reports me by using Italian. My text has most definitely been edited and the editing may take into account the needs of the hearers (who have no knowledge of my dialect) (a modification of Devitt's 1996 motivation to deviate). However, I may have reasons to be displeased by the editings. But this is an extreme case which even involves

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[8] A serious objection to my Paraphrase Principle was raised by Franco Lo Piparo (personal communication) at the 2017 conference of the Italian Association for Philosophy of Language. Franco stated that the Paraphrase Principle is anchored too much to the original speaker's approval with regards to the legitimacy of the indirect report. However, in some cases, the speaker is not the best authority to judge what he says, and what he is really saying only emerges in interaction with the addressees. I assume that the cases which Lo Piparo has in mind are those in which, by saying something, we offend a hearer and we are only aware of that when the hearer tells us. I assume that if Lo Piparo is considering the perlocutionary effects of the utterance, then his objection may not jeopardise the Paraphrase Principle which is primarily intended to encompass illocutionary effects and what the speaker means or says, without considering the perlocutionary effects, whether intended or unintended. Another response to Lo Piparo's objection is to combine his objection with the one raised by Wayne Davis (p.c.) and offer the same reply; when the original speaker is likely to fail to be sufficiently objective, then the indirect report has to be approved by an impartial judge.

translating parts of the utterance. A less extreme case is one in which a number of grammatical or punctuation errors have been corrected. If I were sufficiently conscientious, although pleased by the changes, I would still be able to object to them on the grounds that the changes transformed reality, they showed a syntactic competence which I lacked or, alternatively, showed me to be in a different phase (suppose that when I am nervous I always make grammatical mistakes indicating that I am nervous, and that my having made a number of mistakes invariably points to me being nervous). In other words, there might be tension between a completely conscientious original speaker and a reporter who wants to protect his reputation in the eyes of his readers/hearers. For example, in the case of a journalist, it certainly would not be appropriate to inject errors into an indirect report, when aiming to represent the original speech, unless temporary and parenthetical usage is made of quotation marks (as in mixed indirect reports); but of course, in the case of oral speech, the interpretation of inverted commas is not indicated unambiguously, which may be a source of confusion. Where does the tension I have just mentioned originate from? Presumably, it stems from the fact that an indirect report mixes two voices (the original speaker and the reported speaker) and that while the original speaker is responsible for the things s/he said (and to some extent for its form), the reporting speaker is nevertheless the author of the overall text (the complete indirect report). The reported speaker has a number of rights both as principal and author. But the reporting speaker also has some other rights as reporter/author. As we have seen in Capone (2016a) in a number of cases, the idea of pragmatic opacity has to defer to the practical interests of the reporter and the hearers (See Devitt 1996; Wettstein 2016). For example, in cases in which the hearers are not able to fix on a referent through an NP (a noun phrase, whether a pronominal, a proper name or a common name), the reporter may well change the NP and use one that the hearer is familiar with (allowing him/her to recognize the referent). Another exception is the use of translation. It would be impossible to indirectly report some texts without the aid of translation. Thus, although, in some cases, the practice of translating a text (in indirectly reporting) is contrary to what pragmatic opacity dictates, it is nevertheless accepted (as an indispensable necessity). Thus, the case in which a grammatical or punctuation error is corrected in order to project that the reporter is (grammatically) competent appears to me to be an exception to pragmatic opacity, and one which is dictated by practical needs and, furthermore, by a distinction in status between principal and author. The reporter is not principal (with respect to the reported message) but he still retains rights as author, and it is such rights which militate against preserving pragmatic opacity in this case and which favour opting for exceptional behaviour.

Correcting mistakes in an indirect report may be seen as interfering with the speaker's intended meaning. However, a person who uses dialect need not be constrained by such rules. Dialectal speeches are known to be much more flexible than speeches in standard language, which have to be constrained by rules. I have noticed that a dialect like Sicilian can be anarchic in limited ways. Words can be chosen much more freely than in the standard language. Even if grammar is fixed, there can be much variation in the lexicon due to idiosyncratic ways of generating

new words. The Sicilian dialect used by my mother reminds us of the language used by Shakespeare, where pragmatic innovations prevailed over the semantic code. Transforming dialectal speeches into standard language, or even indulging in the practice of correcting putative errors, amounts to a total transformation of the dialectal speech. This should not be done because it is like trying to tame a wild horse, and cannot be achieved without changing the horse's character. It is like denying the very idea which sustains the dialect that, unlike standard and standardised language, dialect can be flexible.

6   Gender Mistakes

To conclude this chapter, a topic that I would like to discuss is that of gender mistakes. Sometimes, particularly in languages like Italian where there are inflections for gender, it may be possible to use (as a morph) a vowel instead of another vowel, with such a change indicating a different gender. (Sono stato a casa = masculine; sono stata a casa = feminine). It is of some theoretical interest to note that the first personal pronominal, at least in English, is not inflected for gender. However in Italian, despite appearances to the contrary, when a past participle is used there is agreement with the first personal pronominal, and in this case we understand that the pronominal is implicitly inflected for gender (otherwise, we would not understand where the agreement relationship originated from). Generally speaking, genuine first-personal pronominals give rise to 'de se' interpretations. In short, it is taken for granted in the literature that genuine 'de se' interpretations are those which do not involve identificational components (Castañeda 1966). For example, a person can think of himself as the subject of his own thought without having to remember his name (cases of amnesia are fairly frequent in discussions of 'de se' attitudes). I have always wondered if minimal or thin identificational components should be included in 'de se' interpretations. For example, in a paper on impure 'de se' thoughts (included in Capone 2016a), I wondered whether it might be reasonable to have a 'de se' thought, without having any idea whether that thought coheres or is inconsistent with previous thoughts. From that paper, it emerged that a thin identificational component (having an idea of what positions one embraced prior to the current one) is crucial to having thoughts that are not merely thoughts in isolation (we need to presuppose some unity of consciousness). Now, we want to reflect on the issue of gender. Can one really have a grasp of oneself without having some minimal identification components such as, for example, being a person of a certain sex? The answer to this question may be multiple because, after all, one may be able to think of oneself as being an abstract person, for whom, at least at certain moments when sexual urges do not occur, gender information is not crucial. However, the philosophy of 'de se' has primarily been considered in English, a language where the first person is not inflected for gender, whereas, as we have already seen, there are languages like Italian where the first personal pronominal is implicitly inflected for gender and such inflection can be seen in agreement relations between the

pronominal and the past participle, as in "Sono stata al cinema (lit. I have been (feminine) at the cinema)". (If you are wondering how it is possible to have implicit inflections for gender, consider this sentence in which even the first person is implicit, as given in the pronominal pro; if a full pronominal can be implicit, we should be open to the idea that morphological features can be implicit). Now, the question of 'de se' arises explicitly in cases of indirect reports, such as:

(1) Maria ha detto di essere andata al cinema
     (lit. Mary said PRO to have gone to the cinema)
     (Mary said she had gone to the cinema)

Although PRO is clearly first-personal here, it must also enter an agreement relation with the past participle, which is explicitly inflected for gender. Now, this kind of sentence appears to be of great importance in establishing that the 'de se' thought must include at least minimal (let us call them 'thin', adopting terminology by Rosenthal 2003) identification components including gender attributions. Otherwise, we would not understand how one can have the 'de se' thought expressed in (1). To elaborate on (1), using Higginbotham's (2003) terminology, one would have to say that Mary said that the subject of the thought 'PRO essere andata al cinema' went to the cinema. But one cannot have the thought 'PRO essere andata al cinema' without having a minimal identification component such as 'the subject of the thought 'PRO essere andata al cinema' is female'. Now, all this seems fairly evident and indubitable to me, thus showing that there must always be impure 'de se' thoughts and that, at best, we can decide how to maximally constrain such impure 'de se' thoughts in a way which excludes thick identification components. We may provisionally say that *thin identificational components* are those which do not, and cannot, result in referential errors (one cannot think of oneself, whether male or female, and be mistaken about the referent, running the risk of referring to someone else in one's thoughts). Presumably, these thin identificational components have the syntactic status of appositions, which is similar to the syntactic status of non-restrictive relative clauses (since such relative clauses do not restrict the semantic content of the nominal, they cannot result in identificational errors). We should probably put this idea to the test with further examples but, sketchy though it is, it appears to be working satisfactorily and at the same time rescuing the idea of 'de se' thoughts and the idea that there can be thin identificational components, without which it is unclear whether one could have thoughts about oneself at all.

The idea that minimal identification components which can never result in referential mistakes should be expressed through appositions (similar in status to non-restrictive relative clauses) seems to me to be of some importance. In Capone's (2016b) paper on impure *de se* thoughts, I assume that a sequence of thoughts cannot be expressed in a coherent way without emanating some presuppositions that the speaker recently embraced positions which do not contradict the current self. Thus, if a sequence of I-thoughts is expressed, the minimum we should expect is that there should be a thin identificational component attached to every occurrence of I, which guarantees that each I-thought is not in contradiction with previously expressed or presupposed I-thoughts (this is not to say that one can never change

one's intellectual position, but when such cases occur, then a sense of self-contradiction is perceived; alternatively, selves have to be considered as part of textual constructions each of which has separate stories). According to what I am now saying, these thin identificational components have to be expressed syntactically in such a way that referential mistakes do not occur, thus through appositives or non-restrictive relative clauses. It is well known that non-restrictive relative clauses are referentially ineffective and, thus, whatever is said in the (non-restrictive) relative clause is said not to affect the reference of the modified clause. This tenuous relationship is exactly what is needed in thin identificational components. They are identificational components; however, through their syntactic status, the identificational component is not allowed to modify the reference, and if reference cannot be modified then no referential mistake can occur as a result of this. (There can be no possibility of misidentification of the reference; to answer possible objections, we can assume there may be two major modifications of the NP, restrictive and non-restrictive modification. Restrictive modification affects the N, whereas non-restrictive modification affects the N' (the next projection above N). Restrictive modification affects Immunity to Error through Misidentification negatively. Non-restrictive modification, being of a looser kind, does not affect Immunity to Error through Misidentification (a) because it does not affect reference (one cannot identify reference through this type of modifier), even if (b) it provides further information about the reference which is not of an identificatory nature.

Now after a rather long detour, let us return to the topic of this chapter: grammatical errors. I suppose that using male rather than feminine inflection is a grammatical error and one which poses thorny dilemmas for the reporter. In case the original speaker said (where he is a man) 'Sono stata a Parigi, ieri', should one modify the report in such a way as to modify the grammatical error? And how can we be sure that this is a temporary error, some slip of the tongue, rather than a semantic characterisation of the 'de se' thought? The fact that John is male does not guarantee that he thinks of himself as being male. Correcting the mistake amounts to making guesses about the way the original speaker normally thinks of himself and, also, about the way he thinks of himself at that moment. Could one who normally thinks of himself as being male, occasionally think of himself as being female and not male? Now, it is not my intention to raise substantive questions about whether sexual identification is a habitual or occasional matter; I only want to state that the reporter should make some choices, and these choices should normally have the aim of capturing the intentions of the original speaker in saying what he/she said. I would say, probably without fear of contradiction, that when we report what someone else has said, we correct his or her errors (whether grammatical, lexical or morphological), presumably because, after all, we reporters are *authors* of the texts we report and we do not want to be accused of being *bad* authors and of having flawed grammatical competence. However, if the reporter is a good reporter, he should also reflect on the theory of mind and have some grasp of the thought being expressed by the original speaker (focusing on putative intentions). As I have said in Capone (2016a), the indirect report should normally (except in exceptional contexts which establish a focus on literal content) aim to report the interpreted thought, and

the thought cannot be interpreted unless one has access to the speaker's intentions. At this point you may very well object: but how can one have access to the original speaker's mind? This may be only a slip of the tongue and it may not be worth investigating whether the intention was to express a female or male characterization of the subject. But then, if we are unsure, how can we produce the report? We are at an impasse. This impasse, which is both theoretical and practical in nature, can be resolved if we pay attention to what I proposed in Capone (2016a), that while there is a preference for reporting thoughts which reflect the original speaker's intentions, when we are unsure because there is an interpretative ambiguity which cannot be resolved, our duty is to pass on the interpretative ambiguity problem to the hearer, so that she can also make an attempt to resolve it. In other words, when there are interpretative ambiguities, we would be best going for literal or quasi-literal reports, passing on the responsibility of interpretation to the hearer (this is a means by which an interpretative problem can be shared with the recipient). Is this not an example of this kind? I would say it (possibly) is. Thus, it might be beneficial in cases such as these not to correct the gender mistake, but to preserve it through mixed quotation, which is, as Maier (2014) states, a way of "deferring the interpretation of an expression or phrase to a source different from the current speaker" (Maier 2014, 7). Now, I am of course aware that in reporting, the ordinary praxis is instead to correct mistakes and pretend that they did not happen. But this praxis, at least for once, appears to me to be very superficial and runs the risk of ignoring a serious interpretation problem. Of course, I do not seriously believe the theoretical hypothesis that on some occasions one feels male and on other occasions feels female. (This is a theoretical possibility and I want it to be regarded as such, an example only a philosopher might conceive!). But at least in some cases, one should recognize that identity problems matter and we are never really sure whether the mistake is just a slip of the tongue, or is concealing an identity problem, in which case we would be best choosing a literal report, rather than correcting the report. So, now we are confronted with a case in which theoretical and practical considerations diverge and take separate roads. I am not saying that theoretical considerations should necessarily be reflected in the practice of making indirect reports, but at least they should be taken into account when attempting to refine the theory. And so far we have seen that, through indirect reports, we are considering the possibility of having 'de se' thoughts with minimal, thin identificational components.

I hasten to the conclusion by answering an objection by Pietro Perconti (personal communication). Suppose I know that, in the case of a gender mistake, the speaker whose speech I am reporting is gay. Then there would be no harm in reporting/ interpreting his intentions (presumably in this case, the error is not because of a slip of the tongue, but a claim to a certain identity). Although one may feel inclined to agree with Perconti and try to guess intentions in the indirect report (and, thus, preserve the apparent mistake by offering it not as a mistake, but as a declaration of sexual orientation), I am unsure, even in this hypothetical situation, whether intentionally preserving the apparent mistake would be a correct way to produce the report, although, by coincidence, it would be the same type of report which we would produce if we opted to preserve the literal reading and pass the error on for

scrutiny by the hearer. In fact, Perconti assumed that someone who is gay may have to think of himself as female (or must think of himself as being female), and this may not be true, at least on numerous occasions. So this situation, despite our urge to contextualize the utterance by recording the reported speaker's declarations as to sexual orientation, is still a bit of a puzzle and may be best treated by deferring the interpretation of the possible error to the hearer.

An even more complicated case is when one uses the feminine morph, not for oneself, but for others. Thus, I may say 'Scema' (idiot-feminine) to my male friend Marco. Of course, I am joking. This case is complicated because I have the serious intention of saying 'idiot' to him and the non-serious intention of saying 'scema-feminine' to him. (This is an interesting case of a use which involves serious and non-serious speech simultaneously). How, should the indirect report proceed? Should the reporter say that the speaker said that Marco is 'scema' or 'scemo'? Of course, correcting the mistake would be a good paraphrase, but not necessarily a very informative one, because we may want to include the information that the speaker was joking in the report. It seems to me that a better paraphrase would be to include the word 'scema', but if this is done, then it is unclear whether this is any longer an indirect report, as a segment of the report seems to appear in quotation marks (even if, in this case, the quotation marks are of a pragmatic nature). Then a paradox of this case is that you cannot produce the indirect report without using mixed quotation, that is, a direct report. If you merely added 'the speaker was joking', you would be partially expressing what had happened, but the hearer is left in the dark as to what had actually happened and what the essence of the joke was. Since the joke involves the text, in order to express the indirect report you must make reference to the text and, in order to do so, you have to use a direct report (even if it is a hybrid one).

Translating this speech act into a language like English, which has no morphological features for gender attached to adjectives, is even more problematic. Suppose you want to simultaneously translate and indirectly report the speech act, how can you do so given that there are no equivalent structures in English?

From the point of view of indirect reporting, another compelling case is offered by an example which was given to me by a female student, who told me that she often uses the word 'spouse' in speaking/referring to her boyfriend. Again, I anticipate there may be problems in indirectly reporting this intentional use of an inappropriate word (Was the word used appropriately or not? Many Italians would be greatly surprised by such a use and would class them as offensive, but it was clear that this boyfriend and girlfriend lived in their own world where they inverted social practices). How would you indirectly report the utterance? Would you correct the inappropriate word or not? And in reporting the utterance quasi-literally would you be blamed for using language in an inappropriate way? Once individual speakers depart from normal language games and invent their own language games and practices, it is unclear how one should report them, because in reporting them by ignoring the infelicities, the reporter is committing the sin of reporting not what is speaker-meant but what is not speaker-meant. Instead, as I have always claimed, the focus in the indirect reporting of another person's utterance should be on the speak-

er's meaning and NOT on literal content. However, this case differs from many others because by adhering to literal meaning (at least in the course of the mixed-quoted segments) this becomes a better way of rendering the speaker's meaning.

Before concluding, it is now time to address a problem for the notion of indirect reporting that is directly derived from our analysis of stylistic or grammatical errors. I stated, in reply to Wayne Davis' doubts/reservations concerning the plausibility of the idea that the original speaker has to approve a paraphrase (expressed in indirectly reporting his speech), that either the original speaker or an impersonal and impartial judge has to approve the paraphrase. However, if the notion of an impartial judge can resolve the issue of what happens when a slur is inappropriately attributed to an original speaker who never uttered it, it is not very promising for the purpose of deciding whether an indirect report that edits an ungrammatical error or a stylistic problem or a stylistic virtuosity should be approved of. In fact, it may be believed that the impartial judge need not be as sensitive, as the author of the utterance, to the form of the utterance, particularly with regard to the style and grammatical status of the discourse. Why should the impartial judge be concerned with the form of the utterance, and specifically the style? Why should s/he resist changes or transformations in the indirect report that concern grammar, particularly if incorrect grammar is corrected/ameliorated? In reply to this, one can state that the impartial judge would certainly give preference to content rather than form, provided that it does not interfere with the expression of the speaker's intentions and it does not attribute offences or vulgarity to the original speaker (the cases of slurs or sexual taboos). The most problematic cases, those of gender which I previously discussed in this chapter, are clearly those in which ignoring form amounts to ignoring the speaker's intentions and this will not do. Thus, for the impartial judge to be objective, s/he has to identify somewhat with the original speaker's point of view. But identification, in this case, does not involve departing from his status as impartial judge, but is a form of omniscience, rather than subjectivity. I hope that, at least in part, this resolves the problems which were generated by considering Wayne Davis' objection and my possible answer.

An alternative is to ignore Wayne Davis' objection by drawing attention to an important distinction which he overlooked. We may, after all, distinguish between the fact that the original speaker approves a paraphrase (in the sense that he is pleased by it) from the fact that the original speaker approves of the paraphrase in public. One may approve a paraphrase without, however, wanting to approve it in public. Perhaps this is all that is required to reply to Wayne Davis: all we need is the notion of publically approving a paraphrase.

7   Conclusion

In this chapter, I have reflected on the general practice of indirect reporting and, in particular, I have expressed considerations on what happens when errors are injected into one's reported speech or when they are edited. There may be problems in both

cases. It would appear to me that reflecting on the way grammatical and morphological errors are treated by indirect reporters, can throw some light on the general practice. In fact, we have reflected on some interesting problems for the description of the praxis of indirect reporting, including the issue as to whether the original speaker or an impartial judge has to approve the indirect report and judge it to be satisfactory.

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Chapter 12
Conversational Presuppositions. Presupposition as Defeasible (And Non-defeasible) Inference

The concept of speaker meaning was the fundamental concept of Paul Grice's account of speech, and it was his central thesis that this concept can and should be analysed independently of any institutional linguistic practice. (…) The reason he insisted on this was that he wanted to give a basis for understanding the institution of language as a device that has the function of meaning things, and to separate an account of the functions that language was designed to serve from an account of the means that language provides for serving those functions. The hope was that separating means from ends would help to clarify the specific conventional mechanisms that language provides.

(Stalnaker 2008, 539).

Abstract Is presupposition a semantic or genuinely pragmatic notion? My answer in this paper is that it is a pragmatic notion and I provide explanantions for this view, mainly related to cancellability. Of course, it is not easy to extract theoretical considerations from data and it is possible that one gives an opnionated interpretation of the data. However, at least I wish to propose that in the case of presuppositions data have to be seen in a different way and new data must also be consulted.

1 Introduction

In this chapter, I will attempt to establish the admittedly controversial claim that presuppositions are normally defeasible inferences, taking the lead from Levinson (1983), Simons (2013), Macagno and Capone (2016a, b, 2017). In passing, I will further justify some of the claims that we made in Macagno and Capone (2016a, b). I will also make a further attempt to explain those notions more clearly. Most importantly, I will capitalize on the distinction between potential and actual presuppositions, a distinction which may be parallel to the distinction between potential and

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It took me 23 years to complete this chapter. When I discussed these ideas with the late Anna Morpurgo Davis during lunch in Somerville College, Oxford, she smiled intensely. Now that I am able to offer a demonstration of those ideas with some degree of confidence, I dedicate this chapter to her.

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actual conversational implicatures (see Levinson 2000; Levinson 1983; Huang 1994, 2014). Levinson (1983) understands this distinction and assumes it to be of importance, but in my opinion he does not sufficiently capitalize on this, and this is what I would like to achieve in this chapter. In addition, the terminology he uses is not exactly cast in these terms, but I believe that it is not unreasonable to borrow the distinction from the theory of generalized conversational implicatures, given that, as Atlas (2004) and Levinson (1983) state, there are many points of contact between conversational implicatures and conversational presuppositions.

2   Conversational Presuppositions

In adopting Goffman (1981), linguists are too often guilty of the sin of considering sentences as abstract units which have little or no relation with the context of use. Goffman calls sentences 'little orphans'. There is no exaggeration in Goffman's complaint against general linguists: it is true that in their attempt to proceed towards more abstract and powerful theories, they have deliberately ignored the small details of language use, sometimes even considering them as 'noise'. This sin has produced theories which have increasingly departed from the authentic purpose of linguistics, which is to describe language in relation to society and to see language and communication as intertwined (see Kecskes 2013). One of the results of this pernicious attitude (notice that I am not saying that abstraction power is pernicious but that one should never lose sight of the authentic purpose of language as being connected with communication) is that we have received a theory of presuppositions which still considers them as sentential phenomena. My intuition is that the theory is on a much better footing if we recognize, from the outset, the distinction between sentential presupposition and the speaker's presupposition (or between potential presuppositions and actual presuppositions). Stalnaker's (1974) theory seems to move in this direction and is formulated in such an abstract way as to accommodate many of the new considerations I am broaching in this chapter, including the surprising remarks I have included in the conclusion.

Now it is time to explain why I chose the title 'conversational presuppositions'. I will not hide from my readers that I want to lead them in the direction of accepting that presuppositions share a number of qualities with conversational implicatures, primarily defeasibility. But it is not only a matter of stressing that presuppositions need to be calculated in context on a par with conversational implicatures; I also want to stress the dialogical dimension of presuppositions. In responding to the recent debate between Abbott (2000, 2008) and Stalnaker (2008), one has to recognize that the problem lies in the fact that people, until now, have been biased towards treating presupposition as a sentential phenomenon (even those like Levinson, who claim that presuppositions can be defeated in context, are committed to the view that these are essentially sentential phenomena given that presuppositions are tied to the lexemes or grammatical constructions from which they originate (although, in

their view, the context plays the important role of being able to promote, cancel or suspend them)). Presuppositions are said to contribute to the common ground, but for a large class of (sentential) presuppositional triggers, the definedness requirement (the requirement that the utterance containing the presuppositional trigger is felicitous only in a context that contains the presupposition (thus presumably the common ground must entail the presupposition)) is not satisfied, because the presuppositional trigger merely imposes the constraint that the speaker's context must contain the presupposition, but not that the hearer's context must do so too. Stalnaker (1999 and previous papers), adopting a tradition inaugurated by Lewis, and accepted by other formal scholars such as Heim (1992) and van der Sandt (2012) (among others) has tried to resolve this problem by the notion of accommodation. The hearer, faced with an utterance containing a presuppositional trigger, has the option of questioning the presupposition. If he does not use this option, then this means (obviously we are referring to a tacit semantic/pragmatic discourse rule) that he accepts the presupposition and will go on to act as if he accepted the presupposition. (The presupposition will be part of the conversational score, adopting Lewis's (1979) metaphor (also see Stalnaker 2008)). This is similar to the notion of complicity. If we were to listen to a lecture and the lecturer proffered racist remarks against blacks (going as far as to use racist slurs like e.g. 'nigger' (see Kennedy (2002) on such abhorrent uses)), then, unless we interrupt the lecturer and express our reservations and correct him, there will be complicity between us and him. I do not want to rejuvenate the notion of accommodation by calling it 'complicity', but I want to draw attention to the connectedness of the two notions. At this point, Abbott remarks that the notion of accommodation is too *ad hoc* to be taken seriously, given that, in many cases (not only in a couple of cases) the notion of accommodation is required to rescue the pragmatic notion of presupposition. But now it appears to me that this is a prejudice coming from one who is still sentimentally attached to a notion that is too semantic to do any real work. Instead, we need the notion of conversational presupposition to enable us to stress that we are dealing, not with potential presuppositions, but with actual presuppositions. It is no surprise that actual presuppositions are entities which are concerned with context and pragmatic expansions (Bach 2001 places much emphasis on the idea that even literal meanings are projected thanks to a pragmatic layer, what he calls impliciture, although I have always called it explicature (or conversational explicature)). The notion of presupposition in which we should be interested is a dialogical (or conversational notion), and the notion of accommodation is not an *ad hoc* way to rescue a theory which has many weaknesses, but a way to recognize that the speaker and hearer, through a collaborative process, can sometimes be authors of the same utterance (as Goodwin (2007) states, we can proffer collaborative utterances, one section of which is vocalized by a speaker and the remainder of which is vocalized by a conversational partner), and sometimes of the same presupposition. Authorship of presuppositions (and responsibility for them) seems to involve a dialogic, collaborative process which was called 'accommodation', but which is perhaps an instance of a more general type of collaboration we see instantiated in conversations (as noted by conversation ana-

lysts). We are now capitalizing on both the notion that things exist such as actual or conversational presuppositions and the notion that sentences should not be considered as orphans, but should be seen in a dialogic dimension.

Before proceeding towards the main focus of this chapter, it may be worth discussing a couple of considerations by Abbott (2008) that threaten to jeopardize the notion of accommodation as propounded by Stalnaker. Firstly, the idea that once we accept that presuppositions are phenomena of the informative type (as those who propose accommodation have to assume) the distinction between asserting and presupposing things goes by the wayside. Stalnaker (2008) promptly responds that informative presuppositions (such as those we consider in the phenomenon of presupposition accommodation) are not equivalent to assertions. While it may be appropriate to challenge an assertion by immediately, forthrightly (and directly) rejecting it, this cannot be done for informative presuppositions, the rejection of which seems to require the introduction of parentheses (Goffman's notion of footing is again of assistance, as presupposition projection seems to be an activity which is embedded in an another language game (asserting/responding to the assertion), which needs to be temporarily suspended). Presupposition challenging is a parenthetical activity, as Goffman would willingly call it. As Stalnaker (2008, 542) states, "The assumption is that an assertion is something like a proposal to add the information that is the content of an assertion to the common ground, and a rejection of the proposal is a normal move in the conversational game. Accommodated information is communicated indirectly, so that there is no provision for straightforwardly rejecting it. (One has to say something like "Hey, wait a minute" – one of the tests that Kai von Fintel has used in order to identify presupposition). That is why accommodated information survives rejection, and why it is inappropriate to communicate information that is either controversial or noteworthy by presupposing it". An example by Abbott which, instead, apparently seems to be more threatening (to the notion of presupposition accommodation) is the following:

(1) We all know that I have a daughter.

Abbott believes that if accommodation introduces the presupposition into the common ground only after the moment of utterance (the moment of completion of the utterance), then sentences such as (1) should be appropriate – despite the fact that the hearers ignored the fact that the speaker had a daughter. Stalnaker does not pay much attention to this example, because he believes that an utterance like (1), uttered in a context in which the presupposition requires accommodation, will be taken as false (and this is the end of the story). Presumably, for accommodation to take place, the hearers would have to consider it to be worthwhile making the addition of the presupposition, but if the utterance is false, it may not be worth the hearer's effort to add the presupposition to the common ground. Although this is a contentious example, it is not clear what it proves. It certainly does not prove that accommodation cannot occur when language is used rationally and truthfully. If the speaker had proffered the true proposition, 'You do not all know that I have a daughter', the presupposition would have been accommodated without any problems, on the basis of an assertion that is unlikely to be false.

3   Theoretical Considerations

In this chapter, I will accept and capitalize on some programmatic statements by Simons (2013, 330):

> Presuppositions might be conversationally derived, that is, they might be inferences which are licensed by general conversational principles, in combination with the truth conditions of the presupposing utterance. Stalnaker, from whom we have inherited the currently standard view of presupposition, suggests repeatedly that at least some presuppositions have a conversational source. Indeed, he sees one of the primary advantages of the move from a semantic to a pragmatic account of presupposition as being the possibility of explaining "some of the (presupposition) facts in terms of general assumptions about rational strategy in situations where people exchange information or conduct argument" (1974, 205).

The theories (of presuppositions) we have so far received have been fairly untidy. Certainly much progress has been made in considering that the calculation of the inference under negation points to the phenomenon of conversational implicature, but also in those other embeddings where presuppositions survive despite semantic features which would strongly abort entailments, if presuppositions were entailments, such as modal contexts (possible, unlikely, etc.), epistemic contexts (John believes that his cello is very expensive), counterfactuals (If the Queen of England were in Paris, she would go shopping in the most luxurious shops), questions (Have you seen the President?), etc.. In particular, Kempson (1975), Wilson (1975), Atlas and Levinson (1981) and Levinson (1983) have promoted the view that presuppositions under negation and in those contexts that normally block entailments are nothing but conversational implicatures. This view is most interesting, important and also quite reasonable, but admitting, as these scholars do, that there is an asymmetry between presuppositions as entailments in positive sentences and presuppositions as conversational implicatures in negative ones is quite untidy, and also not parsimonious. Adopting Modified Occam's Razor (Grice 1989; Jaszczolt 1999), it would be best if, *ceteris paribus*, we would be able to deal with these inferences as if they were all conversational implicatures. The alternative view, that these inferences are entailments the whole way through, has been definitively discredited, and thus we should not go (back) in this direction. The asymmetry view is clearly untidy, but the alternative (considering presuppositions as conversational implicatures both in positive and negative contexts) is rather problematic, and, *prima facie*, not easy to accept (to say the least, and needs to be defended at some length). Modified Occam's Razor predicts that a (radical) conversational implicature analysis of presupposition is preferable because it would eliminate unnecessary elements. However, there is the *ceteris paribus* clause to be respected, and this is the most troublesome part. There may be considerable theoretical problems in assimilating the notion of presupposition to the notion of conversational implicature, anyway. After all, conversational implicatures and explicatures are part of new information or asserted information, anyway. Presuppositions are normally equated with information taken to belong to the common ground or to become part of the common ground as soon as the assertion is uttered. However, despite this objection, no one can *a priori* exclude that the message conversationally implicated by the use of a

presuppositional trigger can include another message to the effect that the inferred proposition is presupposed. In any case, the theorist could always reply that if this is an objection to the treatment of presupposition as conversational implicature in positive sentences, it should also count as an objection to the treatment of presupposition as conversational implicature in negative sentences. However, rather unproblematically, almost all theorists now assume that these presuppositions are nothing other than conversational implicatures in negative sentences (and modal or epistemic contexts, etc.). However, the main difficulty for treating presupposition as conversational implicature in positive sentences is that such inferences are not easily cancellable[1]. Lack of cancellability seems to prove that they are entailments. However, the demonstration is not so straightforward, given that Grice himself and various others (e.g. Burton Roberts 2005 and Capone 2003, 2006, 2009, 2013a) have argued that in some cases conversational implicatures are not easy to cancel (e.g. those pertaining to the maxim of Manner) or that explicatures, in general, are not cancellable and that conversational implicatures of the particularized type are not at all easy to cancel (see Jaszczolt 2016 on the notion that these implicatures appear to be particularly entrenched). Now, while I do not want to appear too optimistic about the possibility of eliminating asymmetry in the theory of presupposition, at least there are theoretical grounds for wanting to explore the issue further and propose arguments to the effect that presuppositions (both in positive and negative sentences) are susceptible to contextual evaporation.

4   Defeasibility of Conversational Presuppositions (The Role of the Context)

The strongest possible objection to the view that presupposition is a symmetric notion (in other words that we can deal with the presuppositions of positive sentences and their negative counterparts) comes from factive predicates which appear to be strongly presuppositional in the sense that they seem to entail the presupposed proposition. (Simons 2013 deals with factive predicates but, given that her cases of presupposition cancellation rely on constructions that differ from positive sentences (e.g. questions) I doubt that her treatment is definitive, even though there is an example which is of some interest (and will be reported later on)). We have already

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[1]Although linguists are dogmatically committed to the view that presuppositions are entailed in positive sentences, in this chapter I will use some examples by Levinson (1983), Simons (2013) and myself to show that this need not be the case. We are not the only scholars open to the idea that presuppositions need not be entailed. Williamson (2000) (in the context of an essay on human knowledge and its limits) considers that the sentence 'She heard that the volcano was erupting' need not entail that it is a fact that the volcano erupted. The sentence more or less amounts to 'She heard the report that the volcano erupted'. Yet, even if the sentence is not factive, it is presuppositional (if stress is placed on 'heard' (analogously it is presuppositional if the verb is combined with the clitic in the Italian translation (as in 'Lei lo ha sentito che il vulcano stave eruttando'))). Other examples involving the verbs 'understand', 'imagine' etc. are discussed in Capone (1998, 2000).

seen that it may be a serious sin to conflate the notion of presupposition with that of entailment (in fact, presuppositions survive those contexts in which entailments fail). Thus, the fact that a factive predicate appears to entail its presupposition is a fact that we could willingly do without, because the entailment notion does not appear to have much explanatory significance – in fact, when it comes to explaining why presuppositions survive certain modal contexts, we must candidly admit that the notion of entailment and that of presupposition seem to go in different directions. Furthermore, the fact that a factive predicate entails a proposition (which is also presupposed) does not explain the further fact that that proposition also becomes a presupposition, requiring the context to be in a certain form (and thus requires definedness conditions, adopting Heim (1992) and van der Sand (2012)). Entailment is one thing, but presupposition is quite another. Consider the following:

(2) John ought to regret that he went to Paris with his lover.
(3) If John knows that Mary went to Paris with her lover, he will be furious.

Here, the presupposition is not entailed, because modal embedding (or embedding in a conditional) blocks the entailment; yet the presupposition survives. Clearly these examples prove that there can be presupposition without entailment (as well as entailment with (or without) presupposition) and that one is independent of the other[2].

   Further evidence in support of my favoured view of presupposition as conversational implicature comes from the theoretical possibility of having to distinguish between potential and actual presuppositions, in addition to the premise that any segment of an utterance can be taken (or interpreted) as quoted or mixed-quoted (see Saka (1998), Cappelen and Lepore (1997), Capone (2012)). Thus, one can have cases such as the following:

(4) Mary (who is mad) regrets "going to Paris" (in a context where the speaker and the hearer know that Mary never went to Paris).
(5) Mary (who is mad) is furious that "her fiancé left her for Paris for 2 weeks". (We know her fiancé never left for Paris).

Here, the quoted segment (and that it is quoted can be evinced from the context, given that in oral discourse inverted commas cannot easily appear) appears to be at odds with both the entailment and the presuppositional view[3]. As I have noted many

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[2] This example is similar to an example by Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990), reported in Simons (2013):

(a) If Henry discovers that Jane is in New York, there will be trouble.

   Despite being a factive verb, in this context 'discovers' does not presuppose the truth of the embedded proposition.

[3] Simons (2013) provides at least two interesting examples of cancellability in connection with factive predicates:

(b) I notice that you keep chewing on your pencil. Have you recently stopped smoking? (Uttered in an ignorance context). (Admittedly, this example is taken from Geurts 1994).

times in previous sections, one cannot take for granted that a potential presupposition will ascend to become an actual presupposition, given that world knowledge may be in conflict with it. The presupposition may quite easily evaporate, and the fact that it is entailed is no guarantee that it will not evaporate, because entailments themselves, as Kent Bach (2001) states, are to be validated by the pragmatics of the discourse. One needs to first ascertain whether the speaker is speaking seriously, whether he is quoting someone else, etc. Thus, there are various obstacles along the way to hinder entailments becoming actual entailments, that is, entailments projected by the utterance (as part of speaker's meaning). Quoting someone else is sufficient to block the entailments and the presuppositions of a factive predicate. Now, of course, this does not mean that we have ascertained that factive predicates do not entail the propositions they result in. One may well adhere to the view that the relationship between factive predicates and the entailed proposition is indeed one of semantic entailment. But, at this point, one must argue that presupposition is independent of entailment, capitalizing on the force of the following example:

(6) I will regret going to Paris, if I ever go there.

Now it seems to me that, in this case, it is the presupposition of 'I will regret going to Paris' that evaporates, in the sense that it does not get through, while the entailment of 'regret' still ascends. I cannot regret going to Paris unless I went to Paris; thus, when I predicate the future state that I will regret something, I also predicate that the conditions for the regret state are satisfied (thus the utterance must be interpreted as "I will regret going to Paris (and if the regret state is true, I must have arrived there (what Simons (2013), in her most interesting paper, calls pre-condition entailments)), if it ever becomes true that I have gone to Paris". As can be seen, the if-clause suspends the presupposition but not the entailment of the factive verb. This is another reason for keeping presuppositions and entailments separate.

As Simons states, "In this situation, the addressee knows that the speaker is ignorant of her current or prior smoking habits, and in particular cannot be assuming that she (the addressee) was recently a smoker. The speaker is understood merely as asking whether the addressee has undergone any relevant change of state from being a smoker to not being one" (Simons 2013, 332). I quite agree here with Simons that this is a case of cancellability of a presupposition, but the problem for us is not to demonstrate that presuppositions can be defeated in questions or under negation, but that they evaporate in positive sentences too. The other example proposed by Simons (2013, 332) is the following:

(c) I don't know if Jane ever rented "Manhattan" before, but perhaps she has and is renting it again.

I quite agree that here, too, the presupposition triggered by 'again' disappears but, after all, this is a case of presupposition projection in complex sentences and we know that, on the satisfaction account of presupposition, the presupposition of 'again' evaporates because the potentially presupposed presupposition is asserted before the assertion of the presuppositional utterance. (Thus, at the level of the complex sentence, the proposition that she rented it has been asserted and is, accordingly, not presupposed). Despite the fact that the cancellation of the presupposition is due to the projection problem of presupposition, this is nevertheless an important case, as here the presupposition evaporates even though it is triggered by a lexeme occurring in a positive sentence.

Another good example of this is one I discussed with Sir Peter Strawson (personal communication, 1993). Although the literature unanimously states that the verb 'know' presupposes and entails that p, both Strawson and I came to the conclusion that this is not the case. Of course, 'know' entails (in its legitimate non-etiolated uses (see Capone 1998, 2000)) the known proposition, but it does not presuppose it. I can say things such as, 'If I come to know that Mary betrayed me, I will be furious' (a type of example which puzzled Levinson 1983) without presupposing that Mary betrayed me; and this is not a case of cancellation of the presupposition, since 'know' does not presuppose anything, unless a certain intonational device is used. If I want to presuppose the entailed proposition, I can leave a pause after 'know' and stress 'know', as in:

(7) Mary KNOWS that John is in Paris (example from Capone (2000))

An analogous construction can be found in Italian where a presuppositional clitic can be added, which can have two functions:

(a) Modally strengthening the verb 'sapere' (know);
(b) Introducing a discourse presupposition which I have called a speaker/hearer presupposition (perhaps one of the few cases in which accommodation is not required to inject a presupposition into the common ground) (see Capone 1998, 2000, 2013a on presuppositional clitics).

Now, regardless of the controversies about presupposition, I believe that these facts at the very least make a case for distinguishing between entailments and presuppositions. Now this is a small but not negligible victory, because we may well say that, regardless of whether a factive predicate injects an entailment into the discourse, it must be a conversational implicature to validate the entailment (and make it ascend to become part of speaker's meaning) and it must be a conversational implicature to determine whether the entailment is a presupposition of discourse. The most important considerations by Stalnaker (2008) on accommodation seem to point towards the direction of pragmatic presupposition. In itself, the notion of entailment, as noted independently by Abbott, does not suffice to guarantee that a speaker's presupposition will also become a hearer's presupposition (part of the shared common ground, in other words), first of all because an entailment need not even ascend to become a speaker's presupposition (given the difference between potential and actual presuppositions) and, secondly, because a speaker's presupposition needs to be added to the common ground by the hearer if, and only if, the hearer judges that the speaker is a reliable and trustworthy informant. Unless such judgments are made, there will be a discrepancy between the speaker's and hearer's presuppositions.

5   Radical Pragmatics

As a result of the interesting and radical work by Atlas and Levinson (1981) and Levinson (1983), we know that presuppositions are highly contextual, sensitive inferences which are likely to evaporate in certain contexts. To my knowledge, one of the most interesting examples of cancellability (of potential presuppositions) is discussed in Levinson (1983). Actually, Levinson does not make much of this example since he is committed, in general, to accepting that presuppositions are entailments in positive sentences and conversational implicatures in their negative counterparts. Although this example is not sufficient on its own to form a new direction for the theory to take, once we observe it in the context of a battery of examples and discussions of cancellability, we may start pondering as to whether the received orthodox view of the asymmetry between presuppositions in positive sentences and presuppositions/conversational implicatures in their negative counterparts can be fully accepted or, otherwise, whether we should consider the judicious considerations that flow from the acceptance of Modified Occam's Razor and from the discussion of the non-cancellability of explicatures found in Capone (2003, 2006, 2009, 2013a). Now consider that noteworthy example discussed in Levinson (1983):

(8) Mary died before finishing her thesis.

Although temporal adverbials normally trigger potential presuppositions, these are cancelled if one is confronted with world knowledge that is in conflict with them. In Levinson's system, presuppositions seem to be defeated by contextual elements and, in particular, world knowledge and (also) conversational implicatures of the scalar type that are in conflict with them (adopting Gazdar 1979). Even though I will not delve into the projection problem of presuppositions here, I do not share van der Sandt's (2012) worries about accepting the fact that conversational implicatures are able to cancel presuppositions. It is not that we have to be able to explain why, in general, presuppositions are defeated by conversational implicatures; firstly, the problem of defeat only arises in cases where there is conflict between a presupposition and an implicature; secondly, the power of cancelling the presupposition follows on from the fact that there is something in the compositional semantics that places the implicature in a privileged position, that of modification or qualification of the information that follows. Thus if I have the sentence,

(9) If John has an uncle, his uncle will be proud of him

The conversational implicature arising from the if-clause will be perceived to be modifying the presuppositional sentence and, thus, it is natural that the conversational implicature has scope over the presupposition. Furthermore, another way of reasoning this, as in the case of the incompatibilities in law (see Capone (2013b) on the rational lawmaker), is as follows. When there is an incompatibility, this must be resolved in such a way that one of the conflicting propositions has to go. The conflict is resolved rationally, by pragmatically modifying one of the propositions responsible for the conflict. Now in (9), it is clear that the presupposition

triggered by 'his uncle' is only a potential one and, thus, it is possible to cancel it unproblematically. The conversational implicature that, instead, the speaker is unsure whether John has an uncle or not, is not easily cancellable as it amounts to an explicature (I remind readers that in Capone (2009) I argued that explicatures, unlike potential explicatures, are not cancellable). In this case, the inference that the speaker is unsure whether John has an uncle or not is not cancellable, because of the unrationality of making a supposition when, instead, one knows for certain a fact. I remind readers that I was mainly driven to explicatures (like Carston 2002 or Bach 1994) by the desire to highlight that there are ways of rescuing utterances from obvious defects which would make them absurd, paradoxical or contradictory. Although we do not have a straightforward contradiction here, mainly because of the plasticity of potential presuppositions which are likely to evaporate in places where they cannot stay, the explicature is due to a lack of rationality in the discourse in which the presupposition has to go. In this case, forfeiting the explicature would amount to accepting that the speaker is not rational. But this is only digressing into the problem of presupposition projection, which is somewhat outside the scope of this chapter, even though it would presuppose much of what I am saying here. In any case, Levinson has to be credited with showing that there are conversational presuppositions, even though he does not fully generalize this lesson but conforms to the orthodox view that there is an asymmetry between presuppositional behaviour in positive and negative sentences.

However, when we analyze a larger amount of data, we can see that things easily flow from our general assumptions about Modified Occam's razor. Consider the presuppositions of it-clefts. Although Atlas and Levinson (1981), in a radical paper, attempted to show that the presuppositions of it-clefts are sensitive to context because in negative sentences they can evaporate, this may not be sufficient. Consider the discussion of cancellability in connection with it-clefts in Levinson (1983) by considering an example like the following:

(10) It was not Mary who stole the apple; It was not John who did so; it was not Fred; It was not Ann. Given that I have considered all the alternatives and excluded them all, then it must follow that nobody stole the apple.

Actually, the original example in Levinson is slightly more palatable because it is introduced by an indirect report, whereas in my example I have omitted the indirect report. In any case, if Levinson is correct, cancellability should work in this way as well.

Yet, if we are confined to Levinson's or Atlas and Levinson's consideration, we simply know that presuppositions can evaporate in suitable negative sentences. We only know that there is a principle of Informativeness which promotes the presupposition in negative sentences (unless the context indicates otherwise) because the sentence would not make much sense if the presupposition was not considered to be part of the picture. It would appear to be a waste of information to use it-clefts, unless the speaker presupposed the truth of the second part of the cleft. However, Levinson (1983) (and Atlas and Levinson 1981) do not capitalize on the following

considerations. Even if I agree that the presuppositions of it-clefts cannot be easily (or naturally) cancelled in positive sentences, they can be suspended, as in the following example:

(11) It was John who stole the apple if someone ever did.

Here, the presupposition evaporates because we are explicitly casting doubt on whether anyone did steal the apple. Consider now the following case:

(12) It was John who stole the apple (uttered ironically). Whenever something happens, you always accuse John. You also accuse him, even when he is innocent. So, what can I say, it was John who stole the apple, even if in this case nobody really stole it; here it is in the basket; you just didn't see it.

An objection I anticipate is that, after all, we are confronted here with an ironical discourse segment and the theorists in question never intended to discuss ironic discourses. Normally, they presupposed that presuppositions in positive sentences are not cancellable. Yet, I should reply that since, in general, we should accept that only potential presuppositions are cancellable, it may be worth noting whether potential presuppositions can be cancelled in ironical discourses or not. If scholars confine themselves to the view that presuppositions cannot be cancelled in positive sentences, this is hardly informative as a view because, in any case, we know that potential presuppositions can be cancelled and that cases of cancellation must involve utterances and not sentences. Ironical utterances are those which make use of presuppositional sentences and which may lose their potential presuppositions on the way to becoming utterances. Reasoning like this should be the norm, rather than the exception, given that we have already assumed that we are interested in the speaker's presuppositions and not in sentential or potential presuppositions. In any case, I quite agree that orthodox scholars may cling to their positions and remedy the problem by excluding cases of irony from their theories. Of course, such a move would be quite *ad hoc*, but we would at least have to say something in response to this move. At this point, a possible response is that the theorist has to exclude other types of discourse, such as quotation, direct or indirect reports and suppositions. Consider the following:

(13) Suppose someone stole the apple. Then it was not Mary, who is completely honest. It was not Fred, who never eats apples. It was John who stole it. Of course, I never said that someone stole the apple.

But we can now multiply contexts of this kind. Bearing in mind the considerations on footing by E. Goffman (1980), we can think of an example which is based on a reader discussing the content of a novel. Confining himself to the context of the novel, he can say:

(14) It was John who stole the apple, because it was not Mary, who is completely honest, and it was not Fred, who never eats apples. Of course this is a novel. In real life, nobody stole the apple.

You can also construct a kind of discourse where, at the end of a sequence, you can say that the presupposition that held true is, after all, false because it was formulated in the wrong form. Consider this:

(15) It was John who stole the apple, because it was not Mary, who is completely honest, and it was not Fred, who never eats apples. However, it is closer to the truth to say that nobody stole the apple, because one who eats an apple does not count as stealing it.

I agree that (15) has a metalinguistic flavour, but that is no reason why we should exclude these metalinguistic utterances in our discussion of the defeasibility of presuppositions.

The most interesting and compelling counterargument is that, in positive sentences, it-clefts are normally semantically associated with entailments and this is exactly the meaning of the linguistic construction, but they are not normally speaker/hearer presuppositions (to use terminology by Capone (2000)) or do not belong to the common ground (see van der Sandt 2012). Some pragmatic interpretation work, called 'accommodation' by Stalnaker (1999, adopting Lewis 1979), is required to project the presupposition. Is this not sufficient to show that the presupposition is pragmatic? Pragmatics appears to be required, even if we were to accept that the presupposition originally arises as an entailment, because on the way to becoming an utterance a sentence which contains a presupposition trigger needs contextual information to promote (or abort) the presupposition (for example we noted that the presupposition evaporates in citation contexts, authorship/animator contexts, ironical contexts, etc. (see Goffman (1980) on footing). The presupposition also needs pragmatic information to be projected as a speaker/hearer presupposition. The phenomenon of accommodation, which normally occurs unproblematically, does not solely involve a discourse rule but is, in itself, sensitive to pragmatic information. One needs to know, for example, that even if the people present did not explicitly object to what I said, they may nevertheless be critical, because in the past they represented positions which contradicted my presupposition. There is much about the pragmatics of accommodation which infiltrates the acceptance or rejection of a presupposition.

6   Accommodation and Conversational Presuppositions

That accommodation and conversational presuppositions are related is shown by Irene Heim's (1992) discussion of an example such as in the following:

(16) John believes that his cello is broken.

As far as we know, John has rational (and coherent) beliefs and thus we can go on to presuppose the proposition that he has a cello, even though, adopting Heim (1992), it would be correct, from a semantical point of view, to highlight that 'his cello', being within the scope of 'believe', would not automatically project a

presupposition. The reason for this is that, in an extreme but not impossible case, John may have crazy beliefs including a non-existent cello (which he does not possess). Now, I quite agree that the NP 'his cello' is within the scope of 'believes' and therefore, as far as we know, it may well pretend to refer to a non-existent object (in which case the utterance is more or less interpreted echoically as an indirect report with mixed quotation: John believes that "his cello" is broken). However, one aspect of the story that does not persuade me is that Heim considers the semantic presupposition to be: John believes he has a cello and this is eventually reinforced through accommodation (at the global level, that is, at the top level of the discourse representation marker). In other words, the quite normal (and standard) presupposition which is projected in normal cases, when we take John to be normal and rational (and not crazy), that John has a cello, is obtained by somehow repairing the weaker presupposition and adding something to it, similar to admitting that we begin with the semantic presupposition suggested by Heim and then proceed towards pragmatic increments that complete that presupposition. Now, this story appears rather complicated to me and I would prefer a story to be more or less in keeping with Jaszczolt (1999, 2005, 2016), in saying that the preferred interpretation of the NP 'his cello' is referential and that, at best, the sentence is unspecified for presupposition, although it hosts an actual presupposition at the level of the utterance. The gist of my story is that I want to use Heim's data (and somehow give them a twist not intended by Heim herself) to demonstrate that presuppositions are conversational implicatures, in the standard case. In any case, whether or not we accept Heim's semantic story, we have to accept that the full proposition is obtained by accommodation, that is, by using alternative pragmatic means. Of course, part of the accommodation story is that we are normally confronted with rational, coherent or normal believers who are unlikely to make pernicious (perceptual) mistakes such as creating referents where there are none (when Burge (2013) assumes that there can be a mismatch between the way an object appears to us and the way the object really is, he somehow presupposes that outlandish errors concern predicate attribution rather than reference fixing (that is, creating referents for non-existent objects)). Given our expectation that believers would accept things in a normal manner, we exclude the case of empty referents for using potentially referential NPs because we want to be charitable to others and to be willing to consider them as rational, unless and until we have specific evidence to the contrary. This is more or less what the story must be like that explains Heim's very interesting example.

7   Presuppositional Clitics

Other cases which lead us in the direction of accepting the notion that presuppositions are cancellable come from presuppositional clitics (e.g. Giovanni lo sa che Maria è a Parigi (lit. John it knows that Mary is in Paris)). Since I have already discussed this issue in a previous article at length (Capone 2013a; also see Capone 1998, 2000), I will try to be brief here. I have argued that presuppositional citics

combined with verbs of propositional attitude (including 'sapere', 'capire' 'sentire', 'immaginare' etc.) in contexts where they do not anaphorically link with antecedent propositions (which match with them in context; I assume that the clitic is a proxy for a full proposition), conversationally implicate that the embedded proposition (the one embedded in the verb of propositional attitude) has presuppositional status or, in any case, has a complementary status to that of the sentence without the clitic. So given that in Italian, 'sapere' can be used non-presuppositionally (although remaining factive like the English 'know' and, furthermore, being susceptible to etiolated or parasitic uses resembling the semantics of 'believe' (credere)), a use of the more marked construction with the clitic is predicted in the Levinsonian system (Levinson 1983, 2000; also see Huang 1994, 2014) to have an interpretation that is complementary, that is, a presuppositional one. It remains to be ascertained whether the factivity of the clitic (which seems to reinforce a verb of knowledge and exclude parasitic or etiolated uses) also follows from the presuppositional use (I would be very much in favour of this view. The cancellability of these presuppositional interpretations can be demonstrated by taking into account the fact that the anaphoric uses of the clitic are contexts where the factive presupposition may disappear. This (rather succinctly) summarises what I stated in Capone (2013b).

8   More Examples of Defeasibility

There are other cases which lead to the idea that presuppositions are cancellable. Consider the following example;

(17) According to Mario, the Strait of Messina bridge is a modern monster.

In this case, the potential presupposition that the Strait of Messina has a bridge is not projected, although a weaker presupposition can be projected, for example that there has been talk about the Strait of Messina bridge (there have been plans, or construction work has already started). 'According to Mario' works like a modal expression and somehow serves to place the expression 'The Strait of Messina bridge' between inverted commas. This may well be something talked about, rather than a real object. Pragmatics may even intervene to somewhat modify the temporal structure of the sentence by adding a future tense, in which case (17) would have to be understood as (18)

(18) According to Mario, the Strait of Messina bridge will be a modern monster.

This means that the bridge, when and if it is built, will become a modern monster, since the existential quantification is within the scope of the future tense and there is a pragmatic restrictor at the level of the explicature (if is ever built or completed). Now some may believe that the logical presuppositional status of the definite description depends on the presence of the future tense. However, it may well be independent of it. Consider what happens in the following example:

(19) The skyscraper will be destroyed (because it was built illegally).

Certainly the future tense is no obstacle to the projection of the presupposition. The difference between (18) and (19) is due to background knowledge. When we utter (19) we know that the object is existent and we therefore go on to take it for granted and presuppose its existence in discourse. Instead, when we utter (18) we know very well that the bridge was never built and (despite grand plans by Berlusconi) it was never started. Thus, in order to make sense of the existential presupposition we must somehow modify the presupposition and accommodate the presupposition that there has been talk about the project. The existent object is not the bridge but talks about the bridge. (Utterances can be considered to be on a par with objects). It is not the future tense that serves to weaken the implicatue, although pragmatically it also contributes to that, but it is the addition of a restricting clause at the level of the explicature (such as 'if it is ever built or completed) that will determine the content of the presupposition.

Consider now the following case:

(20)   The judge sentenced Mary to two years for stealing a book, but Mary did not steal a book. She would never read books. There is not a single book in her house.

It may appear that the PP (prepositional phrase)'for stealing a book' strongly presupposes that there was a book that Mary stole. Now, this presupposition may well be considered to be a conversational effect, because it can be explicitly (and without much effort) cancelled. An opponent may well state that this is not a real case of presupposition, given that the presupposition can be cancelled in a positive sentence, or she may insist that we accept the fact that there could be two types of presuppositional trigger: strong and weak. However, that this is a presuppositional trigger of some kind is proven by constancy under negation and by embedding in modal contexts (If you asked the question: Did the judge sentence Mary to two years for stealing a book?', you would presuppose the same proposition as in the positive statement).

Another interesting case is the following:

(21)   When the car is destroyed, you will only be able to dream of it.

Now, the pronominal 'it' refers back to the car and, thus, because of anaphora we may well replace it with the descriptive content of the anaphoric antecedent (see Asher (2000) on destruction verbs). But the two occurrences of 'the car' do not have the same presupposition. The presupposition shifts in the discourse. Given the destruction verb, when one processes the second occurrence of 'the car' one will not presuppose that there is a car. In fact, the use of the destruction verb has served to eliminate the presupposition that there is a car (in particular, the car which is being talked about) from the discourse representation. Thus, despite the anaphoric element at the level of descriptive material, the link is not a referential one and it would be incorrect to say that the use of 'The car' in the second occurrence presupposes that there is a car. It merely refers to another discourse referent, created in the meantime, in other words the memory of the car. Somehow this referent (this

presupposition that there is a memory of the car) has to be accommodated at the discourse level to make sense of the referential anaphoric link.

Another, perhaps trivial, case that demonstrates defeasibility comes from schizophrenic discourse. Schizophrenic patients are often disturbed by voices (other than their own) and their mental scene is populated by non-existent objects (objects that exist for them but not for the therapist) (see Andreasen and Grove 1986; Cutting 1989). However, in therapist-patient discourse, it is not unusual to report what the patient has said or what the imaginary person created by the patient has said. So the therapist may end up saying:

(22) So Napoleon hurt you quite a lot.

In this kind of discourse, unlike what happens in ordinary discourse, the therapist is referring to an imaginary object by the name Napoleon and presupposing that there is an imaginary object who converses with his patient. The ordinary existential presupposition introduced by ordinary names must be substantially pragmatically weakened.

9   Presupposition and Footing

Now we should, albeit briefly, dwell on a perplexing problem about presupposition and footing. The problem is the following. When we encounter a presupposition in a that-clause of an indirect report, how do we know that this is a presupposition of the reporting speaker or, rather, a presupposition of the reported speaker? This is a particularly thorny problem, because intuitively the that-clause is a locus where the utterance was authored, both by the original speaker and by the reporter. Also, we are never sure whether the original speaker is responsible (and to what extent) for the content of the that-clause or whether responsibility should be allocated to the reporter.

Usually, Capone (2010) adopted a strategy based on the following principle:

Paraphrasis/Form Principle
The that-clause embedded in the verb 'say' is a paraphrasis of what Y said, and meets the following constraints:
Should Y hear what X said he (Y) had said, he would not take issue with it, as to content, but would approve of it as a fair paraphrasis of his original utterance. Furthermore, he would not object to vocalizing the assertion made out of the words following the complementizer 'that' on account of its form/style. (Capone 2010, 382).

This principle can probably be deduced through pragmatic principles of a more general type, as stated by Capone (2010). But this is not our concern here. All we want to know is whether this principle is useful in understanding and explaining (in addition to describing) the praxis of indirect reporting. If anything, Capone has always taken this principle to militate in favour of the idea that the original speaker is responsible for what is said in the that-clause of the reporting utterance, when offensive, foul or slurring language occurs in the that-clause. Of course, the

application of this principle is modulated in context and I have admitted that, in context, one can settle the potential interpretative ambiguity in a way that is contrary to the predictions of the Paraphrasis/Form Principle. (See Haugh 2014).

So, the Paraphrasis/Form Principle would predict that (possibly) the original speaker (rather than) the reporting speaker is responsible for the presuppositions of that-clauses in indirect reports. (We can, however, remain silent as to whether the reporter accepts the presupposition or not; we can perhaps state that he either does or does not). However, like all predictions by the Paraphrasis/Form Principle, this should be confirmed (or otherwise cancelled) by contextual information. So, *a priori*, we can say that the actual context has the power of cancelling such predictions if a potential contradiction between the contextual information and the prediction is perceived (a contradiction has to be settled somehow and one of the conflicting pieces of information has to be eliminated). What happens when contextual information conflicts in practice with the information predicted by the Paraphasis/Form Principle? Which piece of information should be eliminated? Is the Paraphrasis/Form Principle of such a high status that contextual knowledge can be modified by eliminating that part of it that is in conflict with the principle? It is difficult to say what should happen in practice, unless we locate the problem at the level of the communicative practice. What we know for sure is that, if a principle A cannot be applied because by applying it we violate a principle B that is superior to it, then the principle (A) should (temporarily) be abandoned. So, it is not the case that if information contained in the background defeats Principle A, we should abandon it *ipso facto*. We should at least consider whether there is a stronger motivation, that is, that the practical problem encountered in reconciling information belonging to the common ground and Principle A is impossible to resolve, because in resolving it in favour of Principle A we violate a principle that is superior to that of Principle A. So what kind of Principle B, with a status higher than Principle A, do we have to grapple with?

In Capone (2016), it was argued that one reason why the presuppositions of that clauses of indirect reports are attributed (by default) to the reporting speaker and NOT to the reported speaker is that they should be satisfied by the context. But which context? The reported speaker's context or the reporting speaker's context? In Capone (2016), the idea was advanced that (in the same way in which deictic elements in the that-clauses of indirect reports are assigned reference by taking into account the reporter's and hearer's context because this is immediately accessible to the hearer), presuppositions of NPs or other elements in the that-clauses of indirect reports should be satisfied by the context of the reporter and the hearer because this is the only context that is available to the hearer. If a presupposition is not satisfied, as Levinson (1983) when adopting Strawson states, the discourse is not (and cannot be) felicitous. In some ways the hearer must be involved in assessing whether the discourse is felicitous or not. Thus, the presupposition is satisfied only if the context of the hearer satisfies it. This point is easily proven by accommodation (Stalnaker 1999). Suppose that the speaker says 'John's sister has arrived', even if the hearer does not know (hence the context *prima facie* cannot satisfy the presupposition

triggered by 'John's sister') that John has a sister. At this point, the context is defective and the hearer must accommodate the presupposition (he does that by failing to object to the presupposition, by tacit acceptance/acquiescence). Now, if anything, what the discussion has proven is that scholars like Stalnaker, and generally most practitioners of presuppositions accept that the context is something the hearer must have access to in order to determine whether the presupposition is satisfied, that is, it must be a context shared by both the speaker and hearer (see Capone's 2000 considerations on speaker/hearer presuppositions).

At this point, we have reached the stage where we are more or less aware of the conflicting principles which are involved in this kind of potential communicative situation. On the one hand, the Paraphrasis/Form Principle states that the original speaker ought to be responsible for the presupposition. However, if this is accepted in practice, another principle has to be abandoned with regards to the fact that a presupposition must be satisfied by the context, at least by admitting accommodation. However, Principle B, which we have now termed the Presupposition Satisfaction Principle makes the contrary prediction, because it cannot be satisfied if the context we are referring to is the context of the reported speaker (given that we know little or nothing about that context; but it can be satisfied if the context we refer to is the context of the reporting speaker/hearer). One principle has to be abandoned, and this happens to be the Paraphrasis/Form Principle. But we also saw that, in other cases, this principle could be defeated – one of most notorious cases being that of translated indirect reports (Capone 2016). In any case, at this point we only have to try to understand why the Presupposition Satisfaction Principle is ranked higher than the other Principle A. We can only speculate that the reason for this is that the Presupposition Satisfaction Principle is somewhat semantic in form – and this explanation will suffice in the absence of a theory that considers presuppositions to be genuinely pragmatic phenomena that are cancellable in positive sentences as well as in their negative counterparts (see Huang 2014, particularly p. 66). But at this point, the problem will have to be reduced to the following: why is it that one type of conversational implicature defeats another type of conversational implicature? Although it is difficult to predict the details of such a possible theory, we know that if a presupposition is projected (whether semantically or pragmatically) it must be compatible with the context (a minimal assumption which is alternative to presupposition satisfaction, according to Levinson 1983). The hearer has to ascertain whether it is compatible with the context and, thus, there is the problem that the hearer should have access to the reported speaker's context. Our assumption is that he cannot. Thus, the principle prevails that what is impossible should not be expected. This is most certainly a higher ranking principle than the Paraphrasis/Form Principle. Our hypothetical discussion, which is aimed at surmounting obstacles posed by a possible future pragmatic theory, has steered us in the direction of a principle (that plays some role in pragmatic theories as stated in Capone (2006) in his discussion of Grice's circle) that is fairly general and high ranking:

Do not expect hearers and speakers to do what is not possible for them to do.

There are other facts which ought to be noted in connection with presuppositions and indirect reporting (or belief (indirect) reports). Consider utterances such as the following:

(23) Mary believes that the king of France is bald.
(24) Plato believed that Aristotle was the most important living philosopher.
(25) Mrs Clinton said that President Obama was one of the best presidents of the US.
(26) Mrs Clinton said that the President of the US should care for the overall international balance among states.

Let us assume, without much argument, that belief reports are a kind of indirect report (the demonstration would not be difficult because they are definitely closer to indirect than direct reports). Then the considerations that we have so far accepted would be conducive to accepting the proposition that presuppositions should be satisfied by the context of the utterance (the context of the reporter) rather than by the context of the original speaker. Let us now assume, without argument, that the subject of the belief coincides structurally with the logical characteristics of the original speaker of an indirect report. Then our theory assumes that the presupposition ought to be satisfied by the context of the reporter – thus the reporter and the hearer have to be taken as presupposing that there is a king of France (in 23), that there is a philosopher called 'Aristotle' in (24), that there is someone who is President of the US and is called Obama (in 25) and that there is someone who is President of the US (in 26).

10   A Worry by Neal Norrick (p.c.)

In the final part of this chapter, I will at last address some worries which have been vocalized by Neal Norrick (personal communication), who reacted to a previous paper by Macagno and Capone (2016b) by asking us how we would attempt to reduce the (apparently irreducible) presuppositions of definite expressions to defeasible pragmatic inference. Although a definite description would appear to be a semantic trigger of presuppositions (and these look fairly strong and uncancellable in positive sentences), I have thought that, after all, Neal Norrick's worries are not completely justified, as definite descriptions are triggers of numerous pragmatic inferences which may well require an approach in terms of defeasible (and also non-defeasible) inference. I will not dwell long on this issue, but I will simply refer to existing literature (of the philosophical kind) which at least seems to warrant that definite descriptions are the locus of pragmatic inferences. Consider first the referential/attributive interpretative ambiguity (in adopting Jaszczolt 1999, I will not accept the view that there is a semantical ambiguity of this type here). When we utter definite descriptions in the context of (positive) utterances, things such as 'The President (of the USA)', although it is always clear in context what the speaker's intention is, there is at least a theoretical possibility that the hearer will be

confronted with a choice between a referential and an attributive interpretation. As Jaszczolt (1999, 2005, 2016) and Capone (2011) (adopting Jaszczolt 1999) have made clear, there is a tendency to prefer the referential interpretation, presumably because it is the most informative one and directly links the hearer to a referent which is accessible in the discourse and which is not abstract in form. However, in some contexts the attributive interpretation prevails, particularly if there is an emphasis on the legal status, role and attributes of the institution in question. Thus an utterance like the following is likely to project an attributive interpretation: "The President cannot change the Constitution on his own". Here, although we have an object in mind and we may well provide a referent in our discourse representation, the object that we have in mind is abstract in form and we are unable to effect substitutions in a two way direction. If Clinton is the President, then Clinton cannot change the constitution, but we cannot *ipso facto* say that the things that Clinton does are those things that the President does. The President cannot do some things because it would be illegal for him to do them. But Clinton can do them, although illegally. It may be interesting to regard the positions where attributive/referential interpretative ambiguity can occur as having similarities with opaque contexts, although there may not exist a verb of propositional attitude to create opacity, even though, as I have already said, the relationship between opacity in propositional attitude contexts and this kind of opacity may not be completely analogous.

If there is an attributive/referential interpretative ambiguity, then clearly there must be pragmatic inferences, although these may be explicatures and predicted to be of the non-cancellable type. Even so, they are still pragmatic inferences.

Presuppositions of definite descriptions in some contexts are defeasible. Consider the following example:

(27) The King of France is happy.

I might say this when we are looking (together) at a painting of Louis XXIII and I, obviously, mean that the face of the person represented in the painting is smiling and happy. In this context, despite the constraints imposed by the definite description, I am not presupposing that there is currently a king of France (although I presuppose that there was a king of France in the past). All I am saying is that the King of France represented in the painting is happy. Now, my detractors may well reply that we have been considerably exposed to this kind of example in the literature. A similar example might be, 'The ham sandwich has left'. Here we have a metonymic extension (see Nunberg or Levinson 2000) and we are certainly not presupposing that there is a ham sandwich when we utter the definite description (in fact the sandwich has already been ingested and digested), but we are referring to the person who ordered (and ate) the sandwich. There may be analogies in the two examples, insofar as pragmatics is involved in fixing the referent. But this kind of referent fixing is something that happens in many, if not all, cases of definite description usage. When we say, 'The President of the USA went on his final tour of Europe' (immediately after Trump's election) we mean 'The President who is about to leave his office went on a final tour of Europe (to say goodbye to his European allies)'. Sometimes we may not even be aware of the pragmatic increments that need to be constructed

to make (better) sense of the discourse, but we are certainly capable of making such increments as a matter of routine.

The last point I want to highlight in reply to Neal Norrick's concerns is that the uniqueness presupposition apparently attached to definite descriptions always requires contextualization. We are not referring to a unique referent but to a unique referent in a certain context. The use of a definite description normally presupposes that the hearer is able to identify the referent on the basis of (some) descriptive material, but also on the basis of a context which makes the referent unique (and thus easy to identify). I would never dream of saying, 'That soldier is happy', if there are 1000 soldiers around me and I do not at least use a demonstration to select a unique object. Thus, when I say to my perplexed students, 'The desk is full of dust', I am not uttering this expression in a context where there are more competitors for the referent, but I confine myself to a context where there is usually only one. If the smallest possible context still contains more than one desk (e.g. my university office), then I need at least a demonstration to separate the even more restricted context from the overall context where the perception act occurs. I believe that all this is well known from philosophical literature on definite descriptions (see Elbourne 2013 for an important discussion of the literature) and context restriction and I am not stating anything new. But what I am saying certainly supports the idea that pragmatics is somehow involved in the use and understanding of definite descriptions and their (pragmatic) presuppositions.

11   Conclusion

We have liberated our view of pragmatics from the notion that presupposition should be dependent on semantic entailment and, in fact, we have seen cases in which it is independent of it. We have more or less returned to a position (on the conversational basis of presupposition) which, although expressed many years ago by Stalnaker, is still very contemporary:

> The propositions that P and that Q may be related to each other, and to common beliefs and intentions, in such a way that it is hard to think of a reason that anyone would raise the question whether P, or care about its answer, unless he already believed that Q. (Stalnaker 1974, 205).

It is interesting to note that Stalnaker's definition does not explicitly address the question of whether presupposition should be defined as a matter of entailment. We have already seen that the speaker's presupposition goes beyond entailments and covers the speaker's meaning. However, Simons (2013) believes that she should reformulate Stalnaker's ideas in terms of entailment, as follows:

> Interpretation Principle (tentative)
> Suppose that P entails but is not entailed by Q. A speaker who raises the question whether P indicates a belief that Q. (Simons 2013, 342).

Simons, at a later stage in the paper, feels the need to distinguish ordinary entailments from entailments that are preconditions for the occurrence of the event specified in the presuppositional verb.

The story we have so far promoted is more in keeping with Stalnaker's original ideas which deal with presupposition as a relationship between two propositions related to common ground beliefs and intentions in such a way that raising the question whether P amounts to raising the question whether Q. Now notice that this definition is not only suitable for positive sentences, but also for negative ones (or ones containing modals, question markers, etc.). It is quite abstract and does not mention the word 'entailment' (instead Simons wants to revert back to that notion). The word entailment is not used very satisfactorily in the case of presupposition because we need to think of the speaker as being a speaker who means something, that is, a proposition that is related to another proposition that is also speaker-meant. The notion of entailment is not sufficient to ensure that a proposition is speaker-meant. Even assuming that P entails that Q, saying that P cannot guarantee that the speaker will (also) mean that Q. Simons is closer to the truth when she speaks of entailments that are pre-conditions for the occurrence of a certain change of verb state (John cannot stop smoking unless he smokes (he is a smoker)). But having pre-conditions means that some propositions are conditions for certain other propositions for the speaker, the hearer and also the person being described. This means that the intentions of the speaker matter. The speaker could not say, 'John stopped smoking', unless he thought that smoking is a condition for stopping smoking, and he also thought that, for the hearer and the person being described as smoking, that smoking is a condition for stopping smoking. As stated by Simons, entailment is not sufficient because the entailment relationship only ensures that, if the entailed proposition is false, the entailing proposition is false, but this could be the case even if the speaker and the hearer and the person being described did not currently and consciously believe that the entailed proposition is a pre-condition for the occurrence of the entailing one. Thus, we need both intentions and shared knowledge. So far so good, but I intend to read Stalnaker's definition at a more abstract level, transcending the issue of entailments and pre-conditions. Suppose (by a voluntary stretch of the imagination) that a speaker was unaware that there is an entailment relationship between stopping smoking and smoking. He has either never actually reflected on that long enough, or he is unsure whether stopping Ving entails Ving. He is unsure because he may wonder whether failing to start doing something amounts to the same thing as stopping doing something. Yet, faced with a negative sentence/utterance such as, 'John did not stop smoking and he died', he may well reason that since the speaker raised the issue whether P, he must have raised the issue whether Q. He also reasons that, unless the speaker believed that Q, it would have been pointless (and completely uninformative) to say P. Since the speaker raised the issue whether Q and given that without Q, the assertion of P becomes pointless, the speaker is inclined (and the hearer must be inclined) to believe that Q. Now suppose this suffices to explain where presuppositions come from without the notion of entailment in negative statements. Since negative statements, after all, are contradictions of their positive counterparts, it would be equally pointless to produce them unless the

speaker and the hearer accepted that Q. In fact, contradictory statements must share presuppositions, otherwise there could never be a contradiction. Since Levinson (1983), we know that logical deductions only work if we keep presuppositions fixed. If we changed the presuppositions of names or pronominals, deductive arguments would lead to incorrect conclusions. Consider contradictions like, 'John regrets that P', and, 'John does not regret that P'. These could be represented more economically by, 'John regrets that but John does not regret that'. But, for this statement to be contradictory, 'that' and 'that' must refer to the same object and, thus, must share the same presupposition. The morale of the story is that since positive sentences (statements) are counterparts of negative ones, they must share the same presuppositions. And if we have found a way for negative statements to arrive at their presuppositions without semantic entailment, then we have also found a way for positive sentences to arrive at their presuppositions without knowing their entailments (or while knowing their entailments redundantly). I should probably stop here because, although the logical conclusions are quite surprising, they do not appear to be logically incorrect. It is possible that semantic entailments redundantly accompany conversational presuppositions – but at this point another question comes to mind: is it impossible that these semantic inferences are only sedimented after the pragmatic inferences were there? (A story which is in parallel to the one stating that explicatures were sedimented in linguistic semantics and then became conventionalized).

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Chapter 13
The Clitic 'lo' in Italian, Propositional Attitudes and Presuppositions

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The socio-cognitive approach emphasizes that common ground is a dynamic construct that is mutually constructed by interlocutors throughout the communicative process. The core and emergent components join in the construction of common ground in all stages, although they may contribute to the construction process in different ways, to different extents, and in different phases of the communicative process.

Kecskes and Zhang (2009, 331)

…let us say that a TEXT is a set of instructions from a speaker to a hearer on how to construct a particular DISCOURSE MODEL. The model will contain DISCOURSE ENTITIES, ATTRIBUTES, and LINKS between entities.

Prince (1981, 235)

Abstract In this chapter I have used pronominal clitics in Italian in combination with verbs of propositional attitude to shed light on the opacity effects caused by intrusive pragmatics (at the level of free enrichments/explicatures). Certain problems, as discussed by Schiffer (Propositional attitudes in direct-reference semantics. In: Jaszczolt, Katarzyna (ed) The pragmatics of propositional attitude reports. Elsevier, Oxford, pp 14–30, 2000), completely disappear when the syntax, semantics and pragmatics of propositional clitics are discussed and such considerations are extended to propositional attitudes in general. In this chapter, I will add that a propositional clause must be in an appositional relationship (resulting from free enrichment and, thus, not actually present in the syntax) with the that-clause embedded in verbs of propositional attitude. I consider the consequences of this position. One of the most cogent results of this chapter is that pronominal clitics refer back to full propositions (if they refer to propositions at all) and not to minimal propositions. I take my own considerations on clitics to give support to the interesting and important considerations on emergent presuppositions by Kecskes and Zhang (Pragmat Cogn 17/2:331–355, 2009).

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1   Introduction

In this chapter, I am going to discuss presuppositional clitics in combination with verbs of propositional attitude (factive and non-factive). Combination with non-factive verbs of propositional attitude is important insofar as it shows that the presuppositional phenomena triggered by clitics are not derived from the (semantic) properties of the verbs in question (see also Higginbotham p.c.). I shall primarily discuss a language like Italian, even though in Capone (1997, 2000) I collected data from various European pro-drop languages and compared my own intuitions about presuppositionality with those of the native speakers of those languages. It is generally accepted in the literature on clitics that languages like Spanish display clitic doubling constructions, while languages like Italian or Greek[1] do not. Yet, even in Italian there is a phenomenon which appears to be like clitic doubling. Consider, in fact, the following utterances (discussed in Capone 1997, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2008, 2012):

(1) Giovanni lo sa che Maria è al cinema;
     (Lit. Giovanni it knows that Maria is at the cinema)
(2) Maria lo immaginava che Giovanni era al cinema;
     (Lit. Maria it imagined that Giovanni was at the cinema)
(3) Maria lo aveva capito che Giovanni era a Parigi;
     (Lit. Maria it had understood that Giovanni was in Paris)
(4) Maria lo aveva indovinato che Giovanni era a Parigi;
     (Lit. Maria it had guessed that Giovanni was in Paris)
(5) Maria lo aveva sentito che Giovanni era a Parigi;
     (Lit. Maria it had heard that Giovanni was in Paris)
(6) Maria lo aveva intuito che Giovanni era a Parigi;
     (Lit. Maria it had surmised that Giovanni was in Paris)
(7) Maria lo aveva notato che Giovanni era a Parigi;
     (Lit. Mary it had noticed that Giovanni was in Paris)

Some of the verbs in question are factive and some are not; yet all the utterances appear to host constructions which appear to be like clitic-doubling. I shall refer to the constructions above primarily as presuppositional or pronominal clitics.

Before proceeding further, I need to clarify one point. In this chapter, I connect the issue of pronominal clitics with that of definiteness. Scholars involved with the issue of definiteness have normally concerned themselves with matters such as existential presuppositions. However, I will mainly discuss that area of research that considers the notion of familiarity (Christophersen 1939, Prince 1992). According to Prince (1992), definite descriptions correlate with pieces of information that are hearer-old (indefinite descriptions, instead, correlate with pieces of information that are hearer-new). In this chapter, I consider clitics as instructions (to use a term by Prince) to link to a previous segment of discourse. I slightly formalize this basic idea by recourse to von Heusinger's ideas on definiteness and choice functions.

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[1] The literature on Greek is not unanimous and some authors opt for clitic doubling, as noted by a referee. See also Anagnostopoulou (2007). This is not problematic for me.

    In line with these considerations, it is likely that the presuppositions of pronominal clitics are introduced in discourse through a pronominal which establishes an anaphoric link with an antecedent (a referent/proposition). Since anaphora and definiteness are considered to be two sides of the same familiarity principle (Peregrin and von Heusinger 2003), I take pronominal clitics in Italian to be presuppositional triggers which involve the reference to some proposition that is salient in discourse. I assume that an NP is definite if the referent it introduces is functionally connected with some other discourse item which has previously been introduced. This position is in accordance to both the considerations in Capone (2000)[2] and Nocentini (2003),[3] who, after adopting such considerations, extends them to clitics which are not copies of propositions, but of bare NPs (non-propositional NPs denoting things, rather than facts). Nocentini undertakes a similar analysis, stating that both types of objects, when referred to anaphorically through a clitic, express topical information (read: given information). It is intuitive that the anaphoric properties of presuppositional clitics correlate with their ability to escape modal effects (mainly opacity), as in the following example:

(8) Giovanni lo vuole vendere, il suo violoncello.[4]
     (Lit. Giovanni it wants to sell his cello).

According to Heim (1992), strictly speaking the verb 'wants' creates opacity and marks the object position as being potentially non-referential, even if, normally, the English translation of the sentence in (8) is understood as having the presupposition that John has a cello, and that he does not only believe that he has one. This is a case of presupposition accommodation through a conversational implicature, since in a prototypical scenario people who have beliefs have appropriate evidence for them and can justify them, should they be challenged. It is interesting that in the Italian translation, when the clitic is present, the object position of the embedded clause is referential, either because the clitic refers to some previous item in discourse (not just to an NP but to an NP in a referential position), or because the presupposition is accommodated through some conversational implicature, due to the prolixity of the clitic construction. I reserve this second explanation for cases which cannot be accounted for through anaphora. I have briefly mentioned the issue of the opacity of the NP position embedded in a verb of propositional attitude like 'believe'. This question will be addressed later on. For the time being, it is clear that both propositional and non-propositional objects doubled by (presuppositional) clitics in Italian have special referential properties derivable through anaphoric connections or through conversational implicatures (M-implicatures to follow the terminology in Huang (2000)[5]).

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[2] Also see Leonetti (2007), who adopts the considerations in Capone (2000).

[3] Nocentini agrees with Capone that the doubling of a propositional object by a clitic is typically associated with factivity.

[4] I take this to be a case of right dislocation which is different from clitic doubling.

[5] M-implicatures can be dealt with by Relevance Theory by noticing the extra effort introduced by apparently redundant constructions and by offsetting such extra effort by some extra contextual effects.

2   The Syntax and Semantics of Pronominal Clitics

In this section, I shall review some of the recent, and less recent, proposals on (presuppositional) clitics and the syntax/semantics interface, focusing on the interpretational problem (see Anagnostopoulou 2007; Zwicky 1985 and van Riemsdijk 1999 for some generalizations on the grammatical and phonological properties of clitics). Some of the recent pragmatic proposals (see Leonetti 2007 on deriving specificity from definiteness at the level of the explicature) essentially follow from semantic ones. While previous discussions on clitics seemed to associate them with special specificity effects (see Sportliche 1993; Dobrovie-Sorin 1990), more recent proposals seem to avoid the reference to specificity, while they link the pronominal clitics to definiteness effects. Leonetti (2007) is one of the strongest proponents of the idea that pronominal clitics correlate with definiteness, which essentially follows on from the fact that the clitic has anaphoric properties.

Delfitto (2002) makes much of the anaphoric properties of pronominal clitics and relates definiteness effects to anaphoric properties. Since the pronominal clitic has anaphoric properties, it can link to previous discourse, either to connect with an NP (which refers to an object) or with a full proposition (still, syntactically, an NP). Definiteness features are simply derived from the anaphoric properties of the clitic, since it is capable of referring to an entity which is highly salient and actually present in discourse. As von Heusinger et al. (2003) state, we can assume that definiteness is a discourse-pragmatic property which indicates that the discourse referent associated with a definite expression can be identified with an already introduced discourse item. Definiteness expresses familiarity in a discourse structure. For our purposes, we need to remind readers that both an object and a proposition can be familiar, if we associate it with an item which was previously introduced in a discourse (see also Farkas 2002).

Although the emphasis in this chapter is on propositional attitudes (and hence on salient propositions), clitics can refer back to objectual NPs. These anaphoric properties, which translate easily into definiteness effects, have been diversely described in the literature under the terms Principal Filter Constraint, presuppositionality constraint, and context dependence (Gutiérrez-Rexach 2000).

It is interesting that Leonetti (2007) supports his idea that definiteness – and NOT specificity – is involved in clitic doubling through the data offered by Capone (2000). Capone (2000) provides data on what Leonetti calls 'clitics with complement clauses', such as:

(9) Maria lo sa che Giovanni è a Parigi;
      (Lit. Maria it knows that John is in Paris)
(10) Maria lo ha sentito che Giovanni è a Parigi;
      (Lit. Maria it has heard that John is in Paris)
(11) Maria lo ha sognato che Giovannni è a Parigi;
      (Lit. Maria it has dreamt that Giovanni is in Paris)

According to Capone (2000), these clitics introduce presuppositions, and thus, according to Leonetti (2007) an obvious way to unify the considerations by Capone (2000) with the considerations on objectual NP clitics is by abandoning the specificity constraint, while still holding on to the definiteness constraint. Pronominal clitics are said to refer back anaphorically to salient things, whether they are objectual things or propositions (my considerations are fully compatible with Ariel's (2008) important consideration that pronouns are normally associated with a high degree of activation and generally refer to salient things).

Gutiérrez-Rexach (2000) provides interesting considerations on the properties of clitics as being associated with Principal Filters, the properties of which are reduced by Leonetti (2007) to definiteness effects. What is clear is that Gutiérrez-Rexach, based on his Principal Filter constraint, bans examples such as the following:

(12) ∗Le ho visto poche donne
(13) ∗Le ho viste tante donne

While he obviously includes examples like the Spanish translation of:

(14) L'ho visto Mario

(Spanish involves clitic doubling; see also Janse (2008) who clearly associates clitic doubling with the lack of an intonational break before the doubled DP).

In (14) the clitic is associated with a General filter – there is a domain of entities to which Mario belongs (human beings) which is presupposed. Concerning (12), there is no set of 'few women' which is presupposed. Presumably, what 'Ho visto poche donne' means is that the set of women that I saw is smaller than the set of women that I did not see. But there is no such set as 'few women'.

Now, a thorny question: should we abandon the specificity constraint altogether? After all, this was the constraint which forced the interpretation of the following

(15) Mario lo vuole vendere il violoncello
       (Lit. Mario it wants to sell his cello)

to be specific. In other words, the pronominal clitic prevents us from having access to an interpretation according to which the cello fails to refer to an object belonging to the extra-mental world (suppose Mario falsely believes that he owns a cello, but he does not have one). Presumably, a movement analysis akin to Uriagereka (1995), by placing the clitic in a node c-commanding the node of the verb ('want' in this case), allows the clitic to escape the modal effects of 'want'. Being higher than 'want', the clitic would have to be outside its scope, and this would explain why the non-modal interpretation is accessed. However, interesting and important though this analysis is, we still have to ascertain whether this analysis could be a consequence of another type of analysis (see Corver and Delfitto 1999). In fact, Corver and Delfitto (1999) propose that, UNLIKE ordinary pronominals, clitics do not have inherent person features, but receive them from the verb, and the special configuration in which they appear allows them to take these features from the verb. But now, I am unsure whether person features (+/- human) really depend on the verb, although they sometimes do, as in the case of verbs of propositional attitude ('sapere che',

'credere che', 'immaginare che'), which ordinarily take propositional NPs. It is more reasonable to assume that person features are inherited anaphorically through previously mentioned linguistic items. In which case, (as also noted by Uriagereka 1995), the specificity effects of clitics would also follow from the requirement of taking person features anaphorically. Since modal subordination can occur anaphorically, specificity effects can be obtained for free. But now it would appear to me that both person feature inheritance and specificity inheritance can be obtained for free – and, furthermore, specificity inheritance is nothing other than a consequence of the definiteness effect obtained through the anaphoric effects of pronominal clitics. Modal subordination would ensure a specificity effect as well. Having said all this, the structural considerations illustrated by Uriagereka (1995) seem to me to be indispensible if they are not to grant specificity effects (or person features inheritance) to allow for anaphoric effects. In other words, anaphoric effects can only be allowed if there is the logical possibility that the sentence with a clitic pronoun can escape the modal effects of the main verb (e.g. 'want'); and for this to be possible, it is correct to posit that the clitic is situated in a syntactic node which is higher and c-commanding the verb node.

3   Right Dislocation vs Clitic Doubling

It may be argued that the constructions that are of interest to me in this chapter are only cases of right dislocation (see Cardinaletti 2001). Now, while I clearly accept that situations where a pause is present are cases of clitic right dislocation which involve topicalization (but not necessarily presupposition), I want to argue against the right dislocation analysis of propositional clitic doubling.

First of all, we can have dialogues like the following:

A: lo so.
B: Che cosa è che sai?
A:Che Maria è andata al cinema.

Like Kempson (2012), I take dialogicity (and the possibility of having utterances produced collaboratively) to reveal certain semantic properties of utterances. Here, A and B collaboratively proffer an utterance by their two distinctive utterances. When we combine the two utterances we obtain 'Lo so che Maria è andata al cinema' but it would be absurd to say that there is a pause here before the that-clause. All we have is a semantic reconstruction which may very well be analysed in a similar way to clitic doubling: Lo so pro1 [che Maria è andata al cinema]1. Now given that joint utterances may require a different analysis from clitic right dislocation, nothing can prevent us from seeing 'Lo so che Maria è al cinema' as having a pronominal clitic, whose trace/pro is in an appositional relationship with the that-clause and semantically coindexed with it.

But most importantly, can one pronounce 'Maria lo sa che Giovanni è a Parigi' without a pause before the that-clause? In standard Italian, I do not hear the pause,

UNLESS 'sapere' is focused (either contrastively or not). Both the clitic construction and the construction without the clitic can allow a speaker to focus 'sapere' contrastively (NOT believes), contrary to predictions by Cardinaletti. So, there could be a construction which is similar to clitic doubling and which involves clitic right dislocation.

In this section I will maintain that, in Italian, clitic doubling (to be distinguished from clitic left dislocation, a construction studied by Cinque (1990) and discussed in Capone (2000))[6] is possible in the case of propositional arguments (but not in the case of objectual arguments (DPs) which require an alternative construction (clitic right dislocation). In particular, I claim that it is possible to have two alternative constructions, with clitics, when there is a propositional argument, clitic doubling and right dislocation. Right dislocation invariably requires a pause, which is missing in the case of the clitic doubling construction. So, in my view, it is possible to have the following structures:

(16)   Giovanni lo sa che Maria è a Parigi;
       (John it knows that Mary is in Paris)
(17)   Giovanni lo SA, che Maria è a parigi.
       (John it knows, that Mary is in Paris)

The pause in the case of the clitic right dislocation construction is (normally) preceded by focus on the verb 'sapere' (know). Our task is to show that clitic doubling is involved in the most ordinary construal of sentences, such as that in (16). In standard Italian the pause is missing in a construction such as (16). This is taken by the literature (on clitic doubling) to show that clitic doubling and NOT right dislocation is involved in this case (see Janse 2008).

The above discussion concerning the dialogic example where a sentence such as (16) is broken into two conversational turns seems to me to be perhaps the most compelling form of evidence that clitic doubling is involved, as the right dislocation construction, invariably requiring a pause (and also a monologic utterance as its pragmatic host) does not seem to do justice to the dialogic breaking of the sentence in (16). However, it will be important to provide further justification for my analysis based on semantic evidence. An important piece of evidence is that certain factive verbs do not allow clitic doubling. Consider for instance the following:

(18)   *Giovanni lo rimpiange che sono stato a Parigi senza di lui.
       (Lit. John it regrets that I was in Paris without him).

This seems to be a case of a factive verb disallowing clitic doubling. However, things dramatically improve when right dislocation appears in the sentence:

(19)   Giovani lo rimpiange, che sono stato a Parigi senza di lui.
       (John it regrets// that I was in Paris without him).

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[6] Che Giovanni è andato al cinema, Maria lo sa bene.
   (That John went to the cinema, it Mary knows well).

Now, this seems to me to be important evidence that the distribution of factive verbs in combination with clitics is sensitive to the distinction between clitic doubling and right dislocation. If things were not so, it would not be possible to explain why, in the other types of factive verbs (e.g. 'sapere'), both clitic doubling and right dislocation are possible. Similar pairs can be established by the following examples:

(20) ∗Giovanni lo ribadisce che è stato a Parigi
      (John it states again that he was in Paris)
(21) Giovanni lo ribadisce, che è stato a Parigi
      (John it states again, that he was in Paris)
(22) ∗Giovanni te lo rimprovera che sei stato a Parigi
      (Lit. John it blames you that you were in Paris)
(23) Giovanni te lo rimprovera, che sei stato a Parigi.
      (Lit. John it blames you, that you were in Paris).
(24) Giovanni lo rinfaccia che sono stato a Parigi senza di lui.
      (Lit. John it always blames me that I was in Paris without him).
(25) Giovanni lo rinfaccia (sempre), che sono stato a Parigi senza di lui.
      (Lit. John it (always) blames me that I was in Paris without him).
(26) ??Giovanni lo presuppone che sono stato a Parigi senza di lui
      (John it presupposes that I was in Paris without him)
(27) Giovanni lo presuppone, che sono stato a Parigi senza di lui.
      (John it presupposes// that I was in Paris without him).

More importantly, evidence in favour of clitic doubling, rather than right dislocation, is derived from questions such as the following:

(28) Come lo sai che Maria è andata a Parigi?
      (Lit. How do you it know that Mary went to Paris?)

Clitic doubling is allowed in the question (the how question), but right dislocation is not really acceptable:

(29) ∗Come lo sai, che Maria è andata a Parigi?
      (Lit. How do you it know, that Mary went to Paris?)

(However, the sentence greatly improves with the focal stress being on SAI (know), but in this case the speaker is casting some doubt on the usage of 'sapere' (know) and contrasts it with the weaker 'credere' (believe)).
    Similar considerations apply to the following pairs.

(30) In che modo lo hai scoperto che Maria è andata a Parigi?
      (Lit. In what ways did you it find out that Mary went to Paris?)
(31) In che modo lo hai scoperto, che Maria è andata a Parigi?
      (In what way did you it find out, that Mary went to Paris?)

(However, things improve if the focus is placed on 'scoperto', which selects verbs such as 'hear' (sentire) as alternatives, thus questioning the factive presupposition).

(32) Dove lo hai saputo che Maria è andata a Parigi?
(Where did you it find out that Mary went to Paris?)
(33) *Dove lo hai saputo, che Maria è andata a Parigi?
(Where did you it find out that Mary went to Paris?)

(However, things improve if the focus is placed on 'saputo' (known), which selects a class of alternatives such as, for example, 'venire a credere' (come to believe), which seems to considerably weaken the factive presuppositions).

Further evidence comes from ellipsis, which is notorious for its requirement that the same formal type of constituent is elided.

(34) Giovanni lo sa bene che Maria è andata a Parigi e Giovanni pure [che Maria è andata a Parigi].
(Lit. John it knows well that Mary went to Paris and John too [that Mary went to Paris]).

However, ellipsis is not allowed in the following case:

(35) Giovanni lo sa bene che Maria è andata a Parigi e Mario pure che Giovanni è a Londra.

The reason for this is that clearly ellipsis requires that a constituent of the same type to be elided. However, since 'sa' is not a constituent in itself but requires a syntactic object and the two conjoined sentences have two different syntactic objects, ellipsis (of the verb) is not licit.

However, things change when right dislocation is considered:

(36) Giovanni lo sa bene, che Maria è andata a Parigi, e Mario pure, che Giovanni è a Londra.

The reason for this is that in right dislocation construction, the elided constituent 'lo sa' is of the same (abstract) type as that which occurs in the conjoined sentence. In other words, clitic doubling involves a tighter relationship between the verb and the propositional argument than is the case with right dislocation. It appears that in right dislocation the comma also marks a syntactic boundary.

Furthermore, yes/no questions require clitic doubling constructions, as right dislocated structures are either not licit or, in any case, are rather odd:

(37) ???Lo sai, che Mario è a Parigi?
(Do you it know, that Mario is in Paris?)
(38) Lo sai che Mario è a Parigi?
(Do you it know that Mario is in Paris?)

Things become much worse with if-questions, where right dislocation is even worse in questions such as (39).

(39) Lo sai se Mario è a Parigi?
(Do you it know whether Mario is in Paris?)
(40) *Lo sai, se Mario è a Parigi?
(Do you it know, whether Mario is in Paris?)

((40) is more acceptable with the focus being on 'sai', in which case it selects 'credere' and similar verbs as a class of alternatives (casting doubt on the fact that Mario is in Paris)).

Wh-questions also seem to make clitic doubling compulsory, as the alternative right dislocated structure is very odd and nonsensical:

(41) Chi lo ha detto che Maria è a Parigi?
      (Who it said that Mary was in Paris?)
(42) ????Chi lo ha detto, che Maria è a Parigi?
      (Who it said, that Mary was in Paris?)

((42) is more acceptable, if it is pronounced with the focus being on 'detto' (choosing a possible class of alternative verbs like 'sapere') it actually casts doubt on the fact that Mary is in Paris).

The right dislocation vs. clitic doubling analysis is also supported by the presence of the demonstrative pronominal, which is disallowed with clitic doubling, but allowed with right dislocation:

(43) *Non lo avrei mai immaginato questo/quello che Maria sarebbe andata a vivere a Roma.
      (I would have never it imagined this/that that Maria would have ended up in Rome).
(44) Non lo avrei mai immaginato, questo/quello, che Maria sarebbe andata a vivere a Roma.
      (I would have never it imagined, this/that, that Mary would have ended up in Rome).

The presence of 'la frase' (the sentence) furthermore correlates with clitic doubling, but NOT with right dislocation:

(45) Non l' avevo ancora sentita la frase che il vero è il falso.
      (I had not yet it heard the sentence that what is true is false).
(46) *Non l'avevo ancora sentita la frase, che il vero è il falso.
      (I had not yet it heard the sentence, that what is true is false).

However, if the demonstrative adjective is combined with 'la frase', the right dislocation structure, but NOT the clitic doubling structure, is acceptable:

(47) Non l'avevo ancora sentita, questa frase, che il vero è il falso.
      (I had not yet it heard, this sentence, that what is true is false).
(48) ???Non l'avevo ancora sentita questa frase che il vero è il falso.
      (I had not yet it heard this sentence that what is true is false).

Cleft-sentences also provide evidence in favour of the clitic doubling vs. right dislocation distinction, as the right dislocation construction is not allowed in the cleft-construction:

(49) E' Giovanni che lo sa che Maria è andata al cinema.
      (It is John who it knows that Mary went to the cinema).

(50) ???E' Giovanni che lo sa, che Maria è andata al cinema.
      (It is John who it knows, that Mary went to the cinema).

I take all this evidence to cumulatively demonstrate that the doubling of proposi-tional arguments through a clitic is possible in Italian and contrasts strikingly, as a result of semantico/syntactic properties, with right dislocation.

Suppose however, for the sake of argument, that we agree with Cardinaletti and accept that the construction analysed in this chapter is a case of right-dislocation. Would things be different for our pragmatic theory? All Cardinaletti says about right dislocation is that it correlates with topicality. But topicality need not coincide with presuppositionality (I could say "Anche io lo so" and refer back to something previ-ously said without, however, accepting it, because I am using an ironic tone of voice). Topicality is an instruction to look at something that was previously said (rather than something that was said later) and could be identified with a procedure in keeping with Blakemore (2000), something that facilitates inference but which is not completely coincident with it. Even assuming topicality, we need something like epistemic modal subordination to establish definiteness, being the type of interpre-tation which typically correlates with clitics.

4   Definiteness

In my opinion, in Italian, pronominal clitics used in clitic doubling are associated with definite interpretations. The definite interpretations of clitics could be mod-elled by resorting to choice functions (see Hilbert and Bernays 1939; Ionin 2006; Winter 1997; von Heusinger 2002; Peregrin and von Heusinger 2003), which select a certain referent in a given discourse, and are suitable for the purpose of expressing the relationship between a referent and a speaker (or a cognizer). (See Löbner 1985 for a functional approach to definiteness). In the case of pronominal clitics, the choice functions establish a triadic relationship between a given referent, a speaker and a **cognizer**. The relationship between the speaker and the referent must model the one between the cognizer and the referent. So take, for example, a sentence such as 'Giovanni lo ha visto il violoncello'. Given the definiteness effects of the clitic, there are two choice functions that select the same referent, one from Giovanni's perspective and one from the speaker's perspective. These two choice functions end up selecting the same referent. When the clitic simply refers back to a referent, the relationship between the speaker, the cognizer and the referent is usually one which is guaranteed by the shared perceptual ties between the referent and the speaker/the cognizer. It is true that the speaker and cognizer may view the referent from differ-ent angles (one of them may even have a partial view of the referent), but the rela-tionship between them and the referent is (usually) 'in presentia'. However, when the clitic introduces a speaker/hearer presupposition (a whole proposition and not only a referent is presupposed), we can still model the relationship between the speaker, the cognizer and the proposition through a choice function that selects a

certain thing (a proposition, in this case), but the relationship between the speaker/ the cognizer need not be one 'in presentia', since they may have come to know that the proposition is true at different times, and in different ways. So, while in the case of clitics that refer back to a referent (clitic right dislocation), different choice functions may end up selecting the same referent and the nature of the functions may be sufficiently similar (say, a perceptual relation), in the case of pronominal clitics that refer back to propositions (propositional clitic doubling), the choice functions end up selecting the same object (the same proposition), but the functions may be of a different nature – the speaker may have come to know the proposition by hearsay while the cognizer may have come to know it by direct evidence (for example, he saw the event happen). (See Peregrin and von Heusinger 2003 for more details on the formalization of choice functions in anaphoric patterns; in particular their idea that choice functions assist in the formalizing of local and dynamic properties of discourse concurs with the notion that pronominal clitics introduce choice functions which allow anaphoric uptake; the relationship between a pronominal clitic and the antecedent, when there is an explicit one, is always of a **local** nature, which extends to adjacency pairs). So, the idea that choice functions represent contextual information (von Heusinger 2003) can be tested by reference to the issue of pronominal clitics which introduce very specific contextual requirements, selecting propositions that are salient in the previous context. While readers can become familiar with the details of choice function theory (e.g. by reading Peregrin and von Heusinger 2003), we can informally say that the definiteness of definite descriptions or of clitic constructions can be captured by constructing sets of elements (the set is selected by the descriptive part of a definite description) and by imposing an order on them. An element (the most salient one) is chosen (selected); the function which selects this element can be represented as Φc, which is the result of applying the choice function to the set identified through the descriptive part of the definite description.

We may consider the relationship between the pronominal clitic and the that-clause embedded in a verb of propositional attitude by analogy with the properties of definite descriptions. Definite descriptions are constituted by a determiner and an NP; the NP provides a descriptive part, while the determiner allows the NP to be anaphorically linked to some previous entity (usually an indefinite description such as 'a man'. The structural complexity of the clitic doubling construction reminds us of a definite description. We have a constituent, which forces a definite interpretation; this constituent is the clitic, whose structural position (pre-verbal position) allows it to escape the modal effects (or the opacity effects) of the verb of propositional attitude; the other constituent is the that-clause, syntactically an NP, which provides a descriptive part. The sentential NP refers to a unique event, but this is not built into the semantics of the that-clause, but is only an epiphenomenal consequence of the anaphoric relationship established by the clitic, which anchors the sentential NP to some event which was made salient by some previous discourse element (presumably another sentence with a VP, having an intrinsic position for events).

5   Modal Subordination

Once we accept the hypothesis that clitic doubling (in languages like Spanish) and pronominal clitics in Italian have anaphoric properties linking the clitic to a previously asserted or voiced proposition, we are open to the possible suggestion that some kind of modal subordination (of the epistemic type) occurs between a proposition which was previously voiced or asserted, and the clitic and the proposition which doubles it (also see Capone 2002, 2003, based on Roberts 1989). In this scenario, anaphora is not confined to a propositional object to which the clitic is anchored, but is extended to a propositional attitude. Is it possible that a propositional attitude is transmissible through anaphora? Now, there is something which helps us entertain this possibility. In fact, von Heusinger (2002) claims that "the referent of a specific NP is functionally linked to the speaker of the sentence or to another referential expression in the sentence such as the subject and the object" (p. 3). The functional link between a subject and the referent of a specific NP is, presumably, a perceptual link (a causal link anyway) or a hearsay link (this position is more in keeping with the position that anaphora is responsible for definite/specific interpretations). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that a clitic encodes a procedure for establishing a function. Now, we may adopt and extend the idea of modal subordination (Roberts 1989) by assuming that the anaphoric link is not only between the pronominal clitic and a proposition, but also between a current utterance and a previously expressed point of view (either explicitly or implicitly). If we accept Timothy Williamson's (1996) idea that assertions have implicit modal parts which are expressible by 'I know that', then it is not impossible that the clitic will be anchored to these implicit modal attitudes. While Williamson's idea may be valid for robust categorical assertions, sometimes a speaker's commitment may be weaker than 'I know that'. So, in some cases, an assertion is not categorical and may have, as part of its implicit modal, a verb which is weaker than knowledge. The continuum between full knowledge and weaker forms of knowledge (say hearsay knowledge, or knowledge by inference, etc.) is expressible through various forms of modal elements such as, 'I think that' etc. (See Capone 2001 and Peter Strawson p. c.). What is important to notice is that the expression of this modal element is part of the explicature – thus, even if it is expressed implicitly, it contributes to what is said. And if this is the case, we find a position for an implicit modal element in any of our assertions – whether categorical or not (an adjunct at the level of a sentential node, built as a consequence of free enrichment?). Now, the clitic will not only anchor the sentence to a previously expressed proposition, but also to a previously expressed modal element.[7] And this is a kind of modal subordination – perhaps

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[7] A reviewer takes issue with my pragmatic story because he thinks that the pragmatic effects are independent of the syntax of clitics. "Issues of knowledge and reliability in interpretation are independent from the grammar of clitic pronouns and I do not see any reason to assume that the clitic is linked to an implicit modal element". But the reviewer has probably misunderstood my position, as my discussion is to show that pragmatics, given the constraints of syntax, is able to provide

somewhat different from that described in Roberts (1989). Clearly, this theory is testable, not so much through verbs such as 'sapere' (know) which are factive and, thus, involve a factive attitude to a proposition which will end up being entailed, but through verbs such as 'say' or 'hear' or 'understand'. 'Say' is the weakest of all the verbs of propositional attitude, if it is a verb of propositional attitude at all (doubts were voiced by K. Jaszczolt personal communication.). Consider the Italian case of 'dire' with a pronominal clitic.

(51) A: Maria dice che Giovanni è a Roma;
      (Mary says that John is in Rome).
      B: Anche Mario lo ha detto che Giovanni è a Roma.
      (Lit. Mario too it said that John is in Rome).

Now, there may be more than one case. Suppose Maria is highly reliable, and we know this to be the case. Then the knowledge chain from Maria to the speaker and through the speaker to the hearer (B) is quite reliable. There is very little reason to doubt Mary and what she has said. The clitic 'lo' in B's utterance links to an implicit modal element, possibly an implicit adjunct (and I know that what Maria has said is reliable). Then, B's utterance is a way to corroborate the point of view expressed through A's utterance in (51).

   However, suppose we know that Mary is unreliable and it is mutually manifest that this is the case, then the clitic 'lo' will be anchored to this point of view and the attitude to the proposition 'che Giovanni è a Roma' is as weak as that implicit in A's assertion in (51).

   Now, while this may be no more than a sketch of a solution, it is certainly interesting because it agrees with at least two theories, one by Uriagereka (1995) and one by Roberts (1989). Not to mention the fact that the clitic ends up expressing a link between a proposition (something like the referent of the propositional NP) and the point of view of the cognizer of the verb of propositional attitude, along the lines expressed by von Heusinger (2002). However, we have previously said that definiteness – and not specificity, which may be a consequence of an anaphoric link – is a characteristic of clitics. Von Heusinger establishes identifiability as a criterion of definiteness – definiteness indicates that the new referent is functionally connected with some other discourse item which has been previously introduced. However, as Leonetti argues, once we establish that an NP is definite, we can very well show that it is specific. Now, it is true that this is subject to modal subordination but, at least in some cases, definiteness will imply specificity through modal subordination.

   Now that we have considered modal subordination to be a plausible hypothesis, we should recognize that, at least in some cases, verbs of propositional attitude can be used in combination with pronominal clitics in cases where there can be no plau-

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modal interpretations. The pragmatics I have constructed is not dependent on the syntax, but must presuppose it. Free enrichment is usually obtained by furnishing constituents of thought that are combined with syntactic constituents which are actually present.

sible prior discourse allowing modal subordination. In such cases, the clitics, never-theless, retain their presuppositional status (see also Capone 2003). The embedded proposition in such cases is not an emergent presupposition, according to important work by Kecskes and Zhang (2009), but a socio-cultural presupposition. Consider:

(52) Tutti lo sanno che Parigi è la capitale della Francia.
      (Lit. Everybody it knows that Paris is the capital of France).

The proposition is presupposed, presumably, through a conversational inference triggered by the clitic. For those who are ready to object that, after all, 'sapere' (know) is factive and, thus, the embedded proposition is presupposed anyway, we may change the example and use 'capire', 'sentire' or 'dire':

(53) Tutti lo hanno capito che Parigi è la capitale della Francia.
      (Lit. Everybody it understood that Paris is the capital of France).

Furthermore, it should be added that factive verbs such as 'sapere' (know) can be used loosely. If 'capire' and 'sentire' are factive, they can also be used loosely. But when the clitic is present, they cannot be used in this way. Thus, there is a strong presuppositional reading, which is implicated through the use of a presuppositional clitic or of clitic doubling. Both clitic doubling (in languages like Spanish) and pronominal clitics in Italian, involve a certain degree of redundancy. Thus, it is not implausible that such redundancy (which is otherwise difficult to explain), involv-ing greater cognitive efforts, must be offset by appropriate cognitive effects (to pre-serve the Principle of Relevance by Wilson and Sperber 2012), and thus will conversationally implicate a reading which is complementary to that part of the construction where clitic doubling (or the pronominal clitic) is absent. We may adopt Levinson (2000), Huang (2000) and Horn (2009) and claim that the prolixity generates a conversational implicature. The real difficulty, which may lead one to suspect that the inference is semantic, rather than pragmatic, is the fact that this inference is difficult to cancel. But this is in keeping with many types of M-implicatures. Since the prolixity may be used as a clue to the interpretation x, it is not easy to cancel x, since the prolixity remains otherwise unexplained. If we adopt considerations by Relevance Theorists (see Carston 2002 and Wilson and Sperber 2012), the prolixity equally gives rise to implicatures, since the speaker opted for a construction involving greater processing efforts on the part of the hearer, and thus expected to obtain greater contextual effects which was worth the efforts involved. Cancelling the implicature would require extra effort and this is psychologically implausible, as Jaszczolt (2005) argues. So, both on the neo-Gricean and Relevance-inspired frameworks, we expect that the inference would not be easily cancelled.

6   Do Clitics Link to (Pragmatically Enriched) Propositions or to Sentences?

Before dealing with the issue of propositional attitudes, which is central to this chapter, I want to clarify a preliminary issue: whether clitics are anchored to fully-fledged propositions or, otherwise, sentences. Logically speaking, it is not impossible for a clitic to refer back anaphorically to a sentence, a linguistic form (or even a lexeme) or a phonetic string. However, it is natural that pronominal clitics refer back (anaphorically) to propositions. So, consider the following:

(54)   A: Scriviamo adesso il seguente esempio: 'La mela è rossa'.
       (Let us now write the following example: 'The apple is red').
       B: Anche io l'ho scritto che "la mela è rossa", Maestra.
       (Lit. I also it wrote that "the apple is red", Teacher).

A is a teacher, and B is a child who is practicing writing letters of the alphabet and very short, simple sentences. A clitic can be anaphoric and thus can link anaphorically with a linguistic form. The child may not even be aware of the meaning of the simple sentence; he is merely copying letters of the alphabet. Yet, the clitic establishes identity between the example given by the teacher and the product generated by the child when copying a linguistic string from the blackboard.

   However, cases where pronominal clitics refer back anaphorically to a proposition are far more common. After all, I called these clitics 'presuppositional clitics' because, in the event where there is no context forcing modal subordination, the pronominal clitic serves to promote a proposition to the status of the presupposed information (a presupposition). We may be interested in knowing whether pronominal clitics refer anaphorically to fully-fledged propositions or, otherwise, to minimal propositions. In particular, we may want to know whether explicatures are also referred to anaphorically by clitics. Presumably, a clitic should refer anaphorically both to the result of decoding and to the pragmatically obtained part of the explicature. So, consider the following case:

(55)   A: Mario è andato a Parigi e ha comprato un souvenir di Parigi.
       (Mario went to Paris and bought me a souvenir of Paris).
       B: L'ho capito che Mario è andato a Parigi e ha comprato un souvenir.
       (Lit. I it understood that Mario went to Paris and bought a souvenir).

Through the clitic, B's utterance refers back to the utterance proffered by A and, in particular, to the expressed proposition, which is not only a minimal proposition but a fully-fledged proposition and includes the pragmatic component of the explicature. There is no need to make explicit the temporal relationship between the two events expressed in A's utterance. Given the pragmatic inferences, that much is clear and the explicature (of temporal ordering) is part of the emergent presupposition (to use a term by Kecskes and Zhang (2009)). Emergent presuppositions are propositions which both the speaker and hearer accept as a result of mini-interactions showing acceptance of a certain presupposition on the part of both the speaker and hearer.

Anticipating the term by Kecskes and Zhang (2009), Capone (2000) wrote about speaker/hearer presuppositions. This notion has been resisted for a while, but I am glad that Kecskes and Zhang (2009) came close to this concept that I proposed in Capone (2000). The mini-dialogue in (55) is a very compelling example of emergent presuppositions, since this type of presupposition requires mini-dialogues that ensure acceptance of a certain proposition on the part of the speaker and hearer. But why is it that clitics, generally, do not refer anaphorically to minimal propositions? One reason is that pronominal clitics usually voice presuppositions – and what are presuppositions if not propositions presupposed by the speaker and hearer? Since presuppositions are part of the common ground, it is obvious that they are fully enriched propositions, since the common ground ensures that all propositions present in the context interact with minimal propositions. Even if, by using a clitic, we tried to refer anaphorically to a minimal proposition, in some cases we could not, because/if the common ground, in conjunction with the Principle of Relevance, promotes contextual enrichments that end up constituting a full proposition. An important intuition is that the speaker's meaning prevails in mini-dialogues where pronominal clitics are used, provided that there are no evident clues that an example or a linguistic form is what is referred to by the clitic.

7   Belief Reports and Pronominal Clitics

At this point, I want to reveal the most important purpose of this chapter: to use pronominal clitics to shed light on verbs of propositional attitude. In this section, I will develop considerations already advanced by Capone (2008), by making use of the syntactic apparatus already discussed. It should be pointed out that there are views (on pronominal clitics) which differ from the ones that I have accepted. As Janse (2008) states, there are at least two syntactic positions on pronominal clitics:

a)   The DP doubled by the clitic is an argument of the verb and the clitic is a functional category (indicating agreement);

b)   The clitic is base-generated (in argument position) and the DP has the status of an adjunct.

   If one accepts position b), then one may as well accept position c), which was accepted by Capone (2008):

c)   The DP (or the that-clause in the case of verbs of propositional attitude) is the main argument and the clitic (or its trace) is an apposition. Alternatively, we could consider the trace or pro of the clitic replacing the clitic and the DP as (jointly) a complex argument c-commanded by the verb, the clitic c-commanding the that-clause and the DP.

I now propose to abandon position c), which may raise problems (presumably, the steps involved in such an analysis are greater than those involved in the movement theory of clitics that I accepted in this chapter, as the trace of the clitic would have to move across an NP node and then across a VP node; alternatively, and preferably,

we could have the pro instead of the trace in a complex NP, but the pro would have to be governed and we would have to accept that a VP node can govern a complex NP (consisting of the pro and the that-clause) and government would then have to percolate down the NP node to each of its daughters, including the pro; clearly this explanation involves a greater number of steps than the position expressed in this article, which is basically the same as Anagnostopoulou 2007: the clitic in pre-verbal position and the pro in argument position are coindexed, and the DP which doubles the clitic is an adjunct or an apposition (adjoining to the pro))). The next step is to accept that the clitic can express a mode of presentation of the DP. The clitic expresses a mode of presentation of a proposition and, in particular, the fact that this proposition is given (or is emergent from previous discourse, according to Kecskes and Zhang 2009) and must be anaphorically linked with some previous proposition. Now, if one accepts syntactic theories based on the movement of the clitic, then there is an empty category, **e**, which is in an argument position, while the DP is in an adjunct position (a position compatible with the positions normally occupied by syntactic appositions). Now, it is clear that the relationship between the clitic (in fact, the trace or pro associated with it if we do not think that this empty category is a trace) and the DP is one of **apposition** – albeit the DP is an apposition to the trace of the clitic (alternatively, the pro). So the clitic offers a mode of presentation of a proposition (the proposition embedded in the verb of propositional attitude). But now we may develop a parallel strategy and claim that the mode of presentation of the that-clause embedded a verb of propositional attitude is an apposition of the that-clause. Unlike Schiffer (2000), I do not claim that opacity effects are obtained from a mode of presentation of an NP of the that-clause embedded in a verb of propositional attitude. Instead, I claim that the that-clause has a (complex, sentential) mode of presentation which is provided through pragmatic enrichment (intrusion or free enrichment), and which can be adjoined syntactically to the that-clause in the way an apposition would be. This mode of presentation is complex and consists of copying linguistic materials of the that-clause. So, while the elements of the that-clause contribute truth-conditional meaning which is expressed semantically (in particular, the references of NPs), the apposition clause adjoined through free enrichment contains the complex modes of presentation of the elements of the that-clause, thus allowing opacity. But now we have discussed the mode of presentation contributed by a clitic and the mode of presentation contributed through free enrichment, separately. Sometimes, both contributions can occur simultaneously, as in the following utterance:

(56) Giovanni lo sa che Maria è andata al cinema.
      (Lit. John it knows that Mary went to the cinema).

The clitic introduces a mode of presentation of the embedded proposition, indicating that it is given/presupposed/anaphorically linked to a previously voiced proposition (presumably a case of procedural meaning as discussed by Wilson and Sperber 2012). At an implicit level (to be made explicit through an explicature (Carston 2002; Wilson and Sperber 2012)), a constituent is added through free enrichment; however, not as an apposition to individual DPs (as proposed by Bach 2000), but as

an apposition to the S expressed by the that-clause. Such an apposition is complex and has the following syntactic shape: [NP VP], where NP and VP are copied from the linguistic materials present in the that-clause. Ample demonstration that opacity effects are to be incorporated into truth-conditional meaning – and thus are part of the explicatures and NOT of the implicatures of an utterance containing a verb of propositional attitude – has been provided in Capone (2008), and thus I will not repeat it here. I will merely reiterate that while Salmon and followers try to deal with opacity effects at the level of the implicature, Capone (2008) deals with them at the level of the explicature.

The syntactic theory adopted here (and certainly influenced by Anagnostopoulou 2007) enables us to avoid the complications of the view expressed by Capone (2008), while at the same time allowing us to express the explicatures of verbs of propositional attitudes in terms of the appositive relationships between NPs (or sentential NPs) and a constituent provided through free enrichment which respects assumptions about syntax. In particular, by providing a complex/sentential mode of presentation of the that-clause, one has been allowed to provide individual modes of presentation for each constituent NP or VP of the that-clause. Compositionality has been respected, basically by ensuring that free enrichment does not violate the general syntactic rules of the language (see also Stanley 2007). Now, as Jaszczolt (2005) states, at the level of sentential semantics, verbs of propositional attitude appear to violate compositionality (because by because by replacing an NP **with one** having identical reference, one obtains different truth-conditions); however, at the level of **merger representations** (Jaszczolt 2005), which integrate semantic and pragmatic information, compositionality is preserved. The appositional syntax of free enrichment that I have proposed has allowed us to preserve compositionality, as well as the syntactic constraint on pragmatic enrichment proposed by Stanley.

If pronominal clitics allow us to develop theoretical considerations on pragmatic enrichment that explain opacity effects (why we cannot freely replace an NP with an extensive one), we should also bear in mind that they themselves create other conversational effects that concern NP substitution. Consider the following mini-dialogue:

(57) A: Maria sa che Giovanni è a Parigi.
      (Maria knows that John is in Paris)
      B: Sì, ma anche Angela lo sa questo/che Giovanni è a Parigi.
      (Lit. Yes, but Angela too it knows that John is in Paris).

Classical opacity effects comprise the requirement that one cannot replace the mode of presentation of the reference of an NP (say, Giovanni) with a different one (the two NPs being co-extensive). However, pronominal clitics introduce discourse requirements of their own. Since they introduce speaker/hearer presuppositions (which, in other words, Kecskes and Zhang 2009 call 'emergent presuppositions' in an important paper), it would simply be illicit to replace, in the course of the mini-dialogue, a mode of presentation of the same reference (Giovanni) with another. Speaker/hearer presuppositions seem to concern not only the fact, but also modes of presentation of the reference. This is not surprising, since the same fact could not be

recognized or shared if NPs were freely replaced with modes of presentation which are themselves not part of speaker/hearer presuppositions. The requirement of speaker/hearer presupposition would not be satisfied if a mode of presentation of the reference differing from the one used in the emergent presupposition is employed. And this presumably can be explained through the requirement of anaphoric uptake, which is obviously a textual matter, a matter of using a text which has been previously used. So there are three things at stake in this type of anaphoric uptake: a proposition, a stance to a proposition, and the mode of presentation of the proposition.

8   Conclusion

In this chapter, I have woven many threads together and, in particular, the theory on pronominal clitics (and clitic doubling) and the theory on propositional attitudes. It appears to me that pronominal clitics have much to say on the theory of conversational implicatures and can illuminate the issue of explicature. The most important conclusions I have reached in this chapter concern the general treatment of propositional attitudes, as pronominal clitics clearly indicate that the issue benefits from a treatment based on free enrichments built on appositional relationships. I think that through pronominal clitics we have encountered something that appears like the correct semantics and pragmatics for propositional attitudes.

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